N BANC

A.M. No. 491 October 6, 1989

IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES.

PER CURIAM:

In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereafter "IBP")
held on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine International Convention Center (or PICC), the following
were elected by the House of Delegates (composed of 120 chapter presidents or their
alternates) and proclaimed as officers:

NAME POSITION

Atty. Violeta Drilon President

Atty. Bella Tiro Executive Vice-President

Atty. Salvador Lao Chairman, House of Delegates

Atty. Renato F. Ronquillo Secretary, House of Delegates

Atty. Teodoro Quicoy Treasurer, House of Delegates

Atty. Oscar Badelles Sergeant at Arms, House of Delegates

Atty. Justiniano Cortes Governor & Vice-President for Northern Luzon

Atty. Ciriaco Atienza Governor & Vice-President for Central Luzon

Atty. Mario Jalandoni Governor & Vice-President for Metro Manila

Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon Governor & Vice-President for Southern Luzon

Atty. Teodoro Almine Governor & Vice-President for Bicolandia

Atty. Porfirio Siyangco Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Visayas

 Atty. Ricardo Teruel Governor & Vice-President for Western Visayas

Atty. Gladys Tiongco Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Mindanao

Atty. Simeon Datumanong Governor & Vice-President for Western Mindanao

The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July 4,1989, before the
Supreme Court en banc. However,disturbed by the widespread reports received by some
members of the Court from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and
the adverse comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the intensive
electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main protagonists for the office
of president of the association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C.
Drilon, the alleged use of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public
officials to influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which
prohibit such activities. The Supreme Court en banc, exercising its power of supervision over the
Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into
the veracity of the reports.

It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i.e. the voting and the
canvassing of votes on June 3, 1989) which was conducted by the "IBP Comelec," headed by
Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of Appeals, was unanimously adjudged by the participants
and observers to be above board. For Justice Puno took it upon himself to device safeguards to
prevent tampering with, and marking of, the ballots.

What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported electioneering and
extravagance that characterized the campaign conducted by the three candidates for
president of the IBP.

I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila Standard, Sunday, June
17, 1989), Luis Mauricio, in two successive columns: "The Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya, June 10,
1989) and "The Disintegrating Bar" (Malaya, June 20, 1989), and Teodoro Locsin Jr. in an article,
entitled "Pam-Pam" (The Philippines Free Press, July 8,1989), and the editorial, entitled 'Wrong
Forum" of the Daily Globe (June 8, 1989), were unanimously critical of the "vote-buying and
pressure tactics" allegedly employed in the campaign by the three principal candidates: Attys.
Violeta C. Drilon, Nereo Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who reportedly "poured heart, soul, money
and influence to win over the 120 IBP delegates."

Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's rivals who felt at a disadvantage because
Atty. Drilon allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit far-flung IBP chapters on the pretext of
distributing Bigay Puso donations, and she had the added advantage of having regional
directors and labor arbiters of the Department of Labor and Employment (who had been
granted leaves of absence by her husband, the Labor Secretary) campaigning for her. Jurado's
informants alleged that there was rampant vote-buying by some members of the U.P. Sigma Rho
Fraternity (Secretary Drilon's fraternity), as well as by some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara,
Concepcion, Cruz, Regala and Abello Law Office) where Mrs. Drilon is employed, and that
government positions were promised to others by the office of the Labor Secretary.
Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and, in addition, mentioned "talk of
personnel of the Department of Labor, especially conciliators and employers, notably Chinese
Filipinos, giving aid and comfort to her (Atty. Drilon's) candidacy," the billeting of out-of-town
delegates in plush hotels where they were reportedly "wined and dined continuously, womened
and subjected to endless haggling over the price of their votes x x x" which allegedly "ranged
from Pl5,000 to P20,000, and, on the day of the election, some twelve to twenty votes which
were believed crucial, appreciated to P50,000."

In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a top official of the judiciary allegedly
involved himself in IBP politics on election day by closeting himself with campaigners as they
plotted their election strategy in a room of the PICC (the Philippine International Convention
Center where the convention/election were held) during a recess x x x."

Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed Mauricio's reports with some
embellishments.

II. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE.

Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en banc resolution dated June 15, 1989,
directed the outgoing and incoming members of the IBP Board of Governors, the principal
officers and Chairman of the House of Delegates to appear before it on Tuesday, June 20, 1989,
at 2:00 o'clock p.m., and there to inform the Court on the veracity of the aforementioned reports
and to recommend, for the consideration of the Court, appropriate approaches to the problem
of confirming and strengthening adherence to the fundamental principles of the IBP.

In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), heavily stressed at the time of its organization and commencement of
existence, is that the IBP shall be non-political in character and that there shall be no lobbying
nor campaigning in the choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of
Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national, or regional, or chapter. The fundamental assumption
was that officers, delegates and governors would be chosen on the basis of professional merit
and willingness and ability to serve."

The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note that in connection with
the election of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, there is a
widespread belief, based on reports carried by media and transmitted as well by word of
mouth, that there was extensive and intensive campaigning by candidates for IBP positions as
well as expenditure of considerable sums of money by candidates, including vote-buying, direct
or indirect."

The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus, Jose B.L. Reyes,
attended the dialogue, upon invitation of the Court, to give counsel and advice. The meeting
between the Court en banc on the one hand, and the outgoing and in coming IBP officers on
the other, was an informal one. Thereafter, the Court resolved to conduct a formal inquiry to
determine whether the prohibited acts and activities enumerated in the IBP By-Laws were
committed before and during the 1989 elections of IBP's national officers.

The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate Justice Andres R.
Narvasa, as Chairman, and Associate Justices Teodoro R. Padilla, Emilio A. Gancayco, Abraham
F. Sarmiento, and Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, as members, to conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of
Court, Atty. Daniel Martinez, acted as the committee's Recording Secretary.
A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to subpoenas issued by
the Court to shed light on the conduct of the elections. The managers of three five-star hotels
the Philippine Plaza, the Hyatt, and the Holiday Inn where the three protagonists (Drilon, Nisce
and Paculdo) allegedly set up their respective headquarters and where they billeted their
supporters were summoned. The officer of the Philippine National Bank and the Air Transport
Office were called to enlighten the Court on the charge that an IBP presidential candidate and
the members of her slate used PNB planes to ferry them to distant places in their campaign to
win the votes of delegates. The Philippine Airlines officials were called to testify on the charge
that some candidates gave free air fares to delegates to the convention. Officials of the Labor
Department were also called to enable the Court to ascertain the truth of the reports that labor
officials openly campaigned or worked for the election of Atty. Drilon.

The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus Bigornia and Emil Jurado were
subpoenaed to determine the nature of their sources of information relative to the IBP elections.
Their stories were based, they said, on letters, phone calls and personal interviews with persons
who claimed to have knowledge of the facts, but whom they, invoking the Press Freedom Law,
refused to identify.

The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving, and analyzing and assessing
evidence given by such persons as were perceived to have direct and personal knowledge of
the relevant facts; and the Court, after deliberating thereon, has Resolved to accept and adopt
the same.

III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS.

Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political" character of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, thus:

"SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. — The Integrated Bar is strictly non-political, and every
activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be
penalized accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or
prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality
thereof shall be eligible for election or appointment to any position in the
Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, officer or
employee of the Integrated Bar, or an officer or employee of any Chapter
thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the
moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or
accepts appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the
Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof. "'

Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts relative to IBP
elections:

SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections. — The following acts
and practices relative to election are prohibited, whether committed by a
candidate for any elective office in the Integrated Bar or by any other member,
directly or indirectly, in any form or manner, by himself or through another person:

(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign material;

 (b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign material other than a
statement of the biodata of a candidate on not more than one page of a legal-
size sheet of paper; or causing distribution of such statement to be done by
persons other than those authorized by the officer presiding at the elections;

(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding an elective, judicial,
quasi-judicial or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof;

(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of candidates, as well as

the advertisement thereof;

(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or
to vote for or against a candidate, (1) payment of the dues or other
indebtedness of any member; (2) giving of food, drink, entertainment,
transportation or any article of value, or any similar consideration to any person;
or (3) making a promise or causing an expenditure to be made, offered or
promised to any person."

Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above rules:

(d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or commission of any of the
prohibited acts and practices defined in Section 14 prohibited Acts and Practices
relative to elections) of the by-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be a ground for the
disqualification of a candidate or his removal from office if elected, without
prejudice to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring member pursuant to the
By-laws of the Integrated Bar.

At the formal investigation which was conducted by the investigating committee, the following
violations were established:

(1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for president, executive
vice-president, the officers of candidate the House of Delegates and Board of Governors.

The three candidates for IBP President Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo began travelling around the
country to solicit the votes of delegates as early as April 1989. Upon the invitation of IBP
President, Leon Garcia, Jr. (t.s.n., July 13,1989, p. 4), they attended the Bench and Bar dialogues
held in Cotabato in April 1989 (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p. 123), in Tagaytay City, Pampanga, and in
Baguio City (during the conference of chapter presidents of Northern Luzon (t.s.n., July 3,1989, p.
113; t.s.n., July 10, p. 41; t.s.n., July 13, p. 47) where they announced their candidacies and met
the chapter presidents.

Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking the help of IBP chapter officers,
soliciting their votes, and securing their written endorsements. He personally hand-carried
nomination forms and requested the chapter presidents and delegates to fill up and sign the
forms to formalize their commitment to his nomination for IBP President. He started campaigning
and distributing the nomination forms in March 1989 after the chapter elections which
determined the membership of the House of Delegates composed of the 120 chapter presidents
(t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-86). He obtained forty (40) commitments. He submitted photocopies
of his nomination forms which read:
 "Nomination Form

I Join in Nominating

RAMON M. NISCE

as

National President of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines

______________ _______________

Chapter Signature"

Among those who signed the nomination forms were: Onofre P. Tejada, Candido P. Balbin, Jr.,
Conizado V. Posadas, Quirico L. Quirico Ernesto S. Salun-at, Gloria C. Agunos, Oscar B. Bernardo,
Feliciano F. Wycoco, Amor L. Ibarra, Jose M. Atienza, Jose N. Contreras, Romeo T. Mendoza, Leo
C. Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G. Clarin, Julius Z. Neil, Roem J. Arbolado Democrito M. Perez,
Abelardo Fermin, Diosdado B. Villarin, Jr., Daniel C. Macaraeg, Confesor R. Sansano Dionisio E.
Bala, Jr., Emesto A. Amores, Romeo V. Pefianco, Augurio C. Pamintuan, Atlee T. Viray, Ceferino
C. Cabanas, Jose S. Buban, Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr., Cesar C. Viola, Oscar C. Fernandez, Ricardo B.
Teruel Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto Marella, Jr., Arsenio C. Villalon, Renato F. Ronquillo, Antonio G.
Nalapo Romualdo A. Din Jr., Jose P. Icaonapo Jr., and Manuel S. Person.

Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the Hyatt Hotel based on the commitments he
had obtained (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-85). Unfortunately, despite those formal commitments,
he obtained only 14 votes in the election (t.s.n., June 29, 1 989, p. 86). The reason, he said, is that.
some of those who had committed their votes to him were "manipulated, intimidated, pressured,
or remunerated" (t.s.n., June 29,1989, pp. 8695; Exhibit "M-4-Nisce," t.s.n., July 4, 1989, pp. 100-1
04).

(2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign.

The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit C-1-Crudo and Exhibit C-2-Crudo) show that
Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. of the Department of Environment & Natural Resources
(DENR) borrowed a plane from the Philippine National Bank for his Bicol CORD (Cabinet Officers
for Regional Development) Assistant, Undersecretary Antonio Tria. The plane manifest (Exh. C-2-
Crudo) listed Atty. Violeta Drilon, Arturo Tusi (Tiu), Assistant Secretary for Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Tony Tria, Atty. Gladys Tiongco, and Amy Wong. Except for Tony Tria, the rest
of the passengers were IBP candidates.

Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a PNB plane. She said that she was informed by
Atty. Tiu about the availability of a PNB plane (t.s.n., July 3,1989, pp. 116-118).
Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive vice-president in the Drilon ticket, testified that
sometime in May 1989 he failed to obtain booking from the Philippine Airlines for the projected
trip of his group to Bicol. He went to the DENR allegedly to follow up some papers for a client.
While at the DENR, he learned that Assistant Secretary Tria was going on an official business in
Bicol for Secretary Fulgencio Factoran and that he would be taking a PNB plane. As Assistant
Secretary Tria is his fraternity brother, he asked if he, together with the Drilon group, could hitch a
ride on the plane to Bicol. His request was granted. Their purpose in going to Bicol was to assess
their chances in the IBP elections. The Drilon company talked with the IBP chapter presidents in
Daet, Naga, and Legaspi, and asked for their support (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 549).

Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB plane by Atty. Drilon and her
group. He recalled that on May 23,1989, DENR Secretary Factoran instructed him to go to Bicol
to monitor certain regional development projects there and to survey the effect of the typhoon
that hit the region in the middle of May. On the same day, Atty. Tiu, a fraternity brother
(meaning that Tiu belongs to the Sigma Rho fraternity) went to the DENR office and requested
the Secretary (Factoran) if he (Tiu) could be allowed to hitch a ride on the plane. Assistant
Secretary Tria, together with the Drilon group which included Attorneys Drilon, Grapilon, Amy
Wong, Gladys Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at the Domestic Airport bound for Naga, Daet and
Legaspi. In Legaspi the Drilon group had lunch with Atty. Vicente Real, Jr., an IBP chapter
president (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 54-69).

(3) Formation of tickets and single slates.

The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted having formed their own slates for
the election of IBP national officers on June 3, 1989.

Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of — himself for President; Bella D. Tiro, for Executive Vice-
President; and for Governors: Justiniano P. Cortez (Northern Luzon), Oscar C. Fernandez (Central
Luzon), Mario C.V. Jalandoni (Greater Manila), Petronilo A. de la Cruz (Southern Luzon),
Teodorico C. Almine, Jr. (Bicolandia), Ricardo B. Teruel (Western Visayas), Porfirio P. Siyangco
(Eastern Visayas), Jesus S. Anonat (Western Mindanao), Guerrero A. Adaza, Jr. (Eastern
Mindanao) (Exhibit M-Nisce).

The Drilon ticket consisted of. Violeta C. Drilon for President, Arturo Tiu for Executive Vice
President, Salvador Lao for Chairman of the House of Delegates, and, for Governors: Basil
Rupisan (Northern 'Luzon), Acong Atienza (Central Luzon), Amy Wong (Metro Manila), Jose
Grapilon (Southern Tagalog), Teodoro Almine (Bicolandia), Baldomero Estenzo (Eastern Visayas),
Joelito Barrera (Western Visayas), Gladys Tiongco (Eastern Mindanao), Simeon Datumanong
(Western Mindanao) (Exhibit M-1-Nisce).

Atty. Ramon N. Nisce's line-up listed himself and Confessor B. Sansano Benjamin B. Bernardino,
Antonio L. Nalapo Renato F. Ronquillo, Gloria C. Agunos, Mario Valderrama, Candido P. Balbin
Jr., Oscar C. Fernandez, Cesar G. Viola, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla, Jr., Jose S.
Buban, Joel A. Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite and Oscar V. Badelles.

(4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates.

Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some delegates to the convention. He
mentioned Oscar Badelles to whom he gave four round-trip tickets (worth about P10,000) from
Iligan City to Manila and back. Badelles was a voting delegate. Nisce, however, failed to get a
written commitment from him because Atty. Medialdea assured him (Nisce) "sigurado na 'yan,
h'wag mo nang papirmahin." Badelles won as sergeant-at-arms, not in Nisce's ticket, but in that
of Drilon.

Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane tickets, but he Badelles said that he did not
use them, because if he did, he would be committed to Nisce, and he Badelles did not want to
be committed (t.s.n., July 4,1989, pp. 77-79, 95-96).

Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was his candidate, and another ticket to Mrs.
Linda Lim of Zamboanga. Records of the Philippine Airlines showed that Atty. Nisce paid for the
plane tickets of Vicente Real, Jr. (Exh. D-1-Calica), Romeo Fortes (Exh. D-1-Calica), Cesar Batica
(Exh. D-2-Calica), Jose Buban of Leyte (Exh. D-2-Calica), Delsanto Resuello (Exh. D-3- Calica),
and Ceferino Cabanas (Exh. D-3-Calica).

In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisce's candidates won: Renato Ronquillo of
Manila 4, as Secretary of the House of Delegates (t.s.n. July 3, p. 161).

(5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, entertainment to delegates.

(a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO

Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and three suites at the Holiday Inn,
which served as his headquarters. The 24 rooms were to be occupied by his staff (mostly ladies)
and the IBP delegates. The three suites were to be occupied by himself, the officers of the
Capitol Bar Association, and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He paid P150,000 for the hotel bills of his
delegates at the Holiday Inn, where a room cost P990 per day with breakfast.

Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn were: Emesto C. Perez, Tolomeo Ligutan
Judge Alfonso Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio Bisnar, Benedicto Balajadia, Jesus Castro,
Restituto Villanueva, Serapio Cribe Juanita Subia, Teodorico J. Almine, Rudy Gumban, Roem
Arbolado, Ricardo Teruel, Shirley Moises, Ramon Roco, Alberto Trinidad, Teodoro Quicoy Manito
Lucero, Fred Cledera Vicente Tordilla, Julian Ocampo, Francisco Felizmenio Marvel Clavecilla,
Amador Capiral, Eufronio Maristela, Porfirio Siyangco, William Llanes, Jr., Marciano Neri, Guerrero
Adaza, Diosdado Peralta, Luis C. Formilleza, Jr., Democrito Perez, Bruno Flores, Dennis Rendon,
Judge Ceferino Chan, Mario Jalandoni, Kenneth Siruelo Bella Tiro, Antonio Santos, Tiburcio
Edano James Tan, Cesilo A. Adaza, Francisco Roxas, Angelita Gacutan, Jesse Pimentel, Judge
Jaime Hamoy, Jesus Anonat, Carlos Egay, Judge Carlito Eisma, Judge Jesus Carbon, Joven
Zach, and Benjamin Padon.

Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn's credit manager, testified that Atty. Paculdo booked 52 (not 24)
rooms, including the presidential suite, which was used as the Secretariat. The group bookings
were made by Atty. Gloria Paculdo, the wife of Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 63-68).
The total sum of P227,114.89 was paid to Holiday Inn for the use of the rooms.

(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON

The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at the Philippine Plaza Hotel where her
campaign manager, Atty. Renato Callanta, booked 40 rooms, 5 of which were suites.
According to Ms. Villanueva, Philippine Plaza banquet and conventions manager, the contract
that Atty. Callanta signed with the Philippine Plaza was made in the name of the "IBP c/o Atty.
Callanta."
Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine Plaza, recalled that it was Mr. Mariano
Benedicto who first came to book rooms for the IBP delegates. She suggested that he obtain a
group (or discounted) rate. He gave her the name of Atty. Callanta who would make the
arrangements with her. Mr. Benedicto turned out to be the Assistant Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).

The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for the rooms, food, and beverages
consumed by the Drilon group, with an unpaid balance of P302,197.30. Per Attorney Daniel
Martinez's last telephone conversation with Ms. Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an outstanding
account of P232,782.65 at Philippine Plaza.

Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40 rooms at the Philippine Plaza. He
made a downpayment of P123,000. His "working sheet' showed that the following persons
contributed for that down payment:

(a) Nilo Pena (Quasha Law Office) P 25,000

(b) Antonio Carpio 20,000

(c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law Office) 10,000

(d) Jay Castro 10,000

(e) Danny Deen 20,000

(f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law Office) 10,000

(g) Alfonso Reyno 20,000

(h) Cosme Rossel 15,300

(t.s.n. July 4, 1 989, pp. 3-4)

Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons have been contributing money every
time the IBP embarks on a project. This time, they contributed so that their partners or associates
could attend the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention too.

Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty. Callanta had billeted her delegates at the
Philippine Plaza. She allegedly did not also know in whose name the room she occupied was
registered. But she did ask for a room where she could rest during the convention. She admitted,
however, that she paid for her hotel room and meals to Atty. Callanta, through Atty. Loanzon
(t.s.n. July 3,1989).

The following were listed as having occupied the rooms reserved by Atty. Callanta at the
Philippine Plaza: Violeta Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria C. Loanzon, Leopoldo A. Consulto
Ador Lao, Victoria Borra, Aimee Wong, Callanta, Pena, Tiu, Gallardo, Acong Atienza, D.
Bernardo, Amores, Silao Caingat, Manuel Yuson, Simeon Datumanong, Manuel Pecson, Sixto
Marella, Joselito Barrera, Radon Macalalag, Oscar Badelles, Antonio Acyatan, Ildefonso C.
Puerto, Nestor Atienza, Gil Batula Array Corot, Dimakuta Corot Romeo Fortes Irving Petilla,
Teodoro Palma, Gil Palma, Danilo Deen, Delsanto, Resuello, Araneta, Vicente Real, Sylvio
Casuncad Espina, Guerrero, Julius Neri, Linda Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica, Luis Formilleza, Felix
Macalag Mariano Benedicto, Atilano, Araneta, Renato Callanta.

Atty. Nilo Pena admitted that the Quasha Law Office of which he is a senior partner, gave
P25,000 to Callanta for rooms at the Philippine Plaza so that some members of his law firm could
campaign for the Drilon group (t.s.n. July 5,1989, pp. 7678) during the legal aid seminar and the
IBP convention. Most of the members of his law firm are fraternity brothers of Secretary Drilon
(meaning, members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity). He admitted being sympathetic to the
candidacy of Atty. Drilon and the members of her slate, two of whom Jose Grapilon and Simeon
Datumanong — are Sigma Rhoans. They consider Atty. Drilon as a "sigma rho sister," her husband
being a sigma rhoan.

Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a room for the members of his own firm who
attended the legal aid seminar and the convention. He made the reservation through Atty.
Callanta to whom he paid P20,000 (t.s.n. July 6,1989, pp. 30-34).

Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign during the convention, by soliciting the votes
of delegates he knew, like Atty. Albacite his former teacher (but the latter was already
committed to Nisce), and Atty. Romy Fortes, a classmate of his in the U.P. College of Law (t. t.s.n.
July 6, 1989, pp. 22, 29, 39).

(c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE.

Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras, entered into a contract with the Hyatt
Hotel for a total of 29 rooms plus one (1) seventh-floor room. He made a downpayment of
P20,000 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 58) on April 20, 1989, and P37,632.45 on May 10, or a total of
P57,632.45.

Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr. Ramon Jacinto, the sales department
manager, credit manager, and reservation manager, respectively of the Hyatt, testified that
Atty. Nisce's bill amounted to P216,127.74 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 57-58; Exhibits E-Flores, F-
Jacinto G-Ocampo).

As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms for those who committed
themselves to his candidacy.

The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos Dennis Habanel B. Batula, John E. Asuncion,
Reynaldo Cortes, Lourdes Santos, Elmer Datuin, Romualdo Din, Antonio Nalapo, Israel Damasco,
Candido Balbin, Serrano Balot, Ibarra, Joel Llosa, Eltanal, Ruperto, Asuncion, Q. Pilotin Reymundo
P. Guzman, Zoilo Aguinaldo, Clarin, R. Ronquillo, Dominador Carillo, Filomeno Balinas, Ernesto
Sabulan, Yusop Pangadapun, A. Viray, Icampo, Abelardo Fermin, C. Quiaoit, Augurio
Pamintuan, Daniel Macaraeg, Onofre Tejada.

(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon

In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a candidate while holding an
elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government' (Sec. 14[c], Art. I, IBP By-
Laws), Mariano E. Benedicto II, Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment,
testified that he took a leave of absence from his office to attend the IBP convention. He stayed
at the Philippine Plaza with the Drilon group admittedly to give "some moral assistance" to Atty.
Violeta Drilon. He did so because he is a member of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. When asked
about the significance of Sigma Rho, Secretary Benedicto explained: "More than the husband of
Mrs. Drilon being my boss, the significance there is that the husband is my brother in the Sigma
Rho."

He cheered up Mrs., Drilon when her spirits were low. He talked to her immediate circle which
included Art Tiu, Tony Carpio, Nilo Pena, Amy Wong, Atty. Grapilon, Victor Lazatin, and Boy
Reyno. They assessed the progress of the campaign, and measured the strengths and
weaknesses of the other groups The group had sessions as early as the later part of May.

Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant Secretary Benedicto toted up a bill of P23,110
during the 2-day IBP convention/election. A total of 113 phone calls (amounting to Pl,356) were
recorded as emanating from his room.

Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite, listed in the names of Mrs. Drilon, Gladys
Tiongco (candidate for Governor, Eastern Mindanao) and Amy Wong (candidate for Governor,
Metro Manila). These two rooms served as the "action center' or "war room" where campaign
strategies were discussed before and during the convention. It was in these rooms where the
supporters of the Drilon group, like Attys. Carpio, Callanta, Benedicto, the Quasha and the
ACCRA lawyers met to plot their moves.

(7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any number (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).

Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has heard of candidates paying the IBP
dues of lawyers who promised to vote for or support them, but she has no way of ascertaining
whether it was a candidate who paid the delinquent dues of another, because the receipts are
issued in the name of the member for whom payment is made (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 24-28).

She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of payments in March, April, May during any
election year. This year, the collections increased by P100,000 over that of last year (a non-
election year from Pl,413,425 to Pl,524,875 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 25).

(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one page of legal size sheet of
paper (Sec. 14[a], IBP By-Laws).

On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty. Paculdo caused to be distributed his
bio-data and copies of a leaflet entitled "My Quest," as wen as, the lists of his slate. Attys. Drilon
and Nisce similarly distributed their tickets and bio-data.

The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from P15,000 to P20,000. They were printed by his
own printing shop.

(9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by
the officer presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By-Laws).

Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his campaign materials on the convention
floor. Atty. Carpio noted that there were more campaign materials distributed at the convention
site this year than in previous years. The election was more heated and expensive (t.s.n. July
6,1989, p. 39).

Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, and a candidate
for chairman of the House of Delegates on Nisce's ticket, testified that campaign materials were
distributed during the convention by girls and by lawyers. He saw members of the ACCRA law
firm campaigning for Atty. Drilon (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 142-145).

(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate
(Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).

Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo Capulong, urged him to withdraw his
candidacy for chairman of the House of Delegates and to run as vice-chairman in Violy Drilon's
slate, but he declined (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 137, 149).

Atty. Gloria Agunos personnel director of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in Baguio and president of the
Baguio-Benguet IBP Chapter, recalled that in the third week of May 1989, after the Tripartite
meet of the Department of Labor & Employment at the Green Valley Country Club in Baguio
City, she met Atty. Drilon, together with two labor officers of Region 1, Attys. Filomeno Balbin and
Atty. Mansala Atty. Drilon solicited her (Atty. Agunos') vote and invited her to stay at the
Philippine Plaza where a room would be available for her. Atty. Paculdo also tried to enlist her
support during the chapter presidents' meeting to choose their nominee for governor for the
Northern Luzon region (t.s.n. July 13,1989, pp. 43-54).

Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate, Marcial Magsino, who had earlier
committed his vote to Nisce changed his mind when he was offered a judgeship (This statement,
however, is admittedly hearsay). When Nisce confronted Magsino about the alleged offer, the
latter denied that there was such an offer. Nisce's informant was Antonio G. Nalapo an IBP
candidate who also withdrew.

Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the race and refused to be nominated
(t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104). Vicente P. Tordilla who was Nisce's candidate for Governor became
Paculdo's candidate instead (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104).

Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in Cotabato City, Court Administrator Tiro
went around saying, "I am not campaigning, but my wife is a candidate." Nisce said that the
presidents of several IBP chapters informed him that labor officials were campaigning for Mrs.
Drilon (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 109-110). He mentioned Ciony de la Cerna, who allegedly
campaigned in La Union (t.s.n. June 29,1989,p.111)

Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce's supporter and candidate for governor of the Western Visayas,
expressed his disappointment over the IBP elections because some delegates flip-flopped from
one camp to another. He testified that when he arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport he was
met by an assistant regional director of the DOLE who offered to bring him to the Philippine
Plaza, but he declined the offer. During the legal aid seminar, Atty. Drilon invited him to transfer
to the Philippine Plaza where a room had been reserved for him. He declined the invitation (t.s.n.
July 4,1989, pp. 102-106).

Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City, he already knew that the three
candidates had their headquarters in separate hotels: Paculdo, at the Holiday Inn; Drilon, at the
Philippine Plaza; and Nisce, at the Hyatt. He knew about this because a week before the
elections, representatives of Atty. Drilon went to Dumaguete City to campaign. He mentioned
Atty. Rodil Montebon of the ACCRA Law Office, accompanied by Atty. Julve the Assistant
Regional Director of the Department of Labor in Dumaguete City. These two, he said, offered to
give him two PAL tickets and accommodations at the Philippine Plaza (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 101-
104). But he declined the offer because he was already committed to Atty. Nisce.

Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31, 1989, a businessman, Henry
Dy, approached him to convince him to vote for Atty. Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy that he was
already committed to Nisce.

He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce because he and his two companions (Atty.
Eltanal and Atty. Ruperto) had earlier bought their own tickets for Manila (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, p.
101).

SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED

BY THE CANDIDATES

Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three weeks of campaigning. Of
this amount, the Capitol Bar Association (of which he was the chapter president) contributed
about P150,000. The Capitol Bar Association is a voluntary bar association composed of Quezon
City lawyers.

He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the provinces (Bicol provinces,
Pampanga, Abra, Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 9-14).

Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does not include the expenses
for his campaign which began several months before the June 3rd election, and his purchases
of airplane tickets for some delegates.

The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's camp, showed that her
campaign rang up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty. Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the rooms,
food, and beverage consumed by Atty. Drilon's supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of
P302,197.30 at convention's end.

FINDINGS.

From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates for the
national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections
on June 3, 1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a
"strictly non-political" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.

The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates (Drilon, Nisce and
Paculdo) in five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn and The Hyatt the better for
them to corral and entertain the delegates billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit the
votes of the chapter presidents who comprise the 120-member House of Delegates that elects
the national officers and regional governors; the formation of tickets, slates, or line-ups of
candidates for the other elective positions aligned with, or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or
Nisce; the procurement of written commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to be
filled up by the delegates; the reservation of rooms for delegates in three big hotels, at the
expense of the presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and some members of
her ticket to enable them to "assess their chances" among the chapter presidents in the Bicol
provinces; the printing and distribution of tickets and bio-data of the candidates which in the
case of Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to P20,000; the employment of uniformed
girls (by Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their campaign materials on the
convention floor on the day of the election; the giving of assistance by the Undersecretary of
Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her group; the use of labor arbiters to meet delegates at the airport and
escort them to the Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and hotel
accommodations to delegates (and some families who accompanied them) in exchange for
their support; the pirating of some candidates by inducing them to "hop" or "flipflop" from one
ticket to another for some rumored consideration; all these practices made a political circus of
the proceedings and tainted the whole election process.

The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of
the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of
their obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect
for law and legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional
Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to
be millions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that
the IBP formulated for their observance.

The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the association
detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being
bribed to vote one way or another, certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor
elevate it in the public's esteem.

The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials and outright
prevarications that tainted the statements of the witnesses, including tome of the candidates,
during the initial hearing conducted by it before its fact-finding committee was created. The
subsequent investigation conducted by this Committee has revealed that those parties had
been less than candid with the Court and seem to have conspired among themselves to
deceive it or at least withhold vital information from it to conceal the irregularities committed
during the campaign.

CONCLUSIONS.

It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987 Constitution (See. 8,
Art. VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of seven (7) members among whom
is "a representative of the Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees for
appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the reason why the position of IBP
president has attracted so much interest among the lawyers. The much coveted "power"
erroneously perceived to be inherent in that office might have caused the corruption of the IBP
elections. To impress upon the participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the
misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court,
and to restore the non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate,
expensive electioneering for the top positions in the organization which, as the recently
concluded elections revealed, spawned unethical practices which seriously diminished the
stature of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble and honored profession, the
Court hereby ORDERS:

1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby annulled.
2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of Delegates (approved
by this Court in its resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) of the following national
officers:

(a) the officers of the House of Delegates;

(b) the IBP president; and

(c) the executive vice-president,

be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the By-Laws of the IBP
under Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws.

3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the
Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [91 IBP regions) from among
themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of
automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration of
their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar
Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored.

4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically
succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an
Executive Vice-President from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall
be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run for
election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the
presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation
shall begin anew.

5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section 47. National Officers. — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a
President and Executive Vice-President to be chosen by the Board of Governors
from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation
basis. The governors shall be ex oficio Vice-President for their respective regions.
There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be
appointed by the President with the consent of the Board.

6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows:

(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP shall be the Chairman
and Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the House of Delegates. The Secretary,
Treasurer, and Sergeant-at-Arms shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the House of Delegates.'

7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary-
Treasurer and Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of Delegates is hereby repealed

8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section 37. Composition of the Board. — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall
be governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the
 nine (9) regions as delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the
representation basis of one (1) Governor for each region to be elected by the
members of the House of Delegates from that region only. The position of
Governor should be rotated among the different Chapters in the region.

9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows:

Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at least one (1) month
before the national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the
governor for their region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be
rotated among the chapters in the region.

10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by addingthe following provision as part of the first
paragraph:

No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general membership shall be

held prior to any election in an election year.

11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI should be as they are hereby
deleted.

All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the Resolution en banc of this
Court of July 9, 1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or
modified.

12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9) IBP regions within
three (3) months, after the promulgation of the Court's resolution in this case. Within thirty (30)
days thereafter, the Board of Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect
from among themselves the IBP national president and executive vice-president. In these special
elections, the candidates in the election of the national officers held on June 3,1989, particularly
identified in Sub-Head 3 of this Resolution entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well
as those identified in this Resolution as connected with any of the irregularities attendant upon
that election, are ineligible and may not present themselves as candidate for any position.

13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed by the Court to
administer the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that the dispositions here made are
without prejudice to its adoption in due time of such further and other measures as are
warranted in the premises.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla. Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Griño-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J. and Medialdea, J., took no part.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 3694 June 17, 1993

ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, ISABELO ONGTENGCO, ACHILLES BARTOLOME, AND ST. LUKES MEDICAL
CENTER, complainants,
vs.
ATTORNEY BENJAMIN M. GRECIA, respondent.

Norberto Gonzales for Fernandez.

Bu Castro for Ongtengco & Bartolome.

Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Peña & Nolasco for St. Luke's Hospital.

Joaquin P. Yuseco for respondent Benjamin Grecia.

PER CURIAM:

This disbarment complaint against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia was filed on August 20, 1991 by
Doctors Alberto Fernandez, Isabelo Ongtengco and Achilles Bartolome and the St. Luke's
Medical Center (hereafter "St. Luke's" for brevity) where they are accredited medical
practitioners. The respondent is charged with dishonesty and grave misconduct in connection
with the theft of some pages from a medical chart which was material evidence in a damage
suit filed by his clients against the aforenamed doctors and St. Luke's.

Disciplinary proceedings like this one are in a class by themselves. As we observed in In Re

Almacen, 31 SCRA 562,600, they are neither purely civil nor purely criminal. "Public interests is the
primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a
fit person to be allowed the privileges as such." The purpose is "to protect the court and the
public from the misconduct of officers of the court" (In Re Montagne & Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577,
588), or to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney (Ledesma vs.
Climaco, 57 SCRA 473; Atienza vs. Evangelista, 80 SCRA 338).

Disbarment is nothing new to respondent Grecia. On November 12, 1987, he was disbarred for
his immoral complicity or "unholy alliance" with a judge in Quezon City to rip off banks and
Chinese business firms which had the misfortune to be sued in the latter's court (Prudential Bank
vs. Judge Jose P. Castro and Atty. Benjamin M. Grecia [Adm. Case No. 2756], 155 SCRA 604).

Three years later, on December 18, 1990, the Court, heeding his pleas for compassions and his
promise to mend his ways, reinstated him in the profession. Only eight (8) months later, on August
20, 1991, he was back before the court facing another charge of dishonesty and unethical
practice. Apparently, the earlier disciplinary action that the Court took against him did not
effectively reform him.
The complaint of St. Luke's against Attorney Grecia was referred by the Court to Deputy Court of
Administrator Juanito A. Bernad for investigation, report and recommendation. The following are
Judge Bernad's findings:

The late Fe Linda Aves was seven (7) months pregnant when she was admitted as a patient at
St. Luke's Hospital on December 20, 1990. She complained of dizziness, hypertension, and
abdominal pains with vaginal bleeding. Dr. Fernandez, head of the OB-GYNE Department of St.
Luke's, Dr. Ongtengco, Jr., a cardiologist, and Dr. Bartolome, a urologist, examined Mrs. Aves
and diagnosed her problem as mild pre-eclampsia (p. 63, Rollo). Five (5) days later, on Christmas
day, December 25, 1990, Mrs. Aves was discharged from the hospital, to celebrate Christmas
with her family.

However, she was rushed back to the hospital the next day, December 26, 1990. On December
27, 1990, she died together with her unborn child.

Blaming the doctors of St. Luke's for his wife's demise, Attorney Damaso B. Aves, along with his
three (3) minor children, brought an action for damages against the hospital and the attending
physicians of his wife. Their counsel, respondent Attorney Benjamin Grecia, filed a complaint
entitled: "Attorney Damaso B. Aves, et al. vs. St. Luke's Medical Center, Drs. Alberto Fernandez,
Isabelo Ongtengco, Jr. and Achilles Bartolome" in the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela,
Bulacan, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 3548-V and assigned to Branch 172, presided
over by Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong.

On July 4, 1991, the medical records of Fe Linda Aves were produced in court by St. Luke's, as
requested by Attorney Grecia. The records were entrusted to the Acting Branch Clerk of Court,
Avelina Robles.

On July 16, 1991, between 8:30-9:00 o' clock in the morning, upon arriving in court for another
hearing of the case, Attorney Grecia borrowed from Mrs. Robles the folder containing the
medical records of Mrs. Aves.

While leafing through the folder, Grecia surreptitiously tore off two (2) pages of the medical
records. The respondent's act was notified by Mrs. Robles and Maria Arnet Sandico, a clerk. They
saw Grecia crumple the papers and place them inside the right pocket of his coat. He
immediately returned the folder to Mrs. Roblesa (who was momentarily rendered speechless by
his audacious act) and left the office.

Mrs. Robles examined the medical chart and found pages "72" and "73" missing. She ordered
Sandico to follow the respondent. Sandico saw Grecia near the canteen at the end of the
building, calling a man (presumably his driver) who was leaning against a parked car
(presumably Grecia's car). When the man approached, Grecia gave him the crumpled papers
which he took from his coatpocket. Sandico returned to the office and reported what she had
seen to Mrs. Robles. The latter in turn reported it to Judge Capulong. The three of
them — Judge Capulong, Mrs. Robles and Ms. Sandico — went downstairs. Ms. Sandico pointed
to Judge Capulong the man to whom Grecia had given the papers which he had filched from
medical folder of Linda Aves. Judge Capulong told Sandico to bring the man to her chamber.
On the way back to chamber, Judge Capulong saw the plaintiff, Attorney Damaso Aves, and
St. Luke's counsel, Attorney Melanie Limson. She requested them to come to her office.

In the presence of Attorneys Aves and Limson, Mrs. Robles, Ms. Sandico, and a visitor, Judge
Capulong confronted the man and ordered him to give her the papers which Grecia had
passed on to him. The man at first denied that he had the papers in his possession. However,
when Sandico declared that she saw Grecia hand over the papers to him, the man sheepishly
took them from his pants pocket and gave them to Judge Capulong. When the crumpled
pages "72" and "73" of the medical folder were shown to Sandico, she identified them as the
same papers that she saw Grecia hand over to the man.

After the confrontation, Sandicio and Robles went back to their office. Mrs. Robles collapsed in a
dead faint and was rushed to the Fatima Hospital where she later regained consciousness.

In the ensuing excitement and confusion of recovering the stolen exhibits, no one thought of
ascertaining the identity of the man from whom they were recovered. Judge Capulong
belatedly realized this, so she directed the Valenzuela Police to find out who he was. She also
ordered Sandico to submit a formal report of the theft of the exhibits to the police.

A police investigator, PO3 Arnold Alabastro, tried to ascertain the name of Grecia's driver who
was known only as "SID." He located Grecia's house in Quezon City. Although he was not
allowed to enter the premises, he was able to talk with a house maid. He pretended to be a
cousin of "SID" and asked for the latter. The housemaid informed him that "SID" was sent home to
his province by Grecia.

He talked with Grecia himself but the latter denied that he had a driver named "SID."

PO3 Alabastro also talked wit one of Grecia's neighbors across the street. The neighbor
confirmed that Grecia's driver was a fellow named "SID".

The incident caused enormous emotional strain to the personnel of Judge Capulong's court, so
much so that the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Avelina Robles, was hospitalized. Because of the
incident, Judge Capulong inhibited herself from conducting the trial of Civil Case No. 3548-V.

On August 20, 1991, St. Luke's failed this disbarment case against Grecia.

At the investigation of the case by Judge Bernad, Attorney Damaso Aves, the surviving spouse
of the late Fe Linda Aves and plaintiff in Civil case No. 3548-V, testified that it was Attorney Bu
Castro, counsel of the defendants in said Civil Case No. 3548-V, who lifted two pages from the
medical folder which lay among some papers on top of the table of Acting Branch Clerk of
Court Robles. When he allegedly went outside the courthouse to wait for Attorney Grecia to
arrive, he noticed Attorney Castro come out of the building and walk toward a man in the
parking lot to whom he handed a piece of paper. Afterward, Attorney Castro reentered the
courthouse.

Respondent Grecia denied any knowledge of the theft of the exhibits in the Aves case. He
alleged that the person who was caught in possession of the detached pages of the medical
record was actually "planted" by his adversaries to discredit him and destroy his reputation.

He denied that he had a driver. He alleged that his car was out of order on July 16, 1991, so he
was fetched by the driver of Attorney Aves in the latter's "Maxima" car. He arrived in the
courthouse at exactly 9:15 in the morning and went straight to the courtroom on the second
floor of the building. He did not leave the place until his case was called at 9:40. Since it was
allegedly a very warm day, he wore a dark blue barong tagalog, not a business suit. He
branded the testimony of Ms. Sandico as an absolute falsehood. He alleged that he would not
have done the act imputed to him, because the medical chart was the very foundation of the
civil case which he filed against St. Luke's and its doctors. He wondered why the man, alleged to
be his driver, to whom he supposedly gave the detached pages of the medical chart, was
neither held nor arrested. His identity was not even established.

He likewise branded the testimony of Police Investigator Alabastro as a fabrication for he had
never seen him before.

He underscored the fact that none of the lawyers in the courthouse, nor any of the court
personnel, accosted him about the purloined pages of the medical record and he alleged that
the unidentified man remained in the courtroom even after the confrontation in the Judge's
chamber.

In evaluating the testimonies of the witnesses, Judge Bernad found the court employee, Maria
Arnie Sandico, and Acting branch Clerk of Court Avelina Robles entirely credible and "without
any noticeable guile nor attempt at fabrication, remaining constant even under pressure of
cross examination" (p. 11, Judge Bernad's Report).

That the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Mrs. Robles, who is not even a lawyer, and her lowly clerk,
Ms. Sandico, did not promptly raise a hue and cry on seeing Grecia tear off two pages of the
medical record, was understandable for they hesitated to confront a man of his stature.
Nevertheless, they had the presence of mind to immediately report the matter to their Judge
who forthwith took appropriate steps to recover the exhibits. Robles, Sandico and PO3 Alabastro
had absolutely no motive to testify falsely against the respondent.

While Judge Capulong took the blame for failing to ascertain the identity of Attorney Grecia's
"driver," her swift action in summoning and confronting him led to the recovery of the stolen
pages of the medical chart.

Unfortunately, the inquiry made by Police Investigation Arnold Alabastro into identity of the man
was fruitless for he was never seen again.

Attorney Aves' allegation that it was St. Luke's counsel, Attorney Castro, not Grecia, who stole
the pages from the medical folder and slipped them to an unidentified man, is an incredible
fabrication. Not only is it directly contradicted by Mrs. Robles and Ms. Sandico, but, significantly,
Attorney Aves failed to mention it during the confrontation with the man inside Judge
Capulong's chamber where he (Attorney Aves) was present.

His other allegation that he saw the man inside the courtroom afterwards, is not credible for he
would have called the attention of Judge Capulong who, he knew, had been looking for the
man to ascertain his identity.

In view of his obvious bias for his counsel, Aves' testimony was properly disregarded by the
investigator, Judge Bernad. Likewise wanting in truth and candor was Grecia's testimony. Judge
Bernad noted that while Grecia was punctilious when testifying on the hour of his arrival in court
(9:15 A.M.) on July 16, 1991, and he even remembered that on that day he wore a dark blue
barong tagalog (an apparel that has no pockets), his memory was not sharp when he was
cross-examined regarding more recent events. For instance, he insisted that Judge Bernad was
absent on August 4, 1992, but the truth is that a hearing was held on that date as shown by the
transcript.
When he was confronted with exhibits "A" and "B," Grecia tried to make an issue of the absence
of a court order to deposit Linda Aves' medical chart in court. He forgot that it was he who
asked that the chart be left with the clerk of court.

His allegation that he would be the last person to remove pages 72 and 73 of the medical chart
for the entries therein are favorable to his client's cause is specious. As a matter of fact, the
entries show that after Mrs. Aves was readmitted to the hospital on December 26, 1990, the
doctors were able to stabilize her blood pressure with a normal reading of 120/80.

On the basis of the evidence presented before Judge Bernad, the Court is convinced that the
charge against Attorney Benjamin M. Grecia is true. By stealing two pages from Linda Aves'
medical chart and passing them on to his driver, he violated Rule 1.01, canon 1 of the Rules of
Professional Responsibility as well as canon 7 thereof which provide that:

Canon 1. . . .

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and
deceitful conduct.

Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance
the ends of justice" (People ex rel Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851, 855). An incorrigible practitioner
of "dirty tricks," like Grecia would be ill-suited to discharge the role of "an instrument to advance
the ends of justice."

The importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyer's equipment in the
practice of his profession has been stressed by this Court repeatedly.

. . . The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of

honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the
legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the
public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession. (Marcelo vs. Javier,
Sr., A.C. No. 3248, September 18, 1992, pp. 13-14.)

. . . . The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a

person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law, in the exercise of privileges of
members of the Bar. Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer, although not
related to the discharge of professional duties as a member of the bar, which
puts his moral character in serious doubt, renders him unfit to continue in the
practice of law. (Melendrez vs. Decena, 176 SCRA 662, 676.)

. . . public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant

should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications and who are
sworn to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, a s well as being
subject for judicial disciplinary control for the protection of court, clients and the
 public. (Phil. Association of Free Labor Unions [PAFLU] vs. Binalbagan Isabela
Sugar Company, 42 SCRA 302, 305.)

By descending to the level of a common thief, respondent Grecia has demeaned and
disgraced the legal profession. He has demonstrated his moral unfitness to continue as a
member of the honorable fraternity of lawyers. He has forfeited his membership in the BAR.

Generally, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether

in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as
an officer of the court, or an unfit or unsafe person to enjoy the privileges and to
manage the business of others in the capacity of an attorney, or for conduct
which tends to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the
favorable opinion of the public. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., A.C. No. 3248, September
18, 1992, p. 15.)

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Attorney Benjamin Grecia guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty,
and grossly unethical behavior as a lawyer. Considering that this is his second offense against
the canons of the profession, the Court resolved to impose upon him once more the supreme
penalty of DISBARMENT. His license to practice law in the Philippines is hereby CANCELLED and
the Bar Confidant is ordered to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and
Quiason, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., took no part.

Padilla, J., is on leave.

SECOND DIVISION
Adm. Case No. 4749 January 20, 2000
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed
against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos,
Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the
matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the
proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all,
he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least three years
already, as shown by the following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995,
1996 and 1997: (originals available).
 Annex A — "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in Civil
Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC.
Annex B — "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in Sp.
Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Parañaque, MM.
Annex C — "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File Required
Comment and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No.
42286, CA 6th Div.

This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a
duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal
of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar
standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP,
especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member.
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not
indicate any PTR for payment of professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney may be
done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial
Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these courts).
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:

1. his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En
Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 (in SCRA).
2. his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787,
RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995
denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction which is purportedly on
appeal in the Court of Appeals).

Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November
13, 1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof,
what appears to be respondent's signature above his name, address and the receipt
number "IBP Rizal 259060." Also attached was a copy of the order, dated February 14, 1995,
1 2

issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati,
denying respondent's motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No.
11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification dated March 18, 1997, by the then
3

president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that
respondent's "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or
remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days
from receipt of notice, after which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report
and recommendation. In his comment-memorandum dated June 3, 1998, respondent
4

alleged:5
 3. That with respect to the complainant's absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996
and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no
longer a member in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the
bar who is in good standing is entitled to practice law.
The complainant's basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good
standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of
dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC,
concealment of encumbrances.
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and
reversed and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to
Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was
appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as
a Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction
for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself would
surrender his right or privilege to practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in
his dues.
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to
the present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax
Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard
and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since
1992, is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in
the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he honestly
believe in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited
practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered
by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote
and be voted upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if
only to show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused
compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues
even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender
such fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and
frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as an honest
act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues despite his
candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary.

On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution adopting and
6

approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found
respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three
months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the
decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution, dated April 22, 1999. Hence,
7

pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the
decision of the IBP ordering respondent's suspension for three months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
 On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent's non-indication of the proper
IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter
complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three years."
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter
President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondent's last payment of his IBP dues was
in 1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by
respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is
legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in
the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example.
xxx xxx xxx
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact,
respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the
"undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up to
the present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondent's
Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines.
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court
about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at
least six years and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his memorandum
did not discuss this issue.

First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without
having paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted
by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in
court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP
chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed.
He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in
good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No.
7432, §4 as a senior citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:

Sec. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such
annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the
Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from
each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the
Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of
this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for
one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys.

In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by
paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A.
No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income
taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as
determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year,"
the exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the
public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty
of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in
court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced
age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of
the law, we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he
8

has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision
be attached to Atty. Llamas' personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies
be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the
land.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

EN BANC
B.M. No. 1370 May 9, 2005
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP
DUES.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter, dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP
1

dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005.
He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the
Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in
December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be
assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the
Civil Service law prohibits the practice of one's profession while in government service, and
neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment. 2

On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment stating inter alia: that membership in
3

the IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in
the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the
obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP Board of
Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10,
Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has
been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the
policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is but an
implementation of the Court's directives for all members of the IBP to help in defraying the
cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of
payment of annual dues as requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary
termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what petitioner could have
done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his
membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could
have been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of
discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive status for its members, which if approved
by the Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from
payment of the annual dues.
In his reply dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is the
4

IBP Board of Governor's Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership

dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not they are engaged in active or inactive
practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual
membership dues suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause and
the due process clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual
membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has been in
an inactive status and is without income derived from his law practice. He adds that his
removal from nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute deprivation of
property right without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law by a
lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious to active law practitioners, to fellow
lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community where the inactive lawyers-members reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of
his dues during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in
the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003?
We rule in the negative.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as
distinguished from bar association organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership
in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member
of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar
as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the
direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are
required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the
governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee
for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of
professional ethics or professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient reason
for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for
discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 5

The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population. This requires membership and financial support of every attorney as
condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court. 6

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or
not to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his
annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the State's legitimate interest in elevating
the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program – the lawyers. 7

Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional
power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and in
the integration of the Philippine Bar - which power required members of a privileged class,
8

such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation
of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed
as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and
purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine
Bar, thus:
9

For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the
Court is attempting to levy a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax
purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar,
it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that
purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without
means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries
with it the power to impose such exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of law is that the
regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted
by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member
resulting from his required payment of the annual dues.

Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no

one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as
long as one's membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the
type of practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership
dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of
the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his
membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could
have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in the
process of discussing the situation of members under inactive status and the nonpayment of
their dues during such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with
his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional
rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon, in this wise:
10

. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that
entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to
consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the State, and under
the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the
respondent's right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment,
 which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable
or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a
mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court
to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened
with conditions, one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any
11

of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is
ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the
years 1977-2005, within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this
decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension from the practice of
law.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, and Garcia,
JJ., concur.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, respondent.
x-------------------------x
Bar Matter No. 1227 July 25, 2006
RE: OATH-TAKING OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, INCOMING PRESIDENT OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
x-------------------------x
A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC July 25, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE REMOVAL OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA FROM THE IBP BOARD OF
GOVERNORS AS EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND GOVERNOR.
IN THE MATTER OF THE LETTER-COMPLAINT OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA DATED MAY 18, 2005
TO FORTHWITH DENY/DISAPPROVE THE IBP RESOLUTION UNJUSTLY, ILLEGALLY, ARBITRARILY,
AND ABRUPTLY REMOVING HIM FROM THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE IBP FOR ABSOLUTE
LACK OF BASIS AND FOR FLAGRANT DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.
DECISION
Per Curiam:
Before Us are three consolidated cases revolving around Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Governor and Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de Vera. The first pertains
to a disbarment case questioning Atty. de Vera's moral fitness to remain as a member of
the Philippine Bar, the second refers to Atty. de Vera's letter-request to schedule his oath
taking as IBP National President, and the third case concerns the validity of his removal as
Governor and EVP of the IBP by the IBP Board. The resolution of these cases will determine
the national presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.
A.C. No. 6697
The Office of the Bar Confidant, which this Court tasked to make an investigation, report
and recommendation on subject case, summarized the antecedents thereof as follows:
1
 In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the
suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the
following grounds:

1) respondent's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order

rendered against him by the State Bar of California; and
2) respondent's alleged violation of the so-called "rotation rule" enunciated in
Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (in the Matter: 1989 IBP
Elections).

Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds
due his client, was found to have performed an act constituting moral turpitude by
the Hearing Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing Department – San Francisco, State Bar of
California in Administrative Case No. 86-0-18429. Complainant alleged that the
respondent was then forced to resign or surrender his license to practice law in the
said state in order to evade the recommended three (3) year suspension.
Complainant asserted that the respondent lacks the moral competence necessary
to lead the country's most noble profession.
Complainant, likewise, contended that the respondent violated the so-called
"rotation rule" provided for in Administrative Matter No. 491 when he transferred to
IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter. He claimed that the respondent failed to meet the
requirements outlined in the IBP By-Laws pertaining to transfer of Chapter
Membership. He surmised that the respondent's transfer was intended only for the
purpose of becoming the next IBP National President. Complainant prayed that the
respondent be enjoined from assuming office as IBP National President.
Meanwhile, in his Comment dated 2 May 2005, respondent stated that the issues
raised in above-mentioned Complaint were the very issues raised in an earlier
administrative case filed by the same complainant against him. In fact, according to
him, the said issues were already extensively discussed and categorically ruled upon
by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2005 in Administrative Case No. 6052
(In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard De Vera). Respondent prayed that the
instant administrative complaint be dismissed following the principle of res judicata.
On 15 June 2005, both parties appeared before the Office of the Bar Confidant for
presentation of evidence in support of their respective allegations.
Subsequently, in a Memorandum dated 20 June 2005, complainant maintained that
there is substantial evidence showing respondent's moral baseness, vileness and
depravity, which could be used as a basis for his disbarment. Complainant stressed
that the respondent never denied that he used his client's money. Complainant
argued that the respondent failed to present evidence that the Supreme Court of
California accepted the latter's resignation and even if such was accepted,
complainant posited that this should not absolve the respondent from liability.
Moreover, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not apply in
the case at bar. He asserted that the first administrative case filed against the
respondent was one for his disqualification. x x x.

Bar Matter No. 1227

A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC
As earlier adverted to, Bar Matter No. 1227 refers to Atty. de Vera's letter-request to this
Court to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President. A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, on the
other hand, is a letter-report dated 19 May 2005 of IBP National President Jose Anselmo I.
Cadiz (IBP President Cadiz) furnishing this Court with the IBP's Resolution, dated 13 May 2005,
removing Atty. De Vera as member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP, for committing acts
inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP in general. 2

The controversy in Bar Matter No. 1227 and A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC arose from the regular
meeting of the IBP Board of Governors held on 14 January 2005. In said meeting, by 2/3
vote (6 voting in favor and 2 against), the IBP Board approved the withdrawal of the Petition
filed before this Court docketed as "Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz,
et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, et al. – Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer
for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, SC-
R165108." The Petition was intended to question the legality and/or constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9227, authorizing the increase in the salaries of judges and justices, and to
increase filing fees.
3

The two IBP Governors who opposed the said Resolution approving the withdrawal of the
above-described Petition were herein respondent Governor and EVP de Vera and
Governor Carlos L. Valdez. 4

On 19 January 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed this Court of the decision taken by the IBP
Board to withdraw the afore-mentioned Petition. Attached to his letter was a copy of the
IBP Board's 14 January 2005 Resolution. 5

On 15 April 2005, Bar Matter No. 1227, pertaining to Atty. de Vera's request for oathtaking as
National President, was filed. The same was subsequently consolidated with A.C. No. 6697,
the disbarment case filed against Atty. de Vera. 6

On 22 April 2005, a plenary session was held at the 10th National IBP Convention at the CAP-
Camp John Hay Convention Center, Baguio City. It was at this forum where Atty. de Vera
allegedly made some untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in connection with
the IBP Board's Resolution to withdraw the Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act
No. 9227.7

On 10 May 2005, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining Atty. de
Vera from assuming office as IBP National President. 8

On 12 May 2005, IBP Gov. Romulo A. Rivera wrote IBP National President Cadiz a letter
wherein he prayed for the removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board for having
committed acts which were inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP. 9

On 13 May 2005, in the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board held at the Waterfront Hotel,
Cebu City, the IBP Board, by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as member of the
IBP Board of Governors and as IBP Executive Vice President. Quoted hereunder is the
10

dispositive portion of said Resolution:

NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that Governor Leonard

S. de Vera is REMOVED as a member of the IBP Board of Governors and Executive
Vice President for committing acts inimical to the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP,
to wit:

1. For making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in public

about the Supreme Court and members of the IBP Board of Governors, during
the Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National Convention of Lawyers, held at
CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center on 22 April 2005, making it appear
that the decision of the IBP Board of Governors to withdraw the PETITION
docketed as "Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs.
The Senate of the Philippines, et al., Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition With
Prayer for the Issuance of A Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary
 Injunction, S.C.-R. 165108", was due to influence and pressure from the
Supreme Court of the Philippines;
2. For making said untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies that
brought the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP as a whole in public
contempt and disrepute;
3. For violating Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers
which mandates that "A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others", by making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies during
the Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National Convention of Lawyers in Baguio
City;
4. For instigating and provoking some IBP chapters to embarrass and
humiliate the IBP Board of Governors in order to coerce and compel the latter
to pursue the aforesaid PETITION;
5. For falsely accusing the IBP National President, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz,
during the Plenary Session of the 10th National Convention in Baguio City of
withholding from him a copy of Supreme Court Resolution, dated 25 January
2005, granting the withdrawal of the PETITION, thereby creating the wrong
impression that the IBP National President deliberately prevented him from
taking the appropriate remedies with respect thereto, thus compromising the
reputation and integrity of the IBP National President and the IBP as a whole.11

On 18 May 2005, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing the then Hon.
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter captioned as "Urgent Plea to Correct a Glaring
Injustice of the IBP Board of Governors; Vehement Protest to the Board Resolution Abruptly
Removing Atty. Leonard de Vera from the Board of Governors in Patent Violation of Due
Process; Petition to Deny/Disapprove the Completely Unjustified and Highly Arbitrary
Resolution Precipitately Ousting Atty. de Vera from the Board of Governors in Less Than
Twenty Four (24) Hours from Notice and Judgment Without Formal Investigation." 12

In the said letter, Atty. de Vera strongly and categorically denied having committed acts
inimical to the IBP and its Board. He alleged that on the basis of an unverified letter-
complaint filed by IBP Governor Rivera, the IBP Board voted to expel him posthaste, without
just cause and in complete disregard of even the minimum standards of due process.
Pertinent portions of his letter read:

It is evident that the Board of Governors has committed a grave and serious injustice
against me especially when, as the incumbent Executive Vice President of the IBP, I
am scheduled to assume my position as National President of the IBP on July 1, 2005.
xxx
I was denied the very basic rights of due process recognized by the Supreme Court
even in administrative cases:

1. The denial of the right to answer the charges formally or in writing. The
complaint against me was in writing.
2. The denial of the right to answer the charges within a reasonable period of
time after receipt of the complaint.
3. The denial of the right to a fair hearing.
4. The denial of the right to confront the accuser and the witnesses against
me. I challenged Gov. Rivera to testify under oath so I could question him. He
 refused. I offered to testify under oath so I could be questioned. My request
was denied.
5. The denial of my right to present witnesses on my behalf.
6. The denial of my right to an impartial judge. Governor Rivera was my
accuser, prosecutor, and judge all at the same time.
7. Gov. Rivera's prejudgment of my case becomes even more evident
because when his motion to expel me was lost in a 5-3 votes (due to his
inhibition to vote), Gov. Rivera asked for another round of voting so he can
vote to support his own complaint and motion to expel me. (Emphasis and
13

underscoring in original.)

On 27 May 2005, the IBP Board responded to the 18 May 2005 letter of Atty. de Vera. In 14

their Reply, the IBP Board explained to this Court that their decision to remove Atty. de Vera
was based on valid grounds and was intended to protect itself from a recalcitrant member.
Among the grounds cited and elucidated by the IBP Board were the following:

(i) Atty. de Vera engaged himself in a negative media campaign and solicited
resolutions from IBP Chapters to condemn the IBP Board of Governors for its decision
to withdraw the Petition, all with the end in view of compelling or coercing the IBP
Board of Governors to reconsider the decision to withdraw the Petition.
(ii) Atty. de Vera embarrassed, humiliated and maligned the IBP Board of Governors
and the IBP National President in public or during the Plenary Session at the 10th
National Convention of Lawyers.
(iii) Rather than pacify the already agitated 'solicited' speakers (at the plenary
session), Atty. de Vera "fanned the fire", so to speak, and went to the extent of
making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies about the Supreme Court
and some members of the IBP Board of Governors. He deliberately and intentionally
did so to provoke the members of the IBP Board of Governors to engage him in an
acrimonious public debate and expose the IBP Board of Governors to public ridicule.
(iv) Atty. de Vera uttered untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies, e.g., that
some of the members of the IBP Board of Governors voted in favor of the withdrawal
of the petition (without mentioning names) because "nakakahiya kasi sa Supreme
Court, nakakaawa kasi ang Supreme Court, kasi may mga kaibigan tayo sa Court."
He made it appear that the IBP Board of Governors approved the resolution,
withdrawing the petition, due to "influence" or "pressure" from the Supreme Court. 15

The IBP Board explained that Atty. de Vera's actuation during the Plenary Session was "the
last straw that broke the camel's back." He committed acts inimical to the interest of the IBP
Board and the IBP; hence, the IBP Board decided to remove him.
On 3 June 2005, Atty. de Vera furnished the Court with copies of resolutions and a position
paper coming from various IBP Chapters all condemning his expulsion from the IBP Board
and as IBP EVP.16

On 15 June 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed Chief Justice Davide that in a special
meeting of the IBP Board held at the EDSA Shangri-la Plaza on 13 June 2005, the IBP Board
took note of the vacancy in the position of the IBP EVP brought about by Atty. de Vera's
removal. In his stead, IBP Governor Pura Angelica Y. Santiago was formally elected and
declared as IBP EVP. 17

On 17 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested against the election of Atty. Santiago. On 20
18

June 2005, Atty. Santiago voluntarily relinquished the EVP position through a letter
addressed to the IBP Board. Thus, on 25 June 2005, during its last regular meeting, the IBP
19
Board elected a new EVP in the person of IBP Governor Jose Vicente B. Salazar to replace
Atty. Santiago.
On 28 June 2005, IBP National President Cadiz, through a letter addressed to Chief Justice
Davide, reported to this Court Atty. Salazar's election. IBP National President Cadiz also
20

requested, among other things, that Atty. Salazar's election be approved and that he be
allowed to assume as National President in the event that Atty. de Vera is disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law or should his removal from the 2003-2005 Board of
Governors and as EVP is approved by this Court. Also on 28 June 2005, Atty. de Vera
21

protested the election of Atty. Salazar.22

In his Extended Comment dated 25 July 2005, Atty. de Vera maintained that there was
23

absolutely no factual or legal basis to sustain the motion to remove him from the IBP Board
because he violated no law. He argued that if the basis for his removal as EVP was based
on the same grounds as his removal from the IBP Board, then his removal as EVP was
likewise executed without due notice and without the least compliance with the minimum
standards of due process of law.
Atty. de Vera strongly averred that, contrary to the utterly false and malicious charges filed
against him, the speakers at the Plenary Session of the Baguio Convention, although
undeniably impassioned and articulate, were respectful in their language and exhortations,
not once undermining the stature of the IBP in general and the IBP Board of Governors in
particular. He posited that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the Board during
the Convention's Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected
member of the IBP Board of Governors; and the decision to remove him only shows that the
right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by the incumbent IBP
Board.
Anent the charges that he accused the National President of withholding a copy of this
Court's Resolution granting the withdrawal of the Petition questioning the legality of
Republic Act No. 9227, Atty. de Vera avowed that he made no such remarks. As regards
the election of a new IBP EVP, Atty. de Vera contended that the said election was illegal as
it was contrary to the provisions of the IBP By-Laws concerning national officers, to wit:

Section. 49. Term of office. - The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold
office for a term of two years from July 1 following their election until 30 June of their
second year in office and until their successors shall have been duly chosen and
qualified.
In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his functions and duties shall be
performed by the Executive Vice President, and in the event of death, resignation, or
removal of the President, the Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President
for the unexpired portion of the term. In the event of death, resignation, removal or
disability of both the President and the Executive Vice President, the Board of
Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold office for the unexpired portion of
the term or during the period of disability.
Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, all other officers and employees
appointed by the President with the consent of the Board shall hold office at the
pleasure of the Board or for such term as the Board may fix. 24

To bolster his position, Atty. de Vera stressed that when both the President and the EVP die,
resign, are removed, or are disabled, the IBP By-Laws only provides for the election of an
Acting President and that no mention for an election for EVP was made. Thus, when such
election for EVP occurs, such is contrary to the express provision of the IBP By-Laws.
Atty. de Vera also argued that even if he were validly removed as IBP EVP, his replacement
should come from Eastern Mindanao and not from any other region, due to the Rotation
Rule embodied in par. 2, Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws.
In response to Atty. de Vera's averments, the 2003-2005 IBP Board, through its counsel,
submitted a Reply dated 27 January 2006 and clarified as follows:

(i) The IBP Board of Governors is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect
itself from an intractable member by virtue of Article VI, Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws;
(ii) Atty. de Vera was removed as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP not
because of his disagreement with the IBP Board's position but because of the various
acts that he committed which the IBP Board determined to be inimical to the IBP
Board and the IBP as a whole;
(iii) Atty. de Vera cannot exculpate himself from liability by invoking his constitutional
right to Free Speech because, as a member of the Bar, it is his sworn duty to observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and to insist on
similar conduct by others;
(iv) The IBP Board, in effecting the removal of Atty. de Vera, observed the
fundamental principles of due process. As the records would bear, Atty. de Vera was
duly notified of the Regular Meeting of the IBP Board held on 13 May 2004; was
furnished a copy of Governor Rivera's Letter-Complaint the day before the said
meeting; was furnished a copy of the said Meeting's Agenda; and was allowed to
personally defend himself and his accuser, Gov. Rivera;
(v) Atty. de Vera was validly removed because the required number of votes under
Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws to remove Atty. de Vera as a member of the IBP Board
and as IBP EVP was duly complied with;
(vi) Atty. de Vera's replacement as IBP EVP need not come from Eastern Mindanao
Region because: (a) the rotation rule under Article VII, Section 47, par. 2 of the IBP
By-Laws had already been complied with when Atty. de Vera, who hails from Eastern
Mindanao, was elected IBP EVP; and (b) the rotation rule need not be enforced if
the same will not be practicable, possible, feasible, doable or viable; and, finally,
that –
(vii) Atty. Salazar was validly elected as IBP EVP and, thus, should now be allowed to
take his oath as IBP National President.25

The Court's Ruling

AC No. 6697
In his Memorandum dated 20 June 2005, complainant tendered the following issues for the
26

consideration of the Court:

I.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) COMMITED
MALPRACTICE WHICH AMOUNTED TO MORAL T[U]RPITUDE IN THE STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA AND IN THE PHILIPPINES, IN THE COURSE OF HIS PRACTICE OF LAW.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE OATH OF OFFICE AS LAWYER IS ATTACHED TO THE PERSON OF
ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) WHEREVER HE MAY GO AND NOT NECESSARILY
BOUND BY THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE MORAL T[U]RPITUDE,
AS BASIS FOR DISBARMENT OF RESPONDENT IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING.
 IV.
WHETHER OR NOT RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THIS CASE, DUE TO ADMIN. CASE NO.
[6052] 27

The disposition of the first three related issues hinges on the resolution of the fourth issue.
Consequently, we will start with the last issue.
A.C. No. 6052 is not a bar to the filing of the present administrative case.
In disposing of the question of res judicata, the Bar Confidant opined:

To reiterate, the instant case for suspension and/or disbarment against respondent
Leonard De Vera is grounded on the following:

1) respondent's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order

rendered against him by the State Bar in California; and
2) respondent's alleged violation of the so-called "rotation rule" enunciated in
Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (In the Matter: 1989 IBP
Elections).

