Complete Legal Ethics Case Digests Canons 7 22

CASE 1: In The Matter of the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
January 9, 1973
FACTS: In 1970, the Supreme Court created the Commission on Bar
Integration (CBI) to ascertain the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.
In 1971, the Congress passed HB 3277 (An Act Providing for the Integration
of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor). President Marcos
signed it and it became RA 6397.
the quality of the States legitimate interest. Even assuming that a lawyer is
compelled to join the Integrated Bar, it is still a justified compulsion as it is
an exercise of the police power of the State in regulating and controlling
the legal profession. Also, the inherent power of the Supreme Court to
regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate it.
ISSUE/S: WON the integration of the Bar is constitutional.
NOTE: This case falls under Canon 7 but this Canon is not explicitly
provided for in the case. However, the relation can be seen. Canon 7
provides that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and support the activities of the integrated bar. In
using the word shall, this Canon makes it mandatory for all lawyers to:
(1) uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and (2) support
the activities of the Integrated Bar. In being a member of the Integrated
Bar, a lawyer has certain responsibilities, which, if complied with, will
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Therefore, it is
neither unlawful to have a Bar Integration nor be a member of an
Integrated Bar.
HELD: Yes. The integration of the Bar is constitutional.
CASE 2: In Re: 1989 elections of the IBP
RATIO: The CBI Report defines the Bar Integration as the official unification
of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines, requiring membership
and financial support of every lawyer as sine qua non to the practice of
law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys. It is based on
the recognition that a lawyer is an officer of the court. It improves the
position of the Bar as an instrument of justice and rule of law. It fosters
cohesion among lawyers and ensures the promotion of the objectives of
the legal profession.
FACTS: On June 3, 1989, the IBP held its election however, the winning
candidates were not allowed to take their oath of office on July 4, 1989
due to some reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers
who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse
comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the
intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the
main protagonists for the office of president of the association, namely,
Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged
use of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public
officials to influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the
IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities.
In 1972, the CBI submitted its Report with the earnest recommendation to
ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar through the adoption and
promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule. The Report, alongside the
proceedings in Administrative Case 526 and the views and sentiments of
the Board of Consultants and the Philippine Bench and Bar, prayed for
such integration.
The constitutionality of the Bar Integration hinges on the constitutional

rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech. As the practice
of law is a privilege vested with public interest, it can best discharge its
public responsibilities through collective action. Collective action can only
be done through an organized body.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of an Integrated Bar does not violate
his constitutional freedom to associate because integration does not
make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a
member. Integration only provides an official national organization for the
well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every
lawyer is already a member. Also, an Integrated Bar serves to elevate the
educational and ethical standards of the Bar with the goal of improving
The three candidates for IBP President Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo began
travelling around the country to solicit the votes of delegates as early as
April 1989. Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking
the help of IBP chapter officers, soliciting their votes, and securing their
written endorsements.
The records of the Philippine National Bank show that Sec. Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr. Of the DENR borrowed a plane from the Philippine National
Bank for his Bicol Cabinet Officers for Regional Development Assistant,
LEGAL ETHICS| ATTY. GUZMAN| CASE DIGESTS| CANONS 7-22| YEAR I BLOCK 2|1
Undersecretary Antonio Tria. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB plane by

Atty. Drilon and her group.
The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted having formed
their own slates for the election of IBP national officers on June 3, 1989.
Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some delegates to
the convention. He mentioned Oscar Badelles, a voting delegate, to
whom he gave four round-trip tickets from Iligan City to Manila and back.
Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and three suites at
the Holiday Inn, which served as his headquarters, to be occupied by his
staff and the IBP delegates. He paid P150,000 for the hotel bills. The
delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at the Philippine
Plaza Hotel where her campaign manager, Atty. Renato Callanta,
booked 40 rooms, 5 of which were suites. The total sum of P316,411.53 was
paid by Atty. Callanta for the rooms, food, and beverages consumed by
the Drilon group, with an unpaid balance of P302,197.30. Atty. Nisce, on
the one hand, entered into a contract with the Hyatt Hotel for a total of
29 rooms plus one (1) seventh-floor room. Atty. Nisce's bill amounted to
P216,127.74.
In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a
candidate while holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory
office in the Government, Mariano E. Benedicto II, Assistant Secretary,
Department of Labor and Employment, testified that he took a leave of
absence from his office to attend the IBP convention. He stayed at the
Philippine Plaza with the Drilon group admittedly to give "some moral
assistance" to Atty. Violeta Drilon. He did so because he is a member of
the Sigma Rho Fraternity.
Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has heard of
candidates paying the IBP dues of lawyers who promised to vote for or
support them, but she has no way of ascertaining whether it was a
candidate who paid the delinquent dues of another, because the
receipts are issued in the name of the member for whom payment is
made.
ISSUE/S: WON the candidates violated Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility through their in campaigning for the election.
HELD: Yes. The three candidates employed means that are contrary to the
IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-political"
Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the said By-Laws.
RATIO: The setting up of campaign headquarters by Drilon, Nisce and

Paculdo in five-star hotels; the better for them to corral and entertain the
delegates billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit the votes of the
chapter presidents who comprise the 120-member House of Delegates
that elects the national officers and regional governors; the formation of
tickets, slates, or line-ups of candidates for the other elective positions
aligned with, or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the
procurement of written commitments and the distribution of nomination
forms to be filled up by the delegates; the reservation of rooms for
delegates in three big hotels, at the expense of the presidential
candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and some members of her
ticket; the printing and distribution of tickets and bio-data of the
candidates which in the case of Paculdo admittedly cost him some
P15,000 to P20,000; the employment of uniformed girls and lawyers to
distribute their campaign materials on the convention floor on the day of
the election; the giving of assistance by the Undersecretary of Labor to
Mrs. Drilon and her group; the use of labor arbiters to meet delegates at
the airport and escort them to the Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of prepaid plane tickets and hotel accommodations to delegates in exchange
for their support; the pirating of some candidates by inducing them to
"hop" or "flipflop" from one ticket to another for some rumored
consideration; all these practices made a political circus of the
proceedings and tainted the whole election process.
The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only
violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession
which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and
uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law
and legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of
the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon
1, Code of Professional Responsibility).
CASE 3: Santos, Jr. v. Llamas
FACTS: On Feb. 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr. a member of
the bar, filed a complaint against Atty. Francisco R. Llamas for
misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues. Santos
claimed that Llamas, for a number of years now, has not indicated the
proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data in his pleadings, as the latter only
indicates IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three years already, as show by the
pleadings filed by Llamas in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997.
On April 18, 1997, Santos filed a certification by the then IBP president of
the IBP that respondents last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since
then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership
fees up to the present.
On July 7, 1997, Llamas was required to comment on the complaint and in
his comment, Llamas alleged that he was exempt from payment of IBP
dues under R.A. 7432, Sec. 4, for being a senior citizen since 1992 and that
he was engaged only in limited practice of law. Llamas, also added,
that if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and
if only to show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed
and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill
and pay all past dues even with interests, charges and surcharges and
penalties.
On Dec. 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution adopting
and approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for three months and until he pays his
IBP dues.
ISSUE/S: WON Llamas is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility?
HELD: Yes, Llamas is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
RATIO: Llamas violated Canon 7 which states that A LAWYER SHALL AT
ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION,
AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Although Llamas
failure to pay his IBP dues may be in good faith, his act of indicating IBPRIZAL 259060 in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public
and the courts the he had paid his IBP dues is contrary with the duty of
upholding the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
Llamas failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the
pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty.
However, in view of his advanced age, his express willingness to pay his
dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, the Court
ruled to impose the penalty of one year suspension upon Llamas from the
practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later.
CASE 4: Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr. Requesting Exemption From

Payment of IBP Dues, B.M. No. 1370, May 9, 2005
FACTS: On September 22, 2004, Atty Cecilo Arevalo, Jr. sought the
exemption from the payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 in
the years between 1977-2005. Atty. Cecilio Arevalos contention is that
when he was admitted in the Philippines Bar in 1961, he became part of
the Philippines Civil Service from 1962 to 1986, and then migrated to and
worked in, the USA until his retirement in 2003. He maintained that he
cannot be made to pay the IBP dues because, when he is working in the
Philippine Civil Service, the Civil Service Law prohibits the practice off
ones profession while in the Government service, also when he was in the
USA the IBP dues cannot extend to him.
On November 16, 2004, the IBP submitted its comment, that the
membership in the IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a
lawyer continues to be included in the roll of attorneys as long as he
continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a
member is the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP board
of governors; the policy of the IBP board of governors of no exemption of
payment of annual dues is but an implementation of the Courts directives
for all members of the IBP to help defray the cost of integration of the Bar.
It is maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption, of payment of
annual dues as requested by Atty Arevalo, what is allowed is the voluntary
termination and reinstatement of membership. What he could have done
was to inform the secretary of IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his
membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, reliving him from
his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped.
On February 25, 2005, in reply to the letter of the IBP, Atty. Arevalo
questions the policy of the IBP board of governors of the non-exemption in
the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether
or not they are engaged in active or inactive practice. Asserting that the
said policy is a suffers constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection
clause and the due process clause.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Arevalo is entitled to exemption from payment of his
dues during the time he was inactive in the practice of law.
HELD: NO. The Integration of the Philippines Bar means that official
unification of the entire lawyer population, which requires membership
and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the
practice of law and retention of his name in the Roll of attorneys of the
Supreme Court.
The Court stated that there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the
Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and in integration of the
Philippine Bar. The fee required by the IBP is a necessary consequence of
membership in the IBP for the integration of the Philippine Bar to defray
the expenses of regulation of the profession, Lawyers, which no one is
exempt.
CASE 5. In the Matter of the Petition for Disbarment of Telesforo A. Diao v.
Severino G. Martinez, A.C. No. 244, March 29, 1963
FACTS: Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar. About two years later,
Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his
application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic
qualifications. The matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor
General who caused the charge to be investigated; and later he
submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the
roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his petition for
examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up
law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the
Department of Private Education, specially, in the following particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his
A.A. diploma therefrom which contradicts the credentials he had
submitted in support of his application for examination, and of his
allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal
education".
Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge: but he claims that
although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of
the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which
(according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his
return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army
service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
ISSUE/S: WON Diao be admitted to the Bar despite his misrepresentation.
HELD: No.Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations.
RATIO: Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his
application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (19401941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from
the Arellano University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified,
due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school
records.
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or
"confusion" was obviously of his own making. Had his application disclosed
his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also have
disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his
law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his
Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been permitted to
take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the
Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law,
he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal
education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education,"
(emphasis on "previous").
The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such
examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law;
taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is
equally essential.
CASE 6: Evangeline Leda vs. Atty. Trebonian Tabang, A.C. No. 2505,
February 21 1992
FACTS: Tabang and Leda contracted marriage at Iloilo and was
solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code as marriage of exceptional
character. Both of them kept their marriage a secret until Tabang finishes
his law studies, they had not yet lived as husband and wife.
Tabang, having finished his law studies, declared in his application to take
the bar that he was single. After Tabang passed the bar, Leda blocked
him of taking his oath by instituting a complaint, Bar Matter No. 78, that he
acted fraudulently in filling out his application. Thus, Tabang should be
considered as unworthy to take the lawyers oath for lack of good moral
character. Tabang admitted that he legally married Leda but that the
marriage was not yet made and declared public so that he could
properly take the Bar exams and ensure their future. Bar Matter No. 78 was
dismissed because Tabang said that it just arose out of misunderstanding
between him and Leda.
Leda, in response to this, instituted the present Administrative Case

praying Tabangs disbarment on grounds of using his legal knowledge to
contract an invalid marriage with Leda, misrepresented himself as single,
and for lack of good moral character.
It was found out that the marriage contract was actually void for failure to
comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code, or the five-year
minimum cohabitation before celebration of marriage and that they were
both twenty years old when they got married, below the required
minimum age of twenty-one years old.
He contended that he and Leda agreed not to disclose that their
marriage was void from the beginning because he wanted to finish his
studies and take the bar first. He also believed that when he applied for
the Bar, he honestly believed that in the eyes of the law, he was single.
ISSUE/S: WON Tabang committed gross misrepresentation of his status
HELD: Yes. Tabang committed gross misrepresentation of his status.
RATIO: Tabangs declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981
Bar Examinations that he was "single" was a gross misrepresentation of a
material fact made in utter bad faith, for which he should be made
answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of Professional
Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for
knowingly making a false statement or suppression of a material fact in
connection with his application for admission to the bar." That false
statement, if it had been known, would have disqualified him outright from
taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of good moral
character.
Tabangs protestations that he had acted in good faith in declaring his
status as "single" not only because of his pact with Complainant to keep
the marriage under wraps but also because that marriage to Leda was
void from the beginning, are mere afterthoughts absolutely wanting of
merit. Tabang cannot assume that his marriage to Leda is void. The
presumption is that all the requisites and conditions of a marriage of an
exceptional character under Article 76 of the Civil Code have been met
and that the Judge's official duty in connection therewith has been
regularly performed. Tabang is SUSPENDED from the practice of law until
further Orders
CASE 7: In Re Investigation of Angel Parazo for Alleged Leakage of

Questions in Some Subjects in the 1948 Bar Examinations
FACTS: The defendant, Angel Parazo, a duly accredited reporter of the
Star Reporter, a local daily of general publication wrote in the front page
of a newspaper where it states in bold letters- CLAIM LEAK IN LAST BAR
TEST followed by another in slightly small letters- Applicants in Uproar,
Want Anomaly Probed: One School Favored. According to this article,
the leakage in some subjects in the recent bar examinations were
denounced by some of the law graduates who took part of the test to the
Star Reporter. Only students of one private university in Sampaloc had
mimeographed questions on said subject fully one week before the tests.
The students who made the denunciation to the Star Reporter claim that
the tests actually given were similar in every respect to those they had
seen students of this private university holding around the city. Thereafter,
Justice Padilla, by the authority of the court, instructed Mr. Jose Dela Cruz
with assistance of Mr. E. Soriano to cite Mr. Parazo for questioning. In
September 18, 1948, the investigation of Mr. Parazo was conducted, on
which he testified under oath. He admitted that he was the author of the
news item; that he wrote up the story in good faith and in a spirit of public
service; and that he knew the persons who gave him the information was
given to him in confidence and his informants did not wish their identities
revealed. The investigators urged Mr. Parazo to reveal the names of his
informants so that the Supreme Court may be in the position to start and
conduct the necessary investigation in order to verify their charge and
complaint and take action against the party or parties responsible for this
alleged irregularity, if found true, but Parazo consistently refused to make
the revelation. In the meantime, Justice Montemayor issued a resolution
dated October 7, 1948 authorizing Justice Montemayor to cite Mr. Parazo
before him, explain to him that the court requires him to reveal the source
of his information and of his news item, and to warn him that his refusal to
make the revelation demanded will be regarded as contempt of court.
Because of the seriousness of the matter, Parazo was advised to think it
over and consider the consequences, and if he need time within which to
do this and so that he might even consult the editor and publisher of his
paper, he could be given an extension. On October 15, 1948, Mr. Parazo
appeared before the court but still declined and refused to make the
revelation. At the request of his counsel, that before this Court take action
upon his refusal to reveal, he be accorded a hearing, with the consent of
the Court first obtained, a public hearing was held on the same day,
October 15, 1948 in the course of which, Attorney Serrano extensively and
ably argued the case of his client, invoking the benefits of Republic Act
No. 53, the first section provides that The publisher, editor or duly
accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general
circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news-report
or information appearing in said publication which was related in
confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter, unless the court or a
House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded
by the interest of the state.
ISSUE/S: WON the court can compel Mr. Parazo to reveal the identities of
his informants
HELD: Yes, the court may demand the respondent to reveal the sources of
his information, in refusing to make the revelation which the Court
required of him, he committed contempt of court. The court orders his
immediate arrest and confinement in jail for a period of 1 month.
RATIO: RA No. 53 provides immunity to be accorded to a publisher, editor,
or reporter of any newspaper was absolute that under no circumstances
could he be compelled to reveal his source of information or news report.
The committee however, inserted an amendment by adding to the end
of section 1 of the clause unless the court finds such revelation is
demanded by public interest. The court is satisfied with that the present
case easily comes under the phrase interest of the state. Under Article
VII, section 13 of the Constitution, the SC takes charge of the admission of
members of the Philippine Bar. The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar
have always tried to maintain a high standard for the legal profession,
both in academic preparation and legal training, as well as in honesty
and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves are vitally
interested in keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving
this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those
persons who are known to be honest, possess good moral character, and
show proficiency in and knowledge of the law by the standard set by this
Court by passing the Bar Examinations honestly and in the regular and
usual manner. And one important thing to bear in mind is that the
Judiciary, from the Supreme Court down to the Justice of the Peace
Courts, provincial fiscalships and other prosecuting attorneys, and the
legal departments of the Government, draw exclusively from the Bar to fill
their positions. Consequently, any charge or insinuation of anomaly in the
conduct of Bar Examinations, of necessity is imbued with wide and
general interest and national importance.
CASE 8: Saburnido v. Madrono

FACTS: This is an administrative complaint for disbarment of respondent,
Atty. Florante Madrono, file by spouses Venustiano and Rosalia Saburnido.
Complainants allege that respondent has been harassing them by filing
numerous complaints against them, in addition to committing acts of
dishonesty.
Complainant Venustiano Saburnido is a member of the Philippine National
Police stationed at Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, while his wife Rosalia is a
public school teacher. Respondent is a former judge of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Balingasag-Lagonglong, Misamis Oriental.
Previous to this administrative case, complainants also filed three
administrative cases against the respondent: (1) A. M. No. MTJ-90-383,
charges of grave threats and acts unbecoming a member of the judiciary
against respondent; (2) A.M. No. 92-1-084-RTC, respondent granted and
reduced bail in a criminal case without prior notice to the prosecution; (3)
A.M. No. MTJ-90-486 respondent, in whose court certain confiscated
smuggled goods were deposited, allowed other persons to take the
goods but did not issue the corresponding memorandum receipts.
Respondent was found guilty on these charges and his retirement benefits
were forfeited.
After sometime the respondent lawyer then filed numerous complaints
against the petitioners, to which they allege that this is already a form of
harassment or a way of getting back to them.
ISSUE/S: WON the multiple cases file by the respondent lawyer against the
petitioners is a ground for his disbarment.
HELD: No. The Court finds that suspension from the practice of law is
sufficient to discipline the respondent.
RATIO: Rule 7.03. -- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Clearly, respondents act of filing multiple complaints against herein
complainants reflects on his fitness to be a member of the legal
profession. His act evinces vindictiveness, a decidedly undesirable trait
whether in a lawyer or another individual, as complainants were

instrumental in respondents dismissal from the judiciary. We see in
respondents tenacity in pursuing several cases against complainants not
the persistence of one who has been grievously wronged but the
obstinacy of one who is trying to exact revenge.
After due hearing, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty.
Alfredo Castillo guilty of gross immoral conduct and recommends that he
be meted the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
Respondents action erodes rather than enhances public perception of

the legal profession. It constitutes gross misconduct for which he may be
suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
HELD: Yes. Respondents actions amount to gross immoral conduct.
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,

grounds therefor. -- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. Xxx
CASE 9: Zaguirre v. Castillo
FACTS: Petitioner and respondent met while working in the NBI, the latter
had been courting the former and had promised to marry her while
representing himself to be single.Eventually, the two had an affair
sometime around 1996 and 1997. During that time, respondent was
preparing for his bar examinations, which he passed. On May 10, 1997,
respondent was admitted to the Philippine Bar and it was also around the
first week of May that petitioner knew about respondents marriage when
she was confronted by the wife of the respondent.
On Sept 10, 1997 respondent issued an affidavit admitting his relationship
with the petitioner and that he is the father of her unborn child. Upon
petitioners giving birth however, respondent started to deny the paternity
of the child and refused to give any support to the child. Respondent
claims that he never courted petitioner and that their affair was only
mutual lust. He likewise denied having represented himself as single as he
was known as a married man with children while working in the NBI. As to
the paternity of the child, he denied being the father since petitioner
allegedly was seeing other men during that time. He also avers that he
signed the said affidavit only to save the petitioner from embarrassment.
ISSUE/S: WON respondent has committed gross immoral conduct.
RATIO: The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
The court held that siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a
conduct way below the standards of morality required of every lawyer.
Moreover, his denial of the affidavit earlier executed by him shows a
conduct, which is highly censurable and unbecoming of a member of the
Bar. While respondent does not deny having an extra-marital affair with
complainant, he seeks understanding from the Court, pointing out that
men by nature are polygamous, and that what happened between
them was nothing but mutual lust and desire. The Court was not
convinced and in fact, it is appalled at the reprehensible, amoral attitude
of the respondent. His illicit relationship with the respondent was prior to his
admission to the bar and it would be impossible for respondent not to
know that he is required to have good moral character, and that the
same is not only a condition precedent to admission but also a continuing
requirement. Respondent repeatedly engaged in sexual congress with a
woman not his wife and now refuses to recognize and support a child
whom he previously recognized and promised to support. Therefore,
respondent violated the standards of morality required of the legal
profession and should be disciplined accordingly. However, as held by the
Court, disbarment shall not be meted out if a lesser penalty could be
given. Thus, herein respondent was held GUILTY of Gross Immoral Conduct
and suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.
CASE 10: Violeta Flores Alitagtag v. Atty. Virgilio Garcia
FACTS:This case refers to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent

for the Resolution dated Feb. 6, 2002, finding the respondent guilty of
grave misconduct rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in
the legal profession and ordering his disbarment. The respondent
reiterates his innocence by denying the authorship and participation in
the falsification of the subject deed of donation. He however admits his
negligence and expresses remorse for his failure to diligently perform his
duties as notary public.
Aside from the guilt of being remiss on the performance of his duties, he
was also found guilty of harassing the occupants of the property subject
of the donation by asking Meralco to disconnect its services to the
property and by posting security guards to intimidate the said occupants.
The IBP Investigating Commissioner found no proof as to the participation
of the respondent on the falsification of the signature of Cesar Flores on
the document. The criminal case filed by the complainant found no
reason to indict the respondent as well.
ISSUE/S: Do the actions of Atty. Garcia reflect adversely on this fitness to
practice law and transgressed Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility?
HELD: Yes. Without a doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the
legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty,
including suspension and disbarment. However, the totality of the acts of
misconduct committed by the respondent, his admission of negligence,
plea for compassion and that the fact that this is his first offense, the Court
finds it proper to reinstate him as a member of the bar and suspend him to
the practice of law and from his commission as a notary public for three
years.
FACTS: Sometime in 1991, Atty. Virtusio convinced herein petitioner, Mila

Virtusio, to buy a house in Quezon City from its developer Stateland
Investment Corporation. Mila agreed for Atty. Virtusio to use her personal
checks in paying the seller with Mila reimbursing her. Under this
arrangement, Mila gave her a total of P441,000.
However, Mila started receiving letters from Stateland demanding that
she make good the dishonored checks that it got. Mila confronted Atty.
Virtusio regarding the matter, and the latter assured her that she would
take care of the problem. The demand letters persisted.
For fear of losing the property, Mila dealt with Stateland directly,
discovering that her obligation had come close to P200,000. Mila and her
husband settled their overdue obligation with money borrowed at high
interest.
Upon demand, Atty. Virtusio refused to return the money she had
misappropriated. Only when Mila threatened to file an action against her
did she agree to pay her by executing a deed of sale in Milas favor
covering her Mazda car.
Despite the sale, Atty. Virtusio refused to give up the car, which prompted
Mila to file a replevin case which was decided in the latters favor. But,
Atty. Virtusio had managed to register the car in her childrens name and
sold the same to a third person. Mila filed an estafa case against her apart
from the present disbarment case.
Mila agreed after some financial settlement to withdraw her complaint
against Atty. Virtusio.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Virtusio is guilty by her acts of gross misconduct.
RATIO: Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession. By engaging in acts that
undermine recognition of and respect for legal processes, respondent
clearly committed conduct that adversely reflects in his fitness to be a
member of the legal profession.
CASE 11:Mila Virtusio, vs. Atty. Grenalyn Virtusio, A.C. No. 6753, September
5, 2012
HELD: Yes. The Court finds Atty. Virtusio guilty of gross misconduct and
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and imposes upon her
the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of law for one year.
RATIO: Lawyers are, as officers of the court and instruments for the
administration of justice, expected to maintain not only legal proficiency
but also a high standard of morality, honesty, and fair dealing. Atty.
Virtusio has admitting misusing the money that Mila has entrusted to her.
Her use for personal purposes the money entrusted to her constitutes
dishonest and deceitful conduct under the Code of Professional

Responsibility under Rule 1.01 (shall not engage in xxx dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct) and Rule 7.03.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
CASE 12: Javier v. Cornejo
FACTS: Silverio Q. Cornejo, a practicing lawyer of Lipa, Batangas, is
charged with malpractice (a) for trying to collect from a brother attorney
a sum of money by means of threat, and (b) for having instigated
Severina Paz Teodoro to file a complaint against Atty. Benedicto M.
Javier, for malpractice knowing fully well that the charges therein alleged
were malicious, flimsy and unfounded.
Atty. Javier, in support of his charge, refers to a letter dated December 2,
1935, in which demand was made upon him by Atty. Cornejo, for the
delivery of P195 which was the amount collected and received by Javier
by virtue of a judgment rendered in a certain case in the CFI of Rizal
wherein Severina Paz Teodoro was the judgment creditor and Atty. Javier
was her counsel. In the same letter, Atty. Javier was given 10 days within
which to turn over the said P195, otherwise a complaint would be filed
against him in this court. He was also urged to settle the matter for the
preservation not only of his good name but also that of the legal
profession.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Atty. Silverio Cornejo violated Canon 8, for
executing harassing tactics against his opposing counsel
HELD: No. He did not execute harassing tactics. The letter was not
improper. Prior to the alleged instigation, clients had already been
demanding from Atty Javier the return of the money.
RATIO: We find nothing improper in this letter of Atty. Cornejo to Atty.
Javier. The letter was an extra-judicial demand for the payment of a sum
of money which Severina Paz Teodoro had represented to Atty. Cornejo
as owing to her and which she sought to recover through his professional
services. It was an honest effort on the part of Atty. Cornejo to serve the
interest of his client. The lawyer owes entire "devotion to the interest of his
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and
exertion of his utmost learning and ability", to the end that nothing be
taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied.
As to second ground, it is alleged that the Atty. Cornejo in connivance
with one Gregorio Tapia, induced Severina Paz Teodoro to accuse Atty.
Javier before this court of malpractice. It appears that Atty. Javier was the
respondent in another case (A.C. No. 757) of the unlawful conversion of a
judgment fund amounting to P195 pertaining to his client, Severina Paz
Teodoro, which was dismissed. Now, Atty. Javier comes back against Atty.
Cornejo and charges him with having maliciously instigated the filing of
the complaint in the mentioned case (A.C. No. 757). We find that A.C. No.
757 was instituted in this court on March 18, 1936 and Atty. Cornejo
intervened as counsel for Atty. Javier on Dec 2, 1935. But long before
these dates, Severina Paz Teodoro and her son Feliciano Patea had
already been demanding from Atty. Javier the return of the amount
alleged to be due them. The last demand letter was made on March 23,
1931, and its receipt in the same month. This letter demanded the
payment of the remaining balance of P166.50 from the sum which Atty.
Javier had collected and received as judgment fund of his previous client
Severina Paz Teodoro, and also advised that upon his failure to remit the
amount demanded, the matter would be brought to the attention of this
court.
It should be observed, in this connection, that mutual bickering and
unjustifiable recrimination, between brother attorneys detract from the
dignity of the legal profession and will not receive any sympathy from this
court.
CASE 13: Manuel Y. Macias vs. Benjamin B. Malig
FACTS: This is an administrative case instituted by complainant Atty.
Manuel Y. Macias against respondent Atty. Benjamin B. Malig for
suspension or disbarment upon grounds of malpractice and violation of
the lawyer's oath.
The charge by Atty. Macias in his sworn Complaint dated 14 June 1982,
maybe summed up as follows:
1. He [Atty. Malig] acted as counsel for Rosario M. Llora in Special
Proceedings No. 70878 of the then Court of First Instance of Manila
although Atty. Macias was still her attorney of record.
2. He harassed Atty. Macias to withdraw his appearance in: (a) Special

Proceeding No. 70878, and (b) Civil Case No. 73335 of the then Court of
First Instance of Manila, which became G.R. No. L-34395 of this Honorable
Court; and he intimidated Atty. Macias into signing: (a) the Waiver (Exhibit
"C"), (b) the Substitution of Counsel in Civil Case No. 73335 (Exhibit "R"),
and (c) the substitution of counsel in Special Proceeding No. 70878 (Exhibit
"S").
3. He did not substitute Atty. Macias in Civil Case No. 65763 but claimed
for Himself the attorney's fees of Atty. Macias.
4. He extorted from Atty. Macias, the sum of P10,000.00.
5. He corruptly induced the late Judge Joel Tiangco to lift Atty. Macias
attachment on a property belonging to the Lloras without notice to Atty.
Macias.
6. He actively assisted the Lloras to dispose of all their properties in the
Philippines and remit the proceeds to Australia in fraud of Atty. Macias.
In turn, respondent Atty. Malig in his "Comment with Countercharges"
dated 1 September 1982 sought the disbarment of complainant Atty.
Macias. The countercharges against Atty. Macias are the following:
1. Atty. Macias made an unethical solicitation of case-the settlement of
the estate of Rosario Legarda de Valdes.
2. He instituted a patently baseless and malicious action, Civil case No.
109585, before the Regional Trial Court in Manila for attorney's fees and
damage. against Antonio Ma. Llora, Rosario M. Llora and their familyowned corporations.
3. He maliciously and irresponsible charged Atty. Malig and his clients with
having "exacted" and "extorted" from him the sum of P10,000.00
4. He maliciously and irresponsibly charged Atty. Malig and the late Judge
Joel Tiangco with corruption in the lifting of an attachment.
5. He made an unethical representation of a client.
6. He maliciously and irresponsibly charged Atty. Malig and his clients, the
Llora spouses, with fraudulent disposition of the latter's properties and
salting the proceeds [in] Australia.
ISSUE/S: WON there was condor and fairness towards the other
professional colleague.
HELD: YES both lawyers are guilty for the acts they did which are
unbecoming to the other lawyer.
RATIO: The Court is not prepared to condone by passing over subsilentio
the misconduct of which complainant and respondent are guilty one vis-
a-vis the other. Each party here has shown himself to be too ready to
believe the other guilty of serious misconduct in the practice of the
profession to which they both belong while vehemently asserting his own
good faith. Each party here was too anxious and willing to make serious
accusations against the other which the exertion of reasonable diligence
along with simple courtesy would have shown to be unwarranted by the
facts and the records. Each attorney here was too prone to use
intemperate and offensive language in describing the professional
behavior of the other. Complainant Macias insisted that respondent Malig
"extorted" P10,000.00 from him. The dictionary meaning of "to extort" is "to
obtain from an unwilling or reluctant person by physical force, intimidation
or the abuse of legal or official authority" (Webster's Third New
International [1981, ed.].) Clearly, extortion is an unethical act and may
well be criminal. "Harassment" and "intimidation" are other similarly
unethical and offensive acts that complainant Macias so freely ascribed
to respondent Malig "Corruption" with which complainant in Macias
accused both respondent Malig and the deceased Judge Tiangco is an
even more deplorable term. Upon the other hand, respondent Malig was
not to be outdone and referred to complainant Macias as "denizen" of a
"jungle" who "prey[s] upon his brother lawyer [and] his [own] clients" and
likened him to "a baneful snake biting the hand of the client who fed him"
The Court would also take judicial notice of the fact that complainant
Macias has more than once in the past been rebuked by this Court in
relation to his conduct vis-a-vis clients and former clients. We hold that
complainant Macias and respondent Malig are both guilty of conduct
unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the court. Lawyers must at all
times treat each other, and as well their clients, former clients and the rest
of the community, with that personal dignity, courtesy and civility rightly
demanded of members of the ancient and learned profession of the law.
CASE 14: Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao, vs. Atty. Virgil R. Castro, A.C. No.
6396, October 25, 2005
FACTS: Respondent Atty. Castro went to Atty. Rosalies (complainant)
office to inquire whether the complete records of Civil Case No. 784 had
already been remanded to the MCTC. Atty. Castro was not the counsel of
record of either party in the said civil case. Atty. Rosalie is the Clerk of
Court of the RTC of Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya.
Atty. Rosalie informed Atty. Castro that the record had not yet been
transmitted since a certified true copy of the decision of the Court of
Appeals should first be presented to serve as basis for the transmittal of the
records to the court of origin. To this, Atty. Castro retorted scornfully, Who
will certify the Court of Appeals Decision, the Court of Appeals? You
mean to say, I would still have to go to Manila to get a certified true
copy? Surprised at this outburst, Atty. Rosalie replied, Sir, its in the Rules
but you could show us the copy sent to the party you claim to be
representing. Atty. Castro then replied, Then you should have notified
me of the said requirement. That was two weeks ago and I have been
frequenting your office since then, but you never bothered to notify
me. Atty. Rosalie replied, It is not our duty, Sir, to notify you of the said
requirement.
Atty. Castro then answered, You mean to say it is not your duty to
remand the record of the case? Atty. Rosalie responded, No, Sir, I
mean, its not our duty to notify you that you have to submit a copy of the
Court of Appeals decision. Atty. Castro angrily declared in
Ilocano, Kayat mo nga saw-en, awan pakialam yon? Kasdiay? (You
mean to say you dont care anymore? Is that the way it is?) He then
turned and left the office, banging the door on his way out to show his
anger. The banging of the door was so loud it was heard by the people
at the adjacent RTC, Branch 30 where a hearing was taking place. After a
few minutes, Atty Castro returned to the office, still enraged, and pointed
his finger at Atty. Rosalie and shouted, Ukinnan, no adda ti unget mo iti
kilientek haan mo nga ibales kaniak ah! (Vulva of your mother! If you
are harboring ill feelings against my client, dont turn your ire on
me!) Atty. Rosalie was shocked at Atty. Castros words but still managed
to reply, I dont even know your client, Sir. Atty. Castro left the office
and as he passed by Atty. Rosalies window, he again shouted,Ukinnam
nga babai! (Vulva of your mother, you woman!)
Atty. Rosalie suffered acute embarrassment at the incident, as it
happened in her office of which she was, and still is, the head and in front
of her staff. She felt that her credibility had been tarnished and
diminished, eliciting doubt on her ability to command full respect from her
staff.
The Complaint-Affidavit was supported by an Affidavit signed by
employees of RTC-Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya who witnessed the incident.
A Motion to File Additional Affidavit/Documentary Evidence was also filed.
The CBD-IBP issued an Order requiring respondent to submit his answer to
the complaint. The hearing for the administrative complaint before the
CBD was set. However, on day of the hearing, only complainant
appeared.
Atty. Rosalie filed a Manifestation expressing her desire not to appear on

the next hearing date in view of respondents public apology, adding that
respondent personally and humbly asked for forgiveness which she
accepted.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be
reprimanded and warned that any other complaint for breach of his
professional duties shall be dealt with more severely.The IBP submitted to
this Court a Notice of Resolution adopting and approving the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Castro violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD: Yes. Atty. Castro violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is fined in the amount of P10,000.00 with a warning that
any similar infraction with be dealt with more severely.
RATIO: Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that
lawyers conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward
their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the
legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly towards
each other and otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at
all times.
In the course of his questionable activities relating to Civil Case No. 784,
respondent acted rudely towards an officer of the court. He raised his
voice at the clerk of court and uttered at her the most vulgar of
invectives. Not only was it ill-mannered but also unbecoming considering
that he did all these to a woman and in front of her subordinates. He thus
violated Canon 8 of the CPR. The penalty was tempered because
respondent apologized
to
the
complainant
and
the
latter
accepted it. This is not to say, however, that respondent should be
absolved from his actuations. People are accountable for the
consequences of the things they say and do even if they repent
afterwards.
CASE 15: Antonio A. Alcantara, vs. Atty. Mariano Pefianco, A. C. No. 5398,
December 3, 2002
FACTS: On May 18, 2000, Atty. Ramon Salvani III was conferring with a
client in the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) at the Hall of Justice in San
Jose, Antique, a woman approached them. Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara,
the incumbent District Public Attorney of the PAO in San Jose, Antique,
saw the woman in tears, whereupon he went to the group and suggested
that Atty. Salvani talk with her amicably as a hearing was taking place in
another room. At this point, Atty. Mariano Pefianco, who was sitting
nearby, stood up and shouted at Atty. Salvani and his client, saying "Why
do you settle that case? Have your client imprisoned so that he will realize
his mistake." Atty. Alcantara was surprised by the sudden outburst and
advised him to cool off but, to no avail Atty. Pefianco continued to scold
Atty. Salvani. To avoid any scene with Atty. Pefianco, Atty. Alcantara went
inside his office. He asked his clerk to put a notice outside prohibiting
anyone from interfering with any activity in the PAO. Alcantara then went
out to attend a hearing, but when he came back he heard Pefianco
saying "Atty. Alcantara said that he would send me out of the PAO, what
an idiot." Pefianco upon seeing Alcantara, pointed his finger at him and
repeated his statement for the other people in the office to hear.
Alcantara confronted Pefianco and told him to observe civility or else to
leave the office if he had no business there. Pefianco resented this and
started hurling invectives at Alcantara. According to Alcantara, Pefianco
even took a menacing stance towards him. The incident caused a
commotion in the office. Atty. Pepin Marfil and Mr. Robert Minguez, the
Chief of the Probation Office, tried to pacify Atty. Pefianco. Two guards of
the Hall of Justice came to take Pefianco out of the office, but before
they could do so, he tried to attack Alcantara and even shouted at him,
"Gago ka!" Fortunately, the guards were able to fend off Pefiancos blow
and Alcantara was not harmed.
Atty. Alcantara filed a complaint against Atty. Pefianco for conduct
unbecoming a member of the bar for using improper and offensive
language and threatening and attempting to assault him. Complainant
Alcantara also submitted the affidavits of Atty. Ramon Salvani III, Felizardo
Del Rosario, Atty. Pepin Joey Marfil, Robert Minguez, Herbert Ysulat and
Ramon Quintayo to corroborate his allegations.
In his Comment and Counter-Complaint, respondent Pefianco said that
the sight of the crying woman, whose husband had been murdered,
moved him and prompted him to take up her defense. He said that he
resented the fact that complainant Alcantara had ordered a employee
to put a sign outside prohibiting "standbys" from hanging round in the
PAO.
Respondent Pefianco claimed that while talking with Atty. Salvani

concerning the womans case Alcantara, with his bodyguard, arrived and
shouted at him to get out of the PAO. He claimed that two security guards
also came, and Alcantara ordered them to take him out of the office.
Contrary to complainants claims, however, Pefianco said that it was
Alcantara who moved to punch him and shout at him, "Gago ka!"
Prior to the filing of the present complaint, respondent Pefianco had filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman an administrative and criminal
complaint against complainant. However, the complaint was dismissed
by the said office.
ISSUE/S: WON respondent Atty. Pefianco should be reprimanded for his
actions in the said case.
HELD: Yes, respondent Pefianco violated Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility: A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
RATIO: The Court agrees with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the IBP
that respondent Atty. Pefianco violated Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The Committee noted that respondent failed
not only to deny the accusations against him but also to give any
explanation for his actions. The evidence on record indeed shows that it
was respondent Pefianco who provoked the incident in question. The
affidavits of several disinterested persons confirm complainants allegation
that respondent Pefianco shouted and hurled invectives at him and Atty.
Salvani and even attempted to lay hands on the complainant.
Canon 8 admonishes lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy,
fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound
to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably,
fairly and candidly toward each other and otherwise conduct themselves
without reproach at all times.
In the case at bar, respondents meddling in a matter in which he had no
right to do so caused the untoward incident. He had no right to demand
an explanation from Atty. Salvani why the case of the woman had not or
could not be settled. Even so, Atty. Salvani in fact tried to explain the
matter to respondent, but the latter insisted on his view about the case.
Atty. Mariano Pefianco was found GUILTY of violation of Canon 8 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility and, considering it was his first offense,
he was fined in the amount ofP1,000.00 and REPRIMANDED with a warning
that similar action in the future will be sanctioned more severely.
CASE 16: Yared v. Ilarde
FACTS: Estrella Yared, substituted by Carmen Tiongco because the former
is now dead, and Jose Tiongco were opposing parties to a property in
litigation. Carmen directly filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the
Supreme Court because Judge Ilarde of the RTC ordered the cancellation
of annotation of notices of lis pendens. The Supreme Court noticed and
commented that Carmen has failed to comply with the principle of
judicial hierarchy and that she should have filed the petition in the CA first.
However, the Supreme Court also noticed the improper and unethical
language employed by Jose Tiangco, who was also a counsel for the
private respondents, in his pleadings and motions filed both in SC and
lower court. He described the counsel of the petitioner, Atty. Marciana
Deguma, a rambunctious wreastler-type female of 52 who does not
wear a dress which is not red, and who stampedes into the court room like
a mad fury and who speaks slang English to conceal her faulty grammar.
Jose Tiongco alleged that Atty. Deguma does that to please and
tenderize and sweeten towards her own self the readily available
Carmelo Tiongco, an unmarried mestizo who lives with Carmen. He
further described Atty. Deguma as an unmarried maiden of certain age
and a love-crazed female Apache who is ready to skin the defendant
alive for not being a bastard and a horned spinster and man-hungry
virago and female bull of an Amazon. He also stated that Atty. Deguma
is using PAO as a marriage bureau for her own benefit.
ISSUE/S: W/N Jose Tiongco, being also one of the counsels of the
defendants, violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD: Yes. With the language that he employed, he obviously violated
Canon 8-A Rule 8.01 which states that a lawyer shall not, in his professional
dealings, use languages which is abusive, offensive, or otherwise
improper. He also violated Rule 11.03 which says that a lawyer shall
abstain from scandalous, offensive, or menacing language before the
courts. The SC also cited Romero vs Valle, although allowed some
latitude of remarks or comment in furtherance of the cause he upholds,
his arguments, both written or oral, should be gracious to both court and
opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by

one gentleman to another. Jose Tiongco was merely warned.
Note: In the first part of the case, even the title of the case, it was not
mentioned whether Jose Tiongco is a lawyer or not. Then, theres one
sentence which addressed him Atty. Jose Tiongco.
CASE 17: Cerina B. Likong vs. Atty. Alexander H. Lim, A.C. No. 3149, August
17, 1994
FACTS: Complainant Cerina B. Likong executed a deed of assignment
assigning to Geesnell L. Yap pension checks which she regularly receives
from the US government as a widow of a US pensioner. The deed of
assignment states that the same shall be irrevocable until her loan is fully
paid. Cerina likewise executed a special power of attorney authorizing
Yap to get her pension checks from the post office.
About three months after the execution of the SPA, Cerina informed the
post office that she was revoking the SPA. Yap filed a complaint for
injunction against Cerina. Respondent Alexander H. Lim appeared as
counsel for Yap while Attys. Roland B. Inting and Erico B. Aumentado
appeared for Cerina.
Cerina and Yap filed a joint motion, which does not bear the signatures of
Cerina's counsel, to allow the Yap to withdraw the pension checks. They
likewise entered into a compromise agreement without the participation
of Cerina's counsel. In the compromise agreement, it was stated that
complainant Cerina admitted an obligation to Yap and that they agreed
that the amount would be paid in monthly installments.
Cerina filed a complaint for disbarment, alleging that in all the motions,
she was prevented from seeking assistance, advise and signature of any
of her two lawyers as she was advised by Atty. Lim that it was not
necessary for her to consult her lawyers under the pretense that: (a) this
could only jeopardize the settlement; (b) she would only be incurring
enormous expense if she consulted a new lawyer; (c) respondent was
assisting her anyway; (d) she had nothing to worry about the documents
foisted upon her to sign; (e) complainant need not come to court
afterwards to save her time; and in any event respondent already took
care of everything. She alleged that she was prevented from exhibiting
fully her case by means of fraud, deception and some other form of
mendacity practiced on her by Atty. Lim who, fraudulently or without

authority, assumed to represent complainant and connived in her defeat.
Atty. Lim argued that Cerinas counsel had abandoned her and it was
upon her request that he made the compromise agreement. Atty. Lim
states that he first instructed Cerina to notify her lawyers but was informed
that her lawyer had abandoned her since she could not pay his attorney's
fees.
The compromise agreement prepared by respondent increased Cerinas
debt to Yap and the terms contained therein are grossly prejudicial to
Cerina.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Lim is guilty of misconduct under the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
HELD: Yes. Atty. Lim was suspended from the practice of law for 1 year for
violating Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, constituting
malpractice and grave misconduct.
RATIO: Atty. Lim prevented Cerina from informing her lawyers by giving her
the reasons enumerated in the complaint. There is no showing that Atty.
Lim even tried to inform opposing counsel of the compromise agreement.
Neither is there any showing that Atty. Lim informed the trial court of the
alleged abandonment of Cerina by her counsel.Instead, even assuming
that she was really abandoned by her counsel, Atty. Lim saw an
opportunity to take advantage of the situation, and the result was the
execution of the compromise agreement which is grossly and patently
disadvantageous and prejudicial to Cerina. Undoubtedly, Atty. Lim's
conduct is unbecoming a member of the legal profession.
FACTS: On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr.

