Professional Documents
Culture Documents
JVS Fall 2009 Bengali Uskokov-Libre
JVS Fall 2009 Bengali Uskokov-Libre
Publisher
Deepak Heritage Books
Hampton, Virginia
In Cooperation With
Department of Philosophy and Religios Stdies
CHristopHer NeWport UNiVersitY
Senior editors
Steven J. Rosen
(JoUrNal of VaisHNaVa stUDies)
Graham M. Schweig
(CHristopHer NeWport UNiVersitY)
Managing editor
Steven J. Rosen
Associate editors
E. H. Rick Jarow
(Vassar College)
Design/Production
Barbara Berasi
International Advisory Board
Gy L. Beck
(tUlaNe UNiVersitY)
Edwin F. Bryant
(rUtgers UNiVersitY)
Gerald T. Carney
(HampDeN-sYDNeY College)
Amarnath Chatterjee
(DelHi UNiVersitY)
Nirmal Narayan Gpta
(BeNgali eDUCatioNal faCilitY,
Howrah, Calctta)
Barbara Holdrege
(UNiVersitY of CaliforNia,
saNta BarBara)
Jne McDaniel
(College of CHarlestoN)
Joseph T. OConnell
(UNiVersitY of toroNto)
No. 1
Fall 2009
Introduction
39
53
87
101
113
125
151
Book Reviews
175
187
Introduction
introduCtion
he religios path known as Vaishnavism can be described as devotion to Krishna, Rma, Vishn, or any of his divine incarnations. It is
seen by its adherents as a type of monotheism in which worship of a
personal God is the focs. In sheer nmbers, it prevails as the leading religios system over Shaivism, Shaktism, and the many other paths commonly
associated with Hind dharma.
There are ancient scriptral texts that form the basis of this religion: the
Vedas, the Prnas, the Mahbhrata (inclding the Bhagavad-gt), the
Rmyana, and the writings of the great cryas. Some of these texts date
back to at least the second centry B.C., with an oral tradition that goes back
to antiqity. Vaishnavism is known as santana dharma, or the eternal fnction of the sol, and adherents also refer to it as bhakti-yoga, or the devotional path throgh which one can link with the Spreme.
The religion of Vaishnavism is expressed in varios ways throghot the
Indian sbcontinent. One sch expression is Bengali or Gaya Vaishnavism. This is a form of the religion that began in sixteenth-centry Bengal
with the great avatra/saint r Chaitanya Mahprabh (14861533), bt
which participates in the mch older form of the tradition. It is called gauya becase r Chaitanya proclaimed his mission in the region that was
then known as Gaadea. This extended throghot the sothern side
of the Himalayan Montains and the northern part of the Vindhy Hills,
which is called ryvarta, or the land of the ryans. This portion of India is
divided into ive parts or provinces: Srasvata (Kashmir and the Pnjab),
1
Introduction
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ALeKSANDAR USKOKOV
will, I hope, contribte to the originality of this article, going beyond its
expository prposes.
Throghot this paper yo will ind bits of comparison to Western philosophers. Clearly my goal is not a serios comparative stdy; that wold
reqire a longer article than this. However, I am sre that ideas are like
seeds that can frctify, and ths I did not want to dispense with offering the
comparative in a seedlike form.
I assme that or readers are familiar with the metaphysical standpoints
of Vednta in general and of Gaya Vednta in particlar, and therefore I
will not treat them at all. This also holds tre for the etymology of the word
Gaya. For the irst ive parts of this paper my principal sorce is the
Vednta-syamantaka of Baladeva Vidybhaa,1 and from the sixth section
on, sbtitled The Sbject of Knowledge, I primarily rely on the writings of
A. C. Bhaktivednta Swami Prabhpda. I will also draw from the Tattva-sandarbha of Jva Gosvm and from two commentaries thereon: Jva Gosvms
ato-commentary titled Sarva-savdin and Baladeva Vidybhaas commentary titled Tattva-sandarbha-ippa.
Prelude to the Methods of Knowledge
in the Indian Philosophical Tradition
Before moving to what Gaya Vednta recognizes as methods of knowledge in the broader context of the Indian philosophical tradition, we need
to say a few words abot the general framework of the theory of knowledge.
In terms of this framework, the representatives of Gaya Vednta mainly
accept the formlations of Nyya-darana. So the irst thing we need to
mention is the terminological distinction between jna and pram. The
term jna can be translated as knowledge in the sense of cognition,
or content of consciosness. The characteristic mark of cognition is: the
immediate knowledge that becomes the sbject of the consciosness, having the form I know.2 Knowledge is classiied as representative (recollection, smti) and given (experience, anubhava), and there are two kinds of
experience: valid and invalid.
Valid apprehension is that in which an object is known as possessing
attribtes it really possesses, e.g., the apprehension of silver arising in an
object where there is silverness. This is also known as the valid knowledge
(pram) of a thing.3
That is non-valid apprehension in which an object is known as having an
attribte which it does not have in reality: e.g., the apprehension of silver
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ALeKSANDAR USKOKOV
between the conclsion and the mark. Take the classic example: While
walking in natre, we perceive smoke rising from a hill. This is a sensal
cognitionknowledge originating from the contact of the eye with the
sensm. Bt this simltaneosly serves as a mark or sign of the presence of
ire on the hill. Fire is drawn as a conclsion from the mark of smoke. And
the conclsion is drawn becase we know that there is a reglar, invariant
concomitance (vypti) between smoke and ire.
