Professional Documents
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GU-648 Guide For Process Safety in Design
GU-648 Guide For Process Safety in Design
Document ID
Document Type
Security
Discipline
Owner
Issue Date
Revision
GU-648
Guideline
Unrestricted
th
15 December 2010
1.0
This document is the property of Petroleum Development Oman, LLC. Neither the whole nor any part of
this document may be disclosed to others or reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in
any form by any means (electronic, mechanical, reprographic recording or otherwise) without prior
written consent of the owner.
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Document Authorisation
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ii Revision History
The following is a brief summary of the 4 most recent revisions to this document. Details of all
revisions prior to these are held on file by the issuing department.
Revision
No.
Date
Author
Scope / Remarks
1.0
Dec-10
Ian Jewitt
(MSE4)/yaseen Al
Lawati (UOM6)
New Issue
Draft
Oct-10
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 6
1.1
Background ...................................................................................................................... 6
1.2
Purpose ............................................................................................................................ 6
1.3
Objective .......................................................................................................................... 6
1.4
1.5
1.6
2.2
4.1
4.2
Design Integrity............................................................................................................... 12
4.3
4.4
Identify ............................................................................................................................ 15
5.2
Assess ............................................................................................................................ 16
5.3
Select.............................................................................................................................. 18
5.4
Define ............................................................................................................................. 21
5.5
Execute .......................................................................................................................... 24
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Introduction
1.1
Background
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Asset Integrity Process Safety (AI-PS) is about prevention and mitigation of incidents
(such as fire or explosion) that result from unintentional release of energy or hazardous
substances contained in the process assets we operate.
Successful AI-PS management is based on four principles:
1.
2.
3.
4.
These principles are applicable to all phases of the Opportunity Realisation Process
(ORP).
1.2
Purpose
This guideline will be part of the Project Delivery documentation and its aim is to provide
clarity with regards to AI-PS requirements throughout the phases from project
identification to execution. It does not add any new processes or requirements to
existing ORP deliverables, but extracts from the existing ORP documentation all the
relevant information necessary to meet the AI-PS requirements at handover. It also
provides further clarity with regards to the assurance processes which underpin the
project teams ability to demonstrate that AI-PS requirements are met at the end of
every project phase. This will allow PDO to make the statement that Our Asset is Safe
and we know it after each project phase.
Delivery of AI-PS requires that all major and high risk hazards (Highs and 5s on the risk
Assessment Matrix) are identified and mitigated against using the Hazard and Effects
Management Process (HEMP). The systems and their subsidiary components critical to
managing risks must be properly designed, procured, built, installed, tested and
maintained such that the risk of a major or high risk accident event is ALARP. The HSE
case (SP-2062 - HSE Specification: Specifications for HSE Cases) is the main vehicle to
demonstrate ALARP and is a fundamental AI-PS tool for the project manager and
project team.
1.3
Objective
The main objective of this guideline is to explain the key AI-PS objectives and
deliverables throughout the project phases that demonstrate the facility is fit for the safe
introduction of process fluids and that systems, processes and procedures are in place
so that AI-PS can be safeguarded in the subsequent operate phase.
1.4
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1.6
Step-out Approval
Not applicable to this guideline.
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2.1
Risk Management
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Identify and document Hazards with RAM red and yellow 5A and 5B Process
Safety risks for existing and new Assets.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Verify that Contract Holders monitor the HSE (Process Safety) requirements of
the contract that are relevant to the competence and fitness to work of
contractor staff.
6.
7.
2.2
the complexity of the activity including multiple concurrent tasks, and nonroutine and unexpected activities; and
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8.
9.
Design and construct new Assets and make modifications to existing Assets to
meet the SHALL [PS] requirements identified in PDO specifications and PDOadopted Shell DEPs, or seek a derogation from the TA-1.
10.
11.
Create, make available and maintain the documentation for Safety Critical
Equipment (SCE), including data and drawings that are critical to managing
Process Safety.
12.
Perform Pre-Start Up Audits (PSUA) for new Assets and for modifications to
existing Assets.
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Process safety commitment involves developing and sustaining a culture that embraces
process safety; identifying, understanding and complying with codes, standards,
regulations, and laws; establishing and continually enhancing organizational
competence; and engaging all stakeholders, including employees, contractors, and
neighbours.