filed a complaint-affidavit with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment,
suspension from the practice of law, or imposition of appropriate
disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer for the
following offenses:
1. On November 22, 2000 Atty. Ferrer, as plaintiffs counsel in Civil Case
7040, filed a reply with opposition to motion to dismiss that contained
abusive, offensive, and improper language which insinuated that Atty.
Barandon presented a falsified document in court.
2. Atty. Ferrer filed a fabricated charge against Atty. Barandon in Civil
Case 7040 for alleged falsification of public document when the
document allegedly falsified was a notarized document executed on
February 23, 1994, at a date when Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer
nor was assigned in Camarines Norte. The latter was not even a signatory
to the document.
3. On December 19, 2000, at the courtroom of Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
Daet before the start of hearing, Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk, threatened
Atty. Barandon saying, "Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan,
kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa
Camarines Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur,
umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito."
4. Atty. Ferrer made his accusation of falsification of public document
without bothering to check the copy with the Office of the Clerk of Court
and, with gross ignorance of the law, failed to consider that a notarized
document is presumed to be genuine and authentic until proven
otherwise.
The Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Rule 8.02 A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any
lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to
those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
CASE 18: Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. vs. Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr., A.C.
No. 5768, March 26, 2010
5. The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case against
repeating his unethical act; yet he faces a disbarment charge for sexual
harassment of an office secretary of the IBP Chapter in Camarines Norte;
a related criminal case for acts of lasciviousness; and criminal cases for
libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against him. In October
2000, Atty. Ferrer asked Atty. Barandon to falsify the daily time record of his
son who worked with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems,
Department of Justice. When Atty. Barandon declined, Atty. Ferrer
repeatedly harassed him with inflammatory language.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP Investigating
Commissioner erred in finding respondent Atty. Ferrer guilty of the
charges against him.
2. WON if in the affirmative, whether or not the penalty imposed on him is
justified.
HELD: No. The IBP Board of Governors and the IBP Investigating
Commissioner did not erred in finding respondent Atty. Ferrer guilty of the
charges against him.
RATIO: Under theCanon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
commands all lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and
candor towards their fellow lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel. Specifically, in Rule 8.01, the Code provides:
Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Atty. Ferrers actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence
shows that he imputed to Atty. Barandon the falsification of the Salaysay
Affidavit of the plaintiff in Civil Case 7040. He made this imputation with
pure malice for he had no evidence that the affidavit had been falsified
and that Atty. Barandon authored the same.
Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsification in a
proper forum and without using offensive and abusive language against a
fellow lawyer.
The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in
their pleadings despite the adversarial nature of our legal system.
Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of
the legal profession at all times. Rule 7.03 of the Code provides:
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life
behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it should
always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal
profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has

no place in the dignity of judicial forum.
All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts
who are mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence
they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly.Atty. Ferrers display of
improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, and misconduct in the
performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before
the public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics
that lawyers are sworn to uphold.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the May 22, 2008 Resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors in CBD Case 01-809 and ORDERS the suspension of
Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. from the practice of law for one year effective
upon his receipt of this Decision.
CASE 19: Bugaring, et al., v. Espanol CPR 8.01
FACTS: On December 5, 1996, an incident subject of the petition occurred
during a hearing for Annulment of Sale and Certificates of Title before
respondent Judge Dolores S. Espaol of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite,
Imus, and Cavite. The trial court issued an order on February 27, 1996
directing the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite to annotate at
the back of certain certificates of title a notice of lis pendens. Before the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite could comply with said order,
the defendant Spouses Alvaran, filed a motion to cancel lis pendens. On
July 19, 1996, petitioner, the newly appointed counsel of Royal Bechtel
Builders, Inc., filed an opposition to the motion to cancel lis pendens. On
August 16, 1996, the motion to cancel lis pendens was granted by the
court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by
the defendants. On November 5, 1996, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion
to Resolve, and on November 6, 1996, filed a Rejoinder to Opposition and
Motion for Contempt of Court. During the hearing of this case, plaintiffs
and counsel were present together with one (1) operating a video
camera who was taking pictures of the proceedings of the case while
counsel, Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring was making manifestation to the effect
that he was ready to mark his documentary evidence pursuant to his
Motion to cite (in contempt of court) the Deputy Register of Deeds of
Cavite, Diosdado Concepcion.
The Court called the attention of said counsel who explained that he did
not cause the appearance of the cameraman to take pictures; however,
he admitted that they came from a function, and that was the reason
why the cameraman was in tow with him and the plaintiffs.
Notwithstanding the flimsy explanation given, the counsel sent out the
cameraman after the Court took exception to the fact that although the
proceedings are open to the public and that it being a court of record
and since its permission was not sought, such situation was an abuse of
discretion of the Court. When the respondent, Deputy Register of Deeds
Concepcion manifested that he needed the services of counsel and right
then and there appointed Atty. Elpidio Barzaga to present him, the case
was allowed to be called again. On the second call, Atty. Burgaring
started to insist that he be allowed to mark and present his documentary
evidence in spite of the fact that Atty. Barzaga was still manifesting that
he be allowed to submit a written pleading for his client, considering that
the Motion has so many ramifications and the issues are complicated.
At this point, Atty. Bugaring was insisting that he be allowed to mark his
documentary evidence and was raring to argue as in fact he was already
perorating despite the fact that Atty. Barzaga has not yet finished with his
manifestation. As Atty. Bugaring appears to disregard orderly procedure,
the Court directed him to listen and wait for the ruling of the Court for an
orderly proceeding.
While claiming that he was listening, he would speak up anytime he felt
like doing so. Thus, the Court declared him out of order, at which point,
Atty. Bugaring flared up the uttered words insulting the Court; such as:
'that he knows better than the latter as he has won all his cases of
certiorari in the appellate Courts, that he knows better the Rules of Court;
that he was going to move for the inhibition of the Presiding Judge for
allegedly being antagonistic to his client,' and other invectives were
hurled to the discredit of the Court.
Thus, in open court, Atty. Bugaring was declared in direct contempt and
order the Court's sheriff to arrest and place him under detention. To clear
his name in the legal circle and the general public, petitioner filed a
petition before the Court of Appeals praying for the annulment of the
Order. The Court of Appeals found that from a thorough reading of the
transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing held on December 5, 1996,
it was obvious that the petitioner was indeed arrogant, at times
impertinent, and too argumentative, to the extent of being disrespectful,
annoying and sarcastic towards the court.
ISSUE/S: WON the appellate court committed error in affirming the

assailed order of the trial court
HELD: Yes. The appellate court committed error in the affirmation of the
trial court order
RATIO: Behaving without due regard or deference to his fellow counsel
who at the time he was making representations in behalf of the other
party, was rudely interrupted by the petitioner and was not allowed to
further put a word in edgewise is violative of Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Ethics which obliges a lawyer to conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues. Indeed,
the conduct of petitioner in persisting to have his documentary evidence
marked to the extent of interrupting the opposing counsel and the court
showed disrespect to said counsel and the court, was defiant of the
court's system for an orderly proceeding, and obstructed the
administration of justice. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all
courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings
and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court,
and consequently, to the due administrative of justice.
CASE 20: Atty. Ramon P. Reyes vs. Atty. Victoriano T. Chiong, A.C. No.
5148, July 1, 2003
FACTS: Atty. Reyes alleges that sometime his services were engaged by
one Zonggi Xu, a Chinese-Taiwanese, in a business venture that went
awry.
Xu, through Atty. Reyes, filed a complaint for estafa against Pan, who was
represented by respondent Atty. Chiong. The latter neither appeared on
the two scheduled hearings nor submitted his counter-affidavit.
Atty. Chiong argued that he had shown no disrespect in impleading Atty.
Reyes as co-defendant in the civil case. He alleged that Prosecutor
Salanga was impleaded as an additional defendant because of the
irregularities the latter had committed in conducting the criminal
investigation.
Atty. Reyes was impleaded, because he allegedly connived with his client
(Xu) in filing the estafa case, which Xu knew fully well was baseless.
According to Atty. Chiong, the irregularities committed by Prosecutor
Salanga in the criminal investigation and complainants connivance

therein were discovered only after the institution of the collection suit.
CASE 21: Atty. Casiano U. Laput v. Atty. Francisco E.F. Remotigue & Atty.
Fortunato P. Patalinghug (1962)
Commissioner of the IBP held that Atty. Chiong had no ground to implead
Prosecutor Salanga. In so doing, respondent violated his oath of office
and Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
FACTS: In 1952, a client (named Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera) hired Atty.
Casiano Laput (petitioner) to handle the case regarding the testation of
the estate of the clients deceased husband. In 1955, Atty. Laput,
contemplating to end the proceedings soon, prepared two (2) pleadings
for the Court. However, the client refused to sign these and instructed
Atty. Laput not to file these in Court.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Chiong violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility.
HELD: Yes.Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
a lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel.
Respondents actions do not measure up to this Canon. The Civil case was
for the "collection of a sum of money, damages and dissolution of an
unregistered business venture." It had originally been filed against Spouses
Xu, but was later modified to include complainant and Prosecutor
Salanga.
The amendment of the Complaint and the failure to resort to the proper
remedies strengthen complainants allegation that the civil action was
intended to gain leverage against the estafa case. If respondent or his
client did not agree with Prosecutor Salangas resolution, they should
have used the proper procedural and administrative remedies.
Respondent could have gone to the justice secretary and filed a Motion
for Reconsideration or a Motion for Reinvestigation of Prosecutor
Salangas decision to file an information for estafa.
Moreover, he could have instituted disbarment proceedings against
complainant and Prosecutor Salanga, if he believed that the two had
conspired to act illegally. As a lawyer, respondent should have advised his
client of the availability of these remedies. Thus, the filing of the civil case
had no justification.
It appears that respondent took the estafa case as a personal affront and
used the civil case as a tool to return the inconvenience suffered by his
client. His actions demonstrate a misuse of the legal process. The aim of
every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law,
not to harass them.
Weeks later, Atty. Laput found out in the records of the proceedings that
another lawyer had entered appearance (and in writing, on January 11,
1955) for his client, namely: Atty. Patalinghug (one of the respondents).
Subsequently, on Feb. 5, Atty. Casiano voluntarily asked the Court to
relieve him as counsel. Only then (on Feb 7) that the other lawyer, Atty.
Remotigue entered his appearance (in writing, dated Feb 5).
Now, Atty. Laput complains before the SC that the two lawyers
(Patalinghug and Remotigue) conduct were unethical and improper.
Laput alleged that they did it with malice, desiring to be the new counsels
of Mrs. Barrera. He also alleged that the two lawyers intrigued him,
prompting the client to lose her trust.
It is also alleged that the two lawyers brought the client to their office,
asked her to sign documents (one including Revocation of Powers of
Attorney), and these documents were sent to corporations and other
offices belonging to the estate of the client. Atty. Laput alleged that the
two lawyers well knew that no such powers of attorney was granted to
him by client, and hence concluded that the purpose of the
dissemination of the documents was to embarrass him.
Finally, it was the entering of Atty. Patalinghugs appearance in Court,
without prior notice to Atty. Laput, that constituted the unethical act.
In defense, Atty. Patalinghug said that when he entered his appearance,
the client already lost confidence in Atty. Laput and, by that time, the
client herself had filed a pleading asking the Court to approve the
discharge of Atty. Laput as counsel. Meanwhile, Atty. Remotigue argued
that when he entered his appearance, Atty. Laput had already
withdrawn.
The Solicitor General, upon referral by the Supreme Court, made the
following findings: (1) that the claim of Atty. Patalinghug regarding the
clients pleading to discharge Atty. Laput is true, and therefore, it is the
clients fault that Atty. Laput was not informed; and (2) that the client no
longer trusted Atty. Laput because she found out that the lawyer had
been doing things unauthorized by her, e.g. withdrawal from the bank
accounts (PNB and BPI) and dividend checks from the properties are
being delivered to Atty. Laput instead of the client.
ISSUE/S: WON the conduct of Atty. Patalinghug and Atty. Remotigue were
unethical and unprofessional to warrant disciplinary action
HELD: No. The court finds no irregularity in the conduct of the two lawyers.
RATIO: What happened cannot be considered as case-grabbing. The
investigation by the Sol-Gen revealed that it was the client herself that
sought the services of the two lawyers. In fact, a written contract was
executed so as to set the amount of fees for the legal services.
Also, Atty. Laput is estopped by his own actions he filed his voluntary
withdrawal from the proceedings and the motion he made for the
payment of his attorneys fees amounted to acquiescence (reluctant
acceptance but without protest). Atty. Laput cannot claim that Atty.
Patalinghug was unprofessional.
With respect to the alleged document (Revocation of the Powers of
Attorney) allegedly prepared by Atty. Patalinghug, the inquiry revealed
that there was no malice on the part of the lawyer. The only purpose is to
protect the interests of the client. The court recognizes that Atty. Laputs
pride was hurt and felt that he was intrigued (pictured as a dishonest
lawyer). He even filed cases with the City Fiscal of Cebu, charging the
client and Atty. Patalinghug with Libel and Falsification, but these were
dismissed.
With respect to Atty. Remotigue, he cannot be found guilty of any
unethical conduct because it was already two days after Atty. Laput
withdrew his appearance, when Remotigue entered his own.
CASE 22: GARCIA v. LOPEZ
FACTS: Petitioner Wilfredo Garcia was the counsel of the late Angelina
Sarmiento, applicant in LRC Case No. 05-M-96 which was pending in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 15. Sarmiento

sought the registration and confirmation of her title over a 376,397 sq. m.
tract of land. The case went all the way to the Supreme Court and
ultimately, the RTC decision was upheld. The decision became final and
executory and the RTC, in an order dated 21 February 2002, directed the
Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the decree of registration and
certificate of title. The LRA failed to comply, prompting the complainant
to file an urgent motion to cite the LRA administrator or his representative
in contempt of court.
On 19 September 2002, Respondent Beniamino Lopez filed his entry of
appearance and motion for postponement because he claimed to be
the counsel of the heirs of Sarmiento. Garcia had not withdrawn from the
case therefore he was surprised by what Lopez did. On 24 September
2002, Garcia filed a complaint and charged Lopez with violation of his
oath as a member of the bar and officer of the court, misrepresentation,
amounting to perjury and prayed that the respondent be suspended or
disbarred.
It appears that Sarmiento was succeeded by the following compulsory
heirs: Gina Jarvia (Angelina's daughter by her common-law husband
Victor Jarvia), Alfredo, Zenaida, Wilson, Jeanette and Geneva, all
surnamed Ku (Angelina's children by her husband prior to her relationship
with Victor). Garcia presented an affidavit executed by Gina Jarvia and
Alfredo Ku wherein they stated that they did not engage the services of
Lopez and that they recognized Garcia as their only counsel of record.
Lopez claimed that he was merely representing the heirs Zenaida and
Wilson Ku since they availed of his services. They allegedly did not have a
lawyer a day before a scheduled hearing therefore Lopez executed an
entry of appearance with motion for postponement. He asserted that it
was an honest mistake not to have listed the names of his clients. He
claimed it was not deliberate and did not prejudice anyone. He insisted
that he had no intention of misrepresenting himself to the court.
ISSUE: WON Lopez violated rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
HELD: Yes. He made it appear that he was entering his appearance as
counsel for all the heirs of Sarmiento which was highly unfair to Garcia
who had worked on the case from the very beginning (i.e. since 1996)
and who had not been discharged as such.
RATIO: Canon 8 provides that A lawyer shall conduct himself with

courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and
shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Rule 8.02 states
that A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any
lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to
those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
those specified in the statute. A signature by agents amounts to a signing

by non-qualified attorneys, the office of attorney being originally one of
agency We do not, however, mean to discountenance the use of a
suitable firm designation by partners, all of whom have been duly
admitted to practice.
ISSUE/S: WON the defendants should be punished for contempt.
HELD : YES. Where the law defines contempt, the power of the courts is
restricted to punishment for acts so defined.
CASE 23 : US vs. C.W. Ney and Juan Garcia Bosque

FACTS: In 1904 defendant Bosque, made an arrangement with the
defendant Ney, a practicing attorney, to carry on business together,
sending out a circular signed "Ney & Bosque," stating that they had
established an office for the general practice of law in all the courts of the
Islands and that Bosque would devote himself especially to consultation
and office work relating to Spanish law. The paper was headed "Law
Office Ney & Bosque. Juan G. Bosque,jurisconsulto espaol C.W.
Ney, abogado americano." Since that time the defendant Bosque has not
personally appeared in the courts, and except when the papers from the
office were signed not with the firm name alone nor with any designation
of the firm as attorneys, but with the words "Ney & Bosque C.W.
Ney, abogado."
On May 1, 1905, and September 15, 1906, this court refused to consider
petitions so singed with the names of the defendants and the practice
being repeated, on the 2nd day of October, 1906, ordered the papers
sent to the Attorney-General to take appropriate action thereon, and he
thereupon instituted this proceeding.The defendants disclaim any
intentional contempt, and defend their acts as being within the law.
Section 102 of the Code of Civil procedure, provides that every pleading
must be subscribed by the party or his attorney, does not permit, and by
implication prohibits, a subscription of the names of any other persons,
whether agents or otherwise; therefore a signature containing the name
of one neither a party nor an attorney was not a compliance with this
section, nor was it aided by the too obvious subterfuge of the addition of
the individual name of a licensed attorney. The illegality in this instance
was aggravated by the fact that one of the agents so named was a
person residing in these Islands to whom this court had expressly denied
admission to the bar. The papers in question were irregular and were
properly rejected. We refuse to recognize as a practice any signature of
names appended to pleadings or other papers in an action other than
RATIO:Section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure describes contempt as

follows:
1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment,
or command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge;
2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his official
duties or in his official transactions.
Regarding the first requisite, no direct order or command of this court has
been disobeyed or resisted by the defendant Ney. The only order that the
defendant Bosque can have disobeyed is the one denying him the right
to practice law. This order, however, was directly binding upon him,
notwithstanding proceedings taken for its review, and any hope on his
part of ultimately reversing it furnished no excuse for its violation. Even had
he been entitled under the statute to practice law without any license
from the court and without an application to it, yet its order made on his
own petition. A mandate of the court, while in force, must be obeyed. The
irregular signature to papers, though affixed by his associate, had his
authorization and constitutes a substantial attempt to engage in practice.
Moreover the firm circular in setting forth the establishment of an office for
the general practice of law in all the courts of the Islands, amounted to an
assertion of his right and purpose, not effectively qualified by the addition
that he would devote himself to consultation and office work relating to
Spanish law. Spanish law plays an important part in the equipment of a
lawyer in the Archipelago, standing on a different footing from the law of
other foreign countries, in regard to which a skilled person might as a
calling, advise without practicing law. The fact stated on the circular that
he was a Spanish lawyer did not amount to a disclaimer of his professional
character in the Islands. Independent of statutory provisions, a foreigner is
not by reason of his status disqualified from practicing law. Consequently
the conduct of the defendant Bosque amounts to disobedience of an
order made in a proceeding to which he was a party.
Under the second requisite, Bosque is obviously not answerable, inasmuch

as he was not an officer of the court. On the other hand, under this
subdivision, the defendant Ney, as an admitted attorney, is liable if his
conduct amounted to misbehavior.. In the offense of Bosque in holding
himself out as a general practitioner Ney participated, and for the
improper signature of the pleadings he was chiefly and personally
responsible. It is impossible to say that the signature itself was a violation of
the law, and yet hold guiltless the man who repeatedly wrote it. Moreover
we regret to add that his persistent and rash disregard of the rulings of the
court has not commended him to our indulgence, while the offensive
character of certain papers recently filed by him forbids us from
presuming on the hope of his voluntarily conforming to the customary
standard of members of the bar.
CASE 24: In re Felipe Del Rosario
FACTS:Felipe del Rosario was a candidate in the bar examination who
failed for the second time in 1925. He presented himself for the
succeeding bar examination in 1926 and again failed to obtain the
required rating. Then on March 29, 1927, he authorized the filing of a
motion for the revision of his papers for 1925 based on an alleged mistake
in the computation of his grades. The court, acting in good faith, granted
this motion, and admitted Felipe del Rosario to the bar, but with justices
dissenting.
After the investigation of bar examination matters conducted by the city
fiscal, a criminal charge was lodged in the CFI of Manila against Juan
Villaflor, a former employee of the court and Felipe del Rosario for
falsifying some documents to make it appear that Del Rosario actually
passed the 1925 bar exams. The two were subsequently charged with
falsification. Villaflor pleaded guilty to the information and was sentenced
correspondingly. Del Rosario pleaded not guilty, and at the conclusion of
the trial was acquitted for lack of evidence.
ISSUE/S: WON Felipe Del Rosario should be allowed to practice law
HELD: No, It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose
integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the
prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself out as a
duly authorized member of the bar
RATIO:The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct

which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. The
practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who
demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of
a sound discretion. The acquittal of Felipe del Rosario upon the criminal
charge is not relevant to the proceedings. The conviction of Juan Villaflor
demonstrates that Felipe del Rosario has no legal right to his attorney's
certificate and to admit Felipe del Rosario again to the bar examination
would be tantamount to a declaration of professional purity is impossible
to believe.
CASE 25: Spouses Suarez v. Arsenio Salazar, G.R. No. 139281, September
22, 1999
FACTS: Andres Culanag assumed the name of Filemon A. Manangan
and misrepresented himself to be an attorney-at-law. He appeared as
counsel for petitioners spouses Suarez. In the hearing, Culanag admitted
that he was not a real lawyer and he was the same Filemon Mananga
in a court case (Filemon Manangan v. CFI). Hence, respondent Salazar
filed a Motion to Expunge All Pleadings by Atty. Filemon Mananga with
Motion to Hold Him in Contempt of Court and To Dismiss the Petition.
ISSUE/S: WON Culanag is guilty of indirect contempt of the court.
HELD: Yes. Culanag is guilty of indirect contempt of the court. He is
sentenced to 3 months of imprisonment.
RATIO: (This case did not explicitly explained how Canon 9 applies to it but
the relation can be seen and made.)
Canon 9 provides that a lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.
Culanag is not a lawyer, therefore, representing himself to be one and
counseling for parties constitute unauthorized practice of law. Though he
is not a lawyer bound by the Canons provided in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons apply to him as he engages in unlawful
practice of law, an act Canon 9 prohibits.
CASE 26: Aguirre v Rana
FACTS: Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations. A day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful
bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna

Marie Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to
the Bar. Aguirre charged Rana with unauthorized practice of law, grave
misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
Aguirre alleges that Rana, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for
a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of
Election Canvassers of Mandaon, Masbate. Aguirre further alleges that
Rana filed with the MBEC a pleading entitled Formal Objection to the
Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of
Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, Rana represented himself as counsel for
and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed
the pleading as counsel for George Bunan.
Aguirre claims that Rana is a municipal government employee, being a
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such,
Rana is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or
administrative body.
ISSUE/S: WON Rana violated Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by practicing law without having the authority to do so.
HELD: Yes. Rana violated the code by practicing law without having been
fully admitted to the Philippine Bar.
Ratio: Records show that Rana appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22
May 2001, before he took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled
Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some
Precincts for the
Office of Vice-Mayor, Rana signed as counsel for George Bunan.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained
respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao
informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by
REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of
the said party.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath.
Clearly, Rana engaged in the practice of law without being a member of
the Philippine Bar.
CASE 27: Alawi v. Alauya
FACTS: Complainant, Sophia Alawi, a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa

& Partners Co., Ltd. Of Davao City and respondent, Ashary Alauya, the
incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4 th Judicial Sharia District in
Marawi City, were classmates and used to be friends. Through Alawis
agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on instalment by
Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the Alawis firm; and in
connection with the sale, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by
the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation.
On Dec. 15, 1995, Alauya addressed letters to the President of Villarosa &
Co. and the Vice-President of the Credit & Collection Group of the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation, alleging that his consent
was vitiated by the sales representative, Alawi, rendering the contract
void ab initio and asking for cancellation of his housing loan. Alauya also
wrote on Jan. 18, 1996, a letter to the Head of the Fiscal Management
and Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division of the Supreme
Court to stop the deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in
question.
On Jan. 25, 1996, Alawi filed with the Supreme Court, a verified complaint
to which she appended a copy of the letter and envelope bearing the
type written words, Free Postage-P.D. 26., which were used by Alauya.
Alawi accused Alauya of usurpation of the title attorney which only
regular member of the Philippine Bar properly use. The Supreme Court
resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint, the notice of
resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Marasigan, Assistant Division
Clerk of Court.
Alauya then submitted two letter subsequently. The first, questioned the
authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation from him and the
second, requesting Atty. Marasigan to give him a copy oh the complaint
in order that he may comment thereon. Alauya then submitted his
comment, justifying the use of the title attorney due to the term
counsellor, being confusingly similar to the given to local legislators.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Alauya is justified in using the title attorney?
HELD: No, Alauya is not justified in using the title attorney.
RATIO: Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that A
LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW. Alauya was not a full-fledged member of the
Philippine Bar and may only practice law before the Sharia Bar and is
referred to as counsellor. The title attorney is reserved to those who,
having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.
issued a decision. The Supreme Court holds that the dismissal of the
appeal was in order because of Felipe ecos adamant stand not to
submit to the formal investigation and clear indication of this attitude is
shown by his failure to appear at the investigation.A lso the Supreme
Court said that the said land was actually occupied by Tigman Lumber
Co. However, Felipe Eco was given a period of ninety days to conduct a
voluntary investigation by the Supreme Court
Alauya was reprimanded by the Supreme Court for the excessively

intemperate, insulting or virulent language, and for usurping the title of
attorney.
On September 6, 1958, Felipe Eco filed a motion for excusable negligence

for relief under Rule 38, praying for setting aside of the decision on the
ground of excusable negligence. The alleged negligence consisted of the
erroneous computation by counsel's clerk of the period within which an
appeal may be made, said clerk being of the impression that the
prescriptive period to appeal in certiorari cases is also 30 days like in
ordinary civil actions instead of 15 days as provided in Section 17 of Rule
41
CASE 28: Felipe Eco vs. Juan De G. Rodriguez, G.R. No. L-16731, March 30,
1960
FACTS:On September 11, 1957, a petition for certiorari was filed, which
Felipe Eco sought annulment of the proceeding, orders and decisions
rendered by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural resources and
director of forestry claiming that the said director and secretary
committed a grave ause of discretion in suspending his certificate.
On April 30 1958, the Supreme Court rendered judgment finding that
Felipe Eco who obtained from the bureau of forestry a certificate of
private wood-land registration a possessory information title covering 700
hectares but which it was made to appear in the sketch a total 1200
hectares of land. That Tigman Lumber Co, another licensee, protested
and filed a petition for reconsideration which was apparently granted
because the Director of Forestry suspended the operation of Eco's
certificate; that likewise, it was found that portions of the area released
from the forest zone were under occupancy by some 80 oppositors; that
after a series of protests and counter-protests, objections and counterobjections between the parties, the Director of Forestry recommended
cancellation of Eco's certificate of private woodland and the Secretary of
Agriculture & Natural Resources approved the recommendation; that
upon the appeal of Eco, the Secretary reopened the case and ordered a
formal investigation of the whole controversy to give the parties "ample
opportunity to formally present their respective sides of the controversy
and be given their 'day in court'"; that petitioner Eco refused to submit to
this, reinvestigation, insisting that it was not necessary; that in the face of
this attitude of Eco, the Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources
ISSUE/S: WON the Supreme Court may grant the motion for excusable
negligence of the counsels clerk
HELD: No. Felipe Ecos counsel delegated the computation of the period
of filing an appeal within which the appropriate pleading. This act is
hardly prudent or wise. As the lower court aptly said: "the duty to compute
the period to appeal is a duty that devolves upon the attorney which he
cannot and should not delegate unto an employee because it concerns
a question of study of the law and its application, and this Court considers
this to be a delicate matter that should not be delegated" the negligence
here cannot, therefore, be considered excusable.
CASE 29: W.W. Robinson v. Marcelino Villafuerte Y. Raola
FACTS: The purpose of the suit filed by the plaintiff, W. W. Robinson, is the
collection of various sums owed by the defendant, Marcelino Villafuerte y
Raola, the payment of which is secured by a mortgage on the real
properties set out in the two notarial documents evidencing the debt,
exhibited under letter A and B, and inscribed in the property registry of the
Province of Tayabas. That by the said instrument duly executed the
defendant bound and pledged himself to pay to the plaintiff. The
complaint further alleged, as a first cause of action, that, notwithstanding
the repeated demands made upon the defendant, the latter had not
paid his debt nor the interest thereon. The plaintiff further prayed that an
order be issued directing the delivery to the plaintiff of the properties
described in the complaint, in order that he might administer them during

the course of this suit and until they should ultimately be sold. The
Defendant denies the execution of Special power of attorney. that he did
not give his consent to all of to any one of the mortgages alleged in the
complaint, and that all the said mortgages on the properties therein
mentioned were founded on a supposed power of attorney said to have
been executed by the defendant in favor of Vicente Marcelo
Concepcion, which power of attorney was fictitious, false, fraudulent, null
and void, that it was not executed by the defendant, nor did the latter
intervene therein and that the said power of attorney had no true reason
for existence.
During the hearing of the case, an employee of Messrs. Haussermann,
Cohn & Williams, the plaintiff's attorneys in this suit, addressed questions to
some of the witnesses and was permitted.
ISSUE/S: WON delegation of work of a lawyer to a non-lawyer is proper.
HELD: It is not proper. But it is not detrimental to this case.
RATIO: With regard to the first two alleged errors, relative to Jose Moreno
Lacalle being permitted to address questions to some of the witnesses
during the hearing of the case, notwithstanding the presence of Attorney
Agustin Alvarez, who represented the plaintiff, it is unquestionable that the
intervention of the said law clerk and employee of Messrs. Haussermann,
Cohn & Williams, the plaintiff's attorneys in this suit, was improperly
admitted; it was not authorized by any law, for the reason that the said
Lacalle did not have the capacity and qualifications of a lawyer admitted
under oath to practice his profession before the courts of these Islands,
and therefore, on objection being made to his present at the hearing of
the case, the judge should have sustained such objection and should
have excluded Lacalle and not permitted him to address questions to the
plaintiff's witnesses, notwithstanding the fact that Attorney Agustin Alvares,
designated in substitution of the said Haussermann, Cohn & Williams as the
plaintiff's representative in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, was
present.
Notwithstanding this, the acts performed in the course of some of the
proceedings under the direction of Jose Moreno Lacalle are not subject
to annulment, as no positive detriment was caused to the defendant,
although such intervention is in no manner permitted by the law of
procedure.
However, even though the questions addressed by Lacalle to the plaintiff's

witnesses and the presentation of documents of various kinds exhibited at
the trial be stricken out for the reason that they were made by a person
who was neither a party to the suit nor counsel for the plaintiff, yet we do
not find any reason, based upon any positive prohibition of the law, to
authorize the striking out to the answers given by the witnesses
interrogated by Lacalle, even though the said answers may have been
evoked by questions addressed by a person not authorized by law, and
there is much less reason for rejecting the cross-questions addressed to the
same witnesses by the defendant's attorney, and the answers thereto.
CASE 30: Jose Guballa vs. The Hon. Eduardo P. Caguioa, et. al., G.R. No. L46537 July 29, 1977
FACTS: Guballa is an operator of a public utility vehicle which was
involved in an accident resulting to injuries by Domingo Forteza, Jr. As a
consequence, a complaint for damages was filed by Forteza against
Guballa with the Court of First Instance in Bulacan. An answer was filed on
behalf of Guballa by Irineo W. Vida Jr., of the law firm Vida, Enriquez,
Mercado & Associates.
Because Guballa and counsel failed to appear at the pre-trial
conference, despite due notice, Guballa was treated as in default and
Forteza Jr. was allowed to present his evidence ex parte. A decision was
thereafter rendered by the trial court in favor of Forteza Jr. A Motion for
Reconsideration was then filed by Guballa seeking the lifting of the order
of default, the reopening of the case for the presentation of his evidence
and the setting aside of the decision. Said Motion for Reconsideration was
signed by Ponciano Mercado, another member of the law firm. Case was
appealed, although CA affirmed the decision in toto. Motion for
Reconsideration was filed and was denied.
After the motion was denied, Guballa, through Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos II,
filed a petition for Relief from Judgment on ground that Irineo W. Vida, Jr.,
who prepared his Answer to the Complaint in the lower court, is not a
member of the Philippine Bar. Guballa alleged that his rights had not been
adequately protected and his properties are in danger of being
confiscated and/or levied upon without due process of law. Judge
Caguioa denied petition and said that it is a dilatory tactic by Guballa
and his counsel.
ISSUE/S: WON Judge Caguioa properly denied petition for declatory relief
of Guballa
be divided equally by him, Atty. Fernandez and Felisberto Javier, the

Unions president.
HELD: Yes. Judge Caguioa properly denied petition for declatory relief of
Guballa.
ISSUE/S: WON IT MAY BE STIPULATED THAT THE UNION PRESIDENT MAY

SHARE IN THE ATTORNEYS FEES.
RATIO: Judge Caguioas forthright denial of the Petition for Relief to

frustrate a dilatory maneuver is well-taken; and this Petition must be
denied for lack of merit. The alleged fact that the person who
represented Guballa at the initial stage of the litigation, i.e., the filing of an
Answer and the pretrial proceedings, turned out to be not a member of
the Bar did not amount to a denial of petitioner's day in court. Guballa
was duly represented by bona fide members of the Bar in seeking a
reversal of the judgment for being contrary to law and jurisprudence and
the existence of valid, legal and justifiable defenses. Guballa's rights had
been amply protected in the proceedings before the trial and appellate
courts as he was subsequently assisted by counsel. Petition is dismissed for
lack of merit.
HELD: No. 25% of the Attorneys Fees was awarded solely to Atty.
Fernandez
CASE 31: Amalgamated Laborers Association v. CIR
FACTS: In 1970, Atty. David and Tan Tek Beng, a non-lawyer, entered into
an agreement whereby Tan Tek Beng will supply clients to Atty. David and
in exchange thereof, Atty. David shall give Tan Tek Beng 50% of the
attorneys fees collected as the latters commission. Atty. David also
agreed not to deal with clients supplied by Tan Tek Beng directly without
the latters consent. The agreement went sour due to allegations of
double-cross from both sides. Tan Tek Beng denounced Atty. David before
the Supreme Court but did not seek the enforcement of their agreement.
FACTS: On May 30, 1956, Florentino Arceo and 47 others together with
their union, Amalgamated Laborers Association lodged a complaint in
the CIR,for unfair labor practices against BISCOM and Fraternal Labor
Organization. At the hearing, only 10 of the 48 complainant labourers
appeared and testified. On November 13, 1962, CIR rendered a
judgement which provides that petitioners be reinstated to their former
positions with full back wages and benefits. Respondents BISCOM
appealed to the directly to the SC but it was dismissed. Meanwhile, Atty.
Fernandez(respondent) filed on July 15, 1963 a Notice of Attorneys Lien.
He alleged that he had been an attorney of record for the laborers CIR
Case since the inception of the preliminary hearings of said case up to the
SC, as chief counsel; that he had actually rendered legal services to the
laborers have voluntarily agreed to give him, representing attorneys
fees on contingent basis such amounts equivalent to 25% thereof which
agreement is evidenced by a Note; and that the 25% attorneys fees so
contracted is reasonable and proper taking into consideration the length
of services he rendered the nature of the work actually performed by
him. He further explained that it was supposed to be 30% but Arsenio
Reyes requested him to 25% to satisfy Atty. Carbonells lien of 5%. Atty.
Carbonell disputed this claim and even said the verbal agreement
entered into by the Union and its officers is that the 30% Lawyers Fees shall
RATIO: Canon 34 of Legal Ethics condemns this arrangement in terms

clear and explicit. It says: "No division of fees for legal services is proper,
except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or
responsibility." The union president is not the attorney for the laborers. He
may seek compensation only as such president. An agreement whereby
a union president is allowed to share in attorneys' fees is immoral. Such a
contract the court emphatically rejects. It cannot be justified.
CASE 32: Tan Tek Beng v. David
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. David is guilty of malpractice

HELD: Yes.
RATIO: The agreement between Atty. David and Tan Tek Beng is void
because it was tantamount to malpractice which is the practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court. Malpractice
ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a
lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term
malpractice.
That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the
practice of law is a profession, not a business. The lawyer may not seek or
obtain employment by him or through others for to do so would be

unprofessional.
was again opposed by the petitioner for the same reason (manifestation).
Subsequent MRs were also denied for lack of merit.
On the agreement to divide the attorneys fees, the Supreme Court

noted: No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another
lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility.
ISSUE/S: WON the manifestation issued by petitioner has merit.
On the agreement that Atty. David shall not deal with clients supplied
by Beng directly: The professional services of a lawyer should not be
controlled or exploited by any law agency, personal or corporate, which
intervenes between client and lawyer. A lawyers responsibilities and
qualifications are individual. He should avoid all relations which direct the
performance of his duties by or in the interest of such intermediary. A
lawyers relation to his client should be personal, and the responsibility
should be direct to the client. . . .
RATIO: The petitioners' position on the cut-off period for the reckoning of
private respondents' backwages had thoroughly been passed upon and
consistently been rejected by the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter after
repeated reviews of the case. There was no hard or solid proof that
respondents had indeed made an unconditional offer or reinstatement.
The court finds no supervening event nor any meritorious reason to disturb
the amount of backwages awarded to the private respondents, which
have repeatedly been computed by the Research Unit of the Labor
Arbiter. Well settled is the rule that findings of fact of labor officials are
generally conclusive and binding upon the Supreme Court when
supported by substantial evidence, as in this case
CASE 33: Five J Taxi v. NLRC

FACTS: In 1983, petitioner Juan Armamento, the owner and operator of
Five J Taxi, hired private respondents Dominador Sibayan and Jose
Salcedo as taxi drivers where they both earned an average of P4,500 per
month along with a P10 a day as contribution for the maintainance of the
taxis. Sometime in August 1988, private respondents were terminated from
employment and their accumulated deposits were not returned. Thus,
both the respondents filed a complaint against the petitioner for illegal
dismissal and illegal deduction of the said P10 from their salaries. On
October 24, 1988, the Labor Arbiter rendered decision in private
respondents favor ordering the then respondent to reinstate the
complainants to their former positions along with backwages.
Herein petitioner Juan Armamento opposed the computation report of
the Research and Information Unit regarding the rewards due the private
respondents amounting to P79, 260. He alleged that as early as
December 13, 1988, he filed a written manifestation before the Labor
Arbiter stating inter alia that: I am unconditionally accepting
complainants back to work and they can report to work anytime during
office hours. He further alleged that the run of private respondents
backwages should have stopped on the date of issuance of said
manifestation. The Labor Arbiter then referred the case to the Research
and Information Unit for review and possible recomputation. The latter
made a computation report, which was completely adopted by the
Labor Arbiter. The NLRC also affirmed the same computation report which
HELD: No.
CASE 34: Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez and Damaso Perez (petitionersdefendants) vs. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, Ricardo Hermoso
FACTS:This case originated from the civil case filed by the respondent
Ricardo Hermoso against the petitioner Damaso Perez and Gregorio
Subong for the recovery of unpaid purchases of leather materials used in
his shoemaking business. The defendants and their counsel did nothing
despite due notice to them. A judgment was rendered ordering them to
pay the said sum.
On August 23, 1961, the respondent sheriff of Manila levied upon 3,573
shares of common stock registered in the name of Damaso Perez with the
Republic Bank. This led to the series of petitions and motions and other
actions filed by the petitioner and caused the resetting of the public sale
for 6 times. The petitioners were not able to present evidence to support
their argument on Art 160 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE/S: Should the counsel be held liable for abetting the filing of his
clients?
HELD: Yes. The counsel is therefore ordered to pay for the treble costs
assessed against the petitioners.
RATIO: We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation

below, the petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at some
stages alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole purpose of
thwarting the execution of a simple money judgment which has long
become final and executory. Some of the actions were filed, only to be
abandoned or withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far from
viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use
them to subvert the very ends of justice.
CASE 35:Eugenio Cuaresma vs. Marcelo Daquis, et. al., G.R. No. L-35113,
March 25, 1975
FACTS: In a petition for certiorari filed with this Court on behalf of Eugenio
Cuaresma, Atty. Directo included the following categorical allegations:
That Cuaresma had no knowledge of the existence of the civil case
between the respondents, Daquis, PHHC and Navarrio, wherein the judge
in that case gave due course to the complaint. That thereafter, the judge
ordered the demolition of Cuaresmas house and was given only 3 days
from the issuance of the order to remove his house or face demolition.
That Cuaresma was never given a day in court, in violation of his right to
due process.
When in fact, Cuaresma was fully aware of the existence of the said civil
case. As well as that before the Daquis and Navarro filed a writ of
possession, Cuaresma and the other inhabitants of the lot in question were
given 30 days to vacate the same, which was extended another 30 days,
but despite the notice, Cuaresma refused. And that thereafter, Atty.
Directo, on behalf of his client, filed a motion for intervention but which
was denied. In the courts resolution of the aforementioned case, it
declared that there was no truth in Atty. Directos allegation that his client
had no knowledge of the existence of the civil case and required him to
show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Thereafter, in Atty. Directos explanation he professes that if there were
any mistake committed, it had been an honest one and that he had no
intent on his part in misleading this Honorable Court.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Directos assertion of good faith can exculpate him
from any wrongdoing that he may have committed, absence the intent
to cause any confusion.
HELD: No. A mere disclaimer of intent certainly cannot exculpate him,

although in the spirit of charity and forbearance, a penalty of REPRIMAND
would suffice.
RATIO: Every member of the bar should realize that candor in the dealings
with the Court is the very essence of honorable membership.
Moreover, judging from his awkwardly worded petition and even his
compliance is quite indicative of either carelessness or lack of proficiency
in the handling of the English language, it is not unreasonable to assume
that his deficiency in the mode of expression contributed to the
inaccuracy of his statements.
CASE 36: Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et. al
FACTS: Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the UP-Cebu,
known to be a government scholar. She was appointed by then Pres.
Estrada on Dec 21, 1999 as a student regent, to serve a one-year term
(Jan 1, 2000-Dec 31, 2000). Serana discussed with President Estrada the
renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman. On September 4, 2000,
Serana, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the SEC of the Office
of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). It was one of the projects
of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Hall. President gave P15 M to
OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The renovation
failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent, Bugayong, and De
Guzman, Secretary General of the alliance of student councils within UP,
consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and
Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable
cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa.
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the
Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged
or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent. Sheclaimed that
R.A. No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or
offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction (Crimes
Committed by Public Officers), in which estafa is not included.As a student
regent, she was not a public officer since she merely represented her
peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex
officio capacity. She added that she was a simple student and did not
receive any salary as a student regent. Moreover, she also argued that it
was President Estrada and not the government that was
duped. Assuming that she received the P15M, it came from Estrada, not
from the coffers of the government.She had no power or authority to
receive monies or funds. Such power was vested with the Board of
Regents (BOR) as a whole.
The Ombudsman opposed the motion. Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catch-all phrase in relation to office,
thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges against
her. Serana was a public officer. As a member of the BOR, she had the
general powers of administration and exercised the corporate powers of
UP. Compensation is not an essential part of public office. Compensation
has been interpreted to include allowances. Serana was compensated.
Serana filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction in not dimissing
the case despite the fact that it has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged against Serana
HELD: No. Sandiganbayan has not committed a grave abuse of its
discretion in not dismissing the case against Serana.
RATIO: Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D.1606, as amended, rather
than R.A. No. 3019 that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D.1486, promulgated by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to
attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and
employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees
shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people. P.D.
No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D.1606 promulgated on December
10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D.1861. Then, R.A.7975 made
succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on
February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further
modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, as it now stands.
R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019
erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private individuals. the two
statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and
corrupt practices and provides for their penalties.
We urge Seranas counsel to observe Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that
a lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent.
We admonish Seranas counsel to be more careful and accurate in his
citation. A lawyers conduct before the court should be characterized by
candor and fairness. The administration of justice would gravely suffer if
lawyers do not act with complete candor and honesty before the courts.
CASE 37: Walter T. Young vs. Ceasar G. Batuegas
FACTS: On December 29, 2000, Atty. Walter T. Young filed a Verified
Affidavit-Complaint for disbarment against Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas,
Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino and Franklin Q. Susa for allegedly
committing deliberate falsehood in court and violating the lawyer's oath.
Complainant is the private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 00-187627 for
Murder, entitled "People of the Philippines versus Crisanto Arana, Jr.",
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27. On
December 13, 2000, respondents Batuegas and Llantino, as counsel for
accused, filed a Manifestation with Motion for Bail, alleging that the
"accused has voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority. As such, he
is now under detention."2 Upon personal verification with the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where accused Arana allegedly surrendered,
complainant learned that he surrendered only on December 14, 2000, as
shown by the Certificate of Detention executed by Atty. Rogelio M.
Mamauag, Chief of the Security Management Division of the NBI.
Respondent Susa, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC of Manila, Branch 27,
calendared the motion on December 15, 2000 despite the foregoing
irregularity and other formal defects, namely, the lack of notice of hearing
to the private complainant, violation of the three-day notice rule, and the
failure to attach the Certificate of Detention. Respondents filed their
respective comments, declaring that on December 13, 2000, upon
learning that a warrant of arrest was issued against their client, they filed
the Manifestation with Motion for Bail with the trial court. Then they
immediately fetched the accused in Cavite and brought him to the NBI to
voluntarily surrender. However, due to heavy traffic, they arrived at the NBI
at 2:00 a.m. the next day; hence, the certificate of detention indicated
that the accused surrendered on December 14, 2000. They argued that
there was neither unethical conduct nor falsehood in the subject pleading
as their client has voluntarily surrendered and was detained at the NBI. As
regards the lack of notice of hearing, they contend that complainant, as
private prosecutor, was not entitled to any notice. Nevertheless, they
furnished the State and City prosecutors copies of the motion with notice
of hearing thereof. Moreover, the hearing of a motion on shorter notice is
allowed under Rule 15, Sec. 4(2) of the Rules of Court.For his part,
respondent Susa argues in his comment that he was no longer in court
when his co-respondents filed the Manifestation with Motion for Bail. Ms.
Teofila A. Pea, Clerk III, received the said Motion and noticed that it was
set for hearing on December 15, 2000 and the Certificate of Detention
was not attached. However, the presiding judge instructed her to receive
the Motion subject to the presentation of the Certificate of Detention
before the hearing. Thus, the inclusion of the Motion in the court's
calendar on December 15, 2000 was authorized by the presiding judge
and, thus, was done by respondent Susa in faithful performance of his
ministerial duty.
ISSUE/S: WON the respondent lawyers are guilty of falsehood.
HELD: YES, they are guilty of falsehood.
RATIO: A lawyer must be a disciple of truth.He swore upon his admission to
the Bar that he will "do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in
court" and he shall "conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of
his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as
to his clients."He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high
vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the
case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. The
courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty
from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While a lawyer has
the solemn duty to defend his client's rights and is expected to display the
utmost zeal in defense of his client's cause, his conduct must never be at
the expense of truth.
The Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.Evidently, respondent
lawyers fell short of the duties and responsibilities expected from them as
members of the bar. Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be denied
by the court if it found that it had no jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, they craftily concealed the truth by alleging that accused had
voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and was under detention.

Obviously, such artifice was a deliberate ruse to mislead the court and
thereby contribute to injustice. To knowingly allege an untrue statement of
fact in the pleading is a contemptuous conduct that we strongly
condemn. They violated their oath when they resorted to deception.
CASE 38: Director of Lands vs. Marcelino Adorable, et. al., A.C. No. 8197
October 2, 1946
FACTS: At the reconstitution of the above-entitled case, claimantappellant Miguel Pearanda presented copies of several papers, exhibits,
pleadings, motions and orders, including copy of the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo, record on appeal, and the printed brief of
Pearanda who, at the time he filed his motion for reconstitution on
February 26, 1946, was under the impression that the case, which was
pending decision in the Court of Appeals when the war broke out,
remained unacted upon by said court until the motion for reconstitution
was filed.
On June 25, 1946, Attorney Manuel F. Zamora, for the claimants and
appellees, acting under the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and
nobility as becomes a deserving member of the bar, instead of taking
advantage of Pearanda's ignorance of what really happened in the
Court of Appeals, informed the court that the case had been decided in
favor of said claimant and appellant by the Court of Appeals, filing to said
effect the copy of the decision promulgated on September 9, 1942, sent
to him by said court, to save Pearanda the trouble of waiting for the
reconstitution of this case and this tribunal the trouble of deciding again a
case already decided.
Upon being informed of the statements of Attorney Zamora, Pearanda's
attorneys filed a petition with the commissioner for reconstitution to make
a report to this Court that the records be declared reconstituted, together
with the decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 9, 1942, and
that said records be remanded to the lower court for execution of the
decision.
ISSUE/S: WON ATTY. Zamora acted in accordance with the Code of
HELD: Yes. ATTY. Zamora acted in accordance with the Code of
RATIO: The court resolved to declare that the case is reconstituted and to
order that copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on
September 9, 1942, be sent to the lower court for execution. This resolution
is being adopted not without making of record that the considered as an
example worthy to be remembered by all members of the bar. Atty.
Zamora showed truthfulness, fair play and nobility as becoming a
deserving member of the bar.
CASE 39: Paraluman B. Afurong vs. Atty. Angel G. Aquino, A.C. No. 1571
September 23, 1999
FACTS: Victorino Flores sought the assistance of the Citizens Legal
Assistance Office regarding a complaint for ejectment filed by Paraluman
B. Afurong which has already reached finality. His case was assigned to
Atty. Angel G. Aquino, an employee of said office at the time. Atty.
Aquino filed with the City Court of Manila a Petition for Relief from
Judgment with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order. However,
after due hearing, the petition was dismissed for having been filed out of
time. Atty. Aquino subsequently filed with the CFI of Manila a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition. Notwithstanding the fact that he was separated
from the Citizens Legal Assistance Office on October 1, 1975, Atty. Angel
G. Aquino filed on December 11, 1975, an Urgent Motion for
Postponement, signing his name as counsel for Victorino Flores and
indicating the address of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office in Sampaloc,
Manila, as his office address. Atty. Aquino stated therein that he would be
unable to attend the pre-trial conference on December 12, 1975 because
he needed to attend the hearing of a Habeas Corpus Case before the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on the same day and hour.
However, a certification from the Clerk of Court of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court stated that a decision had been rendered on
the aforementioned special proceedings case, and that there was no
hearing in connection with the case on December 12, 1975, for there was
nothing more to be done in the proceedings and the same was declared
closed and terminated. Thus, on December 22, 1975, Afurong filed a
complaint with the Court for disbarment against Atty. Angel G. Aquino for
filing frivolous harassment cases to delay the execution of a final decision,
committing falsehood in an Urgent Motion for Postponement, and
misrepresenting himself as an attorney for the Citizens Legal Assistance
Office. Respondent Aquino denied the allegations contending that such
acts had been done without malice. However, he admitted that at the
time of the pre-trial on December 12, 1975, he was no longer connected
with the Citizens Legal Assistance Office, for he was included as one of
the employees purged. He reasoned, not wanting to remove the case
from the Citizens Legal Assistance Office by appearing as private counsel
for the petitioner and still unable to wait for his reinstatement which he
was informed was forthcoming, he decided to file a motion to postpone
the pre-trial conference of the case. He also conceded that, in order to
give more force to the motion for postponement, he indicated therein
that he had to attend the hearing of another case before the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court. He further admitted that the filing of the
motion with the facts so stated might have caused some delay, but
justifies such act by stating that such filing was prompted by some
circumstances which we can consider as inevitable and unavoidable at
the moment. He adds, If I shall be given another chance to continue
handling the case, I promise that this mistake shall never be repeated.
The court declared respondent guilty for making false allegations in his
Urgent Motion for Postponement. The Court referred the case to the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. It was
transferred to the IBP Board of Governors for investigation and disposition
as provided in the Revised Rules of Court.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Aquino should be punished/sanctioned for his actions
in the said case.
HELD: Yes, Atty. Aquino failed to perform duties expected of an attorney
as provided under the existing Canons of Professional Ethics and Section
20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court in force at the time said acts were
committed.
RATIO: The Revised Rules of Court provides that it is the duty of an
attorney to counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as
appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be
honestly debatable under the law. The decision in the complaint for
ejectment had reached finality and execution of such decision was being
effected. Respondent Atty. Aquino should not have filed a petition for
certiorari considering that there was no apparent purpose for it than to
delay the execution of a valid judgment. Furthermore, Atty. Aquino
committed falsehood when he stated in his Urgent Motion for
Postponement that he had to attend the hearing of a special
proceedings case the same day as the pre-trial on December 12, 1975.
Respondent Aquino admitted that he only included such statement in
order to give more force to the Urgent Motion for Postponement. Such
act violates the Canons of Professional Ethics which obliges an attorney to

avoid the concealment of the truth from the court. A lawyer is mandated
not to mislead the court in any manner.
In case at bar, Atty. Aquino stated false allegations in his motion for
postponement which delayed the execution of a valid decision. It is
worthy to note that the lower court correctly declared respondent in
contempt of court for conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, in violation of Section 3
(d), Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court. Atty. Aquino purposely allowed
the court to believe that he was still employed with the Citizens Legal
Assistance Office when in fact he had been purged from said office. That
he was awaiting reinstatement to the same position at the time does not
remove the fact that he was misrepresenting himself to the court. By
doing so, he has violated his duty to employ, for the purpose of
maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are
consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or
any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law. He
could have delegated the case to another lawyer in the same office. The
court found Atty. Aquino guilty of malpractice and suspendedhim from
the practice of law for six (6) months.
CASE 40:Florido v. Florido
FACTS: Natasha Florido and Atty. James Florido are married and have
children. However, they are estranged and living separately from each
other. Their children are in the custody of Natasha. One day, James went
to Natashas residence in Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and demanded
that the custody of their children be given to him pursuant to a Resolution
issued by the Court of Appeals which granted his motion for temporary
child custody. Natasha called up her lawyer but was informed that he
had not received any Resolution. Natasha asked James for the original
copy of the alleged Resolution but James only provided a photocopy of
it. Doubting this to be true, she refused to give the custody of their children
to James.
A month after, while Natasha and her children were at the ABC Learning
Center, James, accompanied by armed men, suddenly arrived and
demanded that she surrender to him the custody of the children. He
threatened to forcefully take them away with the help of his companions
whom he claimed to be agents of NBI. She was alarmed so she sought the
assistance of Tanjay City Police. Natasha then agreed to allow the kids to
sleep with James for one night on the condition that he would not take
them away from Tanjay City. In the early morning of the following day, she
rushed to the hotel where James and the kids stayed before she learned
that he has plans of taking the kids to Bacolod. She took the children.
James filed with RTC a petition for writ of habeas corpus asserting his right
to custody of the children pursuant to the alleged Resolution issued by the
CA. During the hearing, James did not appear and petition for habeas
corpus was dismissed.
Natasha filed a complaint alleging that James violated his oath by
manufacturing, flaunting, and using a spurious CA Resolution. This was
referred to the IBP-CBD and they recommended that James be
suspended from the practice of law for 3 years. The IBP governors
modified it and recommended a 6-year suspension from the practice of
law.
ISSUE/S: W/N James can be held liable administratively for his reliance on
and attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of CA
HELD: Yes. Although he claimed that he acted in good faith, this is belied
by the fact that he used and presented the spurious Resolution several
times. First, in his petition for issuance of writ of habeas corpus. Second,
when he sought the help of PNP of Tanjay to recover the custody of the
children from Natasha. The SC held that he is presumed to have
participated in the fabrication of the Resolution. Atty. James Florido
violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He was suspended for 2 years.
CASE 41: Re: Letter Of The Up Law Faculty Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A
Statement By The Faculty Of The University Of The Philippines College Of
Law On The Allegations Of Plagiarism And Misrepresentation In The
Supreme Court," A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011
FACTS: For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37
respondent law professors in response to the Resolution directing them to
show cause why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for
violation of specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo in Vinuya, et al. v.
Executive Secretary was promulgated. The counsel for Vinuya, et al. (the
"Malaya Lolas"), Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. and Atty. Romel Regalado
Bagares filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration where they
posited their charge of plagiarism claiming that "in this controversy, the
evidence bears out the fact not only of extensive plagiarism but also of
twisting the true intents of the plagiarized sources by the ponencia to suit
the arguments of the assailed Judgment for denying the Petition.
A statement entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the
University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" was submitted by Dean
Leonen to the Court.
The Ethics Committee was given a copy of the signed UP Law Faculty
Statement that showed on the signature pages the names of the full roster
of the UP Law Faculty, 81 faculty members in all. Indubitable from the
actual signed copy of the Statement was that only 37 of the 81 faculty
members appeared to have signed the same. However, the 37 actual
signatories to the Statement did not include former Supreme Court
Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza as represented in the previous
copies of the Statement submitted by Dean Leonen and Atty. Roque. It
also appeared that Atty. Miguel R. Armovit signed the Statement although
his name was not included among the signatories in the previous copies
submitted to the Court.
Dean Leonen was directed to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10 for submitting, for the
consideration of the Court en banc, a dummy which is not a true and
faithful reproduction of the UP Law Faculty Statement.
Dean Leonens predicament is the fact that he did not from the
beginning submit the signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, to the Court and,
instead, submitted Restoring Integrity II with its retyped or "reformatted"
signature pages. It would turn out, according to Dean Leonens account,
that there were errors in the retyping of the signature pages due to lapses
of his unnamed staff.
"Restoring Integrity I" bears the entire roster of the faculty of the UP College
of Law in its signing pages, and the actual signatures of the thirty-seven
(37) faculty members subject of the Show Cause Resolution while
"Restoring Integrity II" does not bear any actual physical signature, but
which reflects as signatories the names of thirty-seven (37) members of the
faculty with the notation "(SGD.)".
In his Compliance, Dean Leonen essentially denies that Restoring Integrity
II was not a true and faithful reproduction of the actual signed
copy, Restoring Integrity I, because looking at the text or the body, there
were no differences between the two. He attempts to downplay the
discrepancies in the signature pages of the two versions of the Statement
(i.e., Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II) by claiming that it is but
expected in "live" public manifestos with dynamic and evolving pages as
more and more signatories add their imprimatur thereto. He believes that
he had not committed any violation of Canon 10 for he did not mislead
nor misrepresent to the Court the contents of the Statement or the
identities of the UP Law faculty members who agreed with, or expressed
their desire to be signatories to, the Statement.
ISSUE/S: WON Dean Leonen violated Canon 10, Rules 10.02 of the Code of
HELD: Yes. In due consideration of Dean Leonens professed good
intentions, the Court deems it sufficient to admonish the former for failing
to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court as
required under Canon 10.
RATIO: CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the
court.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the
contents of paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or
the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision
already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact
that which has not been proved.
To begin with, the Court said that live public manifesto or not, the
Statement was formally submitted to this Court at a specific point in time
and it should reflect accurately its signatories at that point. The value of
the Statement as a UP Law Faculty Statement lies precisely in the identities
of the persons who have signed it, since the Statements persuasive
authority mainly depends on the reputation and stature of the persons
who have endorsed the same.
Dean Leonen has not offered any explanation why he deviated from this
practice with his submission to the Court of Restoring Integrity II. There was
nothing to prevent the dean from submitting Restoring Integrity I to this
Court even with its blanks and unsigned portions. Yet, Dean Leonen
deliberately chose to submit to this Court the facsimile that did not
contain the actual signatures and his silence on the reason therefor is in
itself a display of lack of candor. Contrary to Dean Leonens proposition,

that is precisely tantamount to making it appear to the Court that a
person or persons participated in an act when such person or persons did
not.
The Court is surprised that someone like Dean Leonen, with his reputation
for perfection and stringent standards of intellectual honesty, could proffer
the explanation that there was no misrepresentation when he allowed at
least one person to be indicated as having actually signed the Statement
when all he had was a verbal communication of an intent to sign. In the
case of Justice Mendoza, what he had was only hearsay information that
the former intended to sign the Statement. If Dean Leonen was truly
determined to observe candor and truthfulness in his dealings with the
Court, the court sees no reason why he could not have waited until all the
professors who indicated their desire to sign the Statement had in fact
signed before transmitting the Statement to the Court as a duly signed
document. If it was truly impossible to secure some signatures, such as that
of Justice Mendoza who had to leave for abroad, then Dean Leonen
should have just resigned himself to the signatures that he was able to
secure.
CASE 42: Commission On Elections, vs. Hon. Tomas B. Noynay, Acting
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, et. al.,, G.R. No. 132365,
July 9, 1998
FACTS: In its Minute Resolution No. 96-3076 of 29 October 1996, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to file an information for
violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code against private
respondents Diosdada Amor, a public school principal, and Esbel Chua
and Ruben Magluyoan, both public school teachers, for having engaged
in partisan political activities. The COMELEC authorized its Regional
Director in Region VIII to handle the prosecution of the cases.
On 25 August 1997, respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay, as presiding
judge of Branch 23, motu proprio ordered the records of the cases to be
withdrawn and directed the COMELEC Law Department to file the cases
with the appropriate Municipal Trial Court on the ground that pursuant to
Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691, the Regional Trial
Court has no jurisdiction over the cases since the maximum imposable
penalty in each of the cases does not exceed six years of imprisonment.
The two motions for reconsideration separately filed by the COMELEC

