ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs.

JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and

PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

FACTS:

The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17,

2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or
seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section
9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof” from a “list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy.” Also considering that Section 15, Article VII
(Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting
President from making appointments within two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to
start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice. Conformably with its
existing practice, the JBC “automatically considered” for the position of Chief
Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely:
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last
two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January
25, 2010, respectively.

The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief
Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution
does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in
the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to
Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the
prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily
expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found
in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial
Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample
restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to appoint members of the
Supreme Court to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its
“insulation from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the
President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC

properly initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the
oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has
occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC
may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of
Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint
one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief
Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.

ISSUE:

Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno
upon his retirement

HELD:

Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to
fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict. The first, Section 15,
Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The other, Section 4 (1), Article
VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be
composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or
in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be
filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition
against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting
President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character,
in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14
and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department
renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department.
This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated
Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover
all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of
appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily
and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section
4 (1) thereof.