To understand hazards and risk, the focus is on collecting, documenting, and
maintaining process safety knowledge in documents such as EORDs, asset registers
and as built drawings; and conducting hazard identification and risk analysis studies
such as HAZID, HAZOP, IPF and Fire & Explosion Analysis (FERM). These areas are
relevant in design and engineering as well as later in operation.
The management of process safety risk is made up of many elements.
Operating integrity is demonstrated;
by operating in accordance with plant start up and shut down procedures;
following the Permit to Work system and associated safe systems of work;
operating within design envelopes; conducting operations activities in accordance
with recognised good practice;
signing Statements of Fitness before starting up operations;
and maintaining emergency preparedness.
Technical integrity is demonstrated;
by executing work activities to ensure that equipment is fabricated and installed in
accordance with specifications;
and that it is maintained and inspected so that it remains fit for service over its entire
life cycle.
Broader elements of managing risk include;
managing contractors to ensure that contractors are not exposed to unrecognized
hazards or undertake activities that present unknown or intolerable risk;
providing training and conducting related activities to ensure reliable human
performance at all levels of the organization;
and recognizing and managing changes.
Design integrity is also an aspect of reducing process safety risk to ALARP. In most
situations, compliance to PDO adopted specifications and practices will be sufficient.
However, this may not always be the case and the application of good engineering
principles, risk assessment and addressing societal concerns (the potential for multiple
fatalities) may also be necessary to achieve ALARP risk in design.
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Learning from incidents involves investigating process safety incidents to identify and
address the root causes; applying lessons from incidents that occur at other facilities
within PDO and within the industry; measuring performance and striving to continuously
improve in areas that have been determined to be risk significant; auditing process
safety management systems; and holding periodic management reviews to determine if
the management systems are working as intended and if the work activities are helping
the facility effectively manage risk.
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4.1
4.1.1
4.1.2
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People
PDO project leadership regularly demonstrates in words and actions that they
are committed to deliver AI-PS requirements
Systems
Quality documentation and data is managed throughout the project phases and
made available for the Operate phase in a user friendly format
Regular assurance of AI-PS deliverables takes place and results are captured in
the HSE Case
Lessons are applied from Process Safety incidents and assurance findings at
other facilities within PDO and within the industry
GU-648 Guide for Applying Process Safety in Projects
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4.2
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Process Safety actions (e.g. from HEMP studies, project reviews, TI verification,
etc.) are tracked and records are maintained to demonstrate closure by
competent Technical Authorities
Design Integrity
Design Integrity is achieved through compliance to good practice (i.e. PDO
specifications and adopted Shell DEPs) and application of HEMP (e.g. HAZID, HAZOP,
IPF assessment, FEA, HSE Case, etc.) to ensure the risk is reduced to ALARP.
The ALARP demonstration process can involve varying degrees of attention which will
depend on the nature of the hazard, the extent of the risk and the control measures to
be adopted. The greater the initial level of risk under consideration, the greater the
degree of rigour PDO requires of the arguments claiming to show that those risks have
been reduced to ALARP. However, Project Managers should not be overburdened if
such rigour is not necessary.
Where risks are required to be reduced to ALARP:
Compliance with relevant good practice alone may be sufficient to demonstrate that
risks have been reduced to ALARP. However, depending on the level of risk and
complexity of the situation, it is also possible that meeting good practice alone may not
be sufficient to reduce risks to ALARP.
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In Severity Five and High Risk hazard situations, where the circumstances are not fully
within the scope of good practice, additional measures may be required to reduce risks
ALARP. Furthermore, where the potential consequences are Severity Five on the PDO
risk assessment matrix, Project Managers should take a precautionary approach by
giving more weight to the use of sound engineering and operational practice than to
arguments about the probability of failure. The Figure below shows the hierarchy of
good engineering principles.
In simple terms, in Severity Five and High Risk hazard situations, Project Managers
should:
4.3
ask the question Are there any other measures which would be effective in
further reducing the risks?; and
Technical Integrity
The project team needs to be able to demonstrate that Technical Integrity can be
maintained throughout the Operate phase by delivering the Design Integrity
requirements. Independent assurance will take place throughout the Define and
Execute phases to confirm TI is designed and built in.
Specifically TI covers:
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Management Systems (SAP-PM / QM) fully populated & tested and consistent
with critical as-built documents and drawings.
