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CLASS AND
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Stewart Clegg and David Dunkerley
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Organization,
class and control
Stewart Clegg
and
David Dunkerley
Data
Clegg, Stewart
Organization, class and control. (International
library of sociology).
1. Organization
I. Title II. Dunkerley, David III. Series
301.18'32
HM131
79-42951
ISBN 0 7100 0421 4
ISBN 0 7100 0435 4 Pbk
Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction
ix
1
7
7
13
17
20
33
33
41
49
71
71
75
76
82
87
92
98
99
100
101
102
105
106
v
CONTENTS
107
113
118
122
127
132
Typologies of organizations
Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy
Blau and Scott
Etzioni
Blau and Scott and Etzioni compared
Additional organizational models
Alvin Gouldner
Peter Blau
General problems of bureaucracy
The Weberians' response
136
136
142
145
153
156
158
163
167
169
Organizations as systems
Talcott Parsons
Parsons' general systems theory
Parsons' theory of the organization as system
Four functional problems of organizations
Three levels of analysis in organizations
Criticisms: the analysis of change and conflict
Substantive limitations
Robert King Merton
Philip Selznick
Developments in systems theory
Closed-system perspective
The development of the open-system perspective
Interdependent parts
Needs for survival
Purposive needs
Organizations as open systems
The system environment
The limitations of the systems approach
171
171
173
175
176
177
178
181
185
187
190
191
196
198
198
198
198
200
207
213
213
213
218
219
vi
CONTENTS
Performance variables
Contextual variables
The dimensions of organization structure: initial data
Why do organization structures vary?
'Metaphysicalpathos' and 'strategic choice' in the
theory of organizations
Empiricism
7
221
222
224
234
251
257
263
263
264
273
Goals in organizations
Goals and definitions of organizations
The goal model
The system model
Goals and decision-making
Charles Perrow and operative goals
Organization goals as abstractions
Organization goals and their outcomes
The analytical usefulness of goals
A substantive critique
298
299
302
303
306
309
312
314
317
318
334
334
339
348
366
366
368
375
10
11 People in organizations
Men and women in organizations
The dual labour market for men and women
Women's orientations to work
Ideological reproduction and the dual labour market
285
295
385
395
400
400
401
405
408
vii
CONTENTS
12
13
viii
410
422
433
433
438
444
450
451
453
458
460
462
463
A76
480
483
483
492
501
503
512
531
540
543
550
Notes
Bibliography
556
561
Author index
Subject index
596
604
Acknowledgments
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Introduction
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
1 Classical sociology,
organizations and theory
Auguste Comte
Perhaps the most significant of the early sociological commentators
for our analysis would be Auguste Comte, if only because he was
the nominal founder of the discipline of sociology in 1838. Comte's
work can be viewed as complementary to that of Montesquieu and
Condorcet. Complementary to Montesquieu, Comte believed that
he had developed his predecessor's enquiry, The Spirit of Laws,
into a positive science through the discovery of the 'evolutionary
principle'. For Comte, developing this idea from Condorcet,
evolution was essentially a development of the human mind. The
stage of social organization was determined by the progress of
civilization. This replaced Montesquieu's principle of social
determination the role of the government with a process of the
natural evolution of civilization which culminated in industrial
society. In making his analysis, Comte was not only teleologically
elevating his contemporary industrial society to the beginning of
analysis and the end of historical development; he was also
attempting something far more concrete. This was to produce an
ideological basis for the re-establishment of social order in the
Restoration period after the destruction of many of the more
traditional bulwarks of that order during the Revolutionary age.
From the perspective of an analysis of Comte's view of the
process of industrialization, the process itself was unfolding at the
time of his writing. What we have, therefore, is not an ex post facto
analysis benefiting from the virtues that hindsight bestows, but
rather an analysis of the contemporary society, or more precisely of
European society during the first two decades of the nineteenth
century.
The theory of history and of social change propounded by Comte
7
is well known. Societies live and die and are replaced by new forms.