One more classic example: In s there is the cognition that Devadatta13 is
mortal. This cognition comes from the knowledge that Devadatta is marked
with the attribte of hmanity (in the sense of membership in a class) and
from being acqainted with the invariant concomitance of hmanity with
mortality.
Inference as a propositional strctre has members flly correspondent
with the terms of Aristotelian logic. To present these members, let s look
at the classic inference in an otline:
- The hill is on ire (or there is a ire on the hill);
- becase there is smoke;
- wherever there is smoke, there is also ire.
The hill in this inference plays the role of paka, a sbject abot which
something is to be demonstrated or afirmed. It is correspondent with the
minor term in an Aristotelian syllogism. Fire plays the role of sdhya, that
which is spposed to be demonstrated or predicated abot a sbject. It is
correspondent with the major term in an Aristotelian syllogism. Finally, the
smoke plays the role of liga, a mark of something, from which a conclsion is conseqent; or of hetu, a reason for the conclsion; or of sdhana,
a means by which the conclsion is drawn. It is correspondent with the
middle term in an Aristotelian syllogism.
In a cognitive sense, the seqence of apprehension corresponds to the
distribtion of the two premises and the conclsion in an Aristotelian syllogism. What we are cognizant of irst is that there is smoke on the hill (the
minor premise). Then we remind orselves that wherever there is smoke
there is also ire (the major premise). Finally, we conclde that there mst
be ire on the hill. However, as far as the formal expression of or cognition is concerned, Indian logicians claim that it has to follow the otlined
strctre. And it is appropriate to remember at this point that the word
prama, apart from method of knowledge, also stands for demonstration
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61
sacred testimony is certain in all circmstances, while the mndane testimony is certain only if the person is trstworthy. The treatment of abda in
the schools of Nyya and Karma-mms is very interesting and important
for the philosophy of langage, bt the scope of or ndertaking gives s
no license to dwell on that.
4. Comparison (upamna)
Comparison is the instrment of knowledge derived from analogy. It is
like the sentence: Gavaya is similar to a cow. Analogy is the cognition of
the relation of the name and the object it denotes. The instrment of analogy is the cognition of similarity.16 Upamna is, then, the sorce of or
knowledge abot the relationship between the word and its denotation. If,
for example, we do not know what a wild cow (gavaya) is, and some experienced and reliable forester tells s, Gavaya is something similar to a cow,
then, if we happen to see some gavaya when we go to the forest and remember the foresters words, the cognition, This is a gavaya, occrs in s. In
this way the relationship between the word and its denotation is established.
The instrment, thanks to which this relationship between the word and its
denotation is established, is the similarity between the gavaya and the cow.
This is how comparison is explained in the school of Nyya.
In Karma-mms it is nderstood in a different way. Cognition is prodced from comparison when, while perceiving an object similar to some
object that we already know, we apprehend that the object we are already
familiar with is similar to the object we are becoming acqainted with.
Ths, if a man knows what a cow is and goes to the forest, he may see a
gavaya and apprehend its similarity to the cow. In this way he can ind ot
that the cow is similar to the gavaya.
5. The postulate (arthpatti17)
A postlate is the hypothesis of other circmstances as the case, from
the observation of the (sal) circmstances not occrring. Like in the
sentence: The fat Devadatta does not eat dring the day. Becase Devadatta
does not eat dring the day, his fatness cannot be (nder sch circmstances). Therefore this introdces his noctrnal eating (as the case of
his fatness).18 The postlate is, then, an assmption of a certain fact as
the case of a state of affairs, withot which this state cold not have taken
place. As sch, we se postlates in or daily life. Not inding in the trnk
of my car the bag illed with goods from the market that I left there (I went
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ALeKSANDAR USKOKOV
back to the market to by some more things, and I did not lock the trnk),
I conclde (and postlate) with annoyanceand, if I am a fragile natre, in
tearsthat someone mst have stolen it. If I look for my friend at his home
and I cannot ind him, knowing that he is alive, I postlate that he mst be
somewhere else; otherwise, we cold not explain why he who is in fact alive
is not home.
The adherents of Karma-mms classify two types of postlate: drthpattipostlating a fact which is essential for explaining something
seen (Devadattas fatness or the absence of the bag in the trnk) and drthpattipostlating a fact which is essential for explaining something that
is heard. And for the second there are also contless examples. If my wife
shots at me, It is over! I have to postlate the addition with or marriage to her exclamation to make sense of it. When a word cannot make
sense in its literal meaning, we have to postlate a igrative meaning. For
example, in the sentence Indstry is the key to sccess, we have to postlate that key is sed in the sense of means; otherwise, the sentence will be
senseless. And when someone approaches me on the streets of Skopje, saying, Hey gys, can I ask yo something?19 I have to postlate a singlar
nmber, thogh the literal meaning necessitates the plral; otherwise, the
prononcement will lack any sense.
