Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Com Transpo 45
Com Transpo 45
Articles Applied:
1
Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public.
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,
are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety
of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in Articles
1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers is further set forth in Articles 1755 and 1756.
Art. 1766. In all matters not regulated by this Code, the rights and obligations of common
carriers shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws.
Facts:
Herein respondent Ernesto Cendana was engaged in buying up used bottles and scrap metal in
Pangasinan. Normally, after collection respondent would bring such material to Manila for resale. He
utilized (2) two six-wheelers trucks which he owned for the purpose. Upon returning to Pangasinan, he
would load his vehicle with cargo belonging to different merchants to different establishments in
Pangasisnan which respondents charged a freight fee for.
Sometime in November 1970, herein petitioner Pedro de Guzman, a merchant and dealer of
General Milk Company Inc. in Pangasinan contracted with respondent for hauling 750 cartons of milk.
Unfortunately, only 150 cartons made it, as the other 600 cartons were intercepted by hijackers along
Marcos Highway. Hence, petitioners commenced an action against private respondent.
In his defense, respondent argued that he cannot be held liable due to force majuere, and that he
is not a common carrier and hence is not required to exercise extraordinary diligence.
Issues:
1. Whether or not respondent can be held liable for loss of the cartons of milk due to force majeure.
2. Whether or not respondent is a common carrier.
Held:
1. The court ruled the affirmative. The circumstances do not fall under the exemption from liability as
enumerated in Article 1734 of the Civil Code. The general rule is established by the article that
common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods which they
carry, unless the same is due to any of the following causes only:
a. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disasters;
b. Act of the public enemy, whether international or civil;
c. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
d. Character of the goods or defects in the packing;
e. Order or act of competent public authority.
2. The court ruled the affirmative. Article 1732 of the New Civil Code avoids any distinction between
one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both and one who
does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. It also avoids a distinction between a person or
enterprise offering transportation services on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such
services on an occasional, episodic, and unscheduled basis.
Facts:
Planters Products (Planters) purchased from Mitsubishi International Corporation of USA of 9,000
metric tons of urea fertilizer which the latter shipped abroad the cargo vessel owned by private
respondent Kyosei Kisin Kabushiki Kaisha (KKKK) from America to La Union. Prior to its voyage, a time
charter party was entered into between Mitusbishi as shipper/charterer and KKKK as ship-owner. After
the Urea fertilizer was loaded in bulk by stevedored hired by the shipper, the steel hatches were closed
with heavy iron lids which remained closed during the entire journey.
Upon arrival of the vessel, the hatches were opened with the use of the vessel boom. Planters
unloaded the cargo from the holders into the steel bodied dump trucks. Each time the dump trucks were
filled up, its load of urea was covered with tarpaulin before it was transported to the consignees
warehouse located some (50) fifty meteres from the wharf. It took (11) eleven days from planters to
unload the cargo. The report submitted by private marine and cargo surveyors revealed a shortage in the
cargo, and some portion in the cargo was contaminated with dirt, rendering the same unfit for commerce.
Planters filed an action for damages bu the appellate court absolved the carrier from liability.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the respondent is a common carrier.
2. Whether or not the respondent is liable for damages.
Held:
1. The court rules the affirmative as to the respondent being a common carrier. The term common
carrier is defined in Article 1732 of the Civil Code. The definition refers to carriers either by land,
water, or air which holds themselves out as ready to engage in carrying goods on transporting
passengers or both for compensation as a public employment and not as a casual occupation; if
the undertaking is a single transaction, not a part of the general business or corporation, although
involving the carriage of goods for a fee, then the person or corporation offering such services is
a private carrier. In the case at bar respondent carrier transports goods indiscriminately for all
persons. Being such, he is a common carrier.
2. The court rules the negative. True, being a common carrier, respondent must have observed
extraordinary diligence over the goods it carries. In the case at bar it has been proven that the
respondent has sufficiently overcome this, by clear and convincing proof, the prima facie
presumption of negligence, due to the manner of storage of the goals during the vogyage. In fact,
it was pointed out that there was a risk in shipping the urea due to its character.
Facts:
Herein defendants were charged with the violation of Act No. 98. The accused herein have been
engaged for more than (4) four years in the transportation of passengers and merchandise in the port of
Curimao, in the loading and unloading of passengers and merchandise by means of voyages from the
shore. The facts state that sometime in September 1912, the said accused, by means of voyages,
unloaded 5,986 sacks of rice belonging to the provincial government of Ilocos Norte where they regularly
charge 6 cents for the unloading and loading of each package of merchandise.