Each society however, is built upon what has gone before in a truly
organic manner. In the same sense that the caterpillar eventually
becomes the butterfly and the tadpole the frog, so, for Comte,
society evolves through distinct transitional periods. The
contemporary society of which he was writing was replacing a
former one. The latter, characterized by an emphasis on religious
fervour and military activity, was spent. From its bankruptcy as a
viable social setting the theological and military types of society
were being surpassed by the industrial and scientific types, at the
centre of which stood modern organizations. Religious thinking was
rapidly being replaced by scientific thinking. The scientists, or those
expressing scientific ideas, were emerging as the new intellectual
leaders of society; it was they who were establishing themselves as
the new ideologists. Moreover, Comte agreed that this new
grouping was inheriting the 'spiritual power' that formerly the
religious leaders had monopolized. This 'spiritual power' gave rise
to beliefs, attitudes and ideas which stood at the very heart of social
order.
The other transformation was the rise of the industrialist at the
expense of the military man. 'Industrialist' is used here in a generic
sense which includes not only the owners of capital but also
financiers, managers and general entrepreneurs: 'organizers' in the
general sense. The two transformations theology to science and
military to industry are of course closely related to each other. A
scientific frame of reference leads to, and in part arises from, the
change from man struggling against man, to man struggling against
his environment. Comte believed his positive philosophy to be such
a science. The 'positive' mode of reasoning and thinking which
Comte described was precisely that which he used in his own work.
Thus it can be argued (cf. Aron, 1965) that Comte was an
exemplification of positive thought. More especially, Comte was a
theorist of a particular 'science' which he termed sociology.
Comte's contemporary society, passing from theological/military
to scientific/industrial, was of necessity in a state of chaos. He
believed this to be a temporary state between the two stages of
social order delineated above. The reorganization that would
inevitably arise would 'occur' not by revolution but by the sciences
becoming dominant, by their synthesis and by the application of a
positive political system. Sociology as a positive science could
enhance the development of the emergent society. And sociology,
above the other positive sciences, could realize the new social order
and organization.
As a basic philosophical attitude, very little of this can be
attributed solely to Comte. The observations of a new social
8
bitter man in terms of the memories of his association with SaintSimon. He wrote to a friend:
Now you may rest assured that henceforward I shall behave as
if this man had never existed. He has done me so much harm that
I shall be rendering him a service if I do nothing more than forget
him. (Quoted by Manuel, 1956, p. 337).
In spite of the fraughtness of the personal side of the break-up of the
association, it did mark the beginnings of Comte's recognition by
the intellectual and academic communities of his time.
It is evident that Comte's ideas were strongly influenced in their
development by those of his patron, as well as by those of the liberal
economists. For instance, Saint-Simon and his followers made wide
application of the ideas of the liberal economists, such as Say,
particularly that entrepreneurs and workers both have a creative
role in society. Comte also stressed this feature. Indeed, SaintSimon's biographer, Manuel (1956) has argued that many of
Comte's ideas were first mooted by Saint-Simon himself. For
example, the fundamental tenets of positivism, the 'positive science
of man' (sociology) and the hierarchical nature of the sciences, are
said to be present in Saint-Simon's work, albeit in a confused and
possibly random manner. But Saint-Simon was not a man of
science, he neither knew much about the philosophy of science, nor
did he work in a scientific manner. Statements that are to be found
in Saint-Simon concerning positivism are perhaps too garbled to be
taken meaningfully. Nevertheless, the statements are there and it is
upon this evidence that his influence over Comte is argued about. It
is probably the case that Saint-Simon could not help but make
oblique references to positivism and to other Comtean ideas (as we
now recognize them to be). They were ideas that were being widely
discussed by his peers and so inevitably he could comment on them.
To award them the status of ideas that were to influence the
fundamental beliefs and thoughts of Comte is possibly an
exaggeration of the reality, and a mistaken application of the
canons of the 'history of ideas'.
Instead of looking between the lines for points of similarity, it is
easier to look for points of difference between the two men. SaintSimon, and more especially his followers, are regarded by many as
among the founders of socialism. Indeed, there is an obelisk in
Moscow in praise of Saint-Simon's work as one of the founders of
the socialist revolution. It is no surprise that there should not be one
to Comte, who, as we have seen, was not influenced by socialist
ideas. On the contrary, Comte was an 1itist who often spoke in
laudatory terms about capitalism and capitalists. Saint-Simonian
socialism has been argued to be one of the early influences in the
14
work of Karl Marx (e.g. Bottomore and Rubel, 1963, ch. 1). What
was it in Saint-Simon which could lead one to make this connection?