Regional Director of Region VIII and by the COMELEC itself through its
Legal Department having been denied by the public respondent in the
Order of 17 October 1997, the petitioner filed this special civil action. It
contends that public respondent "has erroneously misconstrued the
provisions of Rep. Act No. 7691 in arguing that the Municipal Trial Court
has exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide election offenses"
because pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Private respondents maintain that R.A. No. 7691 has divested the Regional
Trial Courts of jurisdiction over offenses where the imposable penalty is not
more than 6 years of imprisonment; moreover, R.A. 7691 expressly provides
that all laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with its provisions are
deemed repealed or modified accordingly. They then conclude that
since the election offense in question is punishable with imprisonment of
not more than 6 years, it is cognizable by Municipal Trial Courts.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON petitioner violated Canon 10.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
2. WON respondent judge violated Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct
HELD:
1. Yes. Petitioner violated Canon 10.02 of the CPR.
2. Yes. Respondent Judge violated Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
RATIO: Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Jose P. Balbuena, Director IV of
petitioner's Law Department, must be admonished for his utter
carelessness in his reference to the case against Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr. In
the motion for Reconsideration he filed, with the court. The Court held that
If Atty. Balbuena was diligent enough, he would have known that the
correct name of the complainant in the case referred to is neither Alberto
Naldeza as indicated in the motion for reconsideration nor Alberto alone
as stated in the petition, but ALBERTO NALDOZA. Moreover, the case was
not reported in volume 245 of the Supreme Court Reports Annotated
(SCRA) as falsely represented in the paragraph 16 of the petition, but in
volume 254 of the SCRA.
Worse, in both the motion for reconsideration and the petition, Atty.
Balbuena deliberately made it appear that the quoted portions were
findings or rulings, or, put a little differently, our own words. The truth is, the
quoted portion is just a part of the memorandum of the Court
Administrator quoted in the decision.
Atty. Jose P. Balbuena is ADMONISHED to be more careful in the

discharge of his duty to the court as a lawyer under the Code of
Rule
10.02
of
Canon
10
of
the
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the text of a decision or authority.
CASE 43: The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU
v. The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., FGU Insurances Group CPR 10.2
On the other hand, under Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by

Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691, provides as follows:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in cases falling
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Court and of the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal
ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of
fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties,
including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however,
That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof
It is obvious that respondent judge did not read at all the opening
sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. It is thus an
opportune time, as any, to remind him, as well as other judges, of his duty
to be studious of the principles of law,to administer his office with due
regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, to be faithful to the
law, and to maintain professional competence.
Canon 3: A Judge should perform official duties honestly, and with
impartiality and diligence adjudicative responsibilities.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
challenged orders of public respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay of 25
August 1997 and 17 October 1997 in Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A1442 to A-1449 are SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to try and
decide said cases with purposeful dispatch and, further, ADMONISHED to
faithfully comply with Canons 4 and 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
and Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
FACTS: The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU,

FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-NATU, and Insular
Life Building Employees Association-NATU (hereinafter referred to as the
Unions), while still members of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW),
entered into separate collective bargaining agreements with the Insular
Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance Group (hereinafter
referred to as the Companies).
Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon
Garcia; the latter was formerly the secretary-treasurer of the FFW and
acting president of the Insular Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life Building
Employees Association. Garcia, as such acting president, in a circular
issued in his name and signed by him, tried to dissuade the members of
the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National
Association of Trade Unions (NATU), to no avail.
Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the
Anti-Dummy Board of the Department of Justice. Thereafter, the
Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956 as assistant corporate
secretary and legal assistant in their Legal Department, and he was soon
receiving P900 a month, or P600 more than he was receiving from the
FFW. Enaje was hired on or about February 19, 1957 as personnel manager
of the Companies, and was likewise made chairman of the negotiating
panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining with the Unions. On
May 20, 1958 the Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of the
Insular Life Building at Plaza Moraga. On July 29, 1958 the CIR prosecutor
filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Companies under
Republic Act 875. The complaint specifically charged the Companies with
(1) interfering with the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right
to concerted action, by sending out individual letters to them urging them
to abandon their strike and return to work, with a promise of comfortable
cots, free coffee and movies, and paid overtime, and, subsequently, by
warning them that if they did not return to work on or before June 2, 1958,
they might be replaced; and (2) discriminating against the members of
the Unions as regards readmission to work after the strike on the basis of
their union membership and degree of participation in the strike.
On August 4, 1958 the Companies filed their answer denying all the
material allegations of the complaint, stating special defenses therein,
and asking for the dismissal of the complaint.
After trial on the merits, the Court of Industrial Relations, through Presiding
Judge Arsenio Martinez, rendered on August 17, 1965 a decision dismissing
the Unions' complaint for lack of merit. On August 31, 1965 the Unions
seasonably filed their motion for reconsideration of the said decision, and
their supporting memorandum on September 10, 1965. This was denied by
the Court of Industrial Relations en banc in a resolution promulgated on
October 20, 1965.
ISSUE/S: WON there was a violated made in the Canon 10.2 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility
HELD: Yes. There was a violation made.
RATIO: Be that as it may, we must articulate our firm view that in citing this
Court's decisions and rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts, judges and
lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and punctuation
mark-for-punctuation mark. Indeed, there is a salient and salutary reason
why they should do this. Only from this Tribunal's decisions and rulings do
all other courts, as well as lawyers and litigants, take their bearings. This is
because the decisions referred to in article 8 of the Civil Code which
reads, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines," are
only those enunciated by this Court of last resort. We said in no uncertain
terms in Miranda, et al. vs. Imperial, et al. (77 Phil. 1066) that "[O]nly the
decisions of this Honorable Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this
jurisdiction." Thus, ever present is the danger that if not faithfully and
exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of this Court may lose their
proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers
and the public who may thereby be misled. But if inferior courts and
members of the bar meticulously discharge their duty to check and
recheck their citations of authorities culled not only from this Court's
decisions but from other sources and make certain that they are verbatim
reproductions down to the last word and punctuation mark, appellate
courts will be precluded from acting on misinformation, as well as be
saved precious time in finding out whether the citations are correct.
CASE 44: Eligio P. Mallari, vs. Government Service Insurance System And
The Provincial Sheriff Of Pampanga, G.R. No. 157659, Petitioner, January
25, 2010
FACTS: Petitioner Mallari obtained two loans totaling P34,000.00 from GSIS.
He mortgaged two parcels of land registered under his and his wifes
names. However, he paid GSIS about ten years after contracting the
obligations only P10,000.00 and P20,000.00 a few months after.
What followed thereafter was the series of inordinate moves of the Mallari
to delay the efforts of GSIS to recover on the debt, and to have the
unhampered possession of the foreclosed property.
GSIS finally commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against him
because he had meanwhile made no further payments.
Mallari sued GSIS and the Provincial Sheriff of Pampanga to enjoin them
from proceeding against him. The RTC decided in his favor, nullifying the
extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale.
GSIS appealed the adverse decision to the CA, which reversed the RTC.
When elevated to the SC, the Court affirmed CAs decision. CA decision
became final and executory, rendering unassailable both the extrajudicial
foreclosure and auction sale.
The sheriff failed to serve the writ of exectution on Mallari, however, partly
because of the Mallaris request for an extension of time within which to
vacate the properties. It is noted that GSIS acceded to the request.
Yet, the petitioner did not voluntarily vacate the properties, but instead
filed a motion quash the writ of execution and commenced a second
case against GSIS and the provincial sheriff.
ISSUE/S: WON Mallari was guilty of misconduct for dilatory tactics to stall
the execution of a final and executory decision in Civil Case No. 7802
which has already been resolved with finality by the Supreme Court.
HELD: Yes. Mallari wittingly adopted his aforedescribed worthless and
vexatious legal maneuvers for no other purpose except to delay the full
enforcement of the writ of possession, despite knowing, being himself a
lawyer, that as a non-redeeming mortgagor he could no longer impugn
both the extrajudicial foreclosure and the ex parte issuance of the writ of
execution cum writ of possession; and that the enforcement of the dulyissued writ of possession could not be delayed. He thus deliberately
abused court procedures and processes, in order to enable himself to
obstruct and stifle the fair and quick administration of justice in favor of
mortgagee and purchaser GSIS.
Rules of Court designates Atty. Pimentel to receive copies of all court

documents pertinent to the cases he handles, and his failure to inform the
court of changes in his address, which is recorded in the court, cannot be
excused because this is his duty. Any failure on the part of the counsel is
binding upon his client.
His conduct contravened Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, by which he was enjoined as a lawyer to
"observe the rules of procedure and xxx not [to] misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice."
ISSUE/S: WON the failure of Atty. Pimentel to inform the Court of the
change in his address, to which all court documents shall be sent, is
excusable
CASE 45: Vill Transport Service, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, The Energy
Corporation, and the Deputy Sheriff of the RTC of Makati (1991)
FACTS: In a civil case, Vill Transport was found guilty of breach of contract
(with Energy Corp.) and was ordered to pay damages. On June 7, 1985,
the court decision was sent via registered mail to the address of Atty.
Amante Pimentel (Mandaluyong), the counsel of Vill Transport. However, it
was returned to the court with a note that Atty. Pimentel had moved out
without leaving a forwarding address. Three months after, Energy Corp.
motioned the court for a writ of execution of the decision, and the same
was granted on September 19, 1985. A month later, Vill Transport filed an
urgent motion for reconsideration and manifested to the court an
intention to appeal the decision ordering Vill Transport to pay for
damages. It argued that it was only on October 21, 1985 that they knew
of the decision (the one sent to the address of Atty. Pimentel on June 7),
and they did not receive a copy of the writ of execution. Energy Corp.
opposed this MR.
HELD: It is not excusable. This is negligence on the part of Atty. Pimentel. It

is unfortunate for Vill Transport to lose the case due to the negligence of its
counsel, but the court cannot tolerate this error. Petition is dismissed, and
the decision of the lower court finding Vill Transport guilty of breach of
contract shall be immediately executory.
RATIO: Atty. Pimentel violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. It requires him to observe the rules of
procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. The
procedure he did not observe is provided for in the [Old] Rules of Court,
Rule 13, Sec. 8:
Sec. 8. Completeness of service Personal service is complete upon
actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration
of five (5) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise provides. Service
by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee; but
if he fails to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the
date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take effect at the
expiration of such time.
Without waiting for the MR to be resolved by the lower court, Vill Transport
filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals, to
have the first judgment set aside. This was denied by the CA. It held that
Atty. Pimentel was duty-bound to notify the court of any change of
address and his failure to do so could not be excused. Hence, the present
appeal.
Atty. Pimentel had his address recorded with the Court so that the latter
may serve him official documents there. Such is required for legal
counsels, in accordance with the Rules of Court. However, when Atty.
Pimentel moved out, he failed to notify the court of his new address. This is
negligence on his part.
Vill Transport admits the negligence on the part of its counsel, Atty.
Pimentel. However, it continues to argue that because their legal counsel
was not served a copy of the decision, the five-day period for appeal the
court observed in this case cannot be valid. Also, they invoke their right to
due process, arguing that they were deprived of their right to appeal.
Energy Corp., on the other hand, argues that Sec. 8, Rule 13 of the [Old]
In one case (Dela Cruz v. Dela Cruz), the Supreme Court adopted the
more stringent rule of requiring not only that the notice of the registered
mail be sent but that it should also be delivered to and received by the
addressee. However, with the element of negligence present in this case,
the same rule cannot be applied. Also, in Antonio vs. Court of Appeals,
the SC categorically stated that the requirement of conclusive proof of
receipt of the registry notice "presupposes that the notice is sent to the
correct address as indicated in the records of the court. It does not apply
where, as in the case at bar, the notice was sent to the lawyer's given
address but did not reach him because he had moved therefrom without
informing the court of his new location. The service at the old address
should be considered valid.
To tolerate this negligence will be injurious to the administration of justice;
there will be non-termination of cases. The Court cannot tolerate the
negligence and ineptitude of lawyers who wantonly jeopardize the
interests of their clients.
A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to
defeat the ends of justice. He should so arrange matters that official and
judicial communications sent by mail will reach him promptly and should
he fail to do so, not only he but his client as well, must suffer the
consequence of his negligence.
ISSUE: WON Villalon violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility
HELD: Yes. A six-month suspension is the penalty but it can no longer be
imposed because of the death of Villalon in 27 September 2006 therefore
it renders this disciplinary case moot and academic.
RATIO: A lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense
of truth and justice. Lawyers have the duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. Filing multiple actions constitutes an
abuse of the Courts processes. It constitutes improper conduct that tends
to impede, obstruct and degrade justice. Those who file multiple or
repetitive actions subject themselves to disciplinary action for
incompetence or wilful violation of their duties as attorneys to act with all
good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions that appear
to be just and consistent with truth and honor.
CASE 46: OLIVARES v. VILLALON

FACTS: Respondent Atty. Arsenio Villalon Jr.s client, Sarah Divina Morales
Al-Rasheed repeatedly sued Petitioner Pablo Olivares for violations of the
lease contract which they executed over a commercial apartment in
Olivares Building in Paranaque. In 1993, a case was filed for an action for
damages and prohibition with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction
in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case was dismissed for improper
venue.
Six years later, on 1 July 1999 an action for breach of contract with
damages was filed but was also dismissed for failure to prosecute. AlRasheed through Villalon sought for a review of the order for dismissing but
the Court of Appeals denied such. A subsequent petition for review on
certiorari was also denied. The 1999 suit was re-filed but was dismissed on
the grounds of res judicata and prescription.
Villalon, on the other hand, asserts that he was only performing his legal
obligation as a lawyer to protect and prosecute the interests of AlRasheed. He denied that he was forum shopping as Al-Rasheed, in her
certificate of non-forum shopping, disclosed the two previous cases
involving the same cause of action which had been filed and dismissed.
Villalon further claims he could not refuse the request to file a new case
because Al-Rasheed was the oppressed party in the transaction.
CASE 47: Concordia B. Garcia v. Atty. Crisanto L. Francisco

FACTS : Concordia B. Garcia seeks the disbarment of Atty. Crisanto L.
Francisco.
On March 9, 1964, Concordia B. Garcia and her husband Godofredo, the
Dionisio spouses, and Felisa and Magdalena Baetiong leashed a parcel of
land to Sotero Baluyot Lee for a period of 25 years beginning May 1, 1964.
Despite repeated verbal and written demands, Lee refused to vacate
after the expiration of the lease. Lee claimed that he had an option to
extend the lease for another 5 years and the right of pre-emption over the
property.
In this disbarment case, the complainant claims that Lee's counsel,
respondent Francisco, commenced various suits before different courts to
thwart Garcia's right to regain her property and that all these proceedings
were decided against Lee. The proceedings stemmed from the said lease
contract and involved the same issues and parties, thus violating the
proscription against forum-shopping.
Respondent, in his comment, says that he inserted in defense of his client's
right only such remedies as were authorized by law.
ISSUE/S : WON respondent violated the Lawyers Oath to not delay any
man for money or malice.
HELD : YES. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the
expense of truth and the administration of justice.
RATIO:The cause of the respondent's client is obviously without merit. The
respondent was aware of this fact when he wilfully resorted to the gambits
summarized above, continuously seeking relief that was consistently
denied, as he should have expected.
By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of
arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining
the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such actions or proceedings
as appear to him to be just and such defenses only as he believes to be
honestly debatable under the law. By violating his oath not to delay any
man for money or malice, he has besmirched the name of an honorable
profession and has proved himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him by
law as an officer of the Court
For this serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he
deserves to be sanctioned, not only as a punishment for his misconduct
but also as a warning to other lawyers who may be influenced by his
example. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR from the
practice of law and from the enjoyment of all the rights and privileges
appurtenant to membership of the Philippine bar.
no power to impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and it can

only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to be
promulgated by Congress with the approval of the Chief Executive. He
also alleges in his answer that "in the exercise of the freedom of speech
guaranteed by the Constitution, Sotto made his statement in the press
with the utmost good faith and with no intention of offending any of the
majority of the members of this high Tribunal, who he thinks, erroneously
decided Parazos case; but he has not attacked, or intended to attack
the honesty or integrity of any one.
ISSUE/S: WON Sotto is guilty for contempt of court hence punished
HELD: Yes, Sotto is found guilty for knowingly publishing false imputations
against the members of the court.
RATIO: As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente
Sotto is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to
which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such
attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. An
attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be
respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts; he may be
removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of
flagrant misconduct.
Atty. Sotto is fined PHP 1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and he is also required to show cause why he should not be
disbarred.
CASE 48: In Re Vicente Sotto for Contempt of Court
CASE 49: Lacson v. Court of Appeals
FACTS: Atty. Vicente Sotto was required to reason why he should not be
punished for contempt in connection with his written statement of the
Supreme Court's decision in the matter of Angel Parazo's case, which was
published in Manila Times and in other newspapers in the locality.
FACTS: Atty. Mario Fortes challenged the courts decision in a case filed by
his client, petitioner Aguido Lacson, Jr. He alleged that the court
committed a reversible error. He filed the instant petition but the court
denied it because he failed to prove his allegation.
Sotto was given ten days besides the five days originally given to him to
file his answer, and although his answer was filed after the expiration of
the period of time given him the said answer was admitted. He does not
deny the authenticity of the statement as it has been published. He
nevertheless, asserts that under Sec 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
which confers upon the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, the Supreme Court has
He then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, stating that: (1) the petition
was denied wholly on the basis of technicality, (2) the denial did not
consider the fraud sought to be stopped, and (3) the court disregarded
the purpose of judicial proceedings, that of seeking the truth in upholding
the fake and falsified OCT of the Tuazons. In a Resolution, the court
denied the Motion for Reconsideration with finality.
The court then directed Fortes to show cause as to why he should not be
held in contempt of court and liable for misconduct for his apparent
malicious and unfounded accusation that the court did not read the
petition and for suppressing from the petitions body the final decision of
Lacsons case. Fortes admitted the charge but explained that it was his
first time to file a petition of such nature and his enthusiasm got the best of
him.
The court recognizes that a lawyer, in defending the cause and rights of
his clients, has the duty to do so with all fervor and energy. However, this is
not enough reason for him to resort to intimidation or proceed without
propriety and respect the dignity of the courts requires. The respect of the
courts is required of lawyers because it guarantees the stability of their
institution. Without such guaranty, this institution would be resting on a
very shaky foundation.
On the other hand, the court said that Fortes should know, or ought to
know, the nature, character and scope of a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. Fortes should have been candid enough in the
petition for review to disclose in its body the fact that the case he handled
was actually a petition to annul a decision. The court considered that the
suppression of the antecedents must have been deliberate since Fortes
must have known that a voluntary disclosure would be fatal to Lacsons
cause.
In the case of Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, the court held
that a lawyer is an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice
and he has the duty to preserve faith in the courts. He has the sworn and
moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily the high esteem
and regard towards the court so essential to the proper administration of
justice.
The court found Fortes did an immeasurable disservice to the court by

putting it into dishonor, disrespect, and public contempt, diminishing
public confidence or promoting distrust in the court, and assailing the
integrity of its members.
Fortes argument that it was his first time to file such a petition is not an
excuse. It should even give him more reason to demonstrate utmost
candor and respect for the court. A clients cause does not permit a
lawyer to cross the line between liberty and license as a lawyers duty is
not only to his client but also with the courts.
CASE 50: Spouses Tiongco v The Honorable Severino C. Aguilar
ISSUE/S: WON Fortes failed to observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts and to its judicial officers.
HELD: Yes. Fortes failed to observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to its judicial officers. He is ordered to pay a fine and warned
that a commission of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
RATIO: Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
a lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
In the case of Salcedo v. Hernandez, the court held that a lawyer is duty
bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court and defend its
integrity not only because he is conferred with a privilege of being a priest
of justice but also because in doing so, he neither creates nor promotes
distrust in the administration of justice. He helps in preventing anybody
from harboring and encouraging discontent, which is the source of
disorder that undermines the foundation of judicial power.
FACTS: On 26 September 1994, this Court required ATTY. JOSE B. TIONGCO,

as counsel for the petitioners, to show cause why he should not be dealt
with administratively for the violation of Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility considering the language that he used in
describing the actions and omissions of the judge that handled his case.
Atty. Tiongco likewise alleged that the Court did not bother reading the
pleadings of his petition saying:
". . . Truly, it is hard to imagine that this Honorable Court had read the
petition and the annexes attached thereto and hold that the same has
"failed to sufficiently show that the respondent Court had committed a
grave abuse of discretion in rendering the questioned judgment". . .
Atty. Tiongco went on further alleging that: If the undersigned has called
anyone a "liar" "thief" "perfidious" and "blasphemer" it is because he is in
fact a liar, thief, perfidious and blasphemer; "this Honorable First Division,
however, forget, that the undersigned also called him a "robber" , a
"rotten manipulator" and "abetter" of graft and shady deals; On the other
hand, if the undersigned called anybody "cross-eyed," it must be because
he is indeed cross-eyed particularly when he sees but five letters in an
eight letter-word; Indeed, it must be a lousy Code of Professional

Responsibility and therefore stands in dire need of amendment which
punishes lawyer who truthfully expose incompetent and corrupt judges
before this Honorable Supreme
Court; It is therefore, respectfully
submitted, that for all his pains, the undersigned does not deserve or is
entitled to the honors of being dealt with administratively or otherwise.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Tiongco violated Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility through the use of disrespectful words in his briefs.
HELD: Yes. Atty Tiongco, in view of his unfounded and malicious
insinuation, violated Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RATIO: CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others. In using in the petition in this case intemperate and scurrilous words
and phrases against the respondent judge which are obviously uncalled
for and entirely irrelevant to the petition and whose glaring falsity is easily
demonstrated by the respondent judge's decision if favor of Atty. Tiongco
and his wife in their case for recovery of possession and damages, and by
the dismissal of the instant petition for failure of the petitioners to
sufficiently show that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion, Atty. Tiongco has equally shown his disrespect to and
contempt for the respondent judge, thereby diminishing public
confidence in the latter and eventually, in the judiciary, or sowing mistrust
in the administration of justice.
application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, alleging Atty.

Bactads claim and false representation that a motion to dismiss is an
allowable pleading under the Revised Rule on Summary Proceedings.
On Jan. 26, 1994, the Court dismissed the case without prejudice to the
refilling of an administrative case in the proper time since there is already
an appeal pending with the RTC in relation to the aforementioned civil
case wherein relief is available. Atty. Boquiren filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the Court on March 2, 1994. Atty.
Boquiren filed another motion for reconsideration dated March 26, 1994.
Both motions for reconsideration filed by Atty. Boquiren contained certain
words which tend to undermine the integrity of the Court.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Atty. Boquiren is guilty of violating the Code of
HELD: Yes, Atty. Boquiren is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
RATIO: Atty. Boquiren violated Canon 11 which states that A LAWYER
SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO
JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
It appears that the words used by Atty. Boquiren are aimed at seriously
undermining the integrity of the Supreme Court.
Atty. Boquiren is ordered to explain within 5 days from receipt of the
Resolution why he should not be cited in contempt and/or subject to
disciplinary action.
CASE 51: BOQUIREN v. DEL ROSARIO-CRUZ

FACTS: Herein complainant, Atty. Felixberto Boquiren was the plaintiffs
counsel in a certain civil case, where herein respondents, Atty. Saturnino
Bactad, was defendants counsel, and Judge Emperatriz del Rosario-Cruz
and Atty. Melinda Gatdula, were the judge and clerk of court,
respectively of the MTC where the said civil case was docketed. Judge
Cruz dismissed the civil case due to plaintiffs lack of cause of action
which Atty. Boquiren, seasonably appealed to the RTC.
On July 5, 1993, Atty. Boquiren filed an administrative complaint against
Judge Cruz and Atty. Gatdula for misconduct, partiality, serious
nonfeasance, culpable dereliction of duty and ignorance of the law in
relation to the aforementioned civil case. Atty. Bactad was also charged
with false representation and employing scheme to defeat the
CASE 52: Socorro Abella Soriano, et. al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
100633, August 28, 2001
FACTS: Deogracias and Rosalina Reyes pleaded that they were employed
by Socorro as manager and administrative assistant of her property and
real estate in 1968. As payment for their services, in 1973, Socorro gave
them one apartment unit to use as their dwelling for the duration of their
lifetime and a token monthly rental on P150 was imposed. In the same
building, another unit was occupied by the spouses which was improved
and converted by them into a pub and restaurant. For the use of the
premises, the token amount of P1500 monthly was imposed. On October
17, 1988, Socorro gave Deogracias and Rosalina notice to vacate the said
two units. Deogracias and Rosalina owned two commercial lots with
improvements. On May 28, 1968, they becameindebted to Socorro in the
amount of P638,635.36. The parties agreed to pay for the debt by selling
the two lots for P2.5M. While looking for a buyer, Deogracias and Rosalina
conveyed the property to Socorro by way of first mortgage. A deed of
absolute sale was executed in place of a real estate mortgage. Action
was initiated by the spouses but the court released the two lots in favor of
Socorro having presented the deed of absolute sale in her name. On
October 28, 1988, the spouses paid the filing fee and legal research. On
November 29, 1988, Socorro filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
two grounds: the first cause of action was barred by the pendency of an
ejectment case between the same parties over the same parties; the
second cause of action was premature
On December 8, 1988, the Carmelite Sisters on behalf of their benefactress
filed with the trial court an urgent ex-parte motion for restraining order.
They talked to respondent judge Naval in his chambers and requested
him to immediately act on Socorros urgent ex-parte motion for a
restraining order. On December 16, 1988, the Trial Court denied the
motion. On January 16, 1989, Socorro, through counsel, filed a motion to
inhibit Judge Naval; while still a law practitioner and politician, he was a
frequent customer of the restaurant of the spouses and was a good friend
of his; he was also a good friend of the attorney of the spouses, Trial Court
denied motion to inhibit
ISSUE/S: WON the Trial Court gravely abused its discretion in refusing to
inhibit
HELD: No. Rule 137, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court provides only
the following grounds for the disqualification of judges- No judge or
judicial officershall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child,
ispeculiarly interested as heir, legatee, creditor orotherwise, or in which he
is related to either partywithin the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity,
orto counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of
the civil law, or in which hehas been executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee orcounsel, or in which he has presided in any inferiorcourt when his
ruling or decision is the subject ofreview, without the written consent of all
parties ininterest signed by them and entered upon the record.A judge
may, in his exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in
a case, for just or validreasons other than those mentioned above.
A litigant may not demand that a judge inhibit himself. Specially so in this
case where there is a finding of fact that respondent judge has not as
yet crossed the line that divides partiality from impartiality. Besides, the test
for determining the propriety of the denial of a motion to inhibit is whether

the movant was deprived of a fair and impartial trial. In this case, there
was no such deprivation.
In a string of cases, the Supreme Court has said that bias and prejudice, to
be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be
proved with clear and convincing evidence. Bare allegations of partiality
and prejudgment will not suffice
CASE 53: Re: Letter Dated February 21, 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda.
FACTS:Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, who identified himself as member, Philippine
Bar, expressed his frustrations over the unfavorable outcome of and the
manner by which the Court resolved cases filed by him. Atty. Sorreda
wrote a letter to the SC Chief Justice after the dismissal of a case filed by
him, expressing his frustrations about the decision, the letter contains the
following:
Mr. Chief Justice, I believe the manner the Court comported itself in the
aforesaid case is totally execrable and atrocious, entirely unworthy of the
majesty and office of the highest tribunal of the land. It is the action not
of men of reason or those who believe in the rule of law, but rather of
bullies and tyrants from whom might is right. I say, shame on the High
Court, for shoving down a hapless suitors throat a ruling which, from all
appearances, it could not justify.
The SC required Atty. Sorreda to show cause why he should not be
properly disciplined for degrading, insulting and dishonoring the Supreme
Court by using vile, offensive, intemperate and contemptuous derogatory
language against it.
Then, Atty. Sorreda wrote two more letters to the court, arguing for the
propriety of his action and practically lecturing the Court on his concepts
of Legal and Judicial Ethics and Constitutional Law.
ISSUE/S: WON
responsibility.
Atty.
Sorreda
violated
the
Code
of
professional
HELD: Yes, heis found guilty both of contempt of court and violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility amounting to gross misconduct as an
officer of the court and member of the Bar. He is hereby indefinitely
SUSPENDED as a member of the Bar and is prohibited from engaging in

the practice of law until otherwise ordered by this Court.
RATIO: Atty. Sorreda, as a citizen and as an officer of the court, is entitled
to criticize the rulings of this Court, to point out where he feels the Court
may have lapsed with error. But, certainly, this does not give him the
unbridled license to insult and malign the Court and bring it into
disrepute. Against such an assault, the Court is duty-bound to act to
preserve its honor and dignity and to safeguard the morals and ethics
of the legal profession.
Atty. Sorreda must be reminded that his first duty is not to his client but to
the administration of justice, to which his clients success is wholly
subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics. The use of intemperate language and
unkind ascription can hardly be justified nor can it have a place in the
dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal profession is
a treasured tradition that must at no time be lost to it.
Here, Atty. Sorreda has transcended the permissible bounds of fair
comment and constructive criticism to the detriment of the orderly
administration of justice. Free expression, after all, must not be used as a
vehicle to satisfy ones irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade
and even destroy this Court and its magistrates.
CASE 54: Rosauro Paragas vs. Fernando A. Cruz, G.R. No. L-24438, July 30,
1965
FACTS: Atty. Jeremias T. Sebastian, acting as counsel de parte for
petitioner Rosauro Paragas, stated in his written motion, that his client
petitioner Paragas prays for a reconsideration of the resolution the Court
has given on ground that it constitutes a violation of the most important
right in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Philippines, a culpable
violation which is a ground for impeachment He also mentioned in his
written motion, when the laws and the rules are violated, the victims
resort, sometimes, to armed force and to the ways of the cave-men! We
do not want Verzosa and Reyes repeated again and again, killed in the
premises of the Supreme Court and in those of the City Hall of Manila.
Considering that the foregoing expressions are derogatory to the dignity
of the Court, the Court required Atty. Sebastian to answer why he should
not be punished. Atty. Sebastian said that he did not intend to file an
impeachment against the Justices and that it is a herculean task which

only exceptional men can do. He also said that it is only a statement of
fact and of their wish. That based on observation, when the laws and the
rules are violated, the victims, sometimes, resort to armed force and to the
ways of the cavemen. He finally contended that he is just against
repetition of these acts of subversion and hate.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Sebastian is liable for contempt due to the derogatory
things that he said
HELD: Yes. Atty Sebastian is liable for contempt due to the derogatory
things that he said.
RATIO: Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges who try his
cases with that courtesy all have a right to expect. As an officer of the
court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential
to the proper administration of justice.Atty. Sebastian failed to observe
this.
The expressions contained in the written motion of Atty. Sebastian are
plainly contemptuous and disrespectful, and reference to the recent
killing of two employees is but a covert threat upon the members of the
Court. That such threats and disrespectful language contained in a
pleading filed in Courts are constitutive of direct contempt. Counsel's
disavowal of any offensive intent is of no avail, for it is a well-known and
established rule that defamatory words are to be taken in the ordinary
meaning attached to them by impartial observers.
CASE 55: Salcedo v. Hernandez
FACTS: Atty. Francisco, who represents the petitioner inserted a paragraph
in his motion for reconsideration stating that denying the motion for
reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the
rights of the petitioner and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the
polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. They wish to exhaust all the
means within out power in order that this error may be corrected by the
very court which has committed it, because they should not want that
some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong,
Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do,
the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim,
and because it is their utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this
honorable court and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of
the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous
decisions like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters
will necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of "sakdalism" and
make the public lose confidence in the administration of justice. The court
required Atty. Francisco to show cause why he should not be found guilty
of contempt, giving him a period of 10 days for that purpose. In his
answer, Atty. Francisco reiterated them several times contending that
they did not constitute contempt because, according to him it is not
contempt to tell the truth.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Francisco can be held in contempt
HELD: Yes, He is ordered to pay a fine of P200 within the period of 10 days
and was reprimanded.
RATIO: As a member of the bar and an officer of the court, Atty. Francisco
is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and defend its integrity,
not only because it has conferred upon him the high privilege not a right
of being what he is now, but also because in doing so, he neither creates
nor promotes distrust in the administration of justice. It is right and plausible
that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do
so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and
never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or
proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the
courts require. The reason for this is that respect of the courts guarantees
the stability of their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would
be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Dissenting Opinion Malcolm, J.:
Human sensitiveness to an attorney's unjust aspersions on judicial
character may induce too drastic action. It may result in the long run in
making of lawyers weak exponents of their clients' causes. Respect for the
courts can better be obtained by following a calm and impartial course
from the bench than by an attempt to compel respect for the judiciary by
chastising a lawyer for a too vigorous or injudicious exposition of his side of
a case. The Philippines needs lawyers of independent thought and
courageous bearing, jealous of the interests of their clients and unafraid of
any court, high or low, and the courts will do well tolerantly to overlook
occasional intemperate language soon to be regretted by the lawyer
which affects in no way the outcome of a case.
CASE 56: De Garcia v. Warden of Makati

FACTS: Petitioner in the case at bar, De Gracia was charged for frustrated
homicide to which he pleaded not guilty. It was later amended to one of
serious physical injuries. It is to such lesser offense that on September 10,
1971, he entered a plea of guilty. On the very same day, respondent
Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado imposed upon him the penalty of four
months and one day of arrests mayor without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. That period of confinement he had duly served by
November 10, 1975, considering that he had been under detention since
July 18, 1975. This notwithstanding, the petition alleged that he was not set
free, the reason being that on November 19, 1975, the last day of the
prison term imposed upon him, "respondent Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Marciano P. Sta. Ana filed with the respondent Judge, in the very same
case where your petitioner was convicted and for which he served
sentence, Criminal Case No. 15289, a 'Motion to Order the Warden to
Hold the Release of Manuel de Gracia (your petitioner)' alleging as a
ground that the 'father of the victim, Gilberts Valenzuela, informed the
movant (respondent Asst. Fiscal, not the People of the Philippines), that
the victim in the above-entitled case died and for this reason the
undersigned will file an amended information.
On December 8, 1975, this Court issued the following resolution: "The Court
[issued] the writ of habeas corpus returnable to this Court on Friday,
December 12, 1975 and required the respondents to make a [return] of
the writ not later than the aforesaid date. On the date of trial, December
16, 1971, Judge Honrado stated that the Petitioner is already released due
to the fact that Trial Fiscal Sta. Ana has not filed the amended information
for homicide. It was also stated that in view of the petitioners release, the
present petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic.
On the morning Deeember 17, 1975, respondent Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Marciano P. Sta. Ana, Jr. and the two aforesaid wardens appeared.
Neither petitioner nor his counsel, Salvador N. Beltran, was present. There
was this manifestation though: '[Petitioner thru counsel, respectfully
manifests that he has already been released from confinement, for which
reason the present petition has been rendered moot and academic ....
ISSUE/S: WON the petitioners counsel, Salvador N. Beltran violated Rule
11.01.
HELD: Yes. Salvador N. Beltran should have appeared in court hearing.

RATIO: It would appear, therefore, that with the release of petitioner, the
matter had indeed become moot and academic. That disposes of this
petition, except for one final note. There was a lapse in judicial propriety
by counsel Salvador N. Beltran who did not even take the trouble of
appearing in Court on the very day his own petition was reset for hearing,
a lapse explicable, it may be assumed, by his comparative inexperience
and paucity of practice before this Tribunal. It suffices to call his attention
to such failing by way of guidance for his future actuations as a member
of the bar.
Rule 11.01: A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings. In the
present case, the lawyer did not even bother to attend the hearing,
which in a way is considered to be a show of disrespect to the courts.
CASE 57: Paredes-Garcia vs. CA
FACTS: The petitioner, an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal, was
deputized at the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City and assigned
at the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 58, Makati City where respondent
is assigned as presiding judge. On April 11, 1995, upon hearing of Criminal
Cases, petitioner and prosecutor arrived late. Respondent judge then
ordered petitioner to explain within 72 hours why she arrived late to court.
Thereafter, petitioner filed her explanation and further averred that she
has never been late in court and that she has never been fined nor
ordered to explain for tardiness in any hearing. On April 12, 1996,
respondent judge issued an order citing the petitioner in contempt of
court and directed her to pay within 72 hours a penalty in the amount of
P100.00. This sanction was grounded on her inappropriate dealings with
the court personnel and the judge. Petitioner then filed for reconsideration
but was later denied by the respondent judge.
ISSUE/S: WON petitioner was correctly cited in contempt by respondent
judge.
HELD: No.
RATIO: The court held that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in
all courts. However, this power is not limitless. It must be used with caution
restraint, judiciousness, deliberation and due regard to the provisions of
the law and the constitutional rights of the individual. Respondent judge
failed to observe the rule of conduct in the exercise of the power to

punish the petitioner for contempt of court. In finding the petitioner guilty
of the aforementioned acts and imposing upon her the penalty of a fine
without granting her an opportunity to answer the imputed falsehood and
improprieties and an opportunity to be heard, the respondent Judge
disregarded the requirements of due process in contempt proceedings
and, therefore, acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion.
CASE 58: Acme Shoe Rubber and Plastic Corp. vs CA, Producers Bank of
the Philippines and Regional Sheriff of Caloocan City
FACTS:Petitioner Chua Pac, the president and general manager of copetitioner, Acme Shoe Rubber and Plastic Corp., executed a chattel
mortgage in favour of private respondent Producers Bank of the
Philippines. The mortgage stood by way of security for petitioners
corporate loan of Php 3 Million. In due time, the said loan was paid by the
petitioner. Subsequently they obtained another loan totalling Php 2.7
Million. This was also paid in due to time. On 1984, the bank yet again,
extended a loan amounting to Php 1 Million. Due to financial constraints,
the lone was not settled and the bank initiated an action for extrajudicial
foreclosure of the chattel mortgage with the Sheriff of Caloocan.
The petitioner filed an action for injunction but this was dismissed by the
said RTC and held the corporation bound by the stipulations of their
chattel mortgage. They also appealed to the Court of Appeals but it only
affirmed in all respects the decision of the trial court. Thus, this petition.
On their reply to the respondents comment on his petition, the counsel
stated in his One Final Word:
"In simply quoting in toto the patently erroneous decision of the trial court,
respondent Court of Appeals should be required to justify its decision
which completely disregarded the basic laws on obligations and
contracts, as well as the clear provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law and
well-settled jurisprudence of this Honorable Court; that in the event that its
explanation is wholly unacceptable, this Honorable Court should impose
appropriate sanctions on the erring justices. This is one positive step in
ridding our courts of law of incompetent and dishonest magistrates
especially members of a superior court of appellate jurisdiction."
ISSUE/S: Should the counsel be held liable for the said statements made in
their reply to the comment?
HELD: Atty. Francisco Sotto, counsel for petitioners, is admonished to be

circumspect in dealing with the courts.
RATIO:"(L)awyers x x x should bear in mind their basic duty `to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers and x
x x (to) insist on similar conduct by others.' This respectful attitude towards
the court is to be observed, `not for the sake of the temporary incumbent
of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.'
And it is `through a scrupulous preference for respectful language that a
lawyer best demonstrates his observance of the respect due to the courts
and judicial officers x x x.'"
2. WON Sottos charges against the adverse litigants cannot be

considered in the present case for they are not the offended parties in the
same.
HELD:
1.Yes. The Court finds the language he used that is not expected from an
officer of the courts. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court.
2. No. There shall be no doubt in the power of the Court to punish Atty.
Sotto for contempt under the circumstances. Such language is not
protected; it surfaces the of feeling of contempt towards a litigant; it
offends the court in which it is made. He is guilty of contempt.
FACTS: After a decision adverse to respondent MacArthur International

Minerals Co., disrespectful statements purportedly made by its counsels,
Vicente Santiago and Jose Beltran Sotto (both members of the Bar) were
brought to this Court with the suggestion of disciplinary action.
RATIO: (1) Atty. Santiagos accusations has no basis in fact and in law. He
did limit his slurs to the Chief Justice and Justice Castro, but the whole
court, pleading all who have received favors from any of those
connected to the petitioners of that cse to inhibit themselves. There is the
not too well concealed effort on the part of a losing litigants attorney to
downgrade the court. Counsels words are intended to create an
atmosphere of distrust. A lawyer is an officer of this court; he is, like the
court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice.
Atty. Sotto, in his statements in his memoranda, he attacks the petitioners

in that case (including the Executive Secretary) of having made wild, false
and ridiculous statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts
against his client. Further averring that their proposition is corrupt on its
face and lays bare the immoral arrogant attitude of the petitioners. Even
further declaring that the petitioners in that case were opportunistically
changing their claims and stories from case to case.
Atty. Santiago justifies his language stating that it was necessary for the
defense of his client. A clients cause does not permit an attorney to cross
the line between liberty and license. Discipline and self-restraint on the
part of the bar even under adverse conditions are necessary for the
orderly administration of justice. The Court finds in the language of Atty.
Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the administration of
justice.
Atty. Santiago, in his third motion for reconsideration, he pictures

petitioners as vulturous executives, and goes on to describe the court as
civilized, democratic tribunal, only to later question the soundness of
said decision of the same tribunal. He filed for a motion to inhibit the Chief
Justice and a justice from judging the case. He depicts the judicial
authorities as acting like messengers of God and that their judgment
would seem to be ordained by the Almighty. He questions the unjudicial
favoritism for the petitioners of that case by the Court.
(2) A lawyers language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of

the legal profession. It is Sottos duty as a member of the Bar to abstain
from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the
honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of
the cause with which he is charged.
CASE 59: Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, G.R. No. L-27072,
January 9, 1970
ISSUE/S:
1. WON Santiagos language in his pleadings can be equated to
contempt.
CASE 60: British Co, Inc., et. al. v. De los Angeles, et. al.
FACTS:On June 12, 1970, a fire broke out in the premises of Tapia at San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. Being holders of fire insurance policies
from different companies, among them the British Co, Inc., and having
failed to secure extrajudicial settlement of their claims, they filed
corresponding civil actions in the CFI of QC. All were assigned to Hon. De
Los Angeles. British and Cibeles were served summons in separate civil
cases with different dates. The counsel for British and Cibeles asked for an
extension of their answers due to events. Tapia filed separate motions in
two cases praying that the petitioner be declared in default, due to a
delayed filing of answer. Judgments were released for service to
petitioners counsel. According to Atty. Felix, he found in the delivery
neither his motion for extension to file answer nor the joint answer they had
filed with Cibeles, but only the orders of default. Two days later, he filed a
joint motion, dated May 25, 1971, to lift the order of default, unverified
and unaccompanied by any affidavit of merit. Hon. De Los Angeles, after
reading in the presence of undersigned counsel that Joint Motion, asked
him to set it for hearing anew and told him that it was always his practice
to give parties a chance to present evidence.
A notice was received by Atty. Felix, Jr. advising him that the motion had
been set for hearing, but on June 22, 1971, respondent judge issued an
order cancelling this notice for the reason that "for failure of defendants to
comply with the requirement imposed by Sec 3 of Rule 18, Rules of Court
and pursuant to the decisions of the SC, this Court can no longer set aside
its order dated April 24, 1971. Certifications for proof of service have been
presented, showing that the orders and copies of decisions were
delivered by the postmaster, completed after the expiration of 5 days
from the date of 1st notice. The period of 30 days within which to interpose
an appeal from these decisions rendered by this Court commenced on
May 25, 1971 the day after the 5th day from May 19, 1971 and expired
after June 23, 1971. From May 25, 1971 to June 23, 1971, no appeal from
these decisions was taken by the defendants. They are by law now final,
unappealable and, as matter of right, British and Cibeles are entitled to
their immediate execution.
Pursuant to the writs issued under this order, the Hongkong & Shanghai
Banking Corp paid to respondent Sheriff P294, 750 for British and the First
National City Bank of New York the sum of P75, 000 for Cibeles, but all paid
were returned to the respective banks by virtue of the writ of preliminary
injunction. British and Cibeles filed a joint "Petition for Relief from
Judgment", but before its execution, the instant petition was filed with this
Court on July 2, 1971 and summons, together with the writ of preliminary
injunction was served on the respondents. On the same day that the
petition for relief was set for hearing, Hon. De Los Angeles found it to be
"sufficient in form and substance" and ordered the respondents "to answer
the same within a period of 15 days from receipt.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Felix has maintained his candor and good behavior
before the Court, with regard to the orders and notice of default
delivered to them, when according to him there was none
HELD: No. He did not maintain it.
RATIO: The contention of British and Cibeles that they were erroneously
declared in default has no merit. As regards Cibeles, there can be no
question that even its motion for extension to file its answer filed out of
time. It was served summons on April 2, 1971, and it is not disputed that its
motion for extension was filed on April 19th, two days late. With respect to
British, its answer admittedly due on April 13, 1971, and although it asked
for an extension of 15 days it was given only 5 days ending April 19,1971,its
answer jointly filed with Cibeles on April 22, was undoubtedly out of time.
Counsel suggests that he was not given enough time, considering that
there was the Holy Week to take into account, but His Honor ruled that
precisely, counsel would have more time because of the holidays.
Besides, it is settled that parties and counsel should not assume that courts
are bound to grant the time they ask for compliance with the rules, and
therefore, the fact that counsel received the order of extension by mail
only on April 26, 1971, is no reason for him to complain. Likewise, that he
was not notified of the motion to declare his clients in default is not
against the rules, for he had no right to such notice. Motions to lift orders
of default may be filed only before judgment, and petitioners' joint motion
was filed only on May 26, 1971, whereas the judgments in question were
rendered on April 28, 1971.
A party who by inaction or negligence allows himself to be declared in
default offends the rule requiring him to answer the summons without
unnecessary delay to the end that the issues may be duly joined and the
litigation be expeditiously terminated. Counsel only makes reference to
the joint answer he had filed on behalf of the British and Cibeles but,
neither the motion itself nor the joint answer is supported by any
corresponding oath. Particularly, when it is considered that counsel has
never pretended that he had actually made inquiries and asked the
proper personnel of the court about them, which he would naturally have
done, considering that before then he had filed motions for extension
followed by the joint answer. Such lack of candor bordering on conscious
misstatements of fact which has actually misled the Court calls for at least
an appropriate explanation from counsel
CASE 61: Brigida S. Buenaseda vs. Secretary Juan Flavier

FACTS: On November 11, 1992, petitioners filed a "Manifestation and
Supplement to 'Motion to Direct Respondent Secretary of Health to
Comply with 22 September 1992 Resolution'. On November 13, 1992, the
Solicitor General submitted its Comment dated November 10, 1992,
alleging that: (a) "despite the issuance of the September 22, 1992
Resolution directing respondents to maintain the status quo, respondent
Secretary refuses to hold in abeyance the implementation of petitioners'
preventive suspension; (b) the clear intent and spirit of the Resolution
dated September 22, 1992 is to hold in abeyance the implementation of
petitioners' preventive suspension, the status quo obtaining the time of the
filing of the instant petition; (c) respondent Secretary's acts in refusing to
hold in abeyance implementation of petitioners' preventive suspension
and in tolerating and approving the acts of Dr. Abueva, the OIC
appointed to replace petitioner Buenaseda, are in violation of the
Resolution dated September 22, 1992; and (d) therefore, respondent
Secretary should be directed to comply with the Resolution dated
September 22, 1992 immediately, by restoring the status quo ante
contemplated by the aforesaid resolution"
ISSUE/S: WON the counsel for the petitioners use of abusive words towards
the other counsel is a ground for a disbarment case.
HELD: Yes, it is a ground for disbarment.
RATIO: we take cognizance of the intemperate language used by
counsel for private respondents hurled against petitioners and their
counsel (Consolidated: (1) Comment on Private Respondent" "Urgent
Motions,
etc.;
(2) Adoption of OSG's Comment; and (3) Reply to Private Respondent's
Comment and Supplemental Comment. A lawyer should not be carried
away in espousing his client's cause. The language of a lawyer, both oral
or written, must be respectful and restrained in keeping with the dignity of
the legal profession and with his behavioral attitude toward his brethren in
the profession. The use of abusive language by counsel against the
opposing counsel constitutes at the same time a disrespect to the dignity
of the court of justice. Besides, the use of impassioned language in
pleadings, more often than not, creates more heat than light.
CASE 62: In re Almacen, L-27654, February 18, 1970
FACTS: Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil
case. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his
client, but Almacen filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He notified the
opposing party of said motion but he failed to indicate the time and
place of hearing of said motion. Hence, his motion was denied. He then
appealed but the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as it agreed with
the trial court with regard to the motion for reconsideration. Eventually,
Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari before the Supreme Court which
also denied his appeal in a minute resolution.
Almacen called such minute resolutions as unconstitutional. He then filed
before the Supreme Court a petition to surrender his lawyers certificate of
title as he claimed that it is useless to continue practicing his profession
when members of the high court are men who are calloused to pleas for
justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and
commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. He further
alleged that due to the minute resolution, his client was made to pay
P120, 000 without knowing the reasons why and that he became one of
the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy. He also stated that
justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is
not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.
The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacens petition as the
Court wanted to wait for Almacen to actually surrender his certificate.
Almacen did not surrender his lawyers certificate though as he now
argues that he chose not to. Almacen then asked that he may be
permitted to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should
be taken against him . . . in an open and public hearing. He said he
preferred this considering that the Supreme Court is the complainant,
prosecutor and Judge. Almacen was however unapologetic.
ISSUE/S: WON Almacen should be disciplined.
HELD: Yes. He was suspended indefinitely.
RATIO: The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed
because the Supreme Court cannot accept every case or write full
opinion for every petition they reject otherwise the High Court would be
unable to effectively carry out its constitutional duties. The proper role of
the Supreme Court is to decide only those cases which present questions
whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular
facts and parties involved. It should be remembered that a petition to

review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the
courts denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned
in the Court of Appeals opinion.
On Almacens attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court
regarded said criticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent,
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory against this Court as
well as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is
unprofessional. It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and
as a citizen, has the right to criticize in properly respectful terms and
through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. His right as a
citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful
manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has
always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the cardinal condition of
all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls
of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts.
In the case at bar, Almacens criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer,
he should have known that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the
running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of
the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the
adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did
not). He has only himself to blame and he is the reason why his client lost.
CASE 63: Judge Rene B. Baculi vs. Atty. Melchor A. Battung, A.C. No. 8920,
September 28, 2011
FACTS: On July 24, 2008, during the hearing on the Motion for
Reconsideration of a civil case in the MTC of Tuguegarao City, Atty.
Melchor Battung was shouting while arguing his motion. The presiding
Judge Baculi advised him to tone down his voice but instead, the Atty.
Battung shouted at the top of his voice. When warned that he would be
cited for direct contempt, Battung shouted, "Then cite me!" Judge Baculi
cited him for direct contempt and imposed a fine of P100.00. Atty.
Battung then left.
While other cases were being heard, Atty. Battung re-entered the
courtroom and shouted, "Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I
am not afraid of you!" Judge Baculi ordered the sheriff to escort Battung
out of the courtroom and cited him for direct contempt of court for the
second time.
After his hearings, Judge Baculi went out and saw Battung at the hall of
the courthouse, apparently waiting for him. Atty. Battung again shouted in
a threatening tone, "Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you! I am not
afraid of you!" He kept on shouting, "I am not afraid of you!" and
challenged the judge to a fight. Staff and lawyers escorted him out of the
building. Judge Baculi also learned that after the respondent left the
courtroom, he continued shouting and punched a table at the Office of
the Clerk of Court.
Judge Baculi filed a complaint for disbarment with the Commission on
Discipline of the IBP against the respondent, alleging that the latter
violated Canons 11 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommended that he be reprimanded.
Respondent Atty. Battung filed his Answer, essentially saying that it was
Judge Baculi who disrespected him. He stated that I only told Judge
Rene Baculi I will file Gross ignorance of the Law against him once inside
the court room when he was lambasting me. According to Battung it
was Judge Baculi who disrespected me. Judge Baculi did not like that I
just submit the Motion for Reconsideration without oral argument because
he wanted to have an occasion to just humiliate me and to make appear
to the public that I am a negligent lawyer, when he said: you justify your
negligence before this court, making it an impression to the litigants and
the public that as if I am a negligent, incompetent, mumbling, and
irresponsible lawyer. Respondent Battung claims that he was provoked
by the presiding judge that is why he shouted back at him. Atty. Battung
asked that the case against him be dismissed.
The IBP conducted its investigation based on the tape of the incident at
the courtroom and the transcript of stenographic notes of the matter
stating that both parties merely reiterated what they alleged in their
submitted pleadings.
ISSUE/S: WON the respondent Atty. Melchor
reprimanded for his actions in the said case.
Battung
should
be
HELD: Yes, Atty. Melchor Battung violated Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility: A lawyer shall abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the