Arthpatti, or postlate, is often compared with the disjnctive hypothetical
syllogism. The similarities between them are nmeros, bt insficient to
sggest fll eqivalence. For the conseqences are what are essential for the
hypothetical syllogism, while arthpatti is a search for the grond or case
for the state of affairs. (Arthpatti is accepted as an independent means of
knowledge by followers of Karma-mms and Advaita-vednta.20)
6. Non-perception (anupalabdhi)
By the non-perception of a pot its nonexistence [or absence] is ascertained. Bt non-perception is absence of perception. Ths, by the proof of
nonexistence we conclde to the nonexistence of the pot.21 This method
of knowledge is also called nonexistence, absence (abhava), which is obvios from the qote. Nonexistence in this context does not mean absolte
nonexistence, bt absence of the object of knowledge in conditions in
which it shold be present. For example, if it is dark and I cannot see the
cp on the table (and I know that I have left it there), the fact that I cannot
perceive the cp does not give me the right to conclde that the cp is not
on the table.
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65
are also accepted becase he does not indiscriminately speak of the others
ignorance and so on, bt only after having irst ascertained their words.
Only ths will his words make sense to those who are prdent. In this way
he implicitly endorses testimony as a method of knowledge, i.e., knowledge
of the ignorance of others.
Vaieikas accept inference as a valid method of knowledge, bt do not
accept testimony. Rather, they sbsme testimony nder sense perception
and inference. This is ngronded, becase testimony is or sorce of
knowledge abot what is dificlt to obtain throgh sense perception and
inference. For example, or knowledge of the movements of the planets
and stars depends on testimony from others. Practically (perhaps even theoretically) it is impossible to determine the position of every plant and star
on the basis of or perception and inference. We learn from teachers the
laws of mathematics and astronomy sed to calclate the planetary and stellar positions; apart from that, instead of doing the calcls orselves, we se
pre-calclated ephemerides. So testimony cannot be sbsmed nder perception and inference, bt is an independent process we may call adoption.
Comparison cannot be accepted as an independent method of knowledge. Depending on its form, it is sbsmed nder perception, inference,
or testimony. The cognition occrring in s when we hear the sentence
Gavaya is something like a cow has the natre of received knowledge
(gama), which is, no dobt, in the realm of testimony.
However, the cognition that the word gavaya signiies something similar
to a cow (i.e., the process of apprehending the relationship between the
name as a sign and the thing signiied) is a prodct of inference. This is
how cognition takes place in comparison: That word which is employed by
the elders in a certain sense (as a sign for a denotatum) is expressing exactly
that sense (it is sing its primary signiicative force), nless the word has
some other force (some igrative meaning); like the word cow is signifying cowness. The word gavaya is sed as something similar to a cow. This
cognition is comparison indeed.27 This qote from Vednta-syamantaka is
very cryptic, and we have to nfold it.
According to traditional Sanskrit poetics, words have three signiicative
fnctions known as abda-vttis, or forces of a word. The primary signiicative
force of a word is its literary or dictionary meaning. If it is a general name,
it stands for the generic natre of the class,28 bt also for all the separate
members of that class. We learn this primary signiicance of the words from
or elders. The following is a classic example29 of how this goes on. A small
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child still nable to talk hears the older brother tell the middle brother:
Bring a cow. Then he notices that the middle brother performs some
activity. And knowing from personal experience that every action prespposes some knowledge (for, even in order to play with something he knows
that he has to get that thing, and perhaps also to ind it), he concldes that
the activity of the middle brother was indced by something that he learned
from the older brother. In shorta sentence prodces knowledge, and
knowledge indces one to act.
Bt the child does not yet know what the speciic words in the sentence
mean, and that learning is accomplished by the processes of vpa (change
to a fresh word in a sentence) and udvpa (removal of an old word in a
sentence). The next time the older brother tells the middle brother: Bring
a horse. The yongest brother again notices that the middle brother is
indced to action, bt he also notices: (1) in the prononced sentence
something remains the same (bring), while something changes (instead of
cow, now it is horse); and (2) in the middle brothers action something
remains the same (he brings something), while something changes (instead
of a cow, now it is a horse). So the child concldes that the word reoccrring in the sentence refers to that which reoccrs in the action, namely the
act of bringing, and that which changes in the sentence refers to that which
changes in the action. Ths the word cow in the irst sentence has to refer
to the cow which the middle brother broght, and the word horse in the
second sentence has to refer to the horse the middle brother broght.
The primary meanings of words are classiied into two categories: (1)
rhiconventional30 sage, according to particlarity, generic character,
or attribteHe is ittha.31 This is a cow. This is white.32 and (2) yoga
the meaning derived from some other word formed by the addition of
an afixe.g., the word pcaka (chef) is formed from the root pac, which
has a sense of cooking and the agent sfix ka.
The second signiicative force of the word is lakaa-vtti, or the secondary
sage of the word, which implies something nexpressed. The classic example is a cowherds village in Gag.33 Becase it is impossible for a village
to be in a river, that which is not stated has to be inferred: It is a cowherds
village on the bank of the Ganges.
The third signiicative force of the word (gaua-vtti) is the igrative
or metaphoric sage. Ths when we hear that Devadatta is a lion,34
Devadatta is referred to as sch, not becase he is a lion bt becase he has
some qalities similar to a lions (strength, corage and so on).