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Operating Integrity
While Operating Integrity refers to the way that an asset is operated, Projects have a
key role to play in this regard by ensuring that assets are delivered in such a way to
support safe operations. Key examples include:
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Human factors issues for process safety have been addressed, e.g. ease of
access to critical manual valves, alarm rationalisation, control room layout, etc.
Operations Management System set up (trip and alarm, PTW, plant operating
procedures, ER procedures, key registers and communications protocols)
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Project Phases
The Opportunity Realisation Process (ORP) is split into six phases punctuated by
decision gates. Each phase has clear milestones and decision gates, activities,
deliverables and decision requirements. The phases are:
This guideline follows the six ORP phases and details what deliverables need to be
achieved at each decision gate, in order to meet the AI-PS requirements at the end of
the execute phase.
5.1
Identify
The Identify phase is the first step of the project cycle and evaluates if we understand
what were getting ourselves into and should we spend resources in assessment of this
opportunity.
The following DCAF deliverables for the Identify Phase have critical AI-PS content:
Deliverable
5.1.1
ATA
Risk Register
Field development
PCAP
Field development
RTA(s)
Surface production, HSE
Risk Register
The process looks at the key deliverables of the project and threats to success and any
opportunities identified. AI-PS threats shall be transferred to a Risk Register which is a
live document updated at each phase of the project. All actions are assigned to an
action party and given a due date and risk owner.
Management of the identified risks is primarily about adopting a structured methodology
of working that ensures risks are identified, understood, agreed, communicated and
acted upon in a timely and consistent manner. Risk Management must be steered by
the project leadership and actively used to support the decision making process.
5.1.2
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5.2
Key deliverables: there are a number of plans, reports and other documents that
are mandatory elements of the ORP. In creating the PCAP, the Project
Manager and Decision Review Board (DRB) must first address these
deliverables and determine how they are applicable to their project.
Key assurance events: the PCAP must include the mandatory assurance events
under the ORP, such as Value Assurance Reviews (VARs) before each
Decision Gate.
Assess
Decision Gate 2 at the end of the Assess Phase confirms the feasibility of the
development and that there is a high enough likelihood of success.
The following DCAF deliverables for the Assess phase have critical AI-PS content:
Deliverable
ATA
RTA(s)
Risk Register*
Field development
PCAP*
Field development
Initial
Assessment
Operations
Surface production
Logistics
Process engineering
Well
engineering,
completions
&
well
interventions,
process
engineering
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Within the Initial Operation Assessment the ground rules for Alarm Management and
Live Operating envelopes needs to be established. This will form the basis for how the
facility will be operated. An Alarm catalogue will be produced following a rigorous risk
based analysis of requirements. The accepted PDO standard for developing these
elements within green field projects is the ESP (Ensure Safe Production) process. ESP
techniques should be employed at Assess stage in a green field project.
5.2.2
5.2.3
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Select
The objectives of the Select phase are to get all strategic decisions of a project
approved by the appropriate authority. The word strategic is used loosely, as the nature
of the decisions to be taken is often dictated by time schedules, lead times for
Government approvals and contracting tactics. It is the phase in which most strategic
decisions on how the project will be executed and operated are made. By the end of the
select phase, the correct AI-PS culture must have been established by the Project
Manager through visible commitment and (plans for) dedicated AI-PS assurance
activities. The project team must be able to demonstrate ALARP and that the selected
option is also the lowest HSE risk option. This ALARP demonstration will continue with
the creation of the design HSE case during the Define phase.
DCAF deliverables with key AI-PS content at Select phase are:
Deliverable
ATA
RTA(s)
Risk Register*
Field development
PCAP*
Field development
Process engineering
Layout Design
Selection Report
Surface
production,
mechanical
static,
electrical, civil, pipelines,
project, HSE (technical
safety)
Selection of Engineering
Design Standards
Project
(concept)
Operations Philosophy
Surface production
Corrosion
Management
Strategy
/
Materials
Selection Report
Materials
inspection
ALARP
Report
Process engineering
HSE Philosophy
Process engineering
Technical
Integrity
Verification Report
Field development
Project
engineering
(concept), HSE
Process
Report
Process engineering
Site
Demonstration
Fire
and
Assessment
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Explosion
Safeguarding
engineering
corrosion
Production
chemistry,
process engineering
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ATA
RTA(s)
OR&A Plan
Surface production
Maintenance
project
(concept)
& integrity,
engineering
5.3.2
5.3.3
Operations Philosophy
The Operations Philosophy covers all aspects of the future operation and is developed
from the Initial Operations Assessment. It provides the framework to ensure facility
design matches how the asset is to be managed, operated, maintained, staffed and
supported. The philosophy should describe how relevant People and Systems, operate
pass Technical Integrity and Operating Integrity objectives will be achieved. It is
essential that Operations Philosophy is developed in parallel with the concept selection
work to ensure that this alignment exists. Intended readers during a projects
development phases are designers and future operators and during steady state
operation technical and operational personnel.