Courts.
RATIO: According to the IBP, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility requires a lawyer to observe and maintain respect due the
courts and judicial officers. He likewise violated Rule 11.03 of Canon 11
that provides that a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the courts. Respondent Battungs
argument that Judge Baculi provoked him to shout should not be given
due consideration since the he should not have shouted at the presiding
judge; by doing so, he created the impression that disrespect of a judge
could be tolerated. What the he should have done was to file an action
before the Office of the Court Administrator if he believed that Judge
Baculi did not act according to the norms of judicial conduct. The IBP
recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for six (6) months.
The Court agrees with the IBPs finding with exception only to the
suspension. Atty. Battung violated Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Respondent Battung disrespected Judge Baculi
by shouting at him inside the courtroom during court proceedings in the
presence of litigants and their counsels, and court personnel. He even
came back to harass Judge Baculi. This behavior, in front of many
witnesses, cannot be allowed. The Court notes that the Battung continued
to threaten Judge Baculi and acted in a manner that clearly showed
disrespect for his position even after the latter had cited him for contempt.
In fact, after initially leaving the court, he returned to the courtroom and
disrupted the ongoing proceedings. These actions were not only against
the person, the position and the stature of Judge Baculi, but against the
court as well whose proceedings were openly and flagrantly disrupted,
and brought to disrepute by Atty. Battung.
Litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because of their position and
avowed duty to the courts, cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule,
demean and disrespect a judge, and the court that he represents. The
Court cited Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr., it is the duty of a lawyer, as an
officer of the court, to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts.
Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution;
without this guarantee, the institution would be resting on very shaky
foundations.
A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely disregards the

latters role, stature and position in our justice system. When the
respondent publicly berated and brazenly threatened Judge Baculi that
he would file a case for gross ignorance of the law against the latter, the
respondent effectively acted in a manner tending to erode the public
confidence in Judge Baculis competence and in his ability to decide
cases. Incompetence is a matter that, even if true, must be handled with
sensitivity in the manner provided under the Rules of Court; an objecting
or complaining lawyer cannot act in a manner that puts the courts in a
bad light and bring the justice system into disrepute.
In the case at bar, Atty. Battungs violations were no less serious as they
were committed in the courtroom in the course of judicial proceedings
where the respondent was acting as an officer of the court, and before
the litigating public. His actions were plainly disrespectful to Judge Baculi
and to the court, to the point of being scandalous and offensive to the
integrity of the judicial system itself. Thus, Atty. Melchor A. Battung was
found guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which
he was suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year. He is sternly
warned that a repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.
CASE 64: Zaldivar v. Gonzalez
FACTS: Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the
Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Gonzalez was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the case.
Zaldivar filed before the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate
graft cases. The Supreme Court rendered decision in favor of Zaldivar and
ordered Gonzalez to cease and desist from investigating. Gonzales
however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal
information against Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview
where he stated that the rich and influential persons get favorable
actions from the Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for an ordinary litigant
to get his petition to be given due course. Zaldivar then filed a Motion for
Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez
to explain his side. After hearing his side, the Supreme Court held that
Gonzalez is guilty of contempt of court. Gonzalez counsel filed a Motion
for Reconsideration raising the following issues:
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the Supreme Court erred in charging Gonzalez with indirect

contempt and convicting him of direct contempt
2. WON the Supreme Court erred to charge Gonzalez under Rule 139 (b)
and not 139 of the Revised Rules of Court
3. WON the Supreme Court erred in applying the visible tendency rule
rather than the clear and present danger rule in disciplinary and
contempt charges
4. WON the Supreme Court erred in holding that intent is irrelevant in
charges of misconduct
5. WON the Supreme Court erred in punishing Gonzalez for contempt for
out of court publications
6. WON the imposition of indefinite suspension against Gonzalez
constitutes cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment.
HELD (In its entirety, Motion for Reconsideration was denied)
1. No. The SC held that Gonzalez is guilty of both contempt of court in
facie curiae and gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member
of the bar. The word in facie curiae is not equivalent of direct
contempt. Rather, the court used the term to signify a frontal assault
upon the integrity of the Court and the entire judicial system. The SC also
noted that it did not impose punishment for Gonzalez acts under direct
contempt.
2. No. Rules 139 talks about the referral of SC to IBP or OSG while Rule
139(b) states that reference to IBP and/or OSG is not mandatory. The SC
did not err in not referring the case to IBP or OSG. The SC held that there is
no need to refer the case to the OSG because the Court itself has
initiated the case against Gonzalez. In addition to this, the SC said that
there is no need for further investigation of facts in the present case
because it was not disputed by Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain
statements attributed to him.
3. No. The SC explained that the visible tendency rule penalizes any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice while the clear and present danger
rule is a method of marking out the appropriate limits of freedom of
speech and of assembly in certain contexts. The SC held that the clear
and present danger test is not the only test which is recognized and is
applicable to courts. Also, invoking this test would not dissolve the
problem because the statements made by Gonzalez are of such nature
as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech. Hence, visible
tendency rule and not clear and present danger shall be applied.
4. No. The SC explained that human intent can only be shown by

examining ones acts and statements. Gonzalez disclaimer of intent to
attack the Court cannot prevail over the plain import of what he did say
and do. Gonzalez cannot negate the clear import of his acts and
statements by simply pleading a secret intent or state of mind
incompatible with his acts or statements.
5. No. Respondents counsel asked the SC to follow what he presented as
alleged modern trends in UK and US concerning the law of contempt. The
SC held that the text he cites is not applicable in Philippine courts.
6. No. Indefinite suspension has the effect of placing the key to the
restoration of his rights and privileges as a lawyer in his own hands. The
sanction has the effect of giving Gonzalez the chance to purge himself in
his own good time.
CASE 65: Jimmy T. Go vs. Hon. Zeus C. Abrogar, G.R. No. 145213 March 28,
2006
FACTS: Respondent International Exchange Bank (Bank) filed a Complaint
before the RTC for Collection of a Sum of Money against Petitioner Jimmy
T. Go and Alberto T. Looyuko. Go was represented by counsel, Atty.
Ronald E. Javier. The RTC found Go and Looyuko jointly and severally
liable and the decision was received by Atty. Javier on October 20, 1999.
Prior to this receipt, however, the relationship had apparently turned sour
for counsel and client. Go formally released Atty. Javier through a Notice
of Termination filed with the RTC on November 5, 1999 by petitioners new
counsel, Atty. Gregorio D. Caneda, Jr.
Go, now represented by Atty. Caneda, Jr., filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. However, the RTC and the CA held that the
reglamentary period to file the appeal began to run when Atty. Javier,
who was still counsel of record as far as the RTC was concerned, received
a copy of the decision on October 20, 1999, giving petitioner until
November 4, 1999 within which to file his appeal or motion for
reconsideration. Hence, petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration a
day after the period to file had lapsed and the RTC has already ordered
the issuance of a Writ of Execution against petitioner.
Petitioner thereafter goes on to state the basis for his accusations against
everyone connected to the case: 1) Looyuko had withdrawn his appeal;
2) Atty. Flaminiano conformed to the writ of execution; 3) Atty. Javier

neglected his case and continued to represent Looyuko in other cases;
4) Looyuko supported the Motion to Cite petitioner for contempt that was
filed by the Bank; and, 5) Judge Abrogar was once an assistant fiscal
under then Manila City Fiscal Atty. Flaminiano.
ISSUE/S: WON Petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Atty. Gregorio D. Caneda, Jr.
acted in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: Yes.Petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Atty. Gregorio D. Caneda, Jr.
are STRICTLY WARNED not to make disrespectful statements against a
Judge without basis in the records or the evidence.
RATIO: Rule 11.04. A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not
supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.
Petitioners particular attack against an RTC Judge is a serious accusation
that erodes trust and confidence in our judicial system. This Court will not
hesitate to sanction persons who recklessly and nonchalantly impute ill
motives that are nothing more than unfounded speculations. The above
suspicious circumstances enumerated, whether taken together or
separately, are plainly unjustified as they fail to even remotely show the
existence of a grand conspiracy against petitioner. For all their derogatory
implication, they are clearly unsubstantiated and disrespectful to a
member of the Bench.
The Court is also dismayed that such baseless attacks were assisted by
counsel, who is an officer of the court. Under Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN
RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS. In particular, he
shall not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the records or by
evidence. A lawyer should submit grievances against a Judge to the
proper authorities only. Atty. Caneda, Jr. should have known better than
to permit the irresponsible and unsupported claim against
Judge Abrogar to be included in the pleadings. Allowing such statements
to be made is against a lawyers oath of office and goes against the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
CASE 66: Bonifacio Sanz Maceda vs. Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez,
et. al., G.R. No. 102781, April 22, 1993
FACTS: Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of

the Regional Trial Court of Antique, seeks the review of the following
orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated September
18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed
by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his
counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences.
In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's
Office alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service 1
dated February 6, 1989, by certifying "that all civil and criminal cases
which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of
90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31,
1998," when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had
been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been
submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner
similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months of February, April,
May, June, July and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning
January up to September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by this
Court an extension of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned
cases.
Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said
case despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, since the
offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties,
which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an
encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision
over all inferior courts.
ISSUE/S: WON the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an
encroachment into the SCs constitutional duty of supervision over all
inferior courts.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's basic
argument. There is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it
only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A
judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the
Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1,

Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the
Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
Under 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: A

lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities
only.
However, The Court agrees with petitioner that in the absence of any
administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his
certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is

hereby directed to dismiss the complaint filed by public respondent Atty.
Napoleon A. Abiera and to refer the same to this Court for appropriate
action.
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the

Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the
lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the
Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's
compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action
against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
FACTS: Crim. Case No. 5144 was originally raffled to the sala of Judge
Floripinas C. Buyser, RTC of Surigao City, Branch 30. In an Order dated
March 14, 2002, Judge Buyser denied the Demurrer to the Evidence of the
accused, declaring that the evidence thus presented by the prosecution
was sufficient to prove the crime of homicide and not the charge of
murder. Consequently, the counsel for the defense filed a Motion to Fix
the Amount of Bail Bond. Respondent Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, then
Senior State Prosecutor and the deputized prosecutor of the case,
objected thereto mainly on the ground that the original charge of
murder, punishable with reclusion perpetua, was not subject to bail under
Sec. 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order dated November 12, 2002, which motion was
denied for lack of merit in an Order dated February 10, 2003. In October,
2003, respondent appealed from the Orders dated November 12, 2002
and February 10, 2003, to the Court of Appeals (CA). In an Order dated
August 21, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, directed respondent
and the writer of the article, Mark Francisco of the Mindanao Gold Star
Daily, to appear in court on September 20, 2003 to explain why they
should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for the publication of
the article which degraded the court and its presiding judge with its lies
and misrepresentation.
The said Order stated that contrary to the statements in the article, Judge
Buyser described the evidence for the prosecution as not strong, but
sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused only for homicide. Moreover, it
was not true that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an
unclear reason. Judge Buyser, in an Order dated August 30, 2002,
declared in open court in the presence of respondent that he was
inhibiting himself from the case due to the harsh insinuation of respondent
that he lacked the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Respondent
posted the required bond and was released from the custody of the law.
He appealed the indirect contempt order to the CA.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers

granted to it by the Constitution, 3 for such a justification not only runs
counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory
powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel, but
likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's
certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether said
certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court
has the necessary records to make such a determination. The
Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of
government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this
matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavitcomplaint.
In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court
employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must
defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for
determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within
the scope of their administrative duties.
CASE 67: Re: Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo CPR 11.5
Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent presented himself to

the media for interviews in Radio Station DXKS, and again attacked the
integrity of Judge Tan and the trial court's disposition in the proceedings.
ISSUE/S: WON violated and be suspended from the practice of law for
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 11.05 of
Canon 11
RTC ruled in favor of Lim, and declared that the deed of sale was an
absolute and unconditional conveyance of subject property by the
plaintiff in favor of such defendant. On motion for reconsideration,
however, the trial court reversed itself and declared that the sale was in
fact an equitable mortgage.
Lim appealed the case to the Court of Appeals which reversed the ruling
of the RTC. The aggrieved party elevated the matter to this Court which
affirmed the Court of Appeals.
HELD: Yes. The respondent is found guilty for contempt of court.

RATIO: The trial court concluded that respondent, as a member of the bar
and an officer of the court, is duty bound to uphold the dignity and
authority of the court, and should not promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates a lawyer to "observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and to judicial officers and [he] should insist on similar
conduct by others." Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a lawyer "shall
submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only."
Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused
the holding of a press conference where he made statements against the
Order dated November 12, 2002 allowing the accused in Crim. Case No.
5144 to be released on bail.
Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge
Tan was displaying judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior
prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out,
which appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star
Daily. Respondent's statements in the article, which were made while
Crim. Case No. 5144 was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of
Canon 13, which states that "a lawyer shall not make public statements in
the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for
or against a party."
CASE 68: John Siy Lim vs. Atty. Carmelito A. Montano 2006, A.C. No. 5653,
February 27, 2006
FACTS: Complainant John Siy Lim was the defendant in a civil case for
reformation of contract, quieting of title. The subject of the dispute was a
650-square meter conjugal lot.
Respondent Atty. Montano filed a Notice of Appearanceas counsel of

Tuazon (the losing party) He filed, in behalf of his client, a "Motion to
Comply to Decision without Writ and a Complaintfor nullity of TCT and
other documents, reconveyance, maintenance of physical possession
which the trial court denied.
This prompted the Lim to file the instant complaint for disbarment against
Atty. Montano. Lim alleged that Atty. Montano filed the complaint in out
of malice, pointing out that it involves "the same parties, the same causes
of action and relief prayed for as that of first civil case.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Montano is guilty of forum shopping and therefore
administratively liable
HELD: Yes. By his own admission, he was aware that first civil case was
already final and executory when he filed the second case. His allegation
that he "was not the original counsel of his clients" and that "when he filed
the subsequent case for nullity of TCT, his motive was to protect the rights
of his clients whom he believed were not properly addressed in the prior
case for reformation and quieting of title," deserves scant consideration.
As a responsible member of the bar, he should have explained the effect
of such final and executory decision on his clients rights, instead of
encouraging them to file another case involving the same property and
asserting the same rights.
The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the
same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. An
important factor in determining its existence is the vexation caused to the
courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim
substantially the same reliefs.
Atty. Montano should have realized that the ruling of the Court in Tuazon
v. Court of Appeals effectively determined with finality the rights and
obligations of the parties under the questioned deed of sale.
The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in
violation of the doctrine of res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to exert every
effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in
the administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede
or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes such lawyers duty.
CASE 69: MARIBETH CORDOVA and CHRISTOPHER CORDOVA v. HON.
EMMA C. LABAYEN, Presiding Judge, Branch 54, RTC, 6th Judicial Region,
Bacolod City; HON. BETHEL KATALBAS-MOSCARDON, former Presiding
Judge of Branch 54, RTC, 6th Judicial Region, Bacolod City, et.al. (1995)
FACTS: Maribeth Cordovas mother was involved in an ejectment case.
When the mother died, they (present petitioners) became the party in
interest. They hired Atty. Salvador Sabio as their legal counsel. When the
municipal trial court rendered a decision adverse to them (ordering their
ejectment and the payment of rental fee until they vacate it), they
appealed. However, the petitioners in that case motioned for the
issuance of the writ of execution, arguing that while the party had
appealed, they did not file a supersedeas bond [a kind of surety bond
that a court requires from an appellant who wants to delay payment of a
judgment until the appeal is over] or made a deposit every month of the
reasonable value of the use and occupation of the land from which they
are ordered ejected, as required by the [old] Rules of Court. On this
ground, despite their appeal, the court proceeded with the execution of
judgment.
Cordova, thru Atty. Sabio appealed the decision to the RTC and later on,
the CA, arguing that the writ of execution is not valid and illegal
according to the Rules of Court, on the ground that they have a pending
appeal. However, the Regional and Appellate Courts upheld the decision
of the MTC. Hence, the present case charges the Judges Labayen and
Moscardon with manifest partiality and breach of judicial trust, and with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess in jurisdiction.
The Court in this case required Atty. Sabio to show cause why he should
not be disciplined for violation of the CPR, particularly Rules 1.02 and 1.03.
In his answer, he asserted that the writ of execution was issued pending
appeal despite the filing of a supersedeas bond and the payment of
advance rentals, and this was illegal, and constituted the charged
violations by the impleaded judges.
It is now alleged that Atty. Sabio instigated the filing of the groundless
accusations against the impleaded judges.
ISSUES:
1. WON Atty. Sabio instigated the filing of the present charges against the
judges;
2. WON Atty. Sabios act constitutes violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
HELD:
1. Yes
2. Yes. Atty. Sabio is suspended for six months.
RATIO: (1) Upon review of the rules of court, it is clear that the judges
acted in conformity with the rules, and in good faith. It was too manifest
that a lawyer like Atty. Sabio could not have known that. The Court finds
that the actions of the impleaded judges are correct and in accordance
with law and existing rules of court.
In his response to the show-cause order, Atty. Sabio averred that he was
not given a copy of the court order (writ of execution), so the same could
not take effect. That bad faith attended the filing of this administrative
charge was unwittingly disclosed by the allegations of Atty. Sabio in this.
No explanation was made by him nor did he invoke any authority of law
or jurisprudence, since decidedly there is none, to support his theory that
execution should not issue where the adverse party is not served a copy
of the order even where the grant thereof had become a matter of right.
The inescapable conclusion is that the filing of the present complaint was,
at the very least, ill-conceived and malicious, and was resorted to as a
last-ditch effort and a face-saving recourse of counsel.
It must be noted that the administrative complaint was filed only after the
Court of Appeals had rendered a decision. This in itself is already a clear
indication that the acts of the judges are valid and legal. Yet, Atty. Sabio
persisted in instituting these baseless charges to their proven prejudice. As
correctly observed by the Bar Confidant, it is apparent that complainants

decided to institute the present case only on the advice and/or upon the
urging of Atty. Sabio.
(2) As an officer of the court, a lawyer has the sworn duty to assist in, not
to impede or pervert, the administration of justice (in relation to Canon
12). Lawyers should not be filing totally baseless and unfounded charges
against judges and court personnel in a vain attempt to escape the
consequences of their own negligence or in an effort to transgress the
lawful orders of the court.
The present administrative charge seeks to cast doubt on the integrity of
the impleaded judges, the judicial personnel and the court which they
represent, in flagrant abdication of the bounden responsibility of a lawyer
to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice. Atty. Sabio
thus deserves to be punished for instigating the filing of an administrative
complaint by his clients, in the guise of upholding their rights but actually
to frustrate the enforcement of lawful court orders and consequently
obstruct the desirable norms and course of justice.
(Note: The Court charged Sabio with violations of rules 1.02 and 1.03, but
the statement in Ratio #2 is the most related with Canon 12, under which
this case had been assigned in our syllabus).
CASE 70: Millare v. Montero
FACTS: Petitioner Rodolfo Millares mother, Pacifica Millare obtained a
favorable judgement from the MTC, Bangued, Abra which ordered
Respondent Eustaquio Monteros client, Elsa Dy Co to vacate the
premises which is the subject of the ejectment case. Thereafter, Montero
filed numerous cases in hopes of getting a favorable decision for Co. (1)
Civil Case No. 344 which is an appeal from the decision rendered in civil
case no. 844 of the MTC of Bangued, Abra with the RTC, Abra (2) CA-G.R.
CV No. 11404 which is an appeal from the decision of the RTC, Abra (3)
CA-G.R. SP No. 11690 which is an action for the annulment of decisions
and/or reformation or novation of decisions filed with the CA (4) G.R. No.
86084 which is a petition for review on certiorari filed with the Supreme
Court (5) CA-G.R. SP No. 17040 which is an appeal and/or review by
certiorari filed with the CA as well (6) SP Civil Action No. 624 which is a
petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary issuance of
prohibitory order filed with the RTC of Abra.
ISSUE:WON Montero violated Canon 12 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility
HELD:Yes. The rights of Co as Monteros client were fully protected and her
defenses were properly ventilated when Montero filed an appeal from the
MTC to the RTC but Montero thereafter resorted to devious and
underhanded means to delay the execution of judgement by the MTC
adverse to Co.
RATIO:Canon 12 of the CPR provides that a lawyer is required to exert
every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial process,
like filing of dilatory motions, repetitious litigation and frivolous appeals for
the sole purpose of frustrating and delaying the execution of a
judgement.
CASE 71:Re: Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL) of Atty. Marilyn B.

Joyas, Clerk of Court of Court V, RTC of Manila, Branch 16.
FACTS : Atty. Joyas daily time record (DTR)/bundy card for November
2004 showed that she was on unauthorized leave from the 15 th to the
30th of that month. She failed to submit her DTR/bundy card for December
2004. Neither did she file an application for leave.
On April 1, 2005, the Leave Division of the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) sent a telegram to Atty. Joyas requiring her to submit her
DTRs/bundy cards and/or leave applications, but she did not comply.
On May 23, 2005, the OCA Leave Division, thru Judge Carmelita S.
Manahan, presiding judge of Branch 16 of RTC Manila, caused the service
of a letter to Atty. Joyas requiring her to explain her unauthorized
absences in writing. It was received by her husband, Atty. Edwin Joyas, on
July 4, 2005.
In a letter dated July 11, 2005, Atty. Joyas informed the OCA that she
already notified Judge Manahan of her application for retirement
effective at the close of office hours of November 15, 2004. Upon
verification, however, the Employees Welfare and Benefits Division
informed the OCA that Atty. Joyas failed to complete the requirements in
support of her application for retirement. Thus, the OCA recommended
that Atty. Joyas be dropped from the rolls and her position declared
vacant.
The prejudice caused by a court employees prolonged unauthorized

absence is both great and grave. It impedes the dispensation of justice
which is the essential function of the courts. One who delays justice,
denies justice. The non-feasance of Atty. Joyas was aggravated by the
fact that she is a member of the bar.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Marilyn Joyas was in violation of canon 12.

CASE 72: Antonio Villasis, et. al. v CA, et al.
HELD : YES. A lawyer is an officer of the court. It is his duty to promote the
objectives of courts the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and
inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final
judgments. He should not only help achieve these ends but should also
avoid any unethical or improper practice that will impede, obstruct or
prevent their realization as he is charged with the primary task of assisting
in the speedy and efficient dispensation of justice. This Atty. Joyas failed to
do when she went on prolonged unauthorized leave and effectively
abandoned her office.
RATIO: CANON 12 A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER
IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE.
Thus, under civil service rules, Atty. Joyas should be separated from the
service or dropped from the rolls on account of her continued
unauthorized absence since November 15, 2004.
A court employee who goes on absence without leave (AWOL) for a
prolonged period of time disrupts the normal function of the
organization.6 His or her conduct is prejudicial to the best interest of public
service.7 It contravenes a public servants duty to serve the public with
utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.8 It also
manifests disrespect for his or her superiors and colleagues, in particular,
and for the service and the public at large, in general.
By going on AWOL, Atty. Joyas grossly disregarded and neglected the
duties of her office. She failed to adhere to the high standards of public
accountability imposed on all those in government service. The conduct
and behavior of all court personnel are circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility. This Court cannot countenance any act or
omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice
which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or
tend to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary.
FACTS: The case originated in the Antique CFI where after due trial
judgment was rendered in favor of respondents-plaintiffs upholding their
action for quieting of title with recovery of possession and damages.
Petitioners-defendants appealed the adverse judgment to the Court of
Appeals. On June 25, 1970, petitioners as appellants received notice
through their counsel Benjamin M. Valente to submit the appellants' brief
within the reglementary forty-five day period to expire on August 9, 1970.
On August 10, 1970 (the last day of the reglementary period, August 9
being a Sunday), petitioners' counsel, Atty. Valente, filed a motion to
withdraw as counsel because he was employed as technical assistant in
the Supreme Court, with a prayer that appellants' newly engaged counsel
be given sufficient time to file their brief. Said new counsel, Atty. Esdras F.
Tayco, filed on August 18, 1970 his appearance with the appellate court.
On August 27, 1970, the appellate court received respondents-appellees'
motion to dismiss the appeal dated August 5, 1970 for appellants' failure
to file their brief within the reglementary period.
On September 12, 1970, the appellate court required both counsels of
appellants, Atty. Valente and Atty. Tayco to comment on the dismissal
motion. Valente filed his manifestation alleging inter alia that he had not
received a copy of the dismissal motion and could not comment thereon
and submitting the signed conformity of his clients to his withdrawal and
reiterating his prayer for the court to grant his withdrawal and to grant
appellants sufficient time to file their brief. New counsel Tayco filed no
comment whatsoever.
On June 25, 1971 or after the lapse of more than eleven without
appellants having filed their brief at all, the appellate court's special sixth
divisionissued its resolution granting the dismissal motion and dismissing the
appeal on the ground stated by appellees in their motion that appellants
had failed to file their brief within the reglementary 45-day period.It was
only then that Tayco apparently stirred from almost a year of inaction and
filed a motion dated July 13, 1971 for reconsideration of the dismissal of
the appeal on the ground that he as new counsel had not received the
notice to file brief. The appellate court denied the motion for
reconsideration, pointing out "Attorney Tayco's appearance was entered
on August 18, 1970 after the period for filing brief had already expired on
August 10, 1970. Tayco filed a second motion for reconsideration still
without having filed appellants, brief, which the appellate court denied
in not having filed their brief for a year since receipt of due notice to file
the same.
ISSUE/S: WON new counsel violatedRule 12.01 which requires a lawyer to

be adequately prepared
FACTS: Late spouses Jacinto Alejandrino and Enrica Labunos left their 6
children a lot in Cebu. The said lot was to be divided equally among their
children. However, the estate of the Alejandrino spouses was not settled in
accordance with the procedure outlined in the Rules of Court.
HELD: Yes, A new counsel who accepts a case in midstream is presumed

and obliged to acquaint himself with all the antecedent processes and
proceedings that have transpired in the record prior to his takeover.
RATIO: The notice to file the brief had been received on June 25, 1970 to
expire on August 10, 1970. The appellate court did not dismiss the appeal
for failure of appellants to file brief until one year later as per its resolution
of June 25, 1971 or until almost eleven months after the expiration of the
reglementary period on August 10, 1970.
The appellate court gave appellants all the time and opportunity to duly
prosecute their appeal by filing their brief in the interval to no avail. It
asked both counsels to comment on the dismissal motion but withdrawing
counsel Valente claimed he could not file any comment as he had not
received the motion while new counsel Tayco ignored the court's
resolution and filed no comment and filed no brief. Even going by new
counsel Tayco's mistaken notion that he was entitled to a new notice to
file brief, the appellate court's resolution requiring his comment on the
motion to dismiss appeal for failure to file appellant's brief was tantamount
to such notice and he should then have prepared and filed the brief
within forty-five days thereafter. But he never filed the appellants' brief
during the interval of almost 11 months that the appellate court took
before it finally dismissed the appeal. During all this period and even
during the three months that followed when he filed two motions for
reconsideration, he presented no earnest of prosecuting the appeal by at
least filing the brief even at that late date but contented himself with a
perfunctory prayer in his motion that "appellants be allowed to file their
brief."
The appellate court committed no error therefore in dismissing the
appeal. Petitioners-appellants have shown no valid and justifiable reason
for their inexplicable failure to file their brief and have only themselves to
blame for their counsel's utter inaction and grow indifference and neglect
CASE 73: Mauricia Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114151,

September 17, 1998
Petitioner Mauricia Alejandrino, one of the children, allegedly purchased

some of her siblings shares. However, a third party, private respondent,
Licerio Nique, also purchased some of the siblings shares. One sibling,
Laurencia, later questioned the sale in an action for quieting of title and
damages against Nique (Civil Case 1). The RTC ruled in favor of Nique and
declared him as the rightful owner. Laurencia appealed to the Court of
Appeals but she later withdrew the case.
Meanwhile, Mauricia filed a complaint for redemption and recovery of
property with damages against Nique in the RTC (Civil Case 2). She
alleged that Nique neither notified her of his purchase of the undivided lot
nor give her the preemptive right to buy the area as co-owner of the
same lot. Mauricia offered to deposit with the court the redemption price
of the area Nique purchased. However, Nique filed a motion for the
segregation of the portion of the property the court granted to him as
owner. The trial court issued an order for the segregation.
Mauricia questioned this order in a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition and stated that in issuing the questioned
order, the court was merely performing its job of making sure that the
execution of a final judgment conforms to the decreed in the dispositive
portion of the decision. Mauricia then filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but it was denied. Hence, this petition.
Mauricia argued that: (1) the lower court acted beyond its jurisdiction in
ordering the segregation because it was not decreed in its judgment
which had long become final and executory, (2) partition cannot be
effected because Nique is also a defendant in Civil Case 1, (3) the
extrajudicial settlement referred in the order was not discussed in the
lower court decision, and even if it were, she cannot be bound by it as
she was not a party litigant in the civil case.

Nique commented that even if Mauricia was not a party litigant in Civil
Case 1, she is estopped from questioning the decision of said case
because she knew that the case existed. He added that the instant
petition was filed in violation of Circular No. 28-91 on forum shopping
because Mauricias counsel in Civil Case 2, who was also Laurencias
counsel in Civil Case 1, had filed a civil action for redemption and
recovery of properties with damages pending in the RTC.
FACTS: On September 25, 1984, Dynetics, Inc. and Antonio M. Garcia filed
a complaint for declaratory relief and/or injunction against the PISO, BPI,
LBP, PCIB and RCBC or the consortium, seeking judicial declaration,
construction and interpretation of the validity of the surety agreement
that Dynetics and Garcia had entered into with the consortium and to
perpetually enjoin the latter from claiming, collecting and enforcing any
purported obligations which Dynetics and Garcia might have undertaken
in said agreement. In a series of proceedings, the trial court as well as the
Court of Appeals both rendered their decisions adverse to the consortium
on Dec 19, 1989 and Mar 5,1990.
ISSUE/S: WON Mauricia is guilty of forum shopping

HELD: No. Mauricia is not guilty of forum shopping.
RATIO: Rule 12.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
a lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause. This is
the prohibition against forum shopping.
Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or
where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the
other.
For res judicata to apply, the following must be present: (1) a decision on
the merits; (2) by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the decision is final;
and (4) the two actions involve identical parties, subject matter and
causes of action. The fourth element is not present in this case. The parties
are not identical because Mauricia was not impleaded in Civil Case 1.
While the subject matter may be the same property of the Alejandrino
spouses, the causes of action are different. Civil Case 1 is an action for
quieting of title and damages while Civil Case 2 is for redemption and
recovery of properties.
Niques argument on forum shopping is anchored on the fact that
counsel for both Mauricia and Laurencia in those two cases is one and
the same, thereby implying that the same counsel merely wanted to
prevail in the second case after having failed to do so in the first. The
records show, however, that Laurencia executed an affidavit consenting
to the appearance of her counsel in any case that Mauricia might file
against Nique. There is no law prohibiting this act.
CASE 74: Chemphil Export and Import Corporation v Court of Appeals
On 6 April 1990, the PCIB separately filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, likewise, assailing the very same
orders dated 19 December 1989 and 5 March 1990.
On 26 March 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision denying due
course to and dismissing PCIB's petition for certiorari on grounds that PCIB
violated the rule against forum-shopping and that no grave abuse of
discretion was committed by respondent Regional Trial Court in issuing its
assailed orders dated 19 December 1989 and 5 March 1990. PCIB's motion
for reconsideration was denied on 11 January 1994
ISSUE/S: WON PCIB resorted to forum shopping
Held: Yes. PCIB resorted to forum shopping in filing for a separate petition
for certiorari.
Ratio: PCIB's contention that it did not join the consortium because it
"honestly believed that certiorari was the more efficacious and speedy
relief available under the circumstances, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court is not difficult to understand. Certiorari is available only if there is no
appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Hence, in instituting a separate petition for certiorari, PCIB
has deliberately resorted to forum-shopping.
PCIB cannot hide behind the subterfuge that Supreme Court Circular 2891 was not yet in force when it filed the certiorari proceedings in the Court
of Appeals. The rule against forum-shopping has long been
established. Supreme Court Circular 28-91 merely formalized the
prohibition and provided the appropriate penalties against transgressors.
It alarms us to realize that we have to constantly repeat our warning

against forum-shopping. We cannot over-emphasize its ill-effects, one of
which is aptly demonstrated in the case at bench where we are
confronted with two divisions of the Court of Appeals issuing contradictory
decisions, one in favor of CEIC and the other in favor of the
consortium/Jaime Gonzales.
Forum-shopping or the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment
has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another opinion in another
forum, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded
on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would
make a favorable disposition, has been characterized as an act of
malpractice that is prohibited and condemned as trifling with the Courts
and abusing their processes. It constitutes improper conduct which tends
to degrade the administration of justice. It has also been aptly described
as deplorable because it adds to the congestion of the already heavily
burdened dockets of courts.
for the determination of the proper amount that it should pay as

membership dues and to enjoin DVA from implementing its
unreasonable security policy.
On Sept. 21, 1994, DVA filed its motion to dismiss which was granted by the
RTC. CSA then appealed the dismissal of the petition to the CA. While the
appeal was pending another incident arose between the two parties. On
Sept. 9, 1995, CSA was scheduled to conduct review classes however
DVA denied all the vehicles going to the campus from entering and
required a regular DVA sticker before being allowed to enter the premises.
On Sept. 13, 1995, CSA filed another complaint against DVA for injunction
and damages with the RTC docketed as Civil Case No. 95-1396. On Sept.
25, 1995, DVA moved for the dismissal of the second complaint on the
ground of violating the anti forum-shopping rule.
ISSUE/S: WON CSA violated the anti forum-shopping rule
CASE 75: Dasmarinas Village Association v. Court of Appeals
HELD: No, CSA did not violate the anti forum-shopping rule.
FACTS: Since 1969, private respondent Colegio San Agustin (CSA) has
operated a school within the premises of Dasmarinas Village and was
exempt from paying village dues. Thereafter, petitioner Dasmarinas
Village Association (DVA) inquired from Colegio San Agustin if it was
interested in becoming a special member with the corresponding
responsibility of paying membership dues, to which the latter agreed. In
1975, DVA informed CSA that it was increasing membership dues by 25%
to which the latter agreed.
RATIO: For forum-shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same
transactions; same essential facts and circumstances and must raise
identical causes of action, subject matter and issues. In this regard, forumshopping exists where the elements litis pendentia are present or where a
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. The
requisites of litis pendentia not having occurred in the two cases filed by
CSA shows that there was no violation on the part of CSA of the anti
forum-shopping rule under Rule 12.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
On Dec. 5, 1988 CSA proposed that it be assessed as its permanent

membership dues an amount equivalent to 50% of the village dues
collectible from the residents of the village to which DVA agreed. Both
parties complied with this agreement from 1988 to 1991.
In 1992, DVA sent CSA an assessment amounting to P550,000 with the
notation No Discount for 1992 to which the latter protested for being
contrary to the aforementioned agreement between the parties. DVA
also prohibited access to some of the gates of the village to vehicles
bearing CSA stickers and implemented a security measure barring the
entry of these vehicles after 6:00pm. On June 24, 1994, CSA filed a petition
for Declaratory Relief and Damages with Preliminary Injunction with the
RTC docketed as Civil Case No. 94-2062, as well as an amended petition
The requisites of litis pendentia are:

1. Identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the
same interests in both actions;
2. Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being
founded on the same facts;
3. Identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases,
such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other case.
Requisites 2 & 3 are not present in this case, which in turn negates the
violation of the anti forum-shopping rule.
CASE 76: Julia L. Tan, et. al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97238, July 15,
1991
FACTS:This case arose from the refusal of the petitioners to admit and
enroll certain students for the school year 1987-1988 because heated
controversies, acts of misbehavior, and a refusal to dialogue with the
school administration led the school authorities to believe that it would be
best for all concerned if these children enrolled in other schools. Because
the parents of the Children refused to pay the 15% tuition fee increase
granted to Grace Christian School by the Ministry of Education, Culture
and Sports
Two separate petitions for mandamus with prayers for preliminary
mandatory injunction were eventually filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. The first case docketed as Civil Case No. Q-51039 was
assigned to Branch 79 of the court. The second case which led to the
present petition was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2357 and was
assigned to Branch 88.Petitioner Julia L. Tan is an 84 year old widow who is
the Principal of Grace Christian High School offering both elementary and
secondary courses while petitioner James L. Tan is the Administrative
Consultant of the school. The latter case was filed by Vicente Luy and his
daughter Vonette Luy, who were also petitioners in Civil Case No. Q51039.
On June 13, 1989, Judge Tirso Velasco ordered the petitioners to comply
with the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction or he would act on the
motion for contempt. Julia Tan and James Tan opposed this order stating
that Judge Legaspi had just denied the similar motion for contempt in the
other case (Civil Case No. Q-51039). In this opposition, the petitioners
again charged Mr. Luy with forum shopping contending that the first case
he filed with others should take precedence over Civil Case No. Q-892357.
ISSUE/S: WON Vicente Luy and his daughter were engaging in forum
shopping
HELD: Yes. The Court deplored the action of Vicente Luy and his counsel
for filing Civil Case No. Q-89-2357 in 1989 when exactly the same issues
were already before Branch 79 in Civil Case No. Q-51039 filed by, among
others, Mr. Luy in 1987. This results not only in unnecessarily clogging the
heavily burdened dockets of our courts but also in the unseemly sight of
two Branches of the same trial court and two Divisions of the Court of
Appeals issuing contradictory decisions one in favor of the school and
the other in favor of the students and their parents.
Pending any amendment of the Rules or a circular remedying this
problem, lawyers and litigants alike are warned to be more candid with
courts of justice and not engage in forum shopping through deliberate
splitting of actions or appeals in the hope that even as one case is
dismissed, another would still be open.
CASE 77: Francisco A. Achacoso, in his own behalf and in behalf of
Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., v. the Hon. Court of Appeals, Cotram,
S.A., Capital Life Assurance Corp., Joaquin G. Garrido.
FACTS:Upon the filing on December 15, 1972 of the petition at bar for
review of the Court of Appeals' decision dismissing petitioner's petition for
mandamus filed with said court to compel the Manila court of first
instance to allow petitioner's proposed appeal from its adverse judgment
dismissing plaintiff's complaint, the Court per its resolution of December 22,
1972 required respondents to comment thereon.
Respondents filed on February 8, 1973 an extensive eighteen page
comment and petitioner's counsel, Rodrigo M. Nera, filed on February 12,
1973 a motion for leave to file reply within 15 days from notice alleging
that there was need for such reply "in order that this Honorable Court may
be fully and completely informed of the nature of the controversy which
gave rise to the instant petition." The Court granted such leave per its
resolution of February 23, 1973 and notice of such leave was served on
counsel on February 27, 1973.
On the last day for filing of the reply, viz, March 14, 1973 counsel asked for
an additional 15 days averring that "due to the pressure of urgent
professional work and daily trial engagements of the undersigned counsel
during the original period granted, March 29, 1973 counsel again asked
for still another 15-day extension stating that "due to the pressure of urgent
professional work and daily trial engagements of the undersigned
counsel, he has not had sufficient material time to complete the
preparation of petitioners reply. The counsel explained to the Court that
the reason for the extensions was because of finances.
ISSUE/S: WON counsel violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: Yes. the Court hereby administers a reprimand on Atty. Rodrigo M.

Nera.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Daitol should be suspended due to his failure to make
an appellees brief for Ford
RATIO:Counsel's explanation is far from satisfactory. If indeed he was not in

a financial position to advance the necessary expenses for preparing and
submitting the reply, then he could have filed timely the necessary
manifestation that he was foregoing the filing of such reply on petitioner's
behalf. His inaction unduly delayed the Court's prompt disposition of the
case after the filing by respondents on February 8, 1973 of their comments
on the petition showing its lack of merit. Considering, however, that
counsel's record shows no previous infractions on his part since his
admission to the Philippine Bar in 1953, the Court is disposed to be lenient
in this instance.
HELD: Yes. Atty. Daitol should be suspended due to his failure to make an
appeallees brief for Ford.
RATIO: In failing to file the appellee's brief on behalf of his client,
respondent had fallen far short of his duties as counsel as set forth in Rule
12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which exhorts
every member of the Bar not to unduly delay a case and to exertevery
effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
CASE 78: Craig L. Ford vs. Atty. Escolastico Daitol, A.C. No. 3736 November
16, 1995
FACTS: Ford engaged the legal services of respondent Atty. Daitol in a
case against the Philippine Commercial International Bank ("PCIB") in the
Regional Trial Court. After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of
Ford. PCIB thereupon appealed said judgment to the Court of Appeals
("CA"). After PCIB had filed its appellant's brief, the CA directed Ford to file
his appellee's brief. Despite several inquiries by Ford about the status of
the brief and reminders from him to file the same, Atty. Daitol never filed
the appellee's brief with the CA. CA had issued resolution that the case
was filed without a brief. Ford was aggrieved by this and worried that this
may prejudice him in the case, Ford filed a complaint against Daitol
before IBP and a complaint of disciplinary action before the Court.
Atty. Daitol alleged, in his response to the complaint against him, that
before he could finish the draft of the appellee's brief, Ford allegedly
terminated his services due to "various difficulties and misunderstanding"
between them. Ford denied this allegation stating that he had already
advanced an amount of P600.00 as attorney's fees to Atty. Daitol who
had assured him that he was preparing the appellee's brief. Commission
on Bar Discipline found Atty. Daitol to have been remiss in the
performance of his duties as counsel of Ford. Daitol was particularly
faulted for his failure to secure a written discharge from Ford before
considering himself relieved of his duty to file the appellee's brief. The case
went to the Supreme Court for Decision.
After careful consideration of the records of the case, the court finds that
the suspension of respondent from the practice of law is proper. The Court
agrees with the IBP that respondent had been remiss in the performance
of his duties as counsel for complainant. A lawyer engaged to represent a
client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latter's interest
with utmost diligence.
CASE 79: Bergonia v. Merrera
FACTS: Arsenia Bergonia filed a case for the quieting of title against her
niece Josephine Bergonia, as well as the Paraynos. After due trial, the RTC
of Urdaneta ruled in favour of the Parayno. The CA affirmed the ruling of
the trial court and the decision became final and executory. Since the
disputed land was still in the possession of the complainant, the Paraynos
instituted a civil case to recover its possession. After due trial RTC ordered
Bergonia to vacate the premises and to surrender possession thereof to
the Paraynos. Thereafter, complainant appealed the RTC judgement to
the CA. Respondent, as counsel, received a Notice of File Brief on
December 17, 1997. Acting on his Motion for extension, the CA granted
him until March 17, 1998. Even before the extension had lapsed, he again
filed an Urgent Second Motion for extension to file brief, the CA again
granted the motion. Eventually, the deadline, which had already been
extended twice, lapsed without his filing the appellants brief. CA
dismissed the appeal.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Merrerra is guilty of inexcusable negligence
HELD: Yes, Atty. Merrera is found guilty for violating Canons 12 and 18 of
the Canons of Professional Responsibility and is Suspended from the
practice of law for 6 months.
RATIO: Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "A
lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or
offering an explanation for his failure to do so." A lawyer who requests an
extension must do so in good faith and with a genuine intent to file the
required pleading within the extended period. In granting the request, the
court acts on the presumption that the applicant has a justifiable reason
for failing to comply with the period allowed. Without this implied trust, the
motion for extension will be deemed to be a mere ruse to delay or thwart
the appealed decision. The motion will thus be regarded as a means of
preventing the judgment from attaining finality and execution and of
enabling the movant to trifle with procedure and mock the administration
of justice.
CASE 80: Edrial v. Quilat-Quilat
FACTS: Respondents Pedro, Gabriela, Isidra and Estanislao - all surnamed
Quilat-Quilat -- filed an action for recovery of a parcel of land against
Petitioners Remedios, Mauro Jr., Marylene, Idelfonso, Rosalind, Mary Jean - all surnamed Edrial -- and Susan Edrial-Valenzuela. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 6315 and raffled to Branch 39 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City.
The CA dismissed petitioners' appeal because, in issuing the questioned
Orders, the trial judge committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction. In giving petitioners more than ample time to
complete their presentation of evidence and in granting their Motions for
Postponement, the judge was accommodating them more than they
actually deserved.
ISSUE/S: WON the CA erred in denying the petitioners prayer due to their
inexcusable delay.
HELD: No.
RATIO: Counsel's excuses are unsatisfactory and unacceptable. The CA
ruled that petitioners were given "more than enough time" to complete
their presentation of evidence. Respondents rested their case as early as
September 1992. Petitioners' lawyer, at his own request, was allowed to
start presenting evidence only on April 12, 1993. From that day until April
26, 1996 or for a period of three years, counsel presented only two
witnesses. The trial judge was in fact liberal in granting petitioners' Motions
for Postponement. But enough was enough; when they attempted to

delay the trial some more, the trial judge finally and correctly refused to
go along.
The Code of Professional Responsibility requires that lawyers, after
obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, shall
not let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for their failure to do so (Rule 12.03). Moreover, they should
avoid any action that would unduly delay a case, impede the execution
of a judgment or misuse court processes (Rule 12.04).
For the benefit of the bench and bar, worth repeating is the CA's reminder
to petitioners' counsel of his duty to his client and to the court:
"Being an officer of the court a lawyer is part of the machinery in the
administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to
advance its ends-the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive
adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final judgments. A
lawyer should not only help attain these objectives but should likewise
avoid any unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or
prevent their realization, charged as he is with the primary task of assisting
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice."
CASE 81: Manila Pest Control vs. Workmens Compensation Commission
FACTS: WCC considered a complaint filed against it by Mario Abitria for
compensation. It was submitted for decision after he and a physician had
testified. The counsel of Manila Pest Control failed to appear at the
hearing. A motion for reconsideration was filed praying he be allowed to
present evidence on his behalf however, this was denied. Arbitria was
employed by the MPC since February 4, 1956, working six (6) days a week
and receiving an average monthly wage of P180.00 as labourer. H e w a s
assigned in the Research Division which conducted research on rat traps
and other matters regarding extermination of pests, animals and insects.
In the place of his e m p l o y me n t h e w a s m a d e to i n h a l e
d a n ge r o u s f u me s a s th e a t m o s p h e r e w a s polluted with poisonous
chemical dusts. The working condition of his place of work w a s a l s o
warm
and
h u mi d
in
vi e w
of
th e
p r o d u c ts
being
m a n u f a c tu r e d b y th e respondent. He was not extended any
protective device and he was also made to lift heavy objects in the
painting and the soldering. Sometime in July 1966, while the claimant was
soldering, he began to experience symptoms of pulmonary tuberculosis.
Because of his spitting of blood or hemoptysis, he went to consult Dr. Felix