We have already indicated that Saint-Simon's work was lacking in
systematization, but specific themes can be distinguished that
enable us to understand both the man and his work. The main point
we can make initially is that his work does represent a critique of the
existing social order. The exact nature of this critique we shall spell
out below. It was this critique that had led many commentators to
regard Saint-Simon as one of the early founders of socialist thought,
and as a 'critical thinker' (e.g. Marcuse, 1955). However, Marx
rejected the notion that Saint-Simon was a founder of socialism, not
on ideological grounds (he in fact called him a 'utopian socialist')
but on historical grounds. Part of the difficulty that we see Comte
trying to cope with writing about a society whilst it was undergoing
rapid change was a much greater difficulty for Saint-Simon. As
Marx pointed out, Saint-Simon was concerned with industriali-zation before the process had developed to a point where the
problems and contradictions of the capitalist system had become
apparent. For example, basic class conflict had not, during SaintSimon's lifetime, become the ubiquitous phenomenon that it had in
Marx's. Marx, then, recognized that Saint-Simon was 'on the right
track', but that his critique of the status quo and indeed his ideas for
the new society were necessarily stifled.
There exists something of a paradox in Saint-Simon. Where there
is general agreement that he was a critic of the status quo, he was
generally opposed to the French Revolution (he was 29 years of age
when it occurred). His autobiography makes this point very clear: T
did not wish to take part in it. . . . I had an aversion to destruction'
(quoted in Manuel, 1956, p. 62). Like so many of his con-temporaries and successors, Saint-Simon saw the social and
political stability of medieval society to be attributable to the
pervasive impact of religion. Furthermore, he regarded the new
order of society to be one which was emerging organically from the
old. The over-riding stability of medieval society was being
overthrown by a number of factors such as the rise in the importance
of science and technology, the growth of a bourgeoisie with an
industrial base, the growth of Protestantism, and the accompanying
decline in the relative importance of Catholicism.
Saint-Simon saw eighteenth-century philosophy as having had a
great impact on the nineteenth century. In particular, 'Les
Philosophes' had led, in Saint-Simon's eyes, to the partial
breakdown of society at the time he was writing. Their
interpretation of society had been destructive, but had little to offer
by way of constructive alternative societal forms. Saint-Simon
therefore saw his task to be creative as well as critical, constructive
15
as well as destructive.
What were the elements of this creative construction? As with his
pupil, Comte, Saint-Simon's philosophy rested upon an organic
social order, upon stability in the social structure, and upon slow
evolutionary rather than upon rapid revolutionary change. There is
little doubt from his writings that he yearned for an idealized
version of the positive aspects of medieval society, particularly its
emphasis upon stability. Equally, though, he recognized that times
had changed and that there were limited opportunities for incor-porating much of the old into the new. His work rests upon the
probability of unity in society arising from a unity of thought and
intellectual principles. As with Comte, although considerably less
systematically, he saw knowledge (and society) passing through
metaphysical
scientific. He
distinct phases: theological
believed in the scientific study of society (social physiology). He
observed that science had developed a moral and legitimatory
function which had previously been the preserve of religion. The
new elite in society for whom this legitimatory ideology functioned
was an industrial/commerical/financial lite. The form of this
legitimatory ideology was to be positivism, the new religion, which
was to be the replacement for the role of traditional religion in
medieval society. In addition, Saint-Simon believed in an 1ite over
and beyond the temporal industrial lite. This was to be a spiritual
elite of scientists.
What is interesting is that Saint-Simon was not expounding a view
of society that differed in any significant way from that which had
existed before. The structure would be basically similar; only those
comprising the key groups in the structure would be different. Thus,
scientists would replace theologians, and industrialists would
replace feudal leaders. His vision proposed a bourgeois order to
replace feudalism. In order to ensure stability in society, which was
one of the main aims of the programme, Saint-Simon argued for a
coalition between the temporal 1ite (the industrialists) and the
intellectuals in order to produce what Gramsci (1971) was much
later to call an 'hegemonic bloc'.