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Tradition as sch is not at all a method of valid knowledge, for the credibility of the originator of the belief transmitted in the tradition is ncertain.
If it is established that the originator is a trstworthy person, then tradition
is in the scope of received knowledge (gama) or testimony. The same
holds tre for the athority of the sage (ra). If he is trstworthy, his words
are accepted as testimony; otherwise, he cannot be a sorce of accrate
knowledge.
Gestre is testimony sing the services of inference.
Ths, after examining all the methods of knowledge, we come to the conclsion that three of them are independent: sense perception, inference,
and testimony. The other seven are within the scope of the other three and
ths are dependent. Baladeva sbstantiates this with a qotation from the
Manu-sahit.35
Critique of Sense Perception and Inference
In the next two paragraphs of Vednta-syamantaka, Baladeva examines
whether sense perception and inference offer the certainty we need in
philosophy. As for sense perception, it is able to reach only what is in the
immediate proximity of certainty and yet at an appropriate distance. It cannot grasp what is very far off, like a bird lying, or what is too close, like the
eyelids. Perception also depends on or mentality. When we are distrbed,
excited, or immersed in thoghts, we might not notice what we wold otherwise certainly notice. My mind was not present; I did not see it.36 Thales
did not fall in the ditch by accident.
Sense perception cannot grasp that which is covered, still nmanifested,
mixed, or minte. Ths we cannot perceive the planets and the stars covered by the snshine. We cannot taste yogrt that is there in the milk as
potency, becase it is not manifest. We cannot see the drops of rain mixed
with a reservoir of water, and althogh atoms exist, we cannot see them
becase they are too small. As Bhaktivednta Swami Prabhpda concldes,
Under these circmstances, whatever we are experiencing at the present moment is totally conditional and is therefore sbject to mistakes and
incompleteness. These mistaken impressions can never be rectiied by the
mistaker himself or by another, similar person apt to commit similar mistakes.37
As for inference, we shold remember that inference is anumna
knowledge following pon some other knowledge. Therefore its certainty,
provided the process of inferring is condcted in a valid way, will depend
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imity.42 This intentness on something else manifests also on the ontological plain: Being absorbed in the body, we fail to notice or real natre as
spirit. That is why pramda is often referred to as illsion.
Vipralips refers to the omnipresent tendency of cheating. The classic
example given by Swami Prabhpda is that of the salesman who claims
that he will make no proit from s, thogh we know that this cannot be
tre. Baladevas example is: Becase of this, the trth is not revealed to the
disciple, althogh it is known (to the teacher).43
The forth innate shortcoming is karapaavaimperfection or weakness of the senses. We need not elaborate on this; it is a notorios fact. Baladevas descriptive example is: Becase of this, althogh the mind is ixed,
one does not become cognizant of the object as it is. In other words, one is
composed, his attention is well-directed, bt still he cannot become cognizant of the object becase it is simply not within the range of perception.
In terms of the methods of knowledge, bhrama, pramda, and karapaava
are pecliar to perception and inference, while vipralips is an error of testimony (however, this error, nlike the other three, is not fatal).
The Nature of Testimony
If perception and inference cannot provide certainty even in daily life, they
are all the more incompetent for establishing a contact with a reality of an
extramndane and inconceivable natre, namely God. So what is left for s
to examine is the character of testimony.
Baladeva claims that testimony as the word of a trstworthy person does
not case fallacios cognition. If, for example, someone who deserves
nconditional confidence (becase of being experienced and having
spotless character) tells s: There are precios stones in this mine, this
will prodce a correct apprehension in s, thogh we do not have direct
experience. Not only that, testimony is the primary manner by which we
learn abot the world, from the percepts of or elders, at school and the
niversity, and today from the mass media and so on. Baladeva44 lists a few
characteristics of testimony in the process of cognition of mndane objects
and gives illstrations for them one by one.
1. Testimony is a process of knowledge independent of perception and
inference. The proof of this is that there are facts which we do not form
a cognition of by perception and inference, althogh we have employed
these processes. Baladeva gives a simple example (perhaps too simple, bt
nevertheless illstrative): Ten men cross a river. They want to be certain that
all of them arrived safe. One among them conted the others from one to
71
nine, bt forgot to cont himself. Everyone else did the same, bt the reslt
did not change. Ths they began to lament, having lost the tenth man.
Some wise man passed by there, and inding ot the case of their grief, he
placed them in a row. Then he conted them from one to nine and to their
joy declared to the tenth, Yo are the tenth!
2. Testimony annls (corrects) perception and inference. Baladevas
example refers to the power of mantras sed by an expert physician while
treating the patient. One of these mantras is sarpa-dae tvayi via nsti:
Althogh yo were bitten by a snake, there is no poison in yo.45
3. Testimony is not contradictory to perception and inference. For example, One drg alone removes the disorder of the three bodily hmors;
one cold know this from an Ayrvedic text or doctorin stras one does
not find logically impossible statementsand perhaps experience the
reslt by taking the drg.46
4. Testimony can se the services of perception and inference as an illstration or a corrective. An example of the irst: testimony claims that heat is
the remedy against cold, and this is conirmed by perception. An example
of the second: We hear that iron can ct anything earthly (prthiva), and
on this basis we conclde that iron can ct diamonds; however, sense perception shows that this is not the case. Althogh earthly, diamonds ct iron.
