Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Wolff-Michael Roth1,2, Alfredo Jornet3
1University of Victoria; 2Griffith Institute of Educational Research; 3University of Oslo
Abstract Much of what professionals know is learned from the experience of
working on the job. However, to improve learning from practice requires analysis of
practical engagement. How does one learn from experience, which, as pragmatists
frequently suggest, is inchoate and characterized as absorbed coping, so that
something like a determinate experience, an experience, can be isolated, reflected
upon, and learned from? In this study, we investigate this issue in the context of
debriefing sessions from aviation where making aspects of past experience present
again for the purpose of learning is vital to the professional development of pilots.
Twenty-nine debriefing sessions were recorded in five airlines differing in their
(non-) use of an explicit assessment model for pilot performance and (non-) use of a
video-mediated debriefing tool giving rise to a 2 x 2 factorial design. The results
show (a) that pilots tend to forget much of what has happened during their
examinations in the simulator and that the verbal mode alone is insufficient to make
relevant events present again for the purpose of reflection and analysis; (b) bodily
kinetic forms of knowing are critical aspects in making present complex
performances that exist in the form of kinetic melodies rather than being encoded in
the form of explicit representations; and (c) different presentational and
representational tools offer different levels of support in making past experience
present again. The results are discussed in terms of assessment for learning,
corporeal memory, and the role of objects in presencing past experiences.
Implications are drawn for different contexts in which participants are expected to
learn from experience.
Keywords Experience; presencing; representation; Dewey; aviation; debriefing;
formative assessment; learning
Fragment 1
Interviewer: Whats in this session that youve done so far that stands out for you?
What stood out? Positive.
Pilot:
Um, I was just running through using that F-DODAR model, trying to
apply it in the appropriate places and just seeing it actually captured a
wee thing thats got past us, which is having power management
selected at takeoff instead of in cruise or somewhere in the climb, I
cant remember specifically what it was, but. And, yea, I think, Oh it
caught that. So that was something. And just, yeah, that was probably
The pilot interviewed, an experienced airline captain who already trains pilots
new to the type of aircraft his company is using, just has come for a break midway
through a four-hour assessment session in a flight simulator. As other pilots in this
study, he has a difficult time remembering specifically what has happened during
the preceding two hoursan observation that has also been made in other studies
of debriefing in aviation (e.g., Dismukes, McDonnell, & Jobe, 2000). In fact, many
pilots interviewed in our study initially describe their preceding experience as a
blur. Most of the detail that returns to their conscious awareness does so while the
flight examiner goes through the different exercises they have done before in the
high-fidelity, full motion simulator. Frequently during these debriefing sessions,
instances were recorded in which the pilots expressed surprise about having or not
having said or done something in the simulator. These details tend to come from the
flight examiners notebook or recollections, or when pilots see themselves on the
videotape that some companies use to record the simulator sessions. It is frequently
only when situations are made present againwhen they are presented or
represented in some formthat from the preceding stream of (inchoate) experience
some fragments stand out as experience to be remembered. It is from these
remembered segments of experiences that pilots learn to perform in the future
when they find themselves in non-normal situations that they do not tend to
encounter during their everyday flying, but for which they have to be prepared just
in case such an event would actually occur. That is, the only way to prepare for
flying expertly under non-normal conditions is to experience these in simulated
situations where there is no risk to aircraft, passengers, and pilots. But if such
situations are experienced as a blur, how can pilot learn and thereby become ready
for the unexpected? The current research on debriefing generally and on debriefing
in simulation-based learning specifically tends to be silent: there is little peerreviewed literature on how to debrief, how to learn/teach to debrief, and effective
debriefing methods/practices (Fanning & Gaba, 2007).
Our ongoing ethnographic research in aviation shows that many flight examiners
intuitively know that assessment itself is not sufficient to learn but that they have to
work with the pilots and actually go through the events that preceded and pull out
those aspects that will help improve future performance in real flight situations. One
of the flight examiners expresses this to the pilots concisely:
So theres my simple statement, so both of you passed. So now well go down to
some nitty-gritty. And one of the things in going through it is important that you
actually, if we just said Yep, great day, you passed, youre not going to achieve
the same effect as if we actually go through and have a look at individual items
and see if we can actually go through to mature our performance for the next
time. So thats what its all about.
Flight examiners thereby tell examined pilots that doing the nitty-gritty thing,
actually going through the preceding experience, will achieve a different effect than
How are past events made present again for the purpose of turning what has
been part of a frequently inchoate stream of experience into an experience
during formative assessment situations (here debriefing in aviation)?
How are different presentations and representations involved in making
prior experience present again?