In summary, Saint-Simon opposed the contemporary manifesta-tions of 'possessive individualism' (Macpherson, 1962) in the
economic ideologies of his day and wished to re-emphasize the
social. The way he did this was in terms of stressing the potential for
social disorder which existed where normative order was not
present. Where traditional forms of this order had broken down,
particularly the legitimatory ideology of religion, he wished to
create new forms of social solidarity to cement society into a new
order of certainties. His solution and the basis that he proposed for
a new order was in terms of a social and industrial system based
16
upon principles of 'brotherly love' (hence Marx's remark that SaintSimon was 'a Utopian socialist'). A basically organic view of society
is therefore presented by Saint-Simon. This view ensured, theore-tically, the curtailment of potential and actual class conflict. This
raised an interesting question, not entirely germane to our analysis
here, of the extent to which Saint-Simon has been rightly labelled
the founder of socialist thought. Only in one respect centralized
production planning does he appear to have coincident interests
with later socialist writers, while in most other respects his views
reflect litist, romantic, conservative thinking.
Herbert Spencer
Herbert Spencer's (18201903) central contribution to sociology is
the analogy between society and a biological organism. Society is
regarded as a social organism, in terms of its structure, functions
and growth. With the linking of social change and social evolution
which this entailed, it became possible to see societies as not only
undergoing successive phases of growth and development, but also
in some sense as competing with each other for support in differing
environments, with the more successful social adaptations
persisting. Spencer was to develop this view most fully, and in so
doing articulated an ideology which found considerable support in
the boardrooms of organizations engaged in a vigorous capitalism.
While Comte and Saint-Simon were unable to make any concrete
suggestions for the problems of industrial capitalism which were
applicable within the context of large-scale organizations, Herbert
Spencer found much more immediate acceptance. Comte and
Saint-Simon proposed social theocratic ideas as the moral basis by
which to renew social solidarity in the future. Spencer proposed that
capitalism had already achieved perfection, but at costs which he
was also prepared to recognize (see Peel, 1971). Spencer's view of
his contemporary industrial society was that it was characterized by
a twofold process of differentiation and integration. Society was
becoming differentiated into mutually dependent elements. These
integrating elements were of three types: the sustaining system,
which refers to industrial and agricultural production; the
distribution system which relates to forms of communication and
exchange; and the regulatory system which controls society through
the government and military spheres. As these systems become
more differentiated, through, for instance, increases in the division
of labour in the sustaining system, then the distribution system of
communications also grows to integrate the whole. With the
increase in the division of labour and of communications Spencer
maintains that because of increased size, political authority will
17
become more centralized. All the parts of the whole, the three
systems, are in an evolutionary homoeostasis or equilibrium.
Spencer used these ideas to organize his account of the
emergence of contemporary industrial society. He argued that this
society had emerged from an earlier form which he called 'militant
society'. In counter-posing the industrial to the military, Spencer,
like Comte, was proposing an anti-feudal concept. Militant society
is characterized by 'compulsory co-operation' organized on the
basis of an almost constant preparation for war. In such societies
there exists a highly centralized authority and social control under a
military-political leader. Beneath this person, Spencer noted a rigid
hierarchy of power, status and property, with productive labour
being the least esteemed activity. Ideologically, the hierarchy was
reflected in the dominant clerical myths and beliefs and in a rigid
discipline based on a scant regard for individuals.
He contrasted this society with 'industrial society', which he
believed had been developing since feudal times. This society was
becoming more integrated as wars became less frequent. Society
becomes more voluntary and less compulsive, being essentially
constituted by the mutual dependence of individuals exchanging
services in an increasing division of labour. This voluntarism
reaches its peak in 'modern', mid-nineteenth-century society, in
which the sustaining and distributive systems develop their own
regulating systems. These are independent of the state and in the
case of the sustaining system of industrial and agricultural
capitalism, identical with the market. Economic organization in
general is conceptualized after English competitive capitalism in its
most laissez-faire period.
There is now no fixing of prices by the State; nor is there
prescribing of methods. Subject to but slight hindrances from a
few licences, citizens adopt what occupations they please; buy
and sell where they please. The amounts grown and manu-factured, imported and exported, are regulated by laws;
improvements are not enforced nor bad processes legislatively
interdicted; but men carrying on their business as they think
best, are simply required by law to fulfil their contracts and
commanded not to aggress upon their neighbours (Spencer,
1893, pp. 5323).