This corrects the testimony, and we conclde that iron can ct anything
earthly except diamonds.
5. Testimony can also be of service to perception and inference. For
example, travelers trobled by cold spot smoke rising from a nearby hill
and conclde that there is ire there. They start off in that direction to get
warm. On their way they meet a man who tells them: There is no ire on
the hill; it was recently extingished. However, on the next hill yo will certainly ind ire.
6. Testimony is the best way to learn abot things beyond the reach of
perception and inference, sch as the position of the planets in the zodiac,
the times of solar eclipses, and so on.
All this may sond interesting, bt the navoidable qestion is: Is there
really a sorce deserving nconditional trst? What abot the hman tendency of cheating, hanging above testimony like a gillotine? Forapart
from learning abot the world, which cannot be done withot conidence
in teachers, bt which is irrelevant for existential qestionsthe doctrines
of the sages abot that which is beyond the world are variegated. As we
learn from the Mahbhrata, one cannot establish oneself as a sage or
philosopher nless one stands in opposition to other philosophers. This
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being the case, who is the one deserving or conidence? Gatama, Kada,
Kapila, Patajali, Yjavalkya, or ilya? Bddha or akara? Plato,
Aristotle, or Aqinas? Descartes, Kant, or Hegel? Hsserl, Bergson, Scheler,
or Heiddeger? Or Newton, Einstein, or Planck? Who is an pta-purua, a
trstworthy person? Well, in the ltimate analysis, no one. If something
comes from a man, it has to be brdened by his shortcomings and cannot
plead for certainty. For testimony to be absoltely certain and trstworthy, it
has to come from God himself. And ths we come to the point at which or
treatment of the problem has to trn 180 degrees. Seemingly we will make
an nwarranted leap, bt eventally everything will fall into place.
The Subject of Knowledge
If we say that the tre natre of a person is spirit, this will sond like a
mere repetition of something old; no one will lad s for an epoch-making
novel idea. For this is exactly what Plato, Descartes, Berkeley, and Scheler
have claimed, to name jst a few. This is what Gaya Vednta also claims.
However, there is an epoch-making novelty in what Gaya Vednta means
by saying man is spirit.47 And it is this: that my natre as spirit manifests in
the fact that I never come in toch with matter.
As spirit I am qaliied by consciosness. Bt apart from being spirit, I
have impressions of the world, which is not spirit. Bearing in mind that
cognition can represent only that which is similar, how is it possible that
something different from my natre relects in me? This qestion is one
over which philosophers in the West often dispted. Berkeley, for example,
claimed that my knowledge of the world is possible becase both the world
and I share the same natre; the world is an idea appropriate for spirit
and withot a material carrier, for if it had sch a carrier, I cold not have
formed a cognition of it, becase the only things that spirit is capable of
knowing are ideas. Marx and his followers wold also eqate the natre of
thinking and being, bt at the opposite end, by saying they are both matter,
and ths their connection is nproblematic. Descartes postlated two sbstances harmonized in a parallelism made possible by God.
The soltion to this problem offered by Gaya Vednta is different
from these three. It is tre that I am spirit, bt in my present condition this
spirit is in a potential state, is seedlike, and its role is to give life to what by
natre is deadthe body. My self-conception, the way I experience myself
in sch circmstances, cold be called an empirical, impre selfimpre
becase I identify myself with something I am not. Namely, althogh I am
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ether. These elements come in contact with me, as the sbject of knowledge, throgh the sense organs. This contact generates perception. The
ive objects of knowledge are rdimentary or sbtle elements, representative of the gross elements. The vibrations transmitted throgh ether case
cognition of sond. Fire or light cases cognition of form, air of toch,
water of taste, and earth of smell. And ths Berkeley was rightthere is no
sond, form, toch, taste, and smell otside of me. However, this does not
mean that there is nothing that is not an idea.
These sense objects are processed by the mind. The mind is attracted by
some of them and replsed by the othersacceptance and rejection is its
faclty.49 While doing this, it can se the services of the intelligence. The
role of intelligence is to illminate the natre of the objects deemed attractive or replsive by the mind. Intelligence has ive states, conditions, or
modiications (vttis): dobt (saaya), misapprehension (viparysa), correct apprehension (nicaya), memory (smti), and sleep (svpa).50
Philosophy is in the domain of intelligence becase the origin of philosophy is in dobt. The essential property of philosophy is dobt; dobt gives
rise to the impets for philosophical speclation. To deal with philosophical
qestions, Aristotle said, one needs free time, schole, or the leisre gained by
being a free man (not a slave) and by not having to work for ones maintenance. Leisre is a reqired accidental, bt leisre is no garantee that one
will engage in philosophy. Moreover, philosophizing can end in either misapprehension or correct apprehension. Bt we will say more on this later.