5.3.4
5.3.5
ALARP Demonstration
The Concept Selection Report (CSR) forms the basis for the engineering activities in the
Define phase. It clarifies the context in which the selection decision has been made, the
data that have been used, the alternatives that have been studied, and the values and
trade- offs between alternatives. The purpose of the HSE content of the CSR is to
demonstrate that there has been a systematic application of HEMP during the Identify &
Assess and Select phases for each option being considered and to confirm that the
lowest risk option has been actively sought and selected; or alternatively, demonstrate
that the cost/effort required to adopt the lowest risk concept is grossly disproportionate
to the benefit (ALARP).
For very large or complex projects, the ALARP demonstration may be a separate report,
and the summarised in the CSR.
5.3.6
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documents and drawings will be available for each design option, e.g. PFS, mass
balance data, plot layout, process and project descriptions, HSE and Operations
Philosophy, IIA reports, etc.
5.3.7
5.3.8
HSE Philosophy
A HSE philosophy is required to guide and drive the design intent of HSE critical
systems. The philosophies are prepared during the Select phase to be implemented in
later project stages and are used as input into the functional specifications. The main
process safety aspects of the philosophy includes emergency shut down and blowdown;
fire and gas detection; active and passive fire protection (including guidelines for fire
fighting systems and fire protection); sighting and layout; and process containment.
5.3.9
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Define
The objective of ORP Phase 4, Define (or Concept Definition) is to translate the project
concept into a structured plan, with associated costs. This project plan must contain
sufficient level of detail including a comprehensive Design HSE Case to enable the
Decision Executive to decide whether to proceed or not. The Define phase ends with
the Final Investment Decision (FID) which is, traditionally, seen as the point of no return
for the project.
The deliverables from Define also form the basis of handover to the execution
contractors. The main deliverables of Define are the Basis for Design (BfD), the Project
Specification and the Design HSE Case. Together they are commonly referred to as
Front End Engineering Design (FEED).
There are many Define phase deliverables that are necessary to meet AI-PS objectives,
including critical drawings (e.g. PSFS, PFS and UFS, PEFS and UEFS, HACs, F&G
location, F&G C&E, C&E) and critical studies (e.g. relief, flare and vent study, facilities
layout, pipe stress analysis, materials selection report, etc.).
The following selected DCAF deliverables have a with key role in delivering AI-PS in the
Define phase:
Deliverable
ATA
RTA(s)
Risk Register*
Project engineering
PCAP*
Project engineering
Facilities Layout
Mechanical static
Operations Philosophy*
Surface production
Corrosion
Management
Strategy
/
Materials
Selection Report
Materials
inspection
HSE Philosophy*
Project engineering
Technical
Verification Plan*
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Integrity
corrosion
&
Production
process
pipelines
technology,
engineering,
OR&A Plan*
Surface production
Field development
Process
Safeguarding
Memorandum
Process engineering
Functional
Specifications
and Process Data Sheets
for Equipment
Process engineering
Process
engineering,
project engineering
C&A
Project engineering
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ATA
RTA(s)
Project engineering
Maintenance
Strategies
Material
inspection
&
Integrity
corrosion
&
Concept definition / FEED (does the design meet the specifications ALARP)
Detailed Design (does the design continue to meet the specifications ALARP)
Verification may be anything from an internal peer review, to independent 3rd party,
depending on assessed risk. This should be documented in the TIV Plan.
Commissioning is the ultimate Assurance and Verification point for equipment and
systems prior to handover to operations. Verification provides the independence that the
assurance checks and controls are adequate and robust.
5.4.2
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5.4.4
5.4.5
5.4.6
5.4.7
5.4.8
5.4.9
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Execute
The Execute phase delivers the asset to the asset owner, ready for startup. The phase
can last several years and includes numerous areas of very diverse expertise. All the
areas of expertise will have to be integrated and managed to deliver a demonstrably
safe asset.