It appears that the complainant already raised the said issues in an earlier
administrative case against the respondent. Verily, these issues were already argued
upon by the parties in their respective pleadings, and discussed and ruled upon by
this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2003 in Administrative Matter No. 6052
(In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera).
As such, with respect to the first issue, this Court held that:

"As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients
when he was practicing law in California, which in turn compelled him to
surrender his California license to practice law, he maintains that it cannot
serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for
the position he is aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet no final judgment
finding him guilty of the administrative charge, as the records relied upon by
the petitioners are mere preliminary findings of a hearing referee which are
recommendatory findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline which are
subject to the review of and the final decision of the Supreme Court. He also
stresses that the complainant in the California administrative case has
retracted the accusation that he misappropriated the complainant's money,
but unfortunately the retraction was not considered by the investigating
officer. xxx"
"On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera
while he was still practicing law in California, he explained that no final
judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of
the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the discrimination he
suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to pursue
the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the absence
of contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has
the burden to prove the same. In this case, the petitioners have not shown
how the administrative complaint affects respondent De Vera's moral fitness
to run for governor.
On the other hand, as regards the second issue:

"Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post

because he is not really from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in
Parañaque and he was originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only
changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal of
attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency. Petitioners
aver that in changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the
domicile rule.
The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II,
a lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register
with the particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:
xxx
It is clearly stated in the aforequoted section of the By-Laws that it is not
automatic that a lawyer will become a member of the chapter where his
place of residence or work is located. He has the discretion to choose the
particular chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only when he does
not register his preference that he will become a member of the Chapter of
the place where he resides or maintains office. The only proscription in
registering one's preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more
than one chapter at the same time.
The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this
Section, transfer of IBP membership is allowed as long as the lawyer complies
with the conditions set forth therein, thus:
xxx
The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must
be made not less than three months prior to the election of officers in the
chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer.
In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP
membership to Agusan del Sur on 1 August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP
National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a letter addressed to Atty. Amador
Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero,
Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of respondent de
Vera's transfer and advising them to make the necessary notation in their
respective records. This letter is a substantial compliance with the certification
mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that de Vera's transfer was
made effective sometime between 1 August 2001 and 3 September 2001. On
27 February 2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers were
simultaneously held all over the Philippines, as mandated by Section 29.a of
the IBP By-Laws which provides that elections of Chapter Officers and
Directors shall be held on the last Saturday of February of every other year.
Between 3 September 2001 and 27 February 2003, seventeen months had
elapsed. This makes respondent de Vera's transfer valid as it was done more
than three months ahead of the chapter elections held on 27 February 2003.

In the case of Romulo G. Dinsay vs. Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco (Administrative Case No.
2995, 27 November 1996), this Court declared that:

"The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial

proceedings and not to the exercise of the [Court's] administrative powers."
In the said case, respondent Clerk of Court Cioco was dismissed from service for
grave misconduct highly prejudicial to the service for surreptitiously substituting the
bid price in a Certificate of Sale from P3,263,182.67 to only P730,000.00. Thereafter a
complaint for disbarment was filed against the respondent on the basis of the same
incident. Respondent, interposing res judicata, argued that he may no longer be
charged on the basis of the same incident. This Court held that while the respondent
is in effect being indicted twice for the same misconduct, this does not amount to
double jeopardy as both proceedings are admittedly administrative in nature. This
Court qualified that, in the first case, the respondent was proceeded against as an
erring court personnel under the Court's supervisory power over courts while, in the
second case, he was disciplined as a lawyer under the Court's plenary authority over
membersof the legal profession.
In subsequent decisions of this Court, however, it appears that res judicata still
applies in administrative cases. Thus, in the case of Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera vs.
Judge William Layague (Administrastive Matter No. RTJ-93-986), this Court ruled that:

"While double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases, it would be

contrary to equity and substantial justice to penalize respondent judge a
second time for an act which he had already answered for.";

Likewise, in the recent case of Executive Judge Henry B. Basilia vs. Judge Amado L.
Becamon, Lolita Delos Reyes and Eddie Delos Reyes (Administrative Matter No. MTJ-
02-1404, 14 December 2004), this Court held that:

"Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the present
administrative case becomes dismissible.
xxx
Under the said doctrine, a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of
competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and
conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same
parties and for the same cause. It provides that
[a] final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes an
absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or
cause of action. Res judicata is based on the ground that the party to be
affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated the same
matter in the former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should
not be permitted to litigate it again.
This principle frees the parties from undergoing all over again the rigors of
unnecessary suits and repetitious trials. At the same time, it prevents the
clogging of court dockets. Equally important, res judicata stabilizes rights and
promotes the rule of law."

In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised by the complainant
had already been resolved by this Court in an earlier administrative case. The
complainant's contention that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the
case at bar as the first administrative case was one for disqualification while the
instant administrative complaint is one for suspension and/or disbarment should be
given least credence. It is worthy to note that while the instant administrative
 complaint is denominated as one for suspension and/or disbarment, it prayed
neither the suspension nor the disbarment of the respondent but instead merely
sought to enjoin the respondent from assuming office as IBP National President. 28

Contrary to the findings of the Bar Confidant, Adm. Case No. 6052 entitled, "In Re: Petition to
Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera, on Legal and Moral Grounds, From Being Elected IBP
Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the May 31 IBP Election" and promulgated on 11
December 2003 does not constitute a bar to the filing of Adm. Case No. 6697. Although the
parties in the present administrative case and in Adm. Case No. 6052 are identical, their
capacities in these cases and the issues presented therein are not the same, thereby
barring the application of res judicata.
In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential conditions
must concur, namely: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the
decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment or order on the merits,
and (4) there must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of
subject matter, and identity of causes of action. In the absence of any one of these
29

elements, Atty. de Vera cannot argue res judicata in his favor.

It is noteworthy that the two administrative cases involve different subject matters and
causes of action. In Adm. Case No. 6052, the subject matter was the qualification of Atty.
de Vera to run as a candidate for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the
present administrative complaint, the subject matter is his privilege to practice law. In the
first administrative case, complainants' cause of action was Atty. de Vera's alleged violation
or circumvention of the IBP By-laws. In the present administrative case, the primary cause of
action is Atty. de Vera's alleged violation of lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first case, the
complainants sought to prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP Governor for
Eastern Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by complainant in his Memorandum,
what is being principally sought is Atty. de Vera's suspension or disbarment.
The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was resolved
on the basis of the parties' rights and obligations under the IBP By-laws. We held therein that
Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified from running as Regional Governor as there is nothing
in the present IBP By-laws that sanctions the disqualification of candidates for IBP governors.
Consequently, we stressed that the petition had no firm ground to stand on. Likewise, we
held that the complainants therein were not the proper parties to bring the suit as the IBP
By-laws prescribes that only nominees - which the complainants were not - can file with the
IBP President a written protest against the candidate. The Court's statement, therefore, that
Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the ground that he was not morally fit was
mere obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not allow for pre-election disqualification
proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the basis of the administrative
findings of a hearing officer of the State Bar of California suspending him from the practice
of law for three years. We held in that case that –

There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit
before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the determination
of moral fitness of a candidate lies in the individual judgment of the members of the
House of Delegates. Indeed, based on each member's standard of morality, he is
free to nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter possesses the basic
requirements under the law. For another, basically the disqualification of a
 candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment of
an offense which involves moral turpitude. 30

What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by the Supreme Court in a proper
case declaring otherwise, every lawyer aspiring to hold the position of IBP Regional Director
is presumed morally fit. Any person who begs to disagree will not be able to find a receptive
audience in the IBP through a petition for disqualification but must first file the necessary
disbarment or suspension proceeding against the lawyer concerned.
And this is precisely what complainant has chosen to do in the instant case. As his petition is
sufficient in form and substance, we have given it due course pursuant to Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. And, considering that this case is not barred by the prior judgment in Adm.
Case No. 6052, the only issue left for consideration is whether or not Atty. de Vera can be
suspended or disbarred under the facts of the case and the evidence submitted by
complainant.
The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of California, standing alone, is
not proof of malpractice.
In the case of the Suspension From The Practice of Law In The Territory of Guam of Atty.
Leon G. Maquera, we were confronted with the question of whether or not a member of
31

the Philippine Bar, who is concomitantly an attorney in a foreign jurisdiction and who was
suspended from the practice of law in said foreign jurisdiction, can be sanctioned as
member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction.
We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of Atty. de Vera who was
admitted to the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of California, U.S.A.) and
against whom charges were filed in connection with his practice in said jurisdiction.
However, unlike the case of Atty. Maquera, no final judgment for suspension or disbarment
was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension of three years
as he surrendered his license to practice law before his case could be taken up by the
Supreme Court of California.
In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a
foreign jurisdiction does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the
Philippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension are not grounds for disbarment and
suspension in this jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may
transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the
foreign court's action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this
jurisdiction. We likewise held that the judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima
facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer.
The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of Court which
provides:

Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final
order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or
final order is as follows:
xxxx
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order
is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.
In Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc., we explained that "[a] foreign
32

judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a
contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving
of due notice in the foreign forum."
In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the
recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not
constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must
prove by substantial evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by the hearing
officer was based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise
unethical under Philippine law.
There is substantial evidence of malpractice on the part of Atty. de Vera independent of the
recommendation of suspension by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California
Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. –

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent
court or other disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been
admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of
such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall
be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension. 33

Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the court and the public from the
misconduct of officers of the court and to protect the administration of justice by requiring
that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable
men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. The statutory enunciation of the
34

grounds for disbarment on suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general

power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent power of the court over its
officers cannot be restricted. 35

Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a

lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term "Malpractice." That
36

meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a
profession, not a business.
37

Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules on ethical code of his
profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession. 38

Now, the undisputed facts:

1. An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of California,
docketed then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an insurance case Atty. de Vera
handled involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de
Vera was authorized by the elder Willis (father of Julius who was given authority by the son
to control the case because the latter was then studying in San Diego California) for the
release of the funds in settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement
of the case which he then deposited to his personal account; 39

2. The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera be
suspended from the practice of law for three years; and
40

3. Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was accepted by the
Supreme Court of California. 41

Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he
misappropriated his client's funds as the latter's father (the elder Willis) gave him authority to
use the same and that, unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider this explanation
notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis testified under oath that he "expected de Vera
might use the money for a few days."
By insisting that he was authorized by his client's father and attorney-in-fact to use the funds,
Atty. de Vera has impliedly admitted the use of the Willis funds for his own personal use.
In fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainant's allegation in the latter's memorandum
that he (de Vera) received US$12,000.00 intended for his client and that he deposited said
amount in his personal account and not in a separate trust account and that, finally, he
spent the amount for personal purposes. 42

At this point, it bears stressing that in cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial
bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence or that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion. It means such evidence which affords a substantial basis from which
43

the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred. 44

Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his client's funds is highly unethical.
Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic about this, thus:

CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME TO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for
or from the client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his
own and those of others kept by him.

In Espiritu v. Ulep we held that –

45

The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such, it
requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on the part of the
attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of the client.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all
money and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Accordingly,
he shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client. Even more specific is the Canon of Professional Ethics:

The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or
gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his
client.
Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming
into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted
for promptly and should not under any circumstances be commingled with
his own or be used by him.
 Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property held
by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated
the same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in
him by, his client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional
ethics; it impairs the public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment.
Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of
professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession. Those who are guilty of such infraction may be disbarred or suspended
indefinitely from the practice of law. (Emphases supplied.)

In herein case, as it is admitted by Atty. de Vera himself that he used his client's money for
personal use, he has unwittingly sealed his own fate since this admission constitutes more
than substantial evidence of malpractice. Consequently, Atty. de Vera now has the burden
of rebutting the evidence which he himself supplied.
In his defense, Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly authorized by the elder Willis to use the
funds intended for the latter's son. Atty. de Vera also points out that he had restituted the full
amount of US$12,000.00 even before the filing of the administrative case against him in the
State Bar of California.
46

Aside from these self-serving statements, however, we cannot find anywhere in the records
of this case proof that indeed Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to use the funds of his
client. In Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera we declared that –
47

When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he
denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of
morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.

Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that the elder Willis
had indeed testified that he "expected de Vera might use the money for a few days." As
Atty. de Vera had vigorously objected to the admissibility of the document containing this
statement, he is now estopped from relying thereon. Besides, that the elder Willis "expected
de Vera might use the money for a few days" was not so much an acknowledgment of
consent to the use by Atty. de Vera of his client's funds as it was an acceptance of the
probability that Atty. de Vera might, indeed, use his client's funds, which by itself did not
speak well of the character of Atty. de Vera or the way such character was perceived.
In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to his client's money without the
latter's acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It is clear that
Atty. de Vera, by depositing the check in his own account and using the same for his own
benefit is guilty of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and unethical behavior. He
caused dishonor, not only to himself but to the noble profession to which he belongs. For, it
cannot be denied that the respect of litigants to the profession is inexorably diminished
whenever a member of the profession betrays their trust and confidence. Respondent
48

violated his oath to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his client.
Nevertheless, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar respondent from the
practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Where any
49

lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.
In Mortera v. Pagatpatan, we imposed upon Atty. Pagatpatan two years suspension from
50

his practice of law for depositing the funds meant for his client to his personal account
without the latter's knowledge. In Reyes v. Maglaya; Castillo v. Taguines; Espiritu v. Atty.
51 52
Cabredo IV, the respondents were meted one year suspension each for failing to remit to
53

their clients monies in the amounts of P1,500.00; P500.00, and P51,161.00, respectively,
received by them for their clients without the latter's permission. In Dumadag v. Atty.
Lumaya, we indefinitely suspended respondent for failure to remit to his client the amount
54

of the measly sum of P4,344.00 representing the amount received pursuant to a writ of
execution. Considering the amount involved here – US$12,000.00, we believe that the
penalty of suspension for two (2) years is appropriate.
Transferring IBP membership to a chapter where the lawyer is not a resident of is not a
ground for his suspension or disbarment
Complainant insists that Atty. de Vera's transfer of membership from the Pasay, Parañaque,
Las Piñas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter is a
circumvention of the rotation rule as it was made for the sole purpose of becoming IBP
National President. Complainant stresses that Atty. de Vera is not a resident of Agusan del
Sur nor does he hold office therein.
In Adm. Case No. 6052, we held that Atty. de Vera's act of transferring to another IBP
Chapter is not a ground for his disqualification for the post of IBP Governor as the same is
allowed under Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws with the qualification only that the transfer be
made not less than three months immediately preceding any chapter election.
As it was perfectly within Atty. de Vera's right to transfer his membership, it cannot be said
that he is guilty of unethical conduct or behavior. And while one may incessantly argue that
a legal act may not necessarily be ethical, in herein case, we do not see anything wrong in
transferring to an IBP chapter that -- based on the rotation rule – will produce the next IBP
EVP who will automatically succeed to the National Presidency for the next term. Our Code
of Professional Responsibility as well as the Lawyer's Oath do not prohibit nor punish lawyers
from aspiring to be IBP National President and from doing perfectly legal acts in
accomplishing such goal.
Bar Matter No. 1227
Administrative Matter No. 05-5-15-SC
To resolve Bar Matter No. 1227 and Administrative Matter No. 05-5- 15-SC, the following
issues must be addressed:

I. Whether the IBP Board of Governors acted with grave abuse of discretion in
removing Atty. de Vera as Governor and EVP of the IBP on 13 May 2005.

i. Whether the IBP Board of Governors complied with administrative due

process in removing Atty. de Vera.
ii. Whether the IBP removed Atty. De Vera for just and valid cause.

II. Whether Governor Salazar was validly elected as EVP of the IBP on 25 June 2005,
and can consequently assume the Presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.

The IBP Board observed due process in its removal of Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor
We start the discussion with the veritable fact that the IBP Board is vested with the power to
remove any of its members pursuant to Section 44, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws, which
states:

Sec. 44. Removal of members. – If the Board of Governors should determine after
proper inquiry that any of its members, elective or otherwise, has for any reason
become unable to perform his duties, the Board, by resolution of the Majority of the
 remaining members, may declare his position vacant, subject to the approval of the
Supreme Court.
Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause,
including three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable
excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board,
subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the delegates
from the region shall by majority vote, elect a successor from among the members of
the Chapter to which the resigned governor is a member to serve as governor for
the unexpired portion of the term. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the aforementioned section, a member of the IBP Board may be removed for cause
by resolution adopted by two-thirds (2/3) of the remaining members of the Board, subject to
the approval of this Court.
In the main, Atty. de Vera questions his removal from the Board of Governors on procedural
and substantive grounds. He argues that he was denied "very basic rights of due process
recognized by the Honorable Court even in administrative cases" like the right to answer
formally or in writing and within reasonable time, the right to present witnesses in his behalf,
the right to a fair hearing. Atty. de Vera protests the fact that he was not able to cross-
examine the complainant, IBP Gov. Romulo H. Rivera (Atty. Rivera) and that Atty. Rivera
voted as well for his expulsion which made him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same
time. Atty. de Vera emphasized the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from
voting on his own motion. However, when his inhibition resulted in the defeat of his motion
as the necessary 2/3 votes could not be mustered, Atty. Rivera asked for another round of
voting so he could vote to support his own motion.
The IBP Board counters that since its members were present during the plenary session, and
personally witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera's actuations, an evidentiary or formal hearing
was no longer necessary. Since they all witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera, it was enough
that he was given an opportunity to refute and answer all the charges imputed against him.
They emphasized that Atty. de Vera was given a copy of the complaint and that he was
present at the Board Meeting on 13 May 2005 wherein the letter-complaint against him was
part of the agenda. Therein, he was given the opportunity to be heard and that, in fact,
Atty. de Vera did argue his case.
We are in agreement with the IBP Board.
First, it needs stressing that the constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty
and property. It cannot be said that the position of EVP of the IBP is property within the
55

constitutional sense especially since there is no right to security of tenure over said position
as, in fact, all that is required to remove any member of the board of governors for cause is
a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members of the board.
Secondly, even if the right of due process could be rightfully invoked, still, in administrative
proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side. At 56

the outset, it is here emphasized that the term "due process of law" as used in the
Constitution has no fixed meaning for all purposes due "to the very nature of the doctrine
which, asserting a fundamental principle of justice rather than a specific rule of law, is not
susceptible of more than one general statement." The phrase is so elusive of exact
57

apprehension, because it depends on circumstances and varies with the subject matter
58

and the necessities of the situation.59

Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with "judicial process" for a trial in
court is not always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in
judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon
different principles. The due process clause guarantees no particular form of procedure and
its requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character,
the right to a notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law. The constitutional
requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly established
administrative agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before the making
of a determination if thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal before which all
objections and defenses to the making of such determination may be raised and
considered. One adequate hearing is all that due process requires. What is required for
"hearing" may differ as the functions of the administrative bodies differ.
60

The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process. Nor is an actual
61

hearing always essential especially under the factual milieu of this case where the
62

members of the IBP Board -- upon whose shoulders the determination of the cause for
removal of an IBP governor is placed subject to the approval of the Supreme Court – all
witnessed Atty. de Vera's actuations in the IBP National Convention in question.
It is undisputed that Atty. de Vera received a copy of the complaint against him and that
he was present when the matter was taken up. From the transcript of the stenographic
notes of the 13 May 2005 meeting wherein Atty. de Vera was removed, it is patent that Atty.
de Vera was given fair opportunity to defend himself against the accusations made by Atty.
Rivera.
Atty. de Vera, however, additionally questions the fact that Atty. Rivera, who authored the
complaint against him, also voted for his expulsion making him accuser, prosecutor and
judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera likewise laments the fact that Atty. Rivera initially
inhibited himself from voting but when this resulted in the defeat of his motion for lack of the
necessary 2/3 vote, he agreed to another round of voting and that, this time, he voted in
favor of his motion.
For the record, of the nine governors comprising the IBP Board, six voted for Atty. de Vera's
expulsion (including Atty. Rivera) while 3 voted against it (including Atty. de Vera).
Section 44 (second paragraph) of the IBP By-Laws provides:

Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause,
including three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable
excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board,
subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of an IBP Governor is done via a resolution
adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members. The phrase "remaining members" refers to the
members exclusive of the complainant member and the respondent member. The reason
therefore is that such members are interested parties and are thus presumed to be unable
to resolve said motion impartially. This being the case, the votes of Attys. Rivera and de Vera
should be stricken-off which means that only the votes of the seven remaining members are
to be counted. Of the seven remaining members, five voted for expulsion while two voted
against it which still adds up to the 2/3 vote requirement for expulsion.
The IBP Board removed Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor for just and valid cause
All the concerned parties to this case agree that what constitutes cause for the removal of
an IBP Governor has not been defined by Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws albeit it includes
three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse. Thus, the IBP
Board argues that it is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect itself from an
intractable member whose removal was caused not by his disagreement with the IBP Board
but due to various acts committed by him which the IBP Board considered as inimical to the
IBP Board in particular and the IBP in general.
Atty. de Vera, on the other hand, insists that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of
the Board during the Convention's Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a
duly-elected member of the IBP Board of Governors and the decision to remove him only
shows that the right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by the IBP
Board.
After weighing the arguments of the parties and in keeping with the fundamental objective
of the IBP to discharge its public responsibility more effectively, we hereby find that Atty. de
Vera's removal from the IBP Board was not capricious or arbitrary.
Indubitably, conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees of intensity, if not animosity, are
inherent in the internal life of an organization, but especially of the IBP since lawyers are said
to disagree before they agree.
However, the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other organization, is diluted if the conflicts
are brought outside its governing body for then there would be the impression that the IBP,
which speaks through the Board of Governors, does not and cannot speak for its members
in an authoritative fashion. It would accordingly diminish the IBP's prestige and repute with
the lawyers as well as with the general public.
As a means of self-preservation, internecine conflicts must thus be adjusted within the
governing board itself so as to free it from the stresses that invariably arise when internal
cleavages are made public.
The doctrine of majority rule is almost universally used as a mechanism for adjusting and
resolving conflicts and disagreements within the group after the members have been given
an opportunity to be heard. While it does not efface conflicts, nonetheless, once a decision
on a contentious matter is reached by a majority vote, the dissenting minority is bound
thereby so that the board can speak with one voice, for those elected to the governing
board are deemed to implicitly contract that the will of the majority shall govern in matters
within the authority of the board.63

The IBP Board, therefore, was well within its right in removing Atty. de Vera as the latter's
actuations during the 10th National IBP Convention were detrimental to the role of the IBP
Board as the governing body of the IBP. When the IBP Board is not seen by the bar and the
public as a cohesive unit, it cannot effectively perform its duty of helping the Supreme
Court enforce the code of legal ethics and the standards of legal practice as well as
improve the administration of justice.
In view of the importance of retaining group cohesiveness and unity, the expulsion of a
member of the board who insists on bringing to the public his disagreement with a
policy/resolution approved by the majority after due discussion, cannot be faulted. The
effectiveness of the board as a governing body will be negated if its pronouncements are
resisted in public by a board member.
Indeed, when a member of a governing body cannot accept the voice of the majority, he
should resign therefrom so that he could criticize in public the majority opinion/decision to
his heart's content; otherwise, he subjects himself to disciplinary action by the body.
The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his
removal as EVP as well
The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his
removal as EVP as well. Section 47, Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP provides:

SEC. 47. National Officers. – The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a
President and Executive Vice President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from
among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. x x x
Thus, to be EVP of the IBP, one must necessarily be a member of IBP Board of Governors.
Atty. de Vera's removal from the Board of Governors, automatically disqualified him from
acting as IBP EVP. To insist otherwise would be contrary to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
The Court will not interfere with the Resolution of the IBP Board to remove Atty. de Vera since
it was rendered without grave abuse of discretion
While it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an extensive power of supervision
over the IBP, it is axiomatic that such power should be exercised prudently. The power of
64

supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP should not preclude the IBP from exercising its
reasonable discretion especially in the administration of its internal affairs governed by the
provisions of its By-Laws. The IBP By-Laws were precisely drafted and promulgated so as to
define the powers and functions of the IBP and its officers, establish its organizational
structure, and govern relations and transactions among its officers and members. With these
By-Laws in place, the Supreme Court could be assured that the IBP shall be able to carry on
its day-to-day affairs, without the Court's interference.
It should be noted that the general charge of the affairs and activities of the IBP has been
vested in the Board of Governors. The members of the Board are elective and
representative of each of the nine regions of the IBP as delineated in its By-Laws. The Board
65

acts as a collegiate body and decides in accordance with the will of the majority. The
foregoing rules serve to negate the possibility of the IBP Board acting on the basis of
personal interest or malice of its individual members. Hence, the actions and resolutions of
the IBP Board deserve to be accorded the disputable presumption of validity, which shall
66

continue, until and unless it is overcome by substantial evidence and actually declared
invalid by the Supreme Court. In the absence of any allegation and substantial proof that
the IBP Board has acted without or in excess of its authority or with grave abuse of
discretion, we shall not be persuaded to overturn and set aside the Board's action or
resolution.
There is no question that the IBP Board has the authority to remove its members as provided
in Article VI, Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws. Issue arises only as to whether the IBP Board
67

abused its authority and discretion in resolving to remove Atty. de Vera from his post as an
IBP Governor and EVP. As has been previously established herein, Atty. de Vera's removal
from the IBP Board was in accordance with due process and the IBP Board acted well
within the authority and discretion granted to it by its By-Laws. There being no grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the IBP Board, we find no reason to interfere in the Board's
resolution to remove Atty. de Vera.
The election of Atty. Salazar by the IBP Board as IBP EVP in replacement of Atty. De Vera was
conducted in accordance with the authority granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws
In the same manner, we find no reason to disturb the action taken by the 2003-2005 IBP
Board of Governors in holding a special election to fill-in the vacant post resulting from the
removal of Atty. de Vera as EVP of the IBP since the same is a purely internal matter, done
without grave abuse of discretion, and implemented without violating the Rules and By-
Laws of the IBP.
With the removal of Atty. de Vera from the Board, by virtue of the IBP Board Resolution
dated 13 May 2005, he was also removed from his post as EVP; thus, there was a resultant
vacancy in the position of IBP EVP.
Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-Laws expressly grants to the Board the authority to fill
vacancies, however arising, in the IBP positions, subject to the provisions of Section 8 of the
Integration Rule, and Section 11 (Vacancies), Section 44 (Removal of members), Section
68 69 70

47 (National officers), Section 48 (other officers), and Section 49 (Terms of Office) of the
71 72 73

By-Laws. The IBP Board has specific and sufficient guidelines in its Rules and By-Laws on how
to fill-in the vacancies after the removal of Atty. de Vera. We have faith and confidence in
the intellectual, emotional and ethical competencies of the remaining members of the
2005-2007 Board in dealing with the situation within the bounds of the IBP Rules and By-Laws.
The election by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors of a new EVP, who will assume the
Presidency for the term 2005-2007, was well within the authority and prerogative granted to
the Board by the IBP By-Laws, particularly Article VII, Section 47, which provides that "[t]he
EVP shall automatically become President for the next succeeding term." The phrase "for the
next succeeding term" necessarily implies that the EVP that should succeed Atty. Cadiz as
IBP President for the next succeeding term (i.e., 2005-2007) should come from the members
of the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors. Hence, in A.M. No. 05-7-19-SC, we restrained now
IBP EVP Feliciano Bautista from assuming the position of Acting President because we have
yet to resolve the question as to who shall succeed Atty. Cadiz from the 2003-2005 IBP Board
of Governors.
Accordingly, the elections of Governor Santiago on 13 June 2005 as IBP EVP, and thereafter,
Governor Salazar on 25 June 2005, as the new IBP EVP, upon the relinquishment of Gov.
Santiago of the position, were valid.
Neither can this Court give credence to the argument of Atty. De Vera that, assuming his
removal as IBP Governor and EVP was valid, his replacement as IBP EVP should come from
Eastern Mindanao Region pursuant to the rotation rule set forth in Article VII, Section 47, of
the IBP By-Laws.
According to Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws, the EVP shall be chosen by the Board
of Governors from among the nine Regional Governors, as much as practicable, on a
rotation basis. This is based on our pronouncements in Bar Matter 491, wherein we ruled:

"ORDER
xxxx
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President
elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [9] IBP
regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws)
should be restored. The right of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-
President to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was
abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should
be as it is hereby restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall
automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of governors
shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among themselves. The position of
Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who
has served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a
succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9)
regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.
xxxx
(Emphasis Supplied)"

In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP which is actually rotated among
the nine Regional Governors. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is merely a result of
the automatic succession rule of the IBP EVP to the Presidency. Thus, the rotation rule
pertains in particular to the position of IBP EVP, while the automatic succession rule pertains
to the Presidency. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is but a consequence of the
automatic succession rule provided in Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon the election of Atty.
De Vera as IBP EVP, each of the nine IBP regions had already produced an EVP and, thus,
the rotation was completed. It is only unfortunate that the supervening event of Atty. de
Vera's removal as IBP Governor and EVP rendered it impossible for him to assume the IBP
Presidency. The fact remains, however, that the rotation rule had been completed despite
the non-assumption by Atty. de Vera to the IBP Presidency.
Moreover, the application of the rotation rule is not a license to disregard the spirit and
purpose of the automatic succession rule, but should be applied in harmony with the latter.
The automatic succession rule affords the IBP leadership transition seamless and enables the
new IBP National President to attend to pressing and urgent matters without having to
expend valuable time for the usual adjustment and leadership consolidation period. The
time that an IBP EVP spends assisting a sitting IBP President on matters national in scope is in
fact a valuable and indispensable preparation for the eventual succession. It should also be
pointed out that this wisdom is further underscored by the fact that an IBP EVP is elected
from among the members of the IBP Board of Governors, who are serving in a national
capacity, and not from the members at large. It is intrinsic in the IBP By-Laws that one who is
to assume the highest position in the IBP must have been exposed to the demands and
responsibilities of national leadership.
It would therefore be consistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule
for Governor Salazar to assume the post of IBP President. By electing the replacement EVP
from among the members of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors, the IBP benefits from the
experience of the IBP EVP of 2003-2005 – in this case, Governor Salazar – who would have
served in a national capacity prior to his assumption of the highest position.
It will also be inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule if the
EVP for the term 2003-2005 will be elected exclusively by the members of the House of
Delegates of the Eastern Mindanao region. This Court notes that the removal of Atty. De
Vera in 13 May 2005 was about a month before the expiration of the term of office of the
2003-2005 Board of Governors. Hence, the replacement Governor would not have been
able to serve in a national capacity for two years prior to assuming the IBP Presidency.
In any case, Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase "as much as practicable" to clearly
indicate that the rotation rule is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar exceptions in
compelling and exceptional circumstances.
It is in view of the foregoing that the argument advanced by Atty. De Vera that the IBP
national presidency should be assumed by a nominee from Eastern Mindanao region from
where he comes, can not hold water. It would go against the intent of the IBP By-Laws for
such a nominee would be bereft of the wealth of experience and the perspective that only
one who is honed in service while serving in a national post in the IBP would have.
We therefore rule that the IBP Board of Governors acted in accordance with the IBP By-
Laws, in electing Atty. Salazar as IBP EVP and in ensuring a succession in the leadership of
the IBP. Had the Board of Governors not done so, there would have been no one qualified
to assume the Presidency of the IBP on 1 July 2005, pursuant to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:

1) SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the practice of law for TWO
(2) YEARS, effective from the finality of this Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be
attached to the personal record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts;
2) DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in A.M.
No. 05-5-15-SC, praying for the disapproval of the Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, of
the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines removing him from his
posts as Governor and Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the
 Philippines, the said Resolution having been rendered without grave abuse of
discretion;
3) AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar as
Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the remainder of
the term 2003-2005, such having been conducted in accordance with its By-Laws
and absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion; and
4) DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his oath of office and
assume the Presidency of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the term 2005-2007
in accordance with the automatic succession rule in Article VII, Section 47 of the IBP
By-Laws, upon receipt of this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia,
Velasco, Jr., J.J., concur.

EN BANC
A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC December 14, 2010
IN THE MATTER OF THE BREWING CONTROVERSIES IN THE ELECTION IN THE INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A.C. No. 8292
ATTYS. MARCIAL M. MAGSINO, MANUEL M. MARAMBA and NASSER
MAROHOMSALIC, Complainants,

vs.
ATTYS. ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, ABELARDO C. ESTRADA, BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR.,
EVERGISTO S. ESCALON and RAYMUND JORGE A. MERCADO, Respondents.

RESOLUTION
CORONA, C.J.:
This resolves the above matter involving the leadership controversy at the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) and the administrative case that was filed against some of the high-
ranking officers of the IBP on account thereof.
I. Antecedents
The Court in an En Banc Resolution dated June 2, 2009 created a Special (Investigating)
Committee to look into the "brewing controversies in the IBP elections, specifically in the
1

elections of Vice-President for the Greater Manila Region and Executive Vice-President of
the IBP itself xxx and any other election controversy involving other chapters of the IBP, if
any", that includes as well the election of the Governors for Western Mindanao and Western
Visayas.
Consequently, the Special Committee called the IBP officers involved to a preliminary
conference on June 10, 2009. With respect thereto, Atty. Rogelio A. Vinluan then submitted
a Preliminary Conference Brief on the same day. During the conference it was determined
that the investigation would focus on the following issues or controversies:

1. What is the correct interpretation of Section 31, Article V of the IBP By-Laws which
provides:
 "SEC. 31. Membership. – The membership (of Delegates) shall consist of all the
Chapter Presidents and, in the case of Chapters entitled to more than one Delegate
each, the Vice-Presidents of the Chapters and such additional Delegates as the
Chapters are entitled to. Unless the Vice-President is already a Delegate, he shall be
an alternate Delegate. Additional Delegates and alternates shall in proper cases be
elected by the Board of Officers of the Chapter. Members of the Board of Governors
who are not Delegates shall be members ex officio of the House, without the right to
vote."
2. Who was validly elected Governor for the Greater Manila Region?
3. Who was validly elected Governor for Western Visayas Region?
4. Who was validly elected Governor for Western Mindanao Region?
5. Who was validly elected IBP Executive Vice President for the next term?
6. What is the liability, if any, of respondent Atty. Rogelio A. Vinluan under the
administrative complaint for "grave professional misconduct, violation of attorney’s
oath, and acts inimical to the IBP" filed against him by Attys. Marcial Magsino,
Manuel Maramba and Nasser Marohomsalic?

Meanwhile, a Supplemental Complaint dated June 11, 2009 was received from Attys.
Magsino, Maramba and Marohomsalic regarding the earlier complaint that they filed last
May 21, 2009 against Atty. Vinluan.
As such, then IBP President Feliciano M. Bautista and then Executive Vice President (EVP)
Vinluan agreed to submit their respective position papers on the above issues and
controversies. Also, Atty. Vinluan was required to file his answer to the administrative
complaint against him.
A Position Paper dated June 15, 2009 was then received from Atty. Vinluan. Attys. Elpidio G.
Soriano, III and Erwin M. Fortunato also filed their Position Papers both dated June 15, 2009. It
appears that an earlier Position Paper also dated June 15, 2009 was submitted by Atty.
Benjamin B. Lanto.
For their part, Attys. Bautista, Maramba and Magsino filed their Position Paper dated June
16, 2009. Incidentally, in a Manifestation likewise dated June 16, 2009 Attys. Bautista,
Maramba and Marcial M. Magsino submitted the same paper but already bearing the
signature of Atty. Bautista.
Atty. Nasser A. Marohomsalic submitted his Position Paper dated June 17, 2009. The Special
Committee, in the course of its investigation, further received a letter dated June 22, 2009
from Atty. Alex L. Macalawi, President of the IBP Lanao del Sur Chapter.
As to the administrative case filed against him, Atty. Vinluan, as respondent, filed his
Comment dated June 15, 2009. In turn, Attys. Magsino, Maramba and Marohomsalic, as
complainants, submitted their Reply dated June 23, 2009.
The Special Committee then submitted a Report and Recommendation dated July 9, 2009
the dispositive portion of which read as follows:

A. That to avoid further controversy regarding its proper interpretation and

implementation, Sec. 31, Article V, of the By-Laws should be amended as follows
(suggested amendments are in bold print):
"SEC. 31. Membership. – The membership of the House of Delegates shall consist of all
the Chapter Presidents and in the case of Chapters entitled to mo(r)e than on(e)
Delegate each, the Vice President of the Chapters and such additional Delegates
as the Chapters are entitled to. Unless the Vice President is already (a) delegate, he
shall be an alternate Delegate. Additional Delegates and their respective alternates
shall be elected from, and by, the Board of Officers of the Chapter. If the Delegate
chosen is incapacitated, or disqualified, or resigns, or refuses to serve, and there are
enough members of the Board to be elected as Delegates, then the Board of
Officers shall elect the additional delegates and alternates from the general
membership of the Chapter, and his corresponding alternate shall take his place."
B. That to avoid any ambiguity as to how the President shall preside and vote in
meetings of the House of Delegates, paragraph (g), Sec. 33, Article V of the By-Laws
should be amended as follows:
"(g) In all meetings and deliberations of the House, whether in annual or special
convention, the President shall preside, or the Executive Vice President, if the
President is absent or incapacitated, but neither of them shall vote except to break
a tie."
C. Similarly, Sec. 42, Article VI of the By-Laws, on meetings of the Board of Governors,
should be amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 42. Meetings. – The Board shall meet regularly once a month, on such date and
such time and place as it shall designate. Special meetings may be called by the
President, and shall be called by him upon the written request of five (5) members of
the Board. The President shall not vote except to break a tie in the voting. When for
any reason, the President cannot preside on account of his absence, incapacity, or
refusal to call a meeting, the Executive Vice President shall preside, there being a
quorum to transact business, but he may not vote except to break a tie.
D. That Sec. 43, Article VI of the By-Laws, on the procedure for approving a resolution
by the Board of Governors without a meeting, should be amended by adding the
following exception thereto so that the procedure may not be abused in connection
with any election in the IBP:
"This provision shall not apply when the Board shall hold an election or hear and
decide an election protest."
E. That the provision for the strict implementation of the rotation rule among the
Chapters in the Regions for the election of the Governor for the regions, (as ordered
by this Honorable Court in Bar Matter No. 586, May 14, 1991) should be incorporated
in Sec. 39, Article VI of the By-Laws, as follows:
"Sec. 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. – At least one (1) month before
the national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the Governor for
their region, who shall be chosen by rotation which is mandatory and shall be strictly
implemented among the Chapters in the region. When a Chapter waives its turn in
the rotation order, its place shall redound to the next Chapter in the line.
Nevertheless, the former may reclaim its right to the Governorship at any time before
the rotation is completed; otherwise, it will have to wait for its turn in the next round,
in the same place that it had in the round completed.
F. That in view of the fact that the IBP no longer elects its President, because the
Executive Vice President automatically succeeds the President at the end of his
term, Sec. 47, Article VII of the By-Laws should be amended by deleting the provision
for the election of the President. Moreover, for the strict implementation of the
rotation rule, the Committee recommends that there should be a sanction for its
violation, thus:
"Sec. 47. National Officers. – The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a
President, an Executive Vice President, and nine (9) regional Governors. The
Executive Vice President shall be elected on a strict rotation basis by the Board of
Governors from among themselves, by the vote of at least five (5) Governors. The
Governors shall be ex officio Vice President for their respective regions. There shall
also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors.
 "The violation of the rotation rule in any election shall be penalized by annulment of
the election and disqualification of the offender from election or appointment to
any office in the IBP."
G. That Atty. Manuel M. Maramba should be declared the duly elected Governor of
the Greater Manila Region for the 2009-2011 term.
H. That Atty. Erwin Fortunato of the Romblon Chapter should be declared the duly
elected Governor of the Western Visayas Region for the 2009-2011 term.
I. That a special election should be held in the Western Mindanao Region, within
fifteen (15) days from notice, to elect the Governor of that region for the 2009-2011
term. In accordance with the rotation rule, only the six (6) Chapters in the region that
have not yet been elected to the Board of Governors, namely: Zamboanga
Sibugay, Zamboanga del Norte, Za(m)boanga del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Misamis
Occidental, and Maguindanao-Cotabato City, shall participate in the election.
J. That, thereafter, a special election should also be held by the Board of Governors
to elect the Executive Vice President for the 2009-2011 term with strict observance of
the rotation rule. Inasmuch as for the past nine (9) terms, i.e., since the 1991-1993
term, the nominees of the Western Visayas and Eastern Mindanao Regions have not
yet been elected Executive Vice President of the IBP, the special election shall
choose only between the nominees of these two (2) regions who shall become the
Executive Vice President for the 2009-2011 term, in accordance with the strict
rotation rule.
K. That the high-handed and divisive tactics of Atty. Rogelio A. Vinluan and his group
of Governors, Abelardo Estrada, Bonifacio Barandon, Jr., Evergisto Escalon, and
Raymund Mercado, which disrupted the peaceful and orderly flow of business in the
IBP, caused chaos in the National Office, bitter disagreements, and ill-feelings, and
almost disintegrated the Integrated Bar, constituted grave professional misconduct
which should be appropriately sanctioned to discourage its repetition in the future.

II. Findings of the Special Committee

In its Report and Recommendation dated July 9, 2009, the Special Committee disclosed
when it was discussing the Board of Officers of each chapter that:
The government of a Chapter is vested in its Board of Officers composed of nine (9) officers,
namely: the President, Vice-President, Secretary, Treasurer, and five (5) Directors who shall
be elected by the members of the Chapter at the biennial meeting on the last Saturday of
February, and shall hold office for a term of two (2) years from the first day of April following
their election and until their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified. For the
2009-2011 term, the election of Chapter officers was held on February 28, 2009.
In 1983 up to 1995, the Quezon City Chapter elected the usual nine (9) officers to its Board
of Officers and they were all delegates to the House of Delegates. Beginning with the 1997-
1999 term, when it added a Public Relations Officer (P.R.O.) and Auditor to its Board of
Officers, the number of delegates allotted to the Chapter was also increased to eleven (11)
like the membership in its Board of Officers, pursuant to a reapportionment of delegates by
the Board of Governors under Sec. 30, Art. V of the By-Laws.
Up to the 2007-2009 term, all the officers of the QC Chapter were also the Chapter’s
delegates to the House of Delegates. Atty. Victoria Loanzon who has been an officer of the
Chapter in various capacities since 2003, like her fellow officers in the Board, automatically
became a delegate since 2003 up to this time.
For the 2009-2011 term, the Board of Officers of the IBP-QC Chapter that assumed office on
April 1, 2009, is composed of six (6) officers and (5) directors, namely:
 President - - - - - - - - - - Tranquil Salvador III
Vice President - - - - - - Jonas Cabochan
Secretary - - - - - - - - - - Christian Fernandez
Treasurer - - - - - - - - - - Victoria Loanzon
Auditor - - - - - - - - - - - Ginger Anne Castillo
P.R.O. - - - - - - - - - - - - Ernesto Tabujara III
Director - - - - - - - - - - - Annalou Nachura
Director - - - - - - - - - - - Melody Sampaga
Director - - - - - - - - - - - Francois Rivera
Director - - - - - - - - - - - Joseph Cerezo
Director - - - - - - - - - - - Marita Iris Laqui

It is important to be an officer of one’s Chapter and a delegate to the House of Delegates,

because a delegate gets to elect the Governor for the Region (which must rotate among
the Chapters in the region). The Governor of the Region becomes a member of the Board
of Governors, and gets to elect, or be elected, as the next IBP Executive Vice President who
automatically becomes President for the next succeeding term (which must also rotate
among the Regions). 2

The Special Committee then pointed out that with respect to the IBP Board of Governors this
consists of "nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) Regions. One (1) Governor for each Region
shall be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that region only. The
Governors, the President and the Executive Vice-President shall hold office for a term of two
(2) years from July 1 immediately following their election, up to June 30 of their second year
in office and until their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified." It was further
added by the Committee that:
At least one (1) month before the national convention, the delegates from each Region
shall elect the Governor for their region. The IBP By-Laws provide that "starting in 1993-1995,
the principle on rotation shall be strictly implemented so that all prior elections for Governor
in the region shall be reckoned with or considered in determining who should be Governor
to be selected from the different chapters to represent the region in the Board of
Governors. Hence, the governorship of the region shall rotate among the chapters in the
region.
The Governors-elect shall, by a vote of at least five (5), choose an Executive Vice-President,
x x x either from among themselves or from other members of the Integrated Bar. The
Executive Vice-President shall automatically become President for the next succeeding
term. The Presidency shall rotate among the nine (9) Regions. 3

According to the Committee, the "rotation of the position of Governor of a region among
the Chapters was ordered by the Supreme Court in its Resolution dated May 14, 1991 in Bar
Matter No. 586 (Clarification Re: Bar Matter No. 491, Atty. Romulo T. Capulong petitioner)".
With respect thereto, it was revealed that:
Pursuant to the principle of rotation, the governorship of a region shall rotate once in as
many terms as the number of chapters there are in the region, to give every chapter a
chance to represent the region in the Board of Governors. Thus, in a region composed of 5
chapters, each chapter is entitled to the governorship once in every 5 terms, or once every
ten (10) years, since a term is two (2) years.
The record of the National IBP Secretariat shows that during the past five (5) terms, from
1999 up to 2009, the GMR (Greater Manila Region) governorship was occupied by the five
(5) chapters of the region as follows:

1999-2001 ----- Jose P. Icaonapo ------------ Manila III

 2001-2003 ----- Santos V. Catubay, Jr. ---- QuezonCity
2003-2005 ----- Rosario Setias-Reyes ------ Manila II
2005-2007 ----- Alicia A. Risos-Vidal ------ Manila I
2007-2009 ----- Marcial M. Magsino ------- Manila IV

In the next round, which starts with the 2009-2011 term, the same order of rotation should be
followed by the five (5) chapters, i.e., Manila III shall begin the round, to be followed by
Quezon City for 2011-2013 term, Manila for the 2013-2015 term, Manila I for the 2015-2017
term, and Manila IV for the 2017-2019 term.
In the Western Visayas Region which is composed of ten (10) chapters, each chapter is
entitled to represent the governorship of the region once every ten (10) terms. The first
chapter to occupy the governorship, must wait for the nine (9) other chapters to serve their
respective terms, before it may have its turn again as Governor of the region.
The same rule applies to the Western Mindanao Region which is composed of twelve (12)
chapters.
On April 25, 2009, the election of Governors for the nine (9) IBP regions proceeded as
scheduled, presided over by their respective outgoing Governor. 4

It was then cited by the Special Committee that "Sec. 47, Art. VII of the By-Laws, as
amended by Bar Matter 491, Oct. 6, 1989, provides that the Executive Vice President shall
be chosen by the Board of Governors from among the nine (9) regional governors. The
Executive Vice President shall automatically become President for the next succeeding
term. The Presidency shall rotate among the nine Regions." Further, the Committee averred
that:
The list of national presidents furnished the Special Committee by the IBP National
Secretariat, shows that the governors of the following regions were President of the IBP
during the past nine (9) terms (1991-2009):

Numeriano Tanopo, Jr. (Pangasinan) --- Central Luzon --- 1991-1993

Mervin G. Encanto (Quezon City) ------ Manila ------------ 1993-1995
Raul R. Angangco (Makati) -------------- Southern Luzon - 1995-1997
Jose Aguila Grapilon (Biliran) ----------- Eastern Visayas – 1997-1999
Arthur D. Lim (Zambasulta) ------------- Western Mindanao-1999-2001
Teofilo S. Pilando, Jr. (Kalinga-Apayao)-Northern Luzon – 2001-2003
Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (Camarines Sur) –Bicolandia -------- 2003-2005
Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (Camarines Sur) –Bicolandia ----2005-Aug 2006
Jose Vicente B. Salazar (Albay) ---------- Bicolandia --- Aug. 2006-2007
Feliciano M. Bautista (Pangasinan) ------ Central Luzon ---- 2007-2009

Only the governors of the Western Visayas and Eastern Mindanao regions have not yet had
their turn as Executive Vice President cum next IBP President, while Central Luzon and
Bicolandia have had two (2) terms already.
Therefore, either the governor of the Western Visayas Region, or the governor of the Eastern
Mindanao Region should be elected as Executive Vice-President for the 2009-2011 term. The
one who is not chosen for this term, shall have his turn in the next (2011-2013) term.
Afterwards, another rotation shall commence with Greater Manila in the lead, followed by
Southern Luzon, Eastern Visayas, Western Mindanao, Northern Luzon, Bicolandia, Central
Luzon, and either Western Visayas or Eastern Mindanao at the end of the round. 5

The Committee then disclosed that the controversies involved herein and should be
resolved are the following: (I) the dispute concerning additional delegates of the QC
Chapter to the House of Delegates; (II) the election of the Governor for the Greater Manila
Region (GMR); (III) the election of Governor for the Western Visayas Region; (IV) the election
of Governor for the Western Mindanao Region; (V) the resolution of the election protests;
(VI) the election of the IBP Executive Vice President for the 2009-2011 term; and, (VII) the
administrative complaint against EVP Rogelio Vinluan.
In addressing the above controversies, the Committee arrived at the following findings and
conclusions:
I. The silence of Sec. 31, Art. V of the IBP By-Laws on who may be elected as additional
delegates and alternates by the remaining members of the Board of Officers of the
Chapter when the Chapter is entitled to more than two (2) delegates to the House of
Delegates, is the root cause of the conflicting resolutions of the Bautista and Vinluan
factions on the proper interpretation of the aforementioned provision of the By-Laws.
According to the Resolution No. XVIII-2009 dated April 17, 2009 of the Bautista Group, "the
additional delegate/s shall be elected by the Board of Officers of the Chapter only from
among the remaining duly elected officers and members of the Board, in consideration of
their mandate from the general membership.
According to the Resolution No. XVIII-2009 (Special-23 April 2009) of the Vinluan Group, "the
election of the additional delegate/s for the Chapters entitled to more than two (2)
delegates shall be elected by the Board of Officers of the Chapter from among the general
membership who are in good standing to include the remaining duly elected officers and
members of the Board."
The Committee finds the qualification introduced by Resolution No. XVIII-2009 – "that the
additional delegate/s and alternates must be elected from among the remaining officers of
the Chapter" – to be consistent with the precedent set by Section 31 itself in appointing
members of the Board of Officers, namely, (a) the president of the Chapter as the
delegate, and the vice president as the alternate, or second, delegate to the House of
Delegates, when the Chapter is entitled to two (2) delegates. There is a manifest intention in
Sec. 31, Art. V of the By-Laws to reserve membership in the House of Delegates (which is the
deliberative body of the IBP) for the elected officers of the Chapter since they have already
received the mandate of the general membership of the Chapter.
For the past four (4) terms (2003-2011), Atty. Loanzon has been an officer and delegate of
the QC Chapter to the House of Delegates, until the Vinluan Group introduced its own
interpretation of the aforementioned provision of the By-Laws and elected non-officers of
the Chapter as delegates to the House of Delegates in lieu of herself and Atty. Laqui.
We find the Vinluan Group’s interpretation of Sec. 31, Art. V, of the By-Laws in Resolution No.
XVIII-2009 (Special – 23 April 2009) to be in error and devoid of rational and historical bases.
II. Attys. Victoria Loanzon and Marite Laqui were properly recognized as delegates of the
QC Chapter by the Presiding Officer, GMR Governor Marcial Magsino, during the election
on April 25, 2009 of the Governor for the Greater Manila Region, in accordance with the
guideline in Resolution No. XVIII-2009.
The argument of the QC-Chapter President Tranquil Salvador, that Attys. Loanzon and Laqui
were not delegates because they were not elected by the QC-Board of Officers, is not well
taken.
Sec. 31, Art. V of the By-Laws provides that:
"Additional Delegates and alternates shall in proper cases be elected by the Board of
Officers of the Chapter."
The QC Chapter is not a "proper case" for the election of additional delegates by the Board
of Officers because the Chapter is entitled to the same number of delegates (11) to the
House, as the number of officers in its Board of Officers. Its officers are ipso facto the
Chapter’s delegates to the House. There is no need for the Board of Officers to conduct an
election.
A "proper case" for the election of additional delegates and alternates by the Board of
Officers occurs when the number of additional delegates and alternates for the Chapter is
less than the members of the Board of Officers, for, then, the Board of Officers must select,
and elect, who among themselves should be the additional delegate/s and alternates of
the Chapter to the House of Delegates. That has never been the case of the QC Chapter.
III. Atty. Manuel Maramba (Manila III Chapter) was validly elected as GMR Governor for the
2009-2011 term, not only because he outvoted his rival, Atty. Elpidio Soriano (Quezon City
Chapter), but also because under the principle of rotation of the governorship (Bar Matter
No. 586, May 14, 1991) since the five (5) chapters of the Greater Manila Region have all
represented the region in the Board of Governors during the past five (5) terms, in the
following order:

1999-2001 -------- Manila III -------- Jose P. Icaonapo

2001-2003 -------- Quezon City ----- Santos V. Catubay, Jr.
2003-2005 -------- Manila II ---------- Rosario Setias-Reyes
2005-2007 -------- Manila I ----------- Alicia A. Risos-Vidal
2007-2009 -------- Manila IV --------- Marcial M. Magsino

it is now the turn of the representative of the Manila III Chapter to sit again in the Board of
Governors for the next round which begins in the 2009-2011 term. The Manila III
representative, Atty. Manuel M. Maramba, has every right to the position not only because
he won the election with 13 votes in his favor against 12 for Atty. Soriano, but also because
his election follows the rotation rule decreed by the Supreme Court.
On the other hand, the election of Atty. Soriano (QC Chapter) in the special election that
was presided over by EVP Vinluan on May 4, 2009, was a nullity on three (3) grounds: First,
because Atty. Soriano already lost the election on April 25, 2009. Second, the special
election conducted by the Vinluan Group on May 4, 2(00)8 was illegal because it was not
called nor presided over by the regional Governor. Third, Atty. Soriano is disqualified to run
for GMR Governor for the 2009-2011 term because his "election" as such would violate the
rotation rule which the Supreme Court requires to be "strictly implemented". Under the
rotation rule, the GMR governorship for the 2009-2011 term belongs to the Manila III
Chapter, not to the QC Chapter, whose turn will come two (2) years later, in 2011-2013 yet.
IV. Atty. Erwin Fortunato of the Romblon Chapter was duly elected as Governor for the
Western Visayas Region for the 2009-2011 term, not only because he obtained the highest
number of votes among the three (3) candidates for the position, but also because under
the rotation rule, it is now the turn of the Romblon Chapter to represent the Western Visayas
Region in the IBP Board of Governors.
The contention of the protestants, Attys. Cornelio Aldon (Antique Chapter) and Benjamin
Ortega (Negros Occidental Chapter) that the rotation rule in Sections 37 and 39 of the IBP
By-Laws is not mandatory but only directory, betrays their ignorance of the resolution of the
Supreme Court in Bar Matter No. 586 dated May 16, 1991, ruling that "the principle on
rotation shall be strictly implemented so that all prior elections for governor in the region
shall be reckoned with or considered in determining who should be the governor to be
selected from the different chapters to represent the region in the Board of Governors."
V. Neither Atty. Nasser Marohomsalic nor Atty. Benjamin Lanto is qualified to be elected
Governor of Western Mindanao Region. Sec. 39, Art. VI of the IBP By-Laws provides that:
"Starting in 1993-1995, the principle of rotation in the position of governor among the
different chapters to represent the region in the Board of Governors shall be strictly
implemented.
Under Sec. 37, Art. VI of the By-Laws, the Governor of a region shall be elected by the
members of the House of Delegates from that region only. Since the delegate of a Chapter
to the House of Delegates is the President of the Chapter, not the Board of Officers, the
nominee of the Chapter President, not the nominee of the Board of Officers, is the valid
nominee for Governor of the Region.
However, under the rotation rule, it is not the Lanao del Sur Chapter that should represent
the Western Mindanao Region in the Board of Governors for the 2009-2011 term. The record
of the IBP National Secretariat shows that, starting in 1993-1995 when the strict
implementation of the rotation rule began, the 12-chapter Western Mindanao Region has
been represented in the Board of Governors by only six (6) Chapters, as follows:

1993-1995 ----- Lanao del Sur ------ Dimnatang T. Saro

1995-1997 ----- Cotabato ------------ George C. Jabido
1997-1999 ----- ZAMBASULTA -- Arthur D. Lim
1999-2001 ----- ZAMBASULTA -- Paulino R. Ersando
2001-2003 ----- North Cotabato --- Little Sarah A. Agdeppa
2003-2005 ----- Sultan Kudarat ---- Carlos L. Valdez, Jr.
2005-2007 ----- SOCSARGEN ----- Rogelio C. Garcia
2007-2009 ----- Sultan Kudarat ---- Carlos L. Valdez, Jr.

