Look beyond the headlines and the hysteria and there are some important

questions to be asked about the diplomatic standoff betwen China and Japan over a
scattering of rocky islands, especially as Beijing brings in a new cohort of leaders.
--The Economists current front cover asks a simple and scary question: Could China
and Japan really go to war over a scattering of rocky islands? Sadly yes, it concludes.
The Economists cover story is just one of a multitude examining the SenkakuDiaoyutai islands and Sino-Japanese relations, and many of them come to similarly
alarming conclusions. But at such an auspicious time in China, as it reconfigures its
leadership, it is also worth asking what is really new and surprising about the current
stand-off, and what owes more to the rituals of rivalry.
Three features stand out as new. First, this flash of tension is happening very close to
the Party Congress that will install successors to the Hu-Wen duet of leaders. PreCongress politicking, including polemics on policies, has happened before.
Conservatives and reformers (or leaders wishing to appear as reformers) have often
locked horns through the press or prominent public intellectuals during that preCongress phase. One has to go back to 1984, however, to see foreign policy used so
directly as a major political issue. Then, it was against the politically liberal Hu
Yaobang, a general secretary who was finally ousted in January 1987. Japan was
already the fuse, because Hu Yaobang had invited thousands of Japanese youngsters
to China, in what was a move to solidify the relationship with Tokyo. In fact, the
younger Hu Jintao, now Chinas outgoing leader, and Japans Prime Minister,
Yoshihiko Noda, both participated in this friendship event. Conservatives used the
pretext to counter Hu Yaobang and political reform, and it is only after this turn that
Chinas propaganda and education began highlighting and drumming up the
historical issues between the two countries. Even so, the campaign was not held so
close to a major institutional event.
Second, there has never been such simultaneous display of wide-spread antiJapanese (or anti-foreign) demonstrations coinciding with a wide range of economic
sanctions or official threats. The break with the past is quantitative more than
qualitative. Some European countries have suffered tourist travel sanctions and visa
issues, but the actual functioning of the worlds workshop has never been hindered
by issues in foreign relations. China sanctioned Japan in 2010 around the rare earth
issue: Japan is a major user of rare earths, because of its advances electronics and
electrical industries, in part competing with China. Outright boycotts are another
matter, and one has to dig for the May 4, 1919 tradition to find them. China is now
taking a big risk over WTO issues even if it claims that it is only following the lead
of the United States, which has condoned commercial sanctions as a tool of foreign
policy but never in a bilateral dispute. The willingness to risk economic relations
with a key trading partner is an extraordinary act of self-confidence, or an
extraordinary miscalculation. Lost in the din, a Japanese government spokesman in
August declared that Japan would not continue regional economic cooperation with
China against all odds. And the United States have just announced a large package of
anti-dumping actions targeting China.

Third, the language and methods used by demonstrators are unprecedentedly

inflammatory and aggressive in recent history: again, this should be judged on an
aggregate scale, not from isolated incidents. Banners talk about nuking Japan, and
there are riots (not just demonstrations) against signs of Japanese presence as well
as direct attacks on diplomats. There is of course considerable doubt as to how much
these acts are spontaneous or organised, and there are also doubts whether some at
least of the violence especially in Southern China is not just another way to vent
dissatisfaction against authorities. But given the extraordinary fast move, during the
same period, by authorities to stamp out domestic political gossip on the internet and
social media there is no doubt that the anti-Japanese ugliness is at least being
allowed to run its course.
There is much less thats really new in the issue itself the barren islands that are at
the heart of the formal dispute. True, numbers are impressive in terms of Chinese
maritime patrol boats deployed, and corresponding Japanese mobilisation. But this
is not the PLA navy, nor is it Japans navy. There have been hints of a 1000 ship
flotilla of Chinese fishermen sailing to the area, and this would have looked as a
repeat of the Red Guards deployment against Soviet soldiers on the contested Ussuri
border in 1969. Luckily, this tryst, which would have forced a Japanese response,
seems to have been shelved. And U.S. Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta, visiting
Beijing, has also called for Japanese military restraint. All the arguments regarding
possession are well-known and worn-out, but suffice it to say that Japan would have
a sound legal (not necessarily historical) case to make, except that it has steadfastly
refused to acknowledge the very existence of the issue and therefore does not engage
in the legal route. However China may be infuriated that a few weeks ago Japan, for
the first time, announced it would consider an international legal ruling of another
territorial dispute with South Korea. Back in 1998, Japans extension of formal
apologies to South Korea for its actions during the war was actually taken as a slight
by China, which considered it should come first.
One question looms over all the others: are these events connected with the
succession issue and with the Party Congress? Evidently they are, which does not
imply that one nationalist, militaristic and politically conservative faction is alone
behind them. Generally, a reform faction must beware of being blackmailed for a lack
of patriotism. Deng Xiaoping took a harder line than anyone else on Vietnam, and
held tough negotiations over the return of Hong Kong including the stationing of
the PLA after 1997. It is possible that outgoing leaders have avoided taking charge
and curtailed too quickly and visibly the incidents and disturbances, lest they be
saddled with another accusation of weakness. There are also plenty of other big
issues in front of the Party Congress: the fate of Politburo member, Bo Xilai who is
now openly described by Chinas official news agency as having covered up the
murder of a foreigner; the issue of political liberalisation and/or raising the statute of
the law over arbitrary Party rule; the perennial juggernaut of economic reform that
may be coming to a head with an economic slow-down.
The more conservative leaders are certainly happy to stir nationalist passions on the
eve of a political succession (they don't make foreign policy themselves, though, but

stir up a lobby). But whether it is this rather than a case of dancing Chinese shadows,
with a view to make headline news around unifying topics, or even a ploy to distract
attention from crucial issues, is perhaps not so important. What matters is that
political irrationality has taken hold over a carefully calibrated foreign policy, and
that China is handing its neighbours ample justification for rearmament and
overcoming scepticism about the benefits of alliance with the US.
Such a miscalculation can only be collective, and therefore points in the direction of a
massive insecurity inside the Chinese collective leadership. The latest news suggests
that China is restraining any incidents on the ground, but toughening its formal
attitude towards Japan by announcing a legal initiative and by reportedly cancelling
celebrations of 40 years of diplomatic relations. Time will tell if this is a long-lasting
restraint and return to rationality, or if the succession process re-ignites the
downwards spiral.