Execute activities are primarily carried out by contractors. The challenge to PDO is to
select the right method of management, contracting strategy, QA/QC and supervision of
those contracts and contractors to ensure the end product is as per the customers
requirements. Vendor and supplier activity supervision is equally critical. The customer
will verify before handover that the asset is safe using the Statement of Fitness review
and the Pre Start Up Audit.
There are many Execute phase deliverables that are necessary to meet AI-PS
objectives, including critical drawings throughout execution (e.g. PSFS, PFS and UFS,
PEFS and UEFS, HACs, F&G location, F&G C&E, C&E) and critical studies (e.g. relief,
flare and vent study, facilities layout, pipe stress analysis, materials selection, etc.).
DCAF deliverables with key AI-PS content for the Execute phase are;
Deliverable
ATA
Risk Register*
Project engineering
HSE
PCAP*
Project engineering
Operations Philosophy*
Surface production
Corrosion
System
Material
inspection
Management
HSE Philosophy*
Project engineering
corrosion
Surface production
OR&A Plan*
Surface production
Electrical
Process
Safeguarding
Memorandum*
Process engineering
Process
engineering,
project engineering
SIL Assessment
C&A
Process
engineering,
mechanical static
Project engineering
PTW System
Surface production
Project engineering
Operating
Procedures
(Plant Operating Manual)
Surface production
Commissioned
Facilities
Engineering and Vendor
Data
Project engineering
Surface
mechanical
mechanical
pipelines
Technical
Verification Plan*
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RTA(s)
Integrity
production,
static,
rotating,
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ATA
RTA(s)
Project engineering
Well
engineering,
completions
&
well
interventions,
surface
production, HSE (technical
safety)
Operations
HSE
Case
(including
MOPO
and
Statement of Fitness)
Project engineering
As Built Drawings
Project engineering
Surface production
Asset register
Project engineering
Surface production
Operations Philosophy
The Operations Philosophy has been developed through the several project phases
leading to a finalised document at handover. This document should reflect the PDO
portfolio segment for which the project has been developed (e.g. Sour). It covers the
entire spectrum of asset operations and its associated technical and non-technical
disciplines. It should at this stage also include an Operations Organisational Strategy
and Resourcing plan which has been agreed with the Production and Maintenance
Functions. This strategy and plan should specifically address the competence
standards and development for safety critical Production and Maintenance staff related
to the portfolio segment.
5.5.2
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Risk Based Inspection (RBI): Corrosion rates, remaining life and next inspection
date.
Inspection drawings
Inspection procedures
Ability to generate trend reports, carry out risk assessment and produce work
packs
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5.5.4
5.5.5
Permit to Work
An Permit to Work (PTW) system approved by PDO, and in accordance with PR-1172
Permit to Work System should be in place.
5.5.6
5.5.7
5.5.8
5.5.9
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Actions to take if or when certain situations arise that could compromise safe
operating limits. These situations are identified from:
o
Statement of Fitness
The Statement of Fitness is an integral part of the Operations HSE Case and by signing
the Statement of Fitness the new asset owner agrees that:
Process safety risks have been identified and documented in the HSE Cases
and are managed to ALARP;
Design and construction of the facility meet the design and engineering
requirements, i.e. as a minimum compliance with the SHALL [PS] requirements
in PDO specifications and Shell DEPs; the Process Safety Basic Requirements
are met; and AI-PS project actions are closed or have risk-assessed plans for
closure;
The Statement of Fitness should be signed prior to the Pre-Startup Audit (PSUA), which
is the last official technical review of the suitability of a facility to accept hydrocarbons.
5.5.10 Critical Documents and Drawings
The critical drawings available at project handover will be the "'Red Lined"" marked up
drawings, not the normal As Built drawings, as producing As Built drawings and
uploading them into Livelink can take several months after commissioning. Typical
critical drawings are Hazardous area plot drawings, PEFS's and Cause and Effect
drawings. An example of a critical document is the Equipment Vendor Operations and
Maintenance manual.
5.5.11 Commissioning and Start-Up (CSU) Plan
A detailed CSU execution plan and related CSU deliverables are developed for each
hardware delivery group to support the execution of CSU requirements during the
Execute and Startup phase. The Level 4 (including resources) CSU execution plans are
aligned with construction plans to create an integrated Mechanical Completion/ CSU
plan (Completions Milestones) that includes all hold/ witness points, including certifying/
verification authorities to verify Technical Integrity of the procured and built equipment.