Therefore, pursuant to the strict rotation, the Lanao del Sur Chapter must wait for the six (6)
other Chapters in the region (Zamboanga Sibugay, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del
Sur, Lanao del Norte, Misamis Occidental, and Maguindanao-Cotabato City) to have their
turn in the Board of Governors before Lanao del Sur may again represent the Western
Mindanao Region in the Board of Governors.
Since both Attys. Nasser Marohomsalic and B(e)njamin Lanto belong to the Lanao del Sur
Chapter, both of them are disqualified to be elected as Governor of the Western Mindanao
Region for the 2009-2011 term. With respect to Atty. Benjamin Lanto, his nomination by the
Board of Officers was not only invalid, but also lost credibility after three (3), out of the
thirteen (13) signatories to his nomination, resigned from the Board of Officers, and six (6)
others signed "authorizations" in favor of Atty. Macalawi authorizing him to nominate and
elect the Governor for the Western Mindanao Region. That left only four (4) votes in favor of
his nomination for Governor of the Western Mindanao Region.
VI. The elections for the IBP Executive Vice President separately held on May 9, 2009 by the
Bautista and Vinluan Groups were null and void for lack of quorum. The presence of five (5)
Governors-elect is needed to constitute a quorum of the 9-member Board of Governors-
elect who shall elect the Executive Vice President.
As previously stated, there were two (2) simultaneous elections for the Executive Vice
President for the 2009-2011 term – one was called and presided over by EVP Vinluan in the
Board Room of the IBP National Office, while the other election for the same position was
presided over by outgoing IBP Pres. Bautista in another room of the same building, at the
same time, 9:00 A.M., on the same date, May 9, 2009.
Those present at the meeting of the Vinluan Group were:

1. Atty. Elpidio G. Soriano

2. Atty. Benjamin B. Lanto
3. Atty. Amador Tolentino, Jr., Governor-elect for Southern Luzon
4. Atty. Jose V. Cabrera, Governor-elect for Bicolandia
5. Atty. Erwin Fortunato, Governor-elect for Western Visayas
6. Atty. Roland B. Inting, Governor-elect for Eastern Visayas
Since both Attys. Soriano and Lanto were not validly elected as Governors respectively of
the Greater Manila Region and the Western Mindanao Region, they were disqualified to sit
in the incoming Board of Governors and participate in the election of the succeeding
Executive Vice President. The remaining four (4) Governors-elect – Governors Tolentino,
Cabrera, Fortunato, and Inting, did not constitute a quorum of the Board of Governors to
conduct a valid election of the IBP Executive Vice President. The election of Atty. Elpidio G.
Soriano as Executive Vice President by the Vinluan Group was invalid. Aside from lack of a
quorum to conduct the elections, EVP Vinluan wrongly presided over the election. Thus,
Atty. Soriano was not duly elected as Governor of the Greater Manila Region, hence, he is
disqualified to sit in the Board of Governors.
Neither did the meeting of the Bautista Group fare any better, for those present were:

1. Atty. Milagros Fernan-Cayosa, Governor-elect for Northern Luzon

2. Atty. Ferdinand Y. Miclat, Governor-elect for Central Luzon
3. Atty. Manuel M. Maramba, Governor-elect for Greater Manila
4. Atty. Roan Libarios, Governor-elect for Eastern Mindanao
5. Atty. Nasser Marohomsalic

Atty. Marohomsalic’s election as Governor for Western Mindanao was invalid for violating
the rotation rule. The four (4) remaining governors-elect (Attys. Cayosa, Miclat, Maramba
and Libarios) like those in the Vinluan Group, did not constitute a quorum to conduct the
election of the IBP Executive Vice President for the current term. The election of Governor
Roan Libarios as Executive Vice President by this group was therefore null and void.
Besides that flaw in his election, since the Eastern Visayas Region, represented by Governor
Jose Aguila Grapilon of Biliran, had succeeded to the presidency in 1997-1999, its next turn
will come after the eight (8) other regions shall have also served in the presidency. That will
be after sixteen years, or, in 2015-2017 yet.
VII. The administrative complaint against EVP Rogelio A. Vinluan and his Group of Governors
(Abelardo Estrada of Northern Luzon, Bonifacio Barandon of Bicolandia, Evergisto Escalon of
Eastern Visayas, and Raymund Mercado of Western Visayas) is meritorious, for their conduct
was fractious and high-handed, causing disunity and acrimonious disagreements in the IBP.
1. The request of the EVP Vinluan’s Group for a special meeting of the Board of Governors
on April 23, 2009 – two (2) days before the scheduled election of the regional Governors on
April 25, 2009 – when IBP Pres. Bautista was in Zamboanga on IBP business, and the other
Governors had just returned to their respective regions to prepare for the April 25 election of
the regional governors, was unreasonable.
The special meeting on April 23, 2009 which he himself presided over, violated Sec. 42, Art.
VI of the By-Laws which provides that it is the President who shall call a special meeting, and
it is also the President who shall preside over the meeting, not Atty. Vinluan (Sec. 50, Art. VII,
By-Laws).
The proper recourse for the Vinluan Group, in view of President Bautista’s refusal to call a
special meeting as requested by them, is found in Section 43, Art. VI of the By-Laws which
provides that-
"The Board may take action, without a meeting, by resolution signed by at least five
Governors provided that every member of the Board shall have been previously apprised of
the contents of the resolution."
But the Vinluan Group ignored that procedure. They held a special meeting on April 23,
2009, where they adopted Resolution No. XVIII-2009 (Special-23 April 2009) striking out as
ultra vires the earlier Resolution No. XVIII-2009 passed in the regular monthly meeting of the
Board of Governors on April 17, 2009. That meeting was illegal, hence, the resolution
adopted therein was null and void.
2. The second special meeting held by the Vinluan Group on April 30, 2009 wherein they
approved Resolution XVIII-2009 (Special-A-30 April 2009) resolving the election protests in the
GMR, Western Visayas and Western Mindanao governors’ elections, with complete
disregard for the protestees’ right to due process, was likewise illegal, hence, the Group’s
resolution of the election protests was likewise null and void, and the new election of the
GMR Governor which they set on May 4, 2009 was invalid.
3. The "Board Resolution" which was adopted and faxed to the Governors-elect on May 8,
2009, by the Vinluan Group, setting the election of the IBP Executive Vice President on May
9, 2009, at 9:00 A.M.; declaring Pres. Bautista "unfit to preside" over the election and
"designating EVP Vinluan to preside over the election" in lieu of Pres. Bautista, was uncalled
and unwarranted, and caused disunity and disorder in the IBP. It was in effect a coup to
unseat Pres. Bautista before the end of his term, and prematurely install EVP Vinluan as
president.
The actuations of Atty. Vinluan’s Group in defying the lawful authority of IBP President
Bautista, due to Atty. Vinluan’s overweening desire to propel his fraternity brother, Atty.
Elpidio G. Soriano, to the next presidency of the IBP, smacked of politicking, which is strongly
condemned and strictly prohibited by the IBP By-Laws and the Bar Integration Rule. 6

Again, it must be noted that while the pending administrative case against Atty. Vinluan
and his co-respondents has not yet been resolved, Atty. Vinluan was not allowed to assume
his position as President of the IBP for 2009-2011. Instead, the Supreme Court designated
retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Santiago Kapunan as Officer-in-Charge of the IBP.
III. Rulings of the Court
The Court completely agrees with the recommendations of the Special Committee with
respect to, among others, the following:
1. Declaring Atty. Manuel M. Maramba (Manila III Chapter) as the duly elected Governor of
the Greater Manila Region for the 2009-2011 term ; and,
7

2. Declaring Atty. Erwin M. Fortunato (Romblon Chapter) as the duly elected Governor of
the Western Visayas Region for the 2009-2011 term . 8

As far as the Court is concerned, there is no dispute that the election of Atty. Maramba was
in order. During the election held last April 25, 2009 which was duly presided over by then
outgoing Greater Manila Region Governor Marcial Magsino, it was Atty. Maramba who
garnered the highest number of votes among the delegates compared to Atty. Soriano, 13
votes to 12 votes. However, instead of accepting the said defeat graciously, Atty. Soriano
then filed an election protest on April 27, 2009 claiming that the said election was void
because there were non-delegates, particularly Attys. Loanzon and Laqui of the Quezon
City Chapter, who were allowed to vote. Consequently, Atty. Soriano got a favorable ruling
from the group of Atty. Vinluan, as EVP, and former Governors Estrada (Northern Luzon),
Barandon, Jr. (Bicolandia), Escalon (Eastern Visayas) and Mercado (Western Visayas) per
Resolution No. XVIII-2009 (Special A-30 April 2009). This then resulted in the anomalous
election of Atty. Soriano as Governor of the Greater Manila Region last May 4, 2009.
In addressing the said controversy, and as already discussed, the Committee concluded
that "the Vinluan Group’s interpretation of Sec. 31, Art. V, of the By-Laws in Resolution No.
XVIII-2009 (Special-23 April 2009) to be in error and devoid of rational and historical bases." It
was then pointed out that "(t)he argument of the QC-Chapter President Tranquil Salvador,
(as well as by Atty. Soriano), that Attys. Loanzon and Laqui were not delegates because
they were not elected by the QC-Board of Officers, is not well taken." Likewise, the
Committee considered the situation then involving the Quezon City Chapter as "not a
‘proper case’ for the election of additional delegates by the Board of Officers because the
Chapter is entitled to the same number of delegates (11) to the House (of Delegates), as
the number of officers in its Board of Officers. Its officers are ipso facto the Chapter’s
delegates to the House. There is no need for the Board of Officers to conduct an election."
Thus, and as rightly determined by the Committee to which the Court subscribes to, "the
election of Atty. Soriano (QC Chapter) in the special election that was presided over by EVP
Vinluan on May 4, 2009, was a nullity on three (3) grounds: First, because Atty. Soriano
already lost the election on April 25, 2009. Second, the special election conducted by the
Vinluan Group on May 4, 2(009) was illegal because it was not called nor presided by the
regional Governor (Atty. Magsino). Third, Atty. Soriano is disqualified to run for GMR
Governor for the 2009-2011 term because his "election" as such would violate the rotation
rule which the Supreme Court requires to be "strictly implemented"." This being so, since he
was not a duly elected Governor of the Greater Manila Region, then Atty. Soriano cannot
be voted as well as IBP Executive Vice President for 2009-2011.
With respect to the case of Atty. Fortunato, his election as Governor for the Western Visayas
Region was upheld since "he obtained the highest number of votes among the three (3)
candidates for the position" and "also because under the rotation rule, it is now the turn of
the Romblon Chapter to represent the Western Visayas Region in the IBP Board of
Governors." On account thereof, the Court is convinced that the contentions of protestees
Attys. Cornelio Aldon (Antique Chapter) and Benjamin Ortega (Negros Occidental
Chapter) cannot prosper. After all, the Court already upheld per its Resolution in Bar Matter
No. 586 dated May 16, 1991 that the "rotation rule" under Sections 37 and 39 of the IBP By-
Laws "shall be strictly implemented so that all prior elections for governor in the region shall
be reckoned with or considered in determining who should be the governor to be selected
from the different chapters to represent the region in the Board of Governors." More so,
when the concerned chapter invoked its right thereto as in the case of Atty. Fortunato who
came from the Romblon Chapter which was next in the rotation.
To the Court, the election of Atty. Fortunato as Governor last April 25, 2009 is well-settled. He
did not only come from the chapter which is entitled to be elected for the said position, but
also got the highest number of votes among the candidates that included protestees Attys.
Aldon and Ortega. As the election was presided over by then outgoing Governor Raymund
Mercado, the Court finds no cogent reason as well to reverse the findings of the Committee
insofar as upholding the election of Atty. Fortunato is concerned. Suffice it to say, the
Committee was correct in not finding any anomaly with respect thereto. 1avvphi1

On the nullification of the election of Atty. Nasser Marohomsalic as Governor for the
Western Mindanao Region, the Court does not agree with the recommendation of the
Committee to hold a special election in the said region . Instead, the Court rules to uphold
9

the election of Atty. Marohomsalic last April 25, 2009 which was presided over by then
outgoing Governor Carlos Valdez, Jr.
It must be pointed out that Atty. Marohomsalic was duly nominated by Atty. Alex Macalawi,
President of the Lanao del Sur Chapter, and the official delegate of the said chapter to the
House of Delegates for the Western Mindanao Region during the elections held last April 25,
2009. On the other hand, Atty. Benjamin Lanto was supposedly nominated by the Board of
Officers of the Lanao del Sur Chapter, except Atty. Macalawi, in Resolution No. 002-2009
dated February 28, 2009. However, it appears that, as discovered by the Committee, "three
(3) signatories of the resolution" apparently "resigned as members of the Board of Officers"
since they are prosecutors who are "ineligible for election or appointment to any position in
the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof", while "(s)ix (6) other signatories of the resolution"
allegedly "recalled their signatures" and they, instead, "signed an ‘authorization’ authorizing
the Chapter President, Atty. Macalawi, "to select and vote" "for the Regional Governor for
Western Mindanao"." Thus, "(t)he withdrawal of nine (9) signatures from the Resolution No.
002, left only four (4) votes in support of Lanto’s nomination – a puny minority of the 14-
member Board of Officers of the Lanao del Sur Chapter." 10

The attempt of Atty. Vinluan and his group of Governors to nullify the election of Atty.
Marohomsalic through Resolution No. XVIII-2009 (Special A-30 April 2009) was clearly
irregular and unjustified. Based on the April 25, 2009 election results, Atty. Marohomsalic won
over his rival Atty. Lanto, 6 votes to 5 votes. Consequently, he was duly proclaimed as the
elected Governor of the Western Mindanao Region. On April 27, 2009, Atty. Lanto filed an
election protest, "questioning the validity of Atty. Marohomsalic’s nomination by Atty.
Macalawi, President of the IBP Lanao del Sur Chapter, and claiming that his (Lanto’s)
nomination by the Board of Officers of the Lanao del Sur Chapter was the valid
nomination."
Immediately, on April 30, 2009, the group of Atty. Vinluan issued Resolution No. XVIII-2009
proclaiming Atty. Lanto as the duly elected Governor without affording Atty. Marohomsalic
his right to due process. More importantly, instead of calling for another election like what it
did for the Greater Manila Region, the group of Atty. Vinluan proceeded to instantly
declare Atty. Lanto as having been duly elected "on the ground that the nomination of the
protestee, Nasser Marohomsalic, was contrary to the will of the Lanao del Sur Chapter
expressed through Board Resolution No. 00(2)-2009 of the Board of Officers (of the Lanao
del Sur Chapter)."11

As borne out by the records, Atty. Marohomsalic was duly nominated by Atty. Alex
Macalawi, President of the Lanao del Sur Chapter, and the official delegate of the said
chapter to the House of Delegates for the Western Mindanao Region during the elections.
On the other hand, Atty. Lanto was supposedly nominated by the Board of Officers of the
same Chapter in a resolution dated February 28, 2009, which was not signed and approved
by Atty. Macalawi. However, and as already pointed out by the Committee, the
"withdrawal of nine (9) signatures from the Resolution No. 002, left only four (4) votes in
support of Lanto’s nomination – a puny minority of the 14-member Board of Officers of the
Lanao del Sur Chapter." 12

Thus, the Committee, citing Sec. 37, Art. VI of the By-Laws, clearly repudiated and
overturned Resolution No. XVIII-2009 (Special A- 30 April 2009) of Atty. Vinluan and his group
of Governors. In its Report, it declared that the "nominee of the Chapter President, not the
nominee of the Board of Officers, is the valid nominee for Governor of the Region," thereby
13

sustaining the position of Atty. Marohomsalic and, in effect, the validity of his nomination by
Atty. Macalawi.
Despite the said findings, Atty. Marohomsalic was stripped of his electoral mandate and
victory when the Committee, invoking the strict application of the "rotation rule,"
proceeded to altogether nullify the result of the elections duly conducted on April 25, 2009.
According to the Committee, neither Lanto nor Marohomsalic is qualified to be elected
governor because it was not the turn of Lanao del Sur chapter to represent the Western
Mindanao Region in the Board of Governors for the 2009-2011 term. As declared in the
Report --
However, under the rotation rule, it is not the Lanao del Sur Chapter that should represent
the Western Mindanao Region in the Board of Governors for the 2009-2011 term. The record
of the IBP National Secretariat shows that, starting in 1993-1995 when the strict
implementation of the rotation rule began, the 12 –chapter Western Mindanao Region has
been represented in the Board of Governors only six (6) Chapters, as follows:

1993-1995---Lanao del Sur-----Dimnatang T. Saro

1995-1997---Cotatabato---------George C. Jabido
1997-1999---ZAMBASULTA—Arthur D. Lim
 1999-2001---ZAMBASULTA---Paulino R. Ersando
2001-2003---North Cotabato---- Little Sarah A. Agdeppa
2003-2005---Sultan Kudarat-----Carlos L. Valdez, Jr.
2005-2007---SOCSARGEN-----Rogelio C. Garcia
2007-2009---Sultan Kudarat-----Carlos L. Valdez, Jr.

Therefore, pursuant to the strict rotation rule, the Lanao del Sur Chapter must wait for the six
(6) other Chapters in the region (Zamboanga Sibugay, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga
del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Misamis Occidental, and Maguindanao-Cotabato City) to have
their turn in the Board of Governors before Lanao del Sur may again represent the Western
Mindanao Region in the Board of Governors.
Since both Attys. Nasser Marohomsalic and Benjamin Lanto belong to the Lanao del Sur
Chapter, both of them are disqualified to be elected as Governor of the Western Mindanao
Region for the 2009-2011 term.
The ruling of the Committee insofar as it nullified the election of Atty. Marohomsalic as
Governor of the Western Mindanao Region cannot be sustained for not being in full accord
with facts and the rules. While the Committee may have correctly pointed out that under
the rotation rule it was not yet the turn of IBP Lanao del Sur Chapter to represent the region
in the Board of Governors for the 2009-2011 term, it does not necessarily follow that the result
of the elections should be altogether nullified on that ground. Evidently, and as determined
by the Committee itself, there are instances when the "rotation rule" was not followed
insofar as the elections in 1999 and 2007 were concerned with respect to the Western
Mindanao Region.
In the regular election of April 25, 2009, there is no dispute that the voting delegates of IBP
Western Mindanao Region voted into office Atty. Marohomsalic of Lanao del Sur Chapter
as Governor for the 2009-2011 term. During the said election, his only rival was Atty.
Benjamin Lanto who also belongs to the same Lanao del Sur Chapter. A third candidate,
Atty. Escobar from the Sarangani Chapter, was nominated but he declined the nomination.
While the Committee points out that six (6) chapters in the region, including Sarangani, are
entitled to precedence over the Lanao del Sur chapter in the order of rotation, the fact
remains that not one of them nominated or fielded a candidate from their respective ranks
during the April 25, 2009 election. Neither did any one of them challenge the nominations of
the Lanao del Sur Chapter based on the order of rotation.
By not fielding a candidate for Governor and by declining the nomination raised in favor of
its Chapter President (Atty. Escobar), the IBP Sarangani Chapter is deemed to have waived
its turn in the rotation order. The same can be said of the remaining chapters. They too are
deemed to have waived their turn in the rotation as they opted not to field or nominate a
candidate from among their respective members. Neither did they invoke the rotation rule
to challenge the nominations from the Lanao del Sur Chapter. On the contrary, they fully
expressed their concurrence to the cited nominations, which may be interpreted as a
waiver of their right to take their turn to represent the region in the Board of Governors for
the 2009-2011 term.
It need not be stressed that, as cited by the Committee itself, there were instances when
the Governor of the Western Mindanao Region came from the same chapter such as
ZAMBASULTA (1997-1999 & 1999-2001) and Sultan Kudarat (2003-2005 & 2007-2009). Thus,
Atty. Marohomsalic could not be faulted if the other chapters opted not to field or
nominate their own candidates. Having been validly nominated and duly proclaimed as
the duly elected Governor of Western Mindanao, Atty. Marohomsalic therefore deserves to
assume his position during the remainder of the term.
It would have been a different story if another Chapter in the order of rotation fielded its
own candidate or invoked the rotation rule to challenge Atty. Marohomsalic’s nomination.
But the record is bereft of any showing that his nomination and subsequent election was
challenged on that basis. If there was any challenge at all, it merely referred to his
nomination by Atty. Macalawi which the Committee itself has found to be in order. Thus, no
compelling reason exists to disregard the electoral mandate and nullify the will of the voting
delegates as expressed through the ballot.
The "rotation rule" is not absolute but subject to waiver as when the chapters in the order of
rotation opted not to field or nominate their own candidates for Governor during the
election regularly done for that purpose. If a validly nominated candidate obtains the
highest number of votes in the election conducted, his electoral mandate deserves to be
respected unless obtained through fraud as established by evidence. Such is not the case
here.
Suffice it to say, the "rotation rule" should be applied in harmony with, and not in derogation
of, the sovereign will of the electorate as expressed through the ballot. Thus, Atty.
Marohomsalic cannot be divested and deprived of his electoral mandate and victory. The
order of rotation is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar its relaxation in exceptional and
compelling circumstances.
If only to stress, compared to the case of Atty. Fortunato whose Romblon Chapter invoked
the "rotation rule," no chapter in the Western Mindanao Region which was next in the
rotation invoked the said rule.
Now, in its Report, the Committee nullified the elections for the IBP EVP separately and
simultaneously conducted by President Bautista and EVP Vinluan on May 9, 2009 and called
for a special election for the same. In the case of the election conducted by EVP Vinluan,
14

the results were nullified for lack of authority to preside over the election and for lack
quorum, citing the disqualification of Attys. Soriano and Lanto to sit in the incoming Board of
Governors. The finding deserves to be sustained.
In the same Report, the Committee also nullified the result of the election for the incoming
EVP conducted by President Bautista. While recognizing President Bautista’s authority to
conduct the election, the Committee nonetheless nullified the election results for lack of
quorum, citing the ineligibility of Atty. Marohomsalic to sit in the incoming Board of
Governors, thereby leaving only four (out of nine) Governors-elect in attendance which did
not constitute a quorum.
With the election of Atty. Marohomsalic as Governor of Western Mindanao being deemed
valid, then the defect of lack of quorum that supposedly tainted the election proceedings
for EVP separately conducted by IBP President Bautista may have been cured, five (5)
Governors being sufficient to constitute a quorum.
Be that as it may, the recommendation of the Committee to hold a special election for the
EVP for the remaining 2009-2011 term deserves to be upheld to heal the divisions in the IBP
and promote unity by enabling all the nine (9) Governors-elect to elect the EVP in a unified
meeting called for that purpose. This will enable matters to start on a clean and correct
slate, free from the politicking and the under handed tactics that have characterized the
IBP elections for so long.
In the conduct of the unified election of the incoming EVP, the following findings and
recommendations of the Committee shall be adopted:
THE ROTATION OF THE PRESIDENCY AMONG THE REGIONS-
Sec. 47, Art. VII of the By-Laws, as amended by Bar Matter 491, Oct. 6, 1989, provides that
the Executive Vice President shall be chosen by the Board of Governors from among the
nine (9) regional governors. The Executive Vice President shall automatically become
President for the next succeeding term. The Presidency shall rotate among the nine
Regions."
The list of national presidents furnished the Special Committee by the IBP National
Secretariat, shows that the governors of the following regions were President of the IBP
during the past nine (9) terms (1991-2009):

Numeriano Tanopo, Jr. (Pangasinan)…Central Luzon…1991-1993

Mervin G. Encanto (Quezon City)… Greater Manila 1993-1995
Raul R. Anchangco (Makati)…Southern Luzon…1995-1997
Jose Aguila Grapilon (Biliran)… Eastewrn Visayas … 1997-1999
Arthur D. Lim ( Zambasulta)…Western Mindanao…1999-2001
Teofilo S. Pilando, Jr. (Kalinga Apayao)…Northern Luzon…2001-2003
Jose Anselmo L. Cadiz (Camarines Sur)…Bicolandia…2005-Aug. 2006
Jose Vicente B. Salazar (Albay)…Bicolandia… Aug. 2006-2007
Feliciano M. Bautista (Pangasinan)…Central Luzon…2007-2009

Only the Governors of the Western Visayas and Eastern Mindanao regions have not yet had
their turn as Executive Vice President cum next IBP President, while Central Luzon and
Bicolandia have had two (2) terms already.
Therefore, either the governor of the Western Visayas Region, or the governor of the Eastern
Mindanao Region should be elected as Executive Vice President for the 2009-2011 term.
Accordingly, a special election shall be held by the present nine-man IBP Board of
Governors to elect the EVP for the remainder of the term of 2009-2011, which shall be
presided over and conducted by IBP Officer-in-Charge Justice Santiago Kapunan (Ret.)
within seven (7) days from notice.
Further, in its report, the Committee declared that "the high-handed and divisive tactics of
Atty. Rogelio A. Vinluan and his group of Governors, Abelardo Estrada, Bonifacio Barandon
Jr., Evergisto Escalon, and Raymund Mercado, which disrupted the peaceful and orderly
flow of business in the IBP, caused chaos in the National Office, bitter disagreements, and ill-
feelings, and almost disintegrated the Integrated Bar, constituted grave professional
misconduct which should be appropriately sanctioned to discourage its repetition in the
future."
15

The Committee, however, fell short of determining and recommending the appropriate
penalty for the grave professional misconduct found to have been committed by Atty.
Vinluan and his group of Governors. Still, with the above firm and unequivocal findings and
declarations of the Committee against Atty. Vinluan and his group that included Attys.
Estrada, Barandon, Jr., Escalon and Mercado as "unprofessional" members of the IBP Board
of Governors (2007-2009 term) they certainly do not deserve to hold such esteemed
positions.
It has long been held that, as provided for in Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility that "(a) lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
16

conduct." Added to this, Rule 7.03, Canon 7 requires that "(a) lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession." In
the case at bar, such canons find application.
In addition, it was clear to the Committee, and the Court agrees, that "(t)he actuations of
Atty. Vinluan’s Group in defying the lawful authority of IBP President Bautista, due to Atty.
Vinluan’s overweening desire to propel his fraternity brother, Atty. Elpidio G. Soriano, to the
next presidency of the IBP, smacked of politicking, which is strongly condemned and strictly
prohibited by the IBP By-Laws and the Bar Integration Rule." Indeed, said actuations of Atty.
Vinluan and his group of former IBP Governors Estrada, Barandon, Jr., Escalon and Mercado
were grossly inimical to the interest of the IBP and were violative of their solemn oath as
lawyers. After all, what they did served only to benefit the apparently selfish goals of
defeated candidate Atty. Elpidio Soriano to be elected as IBP EVP and be the next IBP
President for the 2011-2013 term by hook or by crook.
Bearing the above in mind, what Attys. Vinluan, Estrada, Barandon, Jr., Escalon and
Mercado conspired to do was truly "high-handed and divisive" that must not pass
unsanctioned. Otherwise, future leaders of the IBP, Governors at that, might be similarly
inclined to do what they did, much to the prejudice of the IBP and its membership. Surely,
this should be addressed without much delay so as to nip-in-the-bud such gross misconduct
and unprofessionalism. They all deserve to suffer the same fate for betraying as well the trust
bestowed on them for the high positions that they previously held.
The Resolution of the Court in the case of Re: 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines already declared that unethical practices of lawyers during IBP elections
17

cannot but result in the stature of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble
and honored profession being diminished. As held therein, "(r)espect for law is gravely
eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be minions of the law, engage in
unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for their
observance." Indeed, the said strong and vigorous declaration of this Court on the 1989
18

IBP Election scandal is relevant here.

While Atty. Vinluan and his group deserve to be stripped of their positions in the IBP, this can
no longer be done as their terms as Governors already expired, specially on the part of
Attys. Estrada, Barandon, Jr., Escalon and Mercado. However, in the case of Atty. Vinluan,
as former EVP of the IBP he would have automatically succeeded to the presidency for the
term 2009-2011 but now should not be allowed to. After all, and considering the findings of
the Committee, he has clearly manifested his unworthiness to hold the said post. On
account thereof, Atty. Vinluan is thus declared unfit to assume the position of IBP President.
To the Court, if Atty. Vinluan cannot be fit to become a Governor and EVP of the IBP then
he is not entitled to succeed as its President for the 2009-2011 term.
Also, Atty. Vinluan and his group should no longer be allowed to run as national officers to
prevent such similar irregularity from happening again. Thus, in subsequent elections of the
IBP, they are disqualified to run as candidates.
On the recommendation of the Committee to amend Sections 31 , 33, par. (g) , 39 , 42 ,
19 20 21 22

and 43 , Article VI and Section 47 , Article VII of the IBP By-Laws, the Court finds the same in
23 24

order. As such, and in order to immediately effect reforms in the IBP, particularly in the
holding of its elections for national officers, the subject amendments are hereby adopted
and approved.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves that:

1. The elections of Attys. Manuel M. Maramba, Erwin M. Fortunato and Nasser A.

Marohomsalic as Governors for the Greater Manila Region, Western Visayas Region
and Western Mindanao Region, respectively, for the term 2009-2011 are UPHELD;
2. A special election to elect the IBP Executive Vice President for the 2009-2011 term
is hereby ORDERED to be held under the supervision of this Court within seven (7)
days from receipt of this Resolution with Attys. Maramba, Fortunato and
Marohomsalic being allowed to represent and vote as duly-elected Governors of
their respective regions;
3. Attys. Rogelio Vinluan, Abelardo Estrada, Bonifacio Barandon, Jr., Evergisto
Escalon and Raymund Mercado are all found GUILTY of grave professional
misconduct arising from their actuations in connection with the controversies in the
 elections in the IBP last April 25, 2009 and May 9, 2009 and are hereby disqualified to
run as national officers of the IBP in any subsequent election. While their elections as
Governors for the term 2007-2009 can no longer be annulled as this has already
expired, Atty. Vinluan is declared unfit to hold the position of IBP Executive Vice
President for the 2007-2009 term and therefore barred from succeeding as IBP
President for the 2009-2011 term;
4. The proposed amendments to Sections 31, 33, par. (g), 39, 42, and 43, Article VI
and Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws as contained in the Report and
Recommendation of the Special Committee dated July 9, 2009 are hereby
approved and adopted; and
5. The designation of retired SC Justice Santiago Kapunan as Officer-in-Charge of
the IBP shall continue, unless earlier revoked by the Court, but not to extend beyond
June 30, 2011.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7936, June 30, 2020

IN RE: PETITION FOR THE DISBARMENT OF ATTY. ESTRELLA O. LAYSA,

PATRICIA MAGLAYA OLLADA COMPLAINANT, v. ATTY. ESTRELLA O. LAYSA RESPONDENT.

DECISION
INTING, J.:
For the Court's consideration is the Notice of Resolution dated June 28, 2018 of the Integrated Bar of the
1

Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors that resolved to adopt and approve with modification the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Patrick M. Velez (Atty. Velez), dated March
2

27, 2018. The IBP Board of Governors recommended for the indefinite suspension from the practice of law
instead of disbarment of respondent Atty. Estrella O. Laysa (Atty. Laysa) and imposed upon her a fine in the
amount of P5,000.00 for failure to pay her IBP dues and comply with the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) requirements.
The Antecedents

This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Patricia M. Ollada (complainant) against Atty.
Laysa.

Complainant alleged the following:

Complainant, a senior citizen residing in Kaybagal, Tagaytay City, needed legal services for a problem she
had against her lessor Melates M. Salcedo. At Casino Filipino, Tagaytay City, complainant was introduced
to a certain Atty. Laysa, who then agreed to prepare a Demand Letter dated December 27, 2006 against
3

complainant's lessor. 4

Thereafter, complainant and Atty. Laysa met again at Casino Filipino where Atty. Laysa gave complainant
a copy of the lessor's response letter. Displeased with the contents of the response letter, complainant
asked Atty. Laysa to file a case against her lessor; complainant issued Equitable PCI Bank Check No.
0141512 in the amount of P35,000.00 to Atty. Laysa.
5

After having he check encashed on January 8, 2007, Atty. Laysa allegedly did not respond or
communicate anymore with the complainant. There being no update on the status of her case, and due
to her poor health, the complainant eventually lost interest to pursue her case and demanded from Atty.
Laysa the return of the balance of her P35,000.00, through a Letter dated July 24, 2007. Atty. Laysa,
6

however, ignored the complainant's demand. As such, the complainant retained the services of another
counsel, Atty. Cecilia Corazon S. Dulay-Archog. The new counsel sent another Demand Letter dated
7

August 21, 2007 to Atty. Laysa for the return of P30,000.00. The amount of P5,000.00 was deducted from
P35,000.00 in view of the letter drafted by Atty. Laysa to the complainant's lessor. Per Certification dated
8

September 24, 2007 issued by PhilPost, the demand letter against Atty. Laysa was received by her office
secretary, Vilma Pabines. 9

Despite receipt of the complainant's demand letters, Atty. Laysa still did not return the complainant's
money. Consequently, the complainant filed a Petition for Disbarment against Atty. Laysa on May 29, 2008.
10

In the Resolution dated July 30, 2008, the Court required Atty. Laysa to file a comment on the
11

complainant's Petition for Disbarment. However, Atty. Laysa did not file her comment. The Court, in its
Resolution dated January 18, 2010, ordered Atty. Laysa to explain why she should not be dealt with
12

disciplinary measures for her failure to comply with the Court's order requiring her to file a comment on the
Petition for Disbarment.

In the Resolution dated April 18, 2012, the Court noted that the copy of the Resolution dated January 18,
13

2010 sent to Atty. Laysa's address at "911 Molina St., 4100 Cavite City" was returned unserved with the
notation "Return to Sender (RTS)-Moved, Left No Address." The Court ordered the IBP to give information as
to Atty. Laysa's current address.

In the Letter dated June 26, 2012, the IBP informed the Court that Atty. Laysa's current address per record
14

was "Litlit, Silang, Cavite."

In the Resolution dated November 12, 2012, the Court noted the address given by the IBP and waited for
15

Atty. Laysa's compliance to the Resolution dated January 18, 2010, which required her to explain why she
should not be dealt with disciplinary measures for failing to comment on the petition to disbar her.

There being no compliance from Atty. Laysa, the Court imposed a fine of P1,000.00 against her and
dispensed with the filing of her comment. The Court finally referred Atty. Laysa's case to the IBP for
investigation, report, and recommendation. 16

On January 10, 2017, Atty. Velez issued a Notice of Mandatory Conference, directing the parties to
17

appear before the Commission on Bar Discipline on February 15, 2017. Atty. Velez also ordered the parties
to submit their respective mandatory conference briefs.

Neither of the parties attended the mandatory conference nor filed their respective briefs. The IBP, in the
Order dated April 6, 2017, required the parties to submit their respective position papers, documentary
18

evidence, and witnesses' judicial affidavits. The notice for complainant, however, was returned unserved
with the notation "RTS Deceased." 19

On September 14, 2017, Atty. Velez ordered the IBP-Accounting office and MCLE office for any information
regarding Atty. Laysa's standing as a member of the Bar. On even date, the MCLE office provided the
20

following MCLE record of Atty. Laysa:

1 Compliance Period - April 15, 2001 to April 14, 2004 - Non-Compliant (specifically has not filed the
st

required Attorney's Compliance Report (ACR) but has completed the required number of MCLE Units)

2 Compliance Period - April 15, 2004 to April 14, 2007 - Non-Compliant (no record of MCLE units taken)
nd

3rd Compliance Period - April 15, 2007 to April l4, 2010 - Non-Compliant (no record of MCLE units taken)

4 Compliance Period - April 15, 2010 to April 14, 2013 - Non-Compliant (no record of MCLE units taken)
th

5 Compliance Period - April 15, 2013 to April 14, 2016 - Non-Compliant (no record of MCLE units taken)
th 21

On September 14, 2017, the IBP National Treasurer Jean Francois D. Rivera III reported that Atty. Laysa paid
her membership dues only until 2004. 22

Recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

Investigating Commissioner Atty. Velez recommended that Atty. Laysa be disbarred from the practice of
law for her act of abandoning a client's cause, and for her continuous evasion of her responsibilities to the
bar.
 Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors

In the Resolution dated June 28, 2018, the IBP Board of Governors adopted he findings of facts and
23

recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner Atty. Velez with modification in that Atty. Laysa be
meted out with the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law instead of disbarment. The
Board also imposed upon her a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 for her failure to pay her IBP dues and for
her noncompliance with the MCLE requirements.
The Court's Ruling

At the outset, it must be pointed out that Atty. Laysa had been remiss in her duty to report to the IBP
Chapter Secretary the changes on her office and residence addresses. The lapse on her part caused
extreme difficulty on the par: of the IBP, and even to the Court, to serve Atty. Laysa with appropriate
pleadings arid processes relating to her disbarment case.

Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws provides in part:

Section 19. Registration. - x x x x

Registration shall be accomplished by signing and filing in duplicate the prescribed registration form
containing such information as may be required by the Board of Governors, including the following:
xxx

(c) Office address(es);

(d) Residence address(es);
xxx

Every change after registration in respect to any of the matters above specified shall be reported within
sixty days to the Chapter Secretary who shall in turn promptly report the change to the national office. x x x
In this case, Atty. Laysa changed her office and residence addresses without updating the IBP. There being
no court notice or processes that reached Atty. Laysa, she was unable to file a single answer or position
paper on the complaint against her. She also failed to attend the mandatory conference of the case and
file the required mandatory conference brief. Had Atty. Laysa fulfilled her duty to update her registration
with the IBP, she would have received every pleading and notice in relation to the instant case and be
able to explain her side. Indubitably, no one is left to blame, but herself.

ln the course of the investigation of Atty. Laysa's administrative case, the MCLE office reported that she had
not taken any single MCLE compliance units for her second, third, fourth, and fifth compliance period.
Likewise, Atty. Laysa had not even paid her IBP membership dues since 2004. Despite being aware of her
noncompliance with the requirements of the IBP and the MCLE, which warrants her removal from the Roll of
Attorneys, she still offered her legal services and accepted legal fees in the amount of P35,000.00. Worse,
Atty. Laysa thereafter neither communicated nor updated the complainant about her case.

Indubitably, not only that Atty. Laysa should be in the list of delinquent lawyers for her failure to comply with
the IBP and MCLE requirements, she also violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) which states that:
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Atty. Laysa being unmindful of the complainant's cause, the complainant eventually lost interest to pursue
her case, and demanded from Atty. Laysa the return of her money worth P30,000.00. Atty. Laysa, however,
continuously ignored the complainant until the latter's demise.

The foregoing facts showed that Atty. Laysa also violated Rule 16.01, Canon 16 of the CPR which states
that:
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession.

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Atty. Laysa failed to return the complainant's money in the amount of P30,000.00, Atty. Laysa is presumed
to have misappropriated the money for her own use to the prejudice and in violation of the trust reposed in
her by complainant.

The penalty of suspension or disbarment is meted out in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. In this case, Atty. Laysa had shown her
great propensity to disregard and disrespect the legal profession. More than just abandonment of
complainant's cause and failure to return her P30,000.00, Atty. Laysa had continuously evaded her
responsibilities to the bar. She has not paid her dues to the IBP and has not complied with her second to
fifth MCLE compliance period.

Be that as it may, the Court will not disbar a lawyer if it finds that a lesser penalty, such as suspension, will
suffice to accomplish the desired end. From the factual backdrop of the case, the Court finds that the
penalty of three-year suspension suffices to address Atty. Laysa's misdeeds. Her three-year suspension, to
the mind of this Court, suffices to instill in her a firm conviction of maintaining uprightness required of every
member of the profession, subject to her compliance with the MCLE requirements her payment of IBP dues,
and the update of her IBP registration.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Estrella O. Laysa GUILTY of violating Rule 16.01, Canon 16 and
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and for her nonpayment of Integrated Bar
of the Philippines membership dues since 2004 and noncompliance with the second to fifth Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education compliance period. Thus, the Court imposes upon her the penalty of THREE-
YEAR SUSPENSION from the practice of law to take effect immediately, subject to her compliance with the
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education requirements, her payment of Integrated Bar of the Philippine
dues, and the update of her Integrated Bar of the Philippines registration.

Respondent Atty. Estrella O. Laysa is likewise ORDERED to immediately pay a fine of P5,000.00 for her failure
to pay her Integrated Bar of the Philippines dues, and for her noncompliance with the Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education requirements.

Further, respondent Atty. Estrella O. Laysa is ORDERED to return within ten (10) days from notice of this
Decision the amount of P30,000.00 to complainant Patricia Maglaya Ollada with interest at the legal rate of
12% per annum from her date of receipt on January 8, 2007 until June 30, 2013, and 6% per annum from
July 1, 2013 until full payment. Respondent Atty. Estrella O. Laysa is directed to submit to the Court proof of
payment within ten (10) days thereof.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent
Atty. Estrella O. Laysa's personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, Gesmundo, J. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-
Javier, Zalameda, Lopez, Delos Santos, and Gaerlan, JJ., concur.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on June 30, 2020 a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the
Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on July 29, 2020
at 9:35 a.m.
 EN BANC
A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO,
vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.
BENGZON, C.J.:
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was
admitted to the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his
application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The
matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be
investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from
the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court,
he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education
prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially, in the following particulars:

(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma
therefrom — which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his
application for examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the
"required pre-legal education".

Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge:
but he claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the
U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is
equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities
considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to exhibit
any certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is
unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious. Diao never obtained
his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination represented him as an
A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the
Arellano University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a
graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of
his own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it
would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law
studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And
then he would not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the
applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he
had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education(A.A.) as
prescribed by the Department of Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his
false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to
the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby
revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations
is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal
study in the regular manner is equally essential..
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao.
And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and
Makalintal, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 10868

[Formerly CBD Case No. 07-2041]

CHERYLE. VASCO-TAMARAY, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DEBORAH Z. DAQUIS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERCURIAM:
Pretending to be counsel for a party in a case and using a forged signature in a pleading
merit the penalty of disbarment.
Cheryl E. Vasco-Tamaray (Vasco-Tamaray) filed a ComplaintAffidavit before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines on July 30, 2007, alleging that respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis
(Atty. Daquis) filed, on her behalf, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage without her
consent and forged her signature on the Petition. She also alleged that Atty. Daquis signed
1

the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage as "counsel for petitioner," referring to
Vasco-Tamaray. 2

Vasco-Tamaray stated that Atty. Daquis was not her counsel but that of her husband,
Leomarte Regala Tamaray. To support her allegation, she attached the Affidavit of Maritess
3 4

Marquez-Guerrero. The Affidavit states:

1. Sometime in October 2006, I accompanied Cheryl Tamaray in going to East Cafe

at Rustan's Makati to meet with her husband Leomarte Tamaray;
2. We arrived at the said place at around 7:00 pm and Leomarte introduced to us
(Cheryl and I) Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis as his lawyer. He further told us that Atty.
Daquis' husband also worked in Japan and that's how he got to know the latter and
got her services;
3. Among other things, Leomarte told Cheryl that the reason for that meeting and
the presence of Atty. Daquis was because he had decided to file a case to annul his
marriage with Cheryl;
4. Cheryl was shocked and just cried. After awhile [sic], Leomarte's brother arrived
and shortly after, the group left;
5. The next instance that I saw Atty. Daquis was when we (Cheryl and I) went to
McDonald's-Greenbelt where Atty. Daquis tried to convince her not to oppose
Leomarte's decision to have their marriage annulled[.] (Emphasis supplied)
5

Vasco-Tamaray narrated that in December 2006, Atty. Daquis informed her "that a Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa
City." In February 2007, Atty. Daquis asked her to appear before the City Prosecutor's Office
6

of Muntinlupa City. 7
On March 5, 2007, Vasco-Tamaray appeared before the City Prosecutor's Office and met
Atty. Daquis. She asked Atty. Daquis to give her a copy of the Petition but Atty. Daquis
refused.8

Vasco-Tamaray stated that she obtained a copy of the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage from Branch 207 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. She was surprised
to see that the Petition was allegedly signed and filed by her. 9

Vasco-Tamaray alleged that she did not file the Petition, that her signature was forged by
Atty. Daquis, and that her purported community tax certificate appearing on the jurat was
not hers because she never resided in Muntinlupa City. She attached a Certification issued
10

by the Sangguniang Barangay of Putatan, Muntinlupa City stating that she was "never . . . a
resident of #9 Daang Hari Street, Umali Compound, Summitville Subdivision, Barangay
Putatan." She also attached a Certification issued by Barangay Talipapa stating that she
11

has been a resident of "#484-J Saguittarius St., Solville Subd., Barangay Talipapa, Novaliches,
Quezon City... from 2000 till present."
12

Vasco-Tamaray also alleged that the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was Atty.
Daquis' idea, consented to by Leomarte Tamaray. 13

She further alleged that she had never received any court process. The Petition states that
her postal address is "09 Daang Hari St., Umali Comp., Summitville Subd., Putatan,
Muntinlupa City[,]" which is the address of her husband's family. The return slips of the
14

notices sent by the trial court were received by Encarnacion T. Coletraba and Almencis
Cumigad, relatives ofLeomarte Tamaray. 15

Atty. Daquis filed an Answer countering that her client was Vasco-Tamaray, complainant
herself, and not complainant's husband. She alleged that Vasco-Tamaray knew of the
Petition as early as October 2006, not December 2006. 16

With regard to the community tax certificate, Atty. Daquis explained that when she
notarized the Petition, the community tax certificate number was supplied by Vasco-
Tamaray. Atty. Daquis' allegation was supported by the Joint Affidavit of her staff, Ma.
17

Dolor E. Purawan (Purawan) and Ludy Lorena (Lorena). 18

Purawan and Lorena detailed in their Joint Affidavit that they knew Vasco-Tamaray to be a
client of Atty. Daquis and that they never saw Atty. Daquis forge Vasco-Tamaray's
signature. Purawan stated that she typed the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
and that the community tax certificate was provided by Vasco-Tamaray. 19

Atty. Daquis alleged that Vasco-Tamaray wanted her to call and demand money from
Leomarte Tamaray but she refused to do so. 20

Atty. Daquis argued that Vasco-Tamaray had a copy of the Petition. When Vasco-Tamaray
requested another copy on March 5, 2007, Atty. Daquis was unable to grant her client's
request because she did not have a copy of the Petition with her at that time. 21

Atty. Daquis further alleged that Vasco-Tamaray conceived an illegitimate son with a
certain Reuel Pablo Aranda. The illegitimate son was named Charles Dino Vasco. Reuel
Pablo Aranda signed the Affidavit of Acknowledgment/ Admission of Paternity portion of
the birth certificate. 22

The Commission on Bar Discipline required the parties to submit their position papers, but 23

based on the record, only Vasco-Tamaray complied. 24

The Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the dismissal of the Complaint because
Vasco-Tamaray failed to prove her allegations. The Commission on Bar Discipline noted that
Vasco-Tamaray should have questioned the Petition or informed the prosecutor that she
never filed any petition, but she failed to do so. 25

The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline in the Resolution dated
September 27, 2014. 26
The issue for resolution is whether respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis should be held
administratively liable for making it appear that she is counsel for complainant Cheryl
Vasco-Tamaray and for the alleged use of a forged signature on the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
This court finds that respondent violated Canons 1, 7, 10, and 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The charge against respondent for violation of Canon 15 is dismissed.
I
By pretending to be counsel for complainant, respondent violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and failed to uphold her duty of doing no falsehood
nor consent to the doing of any falsehood in court as stated in the Lawyer's Oath. 27

Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.
RULE 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In this case, respondent merely denied complainant's allegation that she was Leomarte
Tamaray's counsel but was unable to rebut the other allegations against her.
28

Respondent admitted that she met complainant in October 2006, but did not refute the
29 30

statement in Maritess Marquez-Guerrero's Affidavit that Leomarte Tamaray introduced her

as his lawyer. Likewise, respondent admitted that she met with complainant
31

subsequently, but did not refute Maritess Marquez-Guerrero's statement that in one of the
32

meetings, she tried to convince complainant not to oppose Leomarte Tamaray's decision to
annul their marriage. 33

Respondent argued in her Answer that she was the counsel for complainant. Yet, there is
34

no explanation how she was referred to complainant or how they were introduced. It
appears, then, that respondent was contacted by Leomarte Tamaray to file a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. As stated in Maritess Marquez-
Guerrero's Affidavit, "Leomarte told Cheryl that the reason for that meeting and the
presence of Atty. Daquis was because he had decided to file a case to annul his marriage
with Cheryl[. ]" 35

Based on this, it seems Leomarte Tamaray intended to file the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. However, respondent made it appear that complainant, not her client
Leomarte Tamaray, was the petitioner. There is a probability that respondent did not want
Leomarte Tamaray to be the petitioner because he would have to admit that he entered
into a bigamous marriage, the admission of which may subject him to criminal liability.
In addition, if it is true that complainant was respondent's client, then there appears to be
no reason for respondent to advise her "not to oppose Leomarte's decision to have their
marriage annulled." 36

The records of this case also support complainant's allegation that she never received any
court process because her purported address in the Petition is the address of Leomarte
Tamaray. The Petition states that complainant is "of legal age, Filipino citizen, married with
postal address at 09 Daang Hari St., Umali Comp., Summitville Subd., Putatan, Muntinlupa
City[.]"
37

The Certificate of Marriage of complainant and Leomarte Tamaray states that Leomarte's
residence is at "Summitvil[l]e Subv [sic], Muntinlupa," while complainant's residence is at
"Hermosa St. Gagalangin, Tondo, Manila." Assuming that complainant lived with her
38

husband after they were married, complainant most likely did not receive court processes
because she left their home before the filing of the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage. As written in the Minutes of the meeting before the Office of the City Prosecutor:
P[etitioner] & R[espondent] met sometime in 1993 through his secretary. They became
sweethearts in 1993 and their relationship as steadies lasted until 1996;
During the 3 years of their union, petitioner knew respondent's family as she even sleeps in
their house; Theirs was also a long distance relationship as respondent worked in Japan;
Upon respondents [sic] return to the Philippines they got married in Feb, 1996. They had no
children, as respondent immediately left for Japan on March 11, 1996;
Respondent returned to the Philippines but unfortunately he brought another woman. As a
result, petitioner left their house. (Emphasis supplied)
39

Further, complainant cannot be faulted for her failure to inform the prosecutor that she did
not file any petition for declaration of nullity of marriage because during the meeting on
March 5, 2007, complainant had no knowledge that the Petition was filed in her name. She 40

obtained a copy of the Petition after the March 5, 2007 meeting. 41

In Yupangco-Nakpil v. Uy, this court discussed Canon 1, Rule 1.01, as follows:

42

Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as it is applied to the members of the legal professions,
engraves an overriding prohibition against any form of misconduct, viz:
CANON 1 - A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
The gravity of the misconduct- determinative as it is of the errant lawyer's penalty- depends
on the factual circumstances of each case .
....
. . . Verily, members of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and
confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal
profession. By no insignificant measure, respondent blemished not only his integrity as a
member of the Bar, but also that of the legal profession. In other words, his conduct fell short
of the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice. 43

When respondent filed the Petition as counsel for complainant when the truth was
otherwise, she committed a falsehood against the trial court and complainant.
II
Respondent violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 when she allowed the
use of a forged signature on a petition she prepared and notarized. 44

Complainant alleged that her signature on the Petition was forged. Respondent merely
45

denied complainant's allegation. 46

The Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was signed by a certain "CVasco." The 47

records of this case show that complainant has used two signatures. In her identification
cards issued by the University of the East, she used a signature that spelled out "CVasco." In 48

her Complaint-Affidavit against respondent, complainant used a signature that spelled out
"CTamaray." 49

A comparison of the signatures appearing on the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of

Marriage and on complainant's identification cards show a difference in the stroke of the
letters "c" and "o." Further, complainant's signatures in the documents attached to the
50

records consistently appear to be of the same height. On the other hand, her alleged
signature on the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage has a big letter "c." Hence, it
51

seems that complainant's signature on the Petition for Declaration ofNullity of Marriage was
forged.
While there is no evidence to prove that respondent forged complainant's signature, the
fact remains that respondent allowed a forged signature to be used on a petition she
prepared and notarized. In doing so, respondent violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and Canon
52

10, Rule 10.01. These canons state:

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the integrated bar.
RULE 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.
....
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
RULE 10.01 -A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court;
nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
In Embido v. Pe, Jr., Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Salvador N. Pe, Jr. was found guilty of
53

violating Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and was meted the penalty of disbarment for falsifying a court
decision "in a non-existent court proceeding." This court discussed that:
54

Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions

can justify a lawyer's disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Specifically, the
deliberate falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a
high degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the
administration of justice in this country, given the purpose of the falsification, which was to
mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status of a person. He thereby became unworthy
of continuing as a member of the Bar. 55

In a similar manner, respondent's act of allowing the use of a forged signature on a petition
she prepared and notarized demonstrates a lack of moral fiber on her part.
Other acts that this court has found violative of Canon 7, Rule 7.03 are: engaging in a
scuffle inside court chambers; openly doubting paternity of his own son; hurling invectives
56 57

at a Clerk of Court; harassing occupants of a property; using intemperate language; and

58 59 60

engaging in an extramarital affair. 61

Furthermore, allowing the use of a forged signature on a petition filed before a court is
tantamount to consenting to the commission of a falsehood before courts, in violation of
Canon 10.
In Spouses Umaguing v. De Vera, this court discussed the importance of Canon 10, Rule
62

10.01, as follows:
The Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to
refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in
court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and
has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation
by others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty,
integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice." (Emphasis
63

supplied)
III
This court further finds that respondent violated Canon 17, which states:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him.
Respondent failed to protect the interests of her client when she represented complainant,
who is the opposing party of her client Leomarte Tamaray, in the same case.
The responsibilities of a lawyer under Canon 17 were discussed in Penilla v. Alcid, Jr.:64

The legal profession dictates that it is not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer to
accord the highest degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the protection of the client's interest.
The most thorough groundwork and study must be undertaken in order to safeguard the
interest of the client. The honor bestowed on his person to carry the title of a lawyer does
not end upon taking the Lawyer's Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys. Rather, such honor
attaches to him for the entire duration of his practice of law and carries with it the
consequent responsibility of not only satisfying the basic requirements but also going the
extra mile in the protection of the interests of the client and the pursuit of justice[. ]
65

Respondent is reminded of the duties and responsibilities of members of the legal profession,
as discussed in Tenoso v. Echanez: 66

Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with public interest
and that "a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in
the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important
functions of the State-the administration of justice-as an officer of the court." Accordingly,
"[l]awyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. " (Citations omitted)
67

IV
This court notes that respondent may have violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 when she entered
her appearance as counsel for complainant even though she was engaged as counsel by
68

Leomarte Tamaray. Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
69

provides:
CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client.
....
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The rationale for Canon 15 was discussed in Samson v. Era: 70

The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a lawyer
would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or
former clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client
involving the same or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former
client only if the former client consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in the
fiduciary obligation of loyalty. Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the
lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client's case, including the weak and strong
points of the case. Knowledge and information gathered in the course of the relationship
must be treated as sacred and guarded with care. It behooves lawyers not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double-dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of justice. The nature of that relationship is,
therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree .
....
. . . The spirit behind this rule is that the client's confidence once given should not be
stripped by the mere expiration of the professional employment. Even after the severance
1âwphi1

of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything that will injuriously affect his former client in
any matter in which the lawyer previously represented the client. Nor should the lawyer
disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation. In this
regard, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly declares that: "A
lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him."
The lawyer's highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards and
costs even to himself. The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease
with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the client's ceasing to employ the
attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even
survives the death of the client.71
The test to determine whether conflict of interest exists was discussed in Hornilla v. Salunat: 72

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to
fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other
client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also,
there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to
perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents
him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client
any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of
interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full
discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. (Emphasis supplied, citations
73

omitted)
Respondent was engaged by Leomarte Tamaray to be his counsel. When the Petition for
74

Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was filed, respondent signed the Petition as counsel for
complainant. If respondent was indeed engaged as counsel by complainant, then there is
75

conflict of interest, in violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03.

However, there is nothing on record to show that respondent was engaged as counsel by
complainant. Hence, this court finds that respondent did not commit conflict of interest.
V
On a final note, Rule 139-B has been amended by Bar Matter No. 1645 dated October 13,
2015. Section 12 of Rule 139-B now provides that:
Rule 139-B. Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys
....
Section 12. Review and recommendation by the Board of Governors.

(a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of
Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with
his report.
(b) After its review, the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, shall
recommend to the Supreme Court the dismissal of the complaint or the imposition of
disciplinary action against the respondent. The Board shall issue a resolution setting
forth its findings and recommendations, clearly and distinctly stating the facts and
the reasons on which it is based. The resolution shall be issued within a period not
exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the
submission of the Investigator's report.
(c) The Board's resolution, together with the entire records and all evidence
presented and submitted, shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action
within ten (10) days from issuance of the resolution.
(d) Notice of the resolution shall be given to all parties through their counsel, if any.76

Under the old rule, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines was given
the power to "issue a decision" if the lawyer complained of was exonerated or meted a
77

penalty of "less than suspension or disbarment." In addition, the case would be deemed
78

terminated unless an interested party filed a petition before this court. 79

The amendments to Rule 139-B is a reiteration that only this court has the power to impose
disciplinary action on members of the bar. The factual findings and recommendations of
the Commission on Bar Discipline and the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines are recommendatory, subject to review by this court. 80

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis is found GUILTY of violating Canon 1, Rule
1.01, Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The charge for violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 against respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis
is DISMISSED.
The penalty of DISBARMENT is imposed upon respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis. The Office
of the Bar Confidant is directed to remove the name of Deborah Z. Daquis from the Roll of
Attorneys.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to respondent's personal record as attorney, to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts
throughout the country for their information and guidance.
This Resolution takes effect immediately.

EN BANC
August 3, 2005
CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ALFREDO CASTILLO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In the Decision dated March 6, 2003, the Court found respondent Atty. Alfredo Castillo guilty
of Gross Immoral Conduct and imposed upon him the penalty of Indefinite
Suspension. Respondent, who was already married with three children, had an affair with
1

complainant between 1996 to 1997, while he was reviewing for the bar until before the
release of the results thereof. Complainant got pregnant and respondent, who was then
already a lawyer, executed a notarized affidavit acknowledging the child as his with a
promise to support said child. Upon the birth of the child, however, respondent started to
refuse recognizing the child and from giving her any form of support.
On April 11, 2003, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration seeking compassion and
forgiveness from this Court. He submitted certificates from government and civic
organizations appreciating his services as a lawyer, certificates of attendance from religious
groups, and certificates of good moral character from judges and lawyers in Occidental
Mindoro. 2

On July 8, 2003, the Court required complainant and the IBP to file comment thereon. 3

On August 11, 2003, the IBP Occidental Mindoro Chapter issued a Resolution (No. 01-2003)
recommending the exoneration of respondent from administrative liability. It stated that the
suspension of respondent, who has served as Clerk of Court, Public Attorney and 3rd
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, would cause a great loss to the community; that respondent
has shown integrity and moral uprightness in the performance of his official functions; that
the acts imputed to him may be attributed to his "youthful indiscretion period"; and that
respondent has mended his ways after taking his oath as member of the bar. 4

The IBP, through Director for Bar Discipline, Rogelio Vinluan, gave its Comment dated August
15, 2003, stating that the motion for reconsideration should be denied until respondent
admits the paternity of the child and agrees to support her.5

On August 17, 2003, complainant submitted her Comment stating that respondent’s motion
for reconsideration should be denied since respondent has not truly repented as he is still
not supporting his child.
6
On August 25, 2003, respondent’s wife, Livelyn Castillo, submitted a handwritten letter
stating that respondent is loving and "maasikaso" and while it is true that respondent had an
affair with complainant, such was only
because of human frailty. She claims that complainant threatened to file the present case
after respondent ended their illicit affair. Complainant also used threat to compel
respondent to sign the affidavit of acknowledgement and support. Livelyn further avers that
respondent is the sole breadwinner of the family and that their family will be gravely
affected by his suspension. 7

On August 28, 2003, respondent filed a Reply to the Comment of the IBP stating that if the
acts acknowledging and giving support to the child of the complainant are the proofs of his
remorse, then he shall comply unconditionally. 8

On September 23, 2003, the Court required complainant to file comment on Livelyn’s letter. 9

On January 13, 2004, complainant’s counsel said that while he sympathizes with Livelyn and
her children, respondent has not taken any move to support complainant and her child to
repair the damage done to them. 10

On March 3, 2005, respondent, in his Reply to complainant’s Comment, reiterated his

willingness to support the child if only to show his
remorse. He attached a photocopy of post dated checks addressed to complainant for
the months of March to December 2005 in the amount of ₱2,000.00 each. 11

On March 4, 2005, Livelyn Castillo, sent another handwritten letter expressing that it is unfair
for her and her three children that respondent had to support complainant’s daughter
when it is not clear who the child’s father is. Livelyn argues that complainant should have
filed a case for support where the paternity of the child could be determined and not use
the present administrative case to get support from respondent. 12

On April 11, 2005, Atty. Luzviminda Puno sent a letter to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro, asking whether or not respondent is still connected with
said office despite having been indefinitely suspended by this Court. It replied on May 10,
2005 that respondent is still connected with their office; that he has been regularly receiving
his salary and benefits; and that this was the first time that they received communication
concerning respondent’s administrative case. 13

Respondent gave his Comment dated May 9, 2005 stating that he continued to discharge
his duties and received salary and benefits in connection therewith since he filed a timely
motion for reconsideration thus the case has not yet attained finality.14

In view of respondent’s show of repentance and active service to the community, the
Court deems it just and reasonable to convert the penalty of indefinite suspension to a
definite period of two years suspension.
WHEREFORE, respondent’s motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The indefinite suspension
imposed on him by the Court in its Decision dated March 6, 2003 is REDUCED to TWO
YEARS suspension effective from date of receipt of herein Resolution.
Complainant’s further claim for support of her child should be addressed to the proper
court in a proper case.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Castillo’s record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and a copy thereof be furnished the IBP, all courts throughout the country and
the Department of Justice including the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental
Mindoro.
SO ORDERED.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
 REYNATO S. PUNO ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

Footnotes

1The fallo reads as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent GUILTY of Gross
Immoral Conduct and ordered to suffer INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from the practice of
law.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Castillo’s personal record in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and a copy thereof be furnished the IBP and all courts
throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
2Rollo, pp. 154-175.
3Id., p. 145.
4Id., p. 192.
 5 Id., pp. 184-185.
6 Id., p. 179.
7 Rollo, pp. 147-150.
8 Id., pp. 183-183a.
9 Id., p. 177.
10 Id., p. 218.
11 Id., p. 231.
12 Id., pp. 237-239.
13 Id., p. 242.
14 Id., p. 244.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 4921 --- Carmelita I. Zaguirre, Complainant, versus Atty. Alfredo
Castillo, Respondent.
DISSENTING OPINION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For resolution is the Plea for Reconsideration filed by Atty. Alfredo A. Castillo of the March 6,
1

2003 Decision finding him guilty of Gross Immoral Conduct and suspending him indefinitely
2

from the practice of law.

Atty. Castillo claimed that for the past years, he received commendations for exemplary
performance and contributions to public service and that he and his wife have been active
in church. His employment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro is their
only source of income and suspending him from the practice of law would affect his
children. He insisted that the Court consider the sanctity of the family in imposing the
penalty.
The IBP however prayed that the plea for reconsideration be denied because he had not
really mended his ways since he continues and still fails to recognize and support his child. 3

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro informed this Court that Atty.
Castillo continued to discharge his functions and had been regularly receiving his salary
and other benefits despite being indefinitely suspended. According to Atty. Castillo, his
indefinite suspension is not yet final in view of the pending motion for reconsideration.
The majority would grant Atty. Castillo’s plea for reconsideration and reduce his penalty to
two (2) years suspension in view of respondent’s "show of repentance and active service to
the community."
With due respect, I beg to disagree.
In the March 6, 2003 Decision, the Court indefinitely suspended Atty. Castillo based on its
finding that he was grossly immoral. He was also found to be unscrupulous because, after
executing a notarized affidavit wherein he recognized and undertook to give support to his
child with Zaguirre, and his incriminating handwritten letter where he bargained with
Zaguirre concerning the monthly support of the child, he subsequently denied his paternity
4

and reneged on his promise to give support. The Court was appalled at the reprehensible
and amoral attitude of Atty. Castillo when he justified his liaison with Zaguirre as merely the
product of man’s polygamous nature.
The Court suspended Atty. Castillo until such time that he is able to show, to the full
satisfaction of the Court, that he had instilled in himself a firm conviction of maintaining
moral integrity and uprightness required of every member of the profession.
I agree with the IBP’s finding that Atty. Castillo has not mended his ways because he
continues and still fails to recognize and support his child with complainant. He has not
shown remorse for having maintained an affair with Zaguirre and fathering her child.
Admittedly, he received commendations for his exemplary performance and contributions
to public service. Unlike the majority though, I hesitate to conclude that these
commendations adequately proved respondent’s repentance. Aside from the self-serving
statement that "he has mended his ways and suffered so much because of the
embarrassment, ridicules and dislikes brought about by this event, especially to his
family", there is absolutely no proof of respondent’s remorse. Besides, a lawyer must not only
5

be exemplary in his public life, but equally important, he must also be morally upright in his
personal life.
I am distressed to note that in the pleadings submitted by respondent and his wife, they
make it appear that they are the aggrieved party. Thus, they claimed that if we "prolong
these agonies, it will not only add anguish and anxiety but also physical economic hardship
upon the respondent and indirectly to his family which they already suffered and still
suffering".6

It must be emphasized that to this date, respondent has not yet served his penalty. Aside
from a short leave of absence, he continued to practice his profession and regularly
received his salary and other benefits. So what economic hardship is he talking about?
As early as August 28, 2003, respondent admitted that acknowledging complainant’s
daughter and giving support remain his undertakings. He even volunteered to comply
unconditionally if they are the required proofs of his remorse. He professed that he did not
7

disown his responsibility to give support.

If, indeed, respondent was so remorseful and willing to comply unconditionally with
his own undertaking, why then did he wait until after the lapse of one (1) year and seven (7)
months before attempting to give support to complainant’s daughter. It was only on March
31, 2005, that respondent furnished us with photocopies of ten (10) postdated checks
payable to Zaguirre at P2,000.00 each. He failed to mention or offer a concrete or
8

permanent settlement.
In his Plea for Reconsideration, Atty. Castillo also claims that:
The respondent is now living in peace and happiness with his family. The darkness of the
past has been buried beneath the earth a long time ago. 9

I am perplexed how Atty. Castillo can claim that he is now "living in peace and happiness
with his family" while complainant Zaguirre and her daughter are encountering hardships
brought about by his non-support.
It is also revolting and ridiculous for respondent to remind this Court in his Plea for
Reconsideration, that suspending him from the practice of law would affect his children
and that we should consider the sanctity of the family in imposing the penalty. It must be
mentioned, lest respondent has forgotten, that he was the one who undermined the
sanctity of marriage and family when he maintained an illicit affair with another woman
during the subsistence of his marriage. Respondent invokes the sanctity of marriage, yet his
acts prove otherwise. The moral delinquency that affect the fitness of a member of the bar
10

to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral
standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the
inviolable social institution of marriage.
11

Initially, the Court suspended Atty. Castillo until such time that he is able to show, to the full
satisfaction of the Court, that he had instilled in himself a firm conviction of maintaining
moral integrity and uprightness required of every member of the profession. To date, I find
no evidence of remorse or sincere repentance of respondent. There is a dearth of evidence
that he has instilled in himself a firm conviction of maintaining moral integrity and
uprightness required of every member of the legal profession.
As held in Delos Reyes v. Aznar:12

It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, to satisfy this Court
that he is a fit and proper person to enjoy continued membership in the Bar. He cannot
dispense with nor downgrade the high and exacting moral standards of the law profession
(Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439 [1967]). As once pronounced by the Court:
"When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges
against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and
Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree
of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. xxx In the case of United
States v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:
"An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not
perform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to
meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things,
he is hardy indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which
the State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is
particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the
State the very means by which it may assist him" (Quingwa v. Puno, 19 SCRA 439 [1967]).
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to deny Atty. Alfredo A. Castillo’s Plea for
Reconsideration. His INDEFINITE SUSPENSION must now immediately take effect.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

EN BANC

B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992

EUFROSINA Y. TAN, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
SBC No. 609 February 24, 1992
MOISES B. BOQUIA, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
SBC No. 616 February 24, 1992
HERVE DAGPIN, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.

Nelbert T. Paculan for respondent.

Moises B. Boquia for himself and Herve Dagpin.

RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
On 29 November 1983, * this Court sustained the charge of unauthorized practice of law
filed against respondent Sabandal and accordingly denied the latter's petition to be
allowed to take the oath as member of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
From 1984-1988, Sabandal filed Motions for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution, all
of which were either denied or "Noted without action." The Court, however, on 10 February
1989, after considering his plea for mercy and forgiveness, his willingness to reform and the
several testimonials attesting to his good moral character and civic consciousness,
reconsidered its earlier Resolution and finally allowed him to take the lawyer's oath "with the
Court binding him to his assurance that he shall strictly abide by and adhere to the
language, meaning and spirit of the Lawyer's Oath and the highest standards of the legal
profession" (Yap Tan v. Sabandal, 10 February 1989, 170 SCRA 211).
However, before a date could be set for Sabandal's oath-taking, complainants Tan, Dagpin
and Boquia each filed separate motions for reconsideration of the Resolution of 10 February
1989. These were acted upon in the Resolution of 4 July 1989 hereunder quoted, in part, for
ready reference:

On 7 April 1989, Complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC No. 616, and Complainant
Moises Boquia in SBC No. 609 also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of our
Resolution allowing respondent to take his oath. They alleged that
respondent had deliberately and maliciously excluded them in his Petition of
28 June 1988. That, of course, is without merit considering that in his Petition of
28 June 1988, respondent had discussed said cases quite lengthily.
On 27 April 1989, Complainant Tan also manifested that Complainant
Benjamin Cabigon in BM No. 59 and Complainant Cornelio Agnis in SBC No.
624, had passed away so that they are in no position to submit their
respective Comments.
One of the considerations we had taken into account in allowing respondent
to take his oath, was a testimonial from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte
Chapter, dated 29 December 1986, certifying that respondent was "acting
with morality and has been careful in his actuations in the community."
Complainant Tan maintains that said IBP testimonial was signed only by the
then President of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, Atty. Senen O.
Angeles, without authorization from the Board of Officers of said Chapter;
and that Atty. Angeles was respondent's own counsel as well as the lawyer of
respondent's parents-in-law in CAR Case No. 347, Ozamiz City. Attached to
Complainant's Motion for Reconsideration was a Certification, dated 24
February 1989, signed by the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President,
Atty. Norberto L. Nuevas, stating that "the present Board of Officers with the
undersigned as President had not issued any testimonial attesting to the good
moral character and civic consciousness of Mr. Nicolas Sabandal."
In his Comment, received by the Court on 27 March 1989, respondent states
that the IBP testimonial referred to by Complainant Tan must have been that
signed by the former IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty.
Senen O. Angeles, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 29 December 1986,
and that he himself had not submitted to the Court any certification from the
IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter Board of Officers of 1988-1989.
Under the circumstances, the Court has deemed it best to require the present
Board of Officers of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, to MANIFEST
whether or not it is willing to give a testimonial certifying to respondent's good
 moral character as to entitle him to take the lawyer's oath, and if not, the
reason therefor. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Norte is likewise required to submit a COMMENT on
respondent's moral fitness to be a member of the Bar.
Compliance herewith is required within ten (10) days from notice.

Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, Judge Pelagio R. Lachica, Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte, filed his Comment, dated 4 August 1989, and
received on 25 August 1989, pertinently reading:

The undersigned, who is not well acquainted personally with the respondent,
is not aware of any acts committed by him as would disqualify him from
admission to the Bar. It might be relevant to mention, however, that there is
Civil Case No. 3747 entitled Republic of the Philippines, Represented by the
Director of Lands, Plaintiff, versus Nicolas Sabandal, Register of Deeds of
Zamboanga del Norte and Rural Bank of Pinan, (Zamboanga del Norte), Inc.,
for Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion pending in this Court in which said
respondent, per complaint filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, is
alleged to have secured a free patent and later a certificate of title to a
parcel of land which, upon investigation, turned out to be a swampland and
not susceptible of acquisition under a free patent, and which he later
mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Pinan (ZN) Inc. The mortgage was later
foreclosed and the land sold at public auction and respondent has not
redeemed the land until the present. (Emphasis Supplied)

The IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter also submitted a Certification, dated 2 February
1990, signed by its Secretary Peter Y. Co and attested to by its President Gil L. Batula, to wit:

This is to certify that based on the certifications issued by the Office of the
Clerk of Court—Municipal Trial Court in the City of Dipolog; Regional Trial
Court of Zamboanga del Norte and the Office of the Provincial and City
Prosecutors, Mr. Nicolas E. Sabandal has not been convicted of any crime,
nor is there any pending derogatory criminal case against him. Based on the
above findings, the Board does not find any acts committed by the petitioner
to disqualify him from admission to the Philippine Bar.