My state of pre spirit in sch circmstances is in a state akin to sspension. Perhaps it is most appropriate to compare it to a dream. While dreaming, I preserve the concept of my identity and remain a knower of cognition, bt that identity can take new and different variants, some of which I
cold not even imagine while awake. Althogh apprehensive in reality, in
my dream I cold be the main hero in some battle. My son cold all of a
sdden appear as my grandfather, and my grandfather cold trn ot to
be my lover. There is no need to enmerate examplesthat cold go on
ad ininitum. What is crcial here is that the dream is my illsory state, albeit
a real one, and so is my condition of identifying with the body. It is illsory,
bt real. I remain the sbject of knowledge, bt I consider myself something I am not. Sitated within the heart of this body, which is compared to
a tree by the Upaniads,51 I, like a bird tasting the frits of the tree, hallcinate, dreaming the dream of material existence.
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pose of Hindism, Mohammedanism, Christianity, or Bddhism? The prpose is to bring people to the light. That is the prpose of religion.56
So the prpose of religion is to train people how to love God. That is the
prpose of all religion. Whether yor religion is Christianity or Hindism
or Mohammedanism, the prpose of yor religion is to train yo how to
love God, becase that is yor constittional position.57
It does not matter whether yo are a Christian or a Hind or a
Mohammedan. Jst try to develop yor love of God. Then yor religion is
very nice; otherwise, it is simply a waste of time.58
I do not say that Christians shold become Hind. I simply say, Please
obey yor commandments. I will make yo a better Christian. That is my
mission. I do not say, God is not in yor tradition; God is only here in
ors. I simply say, Obey God. I dont say, Yo have to accept that Gods
name is Krishna and no other. No. I say, Please obey God. Please try to
love God.59
The pre self has self-evident knowledge (svata-siddha-jna). This knowledge reqires no evidence. It is Veda. In the empirically cognizable world of
matter this Veda manifests as the for Vedas, the Upaniads, Bhagavad-gt,
and in other traditions and cltres as the Bible, Koran, and so on.60
Five Stages of Spiritual Knowledge
Althogh the Vedic sond is objective and self-evident, it is still sudurbodham,61 very dificlt to nderstand by someone conditioned by matter. We
are deaf and blind, for the knowledge that emanates from the Lord is right
at handyet we see it not. The Vedic sond is dificlt to comprehend
becase the heart (along with the spirital sense of hearing) is covered by
the false ego. Therefore, there is a need for this sond to become intelligible to or empirical senses. Since one cannot visally experience the presence of the Spersol, He appears before s as a liberated devotee. Sch a
spirital master is none other than Krishna Himself.62
God as the Spersol appears before or visal and aditory perception as
a liberated devotee, a spirital master, to give s knowledge abot himself.
This transmission of spirital knowledge sometimes goes on in an nbroken chain of teachers (guru-parampar).63 For the teachers testimony to be
pta-vkya (testimony from a trstworthy sorce), he has to be qaliied by
two conditions:64 namely, he has to be ixed in the Vedas (abda) and in the
Spreme (para). Jva Gosvms commentary is illstrative: Learned in the
Vedas, becase of being dedicated to deliberation; ixed on the Spreme,
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correct apprehension (recall the ive conditions of intelligence: dobt, misapprehension, correct apprehension, memory, and sleep). On this level of
knowledge, sense perception also changes. Now it is not jst ordinary and
simple sense perception; it becomes learned, edcated sense perception,
molded by the word (abda). Thanks to what he has learned from testimony, the disciple can now see reality as it really isas God sees it. What he
now sees are not objects with independent or mysterios existence, objects
of contemplation or enjoyment, bt rather transformations of Gods energies. He observes the world throgh the lenses of what he has learned, as
we do in any life condition. This sense perception, based on revelation, is
free from the for defects of conditioned hman life (imperfect senses,
mistakes, illsion, and cheating).70
Even if it is ngided by revelation, inference on that which is beyond
ordinary perception can see glimpses of light. For example, while dreaming I am in all kinds of conditions and circmstances. Sometimes I am
happy. Sometimes I am scared, perhaps becase I am being chased by a
tiger. Nevertheless, what is constant in dreams is the fact that I remain the
same, thogh constantly changing bodies. A dream ends, and the dream
experiences and adventres also come to an end. In some sense I die, bt
I am reborn in the next dream, and everything starts anew. Althogh while
awake I am aware that the wakefl state has a higher reality, higher than the
dream life, what is the garantee that this life is not also jst one dream in
a chain of dreams I have, while my higher, spirital natre is asleep? In any
case, philosophical reasoning shold shake my conviction that I am matter
and that death has to be the end of everything.
Nice examples of sch philosophical reasoning are fond in Platos Phaedo
and in Descartess inference of res cogitans. Bt if this philosophizing is not
joined with revelation, it cannot provide a transition to the next stage of
knowledge, adhokaja. Thanks to spirital practice, a disciple is able to rise
from the stage of intellectal realization of trth to the level of personal
insight. This insight is a personal experience, bt not throgh the material
senses. Now the adept can see reality as it is, thanks to spirital vision or
the vision of the heart (remember that God is in the heart). To express the
whole idea: he is now emerged in direct contemplation of God.
The ifth stage, aprkta, refers to the fll development of or spirital
natre and to the transition from passive awe and reverence and contemplation characteristic of the previos stage to or mtal relationship with
God.
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Conclusion
Singling ot the most signiicant elements of Gaya epistemologytestimony, the sbject of knowledge, and God-realizationlet s consider their
possible contribtion to epistemology in general.