Issue:
Whether or not the provincial government was prejudiced by the preferential privileges in favor of
the shippers.
Held:
The court rules the affirmative. Sec. 5 of Act No. 98, provides that any person or corporation who
may be damaged by the common carrier of any matter or things prohibited shall be entitled to sue or
recover all damges so incurred. It is not believed that that law prohibits common carrier from making
special rates for handling merchandise when the same are made for the purpose of increasing the
business which are regarded as sound. That does not require absolute equality in all cases; it only
applies where the services perfomed in the different cases are substantially the same and conditions
similar.
Tatad v. Garcia
G.R. No. 114222
Facts:
12
Samar Mining Co. v. Nordeutscher Lloyd & C.F. Sharp & Co. Inc.
G.R. No. L-28673
Facts:
13
Held:
Eastern Shipping shall pay the Development Insurance the amount of P256,039 for the 28
packages of calorized lance pipes, and P71,540 for the 7 cases of spare parts, with interest at the legal
rate from the date of the filing of the Complaint on 13 June 1978, plus P5,000 as attorneys fees, and the
costs. The Court, on the other hand, in GR 71478, affirmed the judgment.
The evidence of the defendant did not show that extraordinary diligence was observed by the
vessel to prevent the occurrence of fire at hatches nos. 2 and 3. Defendants evidence did not likewise
show the amount of diligence made by the crew, on orders, in the care of the cargoes. What appears is
15
18
Articles Applied:
Art. 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods,
unless the same is due to any of the following causes only:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
19
Art. 1736. The extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts from the time the goods are
unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the carrier for transportation until the same
are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right
to receive them, without prejudice to the provisions of Article 1738.
Art. 1737. The common carrier's duty to observe extraordinary diligence over the goods remains in full
force and effect even when they are temporarily unloaded or stored in transit, unless the shipper or
owner has made use of the right of stoppage in transitu.
Art. 1738. The extraordinary liability of the common carrier continues to be operative even during the
time the goods are stored in a warehouse of the carrier at the place of destination, until the consignee
has been advised of the arrival of the goods and has had reasonable opportunity thereafter to remove
them or otherwise dispose of them.
Art. 1739. In order that the common carrier may be exempted from responsibility, the natural disaster
must have been the proximate and only cause of the loss. However, the common carrier must exercise
due diligence to prevent or minimize loss before, during and after the occurrence of flood, storm or other
natural disaster in order that the common carrier may be exempted from liability for the loss, destruction,
or deterioration of the goods. The same duty is incumbent upon the common carrier in case of an act of
the public enemy referred to in Article 1734, No. 2.
Art. 1740. If the common carrier negligently incurs in delay in transporting the goods, a natural disaster
shall not free such carrier from responsibility.
20
Art. 1742. Even if the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods should be caused by the character
of the goods, or the faulty nature of the packing or of the containers, the common carrier must exercise
due diligence to forestall or lessen the loss.
Art. 1743. If through the order of public authority the goods are seized or destroyed, the common carrier
is not responsible, provided said public authority had power to issue the order.
Gelisan v. Alday
154 SCRA 388
Facts:
21
Santos v. Sibug
G.R. No. L-26815
Facts:
24
26
27
Magboo v. Bernardo
G.R. No. L-16790
Facts:
The petitioners filed an action against the respondent who is the owner of the jeep and who is
being claimed to be responsible for the death of the petitioners 8 year old child in a vehicular accident.
The respondent denies being liable for the death of the said child because he claimed that there was no
employer-employee relationship between him and the driver of the said jeep because of the boundary
system that they are following. The respondent claims that only the driver should be liable because the
relationship between the two is that of a lessor-lessee. Respondent also claims that he should not be
held subsidiary liable because the driver of the jeep pleaded guilty to a criminal case without
respondents knowledge.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is liable for the death of the child of the petitioners.
Held:
The Court held that the respondent should be liable because the lease he made with the driver of
the jeep was not approved by the Public Service Commission (PSC). Since the lease was made without
such approval, the owner continued to be the operator of the jeep in legal contemplation and such was
responsible for the consequences of his operation. The Court also held that the claim of the respondent
in stating that he did not know of the plea made by the driver, which prevented him from proving his
innocence, was raised too late in the case therefore the respondent is estopped from enforcing any claim
regarding to that matter.
28
Issue:
Held:
Eastern Shipping shall pay the Development Insurance the amount of P256,039 for the 28
packages of calorized lance pipes, and P71,540 for the 7 cases of spare parts, with interest at the legal
rate from the date of the filing of the Complaint on 13 June 1978, plus P5,000 as attorneys fees, and the
costs. The Court, on the other hand, in GR 71478, affirmed the judgment.
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
Lu Do v. Binamara
101 PHIL 120
36
38
41
Articles Applied:
Art. 1744. A stipulation between the common carrier and the shipper or owner limiting the liability of the
former for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods to a degree less than extraordinary
diligence shall be valid, provided it be:
(1) In writing, signed by the shipper or owner;
(2) Supported by a valuable consideration other than the service rendered by the common carrier;
and
42
Art. 1747. If the common carrier, without just cause, delays the transportation of the goods or changes
the stipulated or usual route, the contract limiting the common carrier's liability cannot be availed of in
case of the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods.
Art. 1748. An agreement limiting the common carrier's liability for delay on account of strikes or riots is
valid.
Art. 1749. A stipulation that the common carrier's liability is limited to the value of the goods appearing in
the bill of lading, unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value, is binding.
Art. 1750. A contract fixing the sum that may be recovered. by the owner or shipper for the loss,
destruction, or deterioration of the goods is valid, if it is reasonable and just under the circumstances,
and has been fairly and freely agreed upon.
43
Art. 1752. Even when there is an agreement limiting the liability of the common carrier in the vigilance
over the goods, the common carrier is disputably presumed to have been negligent in case of their loss,
destruction or deterioration.
Art. 1753. The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported shall govern the liability of the
common carrier for their loss, destruction or deterioration.
Art. 1754. The provisions of Articles 1733 to 1753 shall apply to the passenger's baggage which is not in
his personal custody or in that of his employee. As to other baggage, the rules in Articles 1998 and 2000
to 2003 concerning the responsibility of hotel-keepers shall be applicable.
46
51
Issue:
Whether or not Maersk is liable for breach of contract of common carriage.
Held:
The Court held that Maersk is liable for the breach of contract of common carriage. Common
carriers are not obligated by law to carry and deliver merchandise promptly unless the common carrier
previously assumes to deliver the goods at a given date or time. However, such delivery should be made
within a reasonable time.
In this case, it appears in the bill of lading that the goods will arrive on April 3. There was no
contract between the parties in this case, however the petitioner was aware of the date of the expected
arrival of the goods. The court finds that the delay of the delivery was unreasonable. It was due to the
negligence of the petitioner why the cargo arrived so late. Petitioner did not even explain the reason for
such delay. Therefore, petitioner herein is held liable for the breach of contract.
Held:
The Court held that the respondent did not commit a breach in the contract of carriage, The Court
applied Art. 1755 of the Civil Code stating that the common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
person, with due regard to all circumstances. The Court emphasized that there was utmost diligence on
the part of the carrier when it asked the person who bought the box what its contents are. It is not duly
bound to open the box and inspect the contents. The carrier had regard to all the circumstances in the
case because allowances should be given to the passengers and their property bought for it is presumed
that passengers will not bring anything that will cause damage to him or to others. In addition, the Court
stressed the constitutional right to privacy which is always present. Therefore, the carrier is not liable.
Mecenas v. CA
180 SCRA 83
Facts:
M/T Tacloban City, owned by Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) collided with M/T Don
Juan, was owned by respondents Negros Navigation Co., Inc. The petitioners in this case are the heirs of
two passengers who boarded the M/T Don Juan and perished due to the collision. The trial court held the
respondents liable for damages. On appeal, the respondents denied the liability by stating that between
the two vessels, the M/T Tacloban City was the one who is negligent and failed to follow the International
Rules of the Road when it did not turn starboard (right) to prevent the collision. The respondent court
reversed the decision applying the doctrine of last clear chance raised by the respondent. Petitioners
then appealed.
Issue:
59
Facts:
A bus of petitioner Fortune Express, Inc. figured an accident with a jeepney in Lanao del Norte
which resulted to the death of several passengers of the jeepney including two Maranaos. A
Constabulary agent investigated that the jeepney was owned by a Maranao and certain Maranaos were
planning to take revenge on petitioner by burning some of its buses. Subsequently, the Operations
Manager of Fortune Express was advised to take precautionary measures. Four days after the accident,
three armed Maranaos pretended to be passengers of a bus of petitioner. They seized such bus and set
it on fire. The passengers of the bus were asked to get off, but one passenger, Atty. Talib Caorong went
back to retrieve something. He was shot and killed during the incident. Petitioner contends that the
seizure by the armed assailants was a fortuitous event thus it cannot be held liable.
62
Issue:
Whether or not Fortune Express is liable for the death of Atty. Caorong.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the seizure of the bus by the armed Maranaos cannot be assailed
as a fortuitous event. The requisite of unforseeability to be considered forced majeure is lacking. Fortune
Express knew that Maranaos were planning to burn some of its passenger buses and yet petitioner did
nothing to protect the safety of its passengers. Petitioners employees failed to prevent the attack on one
of its passengers because they did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family. Hence,
petitioner should be held liable for the death of Atty. Caorong. Art. 1763 of the New Civil Code provides
that the common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of willful acts of
other passengers, if the employees of the common carrier could have prevented the act through proper
diligence. Because of Fortune Expresss negligence, the seizure of the bus by the armed Maranaos was
made possible.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable in this case.
2. Whether or not Manalo is solely liable for the death and physical injuries of the victims.
Held:
The Court held that the doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable in this case. This doctrine
shall only apply to suits between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. The case at bar is a
case where the passengers are demanding indemnity from the carrier due to the contract of common
carriage.
It is clear from the evidence that it is Manalo and the owners of the jeepney who are negligent in
this case. There was no proper explanation as to why the rear wheel of the vehicle suddenly became
detached. Therefore the Court affirms the decision of the lower court and holds Manalo and the owners
liable to pay damages.
Lara v. Valencia
104 PHIL 65
Facts:
The deceased was an inspector of the Bureau of Forestry in Davao who went to classify logs with
defendant in his Cotabato concession. Lara got sick of malaria. He asked defendant if he could take
him in pick-up back to Davao. Lara sat at the back of the vehicle on a bag. Lara fell off and later died.
CFI rendered judgment ordering defendant to pay damages.
Issue:
Whether or not defendant, as owner of the truck, liable to the death of Lara when the later fell off
his vehicle.
Held:
65
Necesito v. Paras
104 PHIL 75
Facts:
A mother and her son boarded a passenger auto-truck of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Line. While
entering a wooden bridge, its front wheels swerved to the right, the driver lost control and the truck fell
into a breast-deep creek. The mother drowned and the son sustained injuries. These cases involve
action ex contractu against the owner of PRBL filed by the son and heirs of the mother. Lower Court
dismissed the actions, holding that the accident was a fortuitous event.
Issue:
Whether or not the accident was considered a fortuitous event.
66
Facts:
Mario a deaf mute is a son of Petitioner Del Castillo. They are paying passengers of defendant
Bicol Transportation operated by A.L Ammen Transportation. Mario fell upon aligting from the bus and
died.
An action for damages was filed against the driver, conductor and bus companies. The court
rendered a judgment in favor of the respondent. Trial court dismissed the petition based solely that
damages and liability of the carrier is based on the earning capacity of the victim. In the case at bar, the
court considered there is no loss of earning capacity considering the victim was deaf-mute.
69
Issue:
Whether or not the bus employees are liable for damages.
Held:
Common carriers are responsible for the death of their passengers as provided in Articles 1964
and 2206 of the Civil Code. It includes the loss of the deceased earning capacity. The conductor was
told and knowledgeable of passenger Mario being deaf and dumb. The court held that the conductor
should have taken extraordinary care for the safety of the said deaf passenger.
Court procedure demands that the case be remanded to the lower court for determination of the
amount of damages to be awarded. However, the court considered the pendency of the case being on
roll for 13 years. The Supreme Court determined the damages at Php12,000 as indemnity for the victims
death without interest and Php2,000 attorney;s fees. The loss of earning capacity is not awarded since
the vivtim is deaf-mute.
Gatchalian v. Delim
203 SCRA 126
Facts:
Reynalda Gatchalian boarded a minibus owned and operated by respondent herein. She boarded
the bus at La Union and it was bound for Bauang. While the bus was running, one of the passengers
noticed a snapping sound. She was alarmed and asked the driver about it, he then replied that it was
normal. Subsequently, the minibus hit a flower pot on the side of the road which caused the bus to turn
turtle and it fell into a ditch. Several passengers were injured in the accident. Gatchalian suffered injuries
on her leg, arm and face specifically the forehead.
The injured passengers were brought to the hospital for treatment of their injuries. While the
passengers were confined in the hospital, Mrs. Delim, wife of the respondent visited them and paid for
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71
Safety of Passengers
Articles Applied:
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.
Art. 1757. The responsibility of a common carrier for the safety of passengers as required in Articles
1733 and 1755 cannot be dispensed with or lessened by stipulation, by the posting of notices, by
statements on tickets, or otherwise.
72
Art. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or
wilful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of
their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
Art. 1760. The common carrier's responsibility prescribed in the preceding article cannot be eliminated or
limited by stipulation, by the posting of notices, by statements on the tickets or otherwise.
Art. 1761. The passenger must observe the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid injury to
himself.
Art. 1762. The contributory negligence of the passenger does not bar recovery of damages for his death
or injuries, if the proximate cause thereof is the negligence of the common carrier, but the amount of
damages shall be equitably reduced.
Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the wilful
acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the
exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or
omission.
La Mallorca v. Court of Appeals
17 SCRA 739
Facts:
Plaintiffs husband and wife, together with their minor children, boarded a La Mallorca bus. Upon
arrival at their destination, plaintiffs and their children alighted from the bus and the father led them to a
shaded spot about 5 meters from the vehicle. The father returned to the bus to get a piece of baggage
which was not unloaded. He was followed by her daughter Raquel. While the father was still on the
running board awaiting for the conductor to give his baggage, the bus started to run so that the father
had to jump. Raquel, who was near the bus, was run over and killed.
73
Facts:
Petitioner Saturnino Bayasen, the Rural Health Physician in Sagada, Mountain Province, went to
barrio Ambasing to visit a patient. Two nurses from the Saint Theodores Hospital in Sagada, Elena
Awichen and Dolores Balcita, rode with him in the jeep assigned for the use of the Rural Health Unit.
Later, at Ambasing, the girls, who wanted to gather flowers, again asked if they could ride with him up to
a certain place on the way to barrio Suyo which he intended to visit anyway. Dr. Bayasen again allowed
them to ride, Elena sitting herself between him and Dolores.
76
Facts:
On August 9, 1986, Ananias Sumayang along with his friend Manuel Romagos was riding a
motorcycle along the National highway in Cebu. Upon a junction where the highway was connected, they
were hit by a passenger bus driven by Gregorio Pestao and owned by Metro Cebu Auto Bus Corp.
Such bus tried to overtake them sending the motorcycle upon the pavement, resulting to the death pf the
passengers of the motorcycle. Actions were filed by the heirs of Sumayang against the driver and the
owner of Metro Cubu and its insurer.
79
Issue:
Whether or not Metro Cebu and Pestao are liable for the death of the passengers of the
motorcycle.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that Metro Cebu and Pesta are liable for the death of Sumayang and
Romagos. As a professional driver operating a public transport bus, he should have anticipated that
overtaking at a junction was a perilous maneuver and thus should have exercised extreme caution. The
vehicular collision was caused by Pestaos negligence when he attempted to overtake the motorcycle.
In addition, Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code provide that owners and managers are responsible
for damages caused by their employees. The employer is presumed to be negligent in the selection or
supervision of its employees when an injury is caused by the latters negligence. As evidence has shown
that the bus operated with a defective speedometer, it further proved that Metro Cebu was negligent in
the supervision over its driver. It thus failed to conduct its business with the diligence required by law.
Issue:
Whether or not the carrier should be held liable
Held:
While the passenger is entitled to protection from personal violence by the carrier or its agents or
employees, the responsibility of the carrier extends to those acts that the carrier could foresee or avoid
through the exercise of the degree of care or diligence required of it. The Old Civil Code did not impose
upon the carrier absolute liability for assaults of their employees upon the passenger. In the present
case, the act of Devesa is shooting the passenger was entirely unforeseeable by MRC. They had no
means to ascertain or anticipate that the two would meet, or could it reasonably foresee every personal
career that might exist between each of its may employee and any one of the thousands of passengers
riding in its train. The shooting was therefore, a caso fortuito, both being unforeseeable and inevitable,
under the circumstances. The resulting breach of Manila Railroads contract of safe carriage with the
late Tomas Gillaco was excused thereby. Furthermore, when the crime took place, the guard Devesa had
no duties to discharge in connection with the transportation of the deceased from Calamba to Manila.
The stipulation of facts is clear that when Devesa shot and killed Gillaco, Devesa was assigned to guard
the Manila-San Fernando (La Union) trains, and he was at Paco Station awaiting transportation to
Tutuban.
SC reversed the judgment appealed from, and dismissed the complaint, without costs.
Maranan v. Perez
20 SCRA 412
Facts:
Rogelio Carachea was a passenger in a taxicab operated by Pascual perez when he was
stabbed and killed by the driver, who was found guilty of homicide in the CFI. While an appeal at the CA,
Antonia Maranan, Rogelios mother, filed an action to recover damages for the death of her son. The
CFI awarded her P3000 as damages against Perez dismissing the claim against the driver.
Issue:
Whether or not the carrier is liable for the assaults of its employee upon the passengers.
Held:
81
Facts:
A bus of petitioner Fortune Express, Inc. figured an accident with a jeepney in Lanao del Norte
which resulted to the death of several passengers of the jeepney including two Maranaos. A
Constabulary agent investigated that the jeepney was owned by a Maranao and certain Maranaos were
planning to take revenge on petitioner by burning some of its buses. Subsequently, the Operations
Manager of Fortune Express was advised to take precautionary measures. Four days after the accident,
three armed Maranaos pretended to be passengers of a bus of petitioner. They seized such bus and set
it on fire. The passengers of the bus were asked to get off, but one passenger, Atty. Talib Caorong went
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86
Payment of
Damages
Gatchalian v. Delim
203 SCRA 126
Facts:
Reynalda Gatchalian boarded a minibus owned and operated by respondent herein. She boarded
the bus at La Union and it was bound for Bauang. While the bus was running, one of the passengers
noticed a snapping sound. She was alarmed and asked the driver about it, he then replied that it was
normal. Subsequently, the minibus hit a flower pot on the side of the road which caused the bus to turn
89
Facts:
The Stralight Flight of Philippine Airlines (PAL) with 33 passengers took off from Iloilo bpund for
Manila. An hour and fifteen after it crashed in Mindoro. The plane was manufacture 1942 and was
acquired by the airline 1948. It has been certified as airworthy by the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
92
Issue:
How are damages computed.
Held:
The award of damages for death is computed on the life expectancy of the deceased and not of
the beneficiary. Artcle 1764 of the Civil Code provides that article 2206 shall also applu to death of
passenger caused by the breach of contract by the common carrier.
The manner of computing damages is taken from Davila vs. CA. Net yearly income multiplied by
the Life Expectancy of the deceased. The Life Expectancy is based on the American Expectancy Table
of Mortality formula (2/3x[80-30]) cited from Villa Rey Transit Inc. vs. CA.
The income and salary of Nicanor Padilla is evidenced by witnesses, the auditor and manager of
Allied Overseas Trading, pay rolls of the companies and his income tax returns.
The trial court determined the deceased gross annual income to be Php23,100 from his yearly
salary from Padilla shipping Company and Allied Overseas Trading Company. The court considered that
he is single and thus deducted Php9, 200 as yearly living expenses.
His NET INCOME is thus, 13,900 with a life expectancy of 30 years. (Net income x Life
Expectancy) is Php417, 000. This is the amount of indemnity his mother is to receive.
This includes a legal rate of interest of 6% annum from date of judgment on 31August1973 until
fully paid.
Fores v. Miranda
105 PHIL 266
Facts:
Ireneo Miranda, a professor of Fine Arts, was a passenger of a passenger jeepney registered to
Fores but actuall operated by Sackerman. The vehicle was descending the Sta. Mesa bridge at an
excessive rate of speed, and the driver lost control of the same which caused it to swerve and to hit the
bridge wall. As a result of the accident, Five of the passengers were injured, including the respondent
96
98
Issue:
Whether or not defendant is liable for damages.
Held:
Yes. Inattenton and lack of care on the carrier rsulting in the failure of the passenger to be
accommodated in a class availed of and contracted amounts to bad faith and fraud. Furthermore, the
preference to a Belgian passenger is also a wanton disregard of his right from discrimination. The
successive false representations of transferring him to first class is an act of malice and bad faith. This
entitles petitioner to moral damages in accordance to Articlec 2220. Moral damages is increased to
Php15,000 and Exemplary damages to Php100,000.
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