We required the complainants to comment on the aforesaid IBP Certification and to reply
to Executive Judge Pelagio Lachica's comment in our Resolution of 15 February 1990.
On 17 April 1990, after taking note of the unrelenting vehement objections of complainants
Tan (in BM 44) and Boquia (in SBC 616) and the Certification by Executive Judge Lachica,
dated 4 August 1989, that there is a pending case before his Court involving respondent
Sabandal, this Court resolved to DEFER the setting of a date for the oath-taking of
respondent Sabandal and required Judge Lachica to inform this Court of the outcome of
the case entitled Republic v. Sabandal, (Civil Case 3747), pending before his "Sala" as soon
as resolved.
In the meantime, on 18 April 1990, the Court received another Comment, dated 13 March
1990, by complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC 609, vehemently objecting to the oath-taking of
respondent Sabandal and describing his actuations in Civil Case 3747 as manipulative and
surreptitious. This comment was Noted in the Resolution of 22 May 1990.
In a letter, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 15 August 1990, complainant Tan in Bar
Matter 44, informed the Court that her relationship with Sabandal has "already been
restored," as he had asked forgiveness for what has been done to her and that she finds no
necessity in pursuing her case against him. Complainant Tan further stated that she sees no
further reason to oppose his admission to the Bar as he had shown sincere repentance and
reformation which she believes make him morally fit to become a member of the Philippine
Bar. "In view of this development," the letter stated, "we highly recommend him for
admission to the legal profession and request this Honorable Court to schedule his oath-
taking at a time most convenient." This letter was Noted in the Resolution of 2 October 1990,
which also required a comment on Tan's letter from complainants Boquia and Dagpin.
Moises Boquia, for himself, and complainant Dagpin, in their comment, dated 5 November
1990, stated thus:

Eufrosina Yap Tan's letter dated 15 August 1990 is a private personal

disposition which raises the question whether personal forgiveness is enough
basis to exculpate and obliterate these cases. On our part, we believe and
maintain the importance and finality of the Honorable Supreme Court's
resolutions in these cases. . . .
It is not within the personal competence, jurisdiction and discretion of any
party to change or amend said final resolutions which are already res
judicata. Viewed in the light of the foregoing final and executory resolutions,
these cases therefore should not in the least be considered as anything which
is subject and subservient to the changing moods and dispositions of the
parties, devoid of any permanency or finality. Respondent's scheming
change in tactics and strategy could not improve his case.

The above was "Noted" in the Resolution of 29 November 1990.

In compliance with the Resolution of 2 October 1990, Judge Pacifico M. Garcia, Regional
Trial Court Judge of Branch 8, Dipolog City (who apparently succeeded Judge Pelagio
Lachica, the latter having availed of optional retirement on 30 June 1990) submitted to this
Court, on 17 December 1990, a copy of the "Judgment," dated 12 December 1990, in Civil
Case 3747, entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal et al" for Cancellation of
Title and/or Reversion, which, according to him, was already considered closed and
terminated.
Said judgment reveals that an amicable settlement, dated 24 October 1990, had been
reached between the principal parties, approved by the Trial Court, and conformed to by
the counsel for defendant Rural Bank of Pinan.
Briefly, the said amicable settlement cancelled the Original Certificate of Title under Free
Patent in Sabandal's name and the latter's mortgage thereof in favor of the Rural Bank of
Pinan; provided for the surrender of the certificate of title to the Register of Deeds for proper
annotation; reverted to the mass of public domain the land covered by the aforesaid
Certificate of' Title with defendant Sabandal refraining from exercising acts of possession or
ownership over said land; caused the defendant Sabandal to pay defendant Rural Bank of
Pinan the sum of P35,000 for the loan and interest; and the Rural Bank of Pinan to waive its
cross-claims against defendant Nicolas Sabandal.
Judge Pacifico Garcia's letter and the afore-mentioned Judgment were NOTED in our
Resolution of 29 January 1991. In the same Resolution, complainants Tan, Boquia and
Dagpin were required to comment on the same.
Upon request of Sabandal, a certification, dated 20 December 1990, was sent by Executive
judge Jesus Angeles of the RTC of Zamboanga del Norte, certifying that Sabandal has no
pending case with his Court and that he has no cause to object to his admission to the
Philippine Bar. This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 26 February 1991.
Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath in a
Motion dated 8 June 1991. In our Resolution of 1 August 1991, we deferred action on the
aforesaid Motion pending compliance by the complainants with the Resolution of 29
January 1991 requiring them to comment on the letter of Judge Pacifico M. Garcia.
To date, only complainant Tan has complied with the said Resolution by submitting a
Comment, dated 29 August 1991, stating that the termination of Civil Case No. 3747 is "proof
of Sabandal's sincere reformation, of his repentance with restitution of the rights of
complainants he violated," and that "there is no more reason to oppose his admission to the
Bar." This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 24 September 1991.
In a Manifestation, dated 6 December 1991, Sabandal reiterates his plea to be allowed to
take the Lawyer's Oath.
His plea must be DENIED.
In our Resolution of 10 February 1989, Sabandal was allowed to take the oath, ten (10) years
having elapsed from the time he took and passed the 1976 Bar examinations, after careful
consideration of his show of contrition and willingness to reform. Also taken cognizance of
were the several testimonials attesting to his good moral character and civic consciousness.
At that time, we had not received the objections from complainant Tan to Sabandal's
taking the oath nor were we aware of the gravity of the civil case against him.
It turns out that Civil Case No. 3747 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal"
was instituted by the Government in 1985 and was brought about because of respondent's
procurement of a certificate of free patent over a parcel of land belonging to the public
domain and its use as security for a mortgage in order to obtain a loan. At that time,
Sabandal was an employee of the Bureau of Lands. He did not submit any defense and
was declared it default by order of the RTC dated 26 November 1986. The controversy was
eventually settled by mere compromise with respondent surrendering the bogus certificate
of title to the government and paying-off the mortgagor, "to buy peace and forestall further
expenses of litigation incurred by defendants" (Rollo, Judgment in Civil Case No. 3747). The
Office of the Solicitor General interposed no objection to the approval of the said amicable
settlement and prayed that judgment be rendered in accordance therewith, "as the
amicable settlement may amount to a confession by the defendant" (Rollo, supra). It must
also be stressed that in 1985, at the time said case was instituted, Sabandal's petition to take
the lawyer's oath had already been denied on 29 November 1983 and he was then
submitting to this Court motions for reconsideration alleging his good moral character
without, however, mentioning the pendency of that civil case against him.
In view of the nature of that case and the circumstances attending its termination, the
Court now entertains second thoughts about respondent's fitness to become a member of
the Bar.
It should be recalled that Sabandal worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands.
Said employment facilitated his procurement of the free patent title over property which he
could not but have known was public land. This was manipulative on his part and does not
speak well of his moral character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public
service, which can not be erased by the termination of the case filed by the Republic
against him where no determination of his guilt or innocence was made because the suit
had been compromised. Although as the Solicitor General had pointed out, the amicable
settlement was tantamount to a confession on his part. What is more, he could not but have
known of the intrinsic invalidity of his title and yet he took advantage of it by securing a
bank loan, mortgaging it as collateral, and notwithstanding the foreclosure of the
mortgage and the sale of the land at public auction, he did not lift a finger to redeem the
same until the civil case filed against him was eventually compromised. This is a sad
reflection on his sense of honor and fair dealing. His failure to reveal to this Court the
pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed against him during the period that he was
submitting several Motions for Reconsideration before us also reveal his lack of candor and
truthfulness.
There are testimonials attesting to his good moral character, yes. But these were confined to
lack of knowledge of the pendency of any criminal case against him and were obviously
made without awareness of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case instituted by
the Government against him. Those testimonials can not, therefore, outweigh nor smother
his acts of dishonesty and lack of good moral character.
That the other complainants, namely, Moises Boquia (in SBC 606) and Herve Dagpin (in SBC
619) have not submitted any opposition to his motion to take the oath, is of no moment.
They have already expressed their objections in their earlier comments. That complainant
Tan has withdrawn her objection to his taking the oath can neither tilt the balance in his
favor, the basis of her complaint treating as it does of another subject matter.
Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a
privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also
known to possess good moral character:

The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a
high standard for the legal profession, both in academic preparation and
legal training as well as in honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the
licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high
standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the
practice of this noble profession only those persons who are known to be
honest and to possess good moral character. . . . (In re Parazo, 82 Phil. 230).

Although the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined
as "including at least common honesty" (Royong v. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30,
1963, 7 SCRA 859; In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 [1928]). It has also been held that no moral
qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness or candor (Fellner v. Bar
Association of Baltimore City, 131 A. 2d 729).
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Sabandal to be unfit to become a member of the BAR, this
Court's Resolution, dated 10 February 1989 is RECALLED and his prayer to be allowed to take
the lawyer's oath is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 4148 July 30, 1998
REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant,
vs.
Atty. LAURO L. TAPUCAR, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar
sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing
grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña under scandalous
circumstances. 1

Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for
conduct unbecoming an officer of the court. In Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on
April 11, 1980, respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of
six months suspension without pay, while in Administrative Matters Nos. 1720, 1911 and
2

2300-CFI, which were consolidated, this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation
3

from the service of respondent. 4

Now he faces disbarment.

The records reveal the following facts:

From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline, it appears that
complainant and respondent married on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart Roman
Catholic Church in Quezon City. They established their residence in Antipolo, Rizal, where
eight of their eleven children were born. In 1962 respondent relocated his family to
Dadiangas, Cotabato (now Gen. Santos City), where his last three children were born and
where he practiced his profession until his appointment as a CFI Judge in Butuan City on
January 30, 1976.

In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge, respondent began cohabiting
with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña, in Nasipit, Agusan del Norte. On December 28, 1977,
Elena gave birth to their first child, named Ofelia Sembrano Peña.

In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an administrative complaint
against respondent for immorality. After investigation, the penalty of suspension from office
for a period of six months without pay was meted by this Court upon respondent. 5

Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise to another
charge of immorality and other administrative cases, such as: conduct unbecoming an
officer of the court, and grossly immoral conduct. These cases were consolidated and after
investigation, this Court ordered his dismissal and separation from the service. 6

But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his ways. He continued living
with Elena, which resulted in the birth on September 20, 1989, of their second child named
Laella Peña Tapucar. Moreover, he completely abandoned complainant and his children
by her.

Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to Antipolo, Rizal, bringing
along Elena and their two children. And on March 5, 1992, respondent contracted marriage
with Elena in a ceremony solemnized by MTC Judge Isagani A. Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal.
This was done while the respondent's marriage to complainant subsists, as nothing on
record shows the dissolution thereof.

Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to United States of America upon her
retirement from the government service in 1990. However, her children, who remained in
Antipolo, kept her posted of the misery they allegedly suffered because of their father's
acts, including deception and intrigues against them. Thus, despite having previously
withdrawn a similar case which she filed in 1976, complainant was forced to file the present
petition for disbarment under the compulsion of the maternal impulse to shield and protect
her children from the despotic and cruel acts of their own father. Complainant secured the
assistance of her eldest daughter, Atty. Ma. Susana Tapucar-Baua, to represent her in this
case.

Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the matter was referred to the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report
and recommendation. After conducting a thorough investigation, the Commission through
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez recommended that respondent be disbarred, and his
name be stricken off the roll of attorneys. Mainly, this was premised on the ground that,
notwithstanding sanctions previously imposed upon him by the Honorable Supreme Court,
respondent continued the illicit liaison with Elena.
7

In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of contradicting the charges
against him, respondent displayed arrogance, and even made a mockery of the law and
the Court, as when he said:

I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for two months without
pay in 1980 for having a mistress, the same girl Ms. Elena (Helen) Peña, now
my wife. Being ordered separated in later administrative case constitute
double jeopardy. If now disbarred for marrying Ms. Elena Peña will constitute
triple jeopardy. If that's the law so be it.
8

Based on said report, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, passed
on May 17, 1997, a Resolution adopting the Commissioner's recommendation, as follows:

RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97

Adm. Case No. 4148

Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs.

Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,

the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of the Resolution/Decision as Annex
"A"; and, finding the recommendation therein to be fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty.
Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED and that his name be stricken off the
roll of attorneys.

We find the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, as approved and

adopted by the Board of Governors of IBP, more than sufficient to justify and support the
foregoing Resolution, herein considered as the recommendation to this Court by said Board
pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12 (b), of the Rules of Court. * We are in agreement that
respondent's actuations merit the penalty of disbarment.

Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent for
admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one's
good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. There is perhaps no profession after
9

that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of
law. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:
10

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave
in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Emphasis
supplied.)

As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live up to the standards and
norms expected of the legal profession, by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers must maintain a high standard of legal
proficiency, as well as morality including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For they are at
all times subject to the scrutinizing eye of public opinion and community approbation.
Needless to state, those whose conduct — both public and private — fails this scrutiny
would have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized accordingly.

Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent here was once a member of the judiciary,
a fact that aggravates his professional infractions. For having occupied that place of honor
in the Bench, he knew a judge's actuations ought to be free from any appearance of
impropriety. For a judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of
11

justice. Ordinary citizens consider him as a source of strength that fortifies their will to obey
the law. Indeed, a judge should avoid the slightest infraction of the law in all of his
12

actuations, lest it be a demoralizing example to others. Surely, respondent could not have
13

forgotten the Code of Judicial Conduct entirely as to lose its moral imperatives. 14

Like a judge who is held to a high standard of integrity and ethical conduct, an attorney-
15

at-law is also invested with public trust. Judges and lawyers serve in the administration of
justice. Admittedly, as officers of the court, lawyers must ensure the faith and confidence of
the public that justice is administered with dignity and civility. A high degree of moral
integrity is expected of a lawyer in the community where he resides. He must maintain due
regard for public decency in an orderly society.

A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients. Exacted from him, as a member of the profession charged with the responsibility to
16

stand as a shield in the defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of decency,
truthfulness and responsibility that have been compendiously described as "moral
character." To achieve such end, every lawyer needs to strive at all times to honor and
maintain the dignity of his profession, and thus improve not only the public regard for the Bar
but also the administration of justice.
On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether
in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in
honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of
the court.17

The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear
case of misconduct which seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the Court and member of the bar. For disbarment proceedings are intended to
18

afford the parties thereto full opportunity to vindicate their cause before disciplinary action
is taken, to assure the general public that those who are tasked with the duty of
administering justice are competent, honorable, trustworthy men and women in whom the
Courts and the clients may repose full confidence.

In the case of Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr., a complaint for disbarment was filed against a
19

member of the bar by his wife. She was able to prove that he had abandoned his wife and
their son; and that he had adulterous relations with a married but separated woman.
Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence presented by his wife that he was
guilty of grossly immoral conduct. In another case, a lawyer was disbarred when he
20

abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.
The Court held that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected
and required of a member of the bar.

In the present case, the record shows that despite previous sanctions imposed upon him by
this Court, respondent continued his illicit liaison with a woman other than his lawfully-
wedded wife. The report of the Commissioner assigned to investigate thoroughly the
complaint found respondent far from contrite; on the contrary, he exhibited a cavalier
attitude, even arrogance, in the face of charges against him. The IBP Board of Governors,
tasked to determine whether he still merited the privileges extended to a member of the
legal profession, resolved the matter against him. For indeed, evidence of grossly immoral
conduct abounds against him and could not be explained away. Keeping a mistress,
entering into another marriage while a prior one still subsists, as well as abandoning and/or
mistreating complainant and their children, show his disregard of family obligations,
morality and decency, the law and the lawyer's oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long
period of time clearly shows a serious flaw in respondent's character, his moral indifference
to scandal in the community, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could
not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of
justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action.

IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court
is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 4148 July 30, 1998
REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant,
vs.
Atty. LAURO L. TAPUCAR, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar
sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing
grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña under scandalous
circumstances. 1

Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for
conduct unbecoming an officer of the court. In Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on
April 11, 1980, respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of
six months suspension without pay, while in Administrative Matters Nos. 1720, 1911 and
2

2300-CFI, which were consolidated, this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation
3

from the service of respondent. 4

Now he faces disbarment.

The records reveal the following facts:

From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline, it appears that
complainant and respondent married on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart Roman
Catholic Church in Quezon City. They established their residence in Antipolo, Rizal, where
eight of their eleven children were born. In 1962 respondent relocated his family to
Dadiangas, Cotabato (now Gen. Santos City), where his last three children were born and
where he practiced his profession until his appointment as a CFI Judge in Butuan City on
January 30, 1976.

In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge, respondent began cohabiting
with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña, in Nasipit, Agusan del Norte. On December 28, 1977,
Elena gave birth to their first child, named Ofelia Sembrano Peña.

In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an administrative complaint
against respondent for immorality. After investigation, the penalty of suspension from office
for a period of six months without pay was meted by this Court upon respondent. 5

Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise to another
charge of immorality and other administrative cases, such as: conduct unbecoming an
officer of the court, and grossly immoral conduct. These cases were consolidated and after
investigation, this Court ordered his dismissal and separation from the service. 6

But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his ways. He continued living
with Elena, which resulted in the birth on September 20, 1989, of their second child named
Laella Peña Tapucar. Moreover, he completely abandoned complainant and his children
by her.

Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to Antipolo, Rizal, bringing
along Elena and their two children. And on March 5, 1992, respondent contracted marriage
with Elena in a ceremony solemnized by MTC Judge Isagani A. Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal.
This was done while the respondent's marriage to complainant subsists, as nothing on
record shows the dissolution thereof.

Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to United States of America upon her
retirement from the government service in 1990. However, her children, who remained in
Antipolo, kept her posted of the misery they allegedly suffered because of their father's
acts, including deception and intrigues against them. Thus, despite having previously
withdrawn a similar case which she filed in 1976, complainant was forced to file the present
petition for disbarment under the compulsion of the maternal impulse to shield and protect
her children from the despotic and cruel acts of their own father. Complainant secured the
assistance of her eldest daughter, Atty. Ma. Susana Tapucar-Baua, to represent her in this
case.

Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the matter was referred to the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report
and recommendation. After conducting a thorough investigation, the Commission through
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez recommended that respondent be disbarred, and his
name be stricken off the roll of attorneys. Mainly, this was premised on the ground that,
notwithstanding sanctions previously imposed upon him by the Honorable Supreme Court,
respondent continued the illicit liaison with Elena.
7

In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of contradicting the charges
against him, respondent displayed arrogance, and even made a mockery of the law and
the Court, as when he said:

I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for two months without
pay in 1980 for having a mistress, the same girl Ms. Elena (Helen) Peña, now
my wife. Being ordered separated in later administrative case constitute
double jeopardy. If now disbarred for marrying Ms. Elena Peña will constitute
triple jeopardy. If that's the law so be it.
8

Based on said report, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, passed
on May 17, 1997, a Resolution adopting the Commissioner's recommendation, as follows:

RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97

Adm. Case No. 4148

Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs.

Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,

the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of the Resolution/Decision as Annex
"A"; and, finding the recommendation therein to be fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty.
Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED and that his name be stricken off the
roll of attorneys.

We find the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, as approved and

adopted by the Board of Governors of IBP, more than sufficient to justify and support the
foregoing Resolution, herein considered as the recommendation to this Court by said Board
pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12 (b), of the Rules of Court. * We are in agreement that
respondent's actuations merit the penalty of disbarment.

Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent for
admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one's
good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. There is perhaps no profession after
9

that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of
law. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:
10

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave
in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Emphasis
supplied.)

As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live up to the standards and
norms expected of the legal profession, by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers must maintain a high standard of legal
proficiency, as well as morality including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For they are at
all times subject to the scrutinizing eye of public opinion and community approbation.
Needless to state, those whose conduct — both public and private — fails this scrutiny
would have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized accordingly.

Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent here was once a member of the judiciary,
a fact that aggravates his professional infractions. For having occupied that place of honor
in the Bench, he knew a judge's actuations ought to be free from any appearance of
impropriety. For a judge is the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of
11

justice. Ordinary citizens consider him as a source of strength that fortifies their will to obey
the law. Indeed, a judge should avoid the slightest infraction of the law in all of his
12

actuations, lest it be a demoralizing example to others. Surely, respondent could not have
13

forgotten the Code of Judicial Conduct entirely as to lose its moral imperatives. 14

Like a judge who is held to a high standard of integrity and ethical conduct, an attorney-
15

at-law is also invested with public trust. Judges and lawyers serve in the administration of
justice. Admittedly, as officers of the court, lawyers must ensure the faith and confidence of
the public that justice is administered with dignity and civility. A high degree of moral
integrity is expected of a lawyer in the community where he resides. He must maintain due
regard for public decency in an orderly society.

A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients. Exacted from him, as a member of the profession charged with the responsibility to
16

stand as a shield in the defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of decency,
truthfulness and responsibility that have been compendiously described as "moral
character." To achieve such end, every lawyer needs to strive at all times to honor and
maintain the dignity of his profession, and thus improve not only the public regard for the Bar
but also the administration of justice.
On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether
in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in
honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of
the court.17

The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear
case of misconduct which seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the Court and member of the bar. For disbarment proceedings are intended to
18

afford the parties thereto full opportunity to vindicate their cause before disciplinary action
is taken, to assure the general public that those who are tasked with the duty of
administering justice are competent, honorable, trustworthy men and women in whom the
Courts and the clients may repose full confidence.

In the case of Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr., a complaint for disbarment was filed against a
19

member of the bar by his wife. She was able to prove that he had abandoned his wife and
their son; and that he had adulterous relations with a married but separated woman.
Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence presented by his wife that he was
guilty of grossly immoral conduct. In another case, a lawyer was disbarred when he
20

abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.
The Court held that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected
and required of a member of the bar.

In the present case, the record shows that despite previous sanctions imposed upon him by
this Court, respondent continued his illicit liaison with a woman other than his lawfully-
wedded wife. The report of the Commissioner assigned to investigate thoroughly the
complaint found respondent far from contrite; on the contrary, he exhibited a cavalier
attitude, even arrogance, in the face of charges against him. The IBP Board of Governors,
tasked to determine whether he still merited the privileges extended to a member of the
legal profession, resolved the matter against him. For indeed, evidence of grossly immoral
conduct abounds against him and could not be explained away. Keeping a mistress,
entering into another marriage while a prior one still subsists, as well as abandoning and/or
mistreating complainant and their children, show his disregard of family obligations,
morality and decency, the law and the lawyer's oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long
period of time clearly shows a serious flaw in respondent's character, his moral indifference
to scandal in the community, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could
not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of
justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action.

IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court
is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 7204 March 7, 2007
CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a complaint for disbarment filed by Cynthia Advincula against respondent Atty.
1

Ernesto M. Macabata, charging the latter with Gross Immorality.

Complainant alleged the following:
Sometime on 1st week of December 2004 complainant [Cynthia Advincula] seek the legal
advice of the respondent [Atty. Macabata], regarding her collectibles from Queensway
Travel and Tours. As promised, he sent Demand Letter dated December 11, 2004 (copy
attached as Annex "I") to the concerned parties.
On February 10, 2005, met (sic) at Zensho Restaurant in Tomas Morato, Quezon City to
discuss the possibility of filing the complaint against Queensway Travel and Tours because
they did not settle their accounts as demanded. After the dinner, respondent sent
complainant home and while she is about to step out of the car, respondent hold (sic) her
arm and kissed her on the cheek and embraced her very tightly.
Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the morning, she met respondent at
Starbucks coffee shop in West Avenue, Quezon City to finalize the draft of the complaint to
be filed in Court. After the meeting, respondent offered again a ride, which he usually did
every time they met. Along the way, complainant was wandering (sic) why she felt so
sleepy where in fact she just got up from bed a few hours ago. At along Roosevelt Avenue
immediately after corner of Felipe St., in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City when she
was almost restless respondent stopped his car and forcefully hold (sic) her face and kissed
her lips while the other hand was holding her breast. Complainant even in a state of
shocked (sic) succeeded in resisting his criminal attempt and immediately manage (sic) to
go (sic) out of the car.
In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to respondent informing him that
she decided to refer the case with another lawyer and needs (sic) to get back the case
folder from him. The communications transpired was recorded in her cellular phone and
read as follows:

Sent by - forget the case. I decided to refer it with other lawyer

complainant
At 5:33:46 pm

replied by - "does this mean I can not c u anymore"

respondent (Does this mean I cannot see you
at 6:16:11 pm anymore)

sent by - I feel bad. I can’t expect that u will take advantage of the situation.
complainant
at 6:17:59 pm

Follow-up - wrong to kiss a girl especially in the lips if you don’t have relationship
message with her.
Sent by
complainant
At 6:29:30 pm

Replied by - "I’m veri sri. It’s not tking advantage of the situation, 2 put it rightly it s an
respondent expression of feeling. S sri" (I’m very sorry. Its not taking advantage of the
At 6:32:43 pm situation, to put it rightly it is an expression of feeling)

Follow up - I’m s sri. Il not do it again. Wil u stil c me s I can show u my sincerity" (I’m
message so sorry. I’ll not do it again. Will you still see me so I can show you my
by respondent sincerity)
at 6:42:25 pm

On the following day, March 7, 2005 respondent sent another message to complainant at
3:55:32 pm saying "I don’t know wat 2 do s u may 4give me. "Im realy sri. Puede bati na tyo."
(I don’t know what to do so you may forgive me. I’m really sorry. Puede bati na tayo).
Respondent replied "talk to my lawyer in due time." Then another message was received by
her at 4:06:33 pm saying "Ano k ba. I’m really sri. Pls. Nxt ime bhave n me." (Ano ka ba. I’m
really sorry. Please next time behave na ko), which is a clear manifestation of admission of
guilt.
2

In his answer, respondent admitted that he agreed to provide legal services to the
3

complainant; that he met with complainant on 10 February 2005 and 6 March 2005, to
discuss the relevant matters relative to the case which complainant was intending to file
against the owners of Queensway Travel and Tours for collection of a sum of money; that on
both occasions, complainant rode with him in his car where he held and kissed
complainant on the lips as the former offered her lips to him; and, that the corner of Cooper
Street and Roosevelt Avenue, where he dropped off the complainant, was a busy street
teeming with people, thus, it would have been impossible to commit the acts imputed to
him.
By way of defense, respondent further elucidated that: 1) there was a criminal case for Acts
of Lasciviousness filed by complainant against respondent pending before the Office of the
City Prosecutor in Quezon City; 2) the legal name of complainant is Cynthia Advincula
Toriana since she remains married to a certain Jinky Toriana because the civil case for the
nullification of their marriage was archived pursuant to the Order dated 6 December 2000
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Maburao, Occidental Mindoro; 3) the complainant was
living with a man not her husband; and 4) the complainant never bothered to discuss
respondent’s fees and it was respondent who always paid for their bills every time they met
and ate at a restaurant.
A hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, on 26 July 2005.
On 30 September 2005, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa submitted his Report
and Recommendation, recommending the imposition of the penalty of one (1) month
4

suspension on respondent for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Thereafter, the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-117 dated 20 March 2006, approving
and adopting, with modification, the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,
thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering the behavior of Respondent went beyond the norms of conduct
required of a lawyer when dealing with or relating with a client, Atty. Ernesto A. Macabata
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months. 5

The issue to be resolved in this case is: whether respondent committed acts that are grossly
immoral or which constitute serious moral depravity that would warrant his disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law.
Simple as the facts of the case may be, the manner by which we deal with respondent’s
actuations shall have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners
should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used
to be. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened
with a high degree of social responsibility and, hence, must handle their personal affairs with
greater caution.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON I – x x x
Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxxx
Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.
As may be gleaned from above, the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded that their possession of good moral character is a
continuing condition to preserve their membership in the Bar in good standing. The
continued possession of good moral character is a requisite condition for remaining in the
practice of law. In Aldovino v. Pujalte, Jr., we emphasized that:
6 7

This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of
members of the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and
confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal
profession. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege. And whenever it is made to
appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it
becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its
officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of
morality. The legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon
to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of
malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest
degree of morality. We explained in Barrientos v. Daarol that, "as officers of the court,
8 9

lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of
the community."
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar
but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this
exclusive and honored fraternity. They may be suspended from the practice of law or
disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. 10
In Bar Matter No. 1154, good moral character was defined as what a person really is, as
11

distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, or the
estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is
not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has four ostensible
purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to
protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves. 12

In the case at bar, respondent admitted kissing complainant on the lips.

In his Answer, respondent confessed, thus:
13

27. When she was about to get off the car, I said can I kiss you goodnight. She offered her
left cheek and I kissed it and with my left hand slightly pulled her right face towards me and
kissed her gently on the lips. We said goodnight and she got off the car.
xxxx
35. When I stopped my car I said okay. I saw her offered (sic) her left cheek and I lightly
kissed it and with my right hand slightly pulled her right cheek towards me and plant (sic) a
light kiss on her lips. There was no force used. No intimidation made, no lewd designs
displayed. No breast holding was done. Everything happened very spontaneously with no
reaction from her except saying "sexual harassment."
During the hearing held on 26 July 2005 at the 3rd floor, IBP Building, Dona Julia Vargas
Avenue, Ortigas City, respondent candidly recalled the following events:
ATTY. MACABATA:
That time in February, we met … I fetched her I should say, somewhere along the corner of
Edsa and Kamuning because it was then raining so we are texting each other. So I parked
my car somewhere along the corner of Edsa and Kamuning and I was there about ten to
fifteen minutes then she arrived. And so I said … she opened my car and then she went
inside so I said, would you like that we have a Japanese dinner? And she said yes, okay. So I
brought her to Zensho which is along Tomas Morato. When we were there, we discussed
about her case, we ordered food and then a little while I told her, would it be okay for you
of I (sic) order wine? She said yes so I ordered two glasses of red wine. After that, after
discussing matters about her case, so I said … it’s about 9:00 or beyond that time already,
so I said okay, let’s go. So when I said let’s go so I stood up and then I went to the car. I
went ahead of my car and she followed me then she rode on (sic) it. So I told her where to?
She told me just drop me at the same place where you have been dropping me for the last
meetings that we had and that was at the corner of Morato and Roosevelt Avenue. So,
before she went down, I told her can I kiss you goodnight? She offered her left cheek and I
kissed it and with the slight use of my right hand, I ... should I say tilted her face towards me
and when she’s already facing me I lightly kissed her on the lips. And then I said good night.
She went down the car, that’s it.
COMM. FUNA:
February 10 iyan.
xxxx
ATTY. MACABATA:
Okay. After that were through so I said let’s go because I have an appointment. So we
went out, we went inside my car and I said where to? Same place, she said, so then at the
same corner. So before she went down , before she opened the door of the car, I saw her
offered her left cheek. So I kissed her again.
COMM. FUNA:
Pardon?
ATTY. MACABATA:
I saw her offered her left cheek like that, so I kissed her again and then with the use of my
left hand, pushed a little bit her face and then kissed her again softly on the lips and that’s
it. x x x. (Emphases supplied.)
14

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly
immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer
unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be
unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that
warrants disbarment. 15

In Zaguirre v. Castillo, we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, as such conduct

16

which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community. Furthermore, for such conduct to warrant
disciplinary action, the same must not simply be immoral, but grossly immoral. It must be so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
common sense of decency.
The following cases were considered by this Court as constitutive of grossly immoral
conduct:
In Toledo v. Toledo, a lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, when he abandoned
17

his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.
In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr., a lawyer was disbarred after complainant proved that he had
18

abandoned her and maintained an adulterous relationship with a married woman. This
court declared that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected
and required of a member of the bar.
In Dantes v. Dantes, respondent’s act of engaging in illicit relationships with two different
19

women during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly
immoral conduct warranting the imposition of appropriate sanctions. Complainant’s
testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established
that respondent breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the
law profession.
In Delos Reyes v. Aznar, it was ruled that it was highly immoral of respondent, a married
20

man with children, to have taken advantage of his position as chairman of the college of
medicine in asking complainant, a student in said college, to go with him to Manila where
he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat that she would flank in all her subjects in
case she refused.
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, respondent lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his
21

lawful wife and three children, lured an innocent woman into marrying him and
misrepresented himself as a "bachelor" so he could contract marriage in a foreign land.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo, respondent entered into multiple marriages and then resorted
22

to legal remedies to sever them. There, we ruled that "[s]uch pattern of misconduct by
respondent undermines the institutions of marriage and family, institutions that this society
looks to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival
and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole." As
such, "there can be no other fate that awaits respondent than to be disbarred."
In Tucay v. Tucay, respondent contracted marriage with another married woman and left
23

complainant with whom he has been married for thirty years. We ruled that such acts
constitute "a grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the
fundamental ethics of his profession," warranting respondent’s disbarment.
In Villasanta v. Peralta, respondent married complainant while his first wife was still alive,
24

their marriage still valid and subsisting. We held that "the act of respondent of contracting
the second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality." Thus, lacking the
good moral character required by the Rules of Court, respondent was disqualified from
being admitted to the bar.
In Cabrera v. Agustin, respondent lured an innocent woman into a simulated marriage and
25

thereafter satisfied his lust. We held that respondent failed to maintain that degree of
morality and integrity which, at all times, is expected of members of the bar. He is, therefore,
disbarred from the practice of law.
Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with
rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful,
flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable
members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public
welfare.26

Guided by the definitions above, we perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks
as mere gestures of friendship and camaraderie, forms of greetings, casual and customary.
27

The acts of respondent, though, in turning the head of complainant towards him and kissing
her on the lips are distasteful. However, such act, even if considered offensive and
undesirable, cannot be considered grossly immoral.
Complainant’s bare allegation that respondent made use and took advantage of his
position as a lawyer to lure her to agree to have sexual relations with him, deserves no
credit. The burden of proof rests on the complainant, and she must establish the case
against the respondent by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof, disclosing a case that
28

is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary power. Thus, the
29

adage that "he who asserts not he who denies, must prove." As a basic rule in evidence,
30

the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegations—ei incumbit probation, qui
decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis probation nulla sit. In the
31

case at bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden of proof required of
her. A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not
synonymous with guilt. 32

Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the same was
not motivated by malice. We come to this conclusion because right after the complainant
expressed her annoyance at being kissed by the respondent through a cellular phone text
message, respondent immediately extended an apology to complainant also via cellular
phone text message. The exchange of text messages between complainant and
respondent bears this out.
Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there were several people in
the vicinity considering that Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If
respondent truly had malicious designs on complainant, he could have brought her to a
private place or a more remote place where he could freely accomplish the same.
All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondent’s acts are not grossly immoral
nor highly reprehensible to warrant disbarment or suspension.
The question as to what disciplinary sanction should be imposed against a lawyer found
guilty of misconduct requires consideration of a number of factors. When deciding upon
33

the appropriate sanction, the Court must consider that the primary purposes of disciplinary
proceedings are to protect the public; to foster public confidence in the Bar; to preserve
the integrity of the profession; and to deter other lawyers from similar
misconduct. Disciplinary proceedings are means of protecting the administration of justice
34

by requiring those who carry out this important function to be competent, honorable and
reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. While it is discretionary
35

upon the Court to impose a particular sanction that it may deem proper against an erring
lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or
prejudice, but should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the
purity and independence of the bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his
duties to the court, to his client, to his brethren in the profession and to the public.
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not
on the vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons and
only on clear cases of misconduct which seriously affect the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss
of moral character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which neither
affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction
unless they are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyer’s unfitness to
continue in the practice of law. The dubious character of the act charged as well as the
motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before
suspension or disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
attended the commission of the offense should also be considered. 36

Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser
nature. It is also imposed for some minor infraction of the lawyer’s duty to the court or the
client. In the Matter of Darell Adams, a lawyer was publicly reprimanded for grabbing a
37 38

female client, kissing her, and raising her blouse which constituted illegal conduct involving
moral turpitude and conduct which adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law.
Based on the circumstances of the case as discussed and considering that this is
respondent’s first offense, reprimand would suffice.
We laud complainant’s effort to seek redress for what she honestly believed to be an affront
to her honor. Surely, it was difficult and agonizing on her part to come out in the open and
accuse her lawyer of gross immoral conduct. However, her own assessment of the incidents
is highly subjective and partial, and surely needs to be corroborated or supported by more
objective evidence.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for
alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED. However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED to
be more prudent and cautious in his dealing with his clients with a STERN WARNING that a
more severe sanction will be imposed on him for any repetition of the same or similar
offense in the future.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

[A.C. No. 4428 : December 12, 2011]

ELPIDIO P. TIONG, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. GEORGE M. FLORENDO,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Elpidio P. Tiong
[1]

against Atty. George M. Florendo for gross immorality and grave misconduct.
The facts of the case are as follows:

Complainant Elpidio P. Tiong, an American Citizen, and his wife, Ma. Elena T. Tiong, are
real estate lessors in Baguio City. They are likewise engaged in the assembly and repair
of motor vehicles in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. In 1991, they engaged the services of
respondent Atty. George M. Florendo not only as legal counsel but also as administrator
of their businesses whenever complainant would leave for the United States of America
(USA).

Sometime in 1993, complainant began to suspect that respondent and his wife were
having an illicit affair. His suspicion was confirmed in the afternoon of May 13, 1995
when, in their residence, he chanced upon a telephone conversation between the two.
Listening through the extension phone, he heard respondent utter the words "I love you,
I'll call you later". When confronted, his wife initially denied any amorous involvement
with respondent but eventually broke down and confessed to their love affair that began
in 1993. Respondent likewise admitted the relationship. Subsequently, at a meeting
initiated by respondent and held at the Salibao Restaurant in Burnham Park, Baguio City,
respondent and complainant's wife, Ma. Elena, confessed anew to their illicit affair before
their respective spouses.

On May 15, 1995, the parties met again at the Mandarin Restaurant in Baguio City and,
in the presence of a Notary Public, Atty. Liberato Tadeo, respondent and Ma. Elena
executed and signed an affidavit attesting to their illicit relationship and seeking their
[2]

respective spouses' forgiveness, as follows:

"WE, GEORGE M. FLORENDO, a resident of Baguio City and of legal age and
MA. ELENA T. TIONG, likewise a resident of Baguio City, of legal age, depose
and state:

We committed adultery against our spouses from May 1993 to May 13, 1995
and we hereby ask forgiveness and assure our spouses that this thing will
never happen again with us or any other person. We assure that we will no
longer see each other nor have any communication directly or indirectly. We
shall comply with our duties as husband and wife to our spouses and assure
that there will be no violence against them. That any behaviour unbecoming
a husband or wife henceforth shall give rise to legal action against us; We
shall never violate this assurance;

We, the offended spouses Elizabeth F. Florendo and Elpidio Tiong forgive our
spouses and assure them that we will not institute any criminal or legal action
against them because we have forgiven them. If they violate this agreement
we will institute legal action.
 This document consists of four (4) typewritten copies and each party has been
furnished a copy and this document shall have no validity unless signed by all
the parties.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have set out hands this 15th day of May 1995 at
Baguio City, Philippines.

(SIGNED) (SIGNED)

GEORGE M. FLORENDO ELPIDIO TIONG

(SIGNED) (SIGNED)

MA. ELENA T. TIONG ELIZABETH F. FLORENDO"

Notwithstanding, complainant instituted the present suit for disbarment on May 23, 1995
charging respondent of gross immorality and grave misconduct. In his Answer , [3]

respondent admitted the material allegations of the complaint but interposed the defense
of pardon.

In the Resolution dated September 20, 1995, the Court resolved to refer the case to the
[4]

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and decision.

Finding merit in the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through
Commissioner Agustinus V. Gonzaga, submitted its Report and Recommendation dated [5]

September 21, 2007 for the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for one
(1) year, which was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its
Resolution dated October 19, 2007. Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration
[6] [7]

therefrom was denied in the Resolution dated June 26, 2011.

[8]

Hence, the instant petition on the sole issue - whether the pardon extended by
complainant in the Affidavit dated May 15, 1995 is sufficient to warrant the dismissal of
the present disbarment case against respondent for gross immoral conduct.

After due consideration, the Court resolves to adopt the findings and recommendation of
the IBP-CBD except as to the penalty imposed.

The pertinent provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility provide, thus:

"CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS

OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
 Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.

xxxx

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND

DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.

xxxx

Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."

It has been consistently held by the Court that possession of good moral character is not
only a condition for admission to the Bar but is a continuing requirement to maintain
one's good standing in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of law practitioners to
observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar. [9]

Consequently, any errant behaviour on the part of a lawyer, be it in his public or private
activities, which tends to show him deficient in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor, is sufficient to warrant his suspension or disbarment.

In this case, respondent admitted his illicit relationship with a married woman not his
wife, and worse, that of his client. Contrary to respondent's claim, their consortium
cannot be classified as a mere "moment of indiscretion" considering that it lasted for
[10]

two (2) years and was only aborted when complainant overheard their amorous phone
conversation on March 13, 1995.

Respondent's act of having an affair with his client's wife manifested his disrespect for
the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his
utmost moral depravity and low regard for the ethics of his profession. Likewise, he
[11]

violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by complainant which in itself is
prohibited under Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Undeniably,
[12]

therefore, his illicit relationship with Ma. Elena amounts to a disgraceful and grossly
immoral conduct warranting disciplinary action from the Court. Section 27, Rule 138 of
[13]

the Rules of Court provides that an attorney may be disbarred or suspended from his
office by the Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office,
grossly immoral conduct, among others.

Respondent, however, maintains that he cannot be sanctioned for his questioned conduct
because he and Ma. Elena had already been pardoned by their respective spouses in the
May 15, 1995 Affidavit .
[14]
The Court disagrees.

It bears to stress that a case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant
to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case but is intended to cleanse the ranks of
the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the
courts. It is not an investigation into the acts of respondent as a husband but on his
conduct as an officer of the Court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar. [15]

Hence, the Affidavit dated March 15, 1995, which is akin to an affidavit of desistance,
cannot have the effect of abating the instant proceedings. [16]

However, considering the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that a penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months, instead of one (1) year as
recommended by the IBP-CBD, is adequate sanction for the grossly immoral conduct of
respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GEORGE M. FLORENDO is hereby found GUILTY of

Gross Immorality and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS
effective upon notice hereof, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member
of the Philippine Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Abad, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 10145, June 11, 2018

OLIVER FABUGAIS, Complainant, v. ATTY. BERARDO C. FAUNDO JR., Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

In both their professional and personal lives, lawyers must conduct themselves in such a
way that does not reflect negatively upon the legal profession.

Factual Antecedents

This is a Complaint filed by complainant Oliver Fabugais (complainant) against Atty.

1

Berardo C. Faundo, Jr. (respondent lawyer), for gross misconduct and conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer for having allegedly engaged in illicit and immoral relations
with his wife, Annaliza Lizel B. Fabugais (Annaliza).

In her Sinumpaang Salaysay, then 10-year old girl Marie Nicole Fabugais (Marie Nicole),
2

daughter of complainant, alleged that sometime in October 2006, she, along with her
mother, Annaliza. Ate Mimi (Michelle Lagasca), and a certain Ate Ada (Ada Marie
Campos), stayed in a house in Ipil, Zamboanga-Sibugay, that belonged to respondent
lawyer, whom Marie Nicole referred to as "Tito Attorney." Marie Nicole said that when
night-time fell, respondent lawyer slept in the same bed with her and her mother and
that she saw respondent lawyer embracing her mother while they were sleeping.

Marie Nicole further recounted that the next morning, while she was watching television
along with her mother, Ate Mimi and Ate Ada, respondent lawyer who just had a
shower, and clad only in a towel or "tapis," suddenly entered the room; that she (Marie
Nicole) along with her Ate Mimi and her Ate Ada, were told to step outside the room
(either by respondent lawyer, or by her mother Annaliza), while her mother and
respondent lawyer remained inside the room.

Because of these developments, complainant filed a case for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Annaliza, with prayer for the custody of their minor children. In said
case, respondent lawyer entered his appearance as collaborating counsel for
Annaliza.3

Complainant moreover narrated that, on February 17, 2007, while he was driving his
motorcycle along the San Jose Road in Baliwasan, Zamboanga City, respondent
lawyer, who was then riding in tandem in another motorcycle with his own driver,
slowed down next to him (complainant) and yelled at him angrily, "Nah, cosa
man?!" ("So, what now?!"); that he (complainant) also noticed that respondent lawyer
kept following and shouting at him (complainant), and even challenged him to a
fistfight, and threatened to kill him.
4

Complainant further alleged that respondent lawyer also harassed his sister on February
27, 2007 by chasing and trailing after her car. 5

In his Answer, respondent lawyer asserted that the chasing incident actually took place
6

on February 16, 2007, and that it was in fact complainant himself who stared
menacingly at him (respondent lawyer) while he was riding a motorcycle in tandem
with his driver. Respondent lawyer sought to reinforce this assertion through the affidavit
of respondent lawyer's driver, Romeo T. Mirasol, and two other individuals.
7 8

Respondent lawyer denied that he had had any immoral relations with Annaliza. He
claimed that he was merely assisting Annaliza in her tempestuous court battle with
complainant for custody of her children. Respondent lawyer asserted that when Marie
Nicole's maternal grandmother, Ma. Eglinda L. Bantoto, sought out his help in this case,
he told them that they could hide in his (respondent lawyer's) parents' house in Ipil.9

Respondent lawyer claimed that the cordial relationship he had had with Annaliza
could be traced to her being the stepdaughter of his (respondent lawyer's) late uncle,
and also to her having been his former student at the Western Mindanao State
University in Zamboanga City. Respondent lawyer insisted that he was incapable of
committing the misconduct imputed to him for three simple reasons to wit: because he
is a good father to his three children, because he is a respected civic leader, and
because he had never been the subject even of a complaint with the police. He
claimed that complainant filed the instant complaint simply "to harass him from
practicing his legitimate profession, and for no other reason."10

Upon recommendation of the IBP-ZAMBASULTA Chapter Board, this case was

forwarded to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors (BOG) in
April 26, 2007. And, in an Order dated August 2, 2007 this case was then consolidated
11

with a similar case filed by the same complainant against the same respondent. 12

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner

In his Report and Recommendation, IBP Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa

13

(Investigating Commissioner) found respondent lawyer guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended his suspension from the practice
of law for one (1) month.

The Investigating Commissioner noted that on the accusation that respondent lawyer
had chased complainant in his motorcycle on February 17, 2007, this accusation had
not been fully substantiated with convincing evidence. He opined that "there [was]
doubt as to whether the incident did occur with the [respondent lawyer's] presence
and participation. [Since] the motorcycles were moving fast and the parties were
wearing helmets[, the] identity of respondent [lawyer] could not be [categorically]
established."14

The Investigating Commissioner likewise found no sufficient evidence to establish that

respondent lawyer harassed complainant's sister.

However, the Investigating Commissioner found respondent lawyer to have acted

inappropriately with Annaliza which created the appearance of immorality, viz.:

As can be gleaned from the records or the hearing, no categorical sexual activity took
place between respondent and complainant's wife. One would need to inject a bit of
imagination to create an image of something sexual. But as can be read, no sexual
activity took place based on the witness' account.

However, it would be erroneous to conclude that respondent's behavior was in total

and complete accord with how a lawyer should behave, particularly in the presence of
a minor. Was respondent's behavior toward a woman, in the presence of her minor
daughter of 11 years, proper and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession? It is
clear that there was impropriety on the part of respondent.

In Tolosa v. Cargo (A.M. No. 2385, March 8, 1989), the Court held that creating the
appearance that a lawyer is flouting with moral standards is sanctionable. Thus, while
the charge of immorality, viz[.], adulterous relationship, was not factually established,
certain behavior of the respondent did not escape notice of the Court.
In this case, while sexual immorality was not established, respondent should be held to
account for his inappropriate behavior which created the image or appearance of
immorality especially in the presence of a minor girl. Respondent's act of lying in bed
with another married woman, while he himself is a married man, in the presence of the
woman's daughter could raise suspicions, as in fact it did. x x x.

Respondent should have been considerate of the feelings and perceptions of other
people, particularly of minor children.15

The Investigating Commissioner, thus, recommended respondent lawyer's suspension for

one (1) month for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Report and Recommendation of the IBP-BOG

The IBP-BOG in its Resolution No. XIX-2011-302 adopted and approved the findings and
16

recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Sometime in 2011, complainant's counsel Atty. Mario Frez (Atty. Frez) filed a Notice,
Manifestation, and Motion for Withdrawal from this case, stating that complainant had
17

passed away on June 12, 2011; and that he was not sure whether complainant's heirs
were still willing to pursue the disbarment case against respondent lawyer since he has
had no contact with the complainant since June 1, 2009; and he has had no
information as to the whereabouts of complainant's heirs.

Notwithstanding the Motion for Withdrawal filed by Atty. Frez and considering the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondent lawyer in 2013, the IBP-BOG issued
on June 21, 2013 a Resolution denying respondent lawyer's motion for reconsideration.
18

Pursuant to Section 12(c) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, this case is before us for
final action.

Our Ruling

We find substantial merit in the findings of facts of the IBP. And we reject respondent
lawyer's highly implausible defense that the complainant filed the instant case for no
other reason but simply "to harass him from practicing his legitimate profession." There is
19

absolutely nothing in the record to support it.

It bears stressing that this case can proceed in spite of complainant's death and the
apparent lack of interest on the part of complainant's heirs. Disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers are sui generis in nature; they are intended and undertaken primarily to
look into the conduct or behavior of lawyers, to determine whether they are still fit to
exercise the privileges of the legal profession, and to hold them accountable for any
misconduct or misbehavior which deviates from the mandated norms and standards of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, all of which are needful and necessary to the
preservation of the integrity of the legal profession. Because not chiefly or primarily
intended to administer punishment, such proceedings do not call for the active service
of prosecutors.20

We first rule on the accusation relative to the chasing incidents. This Court agrees with
the IBP's findings that the evidence presented by complainant upon this point was
insufficient to establish the fact that respondent lawyer had committed the alleged
acts against the complainant and his sister.

We now turn to the accusation in regard to the immoral acts claimed to have been
committed by respondent lawyer with complainant's wife Annaliza. The issue to be
resolved here is this: Did respondent lawyer in fact commit acts that are grossly immoral,
or acts that amount to serious moral depravity, that would warrant or call for his
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law?

"Immoral conduct" has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or
shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of
the community. This Court has held that for such conduct to warrant disciplinary
21

action, the same must be "grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree." 22

It is not easy to state with accuracy what constitutes "grossly immoral conduct," let
alone what constitutes the moral delinquency and obliquity that renders a lawyer unfit
or unworthy to continue as a member of the bar in good standing. 23

In the present case, going by the eyewitness testimony of complainant's daughter

Marie Nicole, raw or explicit sexual immorality between respondent lawyer and
complainant's wife was not established as a matter of fact. Indeed, to borrow the
Investigating Commissioner's remark: "[o]ne would need to inject a bit of imagination to
create an image or something sexual." 24

That said, it can in no wise or manner be argued that respondent lawyer's behavior was
par for the course for members of the legal profession. Lawyers are mandated to do
honor to the bar at all times and to help maintain the respect of the community for the
legal profession under all circumstances. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
25

Responsibility provides:

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility further provides:

A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.
"There is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned
morality is more imperative than that of the law." As officers of the court, lawyers must
26

in fact and in truth be of good moral character. They must moreover

also be seen or appear to be of good moral character; and be seen or appear to –
live a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. Members
27

of the bar can ill-afford to exhibit any conduct which tends to lessen in any degree the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, the honesty, and the integrity of the legal
profession. The Courts require adherence to these lofty precepts because any
28

thoughtless or ill-considered actions or actuations by any member of the Bar can

irreversibly undermine public confidence in the law and, consequently, those who
practice it.
29

The acts complained of in this case might not be grossly or starkly immoral in its rawness
or coarseness, but they were without doubt condemnable. Respondent lawyer who
made avowals to being a respectable father to three children, and also to being a
respected leader of his community apparently had no qualms or scruples about being
seen sleeping in his own bed with another man's wife, his arms entwined in tender
embrace with the latter. Respondent lawyer's claim that he was inspired by nothing but
the best of intentions in inviting another married man's wife and her 10-year old
daughter to sleep with him in the same bed so that the three of them could enjoy good
night's rest in his airconditioned chamber, reeks with racy, ribald humor.

And in aggravation or the aforementioned unseemly behavior, respondent lawyer

apparently experienced neither qualms nor scruples at all about exploding into the
room occupied by a married man's wife and her 10-year old daughter and their two
other women companions clad with nothing else but a "tapis" or a towel. Of course,
respondent lawyer sought to downplay this boorish impropriety by saying in his Motion
for Reconsideration that he was wearing a malong and not tapis at that time. And, of
course, this plea will not avail because his scanty trappings gave him no license to
intrude into a small room full of women. Respondent lawyer could have simply asked
everyone in the room to step outside for a little while. Or he could have donned his
clothing elsewhere. But these things seemed to have been totally lost to respondent
lawyer's density. Indeed, respondent lawyer seemed to have forgotten that there are
rules other men – decent men, – live by.

Respondent lawyer's defense that he was a "respectable father with three children" and
that he was a "respected civic leader" to boot, flies in the face of a young girl's
perception of his diminished deportment. It does not escape this Court's attention that
the 10-year old Marie Nicole called respondent lawyer "Tito Attorney." Indeed, by
calling respondent lawyer as "Tito Attorney" Marie Nicole effectively proclaimed her
avuncular affection for him, plus her recognition of his being a member of the legal
profession. We believe that Marie Nicole must have been a bit disappointed with what
she saw and observed about the manners, predilections and propensities of her "Tito
Attorney." In fact, a close examination of Marie Nicole's testimony cannot fail to show
that in Marie Nicole's young mind, it was clearly not right, appropriate or proper for her
"Tito Attorney" to be sharing the same bed with her and her mother, and for her mother
to remain alone in the same room with her "Tito Attorney," while this "Tito Attorney" was
dressing up. In all these happenings, a modicum of decency should have impelled this
"Tito Attorney" to behave more discreetly and more sensitively, as he could not have
been unaware that Marie Nicole was observing him closely and that she could be
forming her impressions of lawyers and the legal profession by the actions and the
behavior of this, her "Tito Attorney."

In deciding, upon the appropriate sanction to be imposed upon respondent lawyer in

this case, this Court is ever mindful that administrative disciplinary proceedings are
essentially designed to protect the administration of justice and that this lofty ideal can
be attained by requiring that those who are honored by the title "Attorney" and counsel
or at law are men and women of undoubted competence, unimpeachable integrity
and undiminished professionalism, men and women in whom courts and clients may
repose confidence. This Court moreover realizes only too well that the power to disbar
30

or suspend members of the bar ought always to be exercised not in a spirit of spite,
hostility or vindictiveness, but on the preservative and corrective principle, with a view
to safeguarding the purity of the legal profession. Hence, that power can be
summoned only in the service of the most compelling duty, which must be performed,
in light of incontrovertible evidence of grave misconduct, which seriously taints the
reputation and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and as member of the
Bar. It goes without saying moreover that it should not be exercised or asserted when a
31

lesser penalty or sanction would accomplish the end desired. 32

In the context of the circumstances obtaining in this case, and hewing to jurisprudential
precedence, and considering furthermore that this is respondent lawyer's first offense,
this Court believes that a one-month suspension from the practice of law, as
recommended by the IBP, would suffice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent lawyer Atty. Berardo C. Faundo, Jr. is

hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month, reckoned from receipt
of a copy or this Decision. He is hereby WARNED to be more careful and more
circumspect in all his actions, and to be mindful of the kind of example be holds up,
especially to impressionable young people, lest he brings upon himself a direr fate the
second time around.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the personal records of Atty. Berardo C.
Faundo, Jr. as a member or the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

CANON 8

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 133090 January 19, 2001
REXIE EFREN A. BUGARING AND ROYAL BECHTEL BUILDERS, INC., petitioners,
vs.
HON. DOLORES S. ESPAÑOL, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, respondent.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of
Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite, declaring
1

petitioner Rexie Efren A. Bugaring guilty in direct contempt of court.1âwphi1.nêt

The incident subject of the petition occurred during a hearing held on December 5, 1996 of Civil Case
NO. 1266-96 entitled "Royal Becthel Builders, Inc. vs. Spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz Alvaran, et al.",
2

for Annulment of Sale and Certificates of Title, Specific Performance and Damages with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order in the sala of respondent judge Dolores S.
Español of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite.
Pursuant to a motion filed by the previous counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc., the trial court issued an
order on February 27, 1996 directing the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite to annotate at the
back of certain certificates of title a notice of lis pendens. Before the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Cavite could comply with said order, the defendant Spouses Alvaran on April 15, 1996, filed a motion to
cancel lis pendens. On July 19, 1996, petitioner, the newly appointed counsel of Royal Bechtel Builders,
Inc., filed an opposition to the motion to cancel lis pendens. On August 16, 1996, the motion to cancel lis
pendens was granted by the court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by
the defendants. On November 5, 1996, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve, and on November 6,
1996, filed a Rejoinder to Opposition and Motion for Contempt of Court. 3

During the hearing of the motion for contempt of court held on December 5, 1996, the following incident
transpired:

ATTY. For the plaintiff, your Honor, we are ready.

BUGARING:
ATTY. Same appearance for the defendant, your Honor.
CORDERO:
ATTY. Your Honor please, we are ready with respect to the prosecution of our motion for
BUGARING: contempt, your Honor. May we know from the record if the Register of Deeds is
properly notified for today's hearing.
COURT: Will you call on the Register of Deeds.
INTERPRETER: Atty. Diosdado Concepcion, He is here, your Honor.
ATTY. We are ready, your Honor.
BUGARING:
COURT: There is a motion for contempt in connection with the order of this Court which
directed your office to register lis pendens of the complaint in connection with this
case of Royal Becthel Builder, Inc. versus spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz Alvaran,
et al.
ATTY. Your Honor, I just received this morning at ten o'clock [in the morning] the subpoena.
CONCEPCION:
ATTY. May we put in on record that as early as November 6, 1996, the Office of the Register
BUGARING: of Deeds was furnished with a copy of our motion, your Honor please, and the record
will bear it out. Until now they did not file any answer, opposition or pleadings or
pleadings with respect to this motion.
ATTY. Well I was not informed because I am not the Register of Deeds. I am only the
CONCEPCION: Deputy Register of Deeds and I was not informed by the receiving clerk of our office
regarding this case. As a matter of fact I was surprised when I received this morning
the subpoena, your Honor.
ATTY. Your Honor please, may we put that on record that the manifestation of the
BUGARING: respondent that he was not informed.
COURT: That is recorded. This is a Court of record and everything that you say here is
recorded.
ATTY. Yes your Honor please, we know that but we want to be specific because we will be
BUGARING: [filing] a case against this receiving clerk who did not [inform] him your Honor please,
with this manifestation of the Deputy of the Register of Deeds that is irregularity in the
performance of the official duty of the clerk not to inform the parties concerned.
COURT: Counsel, the Court would like to find out who this fellow who is taking the video
recording at this proceedings. There is no permission from this Court that such
proceedings should be taken.
ATTY. Your Honor, my Assistant. I did not advise him to take a video he just accompanied
BUGARING: me this morning.
COURT: Right, but the video recording is prepared process and you should secure the
permission of this Court.
ATTY. Actually, I did not instruct him to take some video tape.
BUGARING:
COURT: Why would he be bringing camera if you did not give him the go signal that shots
should be done.
ATTY. This Court should not presume that, your Honor please, we just came from an
BUGARING: occasion last night and I am not yet come home, your Honor please. I could prove
your Honor please, that the contents of that tape is other matters your Honor please. I
was just surprised why he took video tape your Honor please, that we ask the
apology of this Court if that offend this Court your Honor please.
COURT: It is not offending because this is a public proceedings but the necessary authority or
permission should be secured.
ATTY. In fact I instructed him to go out, your Honor.
BUGARING:
COURT: After the court have noticed that he is taking a video tape.
ATTY. Yes, your Honor, in fact that is not my personal problem your Honor please, that is
BUGARING: personal to that guy your Honor please if this representation is being ….
COURT: That is very shallow, don't give that alibi.
ATTY. At any rate, your Honor please, we are going to mark our documentary evidence as
BUGARING: part of our motion for contempt, your Honor please.
COURT: What has the Register of Deeds got to say with this matter?
ATTY. Well as I have said before, I have not received any motion regarding this contempt
CONCEPCION: you are talking. I am willing now to testify.
ATTY. Your Honor I am still of the prosecution stage, it is not yet the defense. This is a
BUGARING: criminal proceedings, contempt proceedings is a criminal.
ATTY. Your Honor please, may I ask for the assistance from the Fiscal.
CONCEPCION:
COURT: If this is going to proceed, we need the presence of a Fiscal or a counsel for the
Register of Deeds.
ATTY. Can I appoint an outside lawyer not a Fiscal but a private counsel, your Honor.
CONCEPCION:
COURT: That is at your pleasure. The Court will consider that you should be amply
represented.
ATTY. As a matter of fact I have a lawyer here, Atty. Barzaga if he is willing….
CONCEPCION:
ATTY. Yes, your Honor, I will just review the records.
BARZAGA :4

ATTY. Anyway your Honor please, I will not yet present my witness but I will just mark our
BUGARING: documentary exhibits which are part of the record of the case and thereafter your
Honor please….
COURT: You wait for a minute counsel because there is a preparation being done by newly
appointed counsel of the respondent, Atty. Barzaga is considered as the privately
hired counsel of the register of deeds and the respondent of this contempt
proceedings. How much time do you need to go over the record of this case so that
we can call the other case in the meanwhile.
ATTY. Second call, your Honor.
BARZAGA:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------
COURT: Are you ready Atty. Barzaga?
ATTY. Yes, your Honor. Well actually your Honor, after reviewing the record of the case your
BARZAGA: Honor, I noticed that the motion for contempt of Court was filed on November 6, 1966
and in paragraph 6 thereof, your Honor it is stated that, 'the record of the case shows
up to the filing of this motion, the Register as well as the Deputy Register Diosdado
Concepcion of the Office of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, did not
comply with the Court Orders dated February 27, 1996, March 29, 1996,
respectively.' However, your Honor, Atty. Diosdado Concepcion has shown to me a
letter coming from Atty. Efren A. Bugaring dated September 18, 1996 addressed to
the Register regarding this notice of Lis Pendens pertaining to TCT Nos. T-519248,
519249 and 519250 and this letter request, your Honor for the annotation of the lis
pendens clearly shows that it has been already entered in the book of primary entry.
We would like also to invite the attention of the Hon. Court that the Motion for
Contempt of Court was filed on November 6, 1996. The letter for the annotation of the
lis pendens was made by the counsel for the plaintiff only on September 18, 1996,
your Honor. However, your Honor, as early as August 16, 1996 an Order has already
been issued by the Hon. Court reading as follows, 'Wherefore in view of the above,
the motion of the defendant is GRANTED and the Register of Deeds of the Province
of Cavite, is hereby directed to CANCEL the notice of lis pendens annotated at the
back of Certificate of Title Nos. 519248, 51949 (sic) and 51950 (sic).'
ATTY. Your Honor please, may we proceed your Honor, will first mark our documentary
BUGARING: evidence.
COURT: You wait until the Court allows you to do what you want to do, okay. The counsel has
just made manifestation, he has not prayed for anything. So let us wait until he is
finished and then wait for the direction of this Court what to do to have an orderly
proceedings in this case.
ATTY. Considering your Honor, that the issues appear to be a little bit complicated your
BUGARING: Honor, considering that the order regarding the annotation of the lis pendens has
already been revoked by the Hon. Court your Honor, we just request that we be given
a period of ten days from today your Honor, within which to submit our formal written
opposition your Honor.
COURT: Counsel, will you direct your attention to the manifestation filed earlier by Atty. Tutaan
in connection with the refusal of the Register of Deeds to annotate the lis pendens
because of certain reasons. According to the manifestation of Atty. Tutaan and it is
appearing in the earlier part of the record of this case, the reason for that is because
there was a pending subdivision plan, it is so stated. I think it was dated March, 1996.
May 1 have the record please.
ATTY. Yes, your Honor.
BARZAGA:
COURT: This Court would like to be enlightened with respect to that matter.
ATTY. Well, according to Atty. Diosdado Concepcion he could already explain this, your
BUGARING: Honor.
COURT: Have it properly addressed as part of the manifestation so that this court can be
guided accordingly. Because this Court believes that the root of the matter started
from that. After the submission of the …. What are you suppose to submit?
ATTY. Comment your Honor, on the motion to cite Atty. Diosdado Concepcion in contempt
BUGARING: of Court.
COURT: After the submission of the Comment and furnishing a copy of the comment to the
counsel for the plaintiff, this Court is going to give the counsel for the plaintiff an equal
time within which to submit his reply.
ATTY. Your Honor please, it is the position of this representation your Honor please, that we
BUGARING: will be marking first our documentary evidence because this is set for hearing for
today, your Honor please.
COURT: If you are going to mark your evidence and they do not have their comment yet what
are we going to receive as evidence.
ATTY. If your Honor please …
BUGARING:
COURT: Will you listen to the Court and just do whatever you have to do after the submission
of the comment.
ATTY. I am listening, your Honor please, but the record will show that the motion for
BUGARING: contempt was copy furnished with the Register of Deeds and Diosdado Concepcion.
COURT: Precisely, if you are listening then you will get what the Court would want to do. This
should be an orderly proceedings and considering that this is a Court of record the
comment has to be in first then in your reply you can submit your evidence to rebut
the argument that is going to be put up by the respondent and so we will be able to
hear the case smoothly.