It may be said with Therborn (1976, p. 228) that, while Spencer's
evolutionary tendencies enabled him to see perfection in midVictorian English capitalism at the height of laissez-faire:
It had never been a very accurate account of reality, even in
Spencer's early days, when Engels was writing The Condition of
18
19
Emile Durkheim
Durkheim's central achievement was to spell out the
elements of social explanation at a time when political and
ethical philosophy, the 'science' of political economy, and the
positive schools were united under the banners of individualism
(Taylor et al., 1973, p. 67).
Taylor and his colleagues characterize the central achievement of
Durkheim as thorough-going opposition to 'analytical indivi-dualism'. In particular, this analytical individualism found its
expression in the traditional political philosophies and economics of
liberalism with their fiction of the 'social contract freely entered into
by atomized individuals renouncing a degree of that freedom in
exchange for protection by that society' (Taylor et al., 1973, p. 67).
They cite him to this effect:
The conception of a social contract is today very difficult to
defend, for it has no relation to the facts. The observer does
not meet it along his road, so to speak. Not only are there no
societies which have such an origin, but there are none whose
structure presents the least trace of a contractual organization.
It is neither a fact acquired through history nor a tendency
which grows out of historical development. Hence, to rejuvenate
this doctrine and accredit it, it would be necessary to qualify as
a contract the adhesion which each individual, as adult, gave
to the society when he was born, solely by reason of which he
continues to live. But then he would have to term contractual
every action of man which is not determined by constraint
(Durkheim, 1964a, p. 202).
Such an attack on utilitarian political philosophy was necessarily
an attack on the presuppositions of sociologists such as Spencer,
with his laissez-faire trust in the market. Durkheim, rather than
praising the market as the ethical foundation of a natural order, was
more concerned, first to delineate the role of the market as a
possible source of disorder, second to specify the conditions under
which order would be possible, and third, to determine the reason
for its absence in contemporary industrial society.
Liberal economics rested on an assumption of egoistic indivi-dualism in the market, in which the pursuit of individual selfinterest was conceptualized as having an equilibrating effect.
Durkheim argued against this that on the basis purely of the market,
no stable social order was possible. In The Division of Labour in
Society Durkheim undertook to demonstrate that the organic
solidarity of a division of labour and exchange required regulation
from non-market phenomena: the moral community of social soli20
darity. Only this form of support and regulation could assure the
non-contractual elements of contract and thus maintain the
equilibrium of exchange. Durkheim is thus a thorough-going critic
of the economic policies of laissez-faire (see Durkheim's (1959)
'critical conclusion' to his study of Saint-Simon).
Although Durkheim's work on The Division of Labour in Society
was cast in an evolutionary framework, it had little in common with
Spencer's evolutionism. The latter's evolutionism was developed
from the utilitarian tradition represented by Jeremy Bentham and
James Mill, and epistemologically is premised on pre-Darwinian
Lamarckian biology (Hirst, 1975). As such it is necessarily prescientific and teleological, conceived as a natural philosophy rather
than being based on a natural science. Its premise is a view of
cosmological evolution in which all nature is conceived as subject to
a common evolutionary law tending toward 'progress'. This takes
the form of a transition from the simple to the complex, the
homogeneous to the heterogeneous, through a process of dif-ferentiation which is homologous in all the distinct realms of nature,
because it is conceived as driven by some 'fundamental necessity,
some all pervading principle'. The end of progress, conceived after
utilitarianism, is the greatest happiness of the greatest number.
Durkheim's views were more sanguine.
Durkheim (1964b) situates himself in relation to Spencer's
evolutionism, in the following terms:
Thus although he [Spencer] claims to proceed empirically,
the facts accumulated in his sociology seem to function prin-cipally as arguments, since they are employed to illustrate
analyses of concepts rather than to describe and explain things
(Durkheim, 1964b, p. 21).
He considers both Spencer and Comte to have proposed a
'psychologistic' concept of evolution because the principle of
evolution appears to be 'some inner spring of human nature', 'some
sort of instinct' which can only be 'a metaphysical entity of the very
existence of which there is no demonstration' (Durkheim 1964b, p.
109). Durkheim opposes any such conception of historical necessity
as 'psychologistic' because the necessity of history derives from the
universal subject of history: human nature. Against this indivi-dualist account of the subject of sociology, Durkheim offers social
facts, collective consciousness and social organization.
