Professional Documents
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May 2, 2006
Franco-Belgian Services and Zuellig responded, claiming that they exercised extraordinary diligence in handling the
shipment while it was in their possession; its vessel was seaworthy; and the proximate cause of the loss of cargo was
a fortuitous event. They also filed a cross-claim against petitioner alleging that the loss occurred during the
transshipment with petitioner and so liability should rest with petitioner.
For its part, petitioner also raised the same defense that the ship was seaworthy. It alleged that the sinking of M/V P.
Aboitiz was due to an unforeseen event and without fault or negligence on its part. It also alleged that in accordance
with the real and hypothecary nature of maritime law, the sinking of M/V P. Aboitiz extinguished its liability on the loss
of the cargoes.11
Meanwhile, the Board of Marine Inquiry (BMI) conducted its own investigation to determine whether the captain and
crew were administratively liable. However, petitioner neither informed respondent nor the trial court of the
investigation. The BMI exonerated the captain and crew of any administrative liability; and declared the vessel
seaworthy and concluded that the sinking was due to the vessels exposure to the approaching typhoon.
On November 20, 1989, the trial court, citing the Court of Appeals decision in General Accident Fire and Life
Assurance Corporation v. Aboitiz Shipping Corporation12 involving the same incident, ruled in favor of respondent. It
held petitioner liable for the total value of the lost cargo plus legal interest, thus:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of New India and against Aboitiz
ordering the latter to pay unto the former the amount of P142,401.60, plus legal interest thereon until the same is fully
paid, attorneys fees equivalent to fifteen [percent] (15%) of the total amount due and the costs of suit.
The complaint with respect to Franco and Zuellig is dismissed and their counterclaim against New India is likewise
dismissed
SO ORDERED.13
1avvphil.net
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals and presented the findings of the BMI. However, on August 29,
2002, the appellate court affirmed in toto the trial courts decision. It held that the proceedings before the BMI was
only for the administrative liability of the captain and crew, and was unilateral in nature, hence not binding on the
courts. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied on January 23, 2003.
Hence, this petition for review, alleging that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in:
I.
x x x DISREGARDING THE RULINGS OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE
RULE ON LIMITED LIABILITY UNDER ARTICLE 587, 590 AND 837 OF THE CODE OF COMMERCE TO CASES
INVOLVING THE SINKING OF THE M/V "P. ABOITIZ;
A.
x x x NOT APPLYING THE RULINGS IN THE CASES OF MONARCH INSURANCE CO., INC. ET AL. V. COURT OF
APPEALS ET AL. AND ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION V. GENERAL ACCIDENT FIRE AND LIFE
ASSURANCE CORPORATION, LTD.;
B.
x x x RULING THAT THE ISSUE ON THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE ON LIMITED LIABILITY UNDER ARTICLES
587, 590 AND 837 OF THE CODE OF COMMERCE HAD BEEN CONSIDERED AND PASSED UPON IN ITS
DECISION;
II.
x x x NOT LIMITING THE AWARD OF DAMAGES TO RESPONDENT TO ITS PRO-RATA SHARES IN THE
INSURANCE PROCEEDS FROM THE SINKING OF THE M/V "P. ABOITIZ". 14
Stated simply, we are asked to resolve whether the limited liability doctrine, which limits respondents award of
damages to its pro-rata share in the insurance proceeds, applies in this case.
Petitioner, citing Monarch Insurance Co. Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 15 contends that respondents claim for damages
should only be against the insurance proceeds and limited to its pro-rata share in view of the doctrine of limited
liability.
Respondent counters that the doctrine of real and hypothecary nature of maritime law is not applicable in the present
case because petitioner was found to have been negligent. Hence, according to respondent, petitioner should be
held liable for the total value of the lost cargo.
It bears stressing that this Court has variedly applied the doctrine of limited liability to the same incident the sinking
of M/V P. Aboitiz on October 31, 1980. Monarch, the latest ruling, tried to settle the conflicting pronouncements of this
Court relative to the sinking of M/V P. Aboitiz. In Monarch, we said that the sinking of the vessel was not due to force
majeure, but to its unseaworthy condition.16 Therein, we found petitioner concurrently negligent with the captain and
crew.17 But the Court stressed that the circumstances therein still made the doctrine of limited liability applicable. 18
Our ruling in Monarch may appear inconsistent with the exception of the limited liability doctrine, as explicitly stated in
the earlier part of the Monarch decision. An exception to the limited liability doctrine is when the damage is due to the
fault of the shipowner or to the concurrent negligence of the shipowner and the captain. In which case, the shipowner
shall be liable to the full-extent of the damage.19 We thus find it necessary to clarify now the applicability here of the
decision in Monarch.
From the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, common carriers are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence over the goods they transport according to all the circumstances of each case.20 In the event
of loss, destruction or deterioration of the insured goods, common carriers are responsible, unless they can prove
that the loss, destruction or deterioration was brought about by the causes specified in Article 1734 of the Civil
Code.21 In all other cases, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless
they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence.22 Moreover, where the vessel is found unseaworthy, the
shipowner is also presumed to be negligent since it is tasked with the maintenance of its vessel. Though this duty can
be delegated, still, the shipowner must exercise close supervision over its men.23
In the present case, petitioner has the burden of showing that it exercised extraordinary diligence in the transport of
the goods it had on board in order to invoke the limited liability doctrine. Differently put, to limit its liability to the
amount of the insurance proceeds, petitioner has the burden of proving that the unseaworthiness of its vessel was
not due to its fault or negligence. Considering the evidence presented and the circumstances obtaining in this case,
we find that petitioner failed to discharge this burden. It initially attributed the sinking to the typhoon and relied on the
BMI findings that it was not at fault. However, both the trial and the appellate courts, in this case, found that the
sinking was not due to the typhoon but to its unseaworthiness. Evidence on record showed that the weather was
moderate when the vessel sank. These factual findings of the Court of Appeals, affirming those of the trial court are
not to be disturbed on appeal, but must be accorded great weight. These findings are conclusive not only on the
parties but on this Court as well.24
In contrast, the findings of the BMI are not deemed always binding on the courts.25 Besides, exoneration of the
vessels officers and crew by the BMI merely concerns their respective administrative liabilities.26 It does not in any
way operate to absolve the common carrier from its civil liabilities arising from its failure to exercise extraordinary
diligence, the determination of which properly belongs to the courts.27
Where the shipowner fails to overcome the presumption of negligence, the doctrine of limited liability cannot be
applied.28 Therefore, we agree with the appellate court in sustaining the trial courts ruling that petitioner is liable for
the total value of the lost cargo.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated August 29, 2002 and Resolution dated
January 23, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 28770 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Asscociate Justice
Footnotes
Rollo, pp. 84-97. Penned by Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. (now a member of this Court), with
Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando, and Danilo B. Pine concurring.
1
Id. at 99. Penned by Associate Justice Danilo B. Pine, with Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto, and
Remedios Salazar-Fernando concurring.
2
Id. at 149-166.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 163-164.
10
Id. at 5-6.
11
12
CA-G.R. C.V. No. 10609, March 9, 1989 (Now SC G.R No. 89757, August 6, 1990, 188 SCRA 387).
13
Records, p. 859.
14
15
16
Id. at 98-99.
17
Id. at 101.
18
Id. at 103.
19
Id. at 97.
Civil Code, Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,
are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the
passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
20
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734,
1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers
is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
Id. at Art. 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods,
unless the same is due to any of the following causes only:
21
Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116940, June 11, 1997, 273
SCRA 262, 272.
23
24
Prudential Bank v. Chonney Lim, G.R. No. 136371, November 11, 2005, p. 5.
See Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89757, August 6, 1990, 188 SCRA 387,
390-391.
25
26
Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127897, November 15, 2001, 369 SCRA 24, 33.
27
Id. at 33-34.
Central Shipping Company, Inc. v. Insurance Company of North America, G.R. No. 150751, September
20, 2004, 438 SCRA 511, 523-524.
28