ATTY. My point here your Honor please, is that the respondent had been long time furnished
BUGARING: of this contempt proceedings. With a copy of the motion they should have filed it in
due time in accordance with the rules and because it is scheduled for trial, we are
ready to mark our evidence and present to this Court, your Honor
COURT: (Banging the gavel) Will you listen.
ATTY. I am listening, your Honor.
BUGARING:
COURT: And this Court declares that you are out of order.
ATTY. Well, if that is the contention of the Court your Honor please, we are all officers of the
BUGARING: Court, your Honor, please, we have also ---- and we know also our procedure, your
Honor.
COURT: If you know your procedure then you follow the procedure of the Court first and then
do whatever you want.
ATTY. Yes, your Honor please, because we could feel the antagonistic approach of the
BUGARING: Court of this representation ever since I appeared your Honor please and I put on
record that I will be filing an inhibition to this Hon. Court.
COURT: Do that right away. (Banging the gavel)
ATTY. Because we could not find any sort of justice in town.
BUGARING:
COURT: Do that right away.
ATTY. We are ready to present our witness and we are deprive to present our witness.
BUGARING:
COURT: You have presented a witness and it was an adverse witness that was presented.
ATTY. I did not….
BUGARING:
COURT: With respect to this, the procedure of the Court is for the respondent to file his
comment.
ATTY. Well your Honor please, at this point in time I don't want to comment on anything but I
BUGARING: reserve my right to inhibit this Honorable Court before trying this case.
COURT: You can do whatever you want.
ATTY. Yes, your Honor, that is our prerogative your Honor.
BUGARING:
COURT: As far as this Court is concerned it is going to follow the rules.
ATTY. Yes, your Honor, we know all the rules.
BUGARING:
COURT: Yes, you know your rules that's why you are putting the cart ahead of the horse.
ATTY. No your Honor, I've been challenged by this Court that I know better than this Court.
BUGARING: Modestly (sic) aside your Honor please, I've been winning in many certiorari cases,
your Honor.
COURT: Okay, okay, do that, do that. I am going to cite you for contempt of Court. (Banging
the gavel) You call the police and I am going to send this lawyer in jail. (Turning to the
Sheriff)
ATTY. I am just manifesting and arguing in favor of my client your Honor please.
BUGARING:
COURT: You have been given enough time and you have been abusing the discretion of this
Court.
ATTY. I am very sorry your Honor, if that is the appreciation of the Court but this is one way I
BUGARING: am protecting my client, your Honor.
COURT: That is not the way to protect your client that is an abuse of the discretion of this
Court. (Turning to the Sheriff) "Will you see to it that this guy is put in jail." (pp. 29-42.
Rollo)

Hence, in an Order dated December 5, 1996, Judge Español cited petitioner in direct contempt of court,
thus:

During the hearing of this case, plaintiffs and counsel were present together with one (1)
operating a video camera who was taking pictures of the proceedings of the case while counsel,
Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring was making manifestation to the effect that he was ready to mark his
documentary evidence pursuant to his Motion to cite (in contempt of court) the Deputy Register of
Deeds of Cavite, Diosdado Concepcion.
The Court called the attention of said counsel who explained that he did not cause the
appearance of the cameraman to take pictures, however, he admitted that they came from a
function, and that was the reason why the said cameraman was in tow with him and the plaintiffs.
Notwithstanding the flimsy explanation given, the counsel sent out the cameraman after the Court
 took exception to the fact that although the proceedings are open to the public and that it being a
court of record, and since its permission was not sought, such situation was an abuse of
discretion of the Court.
When the respondent, Deputy Register of Deeds Concepcion manifested that he needed the
services of counsel and right then and there appointed Atty. Elpidio Barzaga to present him, the
case was allowed to be called again. On the second call, Atty. Burgaring started to insist that he
be allowed to mark and present his documentary evidence in spite of the fact that Atty. Barzaga
was still manifesting that he be allowed to submit a written pleading for his client, considering that
the Motion has so many ramifications and the issues are complicated.
At this point, Atty. Bugaring was insisting that he be allowed to mark his documentary evidence
and was raring to argue as in fact he was already perorating despite the fact that Atty. Barzaga
has not yet finished with his manifestation. As Atty. Bugaring appears to disregard orderly
procedure, the Court directed him to listen and wait for the ruling of the Court for an orderly
proceeding.
While claiming that he was listening, he would speak up anytime he felt like doing so. Thus, the
Court declared him out of order, at which point, Atty. Bugaring flared up the uttered words
insulting the Court; such as: 'that he knows better than the latter as he has won all his cases of
certiorari in the appellate Courts, that he knows better the Rules of Court; that he was going to
move for the inhibition of the Presiding Judge for allegedly being antagonistic to his client,' and
other invectives were hurled to the discredit of the Court.
Thus, in open court, Atty. Bugaring was declared in direct contempt and order the Court's sheriff
to arrest and place him under detention.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and the fact that Atty. Rexie Efren Bugaring committed an
open defiance, even challenging the Court in a disrespectful, arrogant, and contumacious
manner, he is declared in direct contempt of Court and is sentenced to three (3) days
imprisonment and payment of a fine of P3,000.00. His detention shall commence immediately at
the Municipal Jail of Imus, Cavite.5

Pursuant to said Order, the petitioner served his three (3) day sentence at the Imus Municipal Jail, and
paid the fine of P3,000.00. 6

While serving the first day of his sentence on December 5, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order citing him in direct contempt of court. The next day, December 6, 1996,
petitioner filed another motion praying for the resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Both motions
were never resolved and petitioner was released on December 8, 1996. 7

To clear his name in the legal circle and the general public, petitioner filed a petition before the Court of
Appeals praying for the annulment of the Order dated December 5, 1996 citing him in direct contempt of
court and the reimbursement of the fine of P3,000.00 on grounds that respondent Judge Dolores S.
Español had no factual and legal basis in citing him in direct contempt of court, and that said Order was
null and void for being in violation of the Constitution and other pertinent laws and jurisprudence. 8

The Court of Appeals found that from a thorough reading of the transcript of stenographic notes of the
hearing held on December 5, 1996, it was obvious that the petitioner was indeed arrogant, at times
impertinent, too argumentative, to the extent of being disrespectful, annoying and sarcastic towards the
court. It affirmed the order of the respondent judge, but found that the fine of P3,000.00 exceeded the
9

limit of P2,000.00 prescribed by the Rules of Court, and ordered the excess of P1,000.00 returned to
10

petitioner. On March 6, 1998, it rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed order dated
December 5, 1996 issued by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the
excess fine of P1,000.00 is ORDERED RETURNED to the petitioner.

Before us, petitioner ascribes to the Court of Appeals this lone error:

THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE

ASSAILED ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH TO PETITIONER'S SUBMISSIONS
 SMACKS OF OPPRESSION AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY, HENCE IT COMMITTED A GRAVE
ERROR OF LAW IN ITS QUESTIONED DECISION. 11

Petitioner insists that a careful examination of the transcript of stenographic notes of the subject
proceedings would reveal that the contempt order issued by respondent judge had no factual and legal
basis. It would also show that he was polite and respectful towards the court as he always addressed the
court with the phrase "your honor please."
We disagree.
Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 22-95 provides:

Direct contempt punished summarily. – A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so

near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including
disrespect toward the court or judge, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn
or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do
so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court or judge and punished by a fine not
exceeding two thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both, if it be a
superior court, or a judge thereof, or by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment
not exceeding one (1) day, or both, if it be an inferior court.

We agree with the statement of the Court of Appeals that petitioner's alleged deference to the trial court in
consistently addressing the respondent judge as "your Honor please" throughout the proceedings is
belied by his behavior therein:

1. the veiled threat to file a petition for certiorari against the trial court (pp. 14-15, tsn, December
5, 1996; pp. 41-42, Rollo) is contrary to Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates that "a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts".
2. the hurled uncalled for accusation that the respondent judge was partial in favor of the other
party (pp. 13-14, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 40-41, Rollo) is against Rule 11.04, Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers from attributing to a judge "motives not
supported by the record or have no materiality to the case".
3. behaving without due regard to the trial court's order to maintain order in the proceedings (pp.
9-13, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 36-40, Rollo) I in utter disregard to Canon 1 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics which makes it a lawyer's duty to "maintain towards the courts (1) respectful
attitude" in order to maintain its importance in the administration of justice, and Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to "observe and maintain the
respect due to the Courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others".
4. behaving without due regard or deference to his fellow counsel who at the time he was making
representations in behalf of the other party, was rudely interrupted by the petitioner and was not
allowed to further put a word in edgewise (pp. 7-13, tsn, December 5, 1996; pp. 34-39, Rollo) is
violative of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Ethics which obliges a lawyer to conduct himself
with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and
5. The refusal of the petitioner to allow the Registrar of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, through
counsel, to exercise his right to be heard (Ibid) is against Section 1 of Article III, 1997 Constitution
on the right to due process of law, Canon 18 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which
mandates a lawyer to always treat an adverse witness "with fairness and due consideration," and
Canon 12 of Code of Professional Responsibility which insists on a lawyer to "exert every effort
and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice."

The Court cannot therefore help but notice the sarcasm in the petitioner's use of the phrase "your honor
please." For, after using said phrase he manifested utter disrespect to the court in his subsequent
utterances. Surely this behavior from an officer of the Court cannot and should not be countenanced, if
proper decorum is to be observed and maintained during court proceedings. 12

Indeed, the conduct of petitioner in persisting to have his documentary evidence marked to the extent of
interrupting the opposing counsel and the court showed disrespect to said counsel and the court, was
defiant of the court's system for an orderly proceeding, and obstructed the administration of justice. The
power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in
judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and
consequently, to the due administrative of justice. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so
13

near a court or judge, as in the case at bar, and can be punished summarily without hearing. Hence,
14

petitioner cannot claim that there was irregularity in the actuation of respondent judge in issuing the
contempt order inside her chamber without giving the petitioner the opportunity to defend himself or make
an immediate reconsideration. The records show that petitioner was cited in contempt of court during he
hearing in the sala of respondent judge, and he even filed a motion for reconsideration of the contempt
order on the same day. 15

Petitioner argued that while it might appear that he was carried by his emotions in espousing the case of
his client – by persisting to have his documentary evidence marked despite the respondent judge's
contrary order – he did so in the honest belief that he was bound to protect the interest of his client to the
best of his ability and with utmost diligence.
The Court of Appeals aptly stated:

But "a lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause" (Buenaseda v. Flavier,
226 SCRA 645, 656). He should not forget that he is an officer of the court, bound to exert every
effort and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice
Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City, 249 SCRA 432, 439). He should not, therefore,
misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice per Rule 10.03. Canon 10 of the
Canons of Professional Responsibility, or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes, in accordance with Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the same
Canons (Ibid).
"Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of
justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice
contravenes such lawyer's duty."16

Although respondent judge was justified in citing petitioner in direct contempt of court, she erred in
imposing a fine in the amount of P3,000.00 which exceeded the ceiling of P2,000.00 under Supreme
Court Administrative Circular No. 22-95 which took effect on November 16, 1995. It was not established
that the fine was imposed in bad faith. The Court of Appeals thus properly ordered the return of the
excess of P1,000.00. Aside from the fine, the three days imprisonment meted out to petitioner was
justified and within the 10-day limit prescribed in Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
It is our view and we hold, therefore, that the Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error in its
assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated March 6, 1998 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite is ordered to return to
the petitioner, Rexie Efren A. Bugaring, the sum of P1,000.00 out of the original fine of
P3,000.00.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
EN BANC

[A.C. No. 5148. July 1, 2003.]

Atty. RAMON P. REYES, Complainant, v. Atty. VICTORIANO T. CHIONG, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Lawyers should treat each other with courtesy, dignity and civility. The bickering and the hostility of their
clients should not affect their conduct and rapport with each other as professionals and members of the
bar.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The Case

Before us is a Sworn Complaint 1 filed by Atty. Ramon P. Reyes with the Office of the Bar Confidant of
this Court, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Victoriano T. Chiong Jr. for violation of his lawyer’s oath and of
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. After the Third Division of this Court referred the case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline resolved to suspend
him as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . [C]onsidering that respondent is bound by his oath which binds him in the obligation that he will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the
same. In addition, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall
conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel. In impleading complainant and Prosecutor Salanga in Civil
Case No. 4884, when it was apparent that there was no legal ground to do so, respondent violated his
oath of office as well as the above-quoted Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility, [r]espondent
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years." 2

The Facts

In his Complaint, Atty. Reyes alleges that sometime in January 1998, his services were engaged by one
Zonggi Xu, 3 a Chinese-Taiwanese, in a business venture that went awry. Xu invested P300,000 on a
Cebu-based fishball, tempura and seafood products factory being set up by a certain Chia Hsien Pan,
another Chinese-Taiwanese residing in Zamboanga City. Eventually, the former discovered that the latter
had not established a fishball factory. When Xu asked for his money back, Pan became hostile, making it
necessary for the former to seek legal assistance.

Xu, through herein complainant, filed a Complaint for estafa against Pan, who was represented
by Respondent. The Complaint, docketed as IS 98J-51990, was assigned to Assistant Manila City
Prosecutor Pedro B. Salanga, who then issued a subpoena for Pan to appear for preliminary investigation
on October 27 and 29, 1998. The latter neither appeared on the two scheduled hearings nor submitted
his counter-affidavit. Hence, Prosecutor Salanga filed a Criminal Complaint 4 for estafa against him
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. 5 On April 8, 1999, the Manila RTC issued a Warrant of
Arrest 6 against Pan.

Thereafter, respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the Warrant of Arrest. 7 He also filed with the
RTC of Zamboanga City a Civil Complaint for the collection of a sum of money and damages as well as
for the .dissolution of a business venture against complainant, Xu and Prosecutor Salanga.

When confronted by complainant, respondent explained that it was Pan who had decided to institute the
civil action against Atty. Reyes. Respondent claimed he would suggest to his client to drop the civil case,
if complainant would move for the dismissal of the estafa case. However, the two lawyers failed to reach
a settlement.

In his Comment 8 dated January 27, 2000, respondent argued that he had shown no disrespect in
impleading Atty. Reyes as co-defendant in Civil Case No. 4884. He claimed that there was no basis to
conclude that the suit was groundless, and that it had been instituted only to exact vengeance. He alleged
that Prosecutor Salanga was impleaded as an additional defendant because of the irregularities the latter
had committed in conducting the criminal investigation. Specifically, Prosecutor Salanga had resolved to
file the estafa case despite the pendency of Pan’s Motion for an Opportunity to Submit Counter-Affidavits
and Evidence, 9 of the appeal 10 to the justice secretary, and of the Motion to Defer/Suspend
Proceedings. 11

On the other hand, complainant was impleaded, because he allegedly connived with his client (Xu) in
filing the estafa case, which the former knew fully well was baseless. According to respondent, the
irregularities committed by Prosecutor Salanga in the criminal investigation and complainant’s connivance
therein were discovered only after the institution of the collection suit.

The Third Division of this Court referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
12 Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed its June 29, 2002 Resolution. 13

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In her Report and Recommendation, 14 Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, to whom the case was
assigned by the IBP for investigation and report, averred that complainant and Prosecutor Salanga had
been impleaded in Civil Case No. 4884 on the sole basis of the Criminal Complaint for estafa they had
filed against respondent’s client. In his Comment, respondent himself claimed that "the reason . . . was . .
. the irregularities of the criminal investigation/connivance and consequent damages."cralaw virtua1aw
library

Commissioner San Juan maintained that the collection suit with damages had been filed purposely to
obtain leverage against the estafa case, in which respondent’s client was the defendant. There was no
need to implead complainant and Prosecutor Salanga, since they had never participated in the business
transactions between Pan and Xu. Improper and highly questionable was the inclusion of the prosecutor
and complainant in the civil case instituted by respondent on the alleged prodding of his client. Verily, the
suit was filed to harass complainants and Prosecutor Salanga.

Commissioner San Juan held that respondent had no ground to implead Prosecutor Salanga and
complainant in Civil Case No. 4884. In so doing, respondent violated his oath of office and Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP adopted the investigating commissioner’s recommendation
for his suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years.

This Court’s Ruling

We agree with the IBP’s recommendation.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and
upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities, and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. 15
Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the
legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that" [a] lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel." chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Respondent’s actions do not measure up to this Canon. Civil Case No. 4884 was for the "collection of a
sum of money, damages and dissolution of an unregistered business venture." It had originally been filed
against Spouses Xu, but was later modified to include complainant and Prosecutor Salanga.

The Amended and Supplemental Complaints 16 alleged the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"27. The investigating prosecutor defendant Pedro Salanga knowingly and deliberately refused and failed
to perform his duty enjoined by the law and the Constitution to afford plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan due process
by violating his rights under the Rules on preliminary investigations; he also falsely made a Certification
under oath that preliminary investigation was duly conducted and plaintiff (was) duly informed of the
charges against him but did not answer; he maliciously and . . . partially ruled that there was probable
cause and filed a Criminal Information for estafa against plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan, knowing fully [well] that
the proceedings were fatally defective and null and void; . . .;

"28. Said assistant prosecutor, knowing also that plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan filed said appeal and motion to
defer for the valid grounds stated therein deliberately refused to correct his errors and consented to the
arrest of said plaintiff under an invalid information and warrant of arrest.

"29. Defendant Atty. Ramon Reyes, knowing that the suit of defendant Zongoi Xu is baseless connived
with the latter to harass and extort money from plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan by said criminal prosecution in the
manner contrary to law, morals and public policy, resulting to the arrest of said plaintiff and causing
plaintiffs grave irreparable damages[.]" 17

We concur with the IBP that the amendment of the Complaint and the failure to resort to the proper
remedies strengthen complainant’s allegation that the civil action was intended to gain leverage against
the estafa case. If respondent or his client did not agree with Prosecutor Salanga’s resolution, they should
have used the proper procedural and administrative remedies. Respondent could have gone to the justice
secretary and filed a Motion for Reconsideration or a Motion for Reinvestigation of Prosecutor Salanga’s
decision to file an information for estafa.

In the trial court, a Motion to Dismiss was available to him if he could show that the estafa case was filed
without basis. Moreover, he could have instituted disbarment proceedings against complainant and
Prosecutor Salanga, if he believed that the two had conspired to act illegally. As a lawyer, respondent
should have advised his client of the availability of these remedies. Thus, the filing of the civil case had no
justification.

The lack of involvement of complainant and Prosecutor Salanga in the business transaction subject of the
collection suit shows that there was no reason for their inclusion in that case. It appears that respondent
took the estafa case as a personal affront and used the civil case as a tool to return the inconvenience
suffered by his client. His actions demonstrate a misuse of the legal process. The aim of every lawsuit
should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them. 18

Lawyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with courtesy, dignity and civility. A great
part of their comfort, as well as of their success at the bar, depends upon their relations with their
professional brethren. Since they deal constantly with each other, they must treat one another with trust
and respect. Any undue ill feeling between clients should not influence counsels in their conduct and
demeanor toward each other. Mutual bickering, unjustified recriminations and offensive behavior among
lawyers not only detract from the dignity of the legal profession, 19 but also constitute highly
unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action.

Furthermore, the Lawyer’s Oath exhorts law practitioners not to "wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same."cralaw virtua1aw library

Respondent claims that it was his client who insisted in impleading complainant and Prosecutor Salanga.
Such excuse is flimsy and unacceptable. While lawyers owe entire devotion to the interests of their
clients, their office does not permit violation of the law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. 20 Their
rendition of improper service invites stern and just condemnation. Correspondingly, they advance the
honor of their profession and the best interests of their clients when they render service or give advice
that meets the strictest principles of moral law. 21

The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers in the esteem of their professional brethren. This
esteem cannot be purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or contrivance. It is born of sharp
contests and thrives despite conflicting interests. It emanates solely from integrity, character, brains and
skill in the honorable performance of professional duty. 22
WHEREFORE, respondent is found guilty as charged and is hereby SUSPENDED for two (2) years from
the practice of law, effectively immediately.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

ATTY. IRENEO L. TORRES and MRS. NATIVIDAD CELESTINO, Adm. Case No. 5910
Complainants,
Present :

- versus - PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, and
ATTY. JOSE CONCEPCION JAVIER, GARCIA, JJ.
Respondent. Promulgated:
'
September 21, 2005

xx - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xx

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

By complaint [1] dated November 26, 2002, Atty. Ireneo L. Torres and Mrs. Natividad Celestino (complainants) charge
Atty. Jose Concepcion Javier (respondent) for malpractice, gross misconduct in office as an attorney and/or violation
of the lawyer's oath.

The charges stemmed from the statements/remarks made by respondent in the pleadings he filed in a petition for audit
of all funds of the University of the East Faculty Association (UEFA), as counsel for the therein petitioners UEFA then
Treasurer Rosamarie Laman, and his wife-former UEFA President Eleonor Javier, before the Bureau of Labor Relations
(BLR), Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) against herein complainants, docketed as NCR-OD-0105-004-
LRD (audit case), [2] and from the pleadings filed by respondent in another labor case as counsel for the one hundred
seventy six (176) faculty members of the University of the East complainants against herein complainant Atty. Ireneo
L. Torres, et al., [3] docketed as NCR-0D-0201-0005-LRD (attorney's fees case). [4]
The complaint sets forth three (3) causes of action against respondent.

The first cause of action is based on respondent's 'Urgent Motion to Expedite with Manifestation and Reiteration of
Position (Motion to Expedite) filed in the audit case which complainants allege contained statements which are
absolutely false, unsubstantiated, and with malicious imputation of crimes of robbery, theft of UEFFA's funds,
destruction or concealment of UEFA's documents and some other acts tending to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt
upon their persons. [5] Portions of the questioned motion read:

Undersigned attorney would like to manifest ' just so it can not be said later on that he kept mum on
the matter ' that when individual respondents-appellants realized that an audit of Union funds was
looming, it appears that they decided to destroy or conceal documents as demonstrated by an
'Incident Report Re Robbery dated May 6, 2002 (a copy just recently secured by the undersigned),
attached hereto as Annex 'A', where the police investigator stated that 'no forcible entry was noted by
him but 'that air condition on the respective rooms were (sic) slightly move (sic) to mislead that suspect
as the same as their point of entry.[] The police officers stated that 'no cash of (sic) money were stolen
but instead claimed that still undetermined documents/important papers were stolen by the suspects.

This brings to mind the United States case against Andersen officials who shredded documents
related to the Enron scandal when they thought nobody was looking. As in the Andersen/Enron case,
 the individual respondents-appellants in the instant case knew that the law was going to come
knocking at their door, asking a lot [of] questions about financial matters.

From the undersigned's standpoint, the alleged 'robbery of 'still undetermined documents/papers' was
an inside job as investigation has shown that there is no evidence of forced entry. Besides, it would
be a cinch to establish a motive by individual respondents-appellants Torres and Celestino to destroy
documents related to the audit ordered by Regional Director Alex E. Maraan. In any event, the
undersigned thinks that the legal process should go on. Lumang gimmick na 'yang 'robbery ng mga
evidensya. They may try to cover up the 'looting of union funds, but there is such a thing as secondary
evidence, not to mention the power of this Honorable Office to issue subpoenas even to the union's
depositary banks. [6] (Underscoring supplied)
Complainants aver that respondent violated the attorney's oath that he 'obey the laws' and 'do no falsehood, the Code
of Professional Responsibility particularly Rule 10.01 thereof, and Rule 138, specifically paragraph 20 (f) of the Rules
of Court for directly pointing to them as the persons who intentionally committed the robbery at the UEFA office, and
for citing the Andersen/Enron case which is irrelevant, impertinent, and immaterial to the subject of quasi-judicial
inquiry. [7]

As second cause of action, complainants allege that in the attorney's fees case, respondent, in his 'Reply to
Respondents (Torres and Marquez) Answer/Comment filed before the DOLE, used language that was clearly abusive,
offensive, and improper, [8] inconsistent with the character of an attorney as a quasi-judicial officer. [9]

As third/last cause of action, complainants quote respondent's statement in the aforesaid Reply, to wit:

It is not uncommon for us trial lawyers to hear notaries public asking their sons, wives, girlfriends,
nephews, etc. to operate a notarial office and sign for them. These girlfriends, nephews, etc. take
affidavits, administer oaths and certify documents. x x x, [10]

and allege that the statement is demeaning to the integrity of the legal profession, 'uncalled for and deserve[s] censure,
[as] the same might shrink the degree of confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity
of the legal profession and the solemnity of a notarial document. [11]

By his Comment, respondent candidly professes that he was angry [12] while he was preparing his 'Motion to Expedite
in the audit case, it having come to his knowledge that the UEFA office had been burglarized and complainant Atty.
Torres had been spreading reports and rumors implicating his clients including his wife to the burglary. [13]

Respondent stresses that he felt that it was his duty to inform the BLR of the loss of the vital documents so that the
resolution of the pending motion for reconsideration filed by complainants would be expedited; [14] and that the
information regarding the burglary and his use of the Andersen/Enron case as a figure of speech were relevant in
drawing a link between the burglary and the audit ' the burglary having rendered the complete implementation of the
audit unattainable. [15]

With respect to the attorney's fees case, respondent claims that Atty. Torres did not in his Answer confront the issues
thereof but instead 'mock[ed] his wife and fabricat[ed] and distort[ed] realities' [16] by including malicious, libelous and
impertinent statements and accusations against his wife which exasperated him. [17] A portion of Atty. Torres' Answer
in the attorney's fees case reads:

x x x in her incumbency as President of the UEFA for 12 years (1987-1999) she got only about
P2.00/hr CBA increase which took effect only [in] 1994, with no other substantial improvements of the
teacher's benefits, and yet she spent for more than half a million negotiation expenses from the
UEFA's funds. Her 1994-1999 CBA was only a carbon copy of her old 1989-1994 CBA with no
substantial improvements, with uncertain amount of her expenses, because she removed/concealed
all the financial records of the UEFA during her term. . . I and the other lawyers/teachers denounced
her unlawful deduction of 10% attorney's fees from the small backwages received by the teachers on
April 28, 1993 although there was actually no lawyer who worked for itand there was no Board nor
General Membership Assembly Resolutions passedthe assembly [Nov. 24, 2001] was apparently
irked to Mrs. Eleanor Javier when she was booed while talking on the floor, like a confused gabble
(sic) [18]
Not wanting to allow his wife to be maligned by Atty. Torres, respondent admits having responded with a counter-attack
in his 'Reply to Respondents (Torres and Marquez) Answer/Comment [19] wherein he stated:

What kind of a lawyer is this Atty. Torres? The undersigned feels that Atty. Torres just cannot kick the
habit of injecting immaterial, irrelevant, and impertinent matters in his pleadings. More than that, he
lies through his teeth. The undersigned thinks that if he has any common sense at all he should shut
up about his accusation that Prof. Javier spent more than half a million pesos for negotiation
expensesshe obtained only P2-increase in union members salary, etc. because of the pendency of
the damage suit against him on this score. He easily forgets the sad chapter of his life as a practitioner
when he lost out to Prof. Javier in the petition for audit (Case No. NCR-OD-M-9401-004) which he
filed to gain 'pogi points prior to the UEFA election in 1994. [20]

xxx

To repeat, if respondent Atty. Torres has any common sense at all, he should stop making irrelevant,
libelous and impertinent allegations in his pleadings. This means changing his 'standard tactic of
skirting the main issues by injecting a web or a maze of sham, immaterial, impertinent or scandalous
matters. [21] (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent adds that he merely wanted to bring to the BLR's attention that Atty. Torres had the habit of hurling baseless
accusations against his wife to embarrass her, including one for unjust vexation and another for collection and damages
both of which were dismissed after trial on the merits, thus prompting him to state that 'these dismissed cases indubitably
indicate Atty. Torres' pattern of mental dishonesty. [22]

Respondent further claims that in his Answer in the same attorney's fees case, Atty. Torres accused his client, Prof.
Maguigad, of forging the signature of a notary public and of 'deliberately us[ing] a falsified/expired Community Tax
Certificate in order to justify the dismissal of the case against him (Atty. Torres); [23] and that Atty. Torres continued
harassing his clients including his wife by filing baseless complaints for falsification of public document. [24] Hence, in
defense of his clients, the following statements in his Reply:

Respondent further concluded that lead petitioner Prof. Maguigad 'falsified the said petition by causing
it to appear that he participated in the falsification when he did not in truth and in fact participate
thereat . . . obviously oblivious of the obvious that it is highly improbable for Prof. Maguigad to have
forged the signature of the notary public. If he intended to forge it, what was the big idea of doing so?
To save Fifty Pesos (P50.00) for notarial fee? Needless to say, the allegation that lead (sic) petitioner
Maguigad used a falsified Com. Tax Cert. is patently unfounded and malicious.

But that is not all. Respondents went further and charged Profs. Mendoza, Espiritu, Ramirez and
Javier with the same crime of falsification of public document . . . 'by causing it to appear that Rogelio
Maguigad had indeed participated in the act of verifying/subscribing and swearing the subject petition
before notary public Atty. Jorge M. Ventayen, when in truth and in fact he did not participate thereat.

To the mind of the undersigned, this is the height of irresponsibility, coming as it does from a member
of the Philippine Bar. There is no evidence to charge them with falsification of public document, i.e.
the 'verification appended to the present petition. They did not even sign it. The crime imputed is
clearly bereft of merit. Frankly, the undersigned thinks that even a dim-witted first-year law student
would not oblige with such a very serious charge.

It is not uncommon for us trial lawyer[s] to hear notaries public asking their sons, wives, girlfriends,
nephews, etc. to 'operate a notarial office and sign for them. These girlfriends, nephews, etc. take
affidavits, administer oaths, and certify documents. Believing that the said 'veification was signed by
an impostor-relative of the notary public [Atty. Jorge M. Ventayan] through no fault of his client, Prof.
Maguigad, the undersigned sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). On
May 2, 2002, an NBI agent called up the undersigned to inform him that he arrested in the area near
UE one Tancredo E. Ventayen whom he caught in flagrante delicto notarizing an affidavit of loss and
feigning to be Atty. Jorge M. Ventayen, supposedly his uncle. [25]
xxx

Petitioners devoted so much space in their answer/comment vainly trying to prove that Profs.
Maguigad, Mendoza, Espiritu, Ramirez, and Javier committed the crime of falsification of public
 document reasoning out that they made 'untruthful statements in the narration of facts' in the basic
petition.

Respondent Torres is a member of the Philippine Bar. But what law books is he reading?

He should know or ought to know that the allegations in petitioners' pleading are absolutely privileged
because the said allegations or statements are relevant to the issues. [26] (Underscoring supplied)

The Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) found respondent guilty of violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility for using inappropriate and offensive remarks in his pleadings.

The pertinent portions of the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation read:

Respondent admits that he was angry when he wrote the Manifestationand alleges that Complainant
implicated his wife in a burglary. Moreover, Respondent alleges that Complainant has been 'engaged
in intimidating and harassing his wife.

It appears that herein Complainant and herein Respondent's wife have had a series of charges and
counter-charges filed against each other. Both parties being protagonists in the intramurals within the
University of the East Faculty Association (UEFA). Herein Complainant is the President of the UEFA
whereas Respondent's wife was the former President of UEFA. Nevertheless, we shall treat this
matter of charges and counter-charges filed, which involved the UEFA, as extraneous, peripheral, if
not outright irrelevant to the issue at hand.

xxx
Clearly, [r]espondent's primordial reason for the offensive remark stated in his pleadings was
his emotional reaction in view of the fact that herein Complainant was in a legal dispute with his wife.
This excuse cannot be sustained. Indeed, the remarks quoted above are offensive and inappropriate.
That the Respondent is representing his wife is not at all an excuse. [27] (Underscoring supplied)

Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be reprimanded.

The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), by Resolution [28] of October 7, 2004, adopted
and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

The Report of the IBP faulting respondent is well-taken but not its recommendation to reprimand him.

It is well entrenched in Philippine jurisprudence that for reasons of public policy, utterances made in the course of
judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions, are absolutely privileged so long as they
are pertinent and relevant to the subject inquiry, however false or malicious they may be. [29]

The requirements of materiality and relevancy are imposed so that the protection given to individuals in the interest of
an efficient administration of justice may not be abused as a cloak from beneath which private malice may be
gratified. [30] If the pleader goes beyond the requirements of the statute and alleges an irrelevant matter which is
libelous, he loses his privilege. [31]

A matter, however, to which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter
of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy or impropriety. [32] That matter alleged in a pleading
need not be in every case material to the issues presented by the pleadings. It must, however,
be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of
inquiry in the course of the trial. [33]

The first cause of action of complainants is based on respondent's allegation in his 'Motion to Expedite that a burglary
of the UEFA office took place, and his imputation to complainants of a plausible motive for carrying out the burglary '
the concealment and destruction of vital documents relating to the audit. The imputation may be false but it could indeed
possibly prompt the BLR to speed up the resolution of the audit case. In that light, this Court finds that the first cause
of action may not lie.
As regards the second cause of action, it appears that respondent was irked by Atty. Torres' Answer to the complaint in
the attorney's fees case wherein he criticized his (respondent's ) wife's performance as past President of UEFA.

This Court does not countenance Atty. Torres' incorporating in his Answer in the attorney's fees case statements such
as 'the assembly . . . was apparently irked by Mrs. Eleonor Javier when she was booed while talking on the floor like a
confused gabble (sic). But neither does it countenance respondent's retaliating statements like 'what kind of lawyer is
Atty. Torres?, 'he lies through his teeth, 'if he has any common sense at all he should shut up, and Atty. Torres forgets
the sad chapter of his life as a practitioner when he lost out to Prof. Javier in the petition for audit which he filed to
gain pogi points. Nor respondent's emphasis that Atty. Torres is of the habit of hurling baseless accusations against his
wife by stating that the dismissal of the cases against his wife, of which Atty. Torres was the complainant, indubitably
indicate Atty. Torres' pattern of mental dishonesty.

The issue in the attorney's fees case was whether the 10% attorney's fees 'checked off from the initial
backwages/salaries of UEFA members is legal. Clearly, the above-quoted statements of respondent in the immediately
preceding paragraph cannot be said to be relevant or pertinent to the issue. That Atty. Torres may have conducted
himself improperly is not a justification for respondent to be relieved from observing professional conduct in his relations
with Atty. Torres.

Clients, not lawyers, are the litigants, so whatever may be the ill-feeling existing between clients should not be allowed
to influence counsel in their conduct toward each other or toward suitors in the case. [34]

In the attorney's fees case, Atty. Torres was acting as counsel for himself as respondent and complainant was acting
as counsel for his wife as complainant. Although it is understandable, if not justifiable, that in the defense of one's clients
- especially of one's wife or of one's self, the zeal in so doing may be carried out to the point of undue skepticism and
doubts as to the motives of opposing counsel, the spectacle presented by two members of the bar engaged in bickering
and recrimination is far from edifying, and detract from the dignity of the legal profession. [35]

Moreover, in arguing against the dismissal of the attorney's fees case on the basis of the alleged forgery of the notary
public's signature, respondent did not only endeavor to point out that Atty. Torres erred in advancing such an argument,
but personally attacked Atty. Torres' mental fitness by stating that 'the undersigned thinks that even a dim-witted first-
year law student would not oblige with such a very serious charge, and '[r]espondent Torres is a member of the bar
[b]ut what law books is he reading.

In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language must be dignified and choice of language is
important in the preparation of pleadings. [36] In the assertion of his client's rights, a lawyer ' even one gifted with
superior intellect 'is enjoined to rein up his temper. [37]

As reflected above, the inclusion of the derogatory statements by respondent was actuated by his giving vent to his ill-
feelings towards Atty. Torres, a purpose to which the mantle of absolute immunity does not extend. Personal colloquies
between counsel which cause delay and promote unseemly wrangling should be carefully avoided. [38]

If indeed Atty. Torres filed criminal complaints for falsification of public documents against respondent's clients as a
scheme to harass them, they are not without adequate recourse in law, for if they plead for a righteous cause, the
course of justice will surely tilt in their favor, the courts being ever vigilant in the protection of a party's rights. [39]

Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

CANON 8 ' A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESSS AND
CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING
TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.

Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive
or otherwise improper.

instructs that respondent's arguments in his pleadings should be gracious to both the court and opposing counsel and
be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another. [40] The language vehicle does not run
short of expressions

which are emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive. [41]
As to the reference by respondent to the unfortunate and contemptible practice of notaries public ' basis of the last
cause of action, while it may detract from the dignity that should characterize the legal profession and the solemnity of
a notarial document, respondent, who justifies the same as legitimate defense of his client who was being accused by
Atty. Torres of forgery, may, given the relevance of the statement to the subject matter of the pleading, be given the
benefit of the doubt.

Respecting the verified complaint ' Annex 'EJ-A [42] to the Comment of respondent filed by his wife, Prof. Eleonor R.
Javier, against complainant Atty. Torres, the same cannot be consolidated with the present administrative case since
the parties and causes of action of such complaint are completely different from those of the present complaint.

WHEREFORE , for employing offensive and improper language in his pleadings, respondent Atty. Jose C. Javier is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for One (1) Month, effective upon receipt of this Decision, and
is STERNLY
WARNED that any future infraction of a similar nature shall be dealt with more severely. '

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

SECOND DIVISION

ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO, A.C. No. 6396

Complainant,

Present:

PUNO, J.,
Chairman,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
'
ATTY. VIRGIL R. CASTRO,
Respondent, Promulgated:

October 25, 2005

x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who hurled invectives at a Clerk of Court. Members of the bar
decorum must at all times comfort themselves in a manner befitting their noble profession.

Complainant Atty. Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. On 8 May 2003, she filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a Complaint-Affidavit [1] with supporting documents [2] against
respondent Atty. Virgil R. Castro for Unprofessional Conduct, specifically violation of Canon 7, Rule 7.03,
Canon 8 and Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. [3] The charge in the complaint is
summed up as follows:

Respondent Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and Vice-President of IBP-Nueva Vizcaya Chapter. On
5 May 2003, respondent went to complainant's office to inquire whether the complete records of Civil Case
No. 784, entitled Sps. Crispino Castillano v. Sps. Federico S. Castillano and Felicidad Aberin, had already
been remanded to the court of origin, MCTC Dupax del Norte, Alfonso Castaned, Nueva Vizcaya. It must
be noted that respondent was not the counsel of record of either party in Civil Case No. 784.

Complainant informed respondent that the record had not yet been transmitted since a certified true copy
of the decision of the Court of Appeals should first be presented to serve as basis for the transmittal of the
records to the court of origin. To this respondent retorted scornfully, 'Who will certify the Court of Appeals'
Decision, the Court of Appeals? You mean to say, I would still have to go to Manila to get a certified true
copy? Surprised at this outburst, complainant replied, 'Sir, it's in the Rules but you could show us the copy
sent to the party you claim to be representing. Respondent then replied, 'Then you should have notified me
of the said requirement. That was two weeks ago and I have been frequenting your office since then, but
you never bothered to notify me. Complainant replied, 'It is not our duty, Sir, to notify you of the said
requirement.

Respondent then answered, 'You mean to say it is not your duty to remand the record of the case?
Complainant responded, 'No, Sir, I mean, it's not our duty to notify you that you have to submit a copy of
the Court of Appeals' decision. Respondent angrily declared in Ilocano, 'Kayat mo nga saw-en, awan
pakialam yon? Kasdiay? (You mean to say you dont care anymore? Is that the way it is?') He then turned
and left the office, banging the door on his way out to show his anger. The banging of the door was so loud
it was heard by the people at the adjacent RTC, Branch 30 where a hearing was taking place. [4]

After a few minutes, respondent returned to the office, still enraged, and pointed his finger at complainant
and shouted, 'Ukinnan, no adda ti unget mo iti kilientek haan mo nga ibales kaniak ah! (Vulva of your
mother! If you are harboring ill feelings against my client, dont turn your ire on me!') Complainant was
shocked at respondent's words but still managed to reply, 'I dont even know your client, Sir. Respondent
left the office and as he passed by complainant's window, he again shouted, 'Ukinnam nga babai! (Vulva
of your mother, you woman!') [5]

Complainant suffered acute embarrassment at the incident, as it happened in her office of which she was,
and still is, the head and in front of her staff. She felt that her credibility had been tarnished and diminished,
eliciting doubt on her ability to command full respect from her staff. [6]

The Complaint-Affidavit, filed three days after the incident, was supported by an Affidavit [7] signed by
employees of RTC-Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya who witnessed the incident. The Affidavit narrated the same
incident as witnessed by the said employees. A Motion to File Additional Affidavit/Documentary
Evidence was filed by complainant on 25 September 2003. [8]

On 26 May 2003, the CBD-IBP issued an Order [9] requiring respondent to submit his answer to the
complaint. Respondent submitted his Compliance [10] dated 18 June 2003. Respondent explained that he
was counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 847, entitled Sps. Federico Castillano, et al. v. Sps. Crispin
Castillano, et al., filed with the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 30. He learned of the finality of the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 64962 with respect to Civil Case No. 847 before the lower court.
Prior to the incident, he went to the office of the complainant to request for the transmittal of the records of
the case to the MCTC and the complainant reassured him of the same.

Respondent admits having inquired about the status of the transmittal of the records on 5 May 2003.
However, he has no explanation as to what transpired on that day. Instead, he narrates that on 25 May
2003, twelve days after the incident, the records had not yet been transmitted, and he subsequently learned
that these records were returned to the court of origin.

The hearing for the administrative complaint before the CBD was set on 25 September 2003 by the
Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan. However, on said date, only complainant appeared. The
latter also moved that the case be submitted for resolution. [11] Respondent later on filed
a Manifestation stating that the reason for his non-appearance was because he was still recuperating from
physical injuries and that he was not mentally fit to prepare the required pleadings as his vehicle was rained
with bullets on 19 August 2003. He also expressed his public apology to the complainant in the
same Manifestation. [12]

Complainant filed a Manifestation expressing her desire not to appear on the next hearing date in view of
respondent's public apology, adding that respondent personally and humbly asked for forgiveness which
she accepted. [13]

The Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be reprimanded and warned that any other
complaint for breach of his professional duties shall be dealt with more severely. [14] The IBP submitted to
this Court a Notice of Resolution adopting and approving the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. [15]

At the onset, it should be noted that respondent was not the counsel of record of Civil Case No. 784. Had
he been counsel of record, it would have been easy for him to present the required certified true copy of
the decision of the Court of Appeals. He need not have gone to Manila to procure a certified true copy of
the decision since the Court of Appeals furnishes the parties and their counsel of record a duplicate original
or certified true copy of its decision.

His explanation that he will enter his appearance in the case when its records were already transmitted to
the MCTC is unacceptable. Not being the counsel of record and there being no authorization from either
the parties to represent them, respondent had no right to impose his will on the clerk of court.

Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Rule 8.02A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor,
to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful
counsel.

Through his acts of constantly checking the transmittal of the records of Civil Case No. 784, respondent
deliberately encroached upon the legal functions of the counsel of record of that case. It does not matter
whether he did so in good faith.

Moreover, in the course of his questionable activities relating to Civil Case No. 784, respondent acted rudely
towards an officer of the court. He raised his voice at the clerk of court and uttered at her the most vulgar
of invectives. Not only was it ill-mannered but also unbecoming considering that he did all these to a woman
and in front of her subordinates.
As held in Alcantara v. Atty. Pefianco, [16] respondent ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior
can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it. [17] These
acts violate Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and Rule 8.01, to wit:

Rule 7.03 ' A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to
practice law, now shall he, whether in public or private life behave in scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.

Canon 8 ' A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 ' A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.

Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that lawyers conduct themselves
with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity
of the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly towards each other and otherwise
conduct themselves without reproach at all times. [18]
As correctly evaluated by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent did not categorically deny the
charges in the complaint. Instead, he gave a lengthy narration of the prefatory facts of the case as well as
of the incident on 5 May 2003.

Complainant also alleged in her Complaint-Affidavit that respondent's uncharacteristic behavior was not an
isolated incident. He has supposedly done the same to Attys. Abraham Johnny G. Asuncion and Temmy
Lambino, the latter having filed a case against respondent pending before this Court. [19] We, however,
cannot acknowledge such allegation absent any evidence showing the veracity of such claim. No affidavits
to that effect were submitted by either Atty. Asuncion or Atty. Lambino.

Nonetheless, the penalty to be imposed should be tempered owing to the fact that respondent had
apologized to the complainant and the latter had accepted it. This is not to say, however, that respondent
should be absolved from his actuations. People are accountable for the consequences of the things they
say and do even if they repent afterwards. The fact remains that things done cannot be undone and words
uttered cannot be taken back. Hence, he should bear the consequences of his actions.

The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem of their brethren. This esteem cannot
be purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or contrivance. It is born of sharp contexts and
thrives despite conflicting interest. It emanates solely from integrity, character, brains and skills in the
honorable performance of professional duty. [20]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby FINED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND
(P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that any similar infraction with be dealt with more severely. Let a copy
of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant for appropriate annotation in the record of the respondent.

SO ORDERED

SECOND DIVISION

A. C. No. 5398. December 3, 2002

ANTONIO A. ALCANTARA, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARIANO PEFIANCO, respondent.

 DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint against Atty. Mariano Pefianco for conduct unbecoming a member of the bar for using
improper and offensive language and threatening and attempting to assault complainant.

The complainant, Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara, is the incumbent District Public Attorney of the Public
Attorneys Office in San Jose, Antique. He alleged that on May 18, 2000, while Atty. Ramon Salvani III
was conferring with a client in the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) at the Hall of Justice in San Jose,
Antique, a woman approached them. Complainant saw the woman in tears, whereupon he went to the
group and suggested that Atty. Salvani talk with her amicably as a hearing was taking place in another
room. At this point, respondent Atty. Mariano Pefianco, who was sitting nearby, stood up and shouted at
Atty. Salvani and his client, saying, Nga-a gina-areglo mo ina, ipapreso ang imo nga kliyente para
mahibal-an na anang sala. (Why do you settle that case? Have your client imprisoned so that he will
realize his mistake.)

Complainant said he was surprised at respondent Pefiancos outburst and asked him to cool off, but
respondent continued to fulminate at Atty. Salvani. Atty. Salvani tried to explain to respondent that it was
the woman who was asking if the civil aspect of the criminal case could be settled because she was no
longer interested in prosecuting the same. Respondent refused to listen and instead continued to scold
Atty. Salvani and the latters client.

As head of the Office, complainant approached respondent and asked him to take it easy and leave Atty.
Salvani to settle the matter. Respondent at first listened, but shortly after he again started shouting at and
scolding Atty. Salvani. To avoid any scene with respondent, complainant went inside his office. He asked
his clerk to put a notice outside prohibiting anyone from interfering with any activity in the Public Attorneys
Office.

Complainant said that he then went out to attend a hearing, but when he came back he heard respondent
Pefianco saying: Nagsiling si Atty. Alcantara nga pagwa-on na kuno ako dya sa PAO, buyon nga klase ka
tawo. (Atty. Alcantara said that he would send me out of the PAO, what an idiot.) Then, upon seeing
complainant, respondent pointed his finger at him and repeated his statement for the other people in the
office to hear. At this point, according to complainant, he confronted respondent Pefianco and told him to
observe civility or else to leave the office if he had no business there. Complainant said respondent
resented this and started hurling invectives at him. According to complainant, respondent even took a
menacing stance towards him.

This caused a commotion in the office. Atty. Pepin Marfil and Mr. Robert Minguez, the Chief of the
Probation Office, tried to pacify respondent Pefianco. Two guards of the Hall of Justice came to take
respondent out of the office, but before they could do so, respondent tried to attack complainant and even
shouted at him, Gago ka! (Youre stupid!) Fortunately, the guards were able to fend off respondents blow
and complainant was not harmed.

Complainant also submitted the affidavits of Atty. Ramon Salvani III, Felizardo Del Rosario, Atty. Pepin
Joey Marfil, Robert Minguez, Herbert Ysulat and Ramon Quintayo to corroborate his allegations.

In his Comment and Counter-Complaint, respondent Pefianco said that the sight of the crying woman,
whose husband had been murdered, moved him and prompted him to take up her defense. He said that
he resented the fact that complainant had ordered an employee, Napoleon Labonete, to put a sign
outside prohibiting standbys from hanging round in the Public Attorneys Office.

Respondent claimed that while talking with Atty. Salvani concerning the womans case, complainant, with
his bodyguard, arrived and shouted at him to get out of the Public Attorneys Office. He claimed that two
security guards also came, and complainant ordered them to take respondent out of the office. Contrary
to complainants claims, however, respondent said that it was complainant who moved to punch him and
shout at him, Gago ka! (Youre stupid!)

Prior to the filing of the present complaint, respondent Pefianco had filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman an administrative and criminal complaint against complainant. However, the complaint was
dismissed by the said office.

The Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines found that respondent
committed the acts alleged in the complaint and that he violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Committee noted that respondent failed not only to deny the accusations against him
but also to give any explanation for his actions. For this reason, it recommended that respondent be
reprimanded and warned that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely in the future.

We find the recommendation of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline to be well taken.

The evidence on record indeed shows that it was respondent Pefianco who provoked the incident in
question. The affidavits of several disinterested persons confirm complainants allegation that respondent
Pefianco shouted and hurled invectives at him and Atty. Salvani and even attempted to lay hands on him
(complainant).

Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility admonishes lawyers to conduct themselves with
1

courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of
the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly toward each other and otherwise
conduct themselves without reproach at all times. cräläwvirtualibräry
2

In this case, respondents meddling in a matter in which he had no right to do so caused the untoward
incident. He had no right to demand an explanation from Atty. Salvani why the case of the woman had not
or could not be settled. Even so, Atty. Salvani in fact tried to explain the matter to respondent, but the
latter insisted on his view about the case.

Respondent said he was moved by the plight of the woman whose husband had been murdered as she
was pleading for the settlement of her case because she needed the money. Be that as it may,
respondent should realize that what he thought was righteous did not give him the right to demand that
Atty. Salvani and his client, apparently the accused in the criminal case, settle the case with the widow.
Even when he was being pacified, respondent did not relent. Instead he insulted and berated those who
tried to calm him down. Two of the witnesses, Atty. Pepin Marfil and Robert Minguez, who went to the
Public Attorneys Office because they heard the commotion, and two guards at the Hall of Justice, who
had been summoned, failed to stop respondent from his verbal rampage. Respondent ought to have
realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation
and erode public respect for it. Whatever moral righteousness respondent had was negated by the way
he chose to express his indignation. An injustice cannot be righted by another injustice.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Mariano Pefianco is found GUILTY of violation of Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and, considering this to be his first offense, is hereby FINED in the amount
of P1,000.00 and REPRIMANDED with a warning that similar action in the future will be sanctioned more
severely.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 5768 March 26, 2010
ATTY. BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDWIN Z. FERRER, SR., Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who is claimed to have hurled invectives upon another lawyer
and filed a baseless suit against him.
The Facts and the Case
On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-affidavit with the
1

Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment,
suspension from the practice of law, or imposition of appropriate disciplinary action against respondent
Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for the following offenses:

1. On November 22, 2000 Atty. Ferrer, as plaintiff’s counsel in Civil Case 7040, filed a reply with
opposition to motion to dismiss that contained abusive, offensive, and improper language which
insinuated that Atty. Barandon presented a falsified document in court.
2. Atty. Ferrer filed a fabricated charge against Atty. Barandon in Civil Case 7040 for alleged
falsification of public document when the document allegedly falsified was a notarized document
executed on February 23, 1994, at a date when Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer nor was
assigned in Camarines Norte. The latter was not even a signatory to the document.
3. On December 19, 2000, at the courtroom of Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Daet before the start
of hearing, Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk, threatened Atty. Barandon saying, "Laban kung laban,
patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa
Camarines Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa
Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito."
4. Atty. Ferrer made his accusation of falsification of public document without bothering to check
the copy with the Office of the Clerk of Court and, with gross ignorance of the law, failed to
consider that a notarized document is presumed to be genuine and authentic until proven
otherwise.
5. The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case against repeating his unethical
act; yet he faces a disbarment charge for sexual harassment of an office secretary of the IBP
Chapter in Camarines Norte; a related criminal case for acts of lasciviousness; and criminal
cases for libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against him. In October 2000, Atty.
Ferrer asked Atty. Barandon to falsify the daily time record of his son who worked with the
Commission on Settlement of Land Problems, Department of Justice. When Atty. Barandon
declined, Atty. Ferrer repeatedly harassed him with inflammatory language.

Atty. Ferrer raised the following defenses in his answer with motion to dismiss:

1. Instead of having the alleged forged document submitted for examination, Atty. Barandon filed
charges of libel and grave threats against him. These charges came about because Atty. Ferrer’s
clients filed a case for falsification of public document against Atty. Barandon.
2. The offended party in the falsification case, Imelda Palatolon, vouchsafed that her thumbmark
in the waiver document had been falsified.
3. At the time Atty. Ferrer allegedly uttered the threatening remarks against Atty. Barandon, the
MTC Daet was already in session. It was improbable that the court did not take steps to stop,
admonish, or cite Atty. Ferrer in direct contempt for his behavior.
4. Atty. Barandon presented no evidence in support of his allegations that Atty. Ferrer was drunk
on December 19, 2000 and that he degraded the law profession. The latter had received various
citations that speak well of his character.
5. The cases of libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against Atty. Ferrer were still
pending. Their mere filing did not make the latter guilty of the charges. Atty. Barandon was forum
shopping when he filed this disbarment case since it referred to the same libel and grave threats
subject of the criminal cases.
In his reply affidavit, Atty. Barandon brought up a sixth ground for disbarment. He alleged that on
2

December 29, 2000 at about 1:30 p.m., while Atty. Ferrer was on board his son’s taxi, it figured in a
collision with a tricycle, resulting in serious injuries to the tricycle’s passengers. But neither Atty. Ferrer
3

nor any of his co-passengers helped the victims and, during the police investigation, he denied knowing
the taxi driver and blamed the tricycle driver for being drunk. Atty. Ferrer also prevented an eyewitness
from reporting the accident to the authorities.4

Atty. Barandon claimed that the falsification case against him had already been dismissed. He belittled
the citations Atty. Ferrer allegedly received. On the contrary, in its Resolution 00-1, the IBP-Camarines
5

Norte Chapter opposed his application to serve as judge of the MTC of Mercedes, Camarines Sur, on the
ground that he did not have "the qualifications, integrity, intelligence, industry and character of a trial
judge" and that he was facing a criminal charge for acts of lasciviousness and a disbarment case filed by
an employee of the same IBP chapter.
On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the IBP-CBD submitted to this
Court a Report, recommending the suspension for two years of Atty. Ferrer. The Investigating
Commissioner found enough evidence on record to prove Atty. Ferrer’s violation of Canons 8.01 and 7.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He attributed to Atty. Barandon, as counsel in Civil Case 7040,
the falsification of the plaintiff’s affidavit despite the absence of evidence that the document had in fact
been falsified and that Atty. Barandon was a party to it. The Investigating Commissioner also found that
Atty. Ferrer uttered the threatening remarks imputed to him in the presence of other counsels, court
personnel, and litigants before the start of hearing.
On June 29, 2002 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XV-2002-225, adopting and approving
6

the Investigating Commissioner’s recommendation but reduced the penalty of suspension to only one
year.
Atty. Ferrer filed a motion for reconsideration but the Board denied it in its Resolution of October 19,
7

2002 on the ground that it had already endorsed the matter to the Supreme Court. On February 5, 2003,
however, the Court referred back the case to the IBP for resolution of Atty. Ferrer’s motion for
reconsideration. On May 22, 2008 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
8

Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner that denied Atty. Ferrer’s motion for
9

reconsideration.10

On February 17, 2009, Atty. Ferrer filed a Comment on Board of Governors’ IBP Notice of Resolution No.
XVIII-2008. On August 12, 2009 the Court resolved to treat Atty. Ferrer’s comment as a petition for
11

review under Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court. Atty. Barandon filed his comment, reiterating his 12

arguments before the IBP. Further, he presented certified copies of orders issued by courts in Camarines
Norte that warned Atty. Ferrer against appearing in court drunk. 13

The Issues Presented

The issues presented in this case are:

1. Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP Investigating Commissioner erred in
finding respondent Atty. Ferrer guilty of the charges against him; and
2. If in the affirmative, whether or not the penalty imposed on him is justified.

The Court’s Ruling

We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to disagree with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors and the Investigating Commissioner.
The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and
morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability. 14

Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to conduct themselves with
courtesy, fairness and candor towards their fellow lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel. Specifically, in Rule 8.01, the Code provides:
Rule 8.01. – A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Atty. Ferrer’s actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence shows that he imputed to Atty.
Barandon the falsification of the Salaysay Affidavit of the plaintiff in Civil Case 7040. He made this
imputation with pure malice for he had no evidence that the affidavit had been falsified and that Atty.
Barandon authored the same.
Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsification in a proper forum and without using
offensive and abusive language against a fellow lawyer. To quote portions of what he said in his reply
with motion to dismiss:
1. That the answer is fraught with grave and culpable misrepresentation and "FALSIFICATION" of
documents, committed to mislead this Honorable Court, but with concomitant grave responsibility of
counsel for Defendants, for distortion and serious misrepresentation to the court, for presenting a grossly
"FALSIFIED" document, in violation of his oath of office as a government employee and as member of the
Bar, for the reason, that, Plaintiff, IMELDA PALATOLON, has never executed the "SALAYSAY
AFFIDAVIT", wherein her fingerprint has been falsified, in view whereof, hereby DENY the same including
the affirmative defenses, there being no knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of the
same, from pars. (1) to par. (15) which are all lies and mere fabrications, sufficient ground for
"DISBARMENT" of the one responsible for said falsification and distortions." 15

The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their pleadings despite the
adversarial nature of our legal system.16

Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins
lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all times. Rule 7.03 of the Code
provides:
Rule 7.03. – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Several disinterested persons confirmed Atty. Ferrer’s drunken invectives at Atty. Barandon shortly before
the start of a court hearing. Atty. Ferrer did not present convincing evidence to support his denial of this
particular charge. He merely presented a certification from the police that its blotter for the day did not
report the threat he supposedly made. Atty. Barandon presented, however, the police blotter on a
subsequent date that recorded his complaint against Atty. Ferrer.
Atty. Ferrer said, "Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na
palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur,
umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito." Evidently, he uttered these with intent to annoy,
humiliate, incriminate, and discredit Atty. Barandon in the presence of lawyers, court personnel, and
litigants waiting for the start of hearing in court. These language is unbecoming a member of the legal
profession. The Court cannot countenance it.
Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful,
befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has
no place in the dignity of judicial forum. Atty. Ferrer ought to have realized that this sort of public
17

behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it.
Whatever moral righteousness Atty. Ferrer had was negated by the way he chose to express his
indignation.1avvphi1
Contrary to Atty. Ferrer’s allegation, the Court finds that he has been accorded due process. The essence
of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one
may have in support of one’s defense. So long as the parties are given the opportunity to explain their
18

side, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with. Here, the IBP Investigating
19

Commissioner gave Atty. Ferrer all the opportunities to file countless pleadings and refute all the
allegations of Atty. Barandon.
All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain
the dignity of the legal profession, hence they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Atty.
20

Ferrer’s display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, and misconduct in the performance of his
duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court, was a patent
transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the May 22, 2008 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors in
CBD Case 01-809 and ORDERS the suspension of Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. from the practice of law for
one year effective upon his receipt of this Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in Atty. Ferrer’s personal record as an attorney with the Office of
the Bar Confidant and a copy of the same be served to the IBP and to the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 10543, March 16, 2016

NENITA D. SANCHEZ, Petitioner, v. ATTY. ROMEO G. AGUILOS, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

This administrative case relates to the performance of duty of an attorney towards his client in which the
former is found and declared to be lacking in knowledge and skill sufficient for the engagement.
Does quantum meruit attach when an attorney fails to accomplish tasks which he is naturally expected to
perform during his professional engagement?

Antecedents

Complainant Nenita D. Sanchez has charged respondent Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos (respondent) with
misconduct for the latter's refusal to return the amount of P70,000.00 she had paid for his professional
services despite his not having performed the contemplated professional services. She avers that in
March 2005, she sought the legal services of the respondent to represent her in the annulment of her
marriage with her estranged husband, Jovencio C. Sanchez; that the respondent accepted the
engagement, fixing his fee at P150,000.00, plus the appearance fee of P5,000.00/hearing; that she then
gave to him the initial amount of P90,000.00; that she had gone to his residence in May 2005 to inquire
1

on the developments in her case, but he told her that he would only start working on the case upon her
full payment of the acceptance fee; that she had only learned then that what he had contemplated to file
for her was a petition for legal separation, not one for the annulment of her marriage; that he further told
her that she would have to pay a higher acceptance fee for the annulment of her marriage; that she
2

subsequently withdrew the case from him, and requested the refund of the amounts already paid, but he
refused to do the same as he had already started working on the case; that she had sent him a letter,
3

through Atty. Isidro S.C. Martinez, to demand the return of her payment less whatever amount
corresponded to the legal services he had already performed; that the respondent did not heed her
4

demand letter despite his not having rendered any appreciable legal services to her; and that his
5

constant refusal to return the amounts prompted her to bring an administrative complaint against him in 6

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 20, 2007.

In his answer dated May 21, 2007, the respondent alleges that the complainant and her British fiancee
7

sought his legal services to bring the petition for the annulment of her marriage; that based on his
evaluation of her situation, the more appropriate case would be one for legal separation anchored on the
psychological incapacity of her husband; that she and her British fiancee agreed on P150,000.00 for his
legal services to bring the action for legal separation, with the fiancee paying him P70,000.00, as
evidenced by his handwritten receipt; that for purposes of the petition for legal separation he required the
8

complainant to submit copies of her marriage contract and the birth certificates of her children with her
husband, as well as for her to submit to further interviews by him to establish the grounds for legal
separation; that he later on communicated with her and her fiancee upon finalizing the petition, but they
did not promptly respond to his communications; that in May 2005, she admitted to him that she had
spent the money that her fiancee had given to pay the balance of his professional fees; and that in June
2005, she returned to him with a note at the back of the prepared petition for legal separation essentially
requesting him not to file the petition because she had meanwhile opted to bring the action for the
annulment of her marriage instead.

The respondent admits that he received the demand letter from Atty. Martinez, but states that he
dismissed the letter as a mere scrap of paper because the demand lacked basis in law. It is noted that he
wrote in the last part of his answer dated May 21, 2007 in relation to the demand letter the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Hence, respondent accordingly treated the said letter demand for refund dated 15 August 2005 (Annex
"B" of the complaint) as a mere scrap of paper or should have been addressed by her counsel ATTY.
ISIDRO S.C. MARTINEZ, who unskillfully relied on an unverified information furnished him, to the
urinal project of the MMDA where it may serve its rightful purpose. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
9

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) summoned the parties to a mandatory conference on
August 3, 2007, but only the complainant and her counsel attended the conference. On his part, the
10

respondent sent a letter dated July 20, 2007 to the IBP-CBD to reiterate his answer. Due to his non-
11

appearance, the IBP-CBD terminated the conference on the same day, but required the complainant to
submit a verified position paper within 10 days. She did not submit the position paper in the end.

In his commissioner's report dated July 25, 2008, IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama,
12

Jr. declared that the respondent's insistence that he could have brought a petition for legal separation
based on the psychological incapacity of the complainant's husband was sanctionable because he
himself was apparently not conversant with the grounds for legal separation; that because he rendered
some legal services to the complainant, he was entitled to receive only P40,000.00 out of the P70,000.00
paid to him as acceptance fee, the P40,000.00 being the value of the services rendered under the
principle of quantum meruit; and that, accordingly, he should be made to return to her the amount of
P30,000.00.

IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. observed that the respondent's statement in the last
part of his answer, to the effect that the demand letter sent by Atty. Martinez in behalf of the complainant
should be treated as a scrap of paper, or should have been addressed "to the urinal project of the MMDA
where it may serve its rightful purpose," was uncalled for and improper; and he opined that such offensive
and improper language uttered by the respondent against a fellow lawyer violated Rule 8.01 of the Code
13

of Professional Responsibility.

IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr. ultimately recommended as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The undersigned Commissioner is most respectfully recommending the following:

(1) To order the respondent to return to the complainant the amount of P30,000.00 which he received
for the purpose of preparing a petition for legal separation. Undersigned believes that considering
the degree of professional services he has extended, the amount of P40,000.00 he received on
March 10, 2005 would be sufficient payment for the same.

(2) For failure to distinguish between the grounds for legal separation and annulment of marriage,
respondent should be sanctioned.

(3) Lastly, for failure to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness towards his colleagues and for using
offensive or improper language in his pleading, which was filed right before the Commission on Bar
Discipline, he must also be sanctioned and disciplined in order to avoid repetition of the said
misconduct.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is most respectfully recommended that Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos
be ordered to return to complainant Nenita D. Sanchez the amount of P30,000.00 which the former
received as payment for his services because it is excessive.

It is also recommended that the Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months for failure to show his respect to his fellow lawyer and for using offensive and
improper language in his pleadings.
Through Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 dated September 20, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors
14

affirmed the findings of Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr., but modified the recommendation of
the penalty, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED AND APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering respondent's failure to
show respect to his fellow lawyer and for showing offensive and improper words in his pleadings, Atty.
Romeo G. Aguilos, is hereby WARNED and Ordered to Return the Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos
to complainant within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
15

The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which the IBP Board of Governors denied through
16

Resolution No. XXI-2014-177 dated March 23, 2014. 17

Issues

The two issues for consideration and resolution are: (a) whether or not the respondent should be held
administratively liable for misconduct; and (b) whether or not he should be ordered to return the attorney's
fees paid.

Ruling of the Court

We adopt and affirm Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 and Resolution No. XXI-2014-177, but modify the
recommended penalty.

1.

Respondent was liable for misconduct, and he should be ordered to return the entire amount
received from the client

The respondent offered himself to the complainant as a lawyer who had the requisite professional
competence and skill to handle the action for the annulment of marriage for her. He required her to pay
P150,000.00 as attorney's fees, exclusive of the filing fees and his appearance fee of P5,000.00/hearing.
Of that amount, he received the sum of P70,000.00.

On the respondent's conduct of himself in his professional relationship with the complainant as his client,
we reiterate and adopt the thorough analysis and findings by IBP Investigating Commissioner De La
Rama, Jr. to be very apt and cogent, viz.:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As appearing in Annex "4", which is the handwritten retainer's contract between the respondent and the
complainant, there is a sweeping evidence that there is an attorney-client relationship. The respondent
agreed to accept the case in the amount of P150,000.00. The acceptance fee was agreed upon to be
paid on installment basis. Excluded in the agreement is the payment of appearance fee, filing fee and
other legal documentation.

That next question is - for what case the P150,000.00 was intended for? Was it intended for the filing of
the annulment case or legal separation?