In his rejection of Spencerian and Comtean evolutionism,
Durkheim did not simply repeat the evolutionary distinctions
already established by sociologists such as Tnnies (1971) between
the idealized past of a warm and cosy community Gemeinschaft and
the less attractive, more individuated Gesellschaft. Durkheim, in
21
like Saint-Simon before him, Durkheim was of the opinion that only
those individuals in economically productive activities were useful
individuals in society. Furthermore, he believed that those
individuals should come together in relation to the common goal of
determining the course of society. Therefore, there was no chance
of conflict between different groups in industrial society: each
group would pursue the same goals as the others. Organic solidarity
could still be achieved in spite of the existence of social classes (of
course, the Marxist notion of social class would deny this
proposition, by definition).
To be fair to him, Durkheim did point to some societal injustices
under industrialism. But he maintained that these were based upon
'structural inequalities'. We have to return, time and again, to his
basic theme of the growing integration in society arising from the
increasing extensive division of labour, the development of
occupational guilds and associations and the necessarily more
elaborate system of industrial relations pertaining in organizations.
Even social classes were viewed in integrative terms, as co-operative rather than conflictual phenomena.
It is in The Division of Labour in Society (1964a) and in
Professional Ethics and Civic Morals (1957) that we find
Durkheim's most significant contributions to our area of study. We
have already seen a number of Durkheim's ideas as developments
of those of Saint-Simon. Here we can begin an examination of
Durkheim's unique contribution to understanding his society and
the social processes of industrialism in general.
In the earliest stages of social evolution, Durkheim saw society in
homogeneous terms. Everybody in primitive society does roughly
similar things, the main differentiation being based upon sexual
characteristics and age. The development of society is both the
cause and effect of heterogeneity of functions. The more complex
society becomes, the greater the breakdown of the solidarity noted
in primitive society. The development of a complex and extensive
division of labour leads, or can lead, in Durkheim's view, to a new
form of solidarity.
In primitive society, the solidaristic condition is referred to as the
conscience collective. This concept represents the prevailing
sentiments possessed by each individual conscience. This is the
notion of mechanical solidarity, that is, 'a social structure of
determined nature' associated with a system of segments,
homogenous and similar to each other, as Durkheim (1964a) put it
in The Division of Labour in Society. In complex society, this
concept of solidarity has to be replaced by the notion of organic
solidarity. Here, it is society that determines the collective
conscience rather than the somewhat nebulous individual con25
the more that industrial and social conflict is manifested and the less
that organic solidarity is apparent. But as we saw above, all of this
arises from an abnormal division of labour a state of anomie.
Despite apparent similarities, Durkheim's analysis is distinct
from those of both Comte and Marx. While Marx saw solidarity as
possible only in either non-antagonistic classes or in a classless
society but as impossible between antagonistic classes, Durkheim
differed. He wished to produce such a solidarity without abolishing
class relations. For him social conflict arose neither from social
classes as it did for Marx, nor from moral decline as it did for Comte.
However, like Marx, Durkheim stressed the role of planning. Marx
argued the need for organization and administration once the
economic system had been transformed to eliminate the structural
inequalities which characterized capitalist society. Durkheim also
emphasized the planning function in his analysis, but did so in a
chronologically different way from Marx. His solution was in terms
of planning and socio-economic regulation as a fore-runner to any
structural changes. All that needed to be done was to establish the
appropriate 'morality' so that changes could be brought about in
order to establish a new equilibrium position (again we see the
structural-functionalist emphasis here). In one respect Durkheim
does go some way towards a Marxist position. He refines his
original conception of the division of labour by reference to a
'forced division of labour'. This is certainly a pathological and
abnormal type, and arises from the fact that in a complex society the
establishment of social classes is in itself a kind of organization of
the division of labour. Lower classes, through organization and
consciousness, develop aspirations and realize that the possibility of
achieving these aspirations is only realizable through possessing the
power of higher classes. This leads to manifest conflict, which for
Durkheim was a discomfort for members of the lower social classes
and an activity in which they had no real wish to participate.