METHOD
This study was designed to investigate the tool-mediated social practices that
are performed to make present again aspects of lived experience so that the latter
comes to stand out as an experience in the Deweyan sense. The sessions are
intended not only to assess pilots but also to allow them to learn acting in situations
not normally encountered during regular flying (e.g., engine failure). The study
employs a form of experience sampling methodology ideally suited for the study of
behavior in organizations because it increases our understanding of variability in
how people feel, think, and act over the course of their daily lives, and how
momentary experiences and events can impact a variety of individual-level
outcomes (Dimotakis, Ilies, & Judge, 2013, p. 325, emphasis added). The design here
is matched to the theoretical underpinnings of this study concerning learning
(outcome) from experience.
Design
This study is a naturalistic investigation in which airlines (pilots) were invited to
participate according to a 2x2 factorial design (Figure 1): (a) a company either uses
or does not use an explicit human-factors based model of assessment of pilot
performance (MAPP) and (b) a company uses or does not use a debriefing tool
(DBT). However, airline companies were nested within cells so that any statistically
significant tests may be due to the company differences rather than effects of tool
use. The investigation is part of a larger ethnographic study concerned with the
assessment and training of airline pilots. The debriefing sessions were part of the
participating companies regular activities during a specific time made available for
data collection. Sessions were recorded involving five regional airlines in the
southern hemisphere, 28 using a twin-propeller aircraft from one of two major
manufacturers and one flying jets.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Access and Ethics
This study is part of a research program that brings together university and
industry partners. The third author, having been a commercial pilot and having
served as flight examiner for an aircraft manufacturer, established relations with
many airlines in the geographical area that contribute to funding research on their
operations. This is an important first step in accessing debriefing sessions that are
normally held in camera and are rarely accessible by researchers. Because of our
The purpose of the debriefing sessions is to allow pilots to learn from the events
that occurred during the 4-hr examination (training) sessions that immediately
preceded the debriefing. However, as intimated in the opening statements of this
study, the examination sessions lead from situation to situation such that pilots
forget much of what remains an inchoate stream of experience. The practice of
making those past events present again for the purpose of learning from them is
dominated by the verbal mode, which pilots and their examiners often characterize
as going over the head. In this section, we elaborate on each of these two points:
difficulties in making the past present and the dominance of the verbal mode.
Difficulties making present experience and the verbal mode Many pilots talked
about the simulator sessions as constituting a blur, but do talk about and thereby
make present again specific events or phenomena that stand out. The reply to the
question What stood out for you? that opens this article is typical in that it
generically points to some issue, here the use of the action model FDODAR (see
below). The excerpt is typical in that frequently little stands out in specific detail,
though pilots have a general sense about whether the session went well or not.
When asked for specific aspects of the simulator sessions, pilots often fail or have
difficulties making these present again for the purpose of discussion. This is
apparent in the following three excerpts, each of which exhibits this problem. In the
first fragment, the examiner asks for the height at which the aircraft was flying after
the memory items following a missed approach (i.e., an aborted landing) had been
completed (turn 01). The captain ventured that it was about 1,000 feet (turn 02),
only to be corrected that they actually had been at 3,000 feet. Pilots have to know at
what height the aircraft is, because the procedure involved in a missed-approach /
go-around situation involves a sequence of specific calls at the point where the
aircraft is to level off after having climbed again because a landing had to be
aborted. In the second fragment, the flight examiner asks the first officer for the call
(a word sequence from the standard operating procedures) he had made at a
particular stage of the flight when one engine has failed (turn 01). The first officer
queries whether he had said acceleration altitude (turn 02), but the flight
examiner notes that he had called climb sequence (turn 03).
Fragment 21
1 The following conventions are used. Acronyms are replaced by full words placed in square
brackets (e.g., [advisory display unit] rather than ADU); square brackets also surround
additional text used to elaborate the often-abbreviated talk (e.g., three [thousand feet]
rather than three) that comes with high degrees of intersubjectivity (Vygotskij, 2005).
Descriptive nouns placed in guillemets (e.g., city) substitute proper names.
Observations are presented in double parentheses and italics (e.g., ((cancel light
movement))).
So we were still able to, we were climbing at a normal rate and by the
time wed done the memory items, what height were we at?
02 CAP: About over 1,000 [feet] probably.
03 FE: Three [thousand feet].
Fragment 3
01 FE: You made a statement that you use on two engines but we dont use that
statement on one engine.
02 FO: Oh did I say acceleration altitude?
03 FE: No you said climb sequence.
Fragment 4
01 FE: Do you know what speedyou started going off to the right, that was
finewhat the speed was?