In the verified Answer filed by the respondent, even the latter is quite confused as to what action he is
going to file in court. The intention of the British national and the complainant was to get married. At that
time and maybe up to now, the complainant is still legally married to a certain Jovencio C. Sanchez. That
considering that the two are intending to get married, we can safely assume that the complainant was
contemplating of filing a petition for annulment of marriage in order to free her from the marriage bond
with her husband. It is only then, granting that the petition will be granted, that the complainant will be free
to marry the British subject. The legal separation is but a separation of husband and wife from board and
bed and the marriage bond still exists. Granting that the petition for legal separation will be granted, one
is not free to marry another person.

A reading of the answer filed by the respondent would show that he himself is not well versed in the
grounds for legal separation. He stated the following;
. . . respondent suggested to them to file instead a legal separation case for the alleged psychological
incapacity of her husband to comply with his marital obligations developed or of their marriage on
February 6, 1999. (please see par. 2 of the Answer).
If the intention was to file a petition for legal separation, under A.M. 02-11-11-SC, the grounds are as
follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 2. Petition-

(a) Who may and when to file - (1) A petition for legal separation may be filed only by the husband or the
wife, as the case may be, within five years from the time of the occurrence of any of the following causes:

(a) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common
child, or a child of the petitioner;

(b) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;

(c) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner,
to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;

(d) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned;

(e) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;

(f) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;

(g) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in or outside the
Philippines;

(h) Sexual infidelity or perversion of the respondent;

(i) Attempt on the life of petitioner by the respondent; or

(j) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
Psychological incapacity, contrary to what respondent explained to the complainant, is not one of those
mentioned in any of the grounds for legal separation.

Even in Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, psychological incapacity is never a ground for the
purpose of filing a petition for legal separation.

On the other hand, psychological incapacity has always been used for the purpose of filing a petition for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage.

That as provided for by Article 36 of the New Family Code, it stales that "a marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization."

That lawyers shall keep abreast of the legal developments and participate in continuing legal education
program (Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility) in order to prevent repetition of such kind of
advise that respondent gave to the complainant. In giving an advise, he should be able to distinguish
between the grounds for legal separation and grounds for annulment of marriage. But as the respondent
stated in his answer, it appears that he is mixed up with the basic provisions of the
law. ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
18

Clearly, the respondent misrepresented his professional competence and skill to the complainant. As the
foregoing findings reveal, he did not know the distinction between the grounds for legal separation and for
annulment of marriage. Such knowledge would have been basic and expected of him as a lawyer
accepting a professional engagement for either causes of action. His explanation that the client initially
intended to pursue the action for legal separation should be disbelieved. The case unquestionably
contemplated by the parties and for which his services was engaged, was no other than an action for
annulment of the complainant's marriage with her husband with the intention of marrying her British
fiancee. They did not contemplate legal separation at all, for legal separation would still render her
incapacitated to re-marry. That the respondent was insisting in his answer that he had prepared a petition
for legal separation, and that she had to pay more as attorney's fees if she desired to have the action for
annulment was, therefore, beyond comprehension other than to serve as a hallow afterthought to justify
his claim for services rendered.

As such, the respondent failed to live up to the standards imposed on him as an attorney. He thus
transgressed Canon 18, and Rules 18.01, 18.02 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to
wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal serviee which he knows or should know that he
is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can
obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.

Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable. (Emphasis supplied)
The next to be dealt with is the matter of the attorney's fees. We can easily agree that every attorney is
entitled to have and receive a just and reasonable compensation for services performed at the special
instance and request of his client. As long as the attorney is in good faith and honestly trying to represent
and serve the interests of the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for such services. 19

The attorney's fees shall be those stipulated in the retainer's agreement between the client and the
attorney, which constitutes the law between the parties for as long as it is not contrary to law, good
morals, good customs, public policy or public order. The underlying theory is that the retainer's
20

agreement between them gives to the client the reasonable notice of the arrangement on the fees. Once
the attorney has performed the task assigned to him in a valid agreement, his compensation is
determined on the basis of what he and the client agreed. In the absence of the written agreement, the
21

lawyer's compensation shall be based on quantum meruit, which means "as much as he deserved." The 22

determination of attorney's fees on the basis of quantum meruit is also authorized "when the counsel, for
justifiable cause, was not able to finish the case to its conclusion." Moreover, quantum meruit becomes
23

the basis of recovery of compensation by the attorney where the circumstances of the engagement
indicate that it will be contrary to the parties' expectation to deprive the attorney of all compensation.

Nevertheless, the court shall determine in every case what is reasonable compensation based on the
obtaining circumstances, provided that the attorney does not receive more than what is reasonable, in
24

keeping with Section 24 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees - An attorney shall be entitled to have and
recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the
importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert
witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on
its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid
therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
The courts supervision of the lawyer's compensation for legal services rendered is not only for the
purpose of ensuring the reasonableness of the amount of attorney's fees charged, but also for the
purpose of preserving the dignity and integrity of the legal profession. cralawred
25

The respondent should not have accepted the engagement because as it was later revealed, it was way
above his ability and competence to handle the case for annulment of marriage. As a consequence, he
had no basis to accept any amount as attorney's fees from the complainant. He did not even begin to
perform the contemplated task he undertook for the complainant because it was improbable that the
agreement with her was to bring the action for legal separation. His having supposedly prepared the
petition for legal separation instead of the petition for annulment of marriage was either his way of
covering up for his incompetence, or his means of charging her more. Either way did not entitle him to
retain the amount he had already received.

The written receipt dated March 10, 2005 shows that the respondent received P70,000.00 as acceptance
fee. His refusal to return the amount to the complainant rested on his claim of having already completed
the first phase of the preparation of the petition for legal separation after having held conferences with the
complainant and her British fiancee. In this respect, IBP Investigating Commission De la Rama, Jr. opined
that the respondent could retain P40,000.00 of the P70,000.00 because the respondent had rendered
some legal services to the complainant, specifically: (a) having the complainant undergo further
interviews towards establishing the ground for legal separation; (b) reducing into writing the grounds
discussed during the interviews based on her statement in her own dialect (Annexes 1 and 2) after he
could not understand the written statement prepared for the purpose by her British fiancee; (c) requiring
her to submit her marriage contract with her husband Jovencio C. Sanchez (Annex 3), and the certificates
of live birth of her four children: Mary Joy, Timothy, Christine, and Janette Anne, all surnamed Sanchez
(Annexes 4, 5, 6 and 7); and (d) finalizing her petition for legal separation (Annex 8) in the later part of
April, 2007.

The opinion of IBP Investigating Commission De la Rama, Jr. in favor of the respondent was too
generous. We cannot see how the respondent deserved any compensation because he did not really
begin to perform the contemplated tasks if, even based on his version, he would prepare the petition for
legal separation instead of the petition for annulment of marriage. The attorney who fails to accomplish
the tasks he should naturally and expectedly perform during his professional engagement does not
discharge his professional responsibility and ethical duty toward his client. The respondent was thus guilty
of misconduct, and may be sanctioned according to the degree of the misconduct. As a consequence, he
may be ordered to restitute to the client the amount received from the latter in consideration of the
professional engagement, subject to the rule on quantum meruit, if warranted.

Accordingly, the respondent shall be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 for his misrepresentation of his
professional competence, and he is further to be ordered to return the entire amount of P70,000.00
received from the client, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the date of this decision until
full payment.

2.

Respondent did not conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional
colleague

The Rules of Court mandates members of the Philippine Bar to "abstain from all offensive personality and
to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the
justice of the cause with which he is charged." This duty of lawyers is further emphasized in the Code of
26

Professional Responsibility, whose Canon 8 provides: "A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel." Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 specifically demands that: "A lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper."

The Court recognizes the adversarial nature of our legal system which has necessitated lawyers to use
strong language in the advancement of the interest of their clients. However, as members of a noble
27

profession, lawyers are always impressed with the duty to represent their clients' cause, or, as in this
case, to represent a personal matter in court, with courage and zeal but that should not be used as
license for the use of offensive and abusive language. In maintaining the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, a lawyer's language - spoken or in his pleadings - must be dignified. As such, every lawyer is
28

mandated to carry out his duty as an agent in the administration of justice with courtesy, dignity and
respect not only towards his clients, the court and judicial officers, but equally towards his colleagues in
the Legal Profession.

The respondent's statement in his answer that the demand from Atty. Martinez should be treated "as a
mere scrap of paper or should have been addressed by her counsel x x x to the urinal project of the
MMDA where it may service its rightful purpose" constituted simple misconduct that this Court cannot
tolerate.

In his motion for reconsideration, the respondent tried to justify the offensive and improper language by
asserting that the phraseology was not per se uncalled for and improper. He explained that he had
sufficient cause for maintaining that the demand letter should be treated as a mere scrap of paper and
should be disregarded. However, his assertion does not excuse the offensiveness and impropriety of his
language. He could have easily been respectful and proper in responding to the letter.

As penalty for this particular misconduct, he is reprimanded, with the stern warning that a repetition of the
offense will be severely punished.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 dated September 20, 2008 of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, with the MODIFICATION that Atty. Romeo G.
Aguilos is hereby FINED P10,000.00 for misrepresenting his professional competence to the client,
and REPRIMANDS him for his use of offensive and improper language towards his fellow attorney, with
the stern warning that a repetition of the offense shall be severely punished.

The Court ORDERS Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos to RETURN to the complainant within thirty (30) days from
notice the sum of P70,000.00, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the date of this decision
until full payment.

Let copies of this decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos as a member of
the Philippine Bar, and be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts throughout the
country.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 11394, December 01, 2016

MARIA VICTORIA G. BELO-HENARES, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROBERTO "ARGEE" C.

GUEVARRA, Respondent.

DECISION
 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Maria
1

Victoria G. Belo-Henares (complainant) against respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra

(respondent) for alleged violations of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7; Rule 8.01 of
Canon 8; and Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Facts

Complainant is the Medical Director and principal stockholder of the Belo Medical Group, Inc. (BMGI), a
corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws and engaged in the specialized field of
2

cosmetic surgery. On the other hand, respondent is the lawyer of a certain Ms. Josefina "Josie" Norcio
3

(Norcio), who filed criminal cases against complainant for an allegedly botched surgical procedure on her
buttocks in 2002 and 2005, purportedly causing infection and making her ill in 2009.4

In 2009, respondent wrote a series of posts on his Facebook account, a popular online social networking
site, insulting and verbally abusing complainant. His posts include the following
excerpts:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Argee Guevarra Quack Doctor Becky Belo: I am out to get Puwitic Justice here! Kiss My Client's
Ass, Belo. Senator Adel Tamano, don't kiss Belo's ass. Guys and girls, nagiisip na akong tumakbo sa
Hanghalan 2010 to Kick some ass!!! I will launch a national campaign against Plastic Politicians No guns,
No goons, No gold - IN GUTS I TRUST!

Argee Guevarra Dr. Vicki Belo, watch out for Josefina Norcio's Big Bang on Friday - You will go down
in Medical History as a QUACK DOCTOR!!!! QUACK QUACK QUACK QUACK. CNN, FOX NEWS,
BLOOMBERG, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, L.A. TIMES c/o my partner in the U.S., Atty. Trixie Cruz-Angeles :)
(September 22 at 11:18pm) 5

Argee Guevarra is amused by a libel case filed by Vicki Belo against me through her office receptionist in
Taytay Rizal. Haaaaay, style-bulok at style-duwag talaga. Lalakarin ng Reyna ng Kaplastikan at
Reyna ng Payola ang kaso... si Imelda Marcos nga sued me for P300 million pesos and ended up
apologizing to me, si Belo pa kaya? (September 15 at 12:08pm) 6

Argee Guevarra get vicki belo as your client!!! may 'extra-legal' budget yon. Kaya lang, histado ko
na kung sino-sino ang tumatanggap eh, pag nalaman mo, baka bumagsak pa isang ahensya ng
gobyerno dito, hahaha (August 9 at 10:31pm) 7

Argee Guevarra ATTENTION MGA BATCHMATES SA DOJ: TIMBREHAN NIYO AKO KUNG
MAGKANONG PANGSUHOL NI BELO PARA MADIIN AKO HA???? I just [want] to know how much
she hates me, ok? Ang payola budget daw niya runs into tens of millions.... (September 15 at
3:57pm) 8

Argee Guevarra thinks aloud how the payola machinery of vicki belo killed the news of a picket
demonstration in front of the Belo clinic. I wonder how television, print[,] and radio programs can kill
the story when the next rallies will have the following numbers 100, 200, 500 and 1000. Kung
magkaasaran pa, 10,000 demonstrators will be assembled in front of the Belo Medical Clinic at Tomas
Morato on July 27, 2009. Hahahahaha! (July 17 at 7:56pm) 9

Argee Guevarra Nakakatawa nga, 10milyon pa budget... [I] didn't know that my reputation is worth that
much. Aba ako kaya magdemanda sa kanila :) Ikot-ikot daw ang mga P.R. ni Belo trying to convince
editors to pin me down with something eh alam ko na wala naman akong sex video!!! Adik talaga
sa botox si Aling Becky at may tama na sa utak - eh kung gagastos ka lang ng 10 milyon para
sa tirang-pikon laban sa akin at to protect your burak na reputasyon as a plastic surgeon, i-donate
mo na lang yon sa biktima ni Ondoy, Pepeng at Ramil! Yung mga homeboys ko sa Pasig na nilimas
[ni] Ondoy ang kukubra sa yo! (October 23 at 5:31pm) 10

Argee Guevarra is inspired by Jose Norio's courageous act of showing her face on national television to
expose the Reyna ng Kaplastikan, Reyna ng Kapalpakan. Inspired by shock nevertheless by the fact
that the much needed partial restoration of her behind would cost a staggering $500,000-$1,000,000
Stanford Medical Hospital and she will still remain permanently disabled for the rest of her life... (July 11
at 2:08am) 11

Argee Guevarra Just got my internet connection. WILL EMAIL U THE LURID UNASSAILABLE FACTS
ABOUT VICKI BELO'S QUACK DOCTORING. (October 27, 2009) 12

Argee Guevarra yeah... actually the issue is simple and you will easily see which side you'll be taking- just
pay Ms. Josie Norcio a visit at St. Luke's at talagang binaboy siya ng Reyna ng Kaplastikan (July 10
at 12:08am) 13

chanrobleslaw
The complaint further alleged that respondent posted remarks on his Facebook account that were
intended to destroy and ruin BMGI's medical personnel, as well as the entire medical practice of around
300 employees for no fair or justifiable cause, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
14

Argee Guevarra yup... [I'll] even throw the kitchen sink at her. Enjoy nga ito, we will paralyze the
operations of all her clinic and seek out her patients and customers to boycott her. [So] far, good
response – 70% decrease in her July sales... (August 9 at 10:29pm) 15

Argee Guevarra Guys, pandemonium has broken loose in [BMGI's] 6 clinics after Ms. Josie Norio's tell-all.
With only 2 surgeons of BMGI certified by PAPRAS, there is real-and-present danger that surgeries like
liposuction, nose lift, boob jobs which have been performed by [BMGI's] physicians, every patient runs the
risk of something going wrong with the procedures they have undergone under [BMGI's] hands:(" (July 12
at 12:21am) 16

Argee Guevarra [T]hey perform plastic surgery procedures without licensed and trained doctors, they
nearly killed a client of mine, medical malpractice, use of banned substances/fillers on patients. just
recently, in flawless clinic, a patient who had a simple facial landed in the hospital ... (August 9 at
10:04pm) 17

Argee Guevarra braces for typhoon Ramil without forgetting to ask comrades and friends in Cebu to greet
Vicki Belo with a boycott once she visits there on Oct. 20. Cebu's royal set already knows that she is not
a certified plastic surgeon: Boycott Belo, Flawless Reckless, Belat Essentials!!!! (October 18 at
6:23pm) 18

Argee Guevarra [W]ell, with all the kababuyan of the Belo clinic, its money-making
machines, dapat convert them into public health clinics!!! instead of pandering to the vanities of
those who want to look like Dra. Belo. (July 11 at 2:16am) 19

Argee Guevarra darling kellyn, so far, i have 3 other ex-belo patients who will tell all too!!!!! Grabe pala
ang mga kapalpakan niyan. So did u leave Belo Clinic because it has become a Frankenstein
Factory? (July 11 at 2:30am) 20

Argee Guevarra BOYCOTT BELO! FLAWLESS RECKLESS! BELAT ESSENTIALS!!! I'll be gone for a
week to a place where there will be no facebook so please, add Trixie Cruz-Angeles if you want to find
out more about our anti-quack doctor campaign! (September 24 at 3:00pm) 21

Argee Guevarra Anyone care to sponsor T-shirts bearing this slogan? - BOYCOTT BELO! FLAWLESS
RECKLESS! BELAT ESSENTIALS! (September 23 at 12:17arn) 22

Argee Guevarra Pare, eksena on Thursday I will go to the hearing with a placard - BOYCOTT BELO!!!
FLAWLESS RECKLESS!!! BELAT ESSENTIALS!!! I will vote for Adel Tamano (La Salle-Ateneo lower
batch sa akin at mabuti ang pamilya niyan)... BUT WOULD YOU??? (September 23 at 1:50am) 23

Argee Guevarra advocates a national patients' boycott of the Belo Medical Group. To all my friends and
comrades, please stay away from Belo's clinics. I have 2 cousins and 3 friends already who have
canceled their lipo from belo. Please help me shut down the Belo Medical Group until they perform
their moral and legal obligation to Ms. Josie Norcio... (July 17 at 2:12pm) 24

chanrobleslaw
Moreover, respondent, through his Facebook account, posted remarks that allegedly threatened
complainant with criminal conviction, without factual basis and without proof, as
25

follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Argee Guevarra Mr. Jay, by next year- GMA will no longer be president and she will be jailed for
plunder; Vicky Belo will no longer be a doctor and she will be in the middle of a criminal
prosecution. The General Surgeon of France will have a Philippine version. By October and November,
some congressmen I have spoken with will be issuing summons to Vicky Belo for a congressional inquiry;
the subject - legislation regulating the practice of cosmetic surgery! (September 22 at 11:31pm) 26

Argee Guevarra Celso de1os Angeles can still get medical attention in prison - from Vicky Belo after she
gets convicted too for criminal negligence and estafa (July 15 at 10:05am) 27

Argee Guevarra is preparing himself for a campaign against the Belo Medical Group for its criminal
negligence which nearly killed Ms. Josie Norcio over a botched butt augmentation procedure. He
found out that the Dr. Belo herself marketed the product to Ms. Norcio, the operation was carried out by
her doctors who were not licensed by the Philippine Association of Plastic Reconstructive and
Aesthetic Surgeons.............. (July 9 at 8:54pm) 28

chanrobleslaw
Complainant likewise averred that some of respondent's Facebook posts were sexist, vulgar, and
disrespectful of women, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
29

Argee Guevarra but can u help me too with maricar reyes? who's the hottest cebuana chic chick there
nowadays? haven't been there for quite some time... pa-chicks ka naman!!! I'm sure marami kang 25-and-
below naprends diyan (August 10 at 8:36pm) 30

Argee Guevarra hay joseph!!! how's the gayest lawyer in cebu? our forces will soon picket the belo clinic
there, can u tell me where that is? halato ko na sayo si hayden, promise!" (August 10 at 12:23am) 31

Argee Guevarra joseph, i can't say i love u too - baka belo's team will use all sorts of attacks na against
me. to thwart them, being the gayest gay in the philippines, can u issue a certification that i am so not like
your type? at yung preferred ko lang ay thin, thalino and thisay? (September 23 at 12:01am) 32

chanrobleslaw
Finally, complainant averred that the attacks against her were made with the object to extort money from
her, as apparent from the following reply made by respondent on a comment on his Facebook
post: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
33

Kellyn Conde Sy utang mo! Pay up time:) (July 11 at 2:37am)

Argee Guevarra kellyn, sisingilin ko muna si belo... at saka sabi mo naman, maibagsak ko lang ang
kaplastikan ni belo, quits na tayo ...(July 11 at 2:38am)34

chanrobleslaw
Asserting that the said posts, written in vulgar and obscene language, were designed to inspire public
hatred, destroy her reputation, and to close BMGI and all its clinics, as well as to extort the amount of
P200 Million from her as evident from his demand letter dated August 26, 2009, complainant lodged the
35

instant complaint for disbarment against respondent before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
docketed as CBD Case No. 09-2551.

In defense, respondent claimed that the complaint was filed in violation of his constitutionally-guaranteed
36

right to privacy, asserting that the posts quoted by complainant were private remarks on his private
37
account on Facebook, meant to be shared only with his circle of friends of which complainant was not a
part. He also averred that he wrote the posts in the exercise of his freedom of speech, and contended
38

that the complaint was filed to derail the criminal cases that his client, Norcio, had filed against
complainant. He denied that the remarks were vulgar and obscene, and that he made them in order to
39

inspire public hatred against complainant. He likewise denied that he attempted to extort money from
40

her, explaining that he sent the demand letter as a requirement prior to the filing of the criminal case
for estafa, as well as the civil case for damages against her. Finally, respondent pointed out that
41

complainant was a public figure who is, therefore, the subject of fair comment. 42

After the mandatory conference had been terminated, the parties were directed to file their respective
43

position papers. Thereafter, the IBP, through the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), set the case for
44

clarificatory hearing. Upon termination thereof, the case was deemed submitted for
45

report/recommendation. 46

IBP's Report and Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation dated August 13, 2013, the IBP-CBD recommended that respondent
47

be suspended for a period of one (1) year from the practice of law, with a stem warning that a repetition of
the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. It held respondent liable for violation of Rule
48

7.03, Rule 8.01, and Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for having posted the
49 50 51

above-quoted remarks on his Facebook account, pointing out that respondent cannot invoke the "private"
nature of his posts, considering that he had at least 2,000 "friends" who can read and react thereto.
Moreover, the IBP-CBD maintained that the criminal cases he had filed against complainant on behalf of
Norcio had been dismissed for insufficient evidence; therefore, he can no longer campaign against
complainant whose alleged crimes against Norcio had not been established. 52

In a Resolution dated September 27, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve
53

the August 13, 2013 Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

Respondent moved for reconsideration, arguing that there was no specific act attributed to him that
54

would warrant his suspension from the practice of law. He also averred that the libel cases filed against
him by an employee of BMGI had already been dismissed, without prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction. 55

In a Resolution dated October 28, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors partially granted respondent's
56

motion, reducing the penalty from one (1) year to six (6) months suspension.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be held administratively
liable based on the allegations of the verified complaint.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Court's Ruling

The Court has examined the records of this case and concurs with the IBP's findings, except as to the
penalty imposed on respondent.

At the outset, the Court notes that respondent never denied that he posted the purportedly vulgar and
obscene remarks about complainant and BMGI on his Facebook account. In defense, however, he
invokes his right to privacy, claiming that they were "private remarks" on his "private account" that can
57

only be viewed by his circle of friends. Thus, when complainant accessed the same, she violated his
constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy.

The defense is untenable.

Facebook is currently the most popular social media site, having surpassed one (1) billion registered
accounts and with 1.71 billion monthly active users. Social media are web-based platforms that enable
58

online interaction and facilitate users to generate and share content. There are various classifications of59

social media platforms and one can be classified under the "social networking sites" such as Facebook. 60

Facebook is a "voluntary social network to which members subscribe and submit information. x x x It has
a worldwide forum enabling friends to share information such as thoughts, links, and photographs, with
one another." Users register at this site, create a personal profile or an open book of who they are, add
61

other users as friends, and exchange messages, including automatic notifications when they update their
profile. A user can post a statement, a photo, or a video on Facebook, which can be made visible to
anyone, depending on the user's privacy settings. 62

To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with different
privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user's profile, as well as information uploaded by
the user. In H v. W, the South Gauteng High Court of Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa
63

recognized this ability of the users to "customize their privacy settings," but with the cautionary advice that
although Facebook, as stated in its policies, "makes every effort to protect a user's information, these
privacy settings are however not foolproof." 64

Consequently, before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her online social networking
activity - in this case, Facebook - it is first necessary that said user manifests the intention to keep certain
posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. This
intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of Facebook's privacy tools. In other words,
utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in the cyber world, of the user's invocation of his or
her right to informational privacy.
65

The bases of the instant complaint are the Facebook posts maligning and insulting complainant, which
posts respondent insists were set to private view. However, the latter has failed to offer evidence that he
utilized any of the privacy tools or features of Facebook available to him to protect his posts, or that he
restricted its privacy to a select few. Therefore, without any positive evidence to corroborate his statement
that the subject posts, as well as the comments thereto, were visible only to him and his circle of friends,
respondent's statement is, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration. 66

Moreover, even if the Court were to accept respondent's allegation that his posts were limited to or
viewable by his "Friends" only, there is no assurance that the same - or other digital content that he
uploads or publishes on his Facebook profile - will be safeguarded as within the confines of privacy, in
light of the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools to interact
and share in any conceivable way";

(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers;

(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and
(4) A user's Facebook friend can "share" the former's post, or "tag" others who are not Facebook
friends with the former, despite its being visible only to his or her own Facebook friends. 67

chanrobleslaw
Thus, restricting the privacy of one's Facebook posts to "Friends" does not guarantee absolute protection
from the prying eyes of another user who does not belong to one's circle of friends. The user's own
Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of
whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is
shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or
who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends." Under the
68

circumstances, therefore, respondent's claim of violation of right to privacy is negated.

Neither can the Court accept the argument that the subject remarks were written in the exercise of his
freedom of speech and expression.

Time and again, it has been held that the freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional
freedoms, is not absolute. While the freedom of expression and the right of speech and of the press are
69

among the most zealously protected rights in the Constitution, every person exercising them, as the Civil
Code stresses, is obliged to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith. As such, the constitutional right of freedom of expression may not be availed of to broadcast lies or
70

half-truths, insult others, destroy their name or reputation or bring them into disrepute. 71

A punctilious scrutiny of the Facebook remarks complained of disclosed that they were ostensibly made
with malice tending to insult and tarnish the reputation of complainant and BMGI. Calling complainant a
"quack doctor," "Reyna ng Kaplastikan," "Reyna ng Payola," and "Reyna ng Kapalpakan," and insinuating
that she has been bribing people to destroy respondent smacks of bad faith and reveals an intention to
besmirch the name and reputation of complainant, as well as BMGI. Respondent also ascribed criminal
negligence upon complainant and BMGI by posting that complainant disfigured ("binaboy") his client
Norcio, labeling BMGI a "Frankenstein Factory," and calling out a boycott of BMGI's services all these
despite the pendency of the criminal cases that Norcio had already filed against complainant. He even
threatened complainant with conviction for criminal negligence and estafa which is contrary to one's
obligation "to act with justice."·

In view of the foregoing, respondent's inappropriate and obscene language, and his act of publicly
insulting and undermining the reputation of complainant through the subject Facebook posts are,
therefore, in complete and utter violation of the following provisions in the Code of Professional
Responsibility:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.

Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client
and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to
obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
chanrobleslaw
By posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant and BMGI, respondent disregarded
the fact that, as a lawyer, he is bound to observe proper decorum at all times, be it in his public or private
life. He overlooked the fact that he must behave in a manner befitting of an officer of the court, that is,
respectful, firm, and decent. Instead, he acted inappropriately and rudely; he used words unbecoming of
an officer of the law, and conducted himself in an aggressive way by hurling insults and maligning
complainant's and BMGI's reputation.

That complainant is a public figure and/or a celebrity and therefore, a public personage who is exposed to
criticism does not justify respondent's disrespectful language. It is the cardinal condition of all criticism
72

that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. In this case,
73

respondent's remarks against complainant breached the said walls, for which reason the former must be
administratively sanctioned.

"Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as their
misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor, a good character being an essential
qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the Code
of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of conduct or misconduct, the reference is not
confined to one's behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers' professional duties,
but also covers any misconduct, which—albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their profession—would
show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law invest in
them." Accordingly, the Court finds that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for a
74

period of one (1) year, as originally recommended by the IBP-CBD, with a stem warning that a repetition
of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra is found guilty of violation of Rules 7.03,
8.01, and 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, and is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.

SO ORDERED.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 8210, August 08, 2016

SPOUSES MANOLO AND MILINIA NUEZCA, Complainants, v. ATTY. ERNESTO V.

VILLAGARCIA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint for disbarment filed by complainants
1

Spouses Manolo and Milinia Nuezca (complainants) against respondent Atty. Ernesto V. Villagarcia
(respondent) for grave misconduct, consisting of alleged unethical conduct in dealings with other persons.

The Facts

In their verified complaint, complainants averred that respondent sent them a demand letter dated
2

February 15, 2009, copy furnished to various offices and persons, which contained not only threatening
but also libelous utterances. Allegedly, the demand letter seriously maligned and ridiculed complainants
to its recipients. Complainants likewise posited that several news clippings that were attached to the
3

demand letter were intended to sow tear in them, and claimed that the circulation thereof caused them
sleepless nights, wounded feelings, and besmirched reputation. Thus, they maintained that respondent
4

should be held administratively liable therefor.

In a Resolution dated July 22, 2009, the Court directed respondent to file his comment to the verified
5
complaint. However, for failure to serve the aforesaid Resolution at respondent's address given by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the complainants were then ordered to furnish the Court the
6

complete and correct address of respondent. Still, complainants failed to comply with the Court's
directive; thus, the Court resolved, among others, to refer the case to the IBP for investigation, report,
7

and recommendation, which set the case for a mandatory conference/hearing. chanrobleslaw
8

Unfortunately, despite notices, complainants failed to appear for the scheduled mandatory hearings.
9

Likewise, the notices sent to respondent were returned unserved with the notations "RTS Moved Out" and
"RTS Unknown." Thus, in an Order dated October 24, 2014, the IBP directed the parties to submit their
10

respective verified position papers together with documentary exhibits, if any.

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation dated May 29, 2015, the IBP -Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),
11

through Commissioner Honesto A. Villamor, recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months for violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Likewise, for defying the lawful order of the IBP, the latter recommended that
respondent be declared in contempt of court and fined the amount of PI,000.00, with a warning that
repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. chanrobleslaw
12

The IBP found that respondent failed to rebut complainants' allegations in their verified complaint.
Moreover, despite repeated notices and directives from the IBP to appear for the mandatory hearings, as
well as to file his pleadings, respondent failed to do so, which was tantamount to defiance of the lawful
orders of the IBP amounting to conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. Finding that respondent did not intend to
file any comment and in the process, purposely delayed the resolution of the instant case, the IBP
recommended that respondent be held in contempt of court. chanrobleslaw
13

In a Resolution dated June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with
14

modification the May 29, 2015 Report and Recommendation of the IBP — CBD by suspending
respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months and deleting the fine imposed on him.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable
based on the allegations of the verified complaint.

The Court's Ruling

The Court has examined the records of this case and partially concurs with the findings and
recommendations of the IBP Board of Governors.

The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and
morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability. Rule 8.01, Canon
15

8 of the CPR provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Rule 8.01. - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
In this case, the demand letter that respondent sent to complainants contained not merely a demand for
them to settle their monetary obligations to respondent's client, but also used words that maligned their
character. It also imputed crimes against them, i.e., that they were criminally liable for worthless or bum
checks and estafa. The relevant portion of the demand letter states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
An early check on the records of some courts, credit-reporting agencies and law enforcement offices
revealed that the names 'MANOLO NUEZCA' and/or 'MANUELO NUEZCA' and 'MILINIA NUEZCA'
responded to our search being involved, then and now, in some 'credit-related' cases and litigations.
Other record check outcomes and results use we however opt to defer disclosure in the meantime and
shall be put in issue in the proper forum as the need for them arise, [sic]
All such accumulated derogatory records shall in due time be reported to all the appropriate entities, for
the necessary disposition and "blacklisting" pursuant to the newly-enacted law known as the "Credit
Information Systems Act of 2008."

x xxx

II. Your several issued BDO checks in 2003 and thereabouts were all unencashed as they proved to be
"worthless and unfounded." By law, you are liable under BP 22 (Boun[c]ing Checks Law) and Art. 315,
Par. 2 (d) SWINDLING/ESTAFA, RPC.

III. For all your deceit, fraud, schemes and other manipulations to defraud Mrs. Arcilla, taking advantage
of her helplessness, age and handicaps to her grave and serious damage, you are also criminally liable
under ART. 318, OTHER DECEITS. RPC. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
16

Indeed, respondent could have simply stated the ultimate facts relative to the alleged indebtedness of
complainants to his client, made the demand for settlement thereof, and refrained from the imputation of
criminal offenses against them, especially considering that there is a proper forum therefor and they have
yet to be found criminally liable by a court of proper jurisdiction. Respondent's use of demeaning and
immoderate language put complainants in shame and disgrace. Moreover, it is important to consider that
several other persons had been copy furnished with the demand letter. As such, respondent could have
besmirched complainants' reputation to its recipients.

At this juncture, it bears noting that respondent failed to answer the verified complaint and attend the
mandatory hearings set by the IBP. Hence, the claims and allegations of the complainants remain
uncontroverted. In Ngayan v. Tugade, the Court ruled that "[a lawyer's] failure to answer the complaint
17

against him and his failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful
orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138,
ifules of Court." chanrobleslaw
18

Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful,
befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has
no place in the dignity of judicial forum. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be
19

emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive. In this regard,
20

all lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain
the dignity of the legal profession, hence, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Thus,
21

respondent ought to temper his words in the performance of his duties as a lawyer and an officer of the
court.

Anent the penalty to be imposed on respondent, the Court takes into consideration the case of Ireneo L.
Torres and Mrs. Natividad Celestino v. Jose Concepcion Javier where respondent-lawyer was
22

suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month for employing offensive and improper
language in his pleadings. In light thereof, and considering that the IBP's recommended penalty is not
commensurate to respondent's misdeed in this case, the Court finds that the penalty of suspension for
one (1) month from the practice of law should be meted upon respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Ernesto V. Villagarcia is found GUILTY of violation of Rule 8.01, Canon
8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) month, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, and is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar.
Likewise, let copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin and Caguioa, JJ., concur

A.C. No. 4807 March 22, 2000

MANUEL N. CAMACHO, complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. LUIS MEINRADO C. PANGULAYAN, REGINA D. BALMORES, CATHERINE V. LAUREL and
HUBERT JOAQUIN P. BUSTOS of PANGULAYAN AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Respondent lawyers stand indicted for a violation of the Code of Professional Ethics, specifically Canon 9
thereof, viz:

A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party
represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter
with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly
to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should
not undertake to advise him as to law.

Atty. Manuel N. Camacho filed a complaint against the lawyers comprising the Pangulayan and
Associates Law Offices, namely, Attorneys Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan, Regina D. Balmores, Catherine
V. Laurel, and Herbert Joaquin P. Bustos. Complainant, the hired counsel of some expelled students from
the AMA Computer College ("AMACC"), in an action for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction and for Damages, docketed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78,
of Quezon City, charged that respondents, then counsel for the defendants, procured and effected on
separate occasions, without his knowledge, compromise agreements ("Re-Admission Agreements") with
four of his clients in the aforementioned civil case which, in effect, required them to waive all kinds of
claims they might have had against AMACC, the principal defendant, and to terminate all civil, criminal
and administrative proceedings filed against it. Complainant averred that such an act of respondents was
unbecoming of any member of the legal profession warranting either disbarment or suspension from the
practice of law.
In his comment, Attorney Pangulayan acknowledged that not one of his co-respondents had taken part in
the negotiation, discussion, formulation, or execution of the various Re-Admission Agreements
complained of and were, in fact, no longer connected at the time with the Pangulayan and Associates
Law Offices. The Re-Admission Agreements, he claimed, had nothing to do with the dismissal of Civil
Case Q-97-30549 and were executed for the sole purpose of effecting the settlement of an administrative
case involving nine students of AMACC who were expelled therefrom upon the recommendation of the
Student Disciplinary Tribunal. The students, namely, Ian Dexter Marquez, Almira O. Basalo, Neil Jason R.
Salcedo, Melissa F. Domondon, Melyda B. De Leon, Leila D. Joven, Signorelli A. Santiago, Michael
Ejercito, and Cleo B. Villareiz, were all members of the Editorial Board of DATALINE, who apparently had
caused to be published some objectionable features or articles in the paper. The 3-member Student
Disciplinary Tribunal was immediately convened, and after a series of hearings, it found the students
guilty of the use of indecent language and unauthorized use of the student publication funds. The body
recommended the penalty of expulsion against the erring students.
The denial of the appeal made by the students to Dr. Amable R. Aguiluz V, AMACC President, gave rise
to the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 on 14th March 1997 before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 78, of Quezon City. While the civil case was still pending, letters of apology and Re-Admission
Agreements were separately executed by and/or in behalf of some of the expelled students, to wit: Letter
of Apology, dated 27 May 1997, of Neil Jason Salcedo, assisted by his mother, and Re-Admission
Agreement of 22 June 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 31 March 1997, of Mrs.
Veronica B. De Leon for her daughter Melyda B. De Leon and Re-Admission Agreement of 09 May 1997
with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 22 May 1997, of Leila Joven, assisted by her mother,
and Re-Admission Agreement of 22 May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter or apology, dated 22
September 1997, of Cleo Villareiz and Re-Admission Agreement of 10 October 1997 with the AMACC
President; and letter of apology, dated 20 January 1997, of Michael Ejercito, assisted by his parents, and
Re-Admission Agreement of 23 January 1997 with the AMACC President.
Following the execution of the letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements, a Manifestation, dated
06 June 1997, was filed with the trial court where the civil case was pending by Attorney Regina D.
Balmores of the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices for defendant AMACC. A copy of the
manifestation was furnished complainant. In his Resolution, dated 14 June 1997, Judge Lopez of the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court thereupon dismissed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549.
On 19 June 1999, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") passed
Resolution No. XIII-99-163, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with an amendment Atty. Meinrado
Pangulayan is suspended from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS for being remiss in his
duty and DISMISSAL of the case against the other Respondents for they did not take part in the
negotiation of the case.

It would appear that when the individual letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements were
formalized, complainant was by then already the retained counsel for plaintiff students in the civil case.
Respondent Pangulayan had full knowledge of this fact. Although aware that the students were
represented by counsel, respondent attorney proceeded, nonetheless, to negotiate with them and their
parents without at the very least communicating the matter to their lawyer, herein complainant, who was
counsel of record in Civil Case No. Q-97-30549. This failure of respondent, whether by design or because
of oversight, is an inexcusable violation of the canons of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a
duty owing to a colleague. Respondent fell short of the demands required of him as a lawyer and as a
member of the Bar.
The allegation that the context of the Re-Admission Agreements centers only on the administrative aspect
of the controversy is belied by the Manifestation which, among other things, explicitly contained the
1

following stipulation; viz:

1. Among the nine (9) signatories to the complaint, four (4) of whom assisted by their
parents/guardian already executed a Re-Admission Agreement with AMACC President, AMABLE
R. AGUILUZ V acknowledging guilt for violating the AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE MANUAL FOR
DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS and agreed among others to terminate all civil, criminal and
administrative proceedings which they may have against the AMACC arising from their previous
dismissal.
xxx xxx xxx
3. Consequently, as soon as possible, an Urgent Motion to Withdraw from Civil Case No. Q-97-
30549 will by filed them.1âwphi1

The Court can only thus concur with the IBP Investigating Commission and the IBP Board of Governors in
their findings; nevertheless, the recommended six-month suspension would appear to be somewhat too
harsh a penalty given the circumstances and the explanation of respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS effective immediately upon his receipt of this decision. The
case against the other respondents is DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and as a
member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Panganiban, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 139281 September 29, 1999

SPOUSES ROMUALDO and NORA SUAREZ., petitioners,
vs.
ARSENIO SALAZAR, et al., respondents.
RESOLUTION

Considering respondents' "Motion to Expunge All Pleadings Filed by Atty. Filemon A. Manangan with
Motion to Hold Him in Contempt of Court and to Dismiss the Petition" and said Atty. Manangan's
admission at the hearing this morning, September 29, 1999, that he is not a lawyer entitled to
practice law in the Philippines, and that he is the same "Filemon A. Manangan" who was found by
this Court in G.R. No. 82760 (Filemon Manangan v. Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya,
Branch 28) decided on August 30, 1990, to be in reality Andres Culanag who is not a member of the
Philippine Bar, but despite these facts he has continued to misrepresent himself to be an attorney-at-
law and has appeared as counsel for petitioners in this case, "Atty. Filemon A. Manangan, who is in
reality Andres Culanag, is hereby declared guilty of indirect contempt of this Court. Wherefore, he is
hereby sentenced to three (3) months imprisonment to be served at the Headquarters of the
National Bureau of Investigation, Taft Avenue, Manila, until further orders from this Court.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.

B. M. No. 1036 June 10, 2003

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, Complainant,
vs.
EDWIN L. RANA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for
membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than
possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar
candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was among those who passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as
members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre ("complainant") filed against
respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-
taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled
that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against
him. Thus, respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of
Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct.
Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in
the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers ("MBEC") of Mandaon,
Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May
2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the
Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as "counsel for and in behalf
of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan," and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan
("Bunan").
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government
employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent
is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of
acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan ("Bunan") without the latter engaging
respondent’s services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent
the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyer’s oath but
disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In
the same resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his "specific assistance" to represent him
before the MBEC. Respondent claims that "he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer
but as a person who knows the law." Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that
objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not
sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an "attorney" in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted
his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a
copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-
Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically motivated
considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of
Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he
be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Comment and refuted the claim of
respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan.
Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao ("Estipona-Hao") filed a petition for
proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao
in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned
his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was
an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondent’s Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant
administrative case is "motivated mainly by political vendetta."
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant ("OBC") for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
OBC’s Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May
2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in
the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even
before he took the lawyer’s oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondent’s misconduct
casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that
respondent’s unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law.
The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly
violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee.
Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was
authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent
appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyer’s oath. In
the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts
for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as "counsel for George Bunan."
In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the "(U)ndersigned
Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN." Bunan himself wrote
the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had "authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent
him" before the MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also "retained" respondent as her
counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that "Atty. Edwin L. Rana
has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of
the said party." Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his
"appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-
PPC." On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before
the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of
Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyer’s oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in
the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, the Court elucidated that:
1

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of
a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as
do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination
by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics
supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court held that "practice of law" means any activity, in or out of court,
2

which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal
profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal
knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before
the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the
charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that
he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he had no
authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine
Bar.3

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to
persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The
exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not
4

acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a
privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person
seeking admission had practiced law without a license. 5

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, a candidate
6

passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was
held in contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e)
of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable
for indirect contempt of court.
7

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath. However, it
1âwphi1

is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that
respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification
to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a
8
lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his
signature in the Roll of Attorneys.
9

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent to
act as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts
complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001
addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respondent stated that he was resigning "effective upon your acceptance." Vice-Mayor Relox
10

accepted respondent’s resignation effective 11 May 2001. Thus, the evidence does not support the
11

charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed
authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While
there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant,

vs.
ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.

NARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E.B. Villarosa &
Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the
incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were
classmates, and used to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by
Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa
& Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the
President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:

. . I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to

terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as
represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's
branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was
vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said
sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which
made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests. He
then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the
"grounds which could evidence the bad faith. deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent . . .;" and
 closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our
contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state on record that I am
terminating the contract . . . I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before
said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was
actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial
contract."

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro,
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went
through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the
description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage - PD 26," had been typed.

On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga,
Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and
void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan
in connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the rate of
P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:

. . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul,

cancel, rescind and voided, the "manipulated contract" entered into
between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as
represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who
maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully
secured and pursued the housing loan without my authority and
against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab
initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent was
vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of
confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between me
and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me.

And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the
anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.

Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15,
1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the
cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account
thereof. a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoñez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the
Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the
anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent." b

The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan
"effective May 1996." and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. " for the buy-back of . . . (Alauya's) mortgage. and . . the refund of . . (his)
payments." c

On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint dated January
25, 1996 — to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage -
PD 26." In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:
1

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through

manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"

2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"
 3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage . . .;" and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine
Bar may properly use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous swindler, forger, manipulator, etc."
without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his
imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance
and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and
completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the senice, or be
appropriately desciplined (sic) . . ."

The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint, Conformably with established
usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court,
the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division
Clerk of Court.2

Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment" in which he questioned the authority of Atty.
3

Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere
Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the
Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result
of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint
had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of Court and
ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar." but also "a scion of a Royal Family . . ."
4

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious
tones, Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might
5

comment thereon. He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the
6

confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi, as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his
signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of
P4,333.10 from his salary.

And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was
he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold
financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his
salary. He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co.
7

he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying
that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of
certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage - PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some
other person, an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV
(subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J); and 8

as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for
postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred
inadvertently and because of an honest mistake. 9

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with
"Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the
title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao
term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider
himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly
prejudiced and injured." He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate
10

and friend. He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the
11

completed document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous
letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the property — subject of his supposed
agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. — is situated; He says Alawi somehow got his
12

GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do so until
after several months. He also claims that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi
forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance,
lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw. 13

Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of
the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations." and
complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent
housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.

It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan
(dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15,
1996 — all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" — in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he
does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."

The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation. 14

The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous
charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith,
resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those
letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:

1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . . illegal and unauthorized acts . . . prejudicial to . . (his)
rights and interests;"

3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and
unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without . . (his) authority and against . . (his) will,"
and "concealed the real facts . . ."

Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense of
his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had
suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,
considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. 15

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter
alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in
the public service. Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees . . at all
16

times respect the rights of others, and . . refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest." More than once has this
17
Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency
involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be
characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of
the public for the judiciary."
18

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or
respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed — however sincerely — to
be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language.
Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires
that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone;
in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or
otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith." Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or
19

downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to
a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law,
he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise
improper. As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights
20

of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint,
courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but
cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that
persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may
only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and
21

one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the
sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The
title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law
and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to
practice law in this jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law, " because in his
region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local
legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of
"counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the record contains
22

no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively
intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for
usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in
the future will be dealt with more severely.

N BANC
B.M. No. 2540 September 24, 2013
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS
MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. Medado
(Medado).
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in
1979 and passed the same year's bar examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7.
1 2

On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center
(PICC) together with the successful bar examinees. He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of
3

Attorneys on 13 May 1980, but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he had
4

misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys given by the Bar Office when he went home to his
5

province for a vacation. 6

Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign
the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he
had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record. 7

By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly doing
corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he
operated "under the mistaken belief that since he had already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll
of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer"; and "the matter of signing in
8

the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten." 9

In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was
required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited. 10

Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be
allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on 21
September 2012 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February
12

2013. The OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence,
13

gross misconduct and utter lack of merit. It explained that, based on his answers during the
14

clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the
Roll of Attorneys. 15

After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject to
the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of
law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to
imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most
serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.
In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the
instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called this
Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged his own
lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar Confidant why it took
him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied:
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong
mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a combination of
apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I have to
come here … sign the roll and take the oath as necessary. 16

For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of
law, which is more than what we can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted as
17

members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere
to the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he
possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held various
positions at the Laurel Law Office, Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil
18

Company, and the Energy Development Corporation. 19

All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine
Bar. While the practice of law is not a right but a privilege, this Court will not unwarrantedly
1âwphi1
20

withhold this privilege from individuals who have shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand
the rigors of the profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of
inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30
years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys. He justifies this behavior by characterizing his
21

acts as "neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of
judgment." 22

We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of
his acts as it negates malice or evil motive, a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful
23 24

justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences. Ignorantia
25

factiexcusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest
mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-
taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had signed
was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid
justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the
Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing
therein that would have made him so. When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue
26

practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the requirements for admission to
the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney or
officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of
court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. Such a finding, however, is in the
27 28

nature of criminal contempt and must be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of
29

hearings. In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of
30

court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any finding of
liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized
practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this
provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to prevent the unauthorized practice
of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the
Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal
profession.
Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9have warranted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law. As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend
31

him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension
by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For his
transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine
him in the amount of ₱32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed
to engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of
law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner
Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this
Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of ₱32,000 for his unauthorized practice
of law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY
WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of
Attorneys will be dealt will be severely by this Court.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-24864 April 30, l985

FORTUNATO HALILI, doing business under the name and style HALILI TRANSIT (substituted
by EMILIA DE VERA DE HALILI), petitioner
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and HALILI BUS DRIVERS and CONDUCTORS UNION
(PTGWO), respondents.
G.R. No. L-27773 April 30, l985
EMILIA DE VERA VDA. DE HALILI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and HALILI BUS DRIVERS AND CONDUCTORS UNION
(PTGWO), respondents.
G.R. No. L-38655 April 30, l985
FELICIDAD M. TOLENTINO, et al., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. L-30110 April 30, l985
EMILIA DE VERA VDA. DE HALILI petitioner,
vs.
HALILI BUS DRIVERS AND CONDUCTORS UNION-PTGWO and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, respondents.
RESOLUTION