Tuazon of the Quezon Institute whose diagnosis was pulmonary
tuberculosis.
The doctor testified that the nature of work of the claimant involving
strenuous physical exertion and other factors of work such as the lowering
of his resistance inview of the enormous inhalation of chemical fumes. The
decision of the WCC was then sent to Atty. Manuel Camacho but care of
petitioners counsel, Atty. Manuel Corpuz. MPC contends that the one
officially furnished with a copy of such decision was not its counsel, who
was without any connection with Atty. Camacho. It would conclude,
therefore, that it had not received a copy of a decision, which could not
thereafter reach the stage of finality calling for a writ of execution.
WCC explained via the affidavit of Mr. Guzman that when he went to the
office of Atty. Corpuz, on March 10, 1967 to deliver a copy of the decision,
but Atty. Corpuz refused to receive the said decision alleging that he was
no longer handling the case. Atty. Corpuz instead instructed Mr. Guzman
to deliver the said decision to Atty. Camacho since it was alreadyAtty,
Camacho who was handling the case, and Atty.Camacho, according to
Atty. Corpuz, even had the records of the case.
Atty. Corpuz is impugning the delivery of the decision to Atty. Camacho. It
was then alleged in the petition that on April 11, 1967, a MR of the
aforesaid order was filed with the averment that petitioner was not aware
of any decision rendered in the case as no copy of the same had
theretofore been furnished to its counsel. The motion for reconsideration
was consequently denied. On June 14, 1967, a plea for execution was
granted on behalf of the Arbiria and subsequently the City Sherriff of
Manila levied on the petitioners properties.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Corpuz misused the processes of the Court to delay
the delivery of justice.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: Atty. Corpuz refused to receive the copy of the decision of the
WCC and he is nowimpugning the delivery of the decision to Atty.
Camacho and denying the knowledgeof it when in fact and in truth the
delivery of the decision to Atty. Camacho was madeper his instruction.An
effort was made to serve petitioner with a copy of the decision; that such
effortsfailure was due to the conduct of its own counsel.
There is no reason why the decision would have been served on some
other counsel if there were no such misinformation, if there were no such
attempt to mislead. It is one thing to exert to the utmost ones ability to
protect the interest of ones client and it is another thing to take
advantage of any unforeseen turn of events, if not to create one, to delay
if not to defeat the recovery of what is justly due and demandable,
especially so, when as in this case, the oblige is a necessitous and povertystricken man suffering from a dreaded disease, that unfortunately afflicts
so many of our countrymen.
CASE 82: Spouses Aguilar vs the Manila Banking Corporation
FACTS:This is a case regarding how the execution of a final judgment was
forestalled by the perpetual dilatory tactics employed by the litigant, and
makes a blatant mockery of justice. These series of actions originated from
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property by the Manila Banking
Corporation because of the petitioners failure to pay their loan of Php
600,000.00. The following are the procedural antecedents:
1.
On May 30 1983, the petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of
the foreclosure sale of the property before the RTC instead of redeeming
the property. This resulted to the parties entering into a compromise
agreement. However, the petitioners failed to pay the balance and the
respondent filed for a motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution to enforce
the earlier decision.
2.
The petitioner filed a Manifestation praying for the deferment of
the enforcement of the execution because according to them, they have
a pending proposal for the settlement of their debt. No settlement was
reached by the parties however during the deferment period. A year and
4 months later, the petitioners were still unable to pay.
3.
The respondent filed again for a Motion to Recall the Courts
Order claiming that their obligation was novated by the Letter. The
respondents contend however that the said letter did not novate the
obligation, rather it was just an accommodation for the more liberal terms
of payment for the petitioners.
4.
The respondents prayed then for the resolution of pending
incidents. The petitioners filed their Opposition claiming that Section 6,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court bars the execution, by mere motions, of
judgment which is more than 5 years old. The respondent argued that the
circumstances of their cases should allow them to be exempted from the
said rule, specifically because it was the petitioners who caused the delay
5.
The petitioners filed on March 6, 2001 in the RTC an Omnibus
Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution. The RTC denied the said Motion.
ISSUE/S: Did the counsel abuse the judicial process and should be held
liable?
HELD: the court cannot countenance, and in fact, condemns, the
outrageous abuse of judicial process by the petitioners and their counsel.
Without a doubt, the present case is an instance where the due process
routine vigorously pursued by the petitioners is but clear- cut devise meant
to perpetually forestall execution of an otherwise final and executory
decision. Aside from clogging the court dockets, the strategy is
deplorable a common course resorted to by losing litigants in the hope of
evading manifest obligations.
RATIO:The Court reminds the counsel of the duty of the lawyers who, as
officers of the court, must see to it that the orderly administration must not
be unduly impeded. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client,
ordinarily a layman on the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit
or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless,
then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit,
rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims
and caprices of his client, and temper his client's propensity to litigate. A
lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his
client; its primacy is indisputable.
CASE 83: The United States vs. Leoncio Ballena, G.R. No. L-6294 February
10, 1911
FACTS: Ana Ramirez was charged with the crime of perjury, and was
consequently found guilty thereof. The basis of the prosecution was the
false testimony given by Ana in a certain criminal case, wherein she
testified under oath before the fiscal, Seor Bailon, that the accused in
that case caused the death of her husband by means of blows inflicted
by him. However, during the trial of said case she testified that her
husband died of illness.
During the trial of this perjury case, Anas mother, Estefania Barruga, stood
witness for herein defendant Leoncio Ballena. Under the latters
instigation, Barruga testified that the fiscal, Bailon, at the time he was
making his investigation into the cause of death of Anas husband,
attempted to rape her daughter and asked for the hand of the girl in
marriage, which she refused for he was a married man.
Subsequently, the fiscal (Bailon) filed an information in the CFI against

Ballena charging him with the crime of subornation of perjury. Barruga
admitted that Ballena strongly insisted that she make it appear that the
fiscal committed those acts as it would be the only way to save her
daughter from imprisonment. Ballena was duly tried and found guilty
wherein from this judgment he is appealing. He is insisting that the
testimony given by Barruga in that perjury case was immaterial to the
issues involved therein.
ISSUE/S: WON Ballena violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
(which was not existing at the time) by inducing Barruga to make false
testimony.
HELD: Yes. The defendant not only willingly and willfully induced the
witness to swear falsely, but he did so maliciously, as it appears on record
that he was the enemy of the fiscal at that time, the fiscal having
prosecuted him previous to this trial.
RATIO: Rule 12.05 - A lawyer shall refrain from talking to his witness during a
break or recess in the trial, while the witness is still under examination.
CASE 84: PNB V. Uy Teng Piao
FACTS: On September 9, 1924, the CFI of Manila rendered a judgment in
favor of PNB and against Uy Teng Piao in a civil case for the sum of P17,
232.42 with interest at 7% from June 1, 1924, plus 10% of the sum amount
for attorney's fees and costs. The court ordered Uy Teng Piao to deposit
the amount with the clerk of the court within 3 months from the date of
the judgment. In case of his failure to do so, the 2 mortgaged properties
described in TCT Nos. 7264 and 8274 should be sold at public auction in
accordance with the law and the proceeds applied to the payment of
the judgment.
Uy Teng Piao failed to comply with the order of the court, and the sheriff
of the City of Manila sold the two parcels of land at public auction to PNB
for P300 and P1, 000 respectively. On February 11, 1925, PNB secured from
Uy Teng Piao a waiver of his right to redeem the property described in TCT
No. 8274. On the same date, the bank sold said property to Mariano
Santos for P8, 600. The other parcel of land was subsequently resold by the
bank for P2,700, because the account of Uy Teng Piao was credited with
the sum of P11, 300. The bank credited Uy Teng Piao with the full amount.
The bank brought the present action to revive the judgment for the
balance of P11, 574.33, with interest at 7% per annum from August 1, 1930.
Uy Teng Piao alleged that he waived his right to redeem the land
described in the TCT of the first parcel of land, in consideration of an
understanding between him and the bank that it would not collect from
him the balance of the judgment. It was on this ground that the trial court
absolved Uy Teng Piao from the complaint.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON there is an agreement between Uy Teng Piao and the bank not
to collect from him the remainder of the judgment
2. WON the appearance of one of the lawyers of PNB as a witness is
recognized
HELD:
1. None. Uy Teng Piao has failed to prove that there was an agreement.
2. No. He must not testify as a witness for his client, unless it is necessary as
provided by the Code of Professional Responsibility
RATIO:Uy Teng Piao has failed to prove any valid agreement on the part
of the bank not to collect from him the remainder of the judgment. The
alleged agreement rests upon the uncorroborated testimony of the
defendant. When asked on cross-examination if Pecson was not in Iloilo at
the time of the execution of Uy Teng Piao's waiver of his right to redeem,
he answered that he did not know; asked when Pecson had spoken to
him about the matter, he replied that he did not remember.
One of the attorneys for PNB testified that Uy Teng Piao renounced his
right to redeem the parcel of land in Calle Ronquillo, because his friend
(Mariano Santos) was interested in buying it. The bank ought to have
presented Pecson as a witness, or his deposition if he was not residing in
Manila at the time of the trial.
With respect to the testimony of the bank's attorney, although the law
does not forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the same time an
attorney in a cause, the courts prefer that counsel should not testify as a
witness unless it is necessary, and that they should withdraw from the
active management of the case.
Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics:When a lawyer is a witness for his
client, except as to merely formal matters, such as the attestation or
custody of an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the case
to other counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer

should avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client.
Uy Teng Piao's testimony as to the alleged agreement is very uncertain.
There is no mention as to such an agreement on the part of the bank. It
only provides the land in Calle Ronquillo. If Pecson had made any such
agreement as Uy Teng Piao claims, he would have required Uy Teng Piao,
a Chinese business man, to waive his right to redeem both parcels of land,
and that he would have insisted upon some evidence of the agreement
in writing. Uy Teng Piao waived his right to redeem the land in Calle
Ronquillo, because a friend of his wished to purchase it and was willing to
pay P8, 600, and the bank agreed to credit Uy Teng Piao with the full
amount of the sale.
If it be conceded that there was such an understanding between Pecson
and Uy Teng Piao, it is not shown that Pecson was authorized to make any
such agreement for the bank. Only the board of directors or the persons
empowered by the board of directors could bind the bank by such an
agreement. There is no merit in the contention that since the bank
accepted the benefit of the waiver it cannot now repudiate the alleged
agreement. The fact that the bank after having bought the land for P1,
000 resold it for P8,600 and credited the Uy Teng Piao with the full amount
of the resale was a sufficient consideration for the execution of
defendant's waiver of his right to redeem.
CASE 85: Cesar L. Lantoria vs. Atty. Irineo L. Bunyi
FACTS: Bunyi alleged that Mrs. Constancia M. Mascarinas of Manila was
the owner of d farm located in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, and that herein
complainant Lantoria was the manager and supervisor of said farm,
receiving as such a monthly allowance. It appears that the complaint in
Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 sought to eject the squatters from the
aforementioned farm.These cases were assigned to the Municipal Court
of Esperanza, Agusan del Bur, the acting municipal judge of which was
the Honorable Vicente Galicia (who was at the same time the regular
judge of the municipal court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur). The defendants
in the mentioned civil cases were, in due course, declared in default.
Three years after, that is, on 11 April 1977, complainant filed with this Court
the present administrative case against respondent Bunyi, predicated
mainly on the above-quoted three (3) letters dated 04 March, 23 April and
01 June, 1974. Complainant contends that respondent won the said three
(3) cases because to (respondent) was the one who unethically prepared
the decisions rendered therein, and that the preparation by respondent

of said decisions warranted disciplinary action against him. The said letter
of June 1, 1974, is self-explanatory and speaks for itself, that if ever the
same was written by the Respondent, it was due to the insistence of the
Complainant thru his several letters received, that the decisions in
question be drafted or prepared for Judge Galicia, who considered such
preparation as a big help to him, because he was at that time holding
two (2) salas one as being the regular Municipal Judge of Bayugan
and the other, as the acting Judge of Esperanza, both of Agusan del Sur,
with many pending cases and it was to the benefit of the Complainant
that the early disposition of the cases involved would not suffer
inconsiderable delay. But, the intention to draft or prepare the decisions in
question was never spawned by the Respondent. Instead, it came from
the under-standing between the Judge and the complainant who, from
his several letters, had demonstrated so much interest to eject at once the
squatters from the farm he was entrusted to manage. Furthermore, the
Complainant's conclusion that the said decisions were lutong macao is
purely non-sense as it is without any factual or legal basis. He himself knew
that Judge Galicia asked for help in the drafting of said decisions as at
any rate they were judgments by default, the defendants lost their
standing in court when they were declared in default for failure to file their
answers and to appear at the place and time set for hearing.
ISSUE/S: WON there was an attempt from the lawyer to influence the
court.
HELD: YES there was an attempt from the lawyer.
RATIO: e, the respondent himself having admitted that the letters in
question truly exist, and that he even asked for an apology from the
Court, for whatever effects such letters may have had on his duty as a
lawyer.
With the admission by respondent of the existence of the letters upon
which the present administrative complaint is based, the remaining issue
to be resolved is the effect of the acts complained of on respondent's
duty both as a lawyer and an officer of the Court.
We find merit in the recommendation of the Solicitor General that
respondent, by way of disciplinary action, deserves suspension from the
practice of law.
The subject letters indeed indicate that respondent had previous

communication with Judge Galicia regarding the preparation of the draft
decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83, and 88, and which he in fact prepared.
Although nothing in the records would show that respondent got the trial
court judge's consent to the said preparation for a favor or consideration,
the acts of respondent nevertheless amount to conduct unbecoming of a
lawyer and an officer of the Court.
Clearly, respondent violated Canon No. 3 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics (which were enforced at the time respondent committed the acts
admitted by him), which provides as follows:
3. Attempts to exert personal influence on the court
Marked attention and unusual hospitality on the part of a lawyer to a
judge, uncalled for by the personal relations of the parties, subject both
the judge and the lawyer to misconstructions of motive and should be
avoided. A lawyer should not communicate or argue privately with the
judge as to the merits of a pending cause and deserves rebuke and
denunciation for any device or attempt to gain from a judge special
personal consideration or favor. A self-respecting independence in the
discharge of professional duty, without denial or diminution of the
courtesy and respect due the judge's station, is the only proper
foundation for cordial personal and official relations between bench and
bar.
In the new Code of Professional Responsibility a lawyer's attempt to
influence the court is rebuked, as shown in Canon No. 13 and Rule 13.01,
which read:
CANON 13 A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain
from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance
of influencing the court.
Rule 13.01 A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or
hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating familiarity with judges.
Therefore, this Court finds respondent guilty of unethical practice in
attempting to influence the court where he had pending civil case.
CASE 86: Domingo V. Austria vs. Hon. Antonio C. Masaquel, G.R. No. L22536 August 31, 1967
FACTS: Respondent Judge Masaquel rendered a decision declaring the
plaintiffs (one of them is Domingo Austria) the owners of the three parcels
of land in question located at San Carlos and Bayambang in the province
of Pangasinan. Pedro Bravo was ordered to vacate the lands and pay the
plaintiffs damages only with respect to the land located at Bayambang.
The plaintiffs filed a motion for the immediate execution of the judgment
which motion was granted by respondent Judge Masaquel and, upon
the plaintiffs' having posted a surety bond in the sum of P2,000.00, the
sheriff placed them in possession of the lands located at San Carlos.
Atty. Mariano C. Sicat, a former assistant or associate of Judge Masaquel,
when the latter was still in the practice of law before his appointment to
the bench, entered his appearance as the new counsel for defendant
Pedro Bravo. Through Atty. Sicat, Bravo then filed a supersedeas bond to
stay the execution of the judgment, which was later on granted by Judge
Masaquel. Austria had asked for the appointment of a receiver over the
parcel of land located at Bayambang, which prayer was granted by
Judge Masaquel, but upon the filing of a bond by Bravo for the nonappointment of a receiver, the order receivership was set aside. Pending
the approval of the defendant's amended record on appeal, Atty. Sicat
filed a motion for new trial. Judge Masaquel granted the said motion. The
hearing on the retrial was finally set.
Before the opening of the court's session, Atty. Daniel Macaraeg, counsel
for Austria and his co-plaintiffs, saw Judge Masaquel in his chamber and
verbally transmitted to him the request of Austria that he (the Judge)
inhibit himself from further hearing the case upon the ground that the new
counsel for the defendant, Atty. Mariano C. Sikat, was his former
associate. Judge Masaquel, however, rejected the request because,
according to him, the reason for the request of his inhibition is not one of
the grounds for disqualification of a judge provided for in the Rules of
Court. Judge called Domingo Austria, and inquired from the latter if it was
true that he asked his lawyer Atty. Macaraeg to approach the Judge in
chambers and to ask him to disqualify himself from trying this case
because defendant's lawyer, Atty. Sicat was formerly associated with the
said Judge. Austria was also asked if he has lost faith in the sense of
fairness and justice of the Presiding Judge of this Court simply because of
Judge Masaquels former association with the defendant's lawyer.
Domingo Austria answered both in the affirmative. Judge Masaquel
declared said plaintiff Domingo Austria in direct contempt of court and he
was ordered to pay a fine of P50.00.
Petitioner Domingo Austria, accordingly, paid the fine of P50.00 under
protest. He filed this instant petition for certiorari before this Court.
ISSUE/S: WON Domingo Austria should be held in direct contempt of court.

HELD: No. Austria is not guilty of direct contempt of court.
RATIO: When the petitioner requested respondent Judge to inhibit himself
from further trying the case upon the ground that the counsel for the
opposite party was the former associate of the respondent Judge,
petitioner did so because he was impelled by a justifiable apprehension
which can occur in the mind of a litigant who sees what seems to be an
advantage on the part of his adversary; and that the petitioner made his
request in a manner that was not disrespectful, much less insulting or
offensive to the respondent Judge or to the court. The respondent Judge
had decided the case in favor of petitioner and his co-plaintiffs, and that
upon plaintiffs' timely motion and filing of bond they were already placed
in possession of the lands in question pending appeal. It was when Atty.
Sicat took over as new counsel for defendant that the latter was given
back the properties, upon a motion to stay the execution of the judgment
which was filed by said counsel and was granted by respondent Judge
over the opposition of petitioner's counsel. Again, when the same counsel
for defendant filed a motion for a new trial, said motion was granted by
respondent Judge in spite of the vigorous objection of counsel for the
petitioner and his co-plaintiffs. And then the petitioner became aware of
the fact that his adversary, the defendant Pedro Bravo, had been
boasting in San Carlos that he was sure to win his case because of his new
lawyer.
While it is true that respondent Judge may not be compelled to disqualify
himself, the fact that Atty. Sicat, admittedly his former associate, was
counsel for a party in the case being tried by him, may constitute a just or
valid reason for him to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing the case on
a retrial, if he so decides, pursuant to the provision of the second
paragraph of Section 1 of the said Rule 137.
Due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than
the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Moreover, second only to the
duty of rendering a just decision, is the duty of doing it in a manner that
will not arouse any suspicion as to its fairness and the integrity of the
Judge.
CASE 87: In re Severino Lozano and Anastacio Quevedo, July 24, 1930CARLO
FACTS: A complaint was made to a judge of First Instance. Said

complaint was referred to the Attorney-General for investigation, report,
and recommendation. The Solicitor-General was designated to conduct
the investigation of the charges, and pursuant to said designation,
proceeded to the municipality of Capiz, Province of Capiz, to take the
testimony of certain witnesses. Said investigation was to be conducted
secretly, as is customary in cases of that nature. However, on April 29,
1930, a newspaper named El Pueblo published in Iloilo and edited by
Severino Lozano, printed an account of the investigation written by
Anastacio Quevedo, said to be an employee in the office of the Judge
under investigation. A certain portion of the article gives an account of
the evidence of the different witnesses involved. Regarding this account,
the complainant attorney alleged that the facts contained were "false,
malicious, and untrue" and that "said report took sides with the respondent
judge and expressed an opinion as to the merits of the same, with the
object undoubtedly, to influence the action of the investigator and the
public in general and to obstruct, embarrass or impede the course of the
present investigation." The Attorney-General likewise stated that the
newspaper report "does not contain a fair and true account of the facts
disclosed at the investigation, creating a wrong impression in the mind of
the public and tending to influence improperly the action of this court in
the said pending matter." Under the circumstances, the observations of
the Attorney-General must necessarily be accepted as true.
At the time of its publication, a resolution dated January 27, 1922 was in
force which provided "That all proceedings looking to the suspension or
disbarment of lawyers, and all proceedings looking to the suspension or
removal of judges of first instance, shall be considered confidential in
nature until the final disposition of the matter." In so far as this resolution
relates to the suspension or removal of Judges of First Instance, it finds
support in section 173 of the Administrative Code, authorizing the SC to
conduct inquiries into the conduct of Judges of First Instance "and to
adopt such rules of procedure in that regard as it may deem proper." The
reason for the adoption of such a rule is readily explainable and consists in
the practice of litigants and others making vindictive and malicious
charges against lawyers and Judges of First Instance, which are ruinous to
the reputations of the respondent lawyers and judges. It was accordingly
thought best to keep such matters secret for the good of the
administration of justice until the final outcome of the proceedings could
be ascertained.
ISSUE/S: WON Severino Lozano and Anastacio Quevedo can be held in

contempt by the SC for their actions in the said case.
HELD: Yes, the right of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized
and care taken at all times to avoid impinging upon it. The power to
punish for contempt is inherent in the Supreme Court.
RATIO: The power to punish for contempt is inherent in the Supreme
Court. The power of the SC extends to administrative proceedings as well
as to suits at law cannot be doubted. It is as necessary to maintain
respect for the courts, indeed to safeguard their very existence, in
administrative cases concerning the removal and suspension of judges as
it is in any other class of judicial proceedings.
The rule is well established that the newspaper publications tending to
impede, obstruct, embarass, or influence the courts in administering
justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitute criminal contempt which
is summarily punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause
is ended. It is also regarded as an interference with the work of the courts
to publish any matters which their policy requires should be kept private,
as for example the secrets of the jury room, or proceedings in camera.
In the case at bar, the Court stated that respondents ignorance of the
said controlling resolution is no excuse, for the very article published by
them indicates that the hearing was held behind closed doors and that
the information of the reporter was obtained from outside the screen and
from comments in social circles. Then in writing up the investigation, it
came about that the testimony was mutilated and that the report
reflected upon the action of the complainant to his possible
disadvantage.
The right of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized and care
taken at all times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is
necessary, in order to dispose of judicial business unhampered by
publication which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or
otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, this court will not hesitate
to exercise its undoubted power to punish for contempt. Hence, Severino
Lazano and Anastacio Quevedo are guilty of contempt of court, and it is
the order of the court that they be punished for such contempt by the
payment of a nominal sum
CASE 88: Cruz v. Salva
FACTS: Manuel Monroy was killed in 1953 and a number of persons were
accused of such killing. These persons were found guilty sentenced to the
penalty of death. They all appealed. Pending the appeal, President
Magsaysay ordered a reinvestigation of the case which was conducted
by the intelligence agents of the Philippine Constabulary and investigators
of Malacanang. The result of the reinvestigation also points to the
convicted persons as the real killers of Monroy.
The counsel of the defendants wrote to Fiscal Salva to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case on the basis of the affidavits and confessions
obtained by the investigator of Malacanang which was made available
to him. Salva formed a committee composed of himself as the chairman
and two assistant city attorneys. Salva subpoenaed Cruz to appear at his
office for the investigation.
Atty. Baizas, counsel of Cruz, questioned the jurisdiction of the committee
to conduct the investigation considering that the case was pending
appeal in SC. Salva contended that he subpoenaed Cruz et al because
of their request to do so and that were it not for his request, he would not
conduct the investigation. Although Cruz denied having made such
request, the SC believed that he indeed made a request of
reinvestigation.
However, the Supreme Court was interested in the manner to which the
investigation headed by Salva was conducted. The investigation was
made not in Salvas office but in the session hall of the Municipal Trial
Court to accommodate a big crowd that wanted to witness the
proceeding, including members of the press. Microphones were installed.
There were reporters everywhere and photographers were busy taking
pictures.
ISSUE: W/N Salva violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD: Yes. The way Salva conducted the investigation is reprehensible. He
publicized and sensationalized the case. He committed what was regard
a grievous error and poor judgment. His actuations went well beyond the
bounds of prudence, discretion, and good taste. Salva was publicly
reprehended and censured for the uncalled for and wide publicity and
sensationalism he had given to and allowed in connection with his
investigation which is considered and found to be contempt of court.
CASE 89: Eduardo L. Martelino, et. al. vs. Jose Alejandro, G.R. No. L-30894,
March 25, 1970
FACTS: This case presents another aspect of the court-martial proceedings
against the petitioner, Major Eduardo Martelino, alias Abdul Latif
Martelino, of the AFP, and the officers and men under him, for violation of
the Articles of War, as a result of the alleged shooting of some Muslim
recruits then undergoing commando training on the island of Corregidor.
At the hearing, petitioner Martelino sought the disqualification of the
President of the general court-martial, following the latter's admission that
he read newspaper stories of the Corregidor incident which had come to
be referred to as the "Corregidor massacre". The petitioner's counsel
referred to a news item appearing in the July 29, 1969 issue of the Daily
Mirror and cited other news reports to the effect that "coffins are being
prepared for the President (of the Philippines) in Jolo," that according to
Senator Aquino "massacre victims were given sea burial," and that
Senator Magsaysay, opposition Vice President candidate, had gone to
Corregidor and "found bullet shells." In addition the petitioners cite in this
Court a Manila Times editorial of August 26, 1969 which states that "The
Jabidah [code name of the training operations] issue was bound to come
up in the course of the election campaign. The opposition could not
possibly ignore an issue that is heavily loaded against the administration."
The petitioners argue that the case had received such an amount of
publicity in the press and other news media and in fact was being
exploited for political purposes in connection with the presidential election
as to imperil his right to a fair trial. The petitioners further allege that the
adverse publicity given in the mass media to the Corregidor incident,
coupled with the fact that it became an issue against the administration
in the 1969 elections, was such as to unduly influence the members of the
court-martial. In support of their contention they invoke the rulings of the
United States Supreme Court in Irvin v. Dowd, Rideau vs. Louisiana, Estes v.
Texas, and Shepard v. Maxwell.
In their answer, the respondents as members of the general court-martial
assert that despite the publicity which the case had received, no proof
has been presented showing that the court-martial's president's fairness
and impartiality have been impaired.
ISSUE/S: WON the publicity given to the case against the petitioners was
such as to prejudice their right to a fair trial.
HELD: No. The spate of publicity did not focus on the guilt of the
petitioners.
RATIO: Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media
regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against
a party.
An examination of the cases cited, however, will show that they are
widely disparate from this case in a fundamental sense.
In Irvin, for instance, the Supreme Court found that shortly after the
petitioner's arrest in connection with six murders committed, the
prosecutor and police officials issued press releases stating that the
petitioner had confessed to the six murders and that "a barrage of
newspaper headlines articles, cartoons and pictures was unleashed
against him during the six or seven months preceding his trial." Irvin marks
the first time a state conviction was struck down solely on the ground of
prejudicial publicity.
In the earlier case of Shepherd v. Florida, which involved elements of
publicity, the reversal of the conviction was based solely on racial
discrimination in the selection of the jury, "It is hard to imagine a more
prejudicial influence than a press release by the officer of the court
charged with defendants' custody stating that they had confessed, and
here just such a statement unsworn to, unseen, uncross-examined and
uncontradicted, was conveyed by the press to the jury.
In Rideau, the petitioner, suspect in the robbery of a bank and in the
kidnapping of three of its employees, and in the killing of one of them, was
similarly given "trial by publicity." Thus, the day after his arrest, a moving
picture film was taken of him in an "interview" with the sheriff. The
"interview," consisted of interrogation by the sheriff and admission by
Rideau that he had perpetrated the bank robbery, kidnapping and
murder. The interview was seen and heard on television by 24,000 people.
His lawyers promptly moved for a change of venue but their motion was
denied and Rideau was convicted and sentenced to death to the
spectacle of Rideau personally confessing in detail to the crimes with
which he was later to be charged.
In the third case, Estes, the Court voided a televised criminal trial for being
inherently a denial of due process. The state ... says that the use of
television in the instant case was "without injustice to the person

immediately concerned,".
In Sheppard, the celebrated murder case of Sam Sheppard, who was
accused of the murder of his wife Marilyn, the newsmen took over
practically the entire courtroom. The Court held that from the unfair and
prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must take
strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the
accused. Of course, there is nothing that proscribes the press from
reporting events that transpire in the courtroom. But where there is a
reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair
trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat abates, or transfer
it to another county not so permeated with publicity. If publicity during the
proceeding threatens the fairness of the trial, a new trial should be
ordered.
In the case at bar, the spate of publicity did not focus on the guilt of the
petitioners but rather on the responsibility of the Government for what was
claimed to be a "massacre" of Muslim trainees. If there was a "trial by
newspaper" at all, it was not of the petitioners but of the Government.
Absent here is a showing of failure of the court-martial to protect the
accused from massive publicity encouraged by those connected with the
conduct of the trial either by a failure to control the release of information
or to remove the trial to another venue or to postpone it until the deluge
of prejudicial publicity shall have subsided. Indeed, the trial of the
petitioners was being held under circumstances which did not permit the
observance of those imperative decencies of procedure which have
come to be identified with due process.
At all events, even granting the existence of "massive" and "prejudicial"
publicity, since the petitioners here do not contend that the respondents
have been unduly influenced but simply that they might be by the
"barrage" of publicity, the Court thinks that the suspension of the courtmartial proceedings has accomplished the purpose sought by the
petitioners' challenge for cause, by postponing the trial of the petitioner
until calmer times have returned. The atmosphere has since been cleared
and the publicity surrounding the Corregidor incident has so far abated
that the court believes that the trial may now be resumed in tranquility.
CASE 90: Magsalang vs. People, G.R. No. L-37679 May 14, 1990 WRONG
CASE ATA TONG BINIGAY NI ATTY.
(Yung case na nilagay ko, MAGLASANG vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 90083
October 4, 1990)
FACTS: On June 22, 1989, a petition for certiorari entitled "Khalyxto Perez
Maglasang vs. People of the Philippines, Presiding Judge, Ernesto B.
Templado (San Carlos City Court) Negros Occidental," was filed by
registered mail with the Court. Due to non-compliance with the
requirements of Circular No. 1-88 of the Court, specifically the nonpayment of P316.50 for the legal fees and the non-attachment of the
duplicate originals or duly certified true copies of the questioned decision
and orders of the respondent judge denying the motion for
reconsideration, the Court dismissed the petition on July 26, 1989.
On September 9, 1989, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano, as counsel of the
petitioner, moved for a reconsideration of the resolution dismissing the
petition. This time, the amount of P316.50 was remitted and the Court was
furnished with a duplicate copy of the respondent judge's decision, and
also the IBP O.R. No. and the date of the payment of his membership
dues. The motion for reconsideration did not contain the duplicate
original or certified true copies of the assailed orders. Thus, in a Resolution
dated October 18, 1989, the motion for reconsideration was denied "with
FINALITY."
Three months later, or on January 22, 1990 to be exact, the Court received
from Atty. Castellano a copy of a complaint dated December 19, 1989,
filed with the Office of the President of the Philippines whereby Khalyxto
Perez Maglasang, through his lawyer, Atty. Castellano, as complainant,
accused all the five Justices of the Court's Second Division with "biases
and/or ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust judgments or
resolution."
The complaint was signed by Atty. Castellano "for the complainant" with
the conformity of one Calixto B. Maglasang, allegedly the father of
accused-complainant Khalyxto. By reason of the strong and intemperate
language of the complaint and its improper filing with the Office of the
President, which, as he should know as a lawyer, has no jurisdiction to
discipline, much more, remove, Justices of the Supreme Court, on
February 7, 1990, Atty. Castellano was required to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt or administratively dealt with for
improper conduct.
ISSUE/S: WON, Atty. Castellano, petitioners lawyer, is guilty of violation of

Canon 11, Rules 11.03 and 11.04; 13.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: It is clear that the case was lost not by the alleged injustices Atty.
Castellano irresponsibly ascribed to the members of the Court's Second
Division, but simply because of his inexcusable negligence and
incompetence. Atty. Castellano, however, seeks to pass on the blame for
his deficiencies to the Court, in the hope of salvaging his reputation
before his client. Unfortunately, the means by which Atty. Castellano
hoped to pass the buck so to speak, are grossly improper. As an officer of
the Court, he should have known better than to smear the honor and
integrity of the Court just to keep the confidence of his client.
CANON 11-A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO
THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR
CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
RULE 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menancing language or behavior before the courts.
RULE 11.04 A lawyer should not attribute to a judge motives not
supported by the record or have materiality to the case.
RULE 13.03 A lawyer shall not brook nor invite interference by another
branch or agency of the government in the normal course of judicial
proceedings.
The Court held that in filing the "complaint" against the justices of the
Court's Second Division, even the most basic tenet of our government
system the separation of powers between the judiciary, the executive,
and the legislative branches has been lost on Atty. Castellano.
The Court therefore take this occasion to once again remind all and
sundry that "the Supreme Court is supreme the third great department
of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate
with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other
department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them
'unjust.'" Consequently, and owing to the foregoing, not even the
President of the Philippines as Chief Executive may pass judgment on any
of the Court's acts.
Finally, Atty. Castellano's assertion that the complaint "was a constructive

criticism intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict
practices of the Justices, concerned as Respondents (sic)" is but a last
minute effort to sanitize his clearly unfounded and irresponsible
accusation. The arrogance displayed by counsel in insisting that the Court
has no jurisdiction to question his act of having complained before the
Office of the President, and in claiming that a contempt order is used as a
weapon by judges and justices against practicing lawyers, however,
reveals all too plainly that he was not honestly motivated in his criticism.
Rather, Atty. Castellano's complaint is a vilification of the honor and
integrity of the Justices of the Second Division of the Court and an
impeachment of their capacity to render justice according to law.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano is found guilty of CONTEMPT
OF COURT and IMPROPER CONDUCT as a member of the Bar and an
officer of the Court, and is hereby ordered to PAY within fifteen (15) days
from and after the finality of this Resolution a fine of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos, or SUFFER ten (10) days imprisonment in the municipal
jail of Calatrava, Negros Occidental in case he fails to pay the fine
seasonably, and SUSPENDED from the practice of law throughout the
Philippines for six (6) months as soon as this Resolution becomes final, with
a WARNING that a repetition of any misconduct on his part will be dealt
with more severely.
CASE 91: PEOPLE v. GAUDENCIO INGCO CPR 14.02
FACTS: Respondent Alfredo R. Barrios, a member of the Philippine Bar, who
was appointed counsel de oficio for the accused in this case, Gaudencio
Ingco, sentenced to death on September 28, 1970 for the crime of rape
with homicide, was required in a resolution of this Court on September 9,
1971 to show cause within ten days why disciplinary action should not be
taken against him for having filed fifteen days late a motion for the
extension of time for submitting the brief for appellant Ingco. The
explanation came in a manifestation of September 16, 1971. It was therein
stated that respondent "was then busy with the preparation of the brief of
one Benjamin Apelo pending in the Court of Appeals; that while he had
made studies in preparation for the brief in this case, during such period
he had to appear before courts in Manila, Quezon City, Pasay City,
Bulacan and Pampanga; and that likewise he did file, on July 27, 1971,
motions for extension in the aforesaid case of Benjamin Apelo with the
Court of Appeals, which motions were duly granted. He would impress on
this Court then that he was misled into assuming that he had also likewise
taken the necessary steps to file a motion for extension of time for the
submission of his brief in this case by the receipt of the resolution from the
Court of Appeals granting him such extension.
ISSUE/S: WON violated the Canon 14.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
HELD: Yes. The respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
RATIO: Clearly, it is a lame excuse that respondent did offer. By his own
confession, he was woefully negligent. Considering that the accused is
fighting for his life, the least that could be expected of a counsel de
oficio is awareness of the period within which he was required to file
appellant's brief. The mere fact that according to him his practice was
extensive, requiring his appearance in courts in Manila and environs as
well as the provinces of Bulacan and Pampanga, should not have
lessened that degree of care necessary for the fulfillment of his
responsibility. What is worse is that by sheer inattention, he would confuse
the proceedings in a matter pending before the Court of Appeals with this
present case. Such grave neglect of duty is deserving of severe
condemnation. It is clearly unworthy of membership in the Bar which
requires dedication and zeal in the defense of his client's rights, a duty
even more exacting when one is counsel de oficio. On such an occasion,
the honor and respect to which the legal profession is entitled demand
the strictest accountability of one called upon to defend an impoverished
litigant. He who falls in his obligation then has manifested a diminished
capacity to be enrolled in its ranks.
CASE 92: The United States vs. Calixto Laranja, G.R. No. 6789, February 16,
1912
FACTS: Calixto and four or five companions went to the house of one
Candoy one night and that a quarrel and fight ensued there which
resulted in the death of Candoy and Ando.
Criminal complaints were filed against appellant Calixto and one Iyon,
charging them with the crime of homicide.
When the case against Calixto was called, a certain agreement with
reference to admitting the testimony taken in the case against Iyon was
entered into by counsel for the defendant and the provincial fiscal. This
agreement, was as follows:
Counsel de oficio, Mr. Lozano, stated that he would submit the case and it
was within the knowledge of the court, that he had been present all
during the trial, assisting the fiscal in the case against Iyon and that
Laranja had been present and heard all the testimony in the case against
Iyon, and that he was willing for the record in the case against Iyon to be
used in the trial of this case. The fiscal agreed to this, and the defendant,
after being sworn, went upon the stand.
Again, if the lawyer had been appointed before the trial of Iyon, he could
have consulted with Calixto and obtained from him all the facts about
how the killing occurred, and the defense of this appellant.
The case was submitted upon the testimony of the appellant and that
taken in the case against Iyon.
Counsel for the defendant now insists that the trial court erred in admitting
the testimony taken in the Iyon case.
Viewed from any standpoint, there was an opportunity for the attorney to
have acted in double capacity. The appearance of such injustice to
clients must be avoided. Courts will give approval in no agree to the
conduct of Mr. Lozano. He should have called the attention of the trial
court to these facts, and the court would then no doubt have relieved
him as attorney de oficio for the appellant.
On the other hand, the Attorney-General insists that no such error was
committed for the reason, as he says, that the defendant waived his right
to be confronted with and to cross-examine the witnesses against him.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Lozano could legally represent Calixto t in the court
below.
HELD: It must be borne in mind that Atty. Lozano was appointed by the
court to represent Calixto.This method is followed in order to divide the
work equally among the attorneys, and we see no objection to such a
method. But generally, the attorney appointed is not selected by the
defendant, who is given no choice in the matter. The defendant must
accept whosoever is designated.
If the attorney was appointed after the Iyon case was closed, he would
have had no reason, of course, for developing the testimony in the case
against Iyon which would have aided the defense of the appellant.
Public policy prohibits him from defending the appellant under these
circumstances; the reason for this prohibition is found in the relation of
attorney and client, which is one of confidence and trust in the very
highest degree. An attorney becomes familiar with all the facts
connected with his client's cause. He learns from his client the weak points
of the case as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be
considered scared and guarded with great care.
We believe there are sufficient reasons in this case under the facts and
circumstances as presented to hold that Mr. Lozano was disqualified and
could not legally represent the defendant in the court below.
The judgment appealed from must be set aside and a new trial ordered.
In defending Calixto (the defendant), it was the duty of attorney to show,

if it could be done, that Candoy was the aggressor and not Calixto.
CASE 93: People v. Felipe Malunsing, et. al., and Manuel Villegas (1975)
The record in the Iyon case shows that there was no attempt on the part
of Attorney Lozano to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the
defendant in that case from the viewpoint of the defense in the case at
bar. The record does not disclose whether Mr. Lozano was appointed to
represent this appellant before or after the trial of Iyon.
FACTS: There was a hearing for the crime of murder, with several accused,
including Manuel Villegas, the appellant in this case. They were all found
guilty of murder. However, Manuel Villegas claims that his constitutional
right to be heard by counsel was violated. He now seeks reversal of the
decision convicting him for murder.
If he was appointed before that trial, he did not, as we have said,

develop by cross-examination of the defendant's witnesses in that case
against Iyon the theory of self-defense which was the plea of this
defendant.
Manuel had a counsel de officio: Atty. Geronimo Pajarito. At the opening

of the trial, Atty. Pajarito manifested to the court that client Manuel had
told him that he had his own lawyer. There was an admission that he did
appear for him in the preliminary investigation but only because there was
no other counsel. When the court asked Manuel if he had informed Atty.
Pajarito of his change of mind, Manuel answered in the negative. The trial
court then said that it was appointing Atty. Pajarito as Manuels counsel
de officio, and as such, they can proceed with the trial. The court also
asked Atty. Pajarito if he wanted an hour or so to confer with Manuel.
However, Atty. Pajarito simply said, I think I know the case. So, the court
proceeded with the trial.
When the court rendered a decision, it noted that it was only Manuel who
did not present any witness nor took the witness stand for himself. It was
alleged in the present petition for review of the decision that during the
trial, Manuel did not understand what was going on. Manuel is
uneducated. The court did not even bother to see to it that Manuel is
substantially receiving his right to counsel, nor did the court inquire why of
all the accused, it was only Manuel who did not present witnesses or
evidence, and why did he not testify on the witness stand.
ISSUE/S: WON the constitutional right of Manuel as accused was violated
because of the conduct of his counsel de officio, Atty. Pajarito
HELD: Yes, it was violated. The court has decided to set aside the lower
courts decision finding him guilty of murder, and orders a re-trial, this time,
with direct orders to make sure that all the safeguards and protection an
accused is entitled to be made available to Manuel
RATIO: First, on the part of the trial court, it is not enough that, in order to
secure the accuseds right to counsel, a counsel de officio was
appointed. Manuel had manifested that he wanted a lawyer of his own
choice, because perhaps he had lost confidence in Atty. Pajarito.
Second, on the part of Atty. Pajarito, there is no respect for the right of the
accused to be heard by counsel when he (Pajarito) said I think I know
the case. He did not even availed of the opportunity to confer with the
client. Instead of conferring with the accused, Pajarito just blithely inform
the judge that he was already fully prepared for his exacting responsibility.
It was unintended, of course, but the result could not rightly be
distinguished from pure travesty.
Manuel is therefore entitled to a new trial where he can be duly
represented either by a counsel of his choice or by one appointed de
officio, one who would discharge his task in a much more diligent and
conscientious manner and would not readily assume that he need not
bother himself unduly with familiarizing himself further with all aspects of
the case. Only in such way there could be an intelligent defense for the
accused.
Note: The court did not impose any disciplinary action on Atty. Pajarito,
but simply ordered a new trial. The court also made no reference to
Canon 14.02 (under which this case was assigned, in our syllabus),
because this case was decided in 1975, but the Code of Professional
Responsibility was promulgated only in 1988.
CASE 94: PEOPLE v. DAENG
FACTS:On or about 13 December 1970, in the New Bilibid Prison in
Muntinlupa the accused/respondents George Daeng, Conrado Bautista,
Gerardo Abubin and Rolando Castillo while the confined at the said
institutiion, conspiring, confederating and acting together and each
armed with improvised deadly weapons did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault and wound therewith one Basilio Beltran,
another convicted prisoner serving final sentence in the same institution. In
the process of serving breakfast to the respondents, inflicting upon Beltran
multiple stab wounds, while then unarmed and unable to defend himself
from the attack launched by the respondents and as a result Beltran died
instantly.
On 28 June 1971 the respondents pleaded not guilty to the charge but
before the trial was adjourned to another date, the trial judge addressed
them that he understands that the respondents are confused and not
ready to plead guilty therefore giving them 24 hours for sole searching.
By the virtue of the crime that was committed, there is no alternative
except to impose death penalty which is the maximum penalty. Therefore
on the following day, the 4 respondents pleaded guilty assisted by their
counsel de oficio. The trial judge forthwith dictated and promulgated his
decision in open court and all 4 respondents were sentenced to death.
In the review of this case on automatic appeal, the Solicitor General
found that the records do not show that it was explained to the
respondents the full import and meaning of their plea of guilty not did it
conduct any inquiry to remove all reasonable possibility that said
respondents might have entered their plea of guilty improvidently or
without clear and precise understanding of the exact nature of the
charge preferred against them and the import of an inevitable conviction
thereof.it was also observed that when the respondents entered the plea
of guilty, the trial court rendered the decision without requiring the
presentation of evidence.it was also found that the counsel de oficio was
appointed to at least three criminal cases where the respondents plea of
not guilty is changed to guilty.
ISSUE/S:WON the conviction should be set aside
HELD: Yes. The case is remanded to the court of origin for a new
arraignment of the respondents.
RATIO: Courts are cautioned for frequent appointment of the same
attorney for counsel de oficio for two basic reasons: (1) it is unfair to the
attorney concerned, considering the burden of his regular practice that
he should be saddled with too many de ofio cases (2) the compensation
provided for by section 32 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court might be
considered by som e lawyers as a regular source of income, something
which the rule does not envision.the accused also stands to suffer
because the overburned counsel would have too little time to spare for his
de oficio cases and also would be inordinately eager to finish such cases
in order to collect his fees within the earliest possible time.
CASE 95: Adelino H. Ledesma v. Hon. Rafael C. Climaco
FACTS : Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an
accused in a case pending in the sala of the respondent judge. On
October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the
Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He commenced discharging his
duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his position as counsel de
parte. The respondent Judge denied him and also appointed him as
counsel de oficio for the two defendants. On November 6, Ledesma filed
a motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, because the
Comelec requires full time service which could prevent him from handling
adequately the defense. Judge denied the motion. So Ledesma instituted
this certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE/S: WON a member of the bar may withdraw as counsel de oficio
due to appointment as Election Registrar.
HELD : No, Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of
fidelity to the duty rqeuired of the legal profession. He ought to have
known that membership in the bar is burdened with conditions. The legal
profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere trade. A
lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio to aid in the
performance of the administration of justice. The fact that such services

are rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer's zeal.
RATIO:
The only attorneys who cannot practice law by reason of their office are
Judges, or other officials or employees of the superior courts or the office
of the solicitor General (Section 32 Rule 127 of the Rules of Court [Section
35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court]. The lawyer involved not
being among them, remained as counsel of record since he did not file a
motion to withdraw as defendant-appellants counsel after his
appointment as Register of Deeds. Nor was substitution of attorney asked
either by him or by the new counsel for the defendant-appellant (People
vs. Williams CA G.R. Nos. 00375-76, February 28, 1963)
To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent
defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de officio (People
v. Daban) Moreover, The right of an accused in a criminal case to be
represented by counsel is a constitutional right of the highest importance,
and there can be no fair hearing with due process of law unless he is fully
informed of his rights in this regard and given opportunity to enjoy them
(People vs. Holgado, L-2809, March 22, 1950)
The trial court in a criminal case has authority to provide the accused with
a counsel de officio for such action as it may deem fit to safeguard the
rights of the accused (Provincial Fiscal of Rizal vs. Judge Muoz Palma, L15325, August 31, 1930)
CASE 96: Antonio Blanza, et al. vs. Atty. Agustin Arcangel
FACTS: Blanza and Pasion complain that way back in April, 1955,
respondent Arcangel volunteered to help them in their respective pension
claims in connection with the deaths of their husbands, both P.C. soldiers,
and for this purpose, they handed over to him the pertinent documents
and also attached their signatures on blank papers. However, they
noticed that since then, Arcangel had lost interest in the progress of their
claims and when they finally asked for the return of their papers six years
later, Arcangel refused to surrender them.
Arcangel admitted having received the documents from complainants
but argued that it was for photostating purposes only. His failure to
immediately return them was due to complainants Blanza and Pasion's
refusal to hand him the money to pay for the photostating costs which
prevented him from withdrawing said documents from the photostat

service. Nonetheless, he had already advanced the expenses himself and
turned over, on December 13, 1961, the documents, their respective
photostats and the photostat service receipt to the fiscal.
ISSUE/S: WON Arcangel violated Rule 18.04 wherein a lawyer must inform
the client on status of case
HELD: The court is compelled to dismiss the charges against respondent
Arcangel for being legally insufficient because of the affidavit of Mrs.
Blanza pardoning respondent and because of the non appearance of
Complainant Pasion nor her counsel to substantiate her charges in the
hearing set
RATIO: The courtcannot but advise against his actuations as a member of
the bar. A lawyer has a more dynamic and positive role in the community
than merely complying with the minimal technicalities of the statute. As a
man of law, he is necessarily a leader of the community, looked up to as a
model citizen. His conduct must be par excellence, especially when
he volunteers his professional services. Arcangel has not lived up to that
ideal standard. It was unnecessary to have complainants Blanza and
Pasion wait, and hope, for six long years on their pension claims. Upon
their refusal to co-operate, respondent Arcangel should have terminated
their professional relationship instead of keeping them hanging
indefinitely. And although the court decided he not be reprimanded, in a
legal sense, this should serve as a reminder to Atty. Arcangel of what the
high standards of his chosen profession require of him.
CASE 97: Dr. Gil Y. Gamilla, et. al. v. Atty. Eduardo J. Marino Jr., A.C No.
4763, March 20, 2003
FACTS: In 1986, respondent Atty. Marino, as president of the UST Faculty
Union (Union), with other union officers, entered into a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) with the UST management for the provision
of economic benefits amounting to P35M. The CBA expired in 1988.
In 1989, UST faculty members went on strike and UST dismissed 16 officers
and directors from office. Atty. Marino was one of these officers. The court
ordered their reinstatement with back wages.
In 1990, Labor Secretary Ruben Torres prescribed the terms and conditions
of a 5-year CBA between UST and the Union, retroactive to 1988. The UST
administration and the Union also entered into a compromise agreement,

where it was agreed that the former would pay P7M to the latter (P5M for
the back wages and other claims, and P2M to satisfy the remaining
obligations under the 1986 CBA). However, only the P5M allotted for the
back wages was immediately paid. The P2M allotted for the remaining
obligations was deferred.
In 1992, UST and the Union executed a memorandum agreement (1992
MOA) to settle the salary increases and other benefits for the period of
June 1991 to May 1993. P42M was allotted for the settlement. The
agreement provided that: (1) the benefits accruing from June 1991 to
October 1992 would be taken from the P42M allotment which UST would
release directly to the faculty members, (2) UST would then cede the
remaining amount to the Union to disburse to cover the benefits from
November 1992 to May 1993, (3) the P2M agreed upon the 1990
compromise agreement would be taken from the P42M allotment, and (4)
Atty. Marinos attorneys fees (P4.2M) would be taken from the P42M
allotment.
Complainants, who are Union members, questioned the alleged lack of
transparency in the management and disbursement of the monetary
benefits among the Union officers and directors. In October 1995, they
initiated a complaint with the Office of the Regional Director (NCR-DOLE).
In November 1996, they initiated another complaint with the same office.
Both complaints prayed for the expulsion of the Union officers and
directors (led by Atty. Marino) for the failure to account for the P42M
allotment.
In July 1997, complainants filed the instant complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Marino, accusing him of: (1) compromising their entitlements
under the 1986 CBA without their knowledge, consent or ratification, for
only P2M when they could have received more than P9M, (2) failing to
account for the P7M he, with the other officers and directors, received
under the 1990 compromise agreement, (3) lack of transparency in the
administration and distribution of the remaining balance of the P42M
allotment under the 1992 MOA, and (4) refusing to remit and account the
P4.2M denominated as attorneys fees.
Complainants accused Atty. Marino for violating: (1) Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of
Canon 1, (2) Rule 15.05 of Canon 15, (3) Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of
Canon 16, and (4) Rule 20.04 of Canon 20, of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In March 1998, the court referred the disbarment complaint to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation. IBP Commissioner Lydia
Navarro issued a Report and the IBP Board of Governors released a
Resolution, both of which found the complaint meritorious and suspended
Atty. Marino from the practice of law until he can give the detailed
accounting of the questioned remittances.
In May 1999, the Regional Director issued an Order for the expulsion of
Atty. Marino and the other officers and directors. In March 2000, the
Bureau of Labor Relations set aside the Order because there was full and
adequate accounting of the P42M allotment, but also directed the
distribution of the P4.2M among the faculty members. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations. The
decision is appealed to the Supreme Court.
In September 2002, the detailed Report and Recommendation of IBP
Commissioner Navarro and the IBP Resolution lifted Atty. Marinos
suspension for sufficiently accounting for the funds.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Marino violated Canon 15, among other laws found in
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: Yes. Atty. Marino violated Canon 15, among other laws found in the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He is reprimanded for his misconduct
with a warning that a more drastic punishment will be imposed on him
upon repetition of the same act.
RATIO: Canon 15 provides that a lawyer shall observe candor, fairness
and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.
Canon 15 requires a lawyer to have a bigger dose of service-oriented
conscience and a little less of self-interest. A lawyer or any other person
occupying fiduciary relations respecting property or persons is utterly
disabled from acquiring for his own benefit the property committed to his
custody for management. The rule stands on the moral obligation to
refrain from placing oneself in positions that ordinarily excite conflict
between self-interest and integrity.
Necessarily, a lawyer cannot continue representing a client in an action or
any proceeding against a party even with the client's consent after the
lawyer brings suit in his own behalf against the same defendant if it is
uncertain whether the defendant will be able to satisfy both judgments. A

lawyer is not authorized to have financial stakes in the subject matter of
the suit brought in behalf of his client.
The test of conflict of interest among lawyers is "whether the acceptance
of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his
duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof."In the same
manner, it is undoubtedly a conflict of interests for an attorney to put
himself in a position where self-interest tempts, or worse, actually impels
him to do less than his best for his client.
In the case at bar, although there was an adequate accounting for the
disbursement of the funds the Union received through the series of
agreements with the UST management, the court believes that Atty.
Mariano had ethical lapses in his transactions. He failed to avoid conflict
of interests: First, when he negotiated for the compromise agreement
wherein he played the diverse roles of union president, union attorney and
interested party (being one of the dismissed employees seeking
restitution); and second, when he obtained P4.2M as attorneys fees
without full disclosure of the circumstances justifying such claim.
As one of the 16 union officers and directors seeking compensation from
UST for their illegal dismissal, Atty. Mariano had a conflict of interest when
he also acted as concurrent lawyer and president of the Union in forging
the compromise agreement. Atty. Marino omitted that basic sense of
fidelity to steer clear of situations that put his loyalty and devotion to his
client, the faculty members of UST, open to question. As the lawyer and
president of the Union, he was duty bound to protect and advance the
interest of union members and the bargaining unit above his own. This
obligation was jeopardized when his personal interest as one of the
dismissed employees of UST complicated the negotiation process and
eventually resulted in the lopsided compromise agreement that rightly or
wrongly brought money to him and the other dismissed union officers and
directors, seemingly or otherwise at the expense of the faculty members.
Atty. Marino ought to have disclosed to the members of the Union his
interest in the compromise agreement as one of the dismissed union
officers seeking compensation for the claim of back wages and other
forms of damages, and also the reasons for reducing the claim of the
faculty members from more than P9M to only P2M. As the record shows,
the explanations for respondent's actions were disclosed only years after
the consummation of the compromise agreement, particularly only after

the instant complaint for disbarment was filed against him, when the
accounting should have been forthcoming either before or during the
settlement of the labor case against the management of UST.
Equally important, since respondent and the other union officers and
directors were to get for themselves a lion's share of the compromise as
they ultimately did, Atty. Marino should have unambiguously divulged and
made clear to his client the compelling probability of conflict of interests.
He should have voluntarily turned over the reins of legal representation to
another lawyer who could have acted on the matter with a deep sense
of impartiality over the several claims against UST and an unfettered
commitment to the cause of the faculty members.
Complainant spouses, upon learning of respondent's appearance against

them in the cadastral proceeding, manifested their disapproval thereof in
a letter dated 30 July 1974. At the hearing before the Office of the Solicitor
General and in his Answer, respondent Hernando admitted his
involvement in the cadastral case as counsel for the Abadillas but denied
having seen or taken hold of the controversial Transfer Certificate of Title,
and having availed himself of any confidential information relating to Lot
9439-B.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Harold M. Hernando represented conflicting interests
and thus has violated Rule 15.01 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of
HELD: Yes. Atty. Harold M. Hernando is guilty of representing conflicting
interests.
CASE 98: Generosa Buted Et Al v Atty. Harold M Hernando

