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31, 2011

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Norman Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of Ethnic Cleansing, College Sta
tion, Texas A & M University Press, 1995, 47-61.
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.

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Adriana Camisar, Boris Diechtiareff, An Analysis of the Dayton Negotiations and
Peace Accords, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 2005, 4.
4
, 4.
5
Robert Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History, New York, Vintage Bo
oks, 1993 .
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341

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.
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.
10
, ...., . ., 134.
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342


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,
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Mario Nobilo, Hrvatski feniks, Diplomatski procesi iza zatvorenih vrata 19901997, Nakladni zavod Globus, Zagreb, 2000, 489.
13
, 490.
12

344

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300.000 .
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sign in Negotiation, International Negotiation, The Netherlands: Kluwer Low Interna
tional, 2003, 153.
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347

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Fen Olsen Hampson, Barriers to Negotiation in International Multilateral Ne
gotiation, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 29; . : Adriana Camisar,
Boris Diechtiareff, An Analysis of the Dayton Negotiations and Peace Accords, the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy, 2005, 11.
18
Michael Watkins, Strategic Simplification: Toward a Theory of Modular De
sign in Negotiation, International Negotiation, Kluwer Law International, 2003, 160.
17

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.
, 161.
Michael Watkins, Getting to Dayton. Negotiating and End to the War in Bo
snia, HBS Case No 1-800-134, Cambridge, Harward Business School, 1999, 17.
19

20

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Camisar, Diechtiareff 2005: A. Camisar, B. Diechtiareff, An Analysis of the Dayton Nego
tiations and Peace Accords, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
Holbrooke 1998: R. Holbrooke, To End a War, New York, Random Hous e.
2007: . , , /
, .
21

Richard Holbrooke, To End a War, New York, Random House, 1998, 317.

351

Camisar, Diechtiareff 2005: A. Camisar, B. Diechtiareff, An Analysis of the Dayton Nego

tiations and Peace Accords, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
Holbrooke 1998: R. Holbrooke, To End a War, New York, Random Hous e.
Kaplan 1993: R. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History. New York, Vintage
Books.
2007: . , , /
, .
Nobilo 2000: M. Nobiolo, Hrvatski feniks, Diplomatski procesi iza zatvorenih vrata 19901997, Nakladni zavod Globus, Zagreb.
Watkins 2003: M. Watkins, Strategic Simplification: Toward a Theory of Modular De
sign in Negotiation, International Negotiation, Kluwer Law International.
Watkins 1999: M. Watkins, Getting to Dayton. Negotiating and End to the War in Bo
snia, HBS Case No 1-800-134, Cambridge, Harward Business School.

352

Sran SLOVI

Daytons Peace Accord

Historic background, preparation, and results
Summary
Although it had had some drawbacks, Daytons Peace Accord was to be a
successful one due to the following reasons:
Firstly, USA finally realised they had been the crucial factor of war ending
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, otherwise their credibility as the great power would
be put into question.
Secondly, Croatian military operation called Oluja (Storm) and rut
hless bombing of Serbian targets in Bosnia and Herzegovina changed balance of
power and created factual fundament for negotiation on territorial division by
drawing of future maps on the field.
Thirdly, Milosevic finally realised Serbs from Bosnia were a primary obstac
le toward the lifting of international sanctions and set free isolation.
Fourthly, American administration gave a full freedom to the main negotia
tor Holbrooke to lead the negotiations.
Finally, Daytons Peac e Accord managed to ensure the ceas e of fire, which
was the greatest achievement of it. On the other hand, it could not give the answer
to the question of the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina either it is in integration
or separation. The basic problem which is going to appear during its implemen
tation will include nation building process on the ruins of the war. This is because
the above mentioned process is influenced by domestic political forces, conside
rations and dilemmas besides strong international civic and military presence. In
this point coercive diplomacy has proven to be unsuccessful. It might be rung off.
Key words: Dayton, negotiations, belligerent parties, Holbrooke, great po
wers, Kosovo and Metohia, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

14. 2011. ,
.