MAKASIAR, J.:
Before Us for resolution is the urgent motion to cite Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda, Ricardo Capuno and
Manila Bank (Cubao Branch) in contempt for the alleged continued failure of aforenamed parties to
comply with the temporary mandatory restraining order issued by this Court on September 1, 1983
and with the resolution dated September 13, 1983 which again directed Atty. Pineda and union
administrator Capuno to comply with the aforesaid mandatory restraining order and which ordered
the Manila Bank to transfer the funds allocated for the workers to the NLRC (p. 376, L-24864, rec.; p.
301, L027773 rec.).
The issuance of the temporary mandatory restraining order stemmed from the questioned orders of
September 23, 1982 and February 9, 1983 issued by Labor Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuela in Case
No. 1099-V before the NLRC which orders respectively allowed the sale of the property awarded to
satisfy or answer for the claims of the union members in these four cases and authorized the
distribution of the proceeds of the purchase.
For a better appreciation of the aforesaid motion for contempt, We must recall certain prefatory facts
which the Solicitor General has so aptly summed up. Thus:
The above-entitled cases involve disputes regarding claims for overtime of more than
five hundred bus drivers and conductors of Halili Transit. Litigation initially
commenced with the filing of a complaint for overtime with the defunct Court of
Industrial Relations on August 20, 1958 docketed as CIR Case No. 1099-V. The
disputes were eventually settled when the contending parties reached an Agreement
on December 23, 1974, the pertinent portions of which are as follows:
WHEREAS, in the face of this strong urging on the part of the Supreme Court
Justices upon the parties to put an immediate end to this case by amicable
settlement, the parties repeatedly came to conference, conscientiously explored all
avenues of settlement, and finally arrived at the tentative agreement (tentative
because of the condition that the same be sanctioned by the court in the estate case)
whereby the Administratrix would transfer to the employees title to that tract of land,
covered by TCT No. 36389, containing an area of approximately 33,952 square
meters, situated in the Barrio of San Bartolome, Municipality of Caloocan, Province
of Rizal, and pay in addition the cash amount of P25,000.00 in full and final
satisfaction of all the claims and causes of action of all of the employees against the
estate of Fortunato F. Halili subject of CIR Case No. 1099-V.
xxx xxx xxx
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing and of the covenants,
stipulations and undertakings hereinafter contained, the parties have agreed as
follows:
l. The UNION, its officers and members-claimants relative to CIR Case No. 1099-V,
shall withdraw and dismiss with prejudice Case No. 1099-V filed by the UNION in
behalf of its members-claimants before the Court of Industrial Relations and all its
incidents thereto.
2. The ESTATE shall deliver or cause to be delivered, to the UNION the following:
(a) Deed of Transfer of a parcel of land situated in Barrio San Bartolome, Caloocan
City, containing an area of THIRTY-THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTY-
TWO (33,952) Square Meters, more or less, and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 35389 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, to be made, upon authority and
approval granted by the Court of First of Rizal, Branch IV, at Quezon City, in Proc.
No. Q-10852 in the name of the Halili Bus Drivers & Conductors Union (PTGWO),
free from any and all liens encumbrances, and any and all claims whatsoever.
(b) Negotiable Check for TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P25,000.00) PESOS in the
name of Domingo D. Cabading, President of the UNION.
3. The transfer of the above-described parcel of land and receipt of the amount of
P25,000.00 constitute the full and final satisfaction of the claims and award in said
CIR Case No. 1099-V, as well as any and all attorney's liens in said case, for and in
consideration of which the UNION members-claimants in CIR Case No. 1099-V by
these present now and forever release and quitclaim Halili Enterprises, Halili Transit,
Fortunato F. Halili his estate, heirs and successors by reason of CIR Case No. 1099-
V, it being their intention that they be absolutely, completely and finally absolved and
released from any and all liability in said case, including attorneys' liens the transfer
of the property and payment of the amount hereinabove stated constituting for all
intents and purposes a full, final and complete settlement and satisfaction of the
award in CIR Case No. 1099-V and all incidents thereto.
4. The UNION and its undersigned officers hereby warrant that the UNION is a duly
registered labor organization and that in a special meeting called for the purpose
they were duly authorized on December 22, 1974, by all the members- claimants in
CIR Case No. 1099-V to sign this Memorandum of Agreement with Release and
Quitclaim which was unanimously approved and ratified by said members-claimants
as evidenced by a Resolution dated December 22, 1974, a copy of which is attached
hereto and made a part hereof as Annex "B", and hereby jointly and severally hold
the estate and heirs of Fortunato F. Halili free and harness from, and undertake to
indemnify them for, any and all liability for any claims by members of the UNION,
their heirs, assigns and agents relating to CIR Case No. 1099-V or attorneys' liens in
connection therewith (69 SCRA 509-510).
On January 6, 1975, pursuant to the Agreement, the administratrix of the estate of
Fortunato F, Halili executed a Deed of Conveyance of Real Property, transferring the
aforementioned parcel of land to the Halili Bus and Conductors Union (PTGWO) in
trust for the members of the union claimants. The parcel of land was eventually
registered in the name of the Union on February 14, 1975. Hence, on February 10,
1976, the contending parties moved for the dismissal of G.R. No. L-30110 and G.R.
 No. L-38655, which this Honorable Court granted on February 27, 1976 (69 SCRA
505). The two other cases, G.R. No. L-24864 and G.R. No. L- 27773, were
previously disposed of on February 26, 1968 and December 28, 1970, respectively
(22 SCRA 785. and 36 SCRA 522).
On August 9, 1982, the Union, through Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda, filed an urgent
motion with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) requesting for authority to
sell and dispose of the property. The motion was granted in an order dated
September 23, 1982. A prospective buyer, the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, inc.
expressed its misgivings on the authority of the Union to sell the property in view of
sec. 66 of PD 1529 which requires no less than an order from a court of competent
jurisdiction as authority to sell property in trust. So, Atty. Pineda filed a motion with
the Supreme Court on December 1, 1982 requesting for authority to sell the property,
This Honorable Court, however, merely noted the motion in a resolution dated
December 8, 1982.
Nevertheless, Atty. Pineda, without authority from the Supreme Court but relying on
the earlier authority given him by the Ministry of Labor, filed another urgent motion
with the latter, praying that the Union be authorized to sell the lot to the Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. and to make arrangements with it such that payment
will be advanced for the real estate taxes inclusive of penalties, attorney's lien which
is equivalent to a thirty-five percent (35%) of the total purchase price, and home
developer's fee of P69,000.00. Apparently, the prospective purchaser had decided to
withdraw its objection regarding the Union's authority to sell. In an Order dated
February 9, 1983, Labor Arbiter Raymundo R. Valenzuela granted the motion. So,
the sale was finally consummated on June 7, 1983, resulting in the execution of an
escrow agreement on June 8, 1983 wherein the purchase price was deposited under
escrow with the Manila Bank-Cubao Branch. The Bank then released the amounts
due the claimants in accordance with the escrow agreement" (pp. 352- 356, L-24864
rec.).
The dispositive portion in L-24864 is re-stated hereunder:
WHEREFORE, the appealed order and resolution en banc are hereby affirmed and
the Court of Industrial Relations is hereby enjoined to make a judicial determination
of the union membership of the claimants, while the Examining Division of said court
shall proceed with its computation of the compensable hours of work rendered by,
and the corresponding compensation payable to, the drivers and conductors
admitted by both parties to be union members since October 1, 1956 and those
contended by the union to be such members but disputed by the employer. No costs.
So ordered (p. 186, L-24864 rec.).
When Atty. Jose C. Espinas (herein movant and alleged original counsel for the Union) learned of
the sale and apportionment of the proceeds from past Union president Amado Lopez, he requested
Labor Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuela to allow him to look into the records of Case No. 1099-V. The
latter, however, told him that the records of the aforecited case were missing. Thereupon, Atty.
Espinas requested Director Pascual Reyes of the NLRC to locate the records (p. 356, L24864 rec.).
Hence, Atty. Espinas filed the urgent motion with prayer for a temporary mandatory restraining order
on August 26, 1983 and the supplement thereto on August 29, 1983 (pp. 215, 227, L-24864 rec.).
On August 30, 1983, the records of Case No. 1099-V were finally found and Atty. Espinas was dully
informed of the development,
The above two motions question the legality of the orders dated September 23, 1982 and February
9, 1983 issued by Labor Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuela in Case No. 1099-V before the NLRC which
authorized the sale of the awarded property and the distribution of the proceeds from such purchase.
Movants Union and counsel Espinas upon filing of the motions urgently pray of thisourt to:
1. Require Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda to deposit with the NLRC the amount of P712,992.00 paid to
him or deposited to his account at Manila Bank, Cubao Branch,allegedly representing 35%
attorney's fees on the sale of 33,952 square meters of the lot registered in the name of the Union;
2. Require the Halili Drivers and Conductors Union through Domingo Cabading or any of his
representatives to deposit with the NIRC the 6% alleged union expenses paid to them or similarly
deposited to their account;
3. Implead with leave of court this Manila Bank Cubao Branch to require the said bank to prevent
further withdrawals of amount deposited in the name of Atty. Pineda and/or the Halili Drivers and
Conductors Union or any of its officers and to turn over any remaining deposits to the NLRC for
proper disposition;
4. Should Atty. Pineda and the Union officers have already withdrawn the deposits or parts thereof,
require them to post a bond in the equivalent amounts of 35% (attorney's fee), 6% (union expenses),
and 5% (broker's fee) respectively of the total proceeds of the sale of the property, solidarity (p. 219,
L-24864 rec.; p. 160, L-27773 rec.).
Likewise, and after due consideration of the merits, movants prayed that—
1. the order of Arbiter Valenzuela dated February 9, 983 be nullified insofar as it allows Atty. Pineda
35% attorney's fees;
2. the NLRC be directed to locate the records of Case No. 1099-V or reconstitute the same and
thereafter to equitably dispose 20% as fees to all lawyers who participated in the proceedings and
any excess amounts to be again distributed to the workers; and
3. these cases be remanded to the NLRC with instructions as above-stated and that the proper
penalty be imposed on those involved and who have acted fraudulently and illegally (p. 220, L-24864
rec.; p. 165, L-27773 rec.).
The succeeding pleadings and developments which are common to all these cases are now
presented chronologically.
On August 29, 1983, Atty. Espinas, for himself and members of the respondent Union, filed a
supplement to urgent motion stating that the prayers in the urgent motion of August 26, 1983 are
reiterated and praying for the nullification of Arbiter Valenzuela's order not only on the award of
attorney's fees but also on the allowance of payment of "union obligations" not previously authorized
nor approved by the NLRC (p. 227, L-24864, rec.; p. 176, L-27773 rec.).
In its resolution dated September 1, 1983, this Court impleaded the Manila Bank, Cubao Branch as
party respondent and directed the issuance of a temporary mandatory restraining order (p. 234, L-
24864 rec. & p. 187, L-27773 rec.). This Court correspondingly issued a temporary mandatory
restraining order on the same date which enjoined Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda or his agents or any
person acting in his stead to deposit with the NLRC the amount of P712,992.00 paid to him or
deposited in his account at Manila Bank, Cubao Branch allegedly representing 35% attorney's fees
on the sale of 33,952 square meters of the lot registered in the name of Halili Drivers and
Conductors Union; directed the Union thru Domingo Cabading or his agents to deposit with the
NLRC 6% alleged union expenses paid to the Union or similarly deposited to its account; and
ordered the NLRC and Manila Bank, Cubao Branch, or their agents or persons in their stead not to
allow withdrawals of amounts deposited in the name of Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda and/or the Union or
any of its officers (P. 235, L-24864; p. 188, L-27773 rec.).
On September 6, 1983, respondent Union, thru Atty. Pineda, filed its comment, in compliance with
the resolution of September 1, 1983, on the urgent motion and the supplement thereto both filed by
counsel Espinas, alleging therein that the subject matter sought to be enjoined or mandated by the
restraining order ceased to exist rendering the same moot and academic, and thus praying for the
dismissal of the said motion and the supplement thereto (p. 237, L-24864 rec.; p. 191, L-27773 rec.).
On September 7, 1983, Atty. Pedro Lopez, an original associate of Atty. Espinas, filed his motion for
leave to intervene, with the submission that the lawyers involved should only divide 20% fees as per
the workers' contract and the rest refunded by Atty. Pineda and the alleged "union officers" for
redistribution to the members (p. 265, L-24864, rec.; p. 219. L-27773 rec.).
Atty. Espinas, in behalf of the workers, filed a manifestation and motion to require Atty, Pineda and
the union to comply with the temporary mandatory restraining order on September 9, 1983, with
prayer that the Manila Bank be ordered to transfer the funds allocated for the workers to the NLRC,
which should be instructed to pay the workers upon proper Identification (without prejudice to
additional shares) or to mail such amounts by money order or manager's check to the workers'
addresses as furnished to the NLRC (p. 274, L-24864, rec.; p. 231, L-27773 rec.).
On September 12, 1983, petitioner filed a manifestation in compliance with the resolution of
September 2, 1983 stating, among other things, that its liability had been completely extinguished
with the approval of the Memorandum of Agreement with Release and Quitclaim in L-38655 and L-
30110; that said agreement operated as an absolute and complete release of petitioner from any
liability to the Union; and that petitioner had not been given any notice of any proceedings respecting
cases subsequent to the promulgation of the decisions aforestated (p. 281, L-24864, rec.; p. 237, L-
27773 rec.).
Counsel Espinas (for the workers involved) filed his reply to comments of respondent Union on
September 14, 1983 praying for this Court to:
1. nullify the order of February 9, 1983 issued by Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuela in CIR Case No.
1099-V and others connected therewith regarding the distribution of proceeds of the sale of the land
belonging to the members-claimants for lack of due process and for being contrary to law;
2. nullify the 35% attorney's fees of Atty. Benjamin Pineda as illegal and unconscionable and in
disregard of other lawyers in the case;
3. require reimbursement to the members-from the Union P101,856.00 allocated without their
consent as Union expenses; P101,856 unreceipted brokers' fees less P4,020.40 expenses for the
transfer of title; to refund the 1 % of the net proceeds, P9,596.18, for named claimants; and to
secure a refund of P308,000.00 from the P712,992.00 fees of Atty. Pineda (the excess of 20% fees
for all lawyers);
4. subject the balance of P404,992.00 of the remainder of Atty. Pineda's 35% fees for distribution
among the three lawyers as may be determined by the NLRC; and
5. should this Court so decides, fix the fees (p. 285, L- 24864 rec.; p. 240, L-27773 rec.).
On September 13, 1983, the Solicitor General filed his comment on the urgent motion and the
supplement thereto dated August 25, 1983 and August 29, 1983, respectively with the
recommendations that (1) the orders of Arbiter Valenzuela dated September 23, 1982 and February
9, 1983 be nullified for having been issued without due process; (2) the case must be remanded to
the NLRC for further proceedings; and (3) the temporary restraining order issued by this Court on
September 1, 1983 be maintained, pending final resolution by the NLRC (p. 351, L-24864 rec.).
The Solicitor General, on October 6, 1983, filed his manifestation and motion in lieu of comment on
the motion of Atty. Pedro Lopez for leave to intervene in L-24864 and L-27773 (p. 360, L-24864 rec.;
p. 289, L-27773 rec.).
On October 6, 1983, counsel Espinas filed his comment on the intervention of Atty. Pedro Lopez
wherein he offers no objection to the latter's intervention and states that said counsel is also entitled
to attorney's fees in accordance with his participation (p. 364, L-24864 rec.; p. 292, L-27773 rec.).
Atty. Pineda filed his comment and manifestation on October 7, 1983, in compliance with the
resolution of September 13, 1983, alleging therein that as per Retainer's Contract dated January 1,
1967, he handled Case No. 1099-V before the Court of Industrial Relations alone. On the mandatory
restraining order, Atty. Pineda claims that as of October 4, 1983, he had a balance of P2,022.70 in
his account with the Manila Bank (p. 370, L-24864 rec.; p. 295, L-27773 rec.).
In its resolution dated October 18, 1983, this Court (1) set, aside as null and void the orders of
September 23, 1982 and February 9, 1983 of Arbiter Raymundo R. Valenzuela; (2) allowed the
intervention of Atty. Pedro Lopez; (3) directed the Manila Bank (Cubao Branch), Atty. Benjamin
Pineda, and the Halili Drivers and Conductors Union through Domingo Cabading or any of his
representatives, to comply with the temporary mandatory restraining order issued on September 1,
1983 and the resolution dated September 13, 1983, within ten [10] days from receipt thereof; and (4)
remanded these cases to the NLRC for further proceedings (p. 374, L-24864 rec.; p. 299, L-27773
rec.).
The day before or on October 17, 1983, Sergio de Pedro, as representative of the workers and
assisted by Atty. Espinas, thus fided the urgent motion to cite Atty. Pineda, Ricardo Capuilo and
Manila Bank (Cubao Branch) in contempt, alleging therein that after two letters dated October 6 and
October l4, l983 to the NLRC which inquired as to whether or not compliant, with the restraining
order had been made, the Commission certified that as of October 14, 1983, no deposits had been
effected by the parties so (directed (p. 376, L-24864 rec.; p. 301, L-27773 rec.).
In its manifestation and motion filed on November 2, 1983, respondent Manila Banking Corporation
(Rustan-Cubao Branch), in compliance with this Court's resolution of September 13, 1983, stated
that it transmitted or paid to the NLRC the amount of P417,380.64 under Cashier's Check No.
34084190 for the account of the Union and P2,022.70 under Cashier's Check No. 34084191 for the
account of Atty. Pineda and thus prayed therein that the aforesaid transmittals be deemed as
sufficient compliance with the aforecited resolution and that the urgent motion to cite respondents in
contempt dated October 17, 1983 be considered moot and academic (p. 390, L-24864 rec.).
On November 8, 1983, respondent Atty. Pineda filed his manifestation and motion in lieu of
comment in compliance with this Court's resolution of October 20, 1983, stating that he and
respondent Union thereby adopt the aforecited manifestation and motion of respondent Manila
Banking Corporation and thus prayed that since they have complied with this Court's resolution of
September 13, 1983, the urgent motion to cite them for contempt be considered moot and academic
(p. 394, L-24864 rec.; p. 310, L-27773 rec.).
On November 10, 1983, respondent Manila Banking Corporation filed another manifestation and
motion in lieu of commence, by way of compliance with the Court's resolution of October 20, 1983
with prayer that its previous manifestation and motion dated October 28, 1983 and filed on
November 2, 1983 be considered as sufficient compliance with the resolution of September 13, 1983
which would render the urgent motion to cite respondents in contempt moot and academic (p. 396,
L-24864 rec. p. 312, L-27773 rec.).
On the foregoing manifestations and motions, representative Sergio de Pedro, with the assistance of
Atty. Espinas, filed a comment on November 16,1983 wherein he alleged that out of the
P2,037,120.00 purchase price, only Pl,940,127.29 was deposited with the Manila Bank; that Atty.
Pineda has yet to return the balance of P710,969,30; and that the Union has still to account for
P111,452.18 (p. 399, L- 24864 rec.; p. 315, L-27773 rec.).
December 14, 1983, respondent Union filed its reply to Mr. de Pedro's above unsigned comment
therein stating among other things that the alleged missing amount of P96.992.71 was used for the
payment of outstanding real estate taxes on real property of said Union covered by TCT No. 205755
and that the amount of P2,022.70 only was remitted by Manila Bank to the NLRC for the account of
Atty. Pineda (p. 323, L-27773 rec.)
On December 20, 1983, Mr. de Pedro and Atty. Espinas, for the workers involved, filed their
rejoinder to the comment of Atty. Pineda and Mr. Capuno reiterating therein their plea to declare
Atty. Pineda and Mr. Capuno in contempt of court and to mete out the proper penalty (p. 328, L-
27773 rec.).
The Manila Banking Corporation filed its compliance with the Court resolution of November 22, 1983
on February 3, 1984, praying that its report to the NLRC on the amount of withdrawals be
considered as sufficient compliance with the said resolution (p. 343, L-27773 rec.).
Atty. Espinas filed his comment and motion on March 15, 1984, stating among other things that as
per report of the Manila Bank to the NLRC, Atty. Pineda has not yet complied with the said order. He
thus moved that Atty. Pineda be required to post a bond on the undeposited balance in the amounts
of P710,969.30 and that Mr. Capuno be also required to post a bond before the NLRC on the
undeposited balance of P52,236.04 during the pendency of the motion for contempt (p. 373, L-
27773 rec.).
On April 4, 1984, Mr. Sergio de Pedro filed his reply to the aforesaid comment of the Union
administrator and Atty. Pineda stating therein that there are still questions to be resolved on the
merits before the NLRC and hence, prays that Arbiter Antonio Tirona be required to continue hearing
the merits of the case pending in the said Commission (p. 377, L-27773 rec.).
Before We resolve the motion for contempt, certain crucial facts which have surfaced and which
precipitated Our issuance of the resolution of October 18, 1983 declaring the two questioned orders
of Arbiter Valenzuela as null and void, must be retraced.
Then Union President Amado Lopez, in a letter dated August 21, 1958, informed J.C. Espinas and
Associates that the general membership of the said Union had authorized a 20% contingent fee for
the law firm based on whatever amount would be awarded the Union (p. 267, L-24864 rec.).
Atty. Jose C. Espinas, the original counsel, established the award of 897 workers' claim in the main
cases before the defunct CIR and the Supreme Court. In L-24864, the Notice of Judgment of this
Court dated February 26, 1968 was served on Messrs. J.C. Espinas & Associates (p. 188, L-24864
rec.). In L-27773, the Notice of Judgment dated December 29, 1970 was sent to Atty. B.C. Pineda &
Associates under same address-716 Puyat Bldg., Suit 404 at Escolta, Manila (p. 147, L-27773 rec.)
Note that this is the same address of Atty. J.C. Espinas & Associates.
When Atty. 'Pineda appeared for the Union in these cases, still an associate of the law firm, his
appearance carried the firm name B.C. Pineda and Associates," giving the impression that he was
the principal lawyer in these cases.
Atty. Pineda joined the law firm of Atty. Espinas in 1965 when these cases were pending resolution.
He always held office in the firm's place at Puyat Building, Escolta until 1974, except in 1966 to 1967
when he transferred to the Lakas ng Manggagawa Offices. During this one-year stint at the latter
office, Atty. Pineda continued handling the case with the arrangement that he would report the
developments to the Espinas firm. When he rejoined the law firm in 1968, he continued working on
these cases and using the Puyat Building office as his address in the pleadings.
When Atty. Pineda rejoined the Espinas firm in 1968, he did not reveal to his partners (he was made
the most senior partner) that he had a retainer's contract entered into on January 1, 1967 which
allegedly took effect in 1966. He stayed with the law firm until 1974 and still did not divulge the 1967
retainer's contract. Only the officers of the Union knew of the contract.
The alleged retainer's contract between Atty. Pineda and the Union appears anomalous and even
illegal as well as unethical considering that-
1. The contract was executed only between Atty. Pineda and the officers of the Union chosen by
about 125 members only. It was not a contract with the general membership, Only 14% of the total
membership of 897 was represented. This violates Article 242 (d) of the Labor Code which provides:
The members shall determine by secret ballot, after due deliberation, any question of
major policy affecting the entire membership of the organization, unless the nature of
the organization or force majeure renders such secret ballot impractical, in which
case the board of directors of the organization may make the decision in behalf of the
general membership (emphasis supplied).
2. The contingent fee of 30% for those who were still working with Halili Transit and the 45% fee for
those who were no longer working worked to the prejudice of the latter group who should and were
entitled to more benefits. Thus, too, when the alleged retainer's contract was executed in 1967, the
Halili Transit had already stopped operations in Metro Manila. By then, Atty. Pineda knew that all the
workers would be out of work which would mean that the 45% contingent fee would apply to all.
3. The contract which retroactively took effect on January 1, 1966, was executed when Atty. Espinas
was still handling the appeal of Halili Transit in the main case before the Supreme Court. Atty.
Pineda would have but did not substitute himself in place of Atty. Espinas or the law firm on the
basis of such contract.
4. When Atty. Pineda filed his motion for approval of his attorney's lien with Arbiter Valenzuela on
February 8, 1983, he did not attach the retainer's contract.
5. The retainer's contract was not even notarized (p. 248, L-24864 rec.).
The Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., as the prospective buyer, initially expresses its misgivings
over the authority of the Union to sell subject property conformably with Section 66 of P.D. No. 1529,
which requires an order from a court of competent jurisdiction authorizing the sale of a property in
trust. The pertinent portion of Section 66 provides:
No instruments which transfers or mortgages or in any way deals with registered land
in trust shall be registered, unless the enabling power thereto is expressly conferred
in the trust instrument, or unless a final judgment or order of a court of competent
jurisdiction has construed the instrument in favor of the power, in which case a
certified copy of such judgment or order may be registered.
The decision of aforenamed purchaser to stop questioning the Union's authority to sell and the
expeditious manner by which Arbiter Valenzuela granted Atty. Pineda's motion for such authority to
sell the property make the entire transaction dubious and irregular.
Thus, without notice to the other lawyers and parties, Atty. Pineda commenced the proceeds before
the NLRC with the filing of a motion and manifestation on August 9, 1982 with Arbiter Valenzuela of
the NLRC Office of the Labor Ministry wherein he asked for authority to sell the property. On
September 23, 1983 or just over a month, Arbiter Valenzuela approved the motion per order of the
same date. Notably, only Atty. Pineda and the lawyers of the purchaser were informed of such order.
On February 4, 1983, again without notice to Atty. Espinas and Atty. Lopez, Atty. Pineda filed a
motion with Arbiter Valenzuela wherein he asked for authority to distribute the proceeds of the sale
of the property. This distribution would include his attorney's fee which was allegedly the subject of a
retainer contract entered into between him and the alleged Union officers, On February 9, 1983, or
barely five days from the day the motion was filed, Arbiter Valenzuela, without informing the other
lawyers and relying exclusively on the unverified motion of Atty. Pineda (the records of the case
were not on hand), approved the said motion which authorized the appointment.
This Court, as earlier stated, nullified said orders dated September 23, 1982 and February 9, 1983 of
Labor Arbiter Valenzuela as violative of the due process clause. It is a settled rule that in
administrative proceedings, or cases coming before administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial
powers, due process requires not only notice and hearing, but also the consideration by the
administrative tribunal of the evidence presented; the existence of evidence to support the decision;
its substantiality a decision based thereon or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties; such decision by the administrative tribunal resting on its own independent consideration of
the law and facts of the controversy; and such decision acquainting the parties with the various
issued involved and the reasons therefore (Ang Tibay vs. Court, 69 Phil. 635, cited on p. 84,
Philippine Constitutional Law, Fernando, 1984 ed.)
Significantly Atty. Pineda's act of filing a motion with this Court on December 1, 1982 praying for
authority to sell was by itself an admission on his part that he did not possess the authority to sell the
property and that this Court was the proper body which had the power to grant such authority. He
could not and did not even wait for such valid authority but instead previously obtained the same
from the labor arbiter whom he knew was not empowered to so authorize. Under Article 224 (a) of
the Labor Code, only final decisions or awards of the NLRC, the Labor Arbiter, or compulsory or
voluntary arbitrators may be implemented or may be the subject of implementing orders by
aforenamed body or officers.
When Atty. Espinas discovered the sale of the property, he went to Arbiter Valenzuela to look into
the transaction who told him that the records of CIR Case No. 1099-V were missing. It took director
Pascual Reyes of the NLRC to locate the records.
The 45% attorney's lien on the award of those union members who were no longer working and the
30% lien on the benefits of those who were still working as provided for in the alleged retainer's
contract are very exorbitant and unconscionable in view of Section 11, Rule VIII of Book III which
explicitly provides:
Sec. 11. Attorney's fees—Attorney's fees on any judicial or administrative
proceedings for the recovery of wages shall not exceed 10% of the amount awarded.
The fees may be deducted from the total amount due the winning party.
The amount of P101,856.00 which Atty. Pineda donated to the Union and which actually
corresponds to 5% of the total 35% attorney's fees taken from the proceeds (p. 263, L-24864, rec.)
appears improper since it amounts to a rebate or commission. This amount was subsequently
treated as union miscellaneous operating expenses without the consent of the general membership.
Thus, in the case of Amalgamated Laborers' Association vs. Court of Industrial Relations (L-23467,
22 SCRA 1267 [March 27, 1968]), We declared:
We strike down the alleged oral agreement that the union president should share in
the attorney's fees. Canon 34 of Legal Ethics condemns this arrangement in terms
clear and explicit. It says: 'No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with
another lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility.' The union
 president is not the attorney for the laborers. He may seek compensation only as
such president. An agreement whereby a union president is allowed to share in
attorney's fees is immoral. Such a contract we emphatically reject. It cannot be
justified.
A contingent fee contract specifying the percentage of recovery an attorney is to
receive in a suit 'should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case,
including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject
to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness. (emphasis supplied).
A deeper scrutiny of the pleadings in L-24864 notably indicates a fraudulent or deceitful pattern in
the actuations of Atty. Pineda. Thus, in his motion for execution of judgment filed on September 18,
1965 in this case, he signed for and in behalf of "J.C. Espinas & Associates" (p. 323, rec.). In his
manifestation dated December 10, 1968, he signed as "B.C. Pineda," lone counsel for petitioner (p.
327, rec.); and yet, he carried the address of Espinas & Associates at 716 G. Puyat Building,
Escolta.
However, in the October 29, 1968 resolution of this Court, a copy thereof was served on "Messrs.
J.C. Espinas, B.C Pineda, J.J. dela Rosa & Associates" at Puyat Building, Escolta (p. 324, rec.). In
the notice of judgment dated December 29, 1970, this Court addressed the said pleading to "Attys.
B.C. Pineda & Associates with the same Puyat Building address (p. 325, rec.). Notably also, then
Union President Amado Lopez addressed his letter dated August 21, 1958 to J.C. Espinas &
Associates" wherein he informed the latter that the general membership of the Union had authorized
them a 20%, contingent fee on whatever award would be given the workers (p. 267, rec.).
The Manila Banking Corporation (Cubao Branch) has manifested that it turned over to the NLRC the
amount of P417,380.64 for the Union's account, which appears to be the balance of P950,021.76
corresponding to the net proceeds for distribution to the workers after deducting P525,480.40, the
total payments to claimants. The amount of P417,380.64 appears lacking, since accurately
computed, the balance should be P424,541,36.
However, the Union has yet to account for P101,856.00, the 5% donation or share from Atty.
Pineda's attorney's fee of 35%.
For the account of Atty. Pineda, the Manila Banking Corporation has remitted to the NLRC the
amount of P2,022.70 only. This means that Atty. Pineda is still accountable for the amount of
P710,969.30. He is directed to return the amount of P712,992.00 representing the 35% attorney's
fees he unlawfully received.
In view of Our resolution of October 18, 1983, which set aside as null and void the questioned orders
dated September 23, 1982 and February 9, 1983 issued by Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuela, the sale
of the Union property and the distribution of the proceeds therefrom had been effected without
authority and, therefore, illegal Consequently. Atty. Pineda and Arbiter Valenzuela become liable for
their unauthorized acts,
Atty. Pineda should be cited for indirect contempt under paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of Section 3,
Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court, The said paragraphs read thus:
Sec. 3. indirect contempts to be punished after charge and hearing.—
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or
company court, or injunction granted by a court or judge, including the act of a
person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the
judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or
induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing
acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to
the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any interference with the process or proceedings of a court not
constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice.
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends
to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice
parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation (12 Am. jur. 389, cited in 14 SCRA 813).
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority,
justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court's orders, but
such conduct as tends to bring the authority of 'the court and the administration of law into disrepute
or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice (17 C.J.S. 4).
This Court has thus repeatedly declared that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all
courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of
judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice
(Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271; In re Kelly, 35 Phil. 944; Commissioner of
Immigration vs. Cloribel, 20 SCRA 1241; Montalban vs. Canonoy, 38 SCRA 1).
In the matter of exercising the power to punish contempts, this Court enunciated in the Slade
Perkins case that "the exercise of the power to punish contempts has a twofold aspect, namely (1)
the proper punishment of the guilty party for his disrespect to the court or its order; and (2) to compel
his performance of some act or duty required of him by the court which he refuses to perform. Due to
this twofold aspect of the exercise of the power to punish them, contempts are classified as civil or
criminal. A civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for
the benefit of the opposing party therein; and a criminal contempt, is conduct directed against the
authority and dignity of a court or of a judge, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority or
dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act. Where the punishment imposed,
whether against a party to a suit or a stranger, is wholly or primarily to protect or vindicate the dignity
and power of the court, either by fine payable to the government or by imprisonment, or both, it is
deemed a judgment in a criminal case. Where the punishment is by fine directed to be paid to a
party in the nature of damages for the wrong inflicted, or by imprisonment as a coercive measure to
enforce the performance of some act for the benefit of the party or in aid of the final judgment or
decree rendered in his behalf, the contempt judgment will, if made before final decree, be treated as
in the nature of an interlocutory order, or, if made after final decree, as remedial in nature, and may
be reviewed only on appeal from the final decree, or in such other mode as is appropriate to the
review of judgments in civil cases. ... The question of whether the contempt committed is civil or
criminal, does not affect the jurisdiction or the power of a court to punish the same. ... (58 Phil. 271,
272).
For civil contempt, Section 7, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly provides:
Sec. 7, Rule 71. Imprisonment until order obeyed. When the contempt consists in the
omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the accused to perform, he may be
imprisoned by order of a superior court until he performs it.
Thus, in the case of Harden vs. Director of Prisons (L-2349, 81 Phil. 741 [Oct. 22, 1948]), where
petitioner was confined in prison for contempt of court, this Court, in denying the petition and
resolving the question of petitioner's indefinite confinement, had the occasion to apply and clarify the
aforequoted provision in the following tenor:
The penalty complained of is neither cruel unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler
136 U.S. 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel
when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not
cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the extinguishment of life.
The punishment meted out to the petitioner is not excessive. It is suitable and
adapted to its objective; and it accords with section 7, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
which provides that "when the contempt consists in the omission to do an act which
is yet in the power of the accused to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of a
superior court until he performs it."
If the term of imprisonment in this case is indefinite and might last through the natural
life of the petitioner, yet by the terms of the sentence the way is left open for him to
avoid serving any part of it by complying with the orders of the court, and in this
 manner put an end to his incarceration. In these circumstances, the judgment cannot
be said to be excessive or unjust. (Davis vs. Murphy [1947], 188 P., 229- 231.) As
stated in a more recent case (De Wees [1948], 210 S.W., 2d, 145-147), 'to order that
one be imprisoned for an indefinite period in a civil contempt is purely a remedial
measure. Its purpose is to coerce the contemner to do an act within his or her power
to perform. He must have the means by which he may purge himself of the contempt
. The latter decision cites Staley vs. South Jersey Realty Co., 83 N.J. Eq., 300, 90 A.,
1042, 1043, in which the theory is expressed in this language:
In a "civil contempt" the proceeding is remedial, it is a step in the
case the object of which is to coerce one party for the benefit of the
other party to do or to refrain from doing some act specified in the
order of the court. Hence, if imprisonment be ordered, it is remedial in
purpose and coercive in character, and to that end must relate to
something to be done by the defendant by the doing of which he may
discharge himself. As quaintly expressed, the imprisoned man carries
the keys to his prison in his own pocket (pp. 747-748).
Likewise. American courts had long enunciated these rulings:
The commitment of one found in contempt of a court order only until the contemnor
shall have purged himself of such contempt by complying with the order is a decisive
characteristic of civil contempt. Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 US 56, 92 L. ed. 476, 68 S Ct
401.
Civil or quasi-criminal contempt is contemplated by a statute providing that if any
person refused to obey or perform any rule, order, or judgment of court, such court
shall have power to fine and imprison such person until the rule, order, or judgment
shall be complied with. Evans v. Evans, 193 Miss 468, 9 So 2d. 641. (17 Am. Jur.
2d.)
The reason for the inherent power of courts to punish for contempt is that respect of the courts
guarantees the stability of the judicial institution. Without such guarantee said institution would be
resting on a very shaky foundation (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; Cornejo vs. Tan, 85 Phil.
722),
Likewise, Atty. Pineda should be subject to disbarment proceedings under Section 27 of Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds.—A
member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corrupt or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any conduct on his part showing his unfitness for the
confidence and trust which characterize the attorney and client relations, and the practice of law
before the courts, or showing such a lack of personal honesty or of good moral character as to
render him unworthy of public confidence (7 C.J.S. 733).
It is a well-settled rule that the statutory grounds for disbarment or suspension are not to be taken as
a limitation on the general power of the courts in this respect. The inherent powers of the court over
its officers cannot be restricted (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567).
Finally, Atty. Pineda could be prosecuted for betrayal of trust by an attorney under Article 209 of the
Revised Penal Code. Said article provides:
Art. 209. Betrayal of must by an attorney or solicitor. Revelation of secrets.—In
addition of the proper administrative action , the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period, or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or both shall be imposed
 upon any attorney-at-law or solicitor (procurador judicial) who, by any malicious
breach of professional duty or inexcusable negligence or ignorance, shall prejudice
his client, or reveal any of the secrets of the latter learned by him in his professional
capacity (emphasis supplied).
The aforequoted criminal sanction for unprofessional conduct of an attorney is without prejudice to
proper administrative action, such as disbarment or suspension of attorneys (p. 503, Criminal Law
Annotated, Padilla, 1972 Ed.).
Labor Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuela should be made to answer for having acted without or beyond
his authority in proper administrative charges. He could also be prosecuted before the Tanodbayan
under the provisions of the Anti-Graft Law. Independently of his liabilities as a government officer, he
could be the subject of disbarment proceedings under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
Atty. Benjamin Pineda could also be held liable under Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act) which makes it unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any
public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 of said act. Section 3 enumerates
the corrupt practices which public officers may be prosecuted for. Atty. Pineda knowingly induced or
caused Labor Arbiter Valenzuela to issue the questioned orders without or beyond the latter's
authority and to which orders the former was not entitled, considering that he was not the sole and
proper representative.
The Manila Banking Corporation (Cubao Branch) per manifestation and motion dated October 28,
1983 and reiterated on November 10, 1983, had transmitted to the NLRC the remaining balance of
P417,380.64 and P2,022.70 for the account of the Union and Atty. Pineda, respectively. This
turnover of the aforecited amounts is a sufficient compliance with Our restraining order and
resolution of September 13, 1983 and hence, the Manila Banking Corporation can no longer be
liable for contempt of court.
Very recently, on August 23, 1984, respondent Union, thru Acting Administrator Ricardo Capuno,
filed its motion to drop Halili Bus Drivers and Conductors Union from the contempt charge in view of
these reasons:
1. The Manila Bank has already turned over to the NLRC the amount of P59,716.14 which
represents the remaining balance of 5% earmarked for Union expenses incurred in the case aside
from the amounts deposited in escrow for the workers. The amount of P42,140.00 was spent
legitimately by the Union for administration purposes relative to the subject property. The Union
asserts that it is ready and willing to account for all expenses and withdrawals from the bank before
the NLRC.
2. The alleged 5% donation of Atty. Pineda to the Union taken from the 35% attorneys' fees was
given to and received by then President Domingo Cabading alone, who thereafter left for the United
States.
3. The 1% allocated for unknown claimants or those not previously listed in the amount of P9,596.18
can easily be accounted for by the Union before the NLRC.
In the same motion, Mr. Capuno clarifies that with regard to attorneys' fees, Atty. Pineda made the
Union officers believe that he would be the one to pay the fees of Attys. Espinas and Lopez for
which reason, the 35% increased fees was approved by the Union's board in good faith. The Union
likewise confirms that Atty. Pineda came into the picture only when he was assigned by Atty.
Espinas in, 1965 to execute the CIR decision which, thru Atty. Espinas handling, was upheld by this
Court in L-24864 in 1968. The Union officers were aware that Atty. Espinas was the principal
counsel even after Atty. Pineda's assignment. They also knew of the original contract for 20%
attorney's fees which was increased to 35% by Atty. Pineda upon the arrangement that with the
increase, he would answer for the payment of Attys. Espinas and Lopez' fees and for necessary
representation expenses (p. 450, L-24864 rec.).
Acting on the aforesaid motion, this Court in its resolution of August 28, 1964, dropped the Union
and its officers from the within contempt charge (p. 455, L-24864 rec.).
WHEREFORE, ATTY. BENJAMIN PINEDA IS HEREBY FOUND GUILTY OF INDIRECT
CONTEMPT OF COURT FOR WHICH HE IS HEREBY SENTENCED TO IMPRISONMENT IN THE
MANILA CITY JAIL UNTIL THE ORDERS OF THIS COURT DATED SEPTEMBER 1 AND
SEPTEMBER 13, 1983 ARE COMPLIED WITH.
ATTY. BENJAMIN PINEDA IS ALSO DIRECTED TO SHOW CAUSE WHY HE SHOULD NOT BE
DISBARRED UNDER RULE 138 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT.
LET COPIES OF THIS RESOLUTION AND THE RESOLUTION OF OCTOBER 18, 1983 BE
FURNISHED THE MINISTRY OF LABOR AND THE TANODBAYAN FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6317 August 31, 2006

LUZVIMINDA C. LIJAUCO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO P. TERRADO, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On February 13, 2004, an administrative complaint was filed by complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco
1

against respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado for gross misconduct, malpractice and conduct
unbecoming of an officer of the court when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him despite
receipt of payment representing attorney’s fees.
According to the complainant, she engaged the services of respondent sometime in January 2001
for P70,000.00 to assist in recovering her deposit with Planters Development Bank, Buendia, Makati
branch in the amount of P180,000.00 and the release of her foreclosed house and lot located in
Calamba, Laguna. The property identified as Lot No. 408-C-2 and registered as TCT No. T-402119
in the name of said bank is the subject of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession then
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna, Branch 24 docketed as LRC Case No. B-
2610.
Complainant alleged that respondent failed to appear before the trial court in the hearing for the
issuance of the Writ of Possession and did not protect her interests in the Compromise Agreement
which she subsequently entered into to end LRC Case No. B-2610. 2

Respondent denied the accusations against him. He averred that the P70,000.00 he received from
complainant was payment for legal services for the recovery of the deposit with Planters
Development Bank and did not include LRC Case No. B-2610 pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Biñan, Laguna.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
3

recommendation. On September 21, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner submitted his report
finding respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provide:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 9.02 – A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not
licensed to practice law, except:
a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the latter’s death,
money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to the persons specified in the
agreement; or
b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer; or
c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan, even if the plan is
based in whole or in part, on a profit-sharing arrangement.
In finding the respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Investigating Commissioner opined that:
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. To be made the
suspension or disbarment of a lawyer, the charge against him must be established by convincing
proof. The record must disclose as free from doubt a case which compels the exercise by the
Supreme Court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act done as well as of the
motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated. x x x.
In the instant scenario, despite the strong protestation of respondent that the Php70,000.00 legal
fees is purely and solely for the recovery of the Php180,000.00 savings account of complainant
subsequent acts and events say otherwise, to wit:
1.) The Php70,000.00 legal fees for the recovery of a Php180,000.00 savings deposit is too high;
2.) Respondent actively acted as complainant’s lawyer to effectuate the compromise agreement.
By openly admitting he divided the Php70,000.00 to other individuals as commission/referral fees
respondent violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that a lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed
to practice law. Worst, by luring complainant to participate in a compromise agreement with a false
and misleading assurance that complainant can still recover after Three (3) years her foreclosed
property respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
says a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. 4

The Investigating Commissioner thus recommended:

WHEREFORE, finding respondent responsible for aforestated violations to protect the public and the
legal profession from his kind, it is recommended that he be suspended for Six (6) months with a
stern warning that similar acts in the future will be severely dealt with.5

The IBP Board of Governors adopted the recommendation of the investigating commissioner. 6

We agree with the findings of the IBP.

The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who show that they possessed and continue to
possess the legal qualifications for it. Indeed, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high
standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must
perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance
with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.7

Lawyers are prohibited from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and are
8

mandated to serve their clients with competence and diligence. They shall not neglect a legal matter
9

entrusted to them, and this negligence in connection therewith shall render them liable. 10

Respondent’s claim that the attorney’s fee pertains only to the recovery of complainant’s savings
deposit from Planter’s Development Bank cannot be sustained. Records show that he acted as
complainant’s counsel in the drafting of the compromise agreement between the latter and the bank
relative to LRC Case No. B-2610. Respondent admitted that he explained the contents of the
agreement to complainant before the latter affixed her signature. Moreover, the Investigating
Commissioner observed that the fee of P70,000.00 for legal assistance in the recovery of the deposit
amounting to P180,000.00 is unreasonable. A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. 11

Respondent’s disregard for his client’s interests is evident in the iniquitous stipulations in the
compromise agreement where the complainant conceded the validity of the foreclosure of her
property; that the redemption period has already expired thus consolidating ownership in the bank,
and that she releases her claims against it. As found by the Investigating Commissioner,
12

complainant agreed to these concessions because respondent misled her to believe that she could
still redeem the property after three years from the foreclosure. The duty of a lawyer to safeguard his
client’s interests commences from his retainer until his discharge from the case or the final
disposition of the subject matter of litigation. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an
attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. The canons of
the legal profession require that once an attorney agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the
task with zeal, care and utmost devotion. 13

Respondent’s admission that he divided the legal fees with two other people as a referral fee does
14

not release him from liability. A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services
with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases. 15

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended on the following grounds: 1) deceit; 2) malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office; 3)
grossly immoral conduct; 4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; 5) violation of the
lawyer’s oath; 6) willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court; and 7) willfully appearing
as an attorney for a party without authority.
In Santos v. Lazaro and Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr., we held that Rule 18.03 of the Code of
16 17

Professional Responsibility is a basic postulate in legal ethics. When a lawyer takes a client’s cause,
he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting his rights. The failure to exercise that
degree of vigilance and attention makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by his
client and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and
society.
A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his client’s case. Once he agrees to
handle a case, he should undertake the task with dedication and care. If he fails in this duty, he is
not true to his oath as a lawyer. Thus, a lawyer should accept only as much cases as he can
efficiently handle in order to sufficiently protect his clients’ interests. It is not enough that a lawyer
possesses the qualification to handle the legal matter; he must also give adequate attention to his
legal work. Utmost fidelity is demanded once counsel agrees to take the cudgels for his client’s
cause. 18

In view of the foregoing, we find that suspension from the practice of law for six months is warranted.
In addition, he is directed to return to complainant the amount he received by way of legal fees
pursuant to existing jurisprudence. 19

WHEREFORE, Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01, 9.02, 18.02 and
20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six
(6) months effective from notice, and STERNLY WARNED that any similar infraction will be dealt
with more severely. He is further ordered to RETURN, within thirty (30) days from notice, the sum of
P70,000.00 to complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco and to submit to this Court proof of his compliance
within three (3) days therefrom.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP, as well as
on the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

A.C. No. 5161 April 14, 2004

ISIDRA TING-DUMALI, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROLANDO S. TORRES, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
In a Complaint-Affidavit filed on 22 October 1999 with this Court, complainant Isidra Ting-Dumali
1

charges respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres with presentation of false testimony; participation in,
consent to, and failure to advise against, the forgery of complainant’s signature in a purported Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting from
such forgery, thereby violating his oath as a lawyer and the canons of legal and judicial ethics.
The complainant is one of the six children of the late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting. Her
siblings are Marcelina T. Rivera; Miriam T. Saria; Felicisima T. Torres, who is married to herein
respondent; Vicente Ting, Jr.; and Eliseo Ting. Their parents died intestate and left several parcels
of land, to wit:
 a) One half of Lot 1586 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of
43,908 square meters more or less, and covered at that time by TCT No. (T-6203) RT-19151
of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite;
b) Lot 1603 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 16,073 square
meters, more or less, and covered at that time by TCT No. (T-6425) RT-7688 of the Registry
of Deeds of Cavite;
c) Lot 1605 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 22,131 square
meters, more or less and covered at that time by TCT No. T- 1869 of the Registry of Deeds
of Cavite.

According to the complainant, the respondent took advantage of his relationship with her and her
brothers and used his profession to deprive them of what was lawfully due them even if it involved
the commission of an illegal, unlawful, or immoral act. She attributes to the respondent the following
acts or omissions:

1. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the perjury
committed by his wife Felicisima and his sister-in-law Miriam when they executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11 November 1986, wherein the two made it appear
that they were the sole heirs of the late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting, knowing
fully well that the same was false. He presented that document to the Register of Deeds of
Cavite for the transfer of the title over Lot No. 1586 in the names of his wife and Miriam. The
lot was later sold to Antel Holdings Inc. for P1,195,400. Payment was already made to, and
received by, Felicisima and Miriam.
2. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the forgery of
complainant’s signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March
1995 involving Lot 1603 when he knew that she was in Italy at that time working as an
overseas contract worker. He even presented the falsified document to the Register of
Deeds of Cavite to transfer the title over the property in favor of his wife Felicisima and
sister-in-law Marcelina. The forgery or falsification was made to enable them to sell Lot 1603
to Antel Holdings, Inc. Payment was received and misappropriated by Felicisima and
Marcelina.
3. In LRC Rec. No. 5964 entitled In Re:Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of the Original
Copy and Owner’s Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-1869 Covering Lot No. 1605 of the Registry
of Deeds for the Province of Cavite, filed by complainant’s sisters Marcelina and Felicisima
on 24 October 1995, the respondent made gross misrepresentation and offered false
testimony to the effect that Marcelina and Felicisima are the only children and legal heirs of
the late spouses Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante for the purpose of obtaining a new title in
their names. With the reconstituted title, and with the express conformity of the respondent,
Felicisima and Marcelina were able to sell Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., for P2,213,100
and profited from the sale to the exclusion of their other siblings. Partial payment was even
received pending the reconstitution proceedings.
4. On 20 November 1996, the respondent made gross and false misrepresentations for the
purpose of profiting therefrom when he requested the buyer through a certain Mrs. Ong to
release the full payment for Lot 1605 under the pretense that the order of reconstitution
would be released within a month when he knew that it would be impossible because he
presented evidence in the reconstitution case only on 12 August 1997. To facilitate the
release of the money, he even used the stationery of the Philippine National Bank, of which
he was an employee.

In his Comment, the respondent denies the allegations of the complaint and asserts that he did not
2

take advantage of his profession to deprive any of the co-heirs of his wife of the estate left by his
parents-in-law.
Insofar as Lot 1586 is concerned, the respondent affirms that Felicisima and Miriam were not
motivated by any desire to solely profit from the sale. Neither can he be faulted by the execution of
the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603 because he had no
part in the execution of the document. All the while he believed in good faith that the Ting sisters had
already agreed on how to dispose of the said lot. If ever complainant’s signature was affixed on that
document, it was done in good faith.
The respondent admits that he was the counsel of Marcelina Ting Rivera, et. al., in LRC Case No.
5964 for the reconstitution of TCT No. T-1869. The false testimony of Marcelina in that case that she
and Felicisima were the only children of spouses Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante could not be
faulted on him because such was a clear oversight. Moreover, the sale of Lot 1605 to Antel
Holdings, Inc., was the decision of Marcelina and his wife. His conformity through his signature was
pro-forma because the property was a paraphernal property of Marcelina and his wife. Anent his
alleged gross and false misrepresentation that the order of reconstitution would be released by the
end of November 1996, suffice it to say that the assurance was made by the Clerk of Court, Mr.
Rosauro Morabe. Besides, petitions for reconstitution are usually uncontested and granted by
courts.
Finally, the respondent believes that complainant intended to harass him in bombarding him with
numerous lawsuits, i.e., this administrative case; Civil Case No. TM-855 for "Annulment of
Documents, Titles, and Reconveyance plus Damages"; and a criminal case for Estafa and
Falsification of Public Documents.
In her reply, the complainant denies the presence of toka or verbal will allegedly made by her mother
and allegedly implemented by their eldest brother Eliseo in view of the following circumstances: (1)
her mother met a sudden death in 1967; and partition of the properties in total disregard of their
father was morally reprehensible, since the latter was still alive; (2) when their mother died, four of
the siblings were still minors including respondent’s wife herself; (3) on 5 February 2000, Eliseo
wrote his siblings, in response to the previous letter of Felicisima, Marcelina, and Miriam, denying
the existence of a toka. She further states that the respondent was not merely a passive onlooker
but, as he admitted, the administrator of the properties of the Ting spouses.
On 14 June 2000, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation or decision. 3

On 9 January 2003, after due hearing and consideration of the issues presented by both parties,
Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP
found the actuations of the respondent to be violative of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule
10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus she recommended that the
respondent be disbarred from the practice of law. 4

In its Resolution No. XV-2003-333 of 21 June 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved and
5

adopted Commissioner San Juan’s report, but reduced the penalty to suspension from the practice
of law for six years.
We fully agree with the Investigating Commissioner in her findings of facts and conclusion of
culpability. The respondent has sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally unfit to
remain in the exclusive and honorable fraternity of the legal profession. In his long years as a lawyer,
he must have forgotten his sworn pledge as a lawyer. It is time once again that the Court inculcate in
the hearts of all lawyers that pledge; thus:

LAWYER'S OATH
I, ……………… , do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to its commission; I
will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid
nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as
a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
 SO HELP ME GOD.

This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to the
pursuit of justice is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law to be forgotten afterwards;
nor is it mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and keep inviolable
at all times. By swearing the lawyer’s oath, they become guardians of truth and the rule of law, as
well as instruments in the fair and impartial dispensation of justice. This oath is firmly echoed and
6

reflected in the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
...
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
…
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.
...
CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

All of these underscore the role of a lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. When the
respondent took the oath as a member of the legal profession, he made a solemn promise to so
stand by his pledge. In this covenant, respondent miserably failed.
The records show that Felicisima and Miriam stated in the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated
11 November 1986 that they are the children of Julita Reynante and thus adjudicated only between
them Lot No. 1586 to the exclusion of their other siblings. There was concealment of the fact that
7

there were other compulsory heirs to the estate of the deceased. Significantly, the respondent is the
brother-in-law of complainant. Being married to complainant’s sister, he knew of his wife’s siblings.
In fact, he declared that the complainant stayed with them while she was in the Philippines. Yet, the
8

respondent presented that document to the Register of Deeds of General Trias, Cavite, to effect the
transfer of the title of the lot in question in the name of his wife and his sister-in-law Miriam.
It also bears noting that the respondent was consulted regarding the falsification of complainant’s
9

signature in the Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603, which contains a
10

purported waiver by the complainant of her right over the property. Marcelina admitted that she
signed complainant’s name in that document. Such act of counterfeiting the complainant’s signature
11

to make it appear that the complainant had participated in the execution of that document is
tantamount to falsification of a public document. 12

Instead of advising Marcelina to secure a written special power of attorney and against committing
falsification, he presented such document to the Registry of Deeds to secure a new title for the lot in
13

favor of Marcelina and his wife. He himself, therefore, may also be held liable for knowingly using a
14

falsified document to the damage of the complainant and her other co-heirs. Notably, he also
15

admitted in an affidavit dated 22 May 1995 that he prepared the legal documents for the transfer of
Lot 1603.16

Respondent did not advise his wife and his sisters-in-law from doing acts which are contrary to law.
He must have kept in mind the first and foremost duty of a lawyer, which is to maintain allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution, and obey the laws of the land. The Code of
Professional Responsibility underscores the primacy of such duty by providing as its canon that a
lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and
legal processes. For a lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society
17

has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice. As such, he should make
18

himself more an exemplar for others to emulate. He should not, therefore, engage in unlawful,
19

dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. He makes himself unfit to remain in the profession who
20

commits any such unbecoming act or conduct. 21

Respondent’s argument that the non-declaration by his wife and his sister- in-law Marcelina of the
other siblings in LRC Rec. No. 5964 for the reconstitution of title involving Lot 1605 was a mere
oversight does not deserve credence in view of the following circumstances: First, the petition clearly
names only Felicisima and Marcelina as the petitioners when there were six siblings who were heirs
of the unpartitioned lot. Second, during the hearing of said case when the respondent asked
22

Marcelina whether she has brothers and sisters other than Felicisima, the latter said none. The
transcript of that hearing reads:

ATTY. TORRES:
Q Madame Witness, are you the only child or daughter of the deceased Sps. Vicente Ting,
Jr. and Julita Reynante?
WITNESS:
A No, sir. We are two, Felicisima Torres and I.
Q Do you have other brothers and sisters?
A None, sir. 23

The respondent allowed Marcelina to commit a crime by giving false testimony in court, and he24

never corrected the same despite full knowledge of the true facts and circumstances of the
case. Moreover, in knowingly offering in evidence such false testimony, he himself may be punished
25

as guilty of false testimony. 26

Moreover, under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer owes candor,
fairness, and good faith to the court. He shall "not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice." This Rule was clearly
27

and openly violated by the respondent when he permitted Marcelina to falsely testify that she had no
siblings aside from Felicisima and when he offered such testimony in the petition for reconstitution of
the title involving Lot 1605.
The respondent must have forgotten that as an attorney he is an officer of the court called upon to
assist in the administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its cause.
For this reason, any act on his part that obstructs and impedes the administration of justice
constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him. 28

It may not be amiss to mention that to further support the reconstitution, he offered in evidence an
Affidavit of Loss, which was executed by Marcelina and notarized by him. During the hearing of this
administrative case, Marcelina admitted that her statement in that affidavit that the title was in her
possession was false, as she was never in possession of the title and would not, therefore, know
29

that the same was lost.

Moreover, in a letter dated 20 November 1996 addressed to a certain Mrs. Ong, the respondent
requested the release of 50% of the remaining balance for the sale of Lot 1605, relaying to Antel
Holdings, Inc., through Mrs. Ong that he was assured by the Clerk of Court that the order directing
the reconstitution of title for Lot 1605 would be released within the month. Respondent’s information
30

was misleading because he presented evidence only on 12 August 1997, or almost a year after he
sent the letter. Such act, therefore, shows lack of candor and honesty on the part of the respondent.
31

Respondent’s acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless bring intolerable dishonor to
the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct for which he may be disbarred or suspended
pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. -- A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
 Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for
a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.

In the determination of the imposable disciplinary sanction against an erring lawyer, we take into
account the primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is to protect the administration of
justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable,
and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. While the assessment of what
32

sanction may be imposed is primarily addressed to our sound discretion, the sanction should neither
be arbitrary or despotic, nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice. Rather, it should ever be
controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar. 33

Thus, the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the
bar. We will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers
where the evidence calls for it. Verily, given the peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this
34

case, we find that respondent’s gross misconduct calls for the severance of his privilege to practice
law for life, and we therefore adopt the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres guilty of gross
misconduct and violation of the lawyer’s oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, thereby rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal
profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is ordered
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith
record it in the personal files of the respondent; all the courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, which shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters; and all administrative and
quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of the Philippines.

G.R. No. 86421 May 31, 1994

SPS. THELMA R. MASINSIN and MIGUEL MASINSIN, SPS. GILBERTO and ADELINA,
ROLDAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. ED VINCENT ALBANO, Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
Branch X, DEPUTY SHERIFF JESS ARREOLA, VICENTE CAÑEDA and THE HON. LEONARDO
CRUZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge Regional Trial of Manila, Branch XXV, respondents.

Gregorio T. Fabros for petitioners.

Isidro F. Molina for private respondent.

RESOLUTION
VITUG, J.:

Spouses Miguel and Thelma Masinsin, et al., instituted this petition for certiorari, prohibition, relief
from judgment, as well as declaratory relief, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction, asking
us to order the Metropolitan Trial Court ("MTC") of Manila, Branch X, to cease and desist from
further proceeding with Civil Case No. 107203-CV.

This case emerged from an ejectment suit (docketed Civil Case No. 107203-CV) filed by private
respondent Vicente Cañeda ("Cañeda"), then as plaintiffs, against herein petitioners, as defendants,
with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (Branch X). After trial, the MTC, on 01 July 1985,
rendered judgment; thus:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants

and all persons claiming right under them to vacate the premises and to remove their
house/apartment and surrender possession of the subject land to the plaintiff; to pay
to the plaintiff the sum of P100.00 a month from January 1987 as the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises until the land is actually
vacated, and the costs of suit. 1

No appeal having been taken therefrom, the judgment became final and executory. On 22 August
1985, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch
XXXII) seeking the annulment of the aforesaid decision in the ejectment case and to set aside an
order of its execution. The petition was in due time dismissed. Again, no appeal was taken
therefrom.

On 07 October 1985, a complaint for "Annulment of Judgment, Lease Contract and Damages" was
filed by petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XLI) asking, in main, for the
nullification of the judgment in the ejectment case. The complaint was dismissed on the ground
of res judicata. This time, petitioners appealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, a
writ of execution was issued by the MTC for the enforcement of its decision. The writ, however, was
held in abeyance when petitioners deposited with the Court of Appeals the sum of P3,000.00 in cash
plus an amount of P100.00 to be paid every month beginning February 1987. On 11 March 1987,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of dismissal of the lower court. Petitioners' recourse to this
Court was to be of no avail. The petition was denied, and an entry of judgment was made on 14 July
1987.

Accordingly, the records were remanded to the MTC for execution. When petitioners refused to
remove their house on the premises in question, upon motion of private respondent, an order of
demolition was issued. Shortly thereafter, the demolition began. Before the completion of the
demolition, a restraining order was issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XIX)
following a petition for certiorari, with preliminary injunction and restraining order, filed by petitioners.
On 23 February 1988, the trial court dismissed the petition.

Unfazed by the series of dismissals of their complaints and petitions, petitioners assailed anew the
MTC decision in a petition for certiorari, with preliminary injunction, and for declaratory relief
(docketed Civil Case No. 88-43944) before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XXV), which,
again, issued a restraining order. 2

Private respondent then filed a motion for an alias writ of execution with the MTC. An ex-
parte motion of petitioners for the issuance of a second restraining order was this time denied by the
RTC (Branch XXV). On 23 August 1990, the trial court, ultimately, dismissed the petition with costs
3 4

against petitioners.
In this petition, petitioners contend that the MTC of Manila (Branch X) has lost jurisdiction to enforce
its decision, dated 01 July 1985, in Civil Case No. 107203, when the property in question was
proclaimed an area for priority development by the National Housing Authority on 01 December
1987 by authority of Presidential Decree 2016.

The petition is totally without merit.

In resolving this issue, we only have to refer to our resolution of 01 February 1993 in G.R. No.
98446, entitled, "Spouses Thelma R. Masinsin, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," to which this case
is intimately related, where we ruled:

. . . The singular question common to both cases submitted for resolution of this court
is the implication of Presidential Decree No. 1517, otherwise known as the "Urban
Land Reform Law," and its amendments or ramifications embodied in Proclamation
No. 1893, as amended by Proclamation No. 1967 and Presidential Decree No. 2016.
All the above statutes are being implemented by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board, and the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council,
Office of the President.

There is a prejudicial issue the answer to which hangs the resolution of this case. On
May 20, 1992, this Court required the National Housing Authority to submit a
Comment on the status of the program of acquisition by the Government of the land
area which includes the disputed property, as part of the Areas for Priority
Development (APD), under the aforementioned decrees and proclamations.

In compliance with said order of this Court, Mr. Andres C. Lingan, Manager of the
Metro Manila Project Department of the National Housing Authority, submitted the
following report on the status of Lot 6-A, Block 1012, located at No. 1890 Obesis
Street, Pandacan, Manila, known as the Carlos Estate, an APD site. Pertinent
portions of the report read:

Please be informed that Lot 6-A, Block 1012 located at No. 1890
Obesis St., Pandacan, Manila which is the subject matter of the case
and located within the Carlos Estate declared as APD site pursuant to
Presidential Proclamation No. 1967, is not for acquisition by NHA.

The Carlos Estate is located outside of the NHA projects under the
Zonal Improvement Project (ZIP) and Community Mortgage Program
(CMP). The site, however, is under the administration of the
Presidential Commission on Urban Poor (PCUP) for acquisition and
upgrading. (Emphasis Supplied.)

The above information answers the uncertainty concerning the status of the alleged
negotiation for the acquisition by the government of certain areas in Metro Manila.
The NHA is definitely NOT acquiring the said lot for its program.

It appearing that the purpose of this Petition for Review is to set aside the decision of
the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the lower courts, in
order to avoid eviction from the disputed premises and to be allowed to acquire the
same allegedly under the Community Mortgage Program of the National Housing
Authority, we find the petition without merit and deny the same. Consequently, the
petition is DISMISSED. 5
What immediately catches one's attention to this case is the evident predilection of petitioners,
through different counsel, to file pleadings, one after another, from which not even this Court has
been spared. The utter lack of merit of the complaints and petitions simply evinces the deliberate
intent of petitioners to prolong and delay the inevitable execution of a decision that has long become
final and executory.

Four times did the petitioners, with the assistance of counsel, try to nullify the same MTC decision
before different branches of the court, trifling with judicial processes. Never, again, should this
practice be countenanced. 6

The lawyer's oath to which we have all subscribed in solemn agreement in dedicating ourselves to
the pursuit of justice, is not a mere fictile of words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that we must
uphold and keep inviolable. Perhaps, it is time we are here reminded of that pledge; thus -

LAWYER'S OATH

I, . . ., do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the

Philippines; I will support and defend its Constitution and obey the laws as well as
the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood nor
consent to its commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will not
delay any man's cause for money or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to my clients and I impose upon myself this obligation voluntary, without
any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

SO HELP ME GOD. (Emphasis supplied.)

We have since emphasized in no uncertain terms that any act on the part of a lawyer, an officer of
the court, which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, impede and degrade the administration of justice is
contumacious calling for both an exercise of disciplinary action and warranting application of the
contempt power. 7

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Petitioners' counsel of record is hereby strongly

CENSURED and WARNED that a similar infraction of the lawyer's oath in the future will be dealt with
most severely. Double costs against petitioners.

This resolution is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10868

[Formerly CBD Case No. 07-2041]

CHERYLE. VASCO-TAMARAY, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DEBORAH Z. DAQUIS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERCURIAM:
Pretending to be counsel for a party in a case and using a forged signature in a pleading merit the
penalty of disbarment.
Cheryl E. Vasco-Tamaray (Vasco-Tamaray) filed a ComplaintAffidavit before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines on July 30, 2007, alleging that respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis (Atty. Daquis)
filed, on her behalf, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage without her consent and forged
her signature on the Petition. She also alleged that Atty. Daquis signed the Petition for Declaration
1

of Nullity of Marriage as "counsel for petitioner," referring to Vasco-Tamaray. 2

Vasco-Tamaray stated that Atty. Daquis was not her counsel but that of her husband, Leomarte
Regala Tamaray. To support her allegation, she attached the Affidavit of Maritess Marquez-
3 4

Guerrero. The Affidavit states:

1. Sometime in October 2006, I accompanied Cheryl Tamaray in going to East Cafe at

Rustan's Makati to meet with her husband Leomarte Tamaray;
2. We arrived at the said place at around 7:00 pm and Leomarte introduced to us (Cheryl
and I) Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis as his lawyer. He further told us that Atty. Daquis' husband
also worked in Japan and that's how he got to know the latter and got her services;
3. Among other things, Leomarte told Cheryl that the reason for that meeting and the
presence of Atty. Daquis was because he had decided to file a case to annul his
marriage with Cheryl;
4. Cheryl was shocked and just cried. After awhile [sic], Leomarte's brother arrived and
shortly after, the group left;
5. The next instance that I saw Atty. Daquis was when we (Cheryl and I) went to
McDonald's-Greenbelt where Atty. Daquis tried to convince her not to oppose Leomarte's
decision to have their marriage annulled[.] (Emphasis supplied)
5

Vasco-Tamaray narrated that in December 2006, Atty. Daquis informed her "that a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City." In6

February 2007, Atty. Daquis asked her to appear before the City Prosecutor's Office of Muntinlupa
City.
7

On March 5, 2007, Vasco-Tamaray appeared before the City Prosecutor's Office and met Atty.
Daquis. She asked Atty. Daquis to give her a copy of the Petition but Atty. Daquis refused. 8

Vasco-Tamaray stated that she obtained a copy of the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
from Branch 207 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. She was surprised to see that the
Petition was allegedly signed and filed by her. 9

Vasco-Tamaray alleged that she did not file the Petition, that her signature was forged by Atty.
Daquis, and that her purported community tax certificate appearing on the jurat was not hers
because she never resided in Muntinlupa City. She attached a Certification issued by the
10

Sangguniang Barangay of Putatan, Muntinlupa City stating that she was "never . . . a resident of #9
Daang Hari Street, Umali Compound, Summitville Subdivision, Barangay Putatan." She also 11

attached a Certification issued by Barangay Talipapa stating that she has been a resident of "#484-J
Saguittarius St., Solville Subd., Barangay Talipapa, Novaliches, Quezon City... from 2000 till
present." 12

Vasco-Tamaray also alleged that the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was Atty. Daquis'
idea, consented to by Leomarte Tamaray. 13

She further alleged that she had never received any court process. The Petition states that her
postal address is "09 Daang Hari St., Umali Comp., Summitville Subd., Putatan, Muntinlupa
City[,]" which is the address of her husband's family. The return slips of the notices sent by the trial
14

court were received by Encarnacion T. Coletraba and Almencis Cumigad, relatives ofLeomarte
Tamaray. 15

Atty. Daquis filed an Answer countering that her client was Vasco-Tamaray, complainant herself,
and not complainant's husband. She alleged that Vasco-Tamaray knew of the Petition as early as
October 2006, not December 2006. 16

With regard to the community tax certificate, Atty. Daquis explained that when she notarized the
Petition, the community tax certificate number was supplied by Vasco-Tamaray. Atty. Daquis'
17
allegation was supported by the Joint Affidavit of her staff, Ma. Dolor E. Purawan (Purawan) and
Ludy Lorena (Lorena). 18

Purawan and Lorena detailed in their Joint Affidavit that they knew Vasco-Tamaray to be a client of
Atty. Daquis and that they never saw Atty. Daquis forge Vasco-Tamaray's signature. Purawan stated
that she typed the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and that the community tax
certificate was provided by Vasco-Tamaray. 19

Atty. Daquis alleged that Vasco-Tamaray wanted her to call and demand money from Leomarte
Tamaray but she refused to do so. 20

Atty. Daquis argued that Vasco-Tamaray had a copy of the Petition. When Vasco-Tamaray
requested another copy on March 5, 2007, Atty. Daquis was unable to grant her client's request
because she did not have a copy of the Petition with her at that time. 21

Atty. Daquis further alleged that Vasco-Tamaray conceived an illegitimate son with a certain Reuel
Pablo Aranda. The illegitimate son was named Charles Dino Vasco. Reuel Pablo Aranda signed the
Affidavit of Acknowledgment/ Admission of Paternity portion of the birth certificate. 22

The Commission on Bar Discipline required the parties to submit their position papers, but based on 23

the record, only Vasco-Tamaray complied. 24

The Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the dismissal of the Complaint because Vasco-
Tamaray failed to prove her allegations. The Commission on Bar Discipline noted that Vasco-
Tamaray should have questioned the Petition or informed the prosecutor that she never filed any
petition, but she failed to do so.
25

The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved the Report
and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline in the Resolution dated September 27,
2014.26

The issue for resolution is whether respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis should be held
administratively liable for making it appear that she is counsel for complainant Cheryl Vasco-
Tamaray and for the alleged use of a forged signature on the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage.
This court finds that respondent violated Canons 1, 7, 10, and 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The charge against respondent for violation of Canon 15 is dismissed.
I
By pretending to be counsel for complainant, respondent violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and failed to uphold her duty of doing no falsehood nor consent to the
doing of any falsehood in court as stated in the Lawyer's Oath.
27

Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and for legal processes.
RULE 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In this case, respondent merely denied complainant's allegation that she was Leomarte Tamaray's
counsel but was unable to rebut the other allegations against her.
28

Respondent admitted that she met complainant in October 2006, but did not refute the statement in
29 30

Maritess Marquez-Guerrero's Affidavit that Leomarte Tamaray introduced her as his

lawyer. Likewise, respondent admitted that she met with complainant subsequently, but did not
31 32

refute Maritess Marquez-Guerrero's statement that in one of the meetings, she tried to convince
complainant not to oppose Leomarte Tamaray's decision to annul their marriage. 33

Respondent argued in her Answer that she was the counsel for complainant. Yet, there is no
34

explanation how she was referred to complainant or how they were introduced. It appears, then, that
respondent was contacted by Leomarte Tamaray to file a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage on the ground of bigamy. As stated in Maritess Marquez-Guerrero's Affidavit, "Leomarte
told Cheryl that the reason for that meeting and the presence of Atty. Daquis was because he had
decided to file a case to annul his marriage with Cheryl[. ]"
35

Based on this, it seems Leomarte Tamaray intended to file the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. However, respondent made it appear that complainant, not her client Leomarte Tamaray,
was the petitioner. There is a probability that respondent did not want Leomarte Tamaray to be the
petitioner because he would have to admit that he entered into a bigamous marriage, the admission
of which may subject him to criminal liability.
In addition, if it is true that complainant was respondent's client, then there appears to be no reason
for respondent to advise her "not to oppose Leomarte's decision to have their marriage annulled." 36

The records of this case also support complainant's allegation that she never received any court
process because her purported address in the Petition is the address of Leomarte Tamaray. The
Petition states that complainant is "of legal age, Filipino citizen, married with postal address at 09
Daang Hari St., Umali Comp., Summitville Subd., Putatan, Muntinlupa City[.]" 37

The Certificate of Marriage of complainant and Leomarte Tamaray states that Leomarte's residence
is at "Summitvil[l]e Subv [sic], Muntinlupa," while complainant's residence is at "Hermosa St.
Gagalangin, Tondo, Manila." Assuming that complainant lived with her husband after they were
38

married, complainant most likely did not receive court processes because she left their home before
the filing of the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. As written in the Minutes of the meeting
before the Office of the City Prosecutor:
P[etitioner] & R[espondent] met sometime in 1993 through his secretary. They became sweethearts
in 1993 and their relationship as steadies lasted until 1996;
During the 3 years of their union, petitioner knew respondent's family as she even sleeps in their
house; Theirs was also a long distance relationship as respondent worked in Japan;
Upon respondents [sic] return to the Philippines they got married in Feb, 1996. They had no children,
as respondent immediately left for Japan on March 11, 1996;
Respondent returned to the Philippines but unfortunately he brought another woman. As a result,
petitioner left their house. (Emphasis supplied)
39

Further, complainant cannot be faulted for her failure to inform the prosecutor that she did not file
any petition for declaration of nullity of marriage because during the meeting on March 5, 2007,
complainant had no knowledge that the Petition was filed in her name. She obtained a copy of the
40

Petition after the March 5, 2007 meeting. 41

In Yupangco-Nakpil v. Uy, this court discussed Canon 1, Rule 1.01, as follows:

42

Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as it is applied to the members of the legal professions, engraves
an overriding prohibition against any form of misconduct, viz:
CANON 1 - A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
The gravity of the misconduct- determinative as it is of the errant lawyer's penalty- depends on the
factual circumstances of each case .
....
. . . Verily, members of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence
reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. By no insignificant
measure, respondent blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also that of the
legal profession. In other words, his conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a
guardian of law and justice. 43

When respondent filed the Petition as counsel for complainant when the truth was otherwise, she
committed a falsehood against the trial court and complainant.
II
Respondent violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 when she allowed the use of a
forged signature on a petition she prepared and notarized. 44

Complainant alleged that her signature on the Petition was forged. Respondent merely denied
45

complainant's allegation. 46

The Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was signed by a certain "CVasco." The records of
47

this case show that complainant has used two signatures. In her identification cards issued by the
University of the East, she used a signature that spelled out "CVasco." In her Complaint-Affidavit
48

against respondent, complainant used a signature that spelled out "CTamaray." 49

A comparison of the signatures appearing on the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
on complainant's identification cards show a difference in the stroke of the letters "c" and "o."
Further, complainant's signatures in the documents attached to the records consistently appear to
50

be of the same height. On the other hand, her alleged signature on the Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage has a big letter "c." Hence, it seems that complainant's signature on the Petition
51

for Declaration ofNullity of Marriage was forged.

While there is no evidence to prove that respondent forged complainant's signature, the fact remains
that respondent allowed a forged signature to be used on a petition she prepared and notarized. In52

doing so, respondent violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01. These canons state:
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the integrated bar.
RULE 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.
....
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
RULE 10.01 -A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall
he mislead or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
In Embido v. Pe, Jr., Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Salvador N. Pe, Jr. was found guilty of violating
53

Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and was meted the penalty of disbarment for falsifying a court decision "in a
non-existent court proceeding." This court discussed that:
54

Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can
justify a lawyer's disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Specifically, the deliberate
falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of moral
turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of justice in this country,
given the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status
of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar. 55

In a similar manner, respondent's act of allowing the use of a forged signature on a petition she
prepared and notarized demonstrates a lack of moral fiber on her part.
Other acts that this court has found violative of Canon 7, Rule 7.03 are: engaging in a scuffle inside
court chambers; openly doubting paternity of his own son; hurling invectives at a Clerk of
56 57

Court; harassing occupants of a property; using intemperate language; and engaging in an

58 59 60

extramarital affair. 61

Furthermore, allowing the use of a forged signature on a petition filed before a court is tantamount to
consenting to the commission of a falsehood before courts, in violation of Canon 10.
In Spouses Umaguing v. De Vera, this court discussed the importance of Canon 10, Rule 10.01, as
62

follows:
The Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from
doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct
himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as
well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule
of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means a coincidence,
therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated
by the Code of Professional Responsibility. In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice." (Emphasis supplied)
63

III
This court further finds that respondent violated Canon 17, which states:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
Respondent failed to protect the interests of her client when she represented complainant, who is
the opposing party of her client Leomarte Tamaray, in the same case.
The responsibilities of a lawyer under Canon 17 were discussed in Penilla v. Alcid, Jr.: 64

The legal profession dictates that it is not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer to accord the
highest degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the protection of the client's interest. The most thorough
groundwork and study must be undertaken in order to safeguard the interest of the client. The honor
bestowed on his person to carry the title of a lawyer does not end upon taking the Lawyer's Oath and
signing the Roll of Attorneys. Rather, such honor attaches to him for the entire duration of his
practice of law and carries with it the consequent responsibility of not only satisfying the basic
requirements but also going the extra mile in the protection of the interests of the client and the
pursuit of justice[. ]
65

Respondent is reminded of the duties and responsibilities of members of the legal profession, as
discussed in Tenoso v. Echanez: 66

Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with public interest and
that "a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession,
to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State-the
administration of justice-as an officer of the court." Accordingly, "[l]awyers are bound to maintain not
only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
" (Citations omitted)
67

IV
This court notes that respondent may have violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 when she entered her
appearance as counsel for complainant even though she was engaged as counsel by Leomarte
68

Tamaray. Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
69

CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions
with his client.
....
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The rationale for Canon 15 was discussed in Samson v. Era: 70

The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a lawyer would
be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. In
the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a
substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the former client
consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty.
Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with
the client's case, including the weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge and information
gathered in the course of the relationship must be treated as sacred and guarded with care. It
behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance
of treachery and double-dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of justice. The nature of that relationship is,
therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree .
....
. . . The spirit behind this rule is that the client's confidence once given should not be stripped by the
mere expiration of the professional employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer
1âwphi1

should not do anything that will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which the lawyer
previously represented the client. Nor should the lawyer disclose or use any of the client's
confidences acquired in the previous relation. In this regard, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility expressly declares that: "A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him."
The lawyer's highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards and costs
even to himself. The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the
termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the client's ceasing to employ the attorney and
retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the
client.
71

The test to determine whether conflict of interest exists was discussed in Hornilla v. Salunat: 72
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or
claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only
cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of
the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client
in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation
to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from
the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
73

Respondent was engaged by Leomarte Tamaray to be his counsel. When the Petition for
74

Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was filed, respondent signed the Petition as counsel for
complainant. If respondent was indeed engaged as counsel by complainant, then there is conflict of
75

interest, in violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03.

However, there is nothing on record to show that respondent was engaged as counsel by
complainant. Hence, this court finds that respondent did not commit conflict of interest.
V
On a final note, Rule 139-B has been amended by Bar Matter No. 1645 dated October 13, 2015.
Section 12 of Rule 139-B now provides that:
Rule 139-B. Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys
....
Section 12. Review and recommendation by the Board of Governors.

(a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors
upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report.
(b) After its review, the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, shall
recommend to the Supreme Court the dismissal of the complaint or the imposition of
disciplinary action against the respondent. The Board shall issue a resolution setting forth its
findings and recommendations, clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on
which it is based. The resolution shall be issued within a period not exceeding thirty (30)
days from the next meeting of the Board following the submission of the Investigator's report.
(c) The Board's resolution, together with the entire records and all evidence presented and
submitted, shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action within ten (10) days from
issuance of the resolution.
(d) Notice of the resolution shall be given to all parties through their counsel, if any. 76

Under the old rule, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines was given the
power to "issue a decision" if the lawyer complained of was exonerated or meted a penalty of "less
77

than suspension or disbarment." In addition, the case would be deemed terminated unless an
78

interested party filed a petition before this court.

79

The amendments to Rule 139-B is a reiteration that only this court has the power to impose
disciplinary action on members of the bar. The factual findings and recommendations of the
Commission on Bar Discipline and the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
are recommendatory, subject to review by this court. 80

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis is found GUILTY of violating Canon 1, Rule
1.01, Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The charge for violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 against respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis
is DISMISSED.
The penalty of DISBARMENT is imposed upon respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis. The Office of
the Bar Confidant is directed to remove the name of Deborah Z. Daquis from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent's personal record as attorney, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to the Office
of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their information
and guidance.
This Resolution takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 162704 : November 19, 2004]
MEMORIA G. ENCINAS and ADOLFO A. BALBOA, Petitioners, v. NATIONAL BOOKSTORE,
INC., Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Two certificates of title in the names of two different persons cover one and the same piece of land.
The question in this case is who is the rightful owner of the property.
The land in question is located at the corner of Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) and Aurora
Boulevard, Quezon City. It was originally part of a larger piece of land designated as Lot No. 4-B-2-B
of the subdivision plan Psd-20172, being a portion of Lot 4-B-2 of Plan SWO-16797, per original
1

survey for Valentin Afable, et. al. dated March 3, 1944. Lot No. 4-B-2-A of said plan was in the name
of Valentin Afable, while Lot No. 4-B-2-B of the same plan was in the name of Eugenio Evangelista.
Lot 4-B-2-B had an area of 8,371 square meters. 2

Lot 4-B-2-B was later recorded in the names of the Heirs of one Simeon Evangelista under Transfer
3

Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-219636, issued on June 22, 1976. The title indicated that the land was
4

originally registered under Act No. 496 on October 3, 1927, in the registration book of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal, Vol. T-51, Page 218, pursuant to Decree No. 917, G.L.R.O. Record No. 197. 5

On December 4, 1978, the Heirs of Simeon Evangelista executed a deed of sale with mortgage of Lot
4-B-2-B in favor of the spouses Nereo and Gloria Paculdo, resulting in the cancellation of TCT No.
219636 and the issuance of TCT No. 251175 in the names of the Paculdo spouses, with the mortgage
6

lien annotated thereon. For failure of the Paculdo spouses to pay their obligation under the mortgage
contract, the mortgage was extra-judicially foreclosed and the land sold at public auction to the Heirs
of Simeon Evangelista. On August 7, 1981, on the basis of the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale executed in
7

favor of the Heirs, TCT No. 251175 of the Paculdo spouses was cancelled and TCT No. 279654 was 8

issued in the name of the Heirs of Simeon Evangelista.