FACTS: In an action for partition instituted by Generosa as compulsory heir
of the deceased Teofilo Buted, respondent was counsel for Luciana
Abadilla and a certain Angela Buted. Involved in said partition case was
a parcel of land Identified as Lot 9439-B. Respondent ultimately
succeeded in defending Luciana Abadilla's claim of exclusive ownership
over Lot 9439-B. When Luciana died, respondent withdrew his
appearance from that partition case.
It appears that Luciana Abadilla sold the lot to Benito Bolisay and a new
Transfer Certificate of Title over the lot was issued in the name of
complainant spouses. When an action for specific performance was
lodged by a couple named Luis Sy and Elena Sy against Benito Bolisay as
one of the defendants, 2 the latter retained the services of respondent
Atty. Hernando however claims that he rendered his services to Benito
Bolisay free of charge. Respondent avers that the relationship between
himself and Benito Bolisay as regards this case was terminated on 4
December 1969.
On 23 February 1974, respondent Hernando, without the consent of the
heirs of Luciana Abadilla and complainant spouses, filed a petition on
behalf of the heirs of Carlos, Dionisia and Francisco all surnamed Abadilla,
seeking the cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of
complainant spouses over the lot. Carlos, Dionisia and Francisco were
Luciana's registered co-owners in the original certificate of title covering
Lot No. 9439-B.
RATIO: The mere fact that respondent had acted as counsel for Benito
Bolisay in the action for specific performance should have precluded
respondent from acting or appearing as counsel for the other side in the
subsequent petition for cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of Title of
the spouses Generosa and Benito Bolisay.
This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner
from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from
unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. It is founded on principles
of public policy, on good taste.
The absence of monetary consideration does not exempt the lawyer from
complying with the prohibition against pursuing cases where a conflict of
interest exists.
CASE 99: Tiana v. Ocampo

FACTS: On July 14, 1981 and Aug. 10, 1981 two separate complaints were
filed by Maria Tiana and the Angel Spouses respectively, against Atty.
Amado Ocampo for disbarment. With regards to the first case,
complainant Tiana, claims that Atty. Ocampo was her retaining counsel
in all her legal problems as early as 1966. In 1972, one Mrs. Concepcion
Blaylock sued Tiana for ejectment to which Atty. Ocampo appeared as
counsel for both parties. Ocampo prepared the answer in the said
ejectment case and made Tiana sign a Compromise Agreement without
the latter reading it. Two years after, Tiana was shocked when she
received an order to vacate the property subject of the ejectment suit.
With regards to the second case, the complainants the Angel Spouses
allege that sometime in 1972, they sold their house in favour of the same
Mrs. Blaylock in the first case, for the amount of P70,000. Ocampo acted
as their counsel and prepared the Deed of Sale of a Residential House
and Waiver of Rights Over a Lot. The Angel spouses then bought another
parcel of land, to which Ocampo again prepared the Deed of Sale.
Ocampo allegedly made the Angel spouses sign two or more documents
which, accordingly, were made parts of the sale transaction. The spouses
then learned because of a complaint against them that the two
documents were a Real Estate Mortgage and a Promissory Note, both in
favour of Blaylock.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Ocampo is guilty of representing conflicting interests?
HELD: Yes, Atty. Ocampo is guilty of representing conflicting interests.
RATIO: Under Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, A
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. The act of
Ocampo of representing both Tiana and Blaylock in the first case and
again representing the Angel spouses and Blaylock in the second cases
constitutes a violation of Rule 15.03 against conflict of interest.
The test of the conflict of interest in disciplinary cases against a lawyer is
whether or not the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney
from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his
client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance thereof.
Ocampo is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.
CASE 100: Benedicto Hornilla, et. al. vs. Atty. Ernesto S. Salunat, A.C. No.
5804, July 1, 2003
FACTS: An SEC Case was filed by the PPSTA against its own Board of
Directors. Atty. Ernesto Salunat admits that the ASSA Law Firm, of which he
is the Managing Partner, was the retained counsel of PPSTA. Yet, he
appeared as counsel of record for the respondent Board of Directors in
the said case. Benedicto Hornilla contend that Atty. Ernesto Salunat was
guilty of conflict of interest because he was engaged by the PPSTA, of
which complainants were members, and was being paid out of its
corporate funds where complainants have contributed. Despite being
told by PPSTA members of the said conflict of interest, respondent refused
to withdraw his appearance in the said cases.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Ernesto Salunat is guilty of conflict of interest
HELD: Yes. Rule15.03. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts.
In other jurisdictions, the prevailing rule is that a situation wherein a lawyer
represents both the corporation and its assailed directors unavoidably
gives rise to a conflict of interest. The interest of the corporate client is
paramount and should not be influenced by any interest of the individual
corporate officials. The rulings in these cases have persuasive effect upon
us. After due deliberation on the wisdom of this doctrine, we are
sufficiently convinced that a lawyer engaged as counsel for a
corporation cannot represent members of the same corporations board
of directors in a derivative suit brought against them. To do so would be
tantamount to representing conflicting interests, which is prohibited by the
Code of Professional Responsibility?
CASE 101: Robert Victor G. Seares, Jr. vs. Atty. Saniata Liwliwa V. GonzalesAlzate, Adm. Case No. 9058, November 14, 2012
FACTS:Respondent Atty. Gonzales-Azalte is the former lawyer of
complainant Seares Jr. Seares Jr. ran for position of Municipal Mayor of
Dolores, Abra in May 2007 and lost, then respondent lawyer filed a protest
in the RTC on behalf of complainant but was dismissed for being Fatally
Defective. Respondent lawyer again filed the protest ibn the RTC and
was dismissed for being time barred and on ground of forum shopping.
Complainant ran again for the same position on May 2010 and won.
Later he learned that his opponents retained Respondent lawyer as their
counsel and one Turqueza charged complainant with abuse of authority,
oppression and grave misconduct and Respondent lawyer represents

Turqueza as counsel.
Seares, Jr. asserts that Atty. Gonzales-Alzate thereby violated Canon 15,
Canon 17 and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
negligently handling his election protest, for prosecuting him, her former
client, and for uttering false and hurtful allegations against him. Hence, he
prays that she should be disbarred.
ISSUE/S: WON Respondent lawyer violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD: No. the Court DISMISSES the administrative complaint against Atty.
Saniata Liwliwa V. Gonzales-Alzate for utter lack of merit. And admonishes
Seares jr. for filing a malicious complaint.
RATIO: The complaint against Atty. Gonzales-Alzate is unfounded and
devoid of substance.
We see no trace of professional negligence or incompetence on the part
of Atty. Gonzales-Alzate in her handling of Seares, Jr.s protest, especially
because she even filed in his behalf a Motion for Reconsideration, a
Comment on the Courts Dismissal of the Protest Ad Cautelam and a
Motion to Withdraw Cash Deposit..
The foregoing notwithstanding, we doubt the sincerity of the charge of
professional negligence and incompetence. Had Seares, Jr. been
prejudiced by Atty. Gonzales-Alzates negligent and incompetent
handling of his election protest, we wonder why he would denounce her
only after nearly five years have passed. The motivation for the charge
becomes suspect, and the charge is thereby weakened all the more.
Respondent lawyers representation of Turqueza neither resulted in her
betrayal of the fidelity and loyalty she owed to Seares, Jr. as his former
attorney, nor invited the suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing
while she was performing her duties as an attorney. Representing
conflicting interests would occur only where the attorneys new
engagement would require her to use against a former client any
confidential information gained from the previous professional relation. To
constitute the violation, the attorney should be shown to intentionally use
against the former client the confidential information acquired by her
during the previous employment
The charge was immediately unworthy of serious consideration because it

was clear from the start that Atty. Gonzales-Alzate did not take
advantage of her previous engagement by Seares, Jr. in her legal
representation of Turqueza in the latters administrative charge against
Seares, Jr. There was no indication whatsoever of her having gained any
confidential information during her previous engagement by Seares, Jr.
that could be used against Seares, Jr. Her engagement by Seares, Jr.
related only to the election protest in 2007, but Turquezas complaint
involved Seares, Jr.s supposedly unlawful interference in ousting Turqueza
as the president of the Liga ng mga Barangay of Dolores, Abra in 2010.
There is no question that both charges were entirely foreign to one
another.
CASE 102: Leticia Gonzales vs. Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, A.C. No. 6836,
January 23, 2006
FACTS: Gonzales filed a petition before the IBP alleging that: she was the
complainant in a case for sum of money and damages filed before the
MTC. she was represented by the law firm CABUCANA, CABUCANA, DE
GUZMAN AND CABUCANA LAW OFFICE, with Atty. Edmar Cabucana
handling the case and herein respondent as an associate/partner.
Gonzales won the case. Sheriff Romeo Gatcheco, failed to fully
implement the writ of execution issued in connection with the judgment
above which prompted Gonzales to file a complaint against the said
sheriff with this Court. After which, Sheriff Gatcheco and his wife went to
the house of Gonzales and they harassed and asked her to execute an
affidavit of desistance regarding her complaint before the Supreme
Court. Gonzales thereafter filed against the Gatchecos criminal cases for
trespass, grave threats, grave oral defamation, simple coercion and unjust
vexation. While law firm above-mentioned was still representing Gonzales,
herein Atty. Marcelino Cabucana represented the Gatchecos in the
cases filed by Gonzales against the said spouses.
Gonzales filed a complaint and alleged that Atty. Marcelino Cabucana
should be disbarred from the practice of law since his acceptance of the
cases of the Gatchecos violates the lawyer-client relationship between
Gonzales and Atty. Marcelino Cabucanas law firm and renders him liable
under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Marcelino averred that it was his brother, Atty. Edmar Cabacuna
who appeared and represented Gonzales in her civil case. He said that
the civil case filed by Gonzales where Atty. Marcelinos brother served as
consel is different from the criminal cases filed by Gonzales against the
Gatcheco spouses.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Marcelino is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility
HELD: Yes. Atty. Marcelino is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
RATIO: The Court finds Atty. Marcelino guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
It is well-settled that a lawyer is barred from representing conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts. Such prohibition is founded on principles of public
policy and good taste as the nature of the lawyer-client relations is one of
trust and confidence of the highest degree. Lawyers are expected not
only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants
be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice. The representation
of opposing clients in said cases, though unrelated, constitutes conflict of
interests or, at the very least, invites suspicion of double-dealing which this
Court cannot allow. Atty. Marcelino is Fined and given a Stern Warning.
CASE 103: Regala v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines instituted a Complaint before the
Sandiganbayan (SB), through the Presidential Commission on Good Govt
(PCGG) against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal
defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes
shares of stocks in the named corps. in PCGG Case No. 33 (CC No. 0033)
entitled "RP vs. Eduardo Cojuangco, et al." Among the defendants named
in the case are herein petitioners and herein private respondent Raul S.
Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello,
Concepcion, Regala and Cruz (ACCRA) Law Offices. ACCRA Law Firm
performed legal services for its clients and in the performance of these
services, the members of the law firm delivered to its client documents
which substantiate the client's equity holdings. In the course of their
dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire information
relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and business

circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and
private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the organization
and acquisition of the companies included in CC No. 0033, and in
keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nomineesstockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration
proceedings.
PCGG filed a "Motion to Admit 3rd Amended Complaint" & "3rd Amended
Complaint" w/c excluded Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33
as partydefendant, Roco having promised hell reveal the identity of the
principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies
involved in PCGG Case # 33. Petitioners were included in 3rd Amended
Complaint for having plotted, devised, schemed, conspired &
confederated w/each other in setting up, through the use of coconut levy
funds, the financial & corporate framework & structures that led to
establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, & more
than 20 other coconut levy funded corps, including the acquisition of San
Miguel Corp. shares & its institutionalization through presidential directives
of the coconut monopoly. Through insidious means & machinations,
ACCRA Investments Corp., became the holder of roughly 3.3% of the
total outstanding capital stock of UCPB. In their answer to the Expanded
Amended Complaint, petitioners alleged that their participation in the
acts w/ w/c their co-defendants are charged, was in furtherance of
legitimate lawyering Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from
ACCRA law firm, filed a separate answer denying the allegations in the
complaint implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten wealth. Petitioners then
filed their "Comment &/or Opposition" w/ Counter-Motion that PCGG
exclude them as parties-defendants like Roco. PCGG set the ff.
precedent for the exclusion of petitioners:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship;
and
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in
favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings.
Consequently, PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate
compliance by Roco of the same conditions precedent. However, during
said proceedings, Roco didnt refute petitioners' contention that he did
actually not reveal the identity of the client involved in PCGG Case No.
33, nor had he undertaken to reveal the identity of the client for whom he
acted as nominee-stockholder.
In a Resolution, SB denied the exclusion of petitioners, for their refusal to

comply w/ the conditions required by PCGG. It held, ACCRA lawyers
cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until they
have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the
existence and identity of the client.
ACCRA lawyers filed MFR w/c was denied. Hence, ACCRA lawyers filed
the petition for certiorari. Petitioner Hayudini, likewise, filed his own MFR
w/c was also denied thus, he filed a separate petition for certiorari,
assailing SBs resolution on essentially same grounds averred by petitioners,
namely:
SB gravely abused its discretion in subjecting petitioners to the strict
application of the law of agency. SB gravely abused its discretion in not
considering petitioners & Roco similarly situated &, thus, deserving equal
treatment.SB gravely abused its discretion in not holding that, under the
facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners from
revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other information requested
by the PCGG. SB gravely abused its discretion in not requiring that
dropping of partydefendants be based on reasonable & just grounds, w/
due consideration to constitutional rts of petitioners
PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that
the revelation of the identity of the client is not w/in the ambit of the
lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor are the documents it required
(deeds of assignment) protected, because they are evidence of nominee
status.
ISSUE/S: WON Attorney-Client privilege prohibits petitioner from revealing
the identity of their clients and other information requested by the PCGG
HELD: Yes, the resolution by the Sandiganbayan was annulled and set
aside
RATIO: As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be
shrouded in mystery. Under this premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction
is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the
name or identity of his client. The reasons advanced for the general rule
are well established. First, the court has a right to know that the client
whose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and
blood. Second, the privilege begins to exists only after the attorney-client
relationship has been established. The attorney-client privilege does not
attach until there is a client. Third, the privilege generally pertains to the
subject matter of the relationship. Finally, due process considerations
require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his
adversary. "A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent
is. He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces.
The general rule is, however, qualified by some important exception. 1)
Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing
the client's name would implicate that client in the very activity for which
he sought the lawyer's advice. 2) Where disclosure would open the client
to civil liability, his identity is privileged. 3) Where the government's lawyers
have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's
name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain
of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client's
name is privileged.
Vitug, J., Concurring Opinion:
The legal profession, despite all the unrestrained calumny hurled against it,
is still the noblest of professions. It exists upon the thesis that, in an orderly
society that is opposed to all forms of anarchy, it so occupies, as it should,
an exalted position in the proper dispensation of justice. In time, principles
have evolved that would help ensure its effective ministration. The
protection of confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship is one, and it
has since been an accepted firmament in the profession. It allows the
lawyer and the client to institutionalize a unique relationship based on full
trust and confidence essential in a justice system that works on the basis of
substantive and procedural due process. To be sure, the rule is not
without its pitfalls, and demands against it may be strong, but these
problems are, in the ultimate analysis, no more than mere tests of vigor
that have made and will make that rule endure.
Davide, J., Dissening Opinion
The rule of confidentiality under the lawyer-client relationship is not a
cause to exclude a party. It is merely a ground for disqualification of a
witness (Sec. 24, Rule 130, Rules of Court) and may only be invoked at the
appropriate time, i.e., when a lawyer is under compulsion to answer as
witness, as when, having taken the witness stand, he is questioned as to
such confidential communication or advice, or is being otherwise
judicially coerced to produce, through subpoenae duces tecum or
otherwise, letters or other documents containing the same privileged

matter.
Puno, J., Dissenting Opinion:
The attorney-client privilege can never be used as a shield to commit a
crime or a fraud. Communications to an attorney having for their object
the commission of a crime "partake the nature of a conspiracy, and it is
not only lawful to divulge such communications, but under certain
circumstances it might become the duty of the attorney to do so. The
interests of public justice require that no such shield from merited exposure
shall be interposed to protect a person who takes counsel how he can
safely commit a crime. The relation of attorney and client cannot exist for
the purpose of counsel in concocting crimes."
Case 104: Hilado v. David
FACTS: Petitoner alleged that she and the counsel for the defendant had
a attorney-client relationship with her when, before trial of the case she
went to the defendants counsel, gave him papers for the case and other
information relevant thereto, although she was not able to pay him legal
fees. That respondents law firm mailed to the plaintiff a written opinion
over his signature on the merit of her case; that this opinion was reached
on the basis of papers she submitted at his office; that Mrs. Hilados
purpose in submitting those papers was to secure Atty. Franciscos
Professional services. Atty. Francisco then appeared as counsel for the
defendant and plaintiff did not object to it until four (4) months later.
Plaintiff then moves to dismiss the case between her and defendant.
ISSUE/S: WON an attorney-client relationship was established between her
and defendant.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO:To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the
client should have employed the attorney professionally on any previous
occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid,
promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted
did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was
had.
Section 19 (e) of Rule 127 imposes upon an attorney the duty "to maintain
inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the
secrets of his client." There is no law or provision in the Rules of Court
prohibiting attorneys in express terms from acting on behalf of both parties
to a controversy whose interests are opposed to each other, but such
prohibition is necessarily implied in the injunctions above quoted. (In re De
la Rosa, 27 Phil., 258.) In fact the prohibition derives validity from sources
higher than written laws and rules. As has been aptly said in In re Merron,
22 N. M., 252, L.R.A., 1917B, 378, "information so received is sacred to the
employment to which it pertains," and "to permit it to be used in the
interest of another, or, worse still, in the interest of the adverse party, is to
strike at the element of confidence which lies at the basis of, and affords
the essential security in, the relation of attorney and client."
It was argued that only copies of pleadings already filed in court were
furnished to attorney Agrava and that, this being so, no secret
communication was transmitted to him by the plaintiff. This would not vary
the situation even if we should discard Mrs. Hilados statement that
papers, personal and private in character, were turned by her.
Precedents are at hand to support the doctrine that the mere relation of
attorney and client ought to preclude the attorney from accepting the
opposite partys retainer in the same litigation regardless of what
information was received by him from his first client.
CASE 105: Mercado vs. Atty. Virtolo
FACTS: Herein complainant is a Senior Education Program Specialist of the
Standards Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards. The
respondent on the other hand, is a Deputy Executive Director of CHED.
Complainants husband filed a Civil Case for the annulment of their
marriage with the RTC of Pasig, which was dismissed by the TC and the
dismissal thereof was final and executory on July 15,1992. In August 1992
however, the counsel of complainant died and on February 1994,
respondent entered his appearance before the trial court as
collaborating counsel for complainant. He also informed the RTC that he
has been appointed as counsel for the complainant. It also appears that
respondent filed criminal cases against complainant for allegedly
falsifying the birth certificates of her children.
Consequently, complainant filed other charges against respondent that
are pending before or decided upon by other tribunals including a libel
suit, administrative case for dishonesty and grave misconduct, and the
violation of R.A. 6713 also known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and employees before the SB. Complainant
Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint for falsification of public
document disclosed confidential facts and information relating to the civil
case for annulment, then handled by respondent Vitriolo as her
counsel. This prompted complainant Mercado to bring this action against
respondent claiming that, in filing the criminal case for falsification,
respondent is guilty of breaching their privileged and confidential lawyerclient relationship, and should be disbarred.
Respondent maintains that his filing of the criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents against complainant does not violate
the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client
because the bases of the falsification case are two certificates of live birth
which are public documents and in no way connected with the
confidence taken during the engagement of respondent as counsel. In
February 9, 2000, the Court referred the AM to the IBP for investigation. The
hearings were set but complainant failed to attend both. On June 21,
2003, the Board approved the report of investigating commissioner and
finding the respondent guilty for violating the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client. However, complainant,
upon learning of the punishment, issued a desistance letter and explicitly
forgives respondent.
ISSUE/S: WON respondent violated the rule on privileged communication
between attorney and client when he filed a criminal case against his
former client.
HELD: No.
RATIO: The Court held that in engaging the services of an attorney, the
client reposes on him special powers of trust and confidence. Their
relationship is strictly personal and highly confidential and fiduciary. The
relation is of such delicate, exacting and confidential nature that is
required by necessity and public interest. Thus, the preservation and
protection of that relation will encourage a client to entrust his legal
problems to an attorney, which is of paramount importance to the
administration of justice. The communication made by a client to his
attorney must not be intended for mere information, but for the purpose
of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations.
Furthermore, the communication must have been transmitted by a client
to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice. Complainant did
not even specify the alleged communication in confidence disclosed by
respondent. All her claims were couched in general terms and lacked
specificity. She contends that respondent violated the rule on privileged
communication when he instituted a criminal action against her for
falsification of public documents because the criminal complaint
disclosed facts relating to the civil case for annulment then handled by
respondent. Complainant did not even specify the alleged
communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims
were couched in general terms and lacked specificity. She contends that
respondent violated the rule on privileged communication when he
instituted a criminal action against her for falsification of public
documents because the criminal complaint disclosed facts relating to the
civil case for annulment then handled by respondent.
CASE 106: Donald Dee vs CA and Amelito Mutuc
FACTS: The petitioner and his father went to the residence of the
respondent to seek the latters advice regarding the problem of the
alleged indebtedness of the petitioners brother, Dewey Dee, to Ceasars
Palace, a well-known casino in Las Vegas. His services were reportedly
contracted for php 100,000.00. Because of the respondents work, the said
indebtedness was answered by Ramon Sy. He brought to the Casino the
letter of Ramon Sy owning the said debt.
Having settled this account of the petitioners brother, the private
respondent sent several demand letters to the petitioner for the balance
of Php50,000.00 as attorneys fees. The petitioner ignored the letter and
this caused the respondent to file a complaint against the petitioner in the
RTC of Makati.
The petitioner contends that there was no lawyer-client relationship
existing between them and their engagement was merely informal. The
first half of the 100,000php that was given by the petitioners were not
attorneys fees but were just pocket money. The RTC decided adversely to
the petitioner.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that at the time
when he was rendering services to the them, he was a consultant and
agent of the Caesars Palace and is therefore representing conflicting
interests. The RTC then reconsidered its decision. The private respondent
filed for the reconsideration of the said decision by the RTC with the Court
of Appeals and the said court reversed the decision of the RTC. Thus, the
petition.
ISSUE/S: Is the respondent not entitled to receive the other half of his
renumeration because he was representing conflicting interests.
HELD: Even assuming that the imputed conflict of interests obtained,
private respondent's role therein was not ethically or legally indefensible.
Generally, an attorney is prohibited from representing parties with
contending positions. However, at a certain stage of the controversy
before it reaches the court, a lawyer may represent conflicting interests
with the consent of the parties. A common representation may work to
the advantage of said parties since a mutual lawyer, with honest
motivations and impartially cognizant of the parties' disparate positions,
may well be better situated to work out an acceptable settlement of their
differences, being free of partisan inclinations and acting with the
cooperation and confidence of said parties.
RATIO:It is not completely accurate to judge private respondent's position
by petitioner's assumption that the interests of Caesar's Palace were
adverse to those of the petitioners. True, the casino was a creditor but that
fact was not contested or opposed by Dewey Dee, since the latter, as
verifications revealed, was not the debtor. Hence, private respondent's
representations in behalf of petitioner were not in resistance to the
casino's claim but were actually geared toward proving that fact by
establishing the liability of the true debtor, Ramon Sy, from whom
payment was ultimately and correctly exacted.
A lawyer is entitled to have and receive the just and reasonable
compensation for services rendered at the special instance and request
of his client and as long as he is honestly in good faith trying to serve and
represent the interests of his client, the latter is bound his just fees.
CASE 107: Alfonso C. Choa, vs. Judge Roberto S. Chiongson, A.M. No. MTJ95-1063 August 9, 1996
FACTS: In a previous case, Atty. Quiroz, counsel for Choa, filed a
complaint against respondent judge for allegedly his bias towards Choas
wife who was his neighbor. The Court dismissed the complaint and
directed Atty. Quiroz to show cause why he no disciplinary action be
taken against him.
In his pleading, which was more of a motion for reconsideration (and must
be noted that such filing of the same was filed beyond the reglementary
period was denied forthwith), he asserts that he never had the intention to
sue or prosecute under any groundless, false, or unlawful suit; that he
assisted the complainant in the honest belief that the latter really had a
cause of action against the Judge Chiongson; that he was only raising the
matter to show that indeed, the Judge Chiongson was being biased due
to such next-door relationship.
The Court interjected that Atty. Quirozs motive was to unduly influence
the course of the appeal in the criminal case of his client by injecting in
the mind of the appellate judge, that indeed, something was definitely
wrong with the appealed decision because the pontente thereof is now
facing a serious administrative complaint.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Quirozs assertion that it was in his honest belief that
his clients had a cause of action may excuse the same from
administrative sanction.
HELD: No. Any criticism against a judge made in the guise of an
administrative complaint which is clearly unfounded and impelled by
ulterior motive will not excuse the lawyer responsible therefor under his
duty of fidelity to the court. Atty. Quiroz is hereby FINED.
RATIO: While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full
devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability, he must do so only within the bounds of law.
He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable
results of his clients case with the end in view of promoting respect for the
law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain such actions or
proceedings only as appear to him be just, and such defense only as he
believes to be debatable under the law. (Rule 15.05)
The time of an officer of a court should not be wasted in answering or
defending groundless complaints; every minute of it is precious and must
be reserved for the enhancement of public service.
CASE 108: MERCADO V. SECURITY BANK CORPORATION
FACTS: On April 22, 1993, spouses Teofilo and Agnes Mercado obtained a
loan of P35M from the Security Bank Corporation. To secure the loan, they
executed in favor of respondent bank a real estate mortgage over their
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 169833. When they
failed to pay the loan, respondent foreclosed the mortgage extrajudicially. The spouses filed with the RTC a complaint for declaration of
nullity of extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings on the grounds of lack of
notice and non-compliance with the publication requirement. In its
decision, the trial court declared that the foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage is void and awarded petitioners P2M by way of moral damages
and attorney's fees. In the same Decision, the trial court granted the
counterclaim and awarded SBC: amount of the loan covered by the Real
Estate Mortgage, percentage of P35M until fully paid as interest, intereston the loan until fully paid, and on the loan and of the interest until fully
paid as penalty.
SBC filed a notice of appeal but it was dismissed by the trial court for its
failure to pay the appeal fee. The spouses did not appeal When the
decision became final and upon the SBC's motion, the trial court issued an
order of execution. Mercados filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied. Spouses filed with the trial court an urgent motion to quash the
notices of levy and the sheriffs sale but it was denied. Hence, the
scheduled execution sale was conducted and the property was sold to
SBC, being the highest bidder. On May 23, 2001, the certificate of sale
issued by the sheriff was registered in the Registry of Deeds. Undaunted,
they filed with the CA a petition for annulment of the trial court's Decision
granting SBC's counterclaim. During its pendency, the trial court issued a
writ of possession in favor of the bank. In their petition, spouses Mercado
alleged, among others, that they were denied their right to due process,
claiming that their failure to appeal from the Decision of the trial court was
due to their former counsel's gross negligence. The CA dismissed the
petition. Spouses filed a 2nd motion for reconsideration but was denied for
being prohibited.
On October 18, 2004, petitioner Mercado wrote Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. stating the inconsistencies of the trial in granting and denying
their petition. They have pointed out his act of calling their counsel, which
Atty. Villanueva had stated that the ponente informed him that she has to
deny their petition on the same ground because of the pressure from the
Chief Justice to favor SBC. Their counsel and the ponente were very close
to each other. It was also very suspicious that after a few days after the
conversation, he and his family left for London, leaving the case to the
care of one of his Associates. Later on, the ponente herself left for
the U.S.A. to visit her children.Before the receipt of the Resolution, denying
their petition on the basis of SBCs unsubstantiated Comment, SBC sold
the spouses property to a corporation and got a permit to demolish
4 buildings erected in their property from the Forbes Park Association,
even if the case is still pending and Motion for Reconsideration with the
Supreme Court has not yet been filed. The buyer already paid the
property because SBC told him that the ponente already had a go-signal
to sell the property. Few days thereafter, all the improvements in our
property were totally demolished by a construction company.
CJ Davide required Mercados lawyer, Atty. Jose P. Villanueva, to
comment on the letter and show cause why he should not be held in
contempt of court. Moreover, the court ordered Mercado to personally
appear and show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court.
On the scheduled date, Mercado, with Atty. Pablo G. Macapagal, his
new counsel, appeared before the Third Division and swore to the truth of
the letter he wrote. He manifested that he only stated what Atty.
Villanueva told him. He further manifested that during the wake of Atty.
Villanuevas mother, he (Atty. Villanueva) pointed to Justice Angelina
Sandoval-Gutierrez, bragging that she is a very very good, close and
long time friend of his. However, while stating this, Mercado referred
to Justice Conchita Carpio Morales as Justice Gutierrez. Atty. Villanueva
denied it, as well as the correlation between their trip in London and the
ponentes trip in US.
Justice Dacudao investigated the case and found Mercado guilty of
improper conduct tending to bring the authority and the administration of
justice by the Court into disrespect when he openly belittled, degraded,
and embarrassed the Highest Court of the land, particularly the Chief
Justice; however, has not acted with bad faith/malice
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Atty. Villanueva has violated Canon 15.06 of CPR,
stating the influence of a member of the Judiciary to the approval and
dismissal of a petition the case at bar
HELD: Yes. He revealed the information previously stated by Mercado.
Jose Teofilo T. Mercado and Atty. Jose P. Villanueva are
declared GUILTY of indirect contempt of court.
RATIO: As for Atty. Villanueva, while Justice Dacudao did not categorically
state that he (Atty. Villanueva) told Mercado that Chief Justice Davide
exerted tremendous pressure on the ponente, the reason why the

petition was dismissed for the second time, however, we are inclined to
believe that Atty. Villanueva gave such information to Mercado. Not
only that, Atty. Villanueva also revealed the name of the ponente; that he
and the ponente have known each other since 1964; and that
the ponente would be at the wake of his mother. The undersigned
investigator is fully convinced that it was only through Atty. Villanueva that
petitioner could have learned or known the name of the ponente in the
case.
Moreover, it was admitted by Atty. Villanueva that he and Justice
Gutierrez have known each other since 1964 and that Justice Gutierrez
was in the wake of his mother. These admissions tend to strengthen the
allegations of petitioner that Atty. Villanueva was the one who told him
the name of the ponente; that Atty. Villanueva told him that he and the
ponente are very close; and that when petitioner attended the wake of
Atty. Villanuevas mother, he was told by Atty. Villanueva that Justice
Gutierrez, the ponente, was coming.
Rule 15.06 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states
that, A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any
public official, tribunal or legislative body. Further, Rule 15.07 provides
that a lawyer must impress upon his client compliance with the laws and
the principles of fairness. In informing Mercado that he was a very very
good, close and long time friend of the ponente, Atty. Villanueva
impressed upon the former that he can obtain a favorable disposition of
his case. However, when his petition was dismissed twice, Mercados
expectation crumbled. This prompted him to hurl unfounded, malicious,
and disrespectful accusations against Chief Justice Davide and
the ponente.
CASE 109: Imelda A. Nakpil vs. Atty. Carlos J. Valdes
name. It was the Nakpils who occupied the Moran summer house. When
Jose Nakpil died on July 8, 1973, respondent acted as the legal counsel
and accountant of his widow, complainant IMELDA NAKPIL. On March 9,
1976, respondent's law firm, Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, handled the
proceeding for the settlement of Jose's estate. Complainant was
appointed as administratrix of the estate. The ownership of the Moran
property became an issue in the intestate proceedings. It appears that
respondent excluded the Moran property from the inventory of Jose's
estate. On February 13, 1978, respondent transferred his title to the Moran
property to his company, the Caval Realty Corporation. On March 29,
1979, complainant sought to recover the Moran property by filing with the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Baguio City an action for
reconveyance with damages against respondent and his corporation. In
defense, respondent claimed absolute ownership over the property and
denied that a trust was created over it.In this case the atty.s accounting
firm also handles the affairs of the Nakpils. respondent insisted that
complainant cannot hold him liable for representing the interests of both
the estate and the claimants without showing that his action prejudiced
the estate. He urged that it is not per se anomalous for respondent's
accounting firm to act as accountant for the estate and its creditors. He
reiterated that he is not subject to the jurisdiction of this Court for he acted
not as lawyer, but as accountant for both the estate and its claimants. He
alleged that his accounting firm merely prepared the list of claims of the
creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. Their claims were not defended by
his accounting or law firm but by Atty. Enrique Chan. He averred that his
law firm did not oppose these claims as they were legitimate and not
because they were prepared by his accounting firm. He emphasized that
there was no allegation that the claims were fraudulent or excessive and
that the failure of respondent's law firm to object to these claims
damaged the estate.
ISSUE/S: WON there was conflict of interest and WON the IBP has
jurisdiction since he was acting as accountant not a lawyer.
FACTS: The friendship of JOSE NAKPIL and respondent CARLOS J. VALDES

dates back to the '50s during their school days in De La Salle and the
Philippine Law School. Their closeness extended to their families and Atty.
Carlos J. Valdes became the business consultant, lawyer and accountant
of the Nakpils. In 1965, Jose Nakpil became interested in purchasing a
summer residence in Moran Street, Baguio City. 1For lack of funds, he
requested respondent to purchase the Moran property for him. They
agreed that respondent would keep the property in trust for the Nakpils
until the latter could buy it back. Title was then issued in Atty. Valdes
HELD: YES there was cconflict of interest and he is liable.

RATIO: Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively practicing both
professions. He is the senior partner of his law and accounting firms which
carry his name. In the case at bar, complainant is not charging
respondent with breach of ethics for being the common accountant of
the estate and the two creditors. He is charged for allowing his
accounting firm to represent two creditors of the estate and, at the same
time, allowing his law firm to represent the estate in the proceedings
where these claims were presented. The act is a breach of professional
ethics and undesirable as it placed respondent's and his law firm's loyalty
under a cloud of doubt. Even granting that respondent's misconduct
refers to his accountancy practice, it would not prevent this Court from
disciplining him as a member of the Bar. The rule is settled that a lawyer
may be suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to
his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.Possession of good moral
character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a
continuing requirement to the practice of law. Public confidence in law
and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of
a member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by
acting in a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity
of the legal profession. Members of the Bar are expected to always live up
to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility as
the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in
nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith.In the case at bar,
respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to his duty to observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in his dealings and transactions with his clients.
CASE 110: Emilia O. Dahiwal vs. Atty. Abelardo B. Dumaguing, A.C. No.
9390, August 1, 2012
FACTS: Complainant Dhaliwal engaged the services of respondent Atty.
Dumaguing in connection with the purchase of a parcel of land from FilEstate Development, Inc. (Fil-Estate). Upon the instruction of Atty.
Dumaguing, complainant
Dhaliwals
daughter
and
son-in-law
withdrew P 342,000.00 from the PNB and handed the cash over to Atty.
Dumaguing. They then proceeded to BPI Family Bank Malcolm Square
Branch where Atty. Dumaguing purchased two manager's checks in the
amounts of P 58,631.94 and P 253,188.00 both payable to the order of FilEstate Inc. When asked why the manager's checks were not purchased at
PNB, Atty. Dumaguing explained that he has friends at the BPI Family Bank
and that is where he maintains an account. These manager's checks were
subsequently consigned with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) after Dhaliwals request to suspend payments to Fil-Estate had
been granted. Atty. Dumaguing, on behalf of Dhaliwal, filed with the
HLURB a complaint for delivery of title and damages against Fil-Estate.
After a week, Atty. Dumaguing withdrew the two manager's checks that
were previously consigned. Dhaliwal informed the HLURB through a letter
that Atty. Dumaguing was no longer representing her. HLURB promulgated
its Decision, adverse to complainant, finding the case for delivery of title
and damages premature as there was no evidence of full payment of the
purchase price. Thereafter, Dhaliwal made demands upon Atty.
Dumaguing to return and account to her the amounts previously
consigned with the HLURB. Atty. Dumaguing did not comply. Thus,
Dhaliwal prays that Atty. Dumaguing be disbarred.
In his defense, Atty. Dumaguing said that the reason why he deemed it
not proper to return the said amount to Dhaliwal is that he filed a motion
for reconsideration with the HLURB but the latter had not yet acted on it.
Atty. Dumaguing attached a copy of the said motion for reconsideration.
The Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Dumaguing violated Canon
16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It also found respondent to
have submitted a false and fabricated piece of documentary evidence,
the Motion for Reconsideration. The Commission recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year. IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution adopting with
modification the Commission's Report and Recommendation.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Dumaguing violated Canon 16 of the Code of
HELD: Yes. He violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
He is suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
RATIO: Atty. Dumaguing is in violation of Canon 16 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which states, among others, that: A lawyer
shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his possession.
Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as payment for
the balance of the purchase price of a parcel of land as in the present
case, but not used for the purpose, should be immediately returned. "A
lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of
his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same
for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act
is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It
impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment."
CASE 111: Sevilla vs. Salubre, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1336, December 19, 2000
FACTS: Petra Sevilla and Sancho Sevilla hired Atty. Ismael L. Salubre as
legal counsel in a civil case for Repurchase and Damages with Prayer for
the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction against Shem J. Alfarero et, al. On
December 26, 1990, upon the advice of Atty. Salubre, the Sevillas turnedover to the Atty. Salubre the amount of P45,000.00 to be consigned with
the trial court as repurchase money. Instead of consigning the said
amount, the Salubre deposited the money in his name with the Family
Savings Bank in Panabo, Davao Province. Without the consent of the
Sevilla spouses, the said amount was withdrawn from the said bank,
misappropriated and used by Salubre for his own purposes and benefit.
This was followed by a series of promises and pleas for extension to pay.
Several promissory notes as well as pleas for extension were initiated by
Atty. Salbure promising to pay the said amount with interest on a certain
date however, it was not fulfilled stating that his loan with the PNB, Tagum
Branch was still being processed. On August 1, 1995, he once again asked
for an extension based on the same ground and promised to pay before
he assumes his post as judge of the MTC.
Atty. Salubre assumed office as judge of the MTC on August 1, 1995. He
issued two checks regarding the said amount due. However, on
November 4, 1997 both checks were dishonoured on the ground
"account closed".The Sevillas, through counsel, sent a demand letter
asking Salubre to make good the value of his two checks within five days
from receipt of the letter.
Sevilla spouses filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Salubre
charging him with violations of Cannons 16 and 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The case was referred to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation. The
OCA recommended that respondent Salubre be allowed to file his
Comment. The OCA opined that although the complaint focuses on acts
of respondent prior to his appointment as judge of the MTC, the charges
falls as one of the serious charges in Rule 140, Section 6 of the Rules of
Court, to wit, willful failure to pay a debt. The obligation was not
extinguished by his appointment as a Judge.
Respondent Atty. Salubre answered that that the amount he received
from complainant was in payment of his appearance fee and other
litigation expenses. He cited the case he handled with the complainants
in 1990 and 1991. Sometime in the middle part of 1990, complainant paid
him the amount of P45,000.00 for litigation expenses and appearance fee
in the above-mentioned cases which he (respondent) deposited in his
name with the Family Savings Bank, Panabo, Davao. However,
complainant caused him to sign a receipt which stated that the purpose
thereof is for the repurchase of the property subject of the case she filed
against Shem Alfarero. Atty. Salubro claims that this amount is not for the
repurchase of the said property considering that the value of the property
subject in the said case is P200,000.00.
Upon Atty. Salubres assumption of office as judge of the MTC, he paid the
amount due without interest. Since he failed to pay the full amount,
complainants filed a case of Estafa before the RTC. To avoid
embarrassment, respondent paid the amount demanded and eventually
complainant executed an Affidavit of Desistance on August 9, 1999 with
the assistance of her counsel. Later, the trial court ordered the dismissal of
the said criminal case of Estafa.
ISSUE/S: WON respondent Atty. Ismael L. Salubre should be disbarred for
his actions in the case at bar.
HELD: Yes, Atty. Ismael L. Salubre violated Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility: A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his possession.
RATIO: The OCA found the contention of respondent to be without merit.
The Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the OCA with
exception to the amount of the fine. The Court recommends that it should
be increased. Respondent Judge Ismael L. Salubre is liable for violation of
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his failure to return
the funds of his client (complainant herein) upon demand. As noted
earlier, respondent finally returned the funds to his client but only after the
latter sued him for estafa.
The Court cited Judge Adoracion G. Angeles vs. Atty. Thomas C. Uy, Jr.,
The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary; it
requires a high degree of fidelity and good faith. It is designed to remove
all such temptation and to prevent everything of that kind from being
done for the protection of the client.
Thus, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession. Furthermore, Rule 16.01 of the Code also states
that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or

received for or from the client. The Canons of Professional Ethics is even
more explicit: "The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his
personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence
reposed in him by his client. Money of the client collected for the client or
other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be
reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any
circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him."
In case at bar, the appointment of the respondent as Judge of the MTC is
not a valid reason for respondent not to properly address and comply
with the demand of complainant, his former client, to pay and settle
forthwith the amount he had received in trust from the latter.
Respondents contention that the money he received from complainant
was actually the latters payment for his appearance fee and other
litigation expenses should have been made known to complainant at the
earliest time when the demand was made. However, instead of properly
saying his piece regarding the matter he bombarded complainant with a
long line of promises in the hope that complainant would eventually allow
the matter to be left unsettled. Nothing in the numerous communications
which respondent judge sent to complainant would indicate that he had
really exerted efforts to explain the real story as he claimed it to be.
Respondent did not even squarely address the veracity of the letters he
sent to complainant and offer an explanation why his contention now is
different from the contents of those letters. What is evident from the
record is the fact that respondent misappropriated the money entrusted
to him by his client (complainant herein) while he was still in trial practice.
The fact that he was eventually appointed as Judge will not exculpate
him from taking responsibility of the consequences of his acts as an officer
of the court and, more so, now as Judge.
Though the acts complained of were prior to his appointment as a Judge,
it is trite to emphasize that the Code of Judicial Ethics no less mandates
that a judge should avoid the appearance of impropriety. Even his
personal behaviour in his everyday life should be beyond reproach.
Hence, respondent Judge Ismael L. Salubre is hereby found guilty of
violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his
failure to return and immediately deliver the funds of his former client,
Petra M. Sevilla upon demand and was ordered to pay a fine in the
amount of P20,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same
and similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
CASE 112: ORDONIO VS EDUARTE

FACTS: Antonia Ulibari filed with RTC for annulment of a document against
her children. The case was handled by Atty. Henerido Eduarte. However,
Atty. Henerido Eduarte was appointed as RTC judge. The case of Ulibari
was then transferred to Atty, Josephine Eduarte, wife of Atty. Henerido
Eduarte. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Antonia Ulibari. Only one
of the children, Dominga Ordonio, appealed to CA. While the appeal was
pending in the CA, Antonia conveyed some parcels of her land to her
children in the form of deeds of absolute sale, prepared and notarized by
Atty. Josephine Eduarte. Antonia also conveyed 20 hectares of land to
Atty. Josephine and Atty. Henerido as their attorneys fees. All the titles
and lands subject to the deeds of absolute sale and deeds of
conveyance were in the name of Antonia. Subsequently, Dominga filed a
disbarment complaint against Atty. Josephine on the basis of an affidavit
executed by her mother, Antonia, stating that she never conveyed parcel
of land to Atty. Josephine as attorneys fees and she had no knowledge
of the deeds of absolute sale executed in favor of her children. The IBPCBD recommended one-year suspension from the practice of law.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON Antonia was defrauded into signing the Deed of Conveyance
2. WON Atty. Josephine violated any law in preparing and notarizing the
deeds of absolute sale in making it appear that there were considerations
therefor, when in truth there were none so received by the seller
HELD
1. Yes. It is clear from Antonias affidavit and deposition that she never
conveyed the said land to her lawyer as attorneys fees. Granting for the
sake of argument that Antonio did convey the land as attorneys fee,
Atty. Josephine should have not caused the execution of the deed since
a case was still pending before CA covering the same land. She violated
Art 1491 of the Civil Code which prohibits lawyers from acquiring
assignment property and rights which may be subject of any litigation in
which they may take part by virtue of their profession. The prohibition
applies when a lawyer has not paid money for it and the property was
merely assigned to him in consideration of legal services rendered at a
time when the property is still subject of a pending case.
2. Yes. Atty. Josephine admitted that Antonia did not actually sell parcels
of land to her children and that she utilized the form of deed of sale
because it was the most convenient and appropriate document to effect
transfer of parcels of land. She violated part of her oath as a lawyer that
she shall not do any falsehood. She violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Overall holding: Suspension of 6 months for having violated Art 1491 of the
Civil Code another 6 months for violation of lawyers oath and Rule 10.01.
Total of one year suspension.
CASE 113: Domingo D. Rubias vs. Isiaias Batilier, G.R. No. L-35702, May 29,
1973
FACTS: Francisco Militante claimed ownership of a parcel of land located
in Iloilo and filed an application for the registration of the title of the land.
The CFI heard the land registration case and dismissed the application for
registration. Militante, appealed to the CA. Pending the disposal of the
appeal, Militante sold to the plaintiff, Domingo Rubias the land. The CA
confirmed the decision of CFI dismissing the application for registration.
Defendant Isaias Batiller argued that he andhis predecessors-in-interest
have always been in actual, open and continuous possession since time
immemorial under claim of ownership of the portions of the lot in question.
Batiller 's counsel filed a motion to dismiss Domingo's complaint alleging
that the latterbought from his father-in-law, Francisco Militante, the
property in dispute which was the subject matter of the land registration
case filed in the CFI of Iloilo, which case was brought on appeal in which
Domingo was the counsel of Francisco Militante. Batiller claims that
Domingo could not have acquired any interest in the property in dispute
as the contract he had with Francisco Militante was inexistent and void.
Invoking Arts. 1491 of the Civil Code which reads:
'ART. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire any purchase, even at a
public auction, either in person of through the mediation of another:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior
courts, and other officers and employees connected with the
administration of justice, the property and rights of in litigation or levied
upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory
they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of
acquiring an assignment and shall apply tolawyers, with respect to the
property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which
they may take part by virtue of their profession.'
ISSUE/S: WONthe contract of sale between Domingo and Francisco over
the property was void.
HELD: Yes because the sale was made when Domingo was counsel of
Francisco in a land registration case involving the property in dispute.
RATIO: CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Article 1491 of our Civil Code prohibits certain persons, by reason of the
relation of trust or their peculiar control over the property, from acquiring
such property in their trust or control either directly or indirectly and "even
at a public or judicial auction," among which are prosecuting attorneys,
and lawyers.
The deed of sale executed by him in favor of Domingo at a time when
Domingo was concededly his counsel of record in the land registration
case involving the very land in dispute was properly declared inexistent
and void by the lower court, as decreed by Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
CASE 114: Leonila J. Licuanan vs. Atty. Manuel L. Melo, A.M. No. 2361,
February 9, 1989
FACTS: An affidavit-complaint, dated November 11, 1981, was filed by
Leonila J. Licuanan with the Office of the Court Administrator on 5
February 1982 against respondent, Atty. Manuel L. Melo, for breach of
professional ethics, alleging that respondent, who was her counsel in an
ejectment case filed against her tenant, failed to remit to her the rentals
collected by respondent on different dates over a twelve-month period,
much less did he report to her the receipt of said amounts. It was only
after approximately a year from actual receipt that respondent turned
over his collections to complainant after the latter, through another
counsel, acquired knowledge of the payment and had demanded the
same.
In his Comment on the complaint, respondent admitted having received
the payment of rentals from complainant's tenant, Aida Pineda, as
alleged in the complaint, but explained that he kept this matter from the
complainant for the purpose of surprising her with his success in collecting
the rentals.
ISSUE/S: WON there was unreasonable delay on the part of the
respondent in accounting for the funds collected by him for his former
client, the complainant herein, for which unprofessional conduct
respondent should be disciplined, as violation of Canon 16.01 of the Code

of Professional Responsibility.
counsel in order to recover the amount rightfully due her but which
respondent had unjustifiedly withheld from her.
HELD: Yes, respondent is guilty of violation of Canon 16.01 of the CPR.
Respondent's unprofessional actuations considered, we are constrained

to find him guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in office.
He has displayed lack of honesty and good moral character. He has
violated his oath not to delay any man for money or malice, besmirched
the name of an honorable profession and has proven himself unworthy of
the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court. He deserves the
severest punishment.
Under Canon 16.01 which provides that: A lawyer shall account for all
money or property collected or received for or from the client.
RATIO: After investigation, the Solicitor General submitted the following