First, it seems to me that Western philosophy has not paid de analytical
attention to testimony as a method of knowledgeattention which is dobtless merited. In or own philosophical conceptions, testimonial knowledge
is either taken for granted or ridicled. The irst approach is nphilosophical a theory of knowledge shold examine the means by which we acqire
knowledge. We implicitly se testimony as a method of knowledge from or
very birth, bt testimonial knowledge is not in voge with philosophers.
Ridicle, the second approach to testimonial knowledge, is jst as ncritical as the irst. We do not have to qote from methodology textbooks,
which say that accepting the method of athority is nscientiictheir
athority has already convinced s that athority has no place in scientiic
knowledge. However, Thomas Khns Strctre of Scientiic Revoltions
clearly shows how mch scientiic knowledgeor any knowledge, for that
matterdepends on athority, testimony, or a paradigm.
Second, I ind that the nderstanding of the sbject of knowledge in the
Gaya Vednta is an original one and deserves serios attention as a prospective soltion to the sbject-object relation. Indeed, I consider it to be
the most important contribtion of this school to general epistemology.
Third, as far as the process of knowledge of God is concerned, I think that
the details revealed in the Gaya Vednta tradition cold also be signiicant for other religios traditions. For if God is one, then the paths leading
to him cannot be all too different in the varios traditions. Ths a ray of
light from one tradition cold shine in the other traditions, too.
endnotes
1. The athorship of Vednta-syamantaka is a matter of dispte. The work
may have been written by Baladevas gr, Rdhdmodara Dsa. We will
treat it provisionally as Baladevas work. In one sense the athorship is
irrelevant, since what is presented in Sarva-savdin (Jva Gosvms own
commentary on Tattva-sandarbha), in Baladevas commentary on the Tattvasandarbha, and in Vednta-syamantaka is pretty mch one and the same. For
practical prposes I have chosen to follow Vednta-syamantaka.
2. Jnmty-anuvyavasya-gamya jnam eva lakaam iti bhva. (Tarkasagraha-dpika 3.16, translation by Swami Virpakshananda.)
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ALeKSANDAR USKOKOV
Sagraha, With the Dpika of Aambhaa and Notes, Sri Ramakrishna Math,
Madras, 1994.
30. Bt it is a conditional conventionality, becase, both in Nyya and
in Gaya Vednta, words receive their signiicative force by the mercy of
God. In Gaya Vednta, all meaningfl words are primarily names of God,
and in a secondary sense they are names of the object which they signify by
convention.
31. A wooden elephant; the name is sed as an instance of a personal
name.
32. rdhara Svm on Bhgavata Pura, 10.87.1.
33. Gagy ghoa.
34. Siho devadatta.
35. pratyaka cnumna ca stra ca vividhgamam
traya suvidita krya dharma-uddhim abhpsat
Sense perception, inference and the varios kinds of revealed scriptres
these three are to be well nderstood by him who is desiros of tre
knowledge abot dharma. (Manu-sahita 12.105, cited in Vednta-syamantaka 1.9)
36. Yad ukta me manonyatra-gata may na dam ity di. (op. cit. 1.10)
37. A. C. Bhaktivednta Swami Prabhpda, Message of Godhead, p. 8,
Bhaktivedanta Book Trst, Los Angeles, 1990.
38. Isnt this exactly the reason why logicians want to ignore the content
and to deal exclsively with the formal laws of inference?
39. Yo can watch it on: http://www.yotbe.com/watch?v=9S6tJpUxvOU
40. Yajadatta is of the same natre as Devadattaa character sed as
representative of mankind in philosophy texts. Devadatta is sed by Jva and
Yajadatta by Baladeva.
41. Vy tat-kle nirvpita-vahnau ciram adhikoditvara-dhme parvate vahnimn dhmd ity dau. (Vednta-syamantaka 1.11)
42. Yenntike gyamna gna na ghyate. (Commentary to Tattva-sandarbha 9)
43. Yay iye svajto py artho na prakyate (Ibid.)
44. They actally originate with Jva Gosvm, in his Sarva-savdin, bt
here we are following Baladeva for practical reasons.
45. Indian cltre traditionally ascribes inconceivable power (acintya-akti)
to some precios stones and mantras, and this is often sed as an example
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in philosophical works. One classical instance is rdhara Svms commentary on Viu Pura, 1.3.2. This may sond strange to s, bt let s remember the healing power of sggestion and hypnoses.
46. According to ancient Indian medicine, diseases are cased by an
imbalance or disorder of the three bodily lids: kapha (phlegm), pitta
(bile), and vta (air).
47. This is not an exclsive possession of Gaya Vednta; it is a fndamental assmption in many schools of Indian philosophy. However, I cannot recall a singe thinker in the West who shares this conception. Perhaps
the phenomenology of Hsserl, Scheler, and other phenomenologists
qaliies as some similarity.
48. Compare rmad-Bhgavatam 6.1.50.
49. op. cit., 3.26.27.
50. op. cit., 3.26.29-30.
51. Muaka, 3.11; vetvatara, 4.6.
52. op.cit., 3.12 and 4.7.