So, in this instance, the division of labour can lead to the opposite
of solidaristic relations throughout society, and this is associated
with the class structure. The concept of a forced division of labour is
used because Durkheim saw industrial society as being at times
based upon a division of labour in which individuals were not using
their natural talents. In other words, he was the champion of a
society where structural inequalities should be based upon the
'natural abilities' of individuals. Durkheim (1956), in his
contributions to the sociology of education, also felt able to
determine what these natural abilities were. This is very different
from Marx and Engels's (1965) metaphor of the individual fishing,
hunting, writing poetry and discussing philosophy as and when he
chose in the future socialist society.
30
the state. Durkheim disagreed with this and argued that the Middle
Age idea of the occupational guild should be re-established,
adapted to the new economic order, and employed to regulate
economic and industrial affairs. The guilds would also function as
the moral arbiters of society. In this way, as we see in Professional
Ethnics and Civic Morals, the anomie so characteristic of
Durkheim's society would be overcome through societal regulation
of the individual.
Durkheim transcends the teleology of psychologistic evolu-tionism. He does not replace it with the sphere of individual
subjectivity as the theoretical object of his science of sociology. He
concludes by producing a sociology, not of individual or human
nature, but of a social nature which possesses a full-blown collective
consciousness of its own. Within this formulation organization is
conceived as having a key role, as the factor of cohesion between
individual and society in and through which the phenomena of the
social are made visible and given, through the effects of social
organization on the individuals who are its subject.
It was at roughly the same time as Durkheim was formulating his
ideas concerning the nature of social solidarity, in a context
moulded by his critique of analytical individualism, that in
Germany the great sociologist Max Weber (18641920) was
struggling to apply the German historicist version of the indivi-dualist position to a study of the advent of modernity. In particular,
he argued in terms of the diminishing influence of 'other-worldly'
and 'religious thought' as part of the process of the 'rationalization'
and 'disenchantment' of the world. He wished to demonstrate the
connection between the religious ethic of Protestantism and the
'spirit' of capitalism.
32
Max Weber has been the subject of a wide number of interpre-tations in recent years, from perspectives as various as psychohistory (Mitzman, 1970) to historical materialism (Therborn, 1976).
Given the wide range of interest in Max Weber, only a limited
analysis of his thought is possible in this context. We shall be
concerned primarily with discussing Max Weber's conception and
method of sociology, in particular as it relates to the formation of
ideal types, especially those of capitalism and organizations (see
Chapter 4).
In recent years, a number of writers such as Therborn (1976),
Binns (1977) and Honigsheim (1968) have stressed the centrality of
marginal utility theory to Weber's analyses. These analyses were
grounded in a series of methodological essays Gesammelte Aufstze
zur Wissenschaftslehre (1951), some of which are translated in The
Methodology of the Social Sciences (1949), which Weber wrote
between 1903 and 1906 and in which he formulated the epistemological principles of economics and history. He applied these
principles in his analyses of Economy and Society (1968). These
principles were the 'offspring of an encounter between German
historicism and Austrian marginalist economics' (Therborn, 1976,
p. 280).
Kant had argued that the objects of sense-experience are ordered
into a system of natural laws by the in-built conceptual apparatus of
the faculty of scientific reason. This reason can never know reality
itself but only reality selected, organized and processed by the
activity of the knowing mind. Practical reason is distinguished from
scientific reason because it deals with direct intuition of the world of
values. This distinction became the basis of a movement of neoKantian philosophers and historians, centred on Heidelberg, to
establish a cultural or historical science on the basis of practical
rather than scientific reason. They sought to do this in direct
opposition to any naturalist conception of historical development
such as that proposed by Saint-Simon, Comte and Spencer.
The distinction was based on Wilhelm Dilthey's (1883) attempt to
develop the hermeneutic tradition of the Geisteswissenschaften,
organized around the concept of 'understanding' or verstehen (see
Outhwaite, 1975), into an historical science. It was elaborated in
particular, by Heinrich Rickert, who argued against using the
methods of the natural sciences in the study of historical
phenomena. Instead, following Dilthey he proposed the method of
verstehen as the key to grasping the uniqueness of cultural and
historical events. Using this method Dilthey had attempted to
specify a range of types of historical-cultural phenomenon.
Weber, arguing from within the Geisteswissenschaften was
opposed to any position which wished to subsume the human
36
under-cutting. Work was, and some would argue still is, done in an
inefficient manner so that it takes longer to complete. This
inefficiency means irrationality in one sense that is, in terms of the
interests of consumers of guild skills and commodities within a
capitalist market economy; but in another sense it is wholly
rational, looked at from the view of the producers. A monopoly
over skills brought with it a monopoly over prices, which in practice
meant tight price regulation.
The distinctions within a guild appeared to be almost caste-like.
As Offe (1976a) argues, progression was possible, but to move from
journeyman to master was virtually impossible to achieve without
the benefits of the right connections within the guild.
Changes became apparent within the guild system by the
seventeenth century, although they were the manifestation of
tendencies which had been accumulating since the so-called 'crisis'
of feudalism in the fourteenth century (see Anderson, 1974, pp.
197212). These tendencies were located in the sphere of
agricultural production, which, by the fourteenth century, had
reached a technical and ecological barrier.
The deepest determination of this general crisis probably lay
. . . in a 'seizure' of the mechanisms of reproduction of the
system at a barrier point of its ultimate capacities. In particular,
it seems clear that the basic motor of rural reclamation, which had
driven the whole feudal economy forwards for three centuries,
eventually over-reached the objective limits of both terrain and
social structure. Population continued to grow while yields fell
on the marginal lands still available for conversion at the
existing levels of technique, and soil deteriorated through haste
or misuse (Anderson, 1974, p. 197).
This 'increasingly precarious ecological balance', combined with
demographic expansion, 'could tip into over-population at the first
stroke of harvest misfortune' as Anderson (1974, pp. 199f.)
records. At the same time during the fourteenth century, from the
early decades onwards, there was a parallel crisis in the urban
sphere, due to a decline in the availability of precious metals for
currency as the European mines reached their technical and
profitable limits of production. This led to wide-spread debasement
and inflation of the currency.
During the first quarter of the fourteenth century, a number of
concommitant factors produced a situation of spiralling inflation
(through the exhaustion of the mines) in the urban sphere and
because of declining population, a contraction of demand for
agricultural staples, notably grain, and thus a decline in grain prices.
This decline in grain prices, coupled with inflation, led to a decline
44
the transformation of the raw material into the final product, the
worker received a cash wage. This, together with the 'voluntary'
nature of the relationship between worker and merchant, displayed
a marked contrast to the guild system and at the same time, an
element of similarity to the factory system. It is clear that this system
heralded new forms of social relations of production, relations
which became more akin to capitalistic forms over time. The
'creeping' capitalization arose from the inherent inefficiency of the
system in terms of the emerging rationality of capitalism: the lack of
control by the merchant-capitalist over his workers; the economic
losses through waste and fraud; the uncertain nature of the labour
force. The independent, voluntary status of the worker was slowly
eroded in an attempt to increase the efficiency of exploitation, first,
by allowing the worker to get into debt and, second, by taking away
the worker's ownership of his tools. These two factors opened the
way for the emergence of a class of alienable wage-labourers
dependent upon the capitalist class for both a living and a
livelihood. But this was yet to emerge; for the present the social
relations at work did not change very much. In general, the work
was home-based; and it was not until the separation of home and
work occurred, with the factory system, that the social relations
altered very much.
This transition from home-based to factory-based work is
generally seen in terms of the development of a specialized division
of labour, subsequent to technical developments, which, to achieve
optimum efficiency, had to be combined with a collectivity of
workers in a factory. From here it is a simple step to seeing the
development of hierarchical organization as developing, quite
naturally, from technical necessity.
In an important paper, 'What do Bosses Do?', Stephen Marglin
(1974) has investigated 'the origins and functions of hierarchy in
capitalist production' in order to argue against the commonly held
view that technological developments autonomously shaped the
nature of organization as it emerged in early capitalist indus-trialization. (This argument is not simply an academic matter of
historical interpretation. In subsequent chapters, particularly
Chapters 6 and 9, we shall encounter a number of contemporary
organization theorists who argue that modern organization
structures are determined by technology.) Marglin's argument is
that neither of the two decisive steps in depriving the workers
of control of product and process . . . (1) the development of the
minute division of labour that characterized the putting-out
system and (2) the development of the centralized organization
that characterizes the factory system. . . took place primarily for
50