Findings and Recommendation: A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself
not to delay any man for money or malice and is bound to conduct
himself with all good fidelity to his clients. Under paragraph 11 of the
Canons of Legal Ethics, he is obligated to report promptly the money of
client that has come to his possession and should not commingle it with his
private property or use it for his personal purpose without his client's
consent.
In the instant case, respondent failed to observe his oath of office. It is
undisputed that the relation of attorney and client existed between
Licuanan and Melo at the time the incident in question took place. The
records disclose that on August 8, 1979, respondent, as Licuanan's
attorney, obtained judgment in Licuanan's favor against Aida Pineda
whereby the latter was directed by the City Court of Manila to pay
Licuanan all her monthly rentals from October, 1978 and succeeding
months thereafter.
The Court finds the foregoing findings well considered and adopt the
same but differ with the recommendation.
The actuations of respondent in retaining for his personal benefit over a
one-year period, the amount of P5,220.00 received by him on behalf of his
client, the complainant herein, depriving her of its use, and withholding
information on the same despite inquiries made by her, is glaringly a
breach of the Lawyer's Oath to which he swore observance, and an
evident transgression of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
Indeed, by his professional misconduct, respondent has breached the
trust reposed in him by his client. He has shown himself unfit for the
confidence and trust which should characterize an attorney-client
relationship and the practice of law. By reason thereof complainant was
compelled to file a groundless suit against her tenant for non-payment of
rentals thereby exposing her to jeopardy by becoming a defendant in a
damage suit filed by said tenant against her By force of circumstances,
complainant was further compelled to engage the services of another
WHEREFORE, consistent with the crying need to maintain the high

traditions and standards of the legal profession and to preserve
undiminished public faith in attorneys-at-law, the Court Resolved to
DISBAR respondent, Atty. Manuel L. Melo, from the practice of law. His
name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
CASE 115: Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Rayos CPR 16.01
FACTS: The records show that in January 1985, respondent induced
complainant who was then 85 years old to withdraw all her bank deposits
and entrust them to him for safekeeping. Respondent told her that if she
withdraws all her money in the bank, they will be excluded from the estate
of her deceased husband and his other heirs will be precluded from
inheriting part of it.
Acting on respondent's suggestion, complainant preterminated all her
time deposits with the Philippine National Bank on January 18, 1985. She
withdrew P588,000.00.
Respondent then advised complainant to deposit the money with Union
Bank where he was working. He also urged her to deposit the money in his
name to prevent the other heirs of her husband from tracing the same.
Complainant heeded the advice of respondent. On January 22, 1985,
respondent deposited the amount of P588,000.00 with Union Bank under
the name of his wife in trust for seven beneficiaries, including his son. The
maturity date of the time deposit was May 22, 1985.
On May 21, 1985, complainant made a demand on respondent to return
the P588,000.00 plus interest. Respondent told her that he has renewed
the deposit for another month and promised to return the whole amount
including interest on June 25, 1985. Respondent, however, failed to return
the money on June 25, 1985.
Valdez argues that he did not abandon his client. He claims that he gave
periodic status reports on the result of his work, that he returned the
documents in connection with the case, and that he rendered an
accounting of the money that he actually received.
On August 16, 1985, respondent informed complainant that he could only

return P400,000.00 to be paid on installment. Complainant acceded to
respondent's proposal as she was already old and was in dire need of
money.
Overgaard declared that he did not receive the documents being

demanded from the respondent, nor did he receive an accounting of the
money he paid to Atty. Valdez.
ISSUE/S: WON violated Canon 16.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Valdez violated Canon 16.01 for failing to account for
all money or property collected or received for or from Overgaard.
HELD: Yes. The respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD: Atty. Valdez violated Canon 16.01 for failing to account for all
money or property collected or received for or from Overgaard.
RATIO: Respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, as

well as his oath as an attorney when he deceived his 85-year old aunt into
entrusting to him all her money, and later refused to return the same
despite demand. Respondent's wicked deed was aggravated by the
series of unfounded suits he filed against complainant to compel her to
withdraw the disbarment case she filed against him. Indeed, respondent's
deceitful conduct makes him unworthy of membership in the legal
profession. The nature of the office of a lawyer requires that he shall be of
good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent
to admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession is
essential to maintain one's good standing in the profession.
CASE 116: Torben B. Overgaard vs. Atty. Godwin R. Valdez, A.C. No. 7902,
September 30, 2008
FACTS: Torben Overgaard engaged the services of respondent Valdez as
his legal counsel in two cases filed by him and two cases filed against him.
Despite the receipt of the full amount of legal fees of P900,000.00 as
stipulated in a Retainer Agreement, the respondent refused to perform
any of his obligations under their contract for legal services, ignored the
complainants request for a report of the status of the cases entrusted to
his care, and rejected the complainants demands for the return of the
money paid to him.
Complainant Overgaard filed a complaint for disbarment against Valdez
before the IBP.
If the respondent had indeed returned the documents sometime in the

middle of July 2006, he would have presented a receipt to prove such
turnover of documents. And if the respondent had indeed rendered an
accounting of the money that was paid to him, he would have attached
a received copy of the accounting to his Motion for Reconsideration. But
he failed to do both. There was no proof presented.
It is a lawyers duty to properly account for the money he received from
the client.If indeed the respondent told the client that he would pay
P300,000.00 to two intelligence operatives, as he claims in his Motion for
Reconsideration, he should have held this money in trust, and he was
under an obligation to make an accounting. It was his duty to secure a
receipt for the payment of this amount on behalf of his client. But he failed
to present any receipt or certification from Collado that the payment was
received. Since the respondent was not able either to present an
accounting of the P900,000.00 paid to him upon the complainants
demand, or to provide a sufficient and plausible explanation for where
such amount was spent, he must immediately return the same.
CASE 117: Fermina Legaspi Darpy. Lydia Legaspi and Agripino Legaspi v.
Atty. Ramon Chaves Legaspi (1975)
FACTS: Fermina Legaspi Daroy and other of her co-petitioners (clients, for
brevity) hired the services of their cousin, Atty. Ramon Chaves Legaspi
(Atty. Ramon, for brevity) for the intestate proceedings of a relative,
where the clients are one of the six parties considered as legal heirs. The
party of the client include Fermina and one Vivencio, their brother who is
abroad. The clients (represented by Atty. Ramon) along with the five other
parties considered to succeed their relative who died intestate came to
an agreement that the coconut land they will inherit is to be divided into
six equal parts; that the administrator of the property will be authorized to
sell it, and the proceeds will be equally divided to the parties.
The property was subsequently sold, but the clients came to know about it
thru a letter sent by Atty. Ramon to their father on Nov 28, 1969. The first
letter informed them that the money had been deposited in the bank and
that they may withdraw it on December 8, 1969, at 9am. However, they
were not able to get the money because a day before, on Dec 7, they
received another note, this time telling them not to proceed to the bank
and instead, go to Cagayan de Oro city on Dec 10 to get the money. On
Dec 9, clients received a note from one Atty. Sugamo telling them not
to proceed to CDO because their checks will be ready on Thursday or
Friday yet. However, on the afternoon of the same day, the clients
received a note from Atty. Ramon, telling them that he hopes for
understanding; that the money is now in his custody; that he previously
had a case where he had to use their own money; that in order to repay
the amount he used, he had sold his jeep, but the buyer was not yet able
to fully pay him. He asks for a few more days until the buyer had delivered
the complete amount.
The truth is, Atty. Ramon received the amount of P4,000 from the deputy
provincial sheriff on October 20, 1969. He even signed a receipt, and the
lawyers of the five other parties were able to get their shares as well,
which they successfully delivered to their clients. The client of Atty. Ramon
made several demands for the delivery of the amount, but he
continuously broke his promises to do so. Hence, the client filed this
complain for disbarment on March 13, 1970. They even pleaded the Court
for immediate action because Atty. Ramon was allegedly bragging that
nothing will happen to this case. The Court referred the case to the
Solicitor General, and the Sol-Gen referred the case to the City Fiscal, but
Atty. Ramon did not appear in any of the proceedings.
Atty. Ramons version of the story is this: he admitted receiving the amount
but allegedly wired (sent a telegram) to the clients father to talk about
the proper disposal of the cash. The father supposedly went to see him
a day after and at their meeting, allegedly agreed that P700 will be
deducted from the 4k to cover the expenses which was to cover
expenses involved in the litigation. It was also alleged that according to
an agreement, the remaining P3,300 will be divided into six: four of the
clients, then their father, then Atty. Ramon. He allegedly gave the P412
share of the father, but Atty. Ramon did not present any receipt to prove
it. It is also claimed that the father told him to keep the share of one of the
clients (Vivencio, who is abroad), but later on, the father allegedly got the
share, but there was no receipt presented to prove this. After all these, an
amount of P2,476 was allegedly left with Atty. Ramon, and the clients
refused consistently to receive the balance because they wanted the
full 4k. He now claims he had paid 2k and that only P476 was left with him.
No proof was presented with regard to this.
ISSUE/S: WON the conduct of Atty. Ramon constitutes breach of trust
(Note: the clients charged him of malpractice for having misappropriated
the sum of 4k, and seeks his disbarment)
HELD: Yes. Atty. Ramon is guilty of deceit, malpractice and professional
misconduct for having misappropriated the funds of his clients. His
manufactured defenses, his lack of candor and his repeated failure to
appear at the investigation conducted by the City Fiscal and at the
hearings scheduled by the SC, thus causing this proceeding to drag on for
a long time, demonstrate his unworthiness to remain as a member of the
noble profession of law.
RATIO: Note that the Court did not specifically cite a Canon from the CPR
because this case was decided in 1975 while the CPR was promulgated
only in 1988.
A lawyer, under his oath is bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity
to his clients. He is obligated to report promptly the money of his clients
that has come into his possession. He should not commingle it with his
private property or use it for his personal purposes without his client's
consent. He should maintain a reputation for honesty and fidelity to
private trust (Pars. 11 and 32, [Old] Canons of Legal Ethics). Money
collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgment in favor of his clients is
held in trust and must be immediately turned over to them (Aya vs.
Bigornia).
"The relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in its
nature and of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character,
requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith" (7 Am. Jur. 2d 105). In
view of that special relationship, "lawyers are bound to promptly account
for money or property received by them on behalf of their clients and
failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. The fact that a lawyer
has a lien (a right to keep possession of property belonging to another

person until a debt owed by that person is discharged) for fees on money
in his hands collected for his clients does not relieve him from the duty of
promptly accounting for the funds received." (In Re: Bamberger).
that case therefore he merely pocketed the said amount.
When he wrote the letter to the father of the clients, as well as the
succeeding letters, he obviously acted in bad faith because he admitted
receiving the cash more than a month earlier. The truth is, he did not send
any wire (message) to the father of the clients asking for a meeting. That
meeting never happened. That the respondent in his testimony and
memorandum forgot that note (the one telling them to withdraw the cash
from the bank at 9am), which is attached with the complaint and which
he admitted in his answer, is an indication that he does not know the facts
of his own case and that he had no scruples in trying to mislead and
deceive the Court.
ISSUE/S: WON Ricafort violated rule 16.02 of Canon 16 of the Code of

He was tempted to concoct a story as to his alleged payments to the

father because the latter is dead and could not refute him. However,
complainants' documentary evidence refutes his prevarications,
distortions and fabrications. He also submitted an alleged copy of the
agreement executed by and among the parties, which include him as an
heir to the estate, but it was not explained why his name appears there. It
was also allegedly signed by Vivencio, but it could not be explained how
Vivencio was able to sign it when he was abroad during its execution.
That document, its incompleteness and lapses manifest the
incompetence of Atty. Ramon and the notary public. That document has
no connection with the P4,000 and does not justify the misappropriation or
breach of trust committed.
It bears emphasis that a lawyer, under his oath pledges himself not to
delay any man for money or malice and is bound to conduct himself with
all good fidelity to his clients. He is obliged to report promptly the money
of his clients that has come into his possession. He should not commingle it
with his private property or use it for personal purposes without his clients
consent. He should maintain a reputation for honesty and fidelity to
private trust.
CASE 118: Businos v. Ricafort

FACTS:Petitioner Lourdes Businos entrusted Respondent Francisco Ricafort
with money for deposit in the bank account of Businos husband. The sum
of the money is P32,000. Of this amount, P30,000 was for deposit to the
bank account and the P2,000 is the amount Ricafort asked as a bond for
civil case no. 5814 when no such bond is required.
Instead of depositing the money, Ricafort converted the money to his
own personal use and despite several demands, he failed to return the
same to Businos. Businos is then constrained to file a criminal case for
estafa and a disbarment case against Ricafort. Also, the P2,000 Ricafort
asked for was never used for a bond because no bond was required of
Despite of numerous summons to comment on the complaint, Ricafort

failed to comply therefore it indicates his high degree of irresponsibility.
HELD:Yes. By converting the money of his clients to his own personal use
without their consent and for collecting P2000 to be used as a bond which
is not required, Ricafort is undoubtedly guilty of deceit, malpractice and
gross misconduct therefore the court resolves to disbar him.
RATIO:According to Rule 16.02 a lawyer shall keep the funds of each client
separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him.
CASE 119: Quilban v. Robinol

FACTS: The Colegio de San Jose, through its administrator, Father Federico
Escaler, sold a land to the Quezon City Government as the site for the
Quezon City General Hospital but reserved an area of 2,743 square meters
as a possible development site. Squatters, however, settled in the area
since 1965 or 1966. In 1970, the Colegio, through Father Escaler gave
permission to Congressman Luis R. Taruc to build on the reserved site a
house for his residence and a training center for the Christian Social
Movement. Seeing the crowded shanties of squatters, Congressman Taruc
suggested to Father Escaler the idea of donating or selling the land cheap
to the squatters. Congressman Taruc then advised the squatters to form
an organization and choose a leader authorized to negotiate with Father
Escaler. Following that advice, the squatters formed the "Samahang
Pagkakaisa ng Barrio Bathala", with Bernabe Martin as President.
But instead of working for the welfare of the Samahan, Martin went to one
Maximo Rivera, a realtor, with whom he connived to obtain the sale to the
exclusion of the other Samaban members. The land was ultimately sold to
Rivera at a cheap price of PI5 per square meter or a total consideration of
P41,961.65. The prevailing price of the land in the vicinity then was P1 00 to
P1 20 per square meter. Father Escaler had been made to believe that
Rivera represented the squatters on the property.
In 1972, thirty-two heads of families of the Samahan filed the case against
Rivera, et. al. The CFI, however, dismissed the case.
To prosecute the appeal in the CAl, the Samahan members hired as their
counsel Atty. Santiago R. Robinol for which the latter was paid P2,000.00
as attorney's fees on. Atty. Robinol was also to be given by the members a
part of the land, subject matter of the case, equal to the portion that
would pertain to each of them. What was initially a verbal commitment
on the land sharing was confirmed in writing.
On 14 November 1978, the Court of Appeals reversed the CFI Decision
and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.
To raise the amount of P41,961.65 ordered paid by the Court of Appeals,
plus expenses for ejectment of the non-plaintiffs occupying the property,
conveyance, documentation, transfer of title etc., the five officers of the
Samahan collected, little by little, P2,500.00 from each head of family. The
Treasurer, Luis Agawan, issued the proper receipts prepared by Atty.
Robinol.
On 18 May 1979, the sum of P68,970.00 was turned over to Atty. Robinol by
the officers; on 31 May 1979 the amounts of P1,030.00 and P2,500.00
respectively; and on 2 June 1979, the sum of P2,500.00, or a total of
P75,000.00.
After almost a year, the five officers discovered that no payment had
been made to Rivers. When queried, Atty. Robinol replied that there was
an intervention filed in the civil case and that a Writ of Execution bad not
yet been issued by the CFI of Quezon City. However, it turned out that the
motion for intervention had already been dismissed. After confronting
Atty. Robinol with that fact, the latter gave other excuses, which the
officers discovered to have no basis at all.
Plaintiffs later on decided to change their counsel, Atty. Robinol, to
terminate his services as Atty. Robinol had delayed paying for their land
notwithstanding the Decision of the Court of Appeals in their favor. They
then approached Atty. Montemayor who agreed to be their counsel.
Court referred administrative cases to the Sol. Gen. who recommended:

1. That Atty. Santiago R. Robinol be suspended for three months for
refusing to deliver the funds of the plaintiffs in his possession, with the
warning that a more severe penalty will be imposed for a repetition of the
same or similar act, and that he be ordered to return to the plaintiffs, the
sum of P75,000.00. 2. That the case against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor,
be dismissed, since he has not committed any misconduct imputed to him
by Atty. Robinol.
ISSUE/S
1. WON Atty. Robinol should be suspended
2. WON Atty. Montemayor should be disbarred
HELD
1. YES
2. NO
RATIO: Atty. Robinol has, in fact, been guilty of ethical infractions and
grave misconduct that make him unworthy to continue in the practice of
the profession. After the CA had rendered a Decision favorable to his
clients and he had received the latter's funds, suddenly, he had a change
of mind and decided to convert the payment of his fees from a portion of
land equivalent to that of each of the plaintiffs to P50,000.00, which he
alleges to be the monetary value of that area. Certainly, Atty. Robinol
had no right to unilaterally appropriate his clients' money not only
because he is bound by a written agreement but also because, under the
circumstances, it was highly unjust for him to have done so. His clients
were mere squatters who could barely eke out an existence. They had
painstakingly raised their respective quotas of P2,500.00 per family with
which to pay for the land only to be deprived of the same by one who,
after having seen the color of money, heartlessly took advantage of
them.
- Atty. Robinol has no basis to claim that since he was unjustly dismissed by
his clients he had the legal right to retain the money in his possession.
Firstly, there was justifiable ground for his discharge as counsel. His clients
had lost confidence in him for he had obviously engaged in dilatory
tactics to the detriment of their interests, which he was duty-bound to pro.
tect. Secondly, even if there were no valid ground, he is bereft of any
legal right to retain his clients' funds intended for a specific purpose-the
purchase of land. He stands obliged to return the money immediately to

their rightful owners.
- The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that complainants' evidence
on this is the more credible. And that he had, in fact, received the total
sum of P75,000-00. Inevitable, therefore, is the conclusion that Atty.
Robinol has rendered himself unfit to continue in the practice of law. He
has not only violated his oath not to delay any man for money and to
conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He has also brought the
profession into disrepute with people who had reposed in it full faith and
reliance for the fulfillment of a life-time ambition to acquire a homelot
they could call their own.
In so far as Atty. Montemayor is concerned, we agree with the findings of
the Solicitor General that he has not exposed himself to any plausible
charge of unethical conduct in the exercise of his profession when he
agreed to serve as counsel for the plaintiffs.There is no doubt that clients
are free to change their counsel in a pending case at any time (Section
26, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and thereafter employ another lawyer who
may then enter his appearance. In this case, the plaintiffs in the civil suit
below decided to change their lawyer, Atty. Robinol, for loss of trust and
confidence. That act was well within their prerogative. In so far as the
complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Robinol against Atty. Montemayor
is concerned, therefore, the same is absolutely without merit.
CASE 120: Arellano University vs. Atty Leovigildo H. Mijares III
FACTS: Complainant Arellano University, Inc. engaged the services of
respondent Leovigildo H. Mijares III for securing a certificate of title
covering a dried up portion of the Estero de San Miguel that the University
had been occupying. The property was the subject of a Deed of
Exchange dated October 1, 1958 between the City of Manila and the
University. In its complaint for disbarment, Arellano University alleged that it
gave Atty Mijares III all the documents the latter needed to finish his work
and was given P500, 000.00 on top of his attorneys fees, supposedly to
cover the expenses for "facilitation and processing."
Respondent Mijares III informed the University that he already completed
Phase I of the titling of the property, meaning that he succeeded in
getting the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to approve it.
The University requested respondent for copies of the MMDA approval but
he unreasonably failed to comply despite repeated demands. When he
made himself scarce, the University was prompted to withdraw all the
cases it had entrusted to him and demand the return of the P500, 000.00 it
gave him. The University eventually terminated respondents services.
Commissioner Funa recommended a) that Mijares be held guilty of
violating Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 15, Rule 15.05, Canon 16, Rules 16.01
and 16.03, and Canon 18, Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and meted out the penalty of disbarment; b) that he be
ordered to return the P500, 000.00 and all the pertinent documents to the
University; and c) that Mijares sworn statement that formed part of his
Answer be endorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman for investigation
and, if warranted, for prosecution with respect to his shady dealing with
Deputy Chairman Lacuna however the IBP Board of Governors modified it
to indefinite suspension.
ISSUE/S: WON respondent Mijares is guilty of misappropriating the P500,
000.00 that the University entrusted to him for use in facilitating and
processing the titling of a property that it claimed
HELD: Yes, he is guilty of violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 15, Rule
15.05, Canon 16, Rules 16.01 and 16.03, and Canon 18, Rule 18.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and imposes on him the penalty of
disbarment.
RATIO: Every lawyer has the responsibility to protect and advance the
interests of his client such that he must promptly account for whatever
money or property his client may have entrusted to him. As a mere trustee
of said money or property, he must hold them separate from that of his
own and make sure that they are used for their intended purpose. If not
used, he must return the money or property immediately to his client upon
demand; otherwise the lawyer shall be presumed to have
misappropriated the same in violation of the trust reposed on him. A
lawyers conversion of funds entrusted to him is a gross violation of
professional ethics
CASE 121: Teresita Bayonla v. Atty. Purita Reyes, AC No 4808, November
22, 2011
FACTS: Petra Durban and Paz Durban were sisters who had jointly owned
a parcel of land in Butuan City. They died without leaving a will. Their land
was then expropriated when the Bancasi Airport was constructed. An
expropriation compensation amounting to about P2.4M was to be paid to
their heirs. Pazs son, Alfredo Tabada, and Tabadas nephew, petitioner
Teresita Bayonla, were the compulsory heirs. Tabada and Bayonla
engaged the legal services of Atty. Purita Reyes to collect their share in
the expropriation compensation. They all agreed that Atty. Reyes would
have 10% of whatever amount they will collect as her attorneys fees.
In November 1993, Atty. Reyes had collected P1M. She continuously failed
to deliver the right amount to Bayonla despite repeated demands.
Hence, Bayonla charged Atty. Reyes with gross dishonesty, deceit,
conversion and breach of trust.
On the other hand, Atty. Reyes argued that they all agreed that she
would receive 40% of whatever amount the heirs would receive. She
added that she even incurred travel and other expenses in collecting
such share.
In June 1998, the court referred the complaint to the IBP for investigation,
report and recommendation. In April 1999, IBP Commissioner Lydia
Navarro recommended against Atty. Reyes. Navarro said that as counsel
of the heirs, Atty. Reyes should have given the heirs a breakdown of
whatever amount she received or would come to her knowledge as their
counsel in accordance with Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Atty. Reyes had the chance to rectify her errors but she
failed to do so.
Navarro then required Atty. Reyes to: (1) render an accounting or
inventory of the collected shares, (2) have the heirs confirm it, and (3)
remit said shares. Unless Atty. Reyes did all these, she was to be suspended
from the practice of law. In a Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved Navarros report.
Atty. Reyes moved for reconsideration but it was denied. She then filed a
motion for reinvestigation but it was also denied. In August 2002, the IBP
Board of Governors informed the court that Atty. Reyes had neither
rendered an accounting nor remityed the amount to Bayonla. In May
2010, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) recommended the final
resolution of the case.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Reyes is guilty violating Canon 16.03 of the Code of
HELD: Yes. Atty. Reyes is guilty of violating Canon 16.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. She is suspended from the practice of law for 2

years, with a warning that a similar offense will be dealt with more severly.
RATIO: Canon 16.03 provides that a lawyer shall deliver the funds and
property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have
a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice
promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same
extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as
provided for in the Rules of Court.
This Rule demands that the lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of
his client when due or upon demand, subject to the lawyers lien over the
funds, or the lawyers option to apply so much of the funds as may be
necessary to satisfy the lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice
promptly thereafter to the client. This is appropriate considering that the
relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary, and
prescribes on a lawyer a great degree of fidelity and good faith. A lawyer
is obliged to render an accounting of all the property and money she has
collected for her client. This obligation includes the prompt reporting and
accounting of the money collected by the lawyer by reason of a
favorable judgment to his client.
Based on the records, Bayonla and her uncle would each receive the
amount of P84,852.00 out of the first release, and the amount of
P121,119.11 out of the second release. Her total share from the two
releases was P205,971.11. With Atty. Reyes being entitled to P82,388.44 as
attorneys fees, the equivalent of 40% of Bayonlas share, the net share of
Bayonla was P123,582.67. Yet, Atty. Reyes actually delivered to her only
P79,000.00,[19] which was short by P44,582.67. Despite demands by
Bayonla and despite the orders from the IBP Board of Governors for her to
remit the shortage. Atty. Reyes refused to do so. By not delivering
Bayonlas share despite her demand, Atty. Reyes violated Rule 16.03. The
money collected by Atty. Reyes as the lawyer of Bayonla was
unquestionably money held in trust to be immediately turned over to the
client.The unjustified withholding of money belonging to the client
warrants the imposition of disciplinary sanctions on the lawyer.
CASE 122: In Re Atty. Melchor E. Ruste
FACTS: Melchor E. Ruste, appeared for and represented, as counsel,
Severa Ventura and her husband, Mateo San Juan in a cadastral
proceeding and there was no agreement the respondent and his said
clients as to the amount of his fees; but that they paid to him upon
demand on different occasions the sums of 30 and P25 as attorney's fees.
After making the payments, Ruste again demanded of the complainant
and his wife as additional fees the sum of P25, but they had no money to
pay, him, and so he asked them to execute in his favor a contract of
lease, and a contract of sale, of their share in said lot No. 3764 in order
that he may be able to borrow or raise said sum of P25.
In accordance with Rustes request, the complainant and his wife
executed on Sept. 22, 1930, a contract of lease, whereby in consideration
of P100, they leased to him their coconut and banana plantation in lot
No. 3764 for a term of five years, and also a deed of sale, whereby in
consideration of P1,000, they sold and transferred to him their undivided
eleven-twentieth (11/20) share in said lot No . 3764, although, in fact and
in truth, neither of the consideration mentioned in said contracts of lease
and sale were ever receive by them.
On Mar 21, 1931, the respondent executed a deed of sale, whereby in
consideration of P370 he sold and transferred to Ong Chua said undivided
eleven-twentieth (11/20) share in lot No. 3764 excluding the house and its
lot, occupied by the complainant and his wife; and on Mar 28, 1931, the
respondent executed another deed of sale, whereby in consideration of
the same amount of P370 paid to him by the same Ong Chua, he sold
and transferred to the latter the same undivided eleven-twentieth (11/20)
share in lot No. 3764.
On Oct 10, 1933, however, the respondent notified the complainant and
his wife in writing that the said house still belonged to the respondent, and
requires said spouses to pay, the sum of P40.50, representing ten months'
rental in arrears, and thereafter a monthly rental of P1.50.
Ruste did not turn over to the complainant and his wife the P370 paid by
Ong Chua.
ISSUE/S: WON Melchor E. Ruste violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility by raising the fund due him through
machinations similar to lending/borrowing.
HELD: Yes. Melchor E. Ruste engineered the machination that led him to
acquire his clients property.
RATIO: In July, 1930, the respondent acted as counsel for the complainant
and his wife when the latter laid claim of ownership, eleven-twentieth of
said lot having been eventually adjudicated to the wife, Severa Ventura,
on December 20, 1933. On September 22, 1930, that is, during pendency
of said cadastral case, the spouses purportedly leased a part of said lot to
Ruste for P100, which lease was cancelled and superseded by a deed of
sale executed on the same date, whereby the said spouses, in
consideration of P1,000, conveyed eleven-twentieth of the same land in
favor of Ruste.
The property being thus in suit, which the respondent was waging on
behalf of his clients, his acquisition thereof by the deed of sale, Exhibit B,
constitutes malpractice.
CASE 123: Bautista v. Gonzales
FACTS: On May 19, 1976, Complainant Angel L. Bautista charged
respondent Ramon A. Gonzales with malpractice, deceit, gross
misconduct and violation of lawyers oath. Bautista alleged that Gonzales
committed certain acts, among others, accepting a case wherein he
agreed with his clients, the Fortunados, to pay all expenses, including
court fees, for a contingent fee of 50% of the value of the property in
litigation.
On Sept. 29, 1976, Gonzales filed an answer, denying all the allegations
against him. The Court then resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor
General on March 16, 1983. On May 16, 1988, Gonzales filed a motion to
dismiss, claiming that the long delay in the resolution of the complaint
against him constitutes a violation of his constitutional right to due process
and speedy disposition of cases. The Solicitor General filed a comment on
the motion to dismiss on Aug. 8, 1988, explaining that the delay was due
to the numerous requests for postponement of scheduled hearings by
both parites. On Jan. 16, 1989, the Court required the Solicitor General to
submit his report and recommendation within 30 days upon receipt of
notice.
On April 11, 1989, the Solicitor General submitted his report and
recommendation that Atty. Gonzales be suspended for six months.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Atty. Gonzales is guilty of violating the Code of
HELD: Yes, Atty. Gonzales is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
RATIO: Atty. Gonzales violated Canon 16.04 which states that A lawyer
shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither
shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is
handling for the client. The act of Gonzales paying all the expenses of
the litigation in consideration of 50% of the amount of the property in
litigation is contrary with Canon 16.04. An agreement whereby an
attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the clients
rights is champertous and violates the fiduciary relationship between the
lawyer and his client.
The Court resolved to impose the penalty of suspension for 6 months from
the practice of law upon the respondent Atty. Gonzales for committing
serious misconduct.
CASE 124: Ruby Mae Barnachea vs. Atty. Edwin T. Quicho, A.C. No. 5925,
March 11, 2003
profession but also for gross misconduct not connected with his
professional duties, making him unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.
A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money or property of his client that may
come to his possession. The conversion by a lawyer funds entrusted to him
by his client is a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of
public confidence in the legal profession.
The relation of attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature and is of a
very delicate, exacting and confidential character. A lawyer is dutybound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients. The profession, therefore, demands of an
attorney an absolute abdication of every personal advantage conflicting
in any way, directly or indirectly, with the interest of his client. In this case,
respondent miserably failed to measure up to the exacting standard
expected of him.
CASE 125: Ma. Libertad SJ Cantiller v. Atty. Humberto V. Potenciano
FACTS:Ruby Barnachea engaged the legal services of Atty. Edwin

Quiocho to cause the transfer under her name of the title over a property
previously owned by her sister. Ruby Barnachea was able to pay
respondent for legal fees.
However, despite the lapse of almost two months, Atty. Edwin Quiocho
failed to secure title over the property in favor of complainant. Ruby
Barnachea demanded that Atty. Edwin Quiocho refund to her the legal
fees and return the documents which she earlier entrusted to him.
However, Atty. Edwin Quiocho failed to comply with said demands. Atty.
Edwin Quiocho denied that complainant contracted his legal services,
although Atty. Edwin Quiocho admitted having received the two checks
from complainant, Atty. Edwin Quiocho claimed that said checks were
intended to cover actual and incidental expenses for transportation,
communication, representation, necessary services, taxes and fees for the
cancellation and transfer of TCT No. 334411 under the name of
complainant and not for legal services.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Edwin Quiocho violated Rule 16.04
HELD: Yes. Even if it were true that no attorney-client relationship existed
between them, case law has it that an attorney may be removed or
otherwise disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in the
FACTS: Complainant lost an ejectment case and was issued to vacate the
rented premises. Desperate and at a loss on what to do, they consulted a
certain Sheriff Pagalunan, on the matter. Pagalunan, in turn, introduced
them to herein respondent. After such introduction, the parties "impliedly
agreed" that respondent would handle their case.
In the afternoon of October 9,1987, the complainant was made to sign by
respondent what she described as a "[h]astily prepared, poorly
conceived, and haphazardly composed 3 petition for annulment of
judgment. Complainant alleges that respondent promised her that the
necessary restraining order would be secured if only because the judge
who would hear the matter was his "katsukaran" (close friend). However,
when the case was raffled and assigned to Branch 153, the presiding
judge asked respondent to withdraw as counsel in the case on the
ground of their friendship.
Later, Cantiller paid Potenciano P2,000.00 as demanded by the latter
which was allegedly needed to be paid to another judge who will issue
the restraining order but eventually Potenciano did not succeed in
locating the judge.
Sometime after the filing of Civil Case No. 55118, respondent informed
complainant and Peregrina that there was a need to file another case
with the Regional Trial Court to enable them to retain possession of the
apartment. For this purpose, respondent told complainant to prepare the
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P 10,000.00) allegedly to be deposited
with the Treasurer's Office of Pasig as purchase price of the apartment
and another one thousand pesos (P 1,000.00) to cover the expenses of
the suit. Respondent stressed to the complainant the need and urgency
of filing the new complaint.
At the hearing of the preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 55118 on
October 30, 1987, respondent, contrary to his promise that he would
secure a restraining order, withdrew his appearance as counsel for
complainant. Complainant was not able to get another lawyer as
replacement. Thus, no restraining order or preliminary injunction was
obtained. As a consequence, the order to vacate in Civil Case No. 6046
was eventually enforced and executed.
Sometime thereafter, it came to complainant's knowledge that there was
really no need to make a deposit of ten thousand pesos (P l0,000.00)
relative to Civil Case No. 55210. After further inquiry, she found out that in
fact there was no such deposit made. Thus, on December 23,1987,
complainant sent a demand letter to respondent asking for the return of
the total amount of eleven thousand pesos (P 11,000.00) which the former
earlier gave to the latter. However, this letter was never answered and the
money was never returned. Hence, complainant lodged this
administrative complaint against herein respondent.
ISSUE/S: WON
Responsibility.
Respondent lawyer violated the Code of Professional
The Court finds that respondent failed to exercise due diligence in

protecting his client's interests. Respondent had knowledge beforehand
that he would be asked by the presiding judge in Civil Case No. 55118 to
withdraw his appearance as counsel by reason of their friendship. Despite
such prior knowledge, respondent took no steps to find a replacement nor
did he inform complainant of this fact.
CASE 126: People vs. Gaudencio Ingco, G.R. No. L-32994, October 29,
1971
FACTS: Respondent Alfredo R. Barrios, a member of the Philippine Bar, who
was appointed counsel de oficio for the accused in this case, Gaudencio
Ingco, sentenced to death for the crime of rape with homicide, was
required in a resolution of this Court to show cause on why disciplinary
action should not be taken against him for having filed fifteen days late a
motion for the extension of time for submitting the brief for appellant
Ingco. Barrios said that he "was then busy with the preparation of the brief
of one Benjamin Apelo pending in the Court of Appeals; that while he
had made studies in preparation for the brief in this case, during such
period he had to appear before courts in Manila, Quezon City, Pasay City,
Bulacan and Pampanga.
He said that he was misled into assuming that he had also likewise taken
the necessary steps to file a motion for extension of time for the submission
of his brief in this case by the receipt of the resolution from the Court of
Appeals granting him such extension.
ISSUE/S: WON Barrios is liable for filing late the motion for extension
HELD: Yes. Barrios is liable for filing late the motion for extension
HELD: Yes, this Court finds Atty. Humberto V. Potenciano to be guilty of the
charges against him and hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law
for an indefinite period until such time he can demonstrate that he has
rehabilitated himself as to deserve to resume the practice of law.
RATIO: When a lawyer takes a client's cause, he thereby covenants that
he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. The failure
to exercise due diligence or the abandonment of a client's cause makes
such lawyer unworthy of the trust which the client had reposed on him.
The acts of respondent in this case violate the most elementary principles
of professional ethics.
RATIO: By his own confession, he was woefully negligent. Considering that

the Ingco was fighting for his life, the least that could be expected of a
counsel de oficio is awareness of the period within which he was required
to file appellant's brief. The mere fact that according to him his practice
was extensive, requiring his appearance in courts in Manila and environs
as well as the provinces of Bulacan and Pampanga, should not have
lessened that degree of care necessary for the fulfillment of his
responsibility. What is worse is that by sheer inattention, he would confuse
the proceedings in a matter pending before the Court of Appeals with this
present case. Such grave neglect of duty is deserving of severe
condemnation. It is clearly unworthy of membership in the Bar which

requires dedication and zeal in the defense of his client's rights, a duty
even more exacting when one is counsel de oficio.
CASE 127: Ngayan v. Tugade

FACTS: The Ngayans, the complainants, alleged that they asked the
respondent, Atty. Tugade to prepare an affidavit to be used as basis for a
complaint to be filed against Mrs. Rowena Soriano and Robert Leonido as
a consequence of the latters unauthorized entry into the complainants
dwelling. Mrs. Ngayan allegedly signed the document without reading it
carefully and after signing, she noticed a paragraph which did not
mention Robert was with Rowena when they entered the Ngayans
residence. Mrs. Ngayan told his omission and in front of her, Atty. Tugade
crossed out the paragraph she complained about and promised to make
another affidavit. In the meantime, complainants filed motions to
discharge the Atty. Tugade as their counsel. The Ngayans made a follow
up about the omission in the document and found out that the name of
Roberto was not included in the charge. Since the omission was remedied
by their new counsel and the case was filed in court. Complainant
averred that the motion was filed by the respondents former classmate
and that Atty. Tugade was also a lawyer of the brother of Roberto in an
insurance company.
ISSUE/S: WON there was betrayal of confidence between Atty. Tugade
and his clients, the Ngayans
HELD: Yes, Atty. Tugade was suspended from the practice of law for a
period of 1 year.
RATIO: In the case at bar, complainants claim that the respondent
furnished the adverse parties in a certain criminal case with a copy of a
discarded affidavit, thus enabling them to use it as evidence against the
complainants. This constitutes betrayal of trust and confidence of his
former clients. The court tend to believe that Atty. Tugade was partial to
the adverse party as he even tried to dissuade the complainants from
filing the charges aginst Robert leonido. This partially could be explained
by the fact that respondent is the former classmate of the adverse partys
counsel and the fact that the respondent is the lawyer of the brother of
Robert in an insurance company.
CASE 128: Santiago et al. v. Atty. Fojas

Facts: Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro
Manas, and Trinidad Nordista were the President, Vice-President,
Treasurer, and Auditor, respectively, of the FEUFA. They allegedly expelled
from the union Paulino Salvador. The latter then commenced with the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a complaint (NCR-OD-M90-10-050) to declare illegal his expulsion from the union.
Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro
Manas, and Trinidad Nordista were the President, Vice-President,
Treasurer, and Auditor, respectively, of the FEUFA. They allegedly expelled
from the union Paulino Salvador. The latter then commenced with the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a complaint (NCR-OD-M90-10-050) to declare illegal his expulsion from the union.
Subsequently, Paulino Salvador filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, a complaint against the
complainants herein for actual, moral, and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees, under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code.
As the complainants' counsel, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the
said case on grounds of (1) res judicataby virtue of the final decision of
the Med-Arbiter in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050 and (2) lack of jurisdiction, since
what was involved was an intra-union issue cognizable by the DOLE. Later,
he filed a supplemental motion to dismiss.
The trial court, per Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, granted the motion
and ordered the dismissal of the case. Upon Salvador's motion for
reconsideration, however, it reconsidered the order of dismissal, reinstated
the case, and required the complainants herein to file their answer within
a non extendible period of fifteen days from notice.
Instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration and dismissal of the case. This motion having been
denied, the respondent filed with this Court a petition for certiorari, which
was later referred to the Court of Appeals and docketed therein as CAG.R. SP No. 25834.
Although that petition and his subsequent motion for reconsideration were
both denied, the respondent still did not file the complainants' answer in
Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. Hence, upon plaintiff Salvador's motion, the
complainants were declared in default, and Salvador was authorized to
present his evidence ex-parte.
The respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order of default and
to stop the ex-parte reception of evidence before the Clerk of Court, but
to no avail.
ISSUE/S: WON the respondent committed a culpable negligence, as
would warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the complaints an
answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91.
HELD: Yes. He is liable for inexcusable negligence.
RATIO: The respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil
Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a "losing cause" for the complainants since
the claims therein for damages were based on the final decision of the
Med-Arbiter declaring the complainants' act of expelling Salvador from
the union to be illegal. This claim is a mere afterthought which hardly
persuades us. If indeed the respondent was so convinced of the futility of
any defense therein, he should have seasonably informed the
complainants thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility expressly provides:
(A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion
on the merits and probable results of the client's case, neither overstating
nor understanding the prospects of the case.)
CASE 129: People vs. Sevilleno
FACTS: On 22 July 1995, at around 10:00 in the morning, Paulino Sevilleno y
Villanueva alias Tamayowent to Barangay Guadalupe, San Carlos
City. He brought with him bread and ice candy for his 9-year old and 8year old nieces, Virginia and Norma, both surnamed Baquia. He then
invited Virginia to accompany him to Sitio Guindali-an "to see (a) beta
show." To reach the place, Paulino and Virginia passed through the
sugarcane fields. At around 11:00 in the same morning, Rogelio, father of
Virginia arrived home and upon learning from his daughter that Paulino is
with Virginia, Rogelio immediately looked for them. Rogelio did not find his
daughter but he bumped into the accused and upon questioning where
his daughter was, Paulino denied although Rogelio noticed the wounds
and scratches on Paulino.
Rogelio then continued the search and the second encounter with the
accused yielded an answer that Virginia is in the sugarcane field.

Accompanied by police officers, they saw the corpse of Virginia and
circumstances show that her killing was attended by rape. Upon the
doctors autopsy, he concluded that Virginia was raped and strangled to
death. Residents of the locale immediately nabbed Paulino and delivered
him to the police authorities. The accused was represented by Atty. Vic
Agravante of the Public Attorneys Office and upon arraignment, the
accused entered a plea of guilty.
The hearing for the presentation of evidence was reset several times and
on October 10 1995, accused manifested that he had no counsel. Thus
the trial court ordered the PAO to provide a counsel de oficio for him. Prior
to the next hearing, the judge was informed that the accused had
escaped detention. The accused was recaptured and Atty. Florentino
Saldavia, also PAO was appointed as counsel de oficio. On 28 August
1996, the date set for the presentation of the evidence for the defense,
Atty. Saldavia moved that the hearing be reset as he was not feeling
well. On 19 November 1996, Atty. Saldavia again moved for
postponement and the hearing was reset to 3 December 1996 on which
date, instead of presenting evidence, Atty. Saldavia manifested that he
was submitting the case for decision but invoking the plea of guilt of the
accused as a mitigating circumstance.
On 6 March 1997 the Regional Trial Court-Br. 57, San Carlos City, rendered
its decision finding the accused guilty of rape with homicide and
sentencing him to death and to pay the heirs of Virginia Baquia P50,000.00
plus costs.
ISSUE/S: WON justice was rendered in accordance with the plea of guilty.
HELD: No.
RATIO: Under Sec. 3, Rule 116, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension
of the consequences of his plea. In every case where the accused enters
a plea of guilty to a capital offense, especially where he is an ignorant
person with little or no education, the proper and prudent course to follow
is to take such evidence as are available and necessary in support of the
material allegations of the information, including the aggravating
circumstances therein enumerated, not only to satisfy the trial judge
himself but also to aid the Supreme Court in determining whether the
accused really and truly understood and comprehended the meaning,

full significance and consequences of his plea. In the instant case, the trial
court did not bother to explain the essential elements of the crime of rape
with homicide with which the accused was charged. Only a clear,
definite and unconditional plea of guilty by the accused must be
accepted by trial courts. Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibilityrequires every lawyer to serve his client with utmost
dedication, competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in this regard renders him
administratively liable.
The court found that Attys. Vic Agravante, Danilo Pabalinas and Florentino
Saldavia, all of PAO, were remiss in their duties as defenders of the
accused. Atty. Agravante did not take time to explain to his client the
nature of the crime of which he was charged and the gravity of the
consequences of his plea. Instead, he readily agreed to the accused
pleading guilty to a capital offense. In the succeeding hearings,
Atty. Pabalinas was supposed to assist the accused ably but miserably
failed. When the case was called and appearances noted, the trial
judge informed the parties that the accused had escaped from
detention. It was then that the prosecution and the defense, including
the trial court, agreed that the accused would be tried in absentia. Then,
at this juncture, Atty. Pabalinas sought to be relieved of his responsibilities
as counsel deoficiowhich, unfortunately, the court also granted. In the
instant case, the aforenamed defense lawyers did not protect, much less
uphold, the fundamental rights of the accused. Instead, they
haphazardly performed their function as counsel de oficioto the detriment
and prejudice of the accused Sevilleno, however guilty he might have
been found to be after trial.
CASE 130: Victoria Legarda vs CA, New Cathay House
FACTS: Petitioner was the owner of a parcel of land and the
improvements thereon. Petitioner entered into a leased agreement with
the respondent thru its representative, Roberto Cabrera, Jr. of the
property for a period of five years that the rental is 25K per month with 5%
escalation per year. Respondent deposited the down payment but
petitioner failed and refused to execute and sign the same despite
demands of the respondent. Respondent suffered damages due to the
delay in the renovation and opening of its restaurant business.
Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for specific performance.
Petitioner engaged the services of the counsel to handle her case. But her
counsel failed to take any action for the case. So the property was sold by
the sheriff thru public auction. After one year redemption period expired
w/out the petitioner redeeming the property and the sheriff issued a final
deed of sale. Upon learning of this unfortunate turn of events, petitioner
prevailed upon her counsel to seek the appropriate relief.
ISSUE/S: Was her counsel negligent of the case? If he was, should she be
bound by such negligence?
HELD: Judged by the actuations of said counsel in this case, he has
miserably failed in his duty to exercise his utmost learning and ability in
maintaining his client's cause. The gross negligence of the late Dean
Coronal in handling, nay mishandling, petitioner's case, docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-43811 in the court a quo, is actually beyond question as this
Court had declared in a per curiam Resolution dated June 10, 1992, 34
where Coronel was meted a six (6)-month suspension from the practice of
law, which suspension order was renewed for another six (6) months in
another Resolution dated March 31, 1993.
RATIO: A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth
and zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of
his utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing can be taken or
withheld from his client except in accordance with the law. He should
present every remedy or defense authorized by the law in support of his
client's cause, regardless of his own personal views. In the full discharge of
his duties to his client, the lawyer should not be afraid of the possibility that
he may displease the judge or the general public.
It is not only a case of simple negligence as found by the appellate court,
but of reckless and gross negligence, so much so that his client was
deprived of her property without due process of law. The Court finds that
the negligence of counsel in this case appears to be so gross and
inexcusable. This was compounded by the fact, that after petitioner gave
said counsel another chance to make up for his omissions by asking him to
file a petition for annulment of the judgment in the appellate court, again
counsel abandoned the case of petitioner in that after he received a
copy of the adverse judgment of the appellate court, he did not do
anything to save the situation or inform his client of the judgment. He
allowed the judgment to lapse and become final.
She should be bound by the decision because neither Cathay nor
Cabrera should be made to suffer for the gross negligence of Legardas
counsel. The common law maxim finds application in this case, between
two parties innocent parties, the one who made it possible for the wrong
to be done should be the one to bear the resulting loss.
CASE 131: Mario S. Mariveles vs. Atty. Odilon C. Mallari, A.C. No. 3294
February 17, 1993
FACTS: Mariveles (petitioner) engaged the services of Atty. Mallari
(respondent) to handle his defense in the RTC where he was charged for
violating B.P. Blg. 22. After an adverse decision was rendered therein,
Mariveles instructed Atty. Mallari to appeal said the decision to the CA,
which the latter did.
However, in the CA, despite numerous extensions of time, totaling 245
days, Atty. Mallari failed to file the appellants brief, resulting in the
dismissal of the appeal. Mariveles discovered his lawyers desertion only
when he was subpoenaed by the trial court to appear before it for the
execution of the decision which had become final.
Through new counsel, Mariveles filed a petition to reinstate his appeal,
cancel the entry of judgment and accept his brief, but it was denied. He
sought relief in the SC which granted his petition, ruling that: the failure of
petitioners former counsel to file the brief xxx amounted to deliberate
abandonment of his clients interest which justified the reinstatement of
Mariveles appeal through a new counsel.
ISSUE/S: WON what Atty. Mallari committed (or what he failed to do) is a
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: Yes. He is guilty of abandonment and dereliction of duty toward his
client and is hereby DISBARRED.
RATIO: Atty. Mallari demonstrated not only appalling indifference and lack
of responsibility to the courts and his client but also a shameless disregard
to his duties as a lawyer.
A lawyer has no business practicing his profession if in the course of that
practice, he will eventually wreck and destroy the future and reputation
of his client and thus disgrace the law profession.
CASE 132: CARINO V. DE LOS REYES
FACTS: On March 3, 1998, Katrina Carino contracted the services of Atty.

Delos Reyes, a former Quezon City prosecutor, to file complaints for
slander by deed, threats, and physical injuries against her relatives Faye
Lorenz, Godofreditas Lorenz, and Rosario Joaquin, who themselves
subsequently filed charges against her and her father for maltreatment,
physical injuries, and threats with the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.
Carino paid Atty. Delos Reyes the amount of P10, 000 as acceptance fee.
However, despite demands by Carino, Atty. Delos Reyes never filed the
complaint-affidavits with the prosecutor's office for preliminary
investigation. On the other hand, with respect to the complaints filed by
the Lorenzes and Joaquin, QC Assistant Prosecutor Soller recommended
the filing of information for maltreatment, threats, and slight physical
injuries against Carino and her father. The cases were subsequently filed
before the MTC of QC. Carino alleged that Atty. Delos Reyes failed to
protect their interest. They were forced to hire the services of another
counsel, Atty. Ricardo Rivera, who immediately filed a motion for
reinvestigation, which was denied by the prosecutor's office.
Atty. Delos Reyes denied that he had agreed to represent Carino in filing
criminal complaints against her relatives. He stated that his services were
hired in connection with the filing of a case for partition of the lot
occupied by her and her father, on one hand, and their relatives in
question, on the other hand. Carino promised to furnish him the
certification of the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for the filing of the case in
court as well as the TCT of the lot but, as Carino failed to do so, Atty. Delos
Reyes withdrew from the case and returned the acceptance fee. Atty.
Delos Reyes added that he is a member of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP, and he is mindful of the duties of members of the bar
toward their clients. On the contrary, Carino admitted the return of the
fee, but the money was paid only after repeated demands made by her
to Atty. Delos Reyes and after she had threatened him with estafa.
The Court referred the case to IBP for investigation, report, and
recommendation. IBP dismissed the complaint for the insufficiency of
evidence.
Carino stated that, after hiring the legal services of Atty. Delos Reyes, she
immediately furnished a copy of the Medical Certificate of her father as
well as their joint complaint concerning the incident and a police blotter.
Days have passed with excuses, and yet he still was not able to prepare
the complaint-affidavits to be filed against the relatives. (March 3, 1998-
May 4, 1998) On the other hand, Atty. Delos Reyesclaimed that he was
hired by Carino to file a case for partition, but, because the Atty. Delos
Reyes failed to give him the documents to be used in filing of the case, he
decided to withdraw his representation.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Delos Reyes has neglected a legal matter entrusted to
him, in this case was the filing of complaint-affidavits against the relatives
of Carino for slander by deed, threats and physical injuries claiming that
his services were hired to file a case for partition
On the other hand, there is no merit in Carino's claim that, as a result of

Atty. Delos Reyes' failure to file the complaint for threats, prescription set
in. Pursuant to Art. 90, in relation to Art. 283 of the Revised Penal Code, the
prescriptive period for filing a complaint for threats is five years. In any
event, the interests of Carino and that of her father are not altogether
without legal protection as they can controvert the charges against them
in the proceedings before the trial court.
CASE 133: Natividad Uy vs. Atty. Braulio RG Tansinin
HELD: Yes. He was not able to provide and submit the complaint-affidavits
for the filing of criminal complaints against the relatives of Carino, not to
the case for partition as he alleged; Reprimanded with warning
RATIO: The Court finds Atty. Delos Reyes' explanation flimsy. His services
were hired by Carino 6 days after the occurrence of the incident giving
rise to the filing of the charges and counter-charges for physical injuries,
threats, and slander by deed filed by the parties before the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of their barangay. It is improbable that she, at that time,
would hire the services of the lawyer for a purpose other than in
connection with petitioner's pressing legal concern, i.e., the filing of the
criminal complaints with the prosecutor's office.
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides - A lawyer
shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Santiago v. Fojas: Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the
lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with
competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with
wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire
devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by
the rules of law, legally applied.
The fact that, as claimed by him, he is a member of the IBP commission
investigating complaints against members of the bar all the more should
have impressed on him his duty of fidelity to his client's cause. That he
returned the money paid to him does not diminish his responsibility but
only mitigates the penalty.
FACTS:Natividad was the defendant in an ejectment case filed with the

Metropolitan Trial Court to defend her rights, Natividad engaged the
services of Atty. Braulio RG Tansinin who timely filed an Answer to the
complaint for ejectment. Required to file a Position Paper, respondent,
however, failed to file one for and on behalf of Natividad. Eventually, a
decision was rendered by the MTC against Natividad. Natividad, through
Atty. Braulio RG Tansinin, elevated the case to the RTC by filing a Notice of
Appeal. In an Orderdated May 25, 2004, the RTC dismissed the appeal
solely because of the failure of Atty. Braulio RG Tansinin to file a
memorandum on appeal. The motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied for having been filed out of time. Realizing that she lost her case
because of the negligence of her counsel, Natividad initiated the
disbarment case against respondent, before the IBP. Natividad averred
that she gave her full trust and confidence to Atty. Braulio RG Tansinin, but
the latter failed miserably in his duty as a lawyer and advocate. She also
claimed that respondents failure to file the required position paper and
memorandum on appeal constituted gross incompetence and gross
negligence, which caused grave injury to Natividad.Lastly, Natividad
alleged that not only did Atty. Braulio RG Tansinin fail to file the required
pleadings, he also was remiss in informing her of the status of the case. For
his part, Atty. Braulio RG Tansinin admitted that Natividad obtained his
legal services, but no legal fee was ever paid to him. Respondent
explained that he could not submit an intelligible position paper, because
the contract between Natividad and her lessor had long expired. He
added that he failed to file the position paper and memorandum on
appeal, because Natividad told him that she would work out the transfer
of ownership to her of the land subject matter of the ejectment case. In
effect, Atty. Braulio RG Tansinin said that he did not submit the required
pleadings, because he knew that the law favored the plaintiff as against
Natividad in the ejectment case.
ISSUE/S: WON the lawyer violated canon 18 section 3.
its Resolution, the Court referred the case to the IBP for investigation,
report, and recommendation.
HELD: YES, he violated it.