02 CAP: Yea, we rejected early.
03 FE: When we went across?
04 CAP: I was looking at it and I thought its getting slow now, so probably I
should just check the [air speed indicator].
05 FE: When you turned?
06 CAP: No idea.
07 FE: You were doing 35 knots. And thats why it jammed, right?
Fragment 4 exemplifies that sometimes it takes several turn pairsconversation
analysts call this a repair sequencebefore a pilot, here the captain of the aircraft,
actually gets to respond to the question and then apparently fails to make present
again the speed that the aircraft was going. Asked for the speed when going off to
the right (turn 01), the captain first talks about having rejected takeoff early (turn
02), and then, following another prompt, says that he had been looking at the
airspeed indicator and that the aircraft was going slow (turn 04). The flight
examiner specifies again that the speed while turning is the item to be made present
again (turn 05), at which point the captain admits having no idea (turn 06). The
flight examiner then states the actual speed and the problem that it caused (i.e.,
something was jamming).
Many pilots asserted following the 4-hr simulator experience that it had been a
blurthough there are instances where something occurred that has been so
dramatic that it continues to be present to the individual pilot or to all of those
involved. But as the preceding examples show, pilots frequently failed or
experienced difficulties. That is, those aspects from the experience that were
relevant for learning to occur were not present for the pilots. If pilots are to learn, if
a particular action (sequence) is to have an effect for the future practice of the pilot,
then it has to stand out: from the inchoate stream of experience some part needs to
be turned into an (emotionally charged) experience such that it in fact can become
present again in the future to serve as a referent. An experience stands out and is
remembered precisely because it is easily made present again in the form of
presentations (original movements) and or representations.
Pauses are measured in seconds and appear in parentheses (e.g., (1.15)); transcribers
comments appear in italics and between double parentheses (e.g., ((air traffic control)));
opening ([) and closing brackets (]) are used to indicate beginning and end of
overlapping speech or gestures.
02 CAP:
03 FE:
04 CAP:
05 FE:
06 CAP:
07 FE:
be natural and roll off, like you did then. So run through how you went
through that one there.
Well as I said, I was hand-flying to 3000 [feet] ((pointing to AP/Hand
fly, Figure 8)). ((Moves finger to item 2, speed)) Just speeds missed, I
think first officer came back with 138 [knots] later. I got him to set
[maximum continuous thrust] ((points to PWR MGT [power
management])) and talked about flap.
Yea, so that was good hey? So we got three out of the four ((back and
forth gestures over the list of items in the FDODAR model)). And then
through good communicating first officer came back and added the
other one in ((points to speed)). Would you consider taking the
autopilot on ((points to AP, autopilot in Figure)) for example?
Well, not from departure town, I can hand fly around therejust as
we mentioned before with the clouds.
Youre right, and around the hills there it is quite a concern, so
sometimes hand-flying is the only option. What about taking autopilot
on, what advantage would that do?
Well I could monitor. Is that what you mean?
Yea, it frees your workload up. But it also frees first officer up quite
a bit. So, and I totally agree, and around, sometimes theres some
situations where you dont want to use it, thats why we stipulate
autopilot on or off.
In this fragment, the flight examiner asks the captain, who was flying the aircraft
at the time, to run through what had happened.3 The captain placed his index
finger on the first item in the Fly the aircraft box of the model (Figure 8). While
doing so, he talks about hand-flying (as opposed to using autopilot) the aircraft to an
altitude of 3,000 feet (turn 02). He moves his finger down to the second item,
speed, and says, just speed missed, and then suggests with a hedge that the first
officer indicated the speed later. Here, the just speed missed flags that although he
is not yet done with the list, it was only that item that he had missed and not the
others that were yet to come. He then moves the finger to the third item, power
management (PWR MGT), while he recounts to have told the first officer to set
maximum continuous thrust (an aspect of power management), and ends his
account by saying that he had talked about flap, that is, the part of the wings that
can be extended and retracted to adjust for the lower speeds during landing and
takeoff. The flight examiner confirms that he had three of the four items, explicitly
indexing the fly the aircraft box and the list by means of a gesture with the pencil
that runs down the list (turn 03). He notes the missed item (speed) was added
because of a good performance in the communication category (see the MAPP
model, Figure 2, which was also used in this session). The flight examiner then
expanded the topic by asking the captain to consider whether using autopilot could
3 Independent of rank, captain and first officer fly sectors in the role of pilot flying (PF) or
pilot non-flying (NPF) (also pilot monitoring). The standard operating procedures specify
the actions that are to be completed by the pilot in the specific role.
the event that the landing has to be aborted (e.g., because of poor visibility). If the pilots
were to leave setting this altitude to a later point during the approach, they would thereby
increase their workload at that point in time.