53. Bhaktivedanta VedaBase 2003.1, 731116SB.DEL.
54. This is becase God as absolte has no parts and is a single, ndivided
sbstance. Althogh having different aspects, they are different in a conditional sense. Ths his name, qalities, form etc. share the same absolte
natre and are identical. Therefore the sond emanating from him is also
flly identical with him.
55. And in this sense Vysa, the athor of the Vedas, is considered to be
Gods incarnation.
56. A. C. Bhaktivednta Swami Prabhpda, Journey of Self-Discovery,
Bhaktivedanta Book Trst, Bombay, 1990, 1993, p. 72.
57. op. cit., p. 75.
58. op. cit., p. 76.
59. op. cit., pp. 110-111.
60. Here it is appropriate to mention that for Gaya Vednta, we ind
the most intelligible and the prest manifestation of knowledge of God in
the rmad-Bhgavatam or Bhgavata Pura. This is extensively elaborated
by Jva Gosvm in his Tattva-sandarbha.
61. rmad-Bhgavatam, 11.21.36.
62. jve skt nhi tte guru caittya-rpe
ik-guru haya ka-mahnta-svarpe, Caitanya-caritmta, di 1.58.
63. Bhagavad-gt 4.2 is illstrative of this.
64. rmad-Bhgavatam, 11.3.21.
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ALeKSANDAR USKOKOV
65. bde brahmai vede vicra-ttparyea. Pare brahmai bhagavad-di-rpvirbhve paroknubhavena nita tathaiva nih prptam. (Bhakti-sandarbha 202)
66. Compare Bhaktivedanta VedaBase 2003.1, 680706SB.MON, 710718IN.
DET, 750112SB.BOM, 750610MW.HON i 760610RC.LA.
67. The concept is frther elaborated: Shotra Swami, Substance and Shadow, The Vedic Method of Knowledge, Govinda-Verlag, Zrich/Altenbrg, 1996,
pp. 163-6.
68. op. cit., str. 164.
69. If by philosophy we mean only speclationan idea which is, I mst
admit, alien to me.
70. This is one more classiication of sense perception: simple (avaidua
not edcated) and learned (vaiduaedcated). It is given by Jva Gosvm
in Sarva-savdin, 9. Tad eva ca puna vaiduam avaidua ceti dvividham.
Tatra vaidue ca vipratipatti-bhramdi-n-doa-rhityt, abdasypi tan-mlatvc
ca.
Bibliography
Aabhaa, Tarka-sagraha.
Baladeva Vidybhaa, Tattva-sandarbha-tippani (in the Tattva-sandarbha
edition of Sri Haridas Sastri).
Baladeva Vidybhaa, Vedanta-syamantaka (the edition of Haridas Shastri,
Vrindavan, sine anno).
Chatterjee, Satischandra and Dhirendramohan Datta, An Introduction to
Indian Philosophy, Calctta: University of Calctta, 1984.
Jva Gosvm, Bhakti-sandarbha (edition of Sri Haridas Sastri, Vrindavan,
1984).
Jva Gosvm, Tattva-sandarbha (edition of Sri Haridas Sastri, Vrindavan, sine
anno, contains Jvas ato-commentary and the commentaries of
Baladeva, Rdhmohana Gosvm, and Garakiora Gosvm).
Prabhpda, A. C. Bhaktivednta Swami, Bhagavad-gt As It Is (2nd
Edition), Singapore: Bhaktivedanta Book Trst, 1989.
Prabhpda, A. C. Bhaktivednta Swami, The Journey of Self-Discovery,
Bombay: Bhaktivedanta Book Trst, 1990, 1993.
Prabhpda, A. C. Bhaktivednta Swami, Message of Godhead, Los Angeles:
Bhaktivedanta Book Trst, 1990.
Prabhpda, A. C. Bhaktivednta Swami, r Caitanya-caritmta, 17 Vols.,
Los Angeles: Bhaktivedanta Book Trst, 1975.
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Contributors
Joseph T. OConnell is Professor Emeritus in the Study of Religion at the
University of Toronto, Canada, and Visiting Professor of World Religions in
the University of Dhaka, Bangladesh. His doctorate from Harvard is in the
Comparative Study of the Major World Religions. His primary area of scholarship is the history of religion in relation to society in the Bengal region
with special concentration on the Chaitanya Vaishnava tradition and certain
sectors of the Muslim tradition in Bengal. Currently he is encouraging the
development the academic study of religion in Indian and Bangladeshi universities.
Jason D. Fuller is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Religious
Studies at DePauw University in Greencastle, Indiana. He received his PhD.
from the University of Pennsylvania in 2005 where he specialized in the history of Bengali Vaishnavism. He is currently working on a book dealing with
the nineteenth-century Vaishnava reformer, Bhaktivinoda Thakura. He is a
frequent contributor to the Journal of Vaishnava Studies.
Aleksandar Uskokov, who hails from Skopje, Macedonia, joined the
International Society for Krishna Consciousness in 1992, and served mainly
in the Bhaktivedanta Book Trust as a translator, editor and production manager for their Serbian and Macedonian literature. He has a BA (Honors) in
Philosophy, University St. Cyril and Methodius, and an MA in Philosophy
of Religion. He has published several articles in the scholarly journal,
Philosophia.
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Contributors
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