RATIO:Atty. Braulio RG Tansinin failure to file the required pleadings and to
inform his client about the developments in her case fall below the
standard exacted upon lawyers on dedication and commitment to their
clients cause. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention,
diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance, and
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. A lawyer should serve his client
in a conscientious, diligent and efficient manner; and he should provide a
quality of service at least equal to that which he, himself, would expect of
a competent lawyer in a like situation. By agreeing to be his clients
counsel, he represents that he will exercise ordinary diligence or that
reasonable degree of care and skill demanded by the character of the
business he undertakes to do, to protect the clients interests and take all
steps or do all acts necessary therefor; and his client may reasonably
expect him to discharge his obligations diligently. It must be recalled that
the MTC required the parties to submit their respective position papers.
However, respondent did not bother to do so, in total disregard of the
court order. In addition Atty. Braulio RG Tansinin failed to file the
memorandum on appeal this time with the RTC where complainants
appeal was then pending. The case was dismissed on that ground alone.
Respondents failure to file the required pleadings is per se a violation of
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Resposibility.
CASE 134: Spouses Garcia vs. Atty. Rolando S. Bala, A.C. No. 5039,
November 25, 2005
FACTS: Complainants Spouses Garcia engaged the services of respondent
Atty. Bala to appeal to the CA the adverse Decision of the Department of
Agrarian Relations Adjudication Board (DARAB). Instead, Atty. Bala
erroneously filed a Notice of Appeal with the DARAB. Under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court, appeals from the decisions of the DARAB should be filed
with the CA through a verified petition for review. Because of Atty. Balas
error, the prescribed period for filing the petition lapsed, to the prejudice
of his clients.Spouses Eduardo and Teresita Garcia filed before this Court a
Letter-Complaint against Atty. Rolando S. Bala.
The Court required Atty. Bala to comment on the Complaint. He failed to
comply; thus, he was presumed to have waived his right to be heard. In
Investigating IBP Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa found Atty. Bala guilty

of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Board of Governors
of the IBP passed a Resolution which adopted with modification the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating commissioner. It
recommended that Atty. Bala should be reprimanded and suspended
from the practice of law for six months; and that he should return, within
thirty days from his receipt of the Decision, the amount of P9,200, with
legal interest from the filing of the present Complaint with this Court.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Bala should be disciplined.
HELD: Yes. He should be disciplined. Atty. Rolando S. Bala is found guilty of
negligence and conduct unbecoming a lawyer; he is suspended from the
practice of law for six months.
RATIO: Rule 18.03 provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable.
Once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to
the cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in them. A client is entitled to the benefit of any and every
remedy and defense authorized by law, and is expected to rely on the
lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.
Evidently, respondent failed to champion the cause of his clients with
wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Despite adequate time, he did
not familiarize himself with the correct procedural remedy as regards their
case. Worse, he repeatedly assured them that the supposed petition had
already been filed.
Since he effectively waived his right to be heard, the Court can only
assume that there was no valid reason for his failure to file a petition for
review, and that he was therefore negligent.
Under the present factual circumstances, respondent should return the
money paid by complainants.
CASE 135: Felisa Joven-De Jesus vs. PNB, et. al., G.R. No. L-19299,
November 28, 1964

FACTS: The case at bar presents a procedural question on the dismissal of
in appeal as perfected out of time. On September 15, 1956, Feliza Joven
De Jesus filed a civil case against Philippine National Bank (PNB), Del
Carmen Branch at the CFI of Pampanga. The Court rendered a decision
ordering the latter to pay the former the sum of P3,274.98 with legal
interest thereon at the rate of 6% a year from the date of the filing of the
complaint. until the principal shall have been fully paid, plus the other sum
of P500.00 as attorney's fees of the said plaintiff. On March 16, 1961
defendant PNB filed its notice of appeal and a motion for extension of
time to file record on appeal. On March 17, 1961, it filed its record on
appeal and appeal bond. However, its appeal was dismissed on that day
by the court on plaintiff Joven De Jesus motion as filed out of time
because the registry return card showed receipt by PNB of its copy of the
decision on February 13, 1961.
PNB filed a "motion for reconsideration and relief from, and/or to set aside
the order of March 17, 1961." It alleged that movant's failure to appeal on
time was due to "accident, mistake and/or excusable negligence," as
supported by affidavits annexed to the motion. The Court denied the
motion on May 18, 1961. Defendant bank has appealed from the orders
of March 17, 1961 and May 18, 1961.
The record will show that copy of the decision sent to appellant's counsel
in its legal department was received on February 13, 1961. In its motion
filed, it stated that the registered mail containing said copy was received
from the post office on February 13, 1961 by Eugenio Magpoc. Although
the latter is postal mail and delivery clerk of appellant's cashier
department, his affidavit states that "as such, one of my duties is to get
and receive from the Post Office all registered mail matters addressed to
the Philippine National Bank, its personnel and different departments"
PNB admitted having filed its notice of appeal, record on appeal and
appeal bond beyond the 30-day period, but contended in its motion of
March 22, 1961, that the delay was due to "accident, mistake and/or
excusable negligence." In support of such contention, it is alleged that on
February 13, 1961 the registered letter was given by the bank's postal mail
clerk Eugenio Magpoc to Feliciano Jimenez, Jr., registered mail clerk of
appellant's cashier department. Due to volume of work, Feliciano
Jimenez, Jr. delivered it to the receiving clerk of appellant's legal
department only on February 15, 1961 and failed to inform the latter that it
was received two days before. Thereupon, it was stamped by said

receiving clerk as received on February 15, 1961. On the basis of this date,
appellant's counsel computed the period to appeal.
ISSUE/S: WON the counsel of the appellant neglected the period for
appeal in the case at bar.
HELD: Yes, appellants counsel carelessly took for granted that the date of
receipt stamped on the letter. He violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility: A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection there with shall
render him liable.
RATIO: According to Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility: A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection there with shall render him liable.
The lower court did not find excusable the negligence in the
circumstances of the case. Appellant's counsel carelessly took for granted
that the date of receipt stamped on the letter by the legal department's
receiving clerk was the date of receipt from the post office. It was known
or at least should have been known to him that letters addressed to
appellant's legal department were taken from the post office by Eugenio
Magpoc and sorted out by Feliciano Jimenez, Jr. Thus, from appellant's
system of handling and receiving correspondence for its legal and all
other departments, it was clear that the date of receipt by the receiving
clerks of its several departments could not be relied upon as the very
same date of receipt from the post office. Counsel for appellant could
have easily found out the latter date had he inquired from Eugenio
Magpoc or Feliciano Jimenez, Jr. and in the circumstances, we find no
excuse for his having failed to do so.
The Court cited, Bello vs. Fernando, Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court requires that the notice of appeal, the appeal bond, and the
record on appeal be all filed in court, and served on the adverse party,
within thirty days from notice of judgment. ...; and compliance with this
period for appeal is considered absolutely indispensable for the
prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of
judicial business, so that if said period is not complied with, the judgment
becomes final and executory.
Such circumstances do not exist in this case. We may also add that
appellant, while invoking the interest of justice, has not shown how it
would stand to be prejudiced from the loss of its right to appeal. From the
record no such prejudice can be gathered, especially because the
judgment provided for reimbursement in appellant's favor by third-party
defendant Jacobo Lampa and the latter has not appealed therefrom.
CASE 136: Agravante v. Patriarca
FACTS: A case was set for pre-trial but before it was held, a fire broke out
on June 26, 1976 in the capitol building. The records of the court were
burned, including the present case. The record was reconstituted and was
rescheduled for pre-trial on January 25, 1978. The defendants counsel
move for the cancellation of this setting. The Court reset the pre-trial to
February 27, 1978. But again, the defendants counsel pleading illness,
sought this be cancelled and rescheduled again. This motion was dated
February 14, 1978 but was only filed on February 22, 1978. This motion
contained no notice of hearing, but a photocopy of a medical certificate
dated January 30, 1978 stating that Atty. Pacamarra has headache and is
advised to take a rest. The motion filed was denied for being not in
accordance with the rules because of lack of notice to the adverse party,
lack of setting of the date of hearing, and the attached medical
certificate was only a photocopy. At the scheduled pre-trial on February
27, neither the counsel nor the defendants appeared. The Court declared
them in default. On March 4, the Court was informed of Juana Patriarcas
death and her heirs requested that she be substituted which was granted.
The heirs of Juana moved for reconsideration of the three orders dated
February 22, February 27, and March 4. But this was denied by the court.
Hence, they filed a petition for certiorari to the SC contending that they
had been denied their day in court.
ISSUE/S: W/N Atty. Pacamarra violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of
HELD: Yes. He neglected his duties to legal matters. His petition for the
rescheduling of the pre-trial set on Feb 27, 1978 is untenable. A party or
counsel desiring a postponement of a pre-trial must comply with the
requisites set out in Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. It shall be made in writing.
It shall state the grounds upon which it is based, and if necessary, be
accompanied by supporting affidavits or papers. It shall specify the date
of hearing. It shall be served by the applicant on all parties concerned 3
days before the said hearing. These requisites were not complied with by
the defendants. The SC also noted that the character of illness of Atty.
Pacamarra is not so severe as to render his non-attendance excusable.
The notice of the denial of his motion for postponement was served to him
in Feb 24, 3 days before the pre-trial date. The SC also held that
defendants contention that the demise of Juana Patriarca prevented
the trial courts acquisition of jurisdiction over her is untenable. The death
of Juana does not affect the Courts jurisdiction. She was substituted. The
defendants actuations give rise to the conclusion that they were
motivated by a desire to delay the disposition of the case. Petition for
certiorari dismissed.
CASE 137: Tomas Alcoriza vs. Atty. Alberto Lumakang, A.M. No. 249,
November 21, 1978
FACTS: An administrative complaint for disciplinary action was filed
against Respondents Attys. Pablo Salazar and Alberto Lumakang. This
case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General, for investigation,
report and recommendation. Since the respondents were residents of
Davao, the case was referred to the City Attorney of Davao City. The
latter submitted that the whole case emanated from the decision of the
MTC for sum of money, between Juana V. Antonio vs. Tomas Alcoriza. The
trial was conducted in the absence of the defendant and or his counsels
despite the fact that they have been duly notified.
Atty. Lumakang explains his failure to appear in the trial:
Early in the morning as usual as I used to, I reported to the office at 7:30
believing that Tomas Alcoriza would come to the office. I waited for him
until 9:00. I know that the hearing of Judge Hofilea will be 9:00 and that
as I said if he will not appear in my office I will not appear for him as I
would be going there without any preparation, so that on that day
though I was jittery I did not go to the court. I stayed in the office waiting
for Alcoriza.
Atty. Lumakang contended that when he asked Alcoriza why he did not
go to the office or to the Court to attend to the trial of his case, Alcoriza
merely answered that he is busy. He then told Alcoriza that the Judge has
become impatient because of the many postponements, that an order
was issued giving him last postponement and that if he will be absent
again on the day of the trial, the Court will proceed to try the case ex
parte. Alcoriza assured that he will go and Atty. Lumakang told him that if
he will not come to the office on the date of the trial, Atty. Lumakang will
not appear in Court as his appearance would only be useless.
CASE 138: Emilio Capulong, et. al. vs. Manuel G. Alino, A.M. No. 381,
February 10, 1968
Atty. Lumakang suspected that Alcoriza had already lost his interest in the
case. This suspicion came true because on the date set for hearing of his
case as Alcoriza did not appear at the office of the respondent neither to
the Court. Such being the case, it is the honest belief of Atty. Lumakang
that a lawyer cannot be more interested in his client's case than the client
himself.
FACTS: Respondent Manuel G. Alio a member of the bar, is charged by

his former clients, the spouses Emilio and Cirila Capulong, with alleged
"gross negligence tantamount to malpractice and betrayal of his clients'
trust and confidence."
ISSUE/S: WON Respondent Atty. Lumakangs failure to appear in the trial

constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: Yes. The Court finds the report and recommendation of the Solicitor
General to be in order and amply justified by the circumstances on
record.
RATIO: Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection there with shall render him liable.
The Solicitor General reported and recommended that the reason of Atty.
Lumakang for his failure to appear in representation of his client, Tomas
Alcoriza, in the trial of his is not wholly laudable. The undersigned believes
that although Atty. Lumakang was not prepared to enter into trial on that
day, still he could do things to protect the interest of his client by
appearing for him in court. However, it is not considered that this inaction
of Atty. Lumakang would constitute so serious a ground as to warrant
disciplinary action in view of the lack of interest which his client has shown
in the premises. Instead, Atty. Lumakang should be reprimanded for his
inaction as it would tend to diminish trust and confidence which the
public is supposed to repose in the office of a lawyer. In order to be free
from any complaint from his client, he should have appeared primarily to
protect the interest of his client and secondarily, to explain to the court
the predicament he was in.
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative case is dismissed insofar as Atty.
Pablo Salazar is concerned, and Atty. Alberto Lumakang is hereby
reprimanded and admonished to be more careful in attending to the
cases of his clients so as to avoid any similar incident as that complained
of.
On August 21, 1957, respondent received from the complainants, as their

counsel in Civil Case No. 2248 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
the decision in which, adverse to said complainants, had been
appealed by them to the Court of Appeals the sum of P298.00, for the
specific purpose of applying the same to the payment of the "appellate"
docket fees (P24), appeal bond (P15), (printing of) the record on appeal
(P150) and appellants' brief (P100), and that said appeal was dismissed
because of respondent's failure to pay the docket fee and to deposit the
estimated cost of printing of the record on appeal.
Respondent alleged that complainants had authorized him to exercise his
judgment and discretion in determining whether or not he should
prosecute the appeal, and to regard said sum of P298.00 as
compensation for his services in connection with said case, should he
consider it advisable to desist from said appeal.
After due hearing, the Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Ecija who, having
been deputized therefor by the Solicitor General, received the evidence
for both parties considered respondent's uncorroborated testimony, in
support of his answer, unworthy of credence and found the charge
against him duly proven, and, accordingly, recommended disciplinary
action against respondent.
Concurring in this finding and recommendation, the Solicitor General filed
the corresponding complaint charging respondent with "deceit,
malpractice or gross misconduct in office as a lawyer," in that, owing to his
"negligence and gross bad faith in unduly and knowingly failing to remit to
the Court of Appeals the docket fee and the estimated cost of printing
the record on appeal," said Court dismissed the aforementioned appeal.
ISSUE/S: WON respondent is guilty of violation of Canon 18.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: Yes. Respondent Alino is guilty of such.
RATIO: A misappropriation of funds held by respondent in trust for his

clients and a breach of such trust, the foregoing acts and omissions
indicate the high degree of irresponsibility of respondent herein and his
unworthiness to continue as a member of the legal profession.
Under Canon 18.03 which provides: A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
The evidence on record fully confirms the finding of guilt made by the
Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Ecija and the Solicitor General and their
conclusion to the effect that respondent's uncorroborated testimony is
unworthy of credence. Indeed, had complainants authorized him to
decide whether or not to prosecute their appeal or desist therefrom, and,
in the latter alternative, to keep the P298.00 in question as his fees,
respondent would have retrieved the receipt issued by him for said sum,
stating specifically that it would be used for docket fees, the record on
appeal, the appeal bond and the (printing) of their brief. Moreover, if his
failure to pay said docket fees and to deposit the estimated cost of
printing of the record on appeal was due to his decision pursuant to the
aforementioned authority he had allegedly been given to desist from
prosecuting the appeal and to apply the money to the payment of his
professional fees, why is it that he filed a motion for reconsideration of the
resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal in consequence
of said failure, thereby securing, in effect, an extension of over five (5)
months, to make said payment and deposit, which, eventually, he did not
make?
Respondent Manuel G. Alio is, accordingly, disbarred. His name is
ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys and his certificate of
Membership of the Philippine Bar, which he is directed to surrender to the
Clerk of Court, within ten (10) days after this judgment has become final,
hereby revoked. It is so ordered.
the document was P42,350.00. Redemption was to be made by the

vendors within three (3) months after the execution of the Deed of Sale, at
the same price of P42,350.00.
On 28 October 1979, or ten (10) days after the expiration of the
redemption period, private respondent spouses filed a petition for
consolidation of title over the parcel of land in question. This was opposed
by petitioner wife in an Answer, duly verified by her, where she alleged as
an affirmative and special defense that the transaction between her and
private respondents was actually one of loan of P 35,000.00, as principal,
with 7% monthly interest, thus totalling P 42,350.00, with the land
mortgaged as collateral or security. That the transaction was an equitable
mortgage can be gleaned, according to her, from the gross inadequacy
of the purchase price and the fact that she, the alleged vendor,
remained in possession of the land and continued to enjoy the fruits
thereof.
On 16 November 1979, or nearly a month after the expiration of the
redemption period, and upon advice of petitioners' then counsel, Atty.
Emmanuel Seno, petitioner wife deposited P42,350.00 in the form of a
bank manager's check, as redemption money, with the Clerk of Court of
respondent trial court. Atty. Seno then manifested at the pre-trial
conference held on 10 March 1980 that he was moving for a judgment on
the pleadings after agreeing to the characterization of the transaction
between the parties as a sale with pacto de retro, because under Article
1606 of the New Civil Code, the vendors (petitioners) may still exercise
their right of repurchase within thirty (30) days from the time final judgment
is rendered in a civil action, if the contract is a true sale with right to
repurchase.
ISSUE/S: WON violated Canon 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD:
Yes. The
Responsibility.
respondent
violated
the
Code
of
Professional
CASE 139: Escudero, et al., v. Judge Dulay CPR 18.03

FACTS: On 18 July 1979, petitioner Araceli D. Escudero, wife of petitioner
Paterno D. Escudero, executed a "Deed of Absolute Sale under Pacto de
Retro" in favor of private respondents, the Amistad spouses, over a parcel
of residential land in Lapu-Lapu City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 9223 of the Register of Deeds of that city. The consideration stated in
RATIO: While this Court is cognizant of the rule that, generally, a client will
suffer the consequences of the negligence, mistake or lack of
competence of his counsel, in the interest of justice and equity,
exceptions may be made to such rule, in accordance with the facts and
circumstances of each case. Adherence to the general rule would, in the
instant case, result in the outright deprivation of their property through a
technicality. The Court cannot close its eyes to the petitioner wife's
affirmative and special defense, under oath in her Answer before the
respondent trial court that her transaction with private respondents was
not a pacto de retro sale but an equitable mortgage. The Court cannot
also but take note of petitioners' evidence to support such verified
defense, notably the incriminating note signed by the agent of both
parties in which the real nature of the questioned transaction is revealed.
CASE 140: Olegario Blanza, et. al. vs. Atty. Agustin Arcangel, A.C. No. 492,
September 5, 1967
But while We are constrained to dismiss the charges against Atty.

Arcangel for being legally insufficient, yet We cannot but counsel against
his actuations as a member of the bar. His conduct must, perforce, be par
excellence, especially so when, as in this case, he volunteers his
professional services. Atty. Arcangel here has not lived up to that ideal
standard. It was unnecessary to have complainants wait, and hope, for six
long years on their pension claims. Upon their refusal to co-operate, Atty.
Arcangel should have forthwith terminated their professional relationship
instead of keeping them hanging indefinitely.
CASE 141: FERNANDO MARTIN O. PEA v. ATTY. LOLITO APARICIO (2007)
FACTS: Complainants Olegaria Blanza and Maria Pasion ask this Court to
take disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Agustin Arcangel for
professional non-feasance.
Way back in April, 1955, Atty. Arcangel volunteered to help them in their
respective pension claims in connection with the deaths of their
husbands, soldiers, and for this purpose, they handed over to him
documents and also affixed their signatures on blank papers
They noticed that since then, Atty. Arcangelhad lost interest in the
progress of their claims and when they finally asked for the return of their
papers six years later, Atty. Arcangel refused to surrender them.
Atty. Arcangel submits that he was not obliged to follow up complainants'
pension claims since there was no agreement for his compensation as
their counsel.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Arcangel should be held liable.
HELD: The Court finds the evidence adduced insufficient to warrant the
taking of disciplinary action against Atty. Arcangel. There is no clear
preponderance of evidence substantiating the accusations against him.
Complainants themselves are partly to blame for the delay in filing their
respective claims
Atty. Arcangel, however, overlooks the fact that he volunteered his
professional services and thus was not legally entitled to recover fees. 2 But
having established the attorney-client relationship voluntarily, he was
bound to attend to complainants' claims with all due diligence.
FACTS: Atty. Aparicio was hired as counsel by an employee who has been
complaining at the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for
alleged illegal dismissal. The NLRC arranged for a mandatory
mediation/conciliation conference to be attended by both parties. Atty.
Aparicio, in behalf of his client, filed a claim for separation pay and
damages, during the conference, but the company (represented by the
complainant, Pea) rejected these as baseless. The company thru Mr.
Pea sent a letter to the employee and Atty. Aparicio, requiring an
explanation as to her absences, and to return to work. However, Atty.
Aparicio, representing his client, made a response reiterating their
arguments re: illegal dismissal. The letter also contained the following
threats to the company:
But if these are not paid on August 10, 2005, we will be constrained to file
and claim bigger amounts including moral damages to the tune of
millions under established precedence of cases and laws. In addition to
other multiple charges like (1) Tax evasion by the millions of pesos of
income not reported to the government, (2) Criminal Charges for Tax
Evasion, (3) Criminal Charges for Falsification of Documents, and (4)
Cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws. These
are reserved for future actions in case of failure to pay the above
amounts as settlements in the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC).
Mr. Pea then filed this complaint for disciplinary action with the IBP,
believing that the letter was unethical. Atty. Aparicio claimed that the
complaint is malicious; that it must be dismissed because of procedural
matters which were not complied with, e.g. certification against forum
shopping. Atty. Aparicio also claims that the issuance of demand letters
had been an accepted practice in the legal profession. There was a
mandatory conference but Atty. Aparicio failed to appear. The

investigating commissioner recommended the dismissal of the case for
failure to comply with procedural matters. The IBP Board of Governors
adopted the recommendation and forwarded it to the Supreme Court.
Mr. Pea then appealed the recommendation of the IBP.
separation pay. The letter was obviously designed to secure leverage to

compel the company to yield to their demands. Indeed, letters of this
nature are definitely proscribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE/S: WON the demand letter made by Atty. Aparicio is unethical and
the act, violative of the CPR
FACTS:Petitioner Angel Albano and his mother retained the services of

Respondent Atty. Perpetua Coloma. Coloma was their counsel in a civil
case during the Japanese occupation. However, Coloma failed to
expedite the hearing and termination of the case which prompted
Albano to sought a different counsel. Coloma intervened in such case in
order to collect her attorneys fees base on a document allegedly signed
by Albano where an agreement to pay her a contingent fee of 33 and
1/3% of whatever could be recovered whether in land or damages is
stipulated. Albano claims that such document was not signed by him nor
his mother and the NBI found that the signature is not in the hand of the
person whose sample signatures were submitted.
HELD: Yes, he violated Rule 19.01. However, disbarment is too harsh a

penalty considering that he acted overzealously to protect the interests of
his client. He is therefore reprimanded, and given a stern warning.
RATIO: Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a
lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law,
reminding legal practitioners that a lawyers duty is not to his client but to
the administration of justice; to that end, his clients success is wholly
subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics. Under Rule 19.01, a lawyer should not file or
threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against
the adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage to compel the
adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyers
client.
It is clear in the content of the demand letter that Atty. Aparicio did what
was exactly prohibited by Rule 19.01. Not only do they violate the CPR,
but they also amount to blackmail, for which he may be criminally liable.
Aparicio does not find anything wrong with what he wrote, dismissing the
same as merely an act of pointing out massive violations of the law by the
other party, and, with boldness, asserting that a lawyer is under
obligation to tell the truth, to report to the government commission of
offenses punishable by the State. He further asserts that the writing of
demand letters is a standard practice and tradition and that our laws
allow and encourage the settlement of disputes. This is misleading. It
cannot be denied that he implied in the letter that if the company heeds
to his demands, he shall keep silent on the other alleged violations.
Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition
in this jurisdiction. However, the letter in this case contains more than just a
simple demand to pay. It contains a threat to file retaliatory charges
against the company which have nothing to do with his clients claim for
CASE 142: Albano v. Coloma
Coloma denied the allegations and claimed that the matters covered
therein were untrue, unfounded and imaginary. Coloma claims that her
services were contracted for such case and that there was agreed upon
fee. Coloma also claims that there is record to show that she was able to
file dozens of papers and pleadings and went to trial with the assistance
of her sister.
ISSUE/S:WON Coloma can collect her attorneys fees
HELD:Yes. The Solicitor General found that the genuineness and due
execution to pay respondent her attorneys fees.
RATIO:Any counsel, who is worthy of his hire is entitled to be fully
recompensed for his services. With his capital consisting solely of his brains
and with his skill, acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in
expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any
judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of a client to escape
payment of his fees. It is indeed ironic if after putting forth the best that is
in him to secure justice for the party he represents, he himslef would not
get his due.
CASE 143: QUIRANTE vs. IAC
FACTS:In the case of Dr. Casasolas claim against its erring building
contractor, the trial court ruled in favor of the former who eventually
died.Here, petitioner Atty. Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for the
confirmation of his attorneys fees. According to him, there was an oral
agreement between him and the late Dr. Casasola with regard to his
attorneys fees, as confirmed in writing by the latters surviving spouse and
two daughters to be computed as follows:
In case of recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond, the attorneys fees of
the undersigned counsel (Atty. Quirante) shall be P30,000.00;
In case the Honorable Court awards damages in excess of the
P120,000.00 bond, it shall be divided equally between the Heirs of Dr.
Casasola, Atty. John C. Quirante and Atty. Dante Cruz.
The trial court granted the motion for confirmationdespite an opposition
thereto.In the petition for review on certiorari, the respondent court (IAC)
ruled that the confirmation of attorneys fees is premature.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Atty. Quirante is entitled of the attorneys fees.
HELD: NO. Ruling of respondent court affirmed.
RATIO: Since the main case from which the petitioners claims for their fees
may arise has not yet become final, the determination of the propriety of
said fees and the amount thereof should be held in abeyance.
The orderly administration of justice dictates that such issue be likewise
determined by the court a quo inasmuch as it also necessarily involves the
same contingencies in determining the propriety and assessing the extent
of recovery of attorneys fees. The alleged confirmation to attorneys fees
should not adversely affect the non-signatories in the petition, since it is
also premised on the eventual grant of damages to the Casasola family.
decision which would have finally resolved the case in your favor,
remembering me then will make me happy. In the meantime, you will
make me happier by just keeping the check. David continued to fight for
Corpus case and got a favorable judgment. Corpus refused to pay
David contending that since David refused the first check given by him,
he gave his services gratuitously.
ISSUE/S: WONprivate respondent Atty. Juan T. David is entitled to
attorney's fees
HELD: Yes because there was at least an implied agreement for the
payment of attorney's fees
RATIO: Payment of attorney's fees to respondent David may be justified by
virtue of the innominate contract of facio ut des (I do and you give which
is based on the principle that "no one shall unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another." Innominate contracts have been elevated to a
codal provision in the New Civil Code by providing under Article 1307 that
such contracts shall be regulated by the stipulations of the parties, by the
general provisions or principles of obligations and contracts, by the rules
governing the most analogous nominate contracts, and by the customs
of the people.
Jurisprudence provides Where one has rendered services to another,
and these services are accepted by the latter, in the absence of proof
that the service was rendered gratuitously, it is but just that he should pay
a reasonable remuneration therefor because 'it is a well-known principle
of law, that no one should be permitted to enrich himself to the damage
of another.
CASE 145: Traders Royal Bank Union-Independent v. NLRC, GR 120592,
March 14, 1997
CASE 144: Corpus vs. CA, et al.

FACTS: David accepted the case of Corpus even though there was no
express agreement regarding the attorneys fees. Corpus was
administratively charged and he employed the services of David. David
won the administrative case for Corpus. Corpus gave a check to David,
but was it was returned by David with the intention of getting paid after
the case is ruled with finality by the SC and Corpus gets his back salaries
and wages. In a letter sent by David to Corpus, he said Your
appreciation of the efforts I have invested in your case is enough
compensation therefor, however, when you shall have obtained a
FACTS: In February 1987, petitioner Traders Royal Bank Employees Union

(Union) and private respondent Atty. Emmanuel Cruz, head of the E.N.A
Cruz and Associates law firm, entered into a retainer agreement. The
Union would pay Atty. Cruz a monthly retainer fee of P3000. The Union
referred to Atty. Cruz the claims of its members for holiday, mid-year and
year-end bonuses against their employer, Trader Royal Bank (TRB).
Atty. Cruz filed the complaint and the Labor Secretary to the NLRC
certified the case. In September 1988, the NLRC ruled in favor of the
employees, awarding them holiday pay differential, mid-year bonus

differential and year-end bonus differential. Acting on the motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution Atty. Cruz filed, the NLRC raffled the case
to Labor Arbiter Oswald Lorenzo.
However, pending the hearing of the application for the writ of execution,
TRB challenged the NLRC decision before the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court modified the decision by deleting the award of mid-year
and year-end bonus differentials. TRB complied with the final judgment
and determined the holiday pay differential. The Union members were
paid through their payroll. In April 1990, the retainer agreement was
terminated.
In September 1990, Atty. Cruz received the Supreme Court decision and
notified the Union. Through a latter, he informed the Union, the TRB
management and the NLRC of his right to exercise and enforce his
attorneys lien over the award of holiday pay differential. In July 1991, he
filed a motion before Labor Arbiter Lorenzo for the determination of his
attorneys fees, praying that 10% of the total reward for holiday pay
differential be declared as his attorneys fees. Lorenzo granted the
motion. The NLRC affirmed the grant. The Union filed a motion for
reconsideration but the NLRC denied it. Hence, this petition.
The Union maintained that: (1) the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in upholding the award of
attorneys fees in violation of the retainer agreement, (2) the award for
attorneys fees should have been incorporated in the main case and not
after the Supreme Court had already reviewed and passed upon the
NLRC decision. It argued that since the Supreme Court had neither taken
up nor approved Atty. Cruzs claim for attorneys fees, the NLRC should
not have allowed said attorneys fees. Thus, the Union posited that the
NLRC acted without jurisdiction in making the award of attorneys fees, as
said act constituted a modification of a final and executor Supreme Court
judgment which did not award attorneys fees.
On the other hand, Atty. Cruz maintained that his motion to determine
attorneys fees was just an incident of the main case where the Union was
awarded its money claims. The grant of attorney's fees was the
consequence of his exercise of his attorney's lien. Such lien resulted from
and corresponds to the services he rendered in the action wherein the
favorable judgment was obtained. To include the award of the attorney's
fees in the main case presupposes that the fees will be paid by TRB to the
adverse party. All that the non-inclusion of attorney's fees in the award
means is that the Supreme Court did not order TRB to pay the opposing
party attorney's fees in the concept of damages. He is not therefore
precluded from filing his motion to have his own professional fees
adjudicated.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Cruz should be awarded attorneys fees.
HELD: Yes. Atty. Cruz should be awarded attorneys fees.
RATIO: Rule 20.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
a lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his
compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition,
injustice or fraud.
This Rule requires that a lawyer shall first and foremost take care of his
clients interest before he concerns himself with his personal
compensation. And in times when there are controversies about it, he has
the remedy of judicial action to claim the amount for the services he
rendered. In the case at bar, the controversy started when the Union
refused to pay Atty. Cruz attorneys fees for the latters render of service in
the litigation of a particular case because they were already paying him
a retainers fee. It is therefore imperative to distinguish an attorneys fee
from a retainers fee.
An attorneys fee is either ordinary or extraordinary. In its ordinary
concept, an attorney's fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a
lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. The
basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his
agreement with the client. In its extraordinary concept, an attorney's fee is
an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing
party in a litigation. The basis of this is any of the cases provided by law
where such award can be made.
The controversy of this case started when the Union had the false
conception that NLRC has jurisdiction over claims for attorneys fees only
before its judgment is reviewed and ruled by the Supreme Court. This is
false because it is a well settled rule that a claim for attorneys fees may
be asserted either in the very action in which the services of a lawyer had
been rendered or in a separate action.
With respect to the first situation, the remedy for recovering attorney's fees
as an incident of the main action may be availed of only when something
is due to the client. Attorney's fees cannot be determined until after the
main litigation has been decided and the subject of the recovery is at the
disposition of the court. The issue over attorney's fees only arises when
something has been recovered from which the fee is to be paid. While a
claim for attorney's fees may be filed before the judgment is rendered,
the determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to the amount
thereof will have to be held in abeyance until the main case from which
the lawyer's claim for attorney's fees may arise has become final.
Otherwise, the determination to be made by the courts will be premature.
Of course, a petition for attorney's fees may be filed before the judgment
in favor of the client is satisfied or the proceeds thereof delivered to the
client.
In the case at bar, Atty. Cruz demanded the first type of attorneys fees.
Heneither filed any claim for attorneys fees before the NLRC when the
latter acted on the Unions money claims nor before the Supreme Court
when it reviewed the NLRC decision. It was only after the Supreme Court
modified the NLRC decision that he demanded his claim before the NLRC
for it would be impossible and improper for the NLRC and for the Supreme
Court to make an award for attorneys fees when no claim for it was
pending before them.
The Union argued that the retainer fee they paid Atty. Cruz was already
the attorneys fees. Atty. Cruz disagreed and said that they had no such
agreement. The contract provides that the P3000 retainer fee does not
cover the services the latter actually rendered before the labor arbiter
and the NLRC in behalf of the former. The monthly payment is intended
merely as a consideration for the law firms commitment to render the
services (general and special legal services) of the retainer agreement.
A general retainer, or retaining fee, is the fee paid to a lawyer to secure
his future services as general counsel for any ordinary legal problem that
may arise in the routinary business of the client and referred to him for
legal action. The future services of the lawyer are secured and committed
to the retaining client. For this, the client pays the lawyer a fixed retainer
fee which could be monthly or otherwise, depending upon their
arrangement. The fees are paid whether or not there are cases referred to
the lawyer. The reason for the remuneration is that the lawyer is deprived
of the opportunity of rendering services for a fee to the opposing party or
other parties. In fine, it is a compensation for lost opportunities.
A special retainer is a fee for a specific case handled or special service

rendered by the lawyer for a client. A client may have several cases
demanding special or individual attention. If for every case there is a
separate and independent contract for attorney's fees, each fee is
considered a special retainer.
Evidently, the P3,000.00 monthly fee provided in the retainer agreement
between the union and the law firm refers to a general retainer, or a
retaining fee, as said monthly fee covers only the law firm's pledge, or as
expressly stated therein, its "commitment to render the legal services
enumerated." The fee is not payment for Atty. Cruzs execution or
performance of the services listed in the contract, subject to some
particular qualifications or permutations stated there.
Also, he asserted that there was no express agreement as to the amount
of his fees for services rendered in the case for recovery of differential pay.
However, he argued that in the absence of such agreement, Article 111
of the Labor Code supplants this omission by providing for an award of ten
percent (10%) of a money judgment in a labor case as attorney's fees. It is
elementary that an attorney is entitled to have and receive a just and
reasonable compensation for services performed at the special instance
and request of his client. As long as the lawyer was in good faith and
honestly trying to represent and serve the interests of the client, he should
have a reasonable compensation for such services.
CASE 146: Hilado v David
FACTS:on April 23, 1945, Blandina Gamboa Hilado brought an action
against Selim Jacob Assad to annul the sale of several houses and lot
executed during the Japanese occupation by Mrs. Hilado's now
deceased husband.
On May 14, Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita filed an answer on
behalf of the defendant; and on June 15, Attorneys Delgado, Dizon, Flores
and Rodrigo registered their appearance as counsel for the plaintiff. On
October 5, these attorneys filed an amended complaint by including
Jacob Assad as party defendant.
On January 28, 1946, Attorney Francisco entered his appearance as
attorney of record for the defendant in substitution for Attorney Ohnick,
Velilla and Balonkita who had withdrawn from the case.
On May 29, Attorney Dizon, in the name of his firm, wrote Attorney
Francisco urging him to discontinue representing the defendants on the
ground that their client had consulted with him about her case, on which
occasion, it was alleged, "she turned over the papers" to Attorney
Francisco, and the latter sent her a written opinion.
In Atty. Franciscos answer to plaintiff's attorneys' complaint, Atty.
Francisco alleged that on about May, 1945, a real estate broker came to
his office in connection with the legal separation of a woman who had
been deserted by her husband, and also told him (Francisco) that there
was a pending suit brought by Mrs. Hilado against a certain Syrian to
annul the sale of a real estate which the deceased Serafin Hilado had
made to the Syrian during the Japanese occupation; that this woman
asked him if he was willing to accept the case if the Syrian should give it to
him; that he told the woman that the sales of real property during the
Japanese regime were valid even though it was paid for in Japanese
military notes; that this being his opinion, he told his visitor he would have
no objection to defending the Syrian.
Attorney Francisco's law firm mailed to the plaintiff a written opinion over
his signature on the merits of her case; that this opinion was reached on
the basis of papers she had submitted at his office; that Mrs. Hilado's
purpose in submitting those papers was to secure Attorney Francisco's
professional services.
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Francisco violated Canon 21 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility by providing the respondents with his opinion
regarding Hilados case.
HELD: Yes. Atty. Francisco violated Canon 21 by providing the respondents
to Hilados case with opinions that he may have acquired through
consultation with Hilado.
RATIO: Section 26 (e), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court provides that "an
attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in
the course of professional employment;" and section 19 (e) of Rule 127
imposes upon an attorney the duty "to maintain inviolate the confidence,
and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client.
Precedents are at hand to support the doctrine that the mere relation of
attorney and client ought to preclude the attorney from accepting the
opposite party's retainer in the same litigation regardless of what

information was received by him from his first client.
The defense that Attorney Agrava wrote the letter Exhibit A and that
Attorney Francisco did not take the trouble of reading it, would not take
the case out of the interdiction. If this letter was written under the
circumstances explained by Attorney Francisco and he was unaware of
its contents, the fact remains that his firm did give Mrs. Hilado a formal
professional advice from which, as heretofore demonstrated, emerged
the relation of attorney and client. This letter binds and estop him in the
same manner and to the same degree as if he personally had written it.
An information obtained from a client by a member or assistant of a law
firm is information imparted to the firm.
The fact that petitioner did not object until after four months had passed
from the date Attorney Francisco first appeared for the defendants does
not operate as a waiver of her right to ask for his disqualification.
CASE 147: Natan v. Capule
FACTS: Complainant Simplicio Natan, the judicial administrator of the
estate of the deceased Maria Patero filed an action against the
decedents husband Santiago Patero for recovery of the wifes share in
the conjugal properties. Santiago was then condemned to deliver his
wifes share in the conjugal properties to Natan plus his one-half share in
the Hacianda Minit for failure to render an accounting of the fruits of the
properties while it was in Santiagos possession. Santiago died in Aug. 1925
and Natan continued in possession of the Hacienda Minit in his original
capacity as administrator.
In 1949, Natan filed an action of forcible entry against 3 individuals for
having illegally occupied and detained portions of the Hacienda Minit
under his administration. Natan engaged the services of respondent Atty.
Simeon Capule who prepared an amended complaint and an opposition
to dismiss the case. Capule received P50 which is a part of his fee of P250
for accepting the case. Natan paid Capule sums of money in partial
payment up to Oct. 7, 1949, amounting to P180. On Oct. 7, 1949, the
hearing of the case was postponed to Nov. 17, 1949 as Capule was based
in Manila and the hearing was conducted in Coron, Palawan. On Nov. 17,
1949, Capule assured Natan what in case he would not be able to arrive
on time, that he would ask the judge for postponement. However, the
judge refused to grant the postponement and Natan was forced to
handle the case himself, being a lawyer. On Nov. 21, 1949, Capule filed a
petition to withdraw as attorney for Natan, to which the latter agreed.
On Jan. 13, 1950, Olimpio Patero filed a motion to intervene in the civil
case of forcible entry filed by Natan against 3 individuals. On Feb. 27, 1950
Capule filed on behalf of Olimpio a petition in the administration
proceedings, alleging that Olimpio Patero is the sole heir of Santiago and
that he is in possession of Hacienda Minit; that the administrator of the
estate, his former client Natan, had been encroaching upon the land
constituting the Hacienda Minit, interfering with its use and occupation
and depriving Olimpio of the harvest of coconut and palay; and praying
that Natan be restrained from interfering with the occupation and
enjoyment of Hacienda Minit by Olimpio. It also appears that during the
filing of the forcible entry case in 1949, Natan gave various documents to
Capule, which the latter used in this petition against his former client.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Capule is guilty of violating the Code of
HELD: Yes, Capule is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
RATIO: Capule violated Canon 21 which states that A LAWYER SHALL
PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED. In this case, Capule used the
documents given to him by his former client Natan during their attorneyclient relationship, in his petition against the latter, after the attorney-client
relationship between them was ended in Nov. 21, 1949. He did actually
utilize the papers, knowledge and information which he had received in
the course of his employment as lawyer for Natan. An attorney is
forbidden to do either of two things after severing his relationship with the
former client. He may not do anything which will injuriously affect his
former client in any matter in which he formerly represented him, nor may
he at any time use against his former client knowledge or information
acquired by virtue of the previous relationship.
The court ruled to impose the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for 2 years upon the respondent Atty. Capule for his misconduct.
CASE 148: Genato vs. Silapan, A.C. No. 4078, July 14, 2003
FACTS: The conflict between the parties started when Atty. Essex Silapan
borrowed two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) from William Genato
which he intended to use as down payment for the purchase of a new
car. In return, Atty. Essex Silapan issued to William Genato a postdated
check in the amount of P176,528.00 to answer for the six (6) months
interest on the loan. Atty. Essex Silapan likewise mortgaged to
complainant his house and lot in Quezon City but did not surrender its title
claiming that it was the subject of reconstitution proceedings before the
Quezon City Register of Deeds. With the money borrowed from William
Genato, Atty. Essex Silapan purchased a new car. However, the
document of sale of the car was issued in William Genatos name and
financed through City Trust Company.
Subsequently, Atty. Essex Silapan failed to pay the amortization on the car
and the financing firm sent demand letters to William Genato. William
Genato tried to encash Atty. Essex Silapans postdated check with the
drawee bank but it was dishonored as respondents account therein was
already closed.
Atty. Essex Silapan failed to heed William Genatos repeated demands for
payment. William Genato then filed a criminal case against Atty. Essex
Silapan for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and a civil case for judicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage. In reply to the allegation of William
Genato, Atty. Essex Silapan said, where he (William Genato) wanted Essex
L. Silapan, his former counsel in that case, to offer bribe money to the
members of the review committee of the Department of Justice where a
petition for review of the resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor was
pending at the time
ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Essex Silapan committed a breach of trust and
confidence by imputing to complainant illegal practices and disclosing
complainants alleged intention to bribe government officials in
connection with a pending case.
HELD: Yes. Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed on him. The long-established rule is that
an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made to him in
his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents. This
obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the
inception of their relationship.[3] The protection given to the client is
perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is
it affected by the partys ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining

another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even
survives the death of the client. It was improper for the Atty. Essex Silapan
to use the alleged bribe against William Genato in the foreclosure case as
it was not the subject matter of litigation therein and Atty. Essex Silapans
professional competence and legal advice were not being attacked in
said case. A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with
his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach. His
relationship with his clients should be characterized by the highest degree
of good faith and fairness
Henceforth, you lawyer for yourselves. Here are your papers.

Johnny
CASE 149: Felicisimo M. Motano v. IBP and Atty. Juan S. Dealca
HELD: Yes. respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca is REPRIMANDED with a

warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely.
FACTS: In a verified complaint filed before this Court on March 9, 1994,

complainant Felicisimo M. Montano charged Atty. Juan Dealca with
misconduct and prays that he be sternly dealt wit administratively. The
complaint[1] is summarized as follows:
1. On November 14, 1992, the complainant hired the services of Atty.
Juan S. Dealca as his counsel in collaboration with Atty. Ronando L.
Gerona in a case pending before the Court of Appeals docketed as CAG.R. CV No. 37467 wherein the complainant was the plaintiff-appellant.
2. The parties agreed upon attorneys fees in the amount of P15,000.00,
fifty percent (50%) of which was payable upon acceptance of the case
and the remaining balance upon the termination of the
case. Accordingly, complainant paid respondent the amount of P7,500.00
representing 50% of the attorneys fee.
3.
Thereafter, even before the respondent counsel had prepared
the appellants brief and contrary to their agreement that the remaining
balance be payable after the termination of the case, Atty. Dealca
demanded an additional payment from complainant. Complainant
obliged by paying the amount of P4,000.00.
4. Prior to the filing of the appellants brief, respondent counsel again
demand payment of the remaining balance of 3,500.00. When
complainant was unable to do so, respondent lawyer withdrew his
appearance as complainants counsel without his prior knowledge
and/or conformity. Returning the case folder to the complainant,
respondent counsel attached a Note dated February 28, 1993,[2] stating:
28 February 1994
Pepe and Del Montano,
For breaking your promise, since you do not want to fulfill your end of the
bargain, heres your reward:
Complainant claimed that such conduct by respondent counsel

exceeded the ethical standards of the law profession and prays that the
latter be sternly dealt with administratively. Complainant later on filed
motions praying for the imposition of the maximum penalty of disbarment.
ISSUE/S: WON respondent lawyer violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
RATIO: We find Atty. Dealcas conduct unbecoming of a member of the

legal profession. Under Canon 22 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and
upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. Although he may
withdraw his services when the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for
the services,[11] under the circumstances of the present case, Atty.
Dealcas withdrawal was unjustified as complainant did not deliberately
fail to pay him the attorneys fees. In fact, complainant exerted honest
efforts to fulfill his obligation. Respondents contemptuous conduct does
not speak well of a member of the bar considering that the amount owing
to him was only P3,500.00. Rule 20.4 of Canon 20, mandates that a lawyer
shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and
shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or
fraud. Sadly, for not so large a sum owed to him by complainant,
respondent lawyer failed to act in accordance with the demands of the
Code.
The Court, however, does not agree with complainants contention that
the maximum penalty of disbarment should be imposed on respondent
lawyer. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in
a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar
will disbarment be imposed as a penalty. It should never be decreed
where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish
the end desired.[12] In the present case, reprimand is deemed sufficient.
CASE 150: Obando vs. Figueras, G.R. No. 139760 (G.R. No. 134854)October
5, 2001(January 18, 2000)
FACTS: Alegria, Strebel Figueras, together with her stepsons, Eduardo and
Francisco, filed a Petition for settlement of the intestate estate of her
deceased husband Jose Figueras. While settlement of the estate was
pending, she died and Eduardo assumed administration of the joint
estates of Don Jose and Doa Alegria. Hardly had the proceedings in
both intestacies begun when Eduardo was served a Petition for Probate
of what purported to be Doa Alegria's Last Will and Testament, filed by
Felizardo S. Obando, a nephew of Doa Alegria. The alleged Will
bequeathed to Obando and several other members of the Obando clan
properties left by the Figueras couple.
fact, Eduardo manifested that he had been tricked by Obando into

signing the aforesaid Manifestation and Motion and Compromise
Agreement.
At the discretion of the court, an attorney who has already been
dismissed by the client is allowed to intervene in a case in order to protect
the client's rights.
After this, the NBI, upon insistence of Eduardo, has found that the alleged
Will is a forgery. Obando was indicted and convicted of Estafa through
falsification of a public document. Eduardo then sold two parcels of land
from the estate to Amigo Realty Corp despite probate courts denial to
sell these lands. Obando, as co-administrator of the joint estate filed a
petition for the nullification of the sale. He was subsequently removed by
the probate court of this said position. Then Figueras field a Joint Motion to
Dismiss after Obandos removal. They alleged that Obando does not
anymore possess legal standing in this case. Obando then claimed that
when Atty. Yuseco filed the Motion to Dismiss for the Eduardo, he no
longer represented him as shown by Eduardos Manifestation and Motion
dispensing with said counsels services in the proceeding in view of a
previously-done Compromise Agreement with Obando.
ISSUE/S: WON The trial court could act on a motion filed by a lawyer who
was allegedy no longer Eduardos counsel of record
HELD: Yes. The trial court could act on a motion filed by t lawyer who was
allegedly no longer Eduardos counsel of record.
RATIO: Representation continues until the court dispenses with the services
of counsel in accordance with Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Counsel may be validly substituted only if the following requisites are
complied with: (1) new counsel files a written application for Substitution;
(2) the client's written consent is obtained; and (3) the written consent of
the lawyer to be substituted is secured, if it can still be; if the written
consent can no longer be obtained, then the application for substitution
must carry proof that notice of the motion has been served on the
attorney to be substituted in the manner required by the Rules. In this
case, we are convinced that Eduardo did not dismiss Attorney Yuseco. In

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CASE 1: In The Matter of the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines,

ISSUE/S: WON the integration of the Bar is constitutional.

HELD: Yes. The integration of the Bar is constitutional.

CASE 2: In Re: 1989 elections of the IBP

The constitutionality of the Bar Integration hinges on the constitutional

Undersecretary Antonio Tria. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB plane by

RATIO: The setting up of campaign headquarters by Drilon, Nisce and

CASE 4: Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr. Requesting Exemption From

Leda, in response to this, instituted the present Administrative Case

CASE 7: In Re Investigation of Angel Parazo for Alleged Leakage of

CASE 8: Saburnido v. Madrono

whether in a lawyer or another individual, as complainants were

Respondents action erodes rather than enhances public perception of

HELD: Yes. Respondents actions amount to gross immoral conduct.

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,

ISSUE/S: WON respondent has committed gross immoral conduct.

RATIO: The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

FACTS:This case refers to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent

FACTS: Sometime in 1991, Atty. Virtusio convinced herein petitioner, Mila

dishonest and deceitful conduct under the Code of Professional

2. He harassed Atty. Macias to withdraw his appearance in: (a) Special

Atty. Rosalie filed a Manifestation expressing her desire not to appear on

Respondent Pefianco claimed that while talking with Atty. Salvani

Atty. Mariano Pefianco was found GUILTY of violation of Canon 8 of the

opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by

mendacity practiced on her by Atty. Lim who, fraudulently or without

FACTS: On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr.

The Code of Professional Responsibility states:

profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has

ISSUE/S: WON the appellate court committed error in affirming the

Salanga in the criminal investigation and complainants connivance

ISSUE/S: WON Atty. Chiong violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 15. Sarmiento

RATIO: Canon 8 provides that A lawyer shall conduct himself with

those specified in the statute. A signature by agents amounts to a signing

CASE 23 : US vs. C.W. Ney and Juan Garcia Bosque

RATIO:Section 232 of the Code of Civil Procedure describes contempt as

Under the second requisite, Bosque is obviously not answerable, inasmuch

RATIO:The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct

bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna

FACTS: Complainant, Sophia Alawi, a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa

Alauya was reprimanded by the Supreme Court for the excessively

On September 6, 1958, Felipe Eco filed a motion for excusable negligence

described in the complaint, in order that he might administer them during

However, even though the questions addressed by Lacalle to the plaintiff's

be divided equally by him, Atty. Fernandez and Felisberto Javier, the

ISSUE/S: WON IT MAY BE STIPULATED THAT THE UNION PRESIDENT MAY

RATIO: Judge Caguioas forthright denial of the Petition for Relief to

CASE 31: Amalgamated Laborers Association v. CIR

RATIO: Canon 34 of Legal Ethics condemns this arrangement in terms

ISSUE/S: WON Atty. David is guilty of malpractice

obtain employment by him or through others for to do so would be

On the agreement to divide the attorneys fees, the Supreme Court

ISSUE/S: WON the manifestation issued by petitioner has merit.

CASE 33: Five J Taxi v. NLRC

RATIO: We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation

HELD: No. A mere disclaimer of intent certainly cannot exculpate him,

voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and was under detention.

act violates the Canons of Professional Ethics which obliges an attorney to

itself a display of lack of candor. Contrary to Dean Leonens proposition,

The two motions for reconsideration separately filed by the COMELEC

Atty. Jose P. Balbuena is ADMONISHED to be more careful in the

On the other hand, under Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by

FACTS: The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU,