DATU SAMAD MANGELEN, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO HABALUYAS
and HABALUYAS ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.
1992 Oct 29 3rd Division G.R. No. 88954

FACTS:

Private respondents filed an urgent motion to reconsider said order which

was likewise denied by the court. Although they received a copy of the denial
order, private respondents still did not file any answer to the complaint.
Consequently, petitioner filed a motion to declare defendants in default and to be
allowed to present evidence ex-parte, which the trial court granted in its Order.
Pursuant thereto, petitioner presented his evidence ex-parte.

The defendant then filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to
hold in abeyance further proceedings on the ground that they had filed with the
then Intermediate Appellate Court a petition for certiorari raising the issues of
improper venue, lack of jurisdiction and litis pendencia. That case was docketed as
A.C.-G.R. No. 03742. 

After considering in open court the said motion, and petitioner's opposition
thereto and in view of the absence of a restraining order from the Intermediate
Appellate Court enjoining the trial court from proceeding with the case, the latter
issued an order denying the defendants' motion to set aside the order of default
Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner based on the
evidence submitted ex-parte; the dispositive portion of said decision was quoted
earlier.

Not satisfied with the aforesaid judgment, private respondents interposed an

appeal before the Intermediate Appellate Court. The Fourth Division of said Court
dismissed the petition of private respondents. Their subsequent petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the dismissal was denied by this
Court in the resolution; the motion to reconsider the same was likewise denied by
this Court.
 After reviewing the records of the case, public respondent promulgated a
ten-page decision.

ISSUE:

Is the public respondent ruled out any merit in the defendants-appellants'

(private respondents) contention that the consideration for the payment of the
P600,000.00 pursuant to the Compromise Agreement.

RULING:

The Petition is GRANTED.

The Supreme Court find the basis for holding private respondent Pedro
Habaluyas jointly and severally liable with private respondent Habaluyas
Enterprises, Inc. for the amounts adjudged. The Compromise Agreement was a
corporate act of the latter with the former signing merely as its representative. No
provision therein makes him solidarily liable with the corporation. Additionally,
the liability arising from the obligation is not solidarily. There is solidarily liability
only when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of the
obligation requires solidarity. The trial court simply cannot write into the
Compromise Agreement a stipulation or condition which the parties did not
contemplate. It would have been entirely different if petitioner alleged and proved
grounds allowing the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction.

The resolution of public respondent of C.A.-G.R. CV No. 04585 is SET

ASIDE and its Decision is hereby REINSTATED. As modified, the Decision of
the trial court of in Civil Case No. 84-22306 is affirmed in all respects except that
the portion holding private respondent Pedro Habaluyas jointly and severally liable
with private respondent Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. and awarding, moral and
exemplary damages, is hereby DELETED and SET ASIDE. Furthermore, the
award of attorney's fees is hereby reduced to P25.000.00.
GERMAN MACHINERIES CORPORATION, Petitioner,
versus
EDDIE D. ENDAYA, Respondent.
2004 Nov 25 2nd DivisionG.R. NO. 156810

FACTS:

Complainant [Eddie Endaya] alleged that he was employed by respondent

company on January 18, 1993, [as a] car painter. On March 29, 1999, he filed a
complaint with the Social Security System against respondent company for failure
to remit his SSS premiums; that when management learned about his complaint, he
was reprimanded and became the object of harassment; that he was shouted at and
belittled. Mr. Andy Junginger told complainant to get his separation pay from the
Cashier and go home as he was already terminated.

Complainant also alleged that on September 6, 1999, he reported for work

but he was surprised that Mr. Joseph Baclig handed him letters of suspension,
dated August 27, 1999 and September 6, 1999 and he was told to go home; that he
reported for work several times thereafter but he was told to stop reporting for
work since his services were already terminated as of August 27, 1999.
Complainant contends that he was illegally dismissed but the Respondents
contended that complainant was never dismissed.

It has invariably been ruled by the Supreme Court that, in termination cases,
the burden of proof rests on the respondent to show that the dismissal is for a just
cause and when there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for the
termination of employment, the law considers that matter a case of illegal
dismissal.  The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of herein respondent.
The respondents contend that complainant abandoned his work and submitted in
evidence a Memorandum. Aggrieved by the Labor Arbiter's decision, herein
petitioner filed an appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
The NLRC affirmed, with modification, the Labor Arbiter's decision. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the NLRC.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary

restraining order and/or preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals assailing
the aforementioned decision and resolution of the. The Court of Appeals issued the
herein assailed resolution dismissing the petition for certiorari. The instant petition
is hereby DISMISSED for LACK OF MERIT and that the questions raised are too
UNSUBSTANTIAL to require consideration. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the appellate court denied the same. Petitioner filed the present
petition for review on certiorari with prayer for the issuance of temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition of the petitioner is granted?

RULING:

A perusal of the records at hand convinces the Supreme Court. They agree
with the Labor Arbiter's conclusion that the Memorandum was simply an
afterthought on the part of the petitioner. Petitioner failed to present proof that
Endaya was indeed suspended prior to the filing of his complaint for illegal
dismissal. If Endaya was in fact suspended, there should have been a record of
proceedings taken by petitioner to investigate the latter's alleged infractions before
suspending him; or at the least, petitioner should have handed out a memorandum,
like the ones it subsequently issued, calling Endaya's attention for his shortcomings
or directing him to explain his side. Despite petitioner's claim that there was an
investigation, they find no evidence to this effect. Hence, they are led to no
conclusion other than the fact that the letter of suspension and the memorandums
were all issued as a means of validating the prior illegal dismissal of Endaya.

The instant petition is DENIED and the temporary restraining order is forthwith
LIFTED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, complainant, vs. SOLEDAD S.
ESCRITOR, respondent.
2003 Aug 4 En Banc A.M. No. P-02-1651

FACTS:

            An administrative complaint was filed by Estrada against Escritor before

Branch 253 of the RTC of Las Pinas City for living with a man not her husband
and having borne a child within this live-in arrangement. Escritor is the court
interpreter of RTC Branch 253. Estrada believes that Escritor is committing an
immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to
remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. She
was charged with committing “disgraceful and immoral conduct” under Book V,
Title I, Section 46 (b) (5) of the Revised Administrative Code.

            Escritor was already a widow when she entered the judiciary in 1999. She
started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage more than
twenty years ago when her husband was still alive but living with another woman.
They have a son. After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a
“Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” in conformity with their religious beliefs
and has the approval of her congregation, the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch
Tower and Bible Tract Society.

Once all legal impediments for the couple are lifted, the validity of the
declarations ceases and the couple should legalize their union. Insofar as the
congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal
arrangement and they remain members in good standing in the congregation.
Escritor appears to be sincere in her religious belief and practice and is not merely
using the “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” to avoid punishment for
immorality. Ministers from her congregation testified on the authenticity of this
practice and that this is to make the “union” of their members under such
circumstances “honorable before God and men.”
            The court could not rule on the issue of whether or not Escritor was to be
held administratively liable so the case was remanded to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) and ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to
intervene in the case.
           
ISSUE:

           Whether or not Escritor’s religious belief and practice should warrant her
claim of religious freedom under Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution.

HELD:

            The administrative complaint was dismissed. The OSG categorically

concedes that the sincerity and centrality of Escritor’s claimed religious belief and
practice are beyond serious doubt. Her request to be exempt from attending the
flag ceremony on the ground of the Jehovah’s Witnesses contrary belief and
practice was duly noted. The OSG failed to demonstrate “the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests” which could limit or override Escritor’s
fundamental right to religious freedom.

            In this particular case and under these distinct circumstances, Escritor’s
conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for
exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion.
Man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state. 

******************************************
HORACIO LUNA and LIBERTY HIZON-LUNA, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ROQUE A.
TAMAYO, as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, NCJR,
Branch CXXXII, Makati, Metro Manila, MARIA LOURDES
SANTOS, and SIXTO SALUMBIDES, respondents.
1985 Jun 18 2nd Division G.R. No. L-68374

FACTS:

Maria Lourdes Santos is an illegitimate child of the petitioner Horacio Luna

who is married to his co-petitioner Liberty Hizon-Luna. Maria Lourdes Santos is
married to her correspondent Sixto Salumbides, and is the parents of Shirley
Santos Salumbides, also known as Shirley Luna Salumbides, who is the subject of
this child custody case. Two or four months after the birth of the said Shirley
Salumbides on April 7, 1975, her parents gave her to the petitioners, a childless
couple with considerable means, who thereafter showered her with love and
affection and brought her up as their very own.

September, 1980, the petitioners decided to take Shirley abroad and show
her Disneyland and other places of interest in America they asked for the
respondents' written consent to the child's application for a U.S. visa, the
respondents refused to give it. When the petitioners returned on October 29, 1980,
they learned that the respondents had transferred Shirley to a different school.
Neither did the said respondents allow Shirley to visit the petitioners. In view
thereof, the petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Court of First
Instance against the private respondents to produce the person of Shirley and
deliver her to their care and custody. A decision was rendered on March 9, 1981,
declaring the petitioners entitled to the child's custody and forthwith granted the
writ prayed for. Shirley prefers to stay with her grandparents instead of her
biological parents and who had signified her intention up kill herself or run away
from home if she should be separated from her grandparents and forced to live
with her biological parents.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not procedural rules more particularly the duty of lower courts to
enforce a final decision of appellate courts in child custody cases, should prevail
over and above the desire and preference of the child.

HELD:

It is a well-known doctrine that when a judgment of a higher court is

returned to the lower court, the only function of the latter court is the ministerial
one of issuing the order of execution. The lower court cannot vary the mandate of
the superior court, or examine it, for any other purpose than execution; nor review
it upon any matter decided on appeal or error apparent; nor intermeddle with it
further than to settle so much as has been demanded. However, it is also equally
well-known that a stay of execution of a final judgment may be authorized
whenever it is necessary to accomplish the ends of justice as when there had been a
change in the situation of the parties which makes such execution inequitable; or
when it appears that the controversy had never been submitted to the judgment of
the court; or when it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently
issued; or that it is defective in substance; or is issued against the wrong party; or
that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied; or when the writ has
been issued without authority.

In the instant case, the petitioners claim that the child's manifestation to the
trial court that she would kill herself or run away from home if she should be
forced to live with the private respondents is a supervening event that would justify
the cancellation of the execution of the final decision rendered by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-12212. The respondents, upon the other hand,
maintain that there are no supervening developments and circumstances since these
events are not new as the Court of Appeals had taken into account the
physiological and emotional consideration of the transfer of custody of Shirley
when it reversed the decision of the trial court and gave to the private respondents
the custody of the child Shirley; and besides, the wishes and desires of the child is
no hindrance to the parents' right to her custody since the right of the parents to the
custody of their children paramount.