Startup procedures, inclusive of coarse Startup on paper exercises are critical due to
the number of historical process safety incidents during facility or equipment startup.
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Visualisation of the SAP work order and notification status by barrier or SCE
group at any level within the asset hierarchy.
Flag and monitor those work orders and notifications that require action.
FSR should be live at commissioning and showing green for all the SCEs
indicating they have passed their first performance test (i.e. commissioning)
successfully.
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The relevant technical authority, e.g. process, rotating, static engineer sets the limits for
equipment and facilities and the Production Technologists sets the envelope for the
wells. These operating envelopes must be clearly communicated to Operations staff
prior to facility handover.
Trip & Alarm Management
Major process safety disasters over the last decades have shown that lack of operator
empowerment to take independent actions can lead to extreme consequences. Human
inhibitions or hesitations, that are usually culture dependent, may override human
capability. This has led to not taking action at all, often against better judgment. To deal
with the situation as described above, a simple philosophy for setting operating limits
and designing or restructuring notification systems has been adopted and summarised
below:
Know the (safe) process limits on which the notifications are based. These
limits must be demonstrably and verifiably within the engineering constraints of
equipment. To ensure consistency, all constraints and limits should reside in a
single, electronic repository;
Actions necessary to bring the process back to its normal state shall be
predefined for every limit and shall be available to the operator. The operator
shall be formally empowered to execute such actions.
Inhibit Management
An Inhibit Management System should be in place at handover to manage the new
facility operation. This should be controlled and documented via operating procedures
in POM's and also by MoC when inhibits or overrides are in place for extended periods.
Approval levels should be stated and personnel responsible informed.
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Key Registers
Key Registers must be in place, auditable and up to date. Typical Key Registers are
competence, inhibits, temporary repairs, deviations, etc.
Operations Handovers
A robust and structured handover process between key Process Safety critical positions
must be in place for both daily and shift (tour) handovers. LINK
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Avoid tank overfill followed by vapour cloud release, i.e. create an inventory
of all storage tanks containing fluids that have the potential to overfill resulting in
a vapour cloud explosion. Examples of such fluids are natural gas liquids
(condensates) and crude oils with a Reid Vapour Pressure (RVP) > 2.5 psi.
Assess the risk of each tank and define the risk mitigation.
Avoid brittle fracture of metallic materials, i.e. determine the LDT or MAT for
all process equipment and piping, containing liquefied gas or compressed
flammable low molecular weight hydrocarbon gas. Take measures to prevent
the equipment being at pressure below the LDT or alternatively ensure the
equipment metal temperature is not below the appropriate MAT at any given
operating pressure. Consider scenarios in which equipment temperature can
drop such as blow-downs, as well as scenarios of subsequent (re)pressurization of equipment.
Sour gas (H2S), in accordance with SP-1190 Design for Sour Service
Specification and PR-1078 H2S Management.
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Ap p e n d ix 1 Re fe re n c e Ma te ria l
The following reference material relates to AI-PSM:
1.
HSE & SD Policy - The Asset Integrity-Process Safety Policy is an integral part
of PDOs HSE & SD policy
2.
3.
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4.
5.
6.
7.
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8.
Operate Product Surface Flow Assets CP-115 - This Code of Practice defines
the Strategies and Controls that need to be implemented in PDO for the
effective Operation of Surface Product Flow Assets. It makes reference to Shell
Standards and Processes when they are applicable and where there is no
equivalent available within PDO
9.
10.
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Ap p e n d ix 2 Ab b re via tio n s
AI-PS
ALARP
BfD
BOM
DCAF
DE
DEP
DRB
ESP
ESP
E-SPIR
FEED
FERM
FSR
HAZID
Hazard Identification
HEMP
MAE
MoC
Management of Change
MOPO
OR&A
ORM
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ORP
PCAP
PEFS
POM
PTW
Permit to Work
QA
Quality Assurance
QC
Quality Control
RAM
RBI
SCE
SIL
SoF
Statement of Fitness
SP
Specification
TIV
VAR
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Ap p e n d ix 3 En d o f De live ry Ma p (to b e d e ve lo p e d )
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