9

In 1982, an unsegregated portion measuring 906 square meters of Lot 4-B-2-B was expropriated by
the Government for the widening of Aurora Boulevard. The unsegregated portion was designated as
Lot 4-B-2-B-1. The remaining portion of 7,465 square meters was designated as Lot 4-B-2-B-2, the
subject land. On May 23, 1983, the Heirs of Simeon Evangelista sold the subject land, to respondent
National Bookstore Inc. through a Deed of Sale with Real Estate Mortgage. Respondent took
10

possession of the subject land, declared the same for taxation purposes and was issued TCT No.
11

300861 covering the subject land.

12

In 1994, petitioner Memoria G. Encinas, through her attorney-in-fact and herein co-petitioner Adolfo
Balboa, filed a Petition for the administrative reconstitution of her title, TCT No. 179854, which was
13

supposedly burned in the fire that razed the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on June 11, 1988. To
support her petition, she presented a copy of her Tax Declaration No. B-040-01639 for the year 1985
14

allegedly covering the subject property and a certification from the Acting Chief of the Revenue
15

Collection Office of the Quezon City Treasurer stating that the real property taxes on the said property
have been paid up to 1994 under Tax Declaration No. 1639. On October 20, 1994, the Administrator
of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), after investigation and verification that the titles to be
reconstituted do not overlap other properties, issued an order reconstituting several transfer
16

certificates of title, including petitioner Encinas' TCT No. 179854. Pursuant to the order, the Registry
of Deeds of Quezon City issued TCT No. RT-103022 in petitioner Encinas' name on November 9,
17

1994.
Petitioner offered the property covered by the reconstituted title for sale to Alfredo C. Ramos, the
president of respondent. It was then that respondent discovered that its TCT No. 300861 and
petitioner's TCT No. RT-103022 referred to the same property, Lot No. 4-B-2-B-2.
On July 17, 1997, after conducting an investigation on titles alleged to have been illegally
reconstituted, the LRA Reconstitution Officer issued a Supplemental Order dated July 17, 1997 and an
Order dated June 8, 1999 which set aside the previous order of reconstitution dated October 20, 1994,
and in particular, directed the exclusion of the reconstitution of the original of TCT No. T-179854. 18

On February 28, 1996, respondent as plaintiff filed an action for quieting of title before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 215, alleging that it was the true and lawful owner of Lot 4-B-2-B-2
as evidenced by its TCT No. 300861. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-96-26716.
Petitioner Encinas as defendant denied respondent's allegations and stubbornly claimed that she was
the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the subject property and neither she nor her predecessor-
in-interest ever sold the property to anybody. She relied on the legality and regularity of the
reconstitution of her title to the subject property.19

On June 21, 1999, the RTC decided in favor of respondent. The trial court declared that while a
reconstituted title has a prima facie appearance of legality, the reconstitution of said title is subject to
the proviso that no other certificate of title covering the same parcel of land exists in the records of
the registry. A certificate of title considered lost or destroyed, if found or recovered, prevails over the
reconstituted title. In Civil Case No. Q-96-26716, the original transfer certificate of title covering the
property, TCT No. 300861 in respondent's name, is on file with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City
and is one of the titles which were not burned in the fire of June 1988. The owner's duplicate copy of
the title is intact and in respondent's possession. Furthermore, respondent was able to show how it
acquired the property from its immediate predecessors and was able to account for the previous major
transactions involving the subject property until ownership thereof was transferred to respondent.
Petitioner Encinas, on the other hand, failed to present any evidence to show how she acquired
ownership of the property. She merely alleged that she was the owner in fee simple. To support her
claim of ownership, she presented a tax declaration covering the property. But it was shown that said
tax declaration was tampered with and apparently falsified. Petitioner Encinas relied mainly on the
presumption of validity of her reconstituted title. However, as the trial court noted, the LRA
Administrator eventually issued the Supplemental Order of July 17, 1997 and Order of June 8, 1999
excluding petitioner Encinas' title from the reconstitution order. To the trial court, not only was
respondent able to prove its ownership of the subject property with preponderant evidence, but the
case had already become moot and academic by virtue of the LRA's cancellation of petitioner Encinas'
reconstituted title. Hence, it upheld respondent's title to the subject property and ordered the
cancellation of petitioner Encinas' reconstituted title. 20

Petitioners promptly moved for reconsideration. On November 10, 1999, the trial court granted the
same and set aside its earlier Decision. In a complete reversal of its previous ruling, the trial court
21

upheld the validity of petitioner Encinas' title. According to the trial court, petitioner Encinas' title, TCT
No. 179854, was registered and issued on August 25, 1972 which should have served as constructive
notice to respondent whose title, TCT No. 300861, was issued only on June 6, 1983. The trial court
also pointed out that there is a manifest defect in respondent's title as to its origin: respondent's title
is a derivative of an original certificate of title issued pursuant to Decree No. 917, GLRO Record No.
197; however, said GLRO Record No. 197 referred to a piece of land located in Bataan, not Quezon
City. Respondent's title referred to a piece of land in Bataan and not the subject property. Hence, in
the Order dated November 10, 1999, the RTC nullified respondent's title, and declared petitioner
Encinas' reconstituted title valid.
Respondent appealed the RTC Order of November 10, 1999 to the Court of Appeals. On October 27,
2003, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the RTC Order and reinstated the RTC Decision of
June 21, 1999. The appellate court found that the antecedents leading to respondent's acquisition of
22

the property were clearly shown in the records and even annotated in its TCT No. 300861. On the
other hand, petitioner Encinas failed to describe the circumstances of her ownership or possession of
the land and to identify her predecessor-in-interest or the manner by which she acquired the property.
Petitioners again raised the argument that the erroneous entry of the GLRO record number in
respondent's title is a fatal defect which proves the title's invalid source. However, the appellate court
concluded that based on the testimony of petitioners' own witnesses, the variance was merely a
23

typographical or clerical error. The same witnesses testified that in cases of such clerical errors, it is
the technical description which controls. The technical description in respondent's title described the
subject property, Lot 4-B-2-B-2, located in Quezon City.
On the other hand, the technical description in petitioner Encinas' title refers to a different parcel of
land. Her title describes a parcel of land which is a portion of Lot 2-E-2 of plan SWO-16797, certainly
not the subject property.
The Court of Appeals also observed that respondent was able to present tax declarations and real
property tax bill receipts in its name and in the name of its immediate predecessor, the Evangelista
clan. While petitioners also presented a tax declaration and certification from the Revenue Collection
Office of Quezon City, upon closer scrutiny, said documents showed that petitioners had declared Lot
4-B-2-B-1 for taxation purposes, and not Lot 4-B-2-B-2, the property subject of this case. It should
24

be remembered that Lot 4-B-2-B-1 refers to the portion which was expropriated by the government.
Petitioners timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate court's decision but this was
25

denied on March 12, 2004. Hence, they filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari, alleging that the
26

Court of Appeals "committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in
upholding the validity of [respondent's] purported TCT No. 300861 notwithstanding the abundance of
competent evidence demonstrating positively that said title is spurious and fake." Petitioners insist
that the variance in the entries in respondent's TCT No. 300186 and GLRO Record No. 197 is not a
mere typographical or clerical error, but instead an indication of the fraudulent nature of respondent's
title.
Petitioners submit that respondent's evidence failed to show that it proved its ownership of the subject
property. In particular, petitioners take issue with the Court of Appeals' alleged disregard of its
evidence which allegedly demonstrates that respondent's title to the subject property is fake and
spurious. Petitioners harp on the supposed incongruity between the entries in the GLRO Record
Numbers in respondent's and petitioner's respective titles to the property.
Respondent, in its Comment, seeks to have the Petition dismissed on the ground that it raises only
questions of fact which this Court cannot entertain via a petition for certiorari .
27

Indeed, this Court has held that factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. However, there are
several exceptions to the rule, namely: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals,
in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of
the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and
are contradicted by the evidence on record. 28

This case falls under one of the exceptions, as the factual conclusions of the trial court and the
appellate court are in conflict with each other. Hence, although the petition raises questions of fact
since it entails a review of the evidence at hand, it may be entertained by this Court.
The issue before this Court is whether petitioners were able to discharge their burden of proving the
superiority of their title over the title of respondent. The Court of Appeals upheld the initial Decision of
the RTC and found the quantum of evidence presented by petitioners insufficient. A review of the
evidence reveals no compelling reason to reverse the appellate court's ruling.
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence. "Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on
either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence"
or "greater weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last
analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy
of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. 29a

Respondent as plaintiff was able to overcome the burden of proof and prove by preponderant evidence
that it has a superior right and title to the subject property. In contrast, petitioners as defendants
seem to rely only on the alleged weakness of respondent's evidence, without asserting any proof other
than her reconstituted title to the subject property.
From the evidence, respondent derived its title from the title of its vendor, the Heirs of Simeon
Evangelista, via a deed of sale. The Heirs obtained their title from their predecessor-in-interest
Simeon Evangelista. Prior to the transfer of the title to respondent, the Heirs had sold the subject
property to the Paculdo spouses in whose names another title was issued. However, the Heirs were
able to reclaim the property upon the failure of the Paculdo spouses to pay their mortgage obligation
on the property. All these transactions involving the property are well-documented. From the time
29

respondent obtained the property, it protected its interest therein by fencing off the property and
designating security guards around its perimeter. Respondent also exercised its obligation as owner
30

by paying real property taxes on the property it had acquired, evidenced by tax declarations issued in
its name by the Quezon City Assessor's Office. 31
In contrast, petitioner Encinas asserts her right to the subject property via a reconstituted title, also
presented in evidence. However, other than the allegation in her Answer to respondent's Complaint
(for quieting of title) that she is the owner in fee simple of the subject property, petitioner Encinas
failed to disclose before any of the judicial levels how she was able to acquire title to the property. The
trial court had intimated during the hearings that to get to the truth of the matter, it is important to
trace the origins or source of the titles of the properties. Counsel for petitioners had manifested time
32

and again that petitioner Encinas herself, who was then in Detroit, Michigan, would be presented to
testify on the acquisition of the property, but the hearings terminated without petitioner Encinas ever
33

making an appearance. Neither was her co-petitioner and attorney-in-fact Adolfo A. Balboa able to
shed light on the matter, as he clearly had no knowledge of the circumstances of petitioner Encinas'
acquisition of the property.34

Petitioners also cannot rely on Tax Declaration No. B-040-01639 allegedly issued in petitioner Encinas'
name, since a tax declaration with the same number was also issued in the name of respondent.
Indeed, according to petitioner's witness, Dante M. Veloria, Assistant City Assessor of Quezon City,
there are many cases of duplication of tax declaration numbers in their office, and such duplication
does not necessarily mean that the duplicate tax declaration is spurious. The Assessor's Office rectifies
the duplication by adjusting the tax declaration number and annotating the correction at the back of
the tax declaration and notifying the persons concerned. The same witness noted that trouble arises
when such duplications are not corrected, as in this case.
Instead of presenting evidence to prove the superiority of petitioner Encinas' title, petitioners rely only
on the apparent weakness of respondent's title, that is, the alleged fatal defect in GLRO Record No.
197 perpetuated in the titles of respondent and its predecessors-in-interest.
Petitioners cite Lorenzana Food Corporation v. Court of Appeals in arguing that these errors cannot
35

simply be qualified as mere typographical errors. However, the facts of the cited case differ from the
case at bar, and the ruling thereon cannot be blindly applied to this case.
The Lorenzana case involved a large tract of land traversed by a railroad and divided into two parcels
designated as Lots 1 and 2, both parcels covered by a reconstituted title Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. (1020) RO-9. A separate OCT for Lot 1, OCT No. (1898) RO-58 was issued, while Lot 2
remained covered by OCT No. (1020) RO-9. Lots 1 and 2 were subsequently subdivided and titles to
the resulting parcels of land were issued. However, the TCTs covering the subdivided parcels of Lot 1,
while correctly indicating OCT No. (1898) RO-58 of Lot 1 as its source, contained the technical
description lifted from the OCT No. (1020) RO-9 covering Lot 2. Subsequent transactions of the
subdivided parcels of land of Lot 1 resulted in the issuance of TCTs containing the incorrect technical
description as well as the inaccurate description of the location of the properties. The controversy
arose when Lorenzana, et al., learned that the same parcels were being claimed by therein respondent
B.E. San Diego, Incorporated, based on titles registered in the latter's name. The trial court found for
respondent B.E. San Diego, as its titles were "not blemished by any defect and were regularly issued."
The trial court also considered in respondent B.E. San Diego's favor its open, adverse and continuous
possession of the disputed land since 1966 and its consistent payment of taxes thereon. This Court
upheld the ruling of the trial court. The defects appearing on the titles of Lorenzana, et al. relating to
the lots' mother title, technical descriptions and locations'judicially admitted by Lorenzana, et al. were
too glaring that they could not be dismissed as clerical and harmless in character. The discrepancies in
Lorenzana, et al.'s titles cannot be upheld against the unblemished titles of B.E. San Diego.
The same cannot be said of the alleged defect in respondent's title in the case at bar. In Lorenzana,
the erroneous entries were too numerous and evident, and involved significant portions of the titles.
On the other hand, the claimed flaw in respondent's title and the title of its predecessors-in-interest is
GLRO Record No. 197, which petitioners assert should be GLRO Record No. 917. It is obvious that
such a defect involves only an interchanging of numbers. It is certainly believable that such variance
in the copying of entries could be merely a typographical or clerical error. Furthermore, as the Court of
Appeals pointed out, petitioners' own witnesses explained that the inconsistency in the entries in the
GLRO record number could be due to clerical error, and in such case, the technical description in the
title should prevail over the record number.
It must be noted, too, that the original of respondent's title still exists and is with the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City as it was not one of the titles that were destroyed by the fire. Petitioner Encinas'
title, on the other hand, is a reconstituted title, which was later withdrawn by the same office which
issued it, pursuant to the Supplemental Order dated July 17, 1997 and Order dated June 8, 1999. 36

Respondent has established by preponderant evidence that it is the rightful owner of the subject
property. Petitioners have not.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED, no reversible error on the part of the
Court of Appeals having been adduced. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-25291 January 30, 1971

THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU

INSURANCE GROUP WORKERS and EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, and INSULAR LIFE
BUILDING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, petitioners,
vs.
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M. OLBES and
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

Lacsina, Lontok and Perez and Luis F. Aquino for petitioners.

Francisco de los Reyes for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.

Araneta, Mendoza and Papa for other respondents.

CASTRO, J.:

Appeal, by certiorari to review a decision and a resolution en banc of the Court of Industrial
Relations dated August 17, 1965 and October 20, 1965, respectively, in Case 1698-ULP.

The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group Workers
& Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU
(hereinafter referred to as the Unions), while still members of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW),
entered into separate collective bargaining agreements with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and
the FGU Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as the Companies).

Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the latter was formerly
the secretary-treasurer of the FFW and acting president of the Insular Life/FGU unions and the
Insular Life Building Employees Association. Garcia, as such acting president, in a circular issued in
his name and signed by him, tried to dissuade the members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the
FFW and joining the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU), to no avail.

Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of the
Department of Justice. Thereafter, the Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956 as assistant
corporate secretary and legal assistant in their Legal Department, and he was soon receiving P900 a
month, or P600 more than he was receiving from the FFW. Enaje was hired on or about February
19, 1957 as personnel manager of the Companies, and was likewise made chairman of the
negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining with the Unions.

In a letter dated September 16, 1957, the Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies for a
modified renewal of their respective collective bargaining contracts which were then due to expire on
September 30, 1957. The parties mutually agreed and to make whatever benefits could be agreed
upon retroactively effective October 1, 1957.

Thereafter, in the months of September and October 1957 negotiations were conducted on the
Union's proposals, but these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result of
which the Unions filed on January 27, 1958 a notice of strike for "deadlock on collective bargaining."
Several conciliation conferences were held under the auspices of the Department of Labor wherein
the conciliators urged the Companies to make reply to the Unions' proposals en toto so that the said
Unions might consider the feasibility of dropping their demand for union security in exchange for
other benefits. However, the Companies did not make any counter-proposals but, instead, insisted
that the Unions first drop their demand for union security, promising money benefits if this was done.
Thereupon, and prior to April 15, 1958, the petitioner Insular Life Building Employees Association-
NATU dropped this particular demand, and requested the Companies to answer its demands, point
by point, en toto. But the respondent Insular Life Assurance Co. still refused to make any counter-
proposals. In a letter addressed to the two other Unions by the joint management of the Companies,
the former were also asked to drop their union security demand, otherwise the Companies "would no
longer consider themselves bound by the commitment to make money benefits retroactive to
October 1, 1957." By a letter dated April 17, 1958, the remaining two petitioner unions likewise
dropped their demand for union shop. April 25, 1958 then was set by the parties to meet and discuss
the remaining demands.

From April 25 to May 6, 1958, the parties negotiated on the labor demands but with no satisfactory
result due to a stalemate on the matter of salary increases. On May 13, 1958 the Unions demanded
from the Companies final counter-proposals on their economic demands, particularly on salary
increases. Instead of giving counter-proposals, the Companies on May 15, 1958 presented facts and
figures and requested the Unions to submit a workable formula which would justify their own
proposals, taking into account the financial position of the former. Forthwith the Unions voted to
declare a strike in protest against what they considered the Companies' unfair labor practices.

Meanwhile, eighty-seven (87) unionists were reclassified as supervisors without increase in salary
nor in responsibility while negotiations were going on in the Department of Labor after the notice to
strike was served on the Companies. These employees resigned from the Unions.

On May 20, 1958 the Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of the Insular Life Building at
Plaza Moraga.

On May 21, 1958 the Companies through their acting manager and president, the respondent Jose
M. Olbes (hereinafter referred to as the respondent Olbes), sent to each of the strikers a letter
(exhibit A) quoted verbatim as follows:

We recognize it is your privilege both to strike and to conduct picketing.

However, if any of you would like to come back to work voluntarily, you may:

1. Advise the nearest police officer or security guard of your intention to do so.

2. Take your meals within the office.

3. Make a choice whether to go home at the end of the day or to sleep nights at the
office where comfortable cots have been prepared.
 4. Enjoy free coffee and occasional movies.

5. Be paid overtime for work performed in excess of eight hours.

6. Be sure arrangements will be made for your families.

The decision to make is yours — whether you still believe in the motives of the strike
or in the fairness of the Management.

The Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a few unionists who were convinced
to desist by the aforesaid letter of May 21, 1958.

From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958, until it was called off on May 31, 1958, some
management men tried to break thru the Unions' picket lines. Thus, on May 21, 1958 Garcia,
assistant corporate secretary, and Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section,
respectively of the Companies, tried to penetrate the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building.
Garcia, upon approaching the picket line, tossed aside the placard of a picketer, one Paulino Bugay;
a fight ensued between them, in which both suffered injuries. The Companies organized three bus-
loads of employees, including a photographer, who with the said respondent Olbes, succeeded in
penetrating the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building, thus causing injuries to the picketers
and also to the strike-breakers due to the resistance offered by some picketers.

Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with the use of photographs as evidence, the
Companies then filed criminal charges against the strikers with the City Fiscal's Office of Manila.
During the pendency of the said cases in the fiscal's office, the Companies likewise filed a petition
for injunction with damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila which, on the basis of the
pendency of the various criminal cases against striking members of the Unions, issued on May 31,
1958 an order restraining the strikers, until further orders of the said court, from stopping, impeding,
obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the
free movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies' building.

On the same date, the Companies, again through the respondent Olbes, sent individually to the
strikers a letter (exhibit B), quoted hereunder in its entirety:

The first day of the strike was last 21 May 1958.

Our position remains unchanged and the strike has made us even more convinced of
our decision.

We do not know how long you intend to stay out, but we cannot hold your positions
open for long. We have continued to operate and will continue to do so with or
without you.

If you are still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group Companies, and if
there are no criminal charges pending against you, we are giving you until 2 June
1958 to report for work at the home office. If by this date you have not yet reported,
we may be forced to obtain your replacement.

Before, the decisions was yours to make.

So it is now.
Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the members of the Unions,
except three (3), were dismissed by the fiscal's office and by the courts. These three cases involved
"slight physical injuries" against one striker and "light coercion" against two others.

At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against them as well as the
ultimatum of the Companies giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to their jobs or else be replaced,
the striking employees decided to call off their strike and to report back to work on June 2, 1958.

However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only to secure
clearances from the City Fiscal's Office of Manila but also to be screened by a management
committee among the members of which were Enage and Garcia. The screening committee initially
rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges. However, all non-strikers with pending criminal
charges which arose from the breakthrough incident were readmitted immediately by the Companies
without being required to secure clearances from the fiscal's office. Subsequently, when practically
all the strikers had secured clearances from the fiscal's office, the Companies readmitted only some
but adamantly refused readmission to 34 officials and members of the Unions who were most active
in the strike, on the ground that they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents,"
without however stating the specific acts allegedly committed. Among those who were refused
readmission are Emiliano Tabasondra, vice president of the Insular Life Building Employees'
Association-NATU; Florencio Ibarra, president of the FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees
Association-NATU; and Isagani Du Timbol, acting president of the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd.
Employees Association-NATU. Some 24 of the above number were ultimately notified months later
that they were being dismissed retroactively as of June 2, 1958 and given separation pay checks
computed under Rep. Act 1787, while others (ten in number) up to now have not been readmitted
although there have been no formal dismissal notices given to them.

On July 29, 1958 the CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the
Companies under Republic Act 875. The complaint specifically charged the Companies with (1)
interfering with the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to concerted action, by
sending out individual letters to them urging them to abandon their strike and return to work, with a
promise of comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid overtime, and, subsequently, by
warning them that if they did not return to work on or before June 2, 1958, they might be replaced;
and (2) discriminating against the members of the Unions as regards readmission to work after the
strike on the basis of their union membership and degree of participation in the strike.

On August 4, 1958 the Companies filed their answer denying all the material allegations of the
complaint, stating special defenses therein, and asking for the dismissal of the complaint.

After trial on the merits, the Court of Industrial Relations, through Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez,
rendered on August 17, 1965 a decision dismissing the Unions' complaint for lack of merit. On
August 31, 1965 the Unions seasonably filed their motion for reconsideration of the said decision,
and their supporting memorandum on September 10, 1965. This was denied by the Court of
Industrial Relations en banc in a resolution promulgated on October 20, 1965.

Hence, this petition for review, the Unions contending that the lower court erred:

1. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice in sending out
individually to the strikers the letters marked Exhibits A and B;

2. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating
against the striking members of the Unions in the matter of readmission of
employees after the strike;
 3. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for dismissing officials
and members of the Unions without giving them the benefit of investigation and the
opportunity to present their side in regard to activities undertaken by them in the
legitimate exercise of their right to strike; and

4. In not ordering the reinstatement of officials and members of the Unions, with full
back wages, from June 2, 1958 to the date of their actual reinstatement to their usual
employment.

I. The respondents contend that the sending of the letters, exhibits A and B, constituted a legitimate
exercise of their freedom of speech. We do not agree. The said letters were directed to the striking
employees individually — by registered special delivery mail at that — without being coursed
through the Unions which were representing the employees in the collective bargaining.

The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike

following unproductive efforts at collective bargaining that the plant would be
operated the next day and that their jobs were open for them should they want to
come in has been held to be an unfair labor practice, as an active interference with
the right of collective bargaining through dealing with the employees individually
instead of through their collective bargaining representatives. (31 Am. Jur.
563, citing NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co. [CA 9th] 133 F2d 676, 146 ALR 1045)

Indeed, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under a collective bargaining
agreement to negotiate or to attempt to negotiate with his employees individually in connection with
changes in the agreement. And the basis of the prohibition regarding individual bargaining with the
strikers is that although the union is on strike, the employer is still under obligation to bargain with
the union as the employees' bargaining representative (Melo Photo Supply Corporation vs. National
Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332).

Indeed, some such similar actions are illegal as constituting unwarranted acts of interference. Thus,
the act of a company president in writing letters to the strikers, urging their return to work on terms
inconsistent with their union membership, was adjudged as constituting interference with the
exercise of his employees' right to collective bargaining (Lighter Publishing, CCA 7th, 133 F2d 621).
It is likewise an act of interference for the employer to send a letter to all employees notifying them to
return to work at a time specified therein, otherwise new employees would be engaged to perform
their jobs. Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting their homes, with the employer or his
representative urging the employees to cease union activity or cease striking, constitutes unfair labor
practice. All the above-detailed activities are unfair labor practices because they tend to undermine
the concerted activity of the employees, an activity to which they are entitled free from the
employer's molestation. 1

Moreover, since exhibit A is a letter containing promises of benefits to the employees in order to
entice them to return to work, it is not protected by the free speech provisions of the Constitution
(NLRB v. Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70). The same is true with exhibit B since it contained
threats to obtain replacements for the striking employees in the event they did not report for work on
June 2, 1958. The free speech protection under the Constitution is inapplicable where the
expression of opinion by the employer or his agent contains a promise of benefit, or threats, or
reprisal (31 Am. Jur. 544; NLRB vs. Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70; NLRB vs. Goigy Co.,
211 F2d 533, 35 ALR 2d 422).

Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to "bribe" the strikers with
"comfortable cots," "free coffee and occasional movies," "overtime" pay for "work performed in
excess of eight hours," and "arrangements" for their families, so they would abandon the strike and
return to work, they were guilty of strike-breaking and/or union-busting and, consequently, of unfair
labor practice. It is equivalent to an attempt to break a strike for an employer to offer reinstatement to
striking employees individually, when they are represented by a union, since the employees thus
offered reinstatement are unable to determine what the consequences of returning to work would be.

Likewise violative of the right to organize, form and join labor organizations are the following acts:
the offer of a Christmas bonus to all "loyal" employees of a company shortly after the making of a
request by the union to bargain; wage increases given for the purpose of mollifying employees after
the employer has refused to bargain with the union, or for the purpose of inducing striking
employees to return to work; the employer's promises of benefits in return for the strikers'
abandonment of their strike in support of their union; and the employer's statement, made about 6
weeks after the strike started, to a group of strikers in a restaurant to the effect that if the strikers
returned to work, they would receive new benefits in the form of hospitalization, accident insurance,
profit-sharing, and a new building to work in.2

Citing paragraph 5 of the complaint filed by the acting prosecutor of the lower court which states that
"the officers and members of the complainant unions decided to call off the strike and return to work
on June 2, 1958 by reason of the injunction issued by the Manila Court of First Instance," the
respondents contend that this was the main cause why the strikers returned to work and not the
letters, exhibits A and B. This assertion is without merit. The circumstance that the strikers later
decided to return to work ostensibly on account of the injunctive writ issued by the Court of First
Instance of Manila cannot alter the intrinsic quality of the letters, which were calculated, or which
tended, to interfere with the employees' right to engage in lawful concerted activity in the form of a
strike. Interference constituting unfair labor practice will not cease to be such simply because it was
susceptible of being thwarted or resisted, or that it did not proximately cause the result intended. For
success of purpose is not, and should not, be the criterion in determining whether or not a prohibited
act constitutes unfair labor practice.

The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees within
the meaning of subsection (a) (1) is whether the employer has engaged in conduct
which it may reasonably be said tends to interfere with the free exercise of
employees' rights under section 3 of the Act, and it is not necessary that there be
direct evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements
of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable inference that anti-union conduct of
the employer does have an adverse effect on self-organization and collective
bargaining. (Francisco, Labor Laws 1956, Vol. II, p. 323, citing NLRB v. Ford, C.A.,
1948, 170 F2d 735).

Besides, the letters, exhibits A and B, should not be considered by themselves alone but should be
read in the light of the preceding and subsequent circumstances surrounding them. The letters
should be interpreted according to the "totality of conduct doctrine,"

... whereby the culpability of an employer's remarks were to be evaluated not only on
the basis of their implicit implications, but were to be appraised against the
background of and in conjunction with collateral circumstances. Under this "doctrine"
expressions of opinion by an employer which, though innocent in themselves,
frequently were held to be culpable because of the circumstances under which they
were uttered, the history of the particular employer's labor relations or anti-union bias
or because of their connection with an established collateral plan of coercion or
interference. (Rothenberg on Relations, p. 374, and cases cited therein.)
It must be recalled that previous to the petitioners' submission of proposals for an amended renewal
of their respective collective bargaining agreements to the respondents, the latter hired Felipe Enage
and Ramon Garcia, former legal counsels of the petitioners, as personnel manager and assistant
corporate secretary, respectively, with attractive compensations. After the notice to strike was served
on the Companies and negotiations were in progress in the Department of Labor, the respondents
reclassified 87 employees as supervisors without increase in salary or in responsibility, in effect
compelling these employees to resign from their unions. And during the negotiations in the
Department of Labor, despite the fact that the petitioners granted the respondents' demand that the
former drop their demand for union shop and in spite of urgings by the conciliators of the Department
of Labor, the respondents adamantly refused to answer the Unions' demands en toto. Incidentally,
Enage was the chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining
between the former and the Unions. After the petitioners went to strike, the strikers were individually
sent copies of exhibit A, enticing them to abandon their strike by inducing them to return to work
upon promise of special privileges. Two days later, the respondents, thru their president and
manager, respondent Jose M. Olbes, brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted
by armed men, who, despite the presence of eight entrances to the three buildings occupied by the
Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two meters wide and in the process, crashed thru
the picket line posted in front of the premises of the Insular Life Building. This resulted in injuries on
the part of the picketers and the strike-breakers. Then the respondents brought against the
lâwphî1.ñèt

picketers criminal charges, only three of which were not dismissed, and these three only for slight
misdemeanors. As a result of these criminal actions, the respondents were able to obtain an
injunction from the court of first instance restraining the strikers from stopping, impeding, obstructing,
etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the free
movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies' buildings. On the
same day that the injunction was issued, the letter, Exhibit B, was sent — again individually and by
registered special delivery mail — to the strikers, threatening them with dismissal if they did not
report for work on or before June 2, 1958. But when most of the petitioners reported for work, the
respondents thru a screening committee — of which Ramon Garcia was a member — refused to
admit 63 members of the Unions on the ground of "pending criminal charges." However, when
almost all were cleared of criminal charges by the fiscal's office, the respondents adamantly refused
admission to 34 officials and union members. It is not, however, disputed that all-non-strikers with
pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident of May 23, 1958 were
readmitted immediately by the respondents. Among the non-strikers with pending criminal charges
who were readmitted were Generoso Abella, Enrique Guidote, Emilio Carreon, Antonio Castillo,
Federico Barretto, Manuel Chuidian and Nestor Cipriano. And despite the fact that the fiscal's office
found no probable cause against the petitioning strikers, the Companies adamantly refused
admission to them on the pretext that they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the
respondents," without stating specifically the inimical acts allegedly committed. They were soon to
admit, however, that these alleged inimical acts were the same criminal charges which were
dismissed by the fiscal and by the courts..

Verily, the above actuations of the respondents before and after the issuance of the letters, exhibit A
and B, yield the clear inference that the said letters formed of the respondents scheme to preclude if
not destroy unionism within them.

To justify the respondents' threat to dismiss the strikers and secure replacements for them in order
to protect and continue their business, the CIR held the petitioners' strike to be an economic strike
on the basis of exhibit 4 (Notice of Strike) which states that there was a "deadlock in collective
bargaining" and on the strength of the supposed testimonies of some union men who did not actually
know the very reason for the strike. It should be noted that exhibit 4, which was filed on January 27,
1958, states, inter alia:
 TO: BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MANILA

Thirty (30) days from receipt of this notice by the Office, this [sic] unions intends to go
on strike against

THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD.

Plaza Moraga, Manila

THE FGU INSURANCE GROUP

Plaza Moraga, Manila

INSULAR LIFE BUILDING ADMINISTRATION

Plaza Moraga, Manila .

for the following reason: DEADLOCK IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING...

However, the employees did not stage the strike after the thirty-day period, reckoned from January
27, 1958. This simply proves that the reason for the strike was not the deadlock on collective
bargaining nor any lack of economic concessions. By letter dated April 15, 1958, the respondents
categorically stated what they thought was the cause of the "Notice of Strike," which so far as
material, reads:

3. Because you did not see fit to agree with our position on the union shop, you filed
a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations on 27 January 1958, citing
`deadlock in collective bargaining' which could have been for no other issue than the
union shop." (exhibit 8, letter dated April 15, 1958.)

The strike took place nearly four months from the date the said notice of strike was filed. And the
actual and main reason for the strike was, "When it became crystal clear the management double
crossed or will not negotiate in good faith, it is tantamount to refusal collectively and considering the
unfair labor practice in the meantime being committed by the management such as the sudden
resignation of some unionists and [who] became supervisors without increase in salary or change in
responsibility, such as the coercion of employees, decided to declare the strike." (tsn., Oct. 14, 1958,
p. 14.) The truth of this assertion is amply proved by the following circumstances: (1) it took the
respondents six (6) months to consider the petitioners' proposals, their only excuse being that they
could not go on with the negotiations if the petitioners did not drop the demand for union shop (exh.
7, respondents' letter dated April 7, 1958); (2) when the petitioners dropped the demand for union
shop, the respondents did not have a counter-offer to the petitioners' demands. Sec. 14 of Rep. Act
875 required the respondents to make a reply to the petitioners' demands within ten days from
receipt thereof, but instead they asked the petitioners to give a "well reasoned, workable formula
which takes into account the financial position of the group companies." (tsn., Sept. 8, 1958, p. 62;
tsn., Feb. 26, 1969, p. 49.)

II. Exhibit H imposed three conditions for readmission of the strikers, namely: (1) the employee must
be interested in continuing his work with the group companies; (2) there must be no criminal charges
against him; and (3) he must report for work on June 2, 1958, otherwise he would be replaced. Since
the evidence shows that all the employees reported back to work at the respondents' head office on
June 2, 1953, they must be considered as having complied with the first and third conditions.
Our point of inquiry should therefore be directed at whether they also complied with the second
condition. It is not denied that when the strikers reported for work on June 2, 1958, 63 members of
the Unions were refused readmission because they had pending criminal charges. However, despite
the fact that they were able to secure their respective clearances 34 officials and union members
were still refused readmission on the alleged ground that they committed acts inimical to the
Companies. It is beyond dispute, however, that non-strikers who also had criminal charges pending
against them in the fiscal's office, arising from the same incidents whence the criminal charges
against the strikers evolved, were readily readmitted and were not required to secure clearances.
This is a clear act of discrimination practiced by the Companies in the process of rehiring and is
therefore a violation of sec. 4(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act.

The respondents did not merely discriminate against all the strikers in general. They separated the
active from the less active unionists on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on the picket lines.
Unionists belonging to the first category were refused readmission even after they were able to
secure clearances from the competent authorities with respect to the criminal charges filed against
them. It is significant to note in this connection that except for one union official who deserted his
union on the second day of the strike and who later participated in crashing through the picket lines,
not a single union officer was taken back to work. Discrimination undoubtedly exists where the
record shows that the union activity of the rehired strikers has been less prominent than that of the
strikers who were denied reinstatement.

So is there an unfair labor practice where the employer, although authorized by the
Court of Industrial Relations to dismiss the employees who participated in an illegal
strike, dismissed only the leaders of the strikers, such dismissal being evidence of
discrimination against those dismissed and constituting a waiver of the employer's
right to dismiss the striking employees and a condonation of the fault committed by
them." (Carlos and Fernando, Labor and Social Legislation, p. 62, citing Phil. Air
Lines, Inc. v. Phil. Air Lines Emloyees Association, L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958.)

It is noteworthy that — perhaps in an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from charges of

discrimination in the readmission of strikers returning to work — the respondents delegated the
power to readmit to a committee. But the respondent Olbes had chosen Vicente Abella, chief of the
personnel records section, and Ramon Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, to screen the unionists
reporting back to work. It is not difficult to imagine that these two employees — having been involved
in unpleasant incidents with the picketers during the strike — were hostile to the strikers. Needless
to say, the mere act of placing in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers the power of
reinstatement, is a form of discrimination in rehiring.

Delayed reinstatement is a form of discrimination in rehiring, as is having the

machinery of reinstatement in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers, and
reinstating a union official who formerly worked in a unionized plant, to a job in
another mill, which was imperfectly organized. (Morabe, The Law on Strikes, p. 473,
citing Sunshine Mining Co., 7 NLRB 1252; Cleveland Worsted Mills, 43 NLRB 545;
emphasis supplied.)

Equally significant is the fact that while the management and the members of the screening
committee admitted the discrimination committed against the strikers, they tossed back and around
to each other the responsibility for the discrimination. Thus, Garcia admitted that in exercising for the
management the authority to screen the returning employees, the committee admitted the non-
strikers but refused readmission to the strikers (tsn., Feb. 6, 1962, pp. 15-19, 23-29). Vicente Abella,
chairman of the management's screening committee, while admitting the discrimination, placed the
blame therefor squarely on the management (tsn., Sept. 20, 1960, pp. 7-8, 14-18). But the
management, speaking through the respondent Olbes, head of the Companies, disclaimed
responsibility for the discrimination. He testified that "The decision whether to accept or not an
employee was left in the hands of that committee that had been empowered to look into all cases of
the strikers." (tsn., Sept. 6, 1962, p. 19.)

Of course, the respondents — through Ramon Garcia — tried to explain the basis for such
discrimination by testifying that strikers whose participation in any alleged misconduct during the
picketing was not serious in nature were readmissible, while those whose participation was serious
were not. (tsn., Aug. 4, 1961, pp. 48-49, 56). But even this distinction between acts of slight
misconduct and acts of serious misconduct which the respondents contend was the basis for either
reinstatement or discharge, is completely shattered upon a cursory examination of the evidence on
record. For with the exception of Pascual Esquillo whose dismissal sent to the other strikers cited the
alleged commission by them of simple "acts of misconduct."

III. Anent the third assignment of error, the record shows that not a single dismissed striker was
given the opportunity to defend himself against the supposed charges against him. As earlier
mentioned, when the striking employees reported back for work on June 2, 1958, the respondents
refused to readmit them unless they first secured the necessary clearances; but when all, except
three, were able to secure and subsequently present the required clearances, the respondents still
refused to take them back. Instead, several of them later received letters from the respondents in the
following stereotyped tenor:

This will confirm the termination of your employment with the Insular Life-FGU
Insurance Group as of 2 June 1958.

The termination of your employment was due to the fact that you committed acts of
misconduct while picketing during the last strike. Because this may not constitute
sufficient cause under the law to terminate your employment without pay, we are
giving you the amount of P1,930.32 corresponding to one-half month pay for every
year of your service in the Group Company.

Kindly acknowledge receipt of the check we are sending herewith.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) JOSE M.
OLBES
President, Insurance
Life
Acting President, FGU.

The respondents, however, admitted that the alleged "acts of misconduct" attributed to the dismissed
strikers were the same acts with which the said strikers were charged before the fiscal's office and
the courts. But all these charges except three were dropped or dismissed.

Indeed, the individual cases of dismissed officers and members of the striking unions do not indicate
sufficient basis for dismissal.

Emiliano Tabasondra, vice-president of the petitioner FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees
Association-NATU, was refused reinstatement allegedly because he did not report for duty on June
2, 1958 and, hence, had abandoned his office. But the overwhelming evidence adduced at the trial
and which the respondents failed to rebut, negates the respondents' charge that he had abandoned
his job. In his testimony, corroborated by many others, Tabasondra particularly identified the
management men to whom he and his group presented themselves on June 2, 1958. He mentioned
the respondent Olbes' secretary, De Asis, as the one who received them and later directed them —
when Olbes refused them an audience — to Felipe Enage, the Companies' personnel manager. He
likewise categorically stated that he and his group went to see Enage as directed by Olbes'
secretary. If Tabasondra were not telling the truth, it would have been an easy matter for the
respondents to produce De Asis and Enage — who testified anyway as witnesses for the
respondents on several occasions — to rebut his testimony. The respondents did nothing of the
kind. Moreover, Tabasondra called on June 21, 1958 the respondents' attention to his non-
admission and asked them to inform him of the reasons therefor, but instead of doing so, the
respondents dismissed him by their letter dated July 10, 1958. Elementary fairness required that
before being dismissed for cause, Tabasondra be given "his day in court."

At any rate, it has been held that mere failure to report for work after notice to return, does not
constitute abandonment nor bar reinstatement. In one case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
taking back of six of eleven men constituted discrimination although the five strikers who were not
reinstated, all of whom were prominent in the union and in the strike, reported for work at various
times during the next three days, but were told that there were no openings. Said the Court:

... The Board found, and we cannot say that its finding is unsupported, that, in taking
back six union men, the respondent's officials discriminated against the latter on
account of their union activities and that the excuse given that they did not apply until
after the quota was full was an afterthought and not the true reason for the
discrimination against them. (NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333,
58 Sup. Ct. 904, 82 L. Ed. 1381) (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 725,
728)

The respondents' allegation that Tabasondra should have returned after being refused readmission
on June 2, 1958, is not persuasive. When the employer puts off reinstatement when an employee
reports for work at the time agreed, we consider the employee relieved from the duty of returning
further.

Sixto Tongos was dismissed allegedly because he revealed that despite the fact that the Companies
spent more than P80,000 for the vacation trips of officials, they refused to grant union demands;
hence, he betrayed his trust as an auditor of the Companies. We do not find this allegation
convincing. First, this accusation was emphatically denied by Tongos on the witness stand.
Gonzales, president of one of the respondent Companies and one of the officials referred to, took a
trip abroad in 1958. Exchange controls were then in force, and an outgoing traveller on a combined
business and vacation trip was allowed by the Central Bank, per its Circular 52 (Notification to
Authorized Agent Banks) dated May 9, 1952, an allocation of $1,000 or only P2,000, at the official
rate of two pesos to the dollar, as pocket money; hence, this was the only amount that would appear
on the books of the Companies. It was only on January 21, 1962, per its Circular 133 (Notification to
Authorized Agent Banks), that the Central Bank lifted the exchange controls. Tongos could not
therefore have revealed an amount bigger than the above sum. And his competence in figures could
not be doubted considering that he had passed the board examinations for certified public
accountants. But assuming arguendo that Tongos indeed revealed the true expenses of Gonzales'
trip — which the respondents never denied or tried to
disprove — his statements clearly fall within the sphere of a unionist's right to discuss and advertise
the facts involved in a labor dispute, in accordance with section 9(a)(5) of Republic Act 875 which
guarantees the untramelled exercise by striking employees of the right to give "publicity to the
existence of, or the fact involved in any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling or
by any method not involving fraud or violence." Indeed, it is not only the right, it is as well the duty, of
every unionist to advertise the facts of a dispute for the purpose of informing all those affected
thereby. In labor disputes, the combatants are expected to expose the truth before the public to
justify their respective demands. Being a union man and one of the strikers, Tongos was expected to
reveal the whole truth on whether or not the respondent Companies were justified in refusing to
accede to union demands. After all, not being one of the supervisors, he was not a part of
management. And his statement, if indeed made, is but an expression of free speech protected by
the Constitution.

Free speech on both sides and for every faction on any side of the labor relation is to
me a constitutional and useful right. Labor is free ... to turn its publicity on any labor
oppression, substandard wages, employer unfairness, or objectionable working
conditions. The employer, too, should be free to answer and to turn publicity on the
records of the leaders of the unions which seek the confidence of his men ...
(Concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 547, 65
Sup. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 430.) (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 591.)

The respondents also allege that in revealing certain confidential information, Tongos committed not
only a betrayal of trust but also a violation of the moral principles and ethics of accountancy. But
nowhere in the Code of Ethics for Certified Public Accountants under the Revised Rules and
Regulations of the Board of Accountancy formulated in 1954, is this stated. Moreover, the
relationship of the Companies with Tongos was that of an employer and not a client. And with regard
to the testimonies of Juan Raymundo and Antolin Carillo, both vice-presidents of the Trust Insurance
Agencies, Inc. about the alleged utterances made by Tongos, the lower court should not have given
them much weight. The firm of these witnesses was newly established at that time and was still a
"general agency" of the Companies. It is not therefore amiss to conclude that they were more
inclined to favor the respondents rather than Tongos.

Pacifico Ner, Paulino Bugay, Jose Garcia, Narciso Daño, Vicente Alsol and Hermenigildo Ramirez,
opined the lower court, were constructively dismissed by non-readmission allegedly because they
not only prevented Ramon Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, and Vicente Abella, chief of the
personnel records section of the Companies, from entering the Companies' premises on May 21,
1958, but they also caused bruises and abrasions on Garcia's chest and forehead — acts
considered inimical to the interest of the respondents. The Unions, upon the other hand, insist that
there is complete lack of evidence that Ner took part in pushing Garcia; that it was Garcia who
elbowed his way through the picket lines and therefore Ner shouted "Close up," which the picketers
did; and that Garcia tossed Paulino Bugay's placard and a fight ensued between them in which both
suffered injuries. But despite these conflicting versions of what actually happened on May 21, 1958,
there are grounds to believe that the picketers are not responsible for what happened. The
lâwphî1.ñèt

picketing on May 21, 1958, as reported in the police blotter, was peaceful (see Police blotter report,
exh. 3 in CA-G.R. No. 25991-R of the Court of Appeals, where Ner was acquitted). Moreover,
although the Companies during the strike were holding offices at the Botica Boie building at Escolta,
Manila; Tuason Building at San Vicente Street, Manila; and Ayala, Inc. offices at Makati, Rizal,
Garcia, the assistant corporate secretary, and Abella, the chief of the personnel records section,
reported for work at the Insular Life Building. There is therefore a reasonable suggestion that they
were sent to work at the latter building to create such an incident and have a basis for filing criminal
charges against the petitioners in the fiscal's office and applying for injunction from the court of first
instance. Besides, under the circumstances the picketers were not legally bound to yield their
grounds and withdraw from the picket lines. Being where the law expects them to be in the legitimate
exercise of their rights, they had every reason to defend themselves and their rights from any assault
or unlawful transgression. Yet the police blotter, about adverted to, attests that they did not resort to
violence.

The heated altercations and occasional blows exchanged on the picket line do not affect or diminish
the right to strike. Persuasive on this point is the following commentary: .
 We think it must be conceded that some disorder is unfortunately quite usual in any
extensive or long drawn out strike. A strike is essentially a battle waged with
economic weapons. Engaged in it are human beings whose feelings are stirred to the
depths. Rising passions call forth hot words. Hot words lead to blows on the picket
line. The transformation from economic to physical combat by those engaged in the
contest is difficult to prevent even when cool heads direct the fight. Violence of this
nature, however much it is to be regretted, must have been in the contemplation of
the Congress when it provided in Sec. 13 of Act 29 USCA Sec. 163, that nothing
therein should be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way
the right to strike. If this were not so, the rights afforded to employees by the Act
would indeed be illusory. We accordingly recently held that it was not intended by the
Act that minor disorders of this nature would deprive a striker of the possibility of
reinstatement. (Republic Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 107 F2d 472, cited in Mathews,
Labor Relations and the Law, p. 378)

Hence the incident that occurred between Ner, et al. and Ramon Garcia was but a necessary
incident of the strike and should not be considered as a bar to reinstatement. Thus it has been held
that:

Fist-fighting between union and non-union employees in the midst of a strike is no bar to
reinstatement. (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Vol. II, p. 855 citing Stackpole
Carbon, Co. 6 NLRB 171, enforced 105 F2d 167.)

Furthermore, assuming that the acts committed by the strikers were transgressions of law, they
amount only to mere ordinary misdemeanors and are not a bar to reinstatement.

In cases involving misdemeanors the board has generally held that unlawful acts are not bar to
reinstatement. (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Id., p. 854, citing Ford Motor
Company, 23 NLRB No. 28.)

Finally, it is not disputed that despite the pendency of criminal charges against non-striking
employees before the fiscal's office, they were readily admitted, but those strikers who had pending
charges in the same office were refused readmission. The reinstatement of the strikers is thus in
order.

[W]here the misconduct, whether in reinstating persons equally guilty with those
whose reinstatement is opposed, or in other ways, gives rise to the inference that
union activities rather than misconduct is the basis of his [employer] objection, the
Board has usually required reinstatement." (Teller, supra, p. 853, citing the Third
Annual Report of NLRB [1938], p. 211.)

Lastly, the lower Court justified the constructive dismissal of Florencio Ibarra allegedly because he
committed acts inimical to the interest of the respondents when, as president of the FGU Workers
and Employees Association-NATU, he advised the strikers that they could use force and violence to
have a successful picket and that picketing was precisely intended to prevent the non-strikers and
company clients and customers from entering the Companies' buildings. Even if this were true, the
record discloses that the picket line had been generally peaceful, and that incidents happened only
when management men made incursions into and tried to break the picket line. At any rate, with or
without the advice of Ibarra, picketing is inherently explosive. For, as pointed out by one author, "The
picket line is an explosive front, charged with the emotions and fierce loyalties of the union-
management dispute. It may be marked by colorful name-calling, intimidating threats or sporadic
fights between the pickets and those who pass the line." (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p.
752). The picket line being the natural result of the respondents' unfair labor practice, Ibarra's
misconduct is at most a misdemeanor which is not a bar to reinstatement. Besides, the only
evidence presented by the Companies regarding Ibarra's participation in the strike was the testimony
of one Rodolfo Encarnacion, a former member of the board of directors of the petitioner FGU
Insurance Group Workers and Employees Union-NATU, who became a "turncoat" and who likewise
testified as to the union activities of Atty. Lacsina, Ricardo Villaruel and others (annex C, Decision, p.
27) — another matter which emphasizes the respondents' unfair labor practice. For under the
circumstances, there is good ground to believe that Encarnacion was made to spy on the actvities of
the union members. This act of the respondents is considered unjustifiable interference in the union
activities of the petitioners and is unfair labor practice.

It has been held in a great number of decisions at espionage by an employer of

union activities, or surveillance thereof, are such instances of interference, restraint
or coercion of employees in connection with their right to organize, form and join
unions as to constitute unfair labor practice.

... "Nothing is more calculated to interfere with, restrain and coerce employees in the
exercise of their right to self-organization than such activity even where no
discharges result. The information obtained by means of espionage is in valuable to
the employer and can be used in a variety of cases to break a union." The unfair
labor practice is committed whether the espionage is carried on by a professional
labor spy or detective, by officials or supervisory employees of the employer, or by
fellow employees acting at the request or direction of the employer, or an ex-
employee..." (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Vol. II, pp. 765-766,
and cases cited.) .

IV. The lower court should have ordered the reinstatement of the officials and members of the
Unions, with full back wages from June 2, 1958 to the date of their actual reinstatement to their usual
employment. Because all too clear from the factual and environmental milieu of this case, coupled
with settled decisional law, is that the Unions went on strike because of the unfair labor practices
committed by the respondents, and that when the strikers reported back for work — upon the
invitation of the respondents — they were discriminatorily dismissed. The members and officials of
the Unions therefore are entitled to reinstatement with back pay.

[W]here the strike was induced and provoked by improper conduct on the part of an
employer amounting to an 'unfair labor practice,' the strikers are entitled to
reinstatement with back pay. (Rothenberg on Labor Relations, p. 418.)

[A]n employee who has been dismissed in violation of the provisions of the Act is
entitled to reinstatement with back pay upon an adjudication that the discharge was
illegal." (Id., citing Waterman S. S. Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 119 F2d 760; N. L. R. B. v.
Richter's Bakery, 140 F2d 870; N. L. R. B. v. Southern Wood Preserving Co., 135 F.
2d 606; C. G. Conn, Ltd. v. N. L. R. B., 108 F2d 390; N. L. R. B. v. American Mfg.
Co., 106 F2d 61; N. L. R. B. v. Kentucky Fire Brick Co., 99 F2d 99.)

And it is not a defense to reinstatement for the respondents to allege that the positions of these
union members have already been filled by replacements.

[W]here the employers' "unfair labor practice" caused or contributed to the strike or
where the 'lock-out' by the employer constitutes an "unfair labor practice," the
employer cannot successfully urge as a defense that the striking or lock-out
employees position has been filled by replacement. Under such circumstances, if no
 job sufficiently and satisfactorily comparable to that previously held by the aggrieved
employee can be found, the employer must discharge the replacement employee, if
necessary, to restore the striking or locked-out worker to his old or comparable
position ... If the employer's improper conduct was an initial cause of the strike, all
the strikers are entitled to reinstatement and the dismissal of replacement employees
wherever necessary; ... . (Id., p. 422 and cases cited.)

A corollary issue to which we now address ourselves is, from what date should the backpay payable
to the unionists be computed? It is now a settled doctrine that strikers who are entitled to
reinstatement are not entitled to back pay during the period of the strike, even though it is caused by
an unfair labor practice. However, if they offer to return to work under the same conditions just
before the strike, the refusal to re-employ or the imposition of conditions amounting to unfair labor
practice is a violation of section 4(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act and the employer is liable for
backpay from the date of the offer (Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union vs. Court
of Industrial Relations, L-19778, Decision, Sept. 30, 1964, 12 SCRA 124; Id., Resolution on motion
for reconsideration, 13 SCRA 258; see also Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 730 and the
cited cases). We have likewise ruled that discriminatorily dismissed employees must receive
backpay from the date of the act of discrimination, that is, from the date of their discharge (Cromwell
Commercial Employees and Laborers Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, supra).

The respondents notified the petitioner strikers to report back for work on June 2, 1958, which the
latter did. A great number of them, however, were refused readmission because they had criminal
charges against them pending before the fiscal's office, although non-strikers who were also facing
criminal indictments were readily readmitted. These strikers who were refused readmission on June
2, 1958 can thus be categorized as discriminatorily dismissed employees and are entitled to
backpay from said date. This is true even with respect to the petitioners Jose Pilapil, Paulino Bugay,
Jr. and Jose Garcia, Jr. who were found guilty only of misdemeanors which are not considered
sufficient to bar reinstatement (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, p. 854), especially
so because their unlawful acts arose during incidents which were provoked by the respondents'
men. However, since the employees who were denied readmission have been out of the service of
the Companies (for more than ten years) during which they may have found other employment or
other means of livelihood, it is only just and equitable that whatever they may have earned during
that period should be deducted from their back wages to mitigate somewhat the liability of the
company, pursuant to the equitable principle that no one is allowed to enrich himself at the expense
of another (Macleod & Co. of the Philippines v. Progressive Federation of Labor, 97 Phil. 205
[1955]).

The lower court gave inordinate significance to the payment to and acceptance by the dismissed
employees of separation pay. This Court has ruled that while employers may be authorized under
Republic Act 1052 to terminate employment of employees by serving the required notice, or, in the
absence thereof, by paying the required compensation, the said Act may not be invoked to justify a
dismissal prohibited by law, e.g., dismissal for union activities.

... While Republic Act No. 1052 authorizes a commercial establishment to terminate
the employment of its employee by serving notice on him one month in advance, or,
in the absence thereof, by paying him one month compensation from the date of the
termination of his employment, such Act does not give to the employer a blanket
authority to terminate the employment regardless of the cause or purpose behind
such termination. Certainly, it cannot be made use of as a cloak to circumvent a final
order of the court or a scheme to trample upon the right of an employee who has
been the victim of an unfair labor practice. (Yu Ki Lam, et al. v. Nena Micaller, et al.,
99 Phil. 904 [1956].)
Finally, we do not share the respondents' view that the findings of fact of the Court of Industrial
Relations are supported by substantial and credible proof. This Court is not therefore precluded from
digging deeper into the factual milieu of the case (Union of Philippine Education Employees v.
Philippine Education Company, 91 Phil. 93; Lu Do & Lu Ym Corporation v. Philippine-Land-Air-Sea
Labor Union, 11 SCRA 134 [1964]).

V. The petitioners (15 of them) ask this Court to cite for contempt the respondent Presiding Judge
Arsenio Martinez of the Court of Industrial Relations and the counsels for the private respondents,
on the ground that the former wrote the following in his decision subject of the instant petition
for certiorari, while the latter quoted the same on pages 90-91 of the respondents' brief: .

... Says the Supreme Court in the following decisions:

In a proceeding for unfair labor practice, involving a determination as

to whether or not the acts of the employees concerned justified the
adoption of the employer of disciplinary measures against them, the
mere fact that the employees may be able to put up a valid defense in
a criminal prosecution for the same acts, does not erase or neutralize
the employer's right to impose discipline on said employees. For it is
settled that not even the acquittal of an employee of the criminal
charge against him is a bar to the employer's right to impose
discipline on its employees, should the act upon which the criminal
charged was based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the
employer's interest... The act of the employees now under
consideration may be considered as a misconduct which is a just
cause for dismissal. (Lopez, Sr., et al. vs. Chronicle Publication
Employees Ass'n. et al., G.R. No. L-20179-81, December 28, 1964.)
(emphasis supplied)

The two pertinent paragraphs in the above-cited decision * which contained the underscored
portions of the above citation read however as follows:

Differently as regard the dismissal of Orlando Aquino and Carmelito Vicente, we are
inclined to uphold the action taken by the employer as proper disciplinary measure. A
reading of the article which allegedly caused their dismissal reveals that it really
contains an insinuation albeit subtly of the supposed exertion of political pressure by
the Manila Chronicle management upon the City Fiscal's Office, resulting in the non-
filing of the case against the employer. In rejecting the employer's theory that the
dismissal of Vicente and Aquino was justified, the lower court considered the article
as "a report of some acts and omissions of an Assistant Fiscal in the exercise of his
official functions" and, therefore, does away with the presumption of malice. This
being a proceeding for unfair labor practice, the matter should not have been viewed
or gauged in the light of the doctrine on a publisher's culpability under the Penal
Code. We are not here to determine whether the employees' act could stand criminal
prosecution, but only to find out whether the aforesaid act justifies the adoption by
the employer of disciplinary measure against them. This is not sustaining the ruling
that the publication in question is qualified privileged, but even on the assumption
that this is so, the exempting character thereof under the Penal Code does not
necessarily erase or neutralize its effect on the employer's interest which may
warrant employment of disciplinary measure. For it must be remembered that not
even the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges against him, is a bar to the
employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon which the
 criminal charges was based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the
employer's interest.

In the herein case, it appears to us that for an employee to publish his "suspicion,"
which actually amounts to a public accusation, that his employer is exerting political
pressure on a public official to thwart some legitimate activities on the employees,
which charge, in the least, would sully the employer's reputation, can be nothing but
an act inimical to the said employer's interest. And the fact that the same was made
in the union newspaper does not alter its deleterious character nor shield or protect a
reprehensible act on the ground that it is a union activity, because such end can be
achieved without resort to improper conduct or behavior. The act of the employees
now under consideration may be considered as a misconduct which is a just cause
for dismissal.** (Emphasis ours)

It is plain to the naked eye that the 60 un-underscored words of the paragraph quoted by the
respondent Judge do not appear in the pertinent paragraph of this Court's decision in L-20179-81.
Moreover, the first underscored sentence in the quoted paragraph starts with "For it is settled ..."
whereas it reads, "For it must be remembered ...," in this Court's decision. Finally, the second and
last underlined sentence in the quoted paragraph of the respondent Judge's decision, appears not in
the same paragraph of this Court's decision where the other sentence is, but in the immediately
succeeding paragraph.

This apparent error, however, does not seem to warrant an indictment for contempt against the
respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels. We are inclined to believe that the misquotation is
more a result of clerical ineptitude than a deliberate attempt on the part of the respondent Judge to
mislead. We fully realize how saddled with many pending cases are the courts of the land, and it is
not difficult to imagine that because of the pressure of their varied and multifarious work, clerical
errors may escape their notice. Upon the other hand, the respondents' counsels have the prima
facie right to rely on the quotation as it appears in the respondent Judge's decision, to copy it
verbatim, and to incorporate it in their brief. Anyway, the import of the underscored sentences of the
quotation in the respondent Judge's decision is substantially the same as, and faithfully reflects, the
particular ruling in this Court's decision, i.e., that "[N]ot even the acquittal of an employee, of the
criminal charges against him, is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees,
should the act upon which the criminal charges were based constitute nevertheless an activity
inimical to the employer's interest."

Be that as it may, we must articulate our firm view that in citing this Court's decisions and rulings, it is
the bounden duty of courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and
punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. Indeed, there is a salient and salutary reason why they
should do this. Only from this Tribunal's decisions and rulings do all other courts, as well as lawyers
and litigants, take their bearings. This is because the decisions referred to in article 8 of the Civil
Code which reads, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form
a part of the legal system of the Philippines," are only those enunciated by this Court of last resort.
We said in no uncertain terms in Miranda, et al. vs. Imperial, et al. (77 Phil. 1066) that "[O]nly the
decisions of this Honorable Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction." Thus, ever
present is the danger that if not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of this Court
may lose their proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public
who may thereby be misled. But if inferior courts and members of the bar meticulously discharge
their duty to check and recheck their citations of authorities culled not only from this Court's
decisions but from other sources and make certain that they are verbatim reproductions down to the
last word and punctuation mark, appellate courts will be precluded from acting on misinformation, as
well as be saved precious time in finding out whether the citations are correct.
Happily for the respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels, there was no substantial change in
the thrust of this Court's particular ruling which they cited. It is our view, nonetheless, that for their
mistake, they should be, as they are hereby, admonished to be more careful when citing
jurisprudence in the future. ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations dated
August 17, 1965 is reversed and set aside, and another is entered, ordering the respondents to
reinstate the dismissed members of the petitioning Unions to their former or comparatively similar
positions, with backwages from June 2, 1958 up to the dates of their actual reinstatements. Costs
against the respondents.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and
Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., took no part.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 174813-15 March 17, 2009
NILO HIPOS, SR. REPRESENTING DARRYL HIPOS, BENJAMIN CORSIÑO REPRESENTING
JAYCEE CORSIÑO, and ERLINDA VILLARUEL REPRESENTING ARTHUR
VILLARUEL, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RTC JUDGE TEODORO A. BAY, Presiding Judge, RTC, Hall of Justice, Quezon
City, Branch 86, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking a reversal of the Order
dated 2 October 2006 of respondent Judge Teodoro A. Bay of Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, which denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City.
The facts of the case are as follows.
On 15 December 2003, two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the crime of
acts of lasciviousness were filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos, Jaycee Corsiño, Arthur Villaruel
and two others before Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, acting as a Family
Court, presided by respondent Judge Bay. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. Q-03-
123284, No. Q-03-123285 and No. Q-03-123286. The Informations were signed by Assistant City
Prosecutor Ronald C. Torralba.
On 23 February 2004, private complainants AAA and BBB filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking
1

Judge Bay to order the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to study if the proper Informations had been
filed against petitioners and their co-accused. Judge Bay granted the Motion and ordered a
reinvestigation of the cases.
On 19 May 2004, petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s] before the City
Prosecutor. They claimed that there was no probable cause to hold them liable for the crimes
charged.
On 10 August 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution on the reinvestigation
affirming the Informations filed against petitioners and their co-accused in Criminal Cases No. Q-03-
123284-86. The Resolution was signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Raniel S. Cruz and approved
by City Prosecutor Claro A. Arellano.
On 3 March 2006, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, treating the Joint
Memorandum to Dismiss the Case as an appeal of the 10 August 2004 Resolution, reversed the
Resolution dated 10 August 2004, holding that there was lack of probable cause. On the same date,
the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay.
On 2 October 2006, Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations in an Order of even
date.
Without moving for a reconsideration of the above assailed Order, petitioners filed the present
Petition for Mandamus, bringing forth this lone issue for our consideration:
CAN THE HON. SUPREME COURT COMPEL RESPONDENT JUDGE BAY TO DISMISS THE
CASE THROUGH A WRIT OF MANDAMUS BY VIRTUE OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE OFFICE
OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY FINDING NO PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST
THE ACCUSED AND SUBSEQUENTLY FILING A MOTION TO WITHDRAW INFORMATION? 2

Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,

immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when the respondent
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station; or when the respondent excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which the latter is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 3

As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion
by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to
any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not
that of the court. 4

In the case at bar, the act which petitioners pray that we compel the trial court to do is to grant the
Office of the City Prosecutor’s Motion for Withdrawal of Informations against petitioners. In effect,
petitioners seek to curb Judge Bay’s exercise of judicial discretion.
There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are beyond
the reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action in those matters,
when refused. However, mandamus is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or
5

discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of
either. In other words, while a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Informations can be
6

compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to
grant or deny such Motion. In the case at bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to
Withdraw Informations; he had already acted on it by denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is
not available anymore. If petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of discretion in
the issuance of such Order denying the Motion to Withdraw Informations, the proper remedy of
petitioners should have been to file a Petition for Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge Bay.
Petitioners counter that the above conclusion, which has been argued by the Solicitor General, is
contrary to a ruling of this Court, which allegedly states that the proper remedy in such cases is a
Petition for Mandamus and not Certiorari. Petitioners cite the following excerpt from our ruling in
Sanchez v. Demetriou : 7

The appreciation of the evidence involves the use of discretion on the part of the prosecutor, and we
do not find in the case at bar a clear showing by the petitioner of a grave abuse of such discretion.
The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified by the Secretary of Justice or in special
cases by the President of the Philippines. But even this Court cannot order the prosecution of a
person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima
facie case. The courts try and absolve or convict the accused but as a rule have no part in the initial
decision to prosecute him.
The possible exception is where there is an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion that
will justify a judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive. But in such a case the proper
remedy to call for such exception is a petition for mandamus, not certiorari or
prohibition. (Emphases supplied.)
8

Petitioners have taken the above passage way out of its context. In the case of Sanchez, Calauan
Mayor Antonio Sanchez brought a Petition for Certiorari before this Court, challenging the order of
the respondent Judge therein denying his motion to quash the Information filed against him and six
other persons for alleged rape and homicide. One of the arguments of Mayor Sanchez was that
there was discrimination against him because of the non-inclusion of two other persons in the
Information. We held that even this Court cannot order the prosecution of a person against whom
the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case. However, if
there was an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors in
that case, Mayor Sanchez should have filed a Petition for Mandamus to compel the filing of charges
against said two other persons.
In the case at bar, the Petition for Mandamus is directed not against the prosecution, but against the
trial court, seeking to compel the trial court to grant the Motion to Withdraw Informations by the City
Prosecutor’s Office. The prosecution has already filed a case against petitioners. Recently, in Santos
v. Orda, Jr., we reiterated the doctrine we established in the leading case of Crespo v. Mogul, that
9 10

once a criminal complaint or an information is filed in court, any disposition or dismissal of the case
or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of
the trial court. Thus, we held:
In Crespo v. Mogul, the Court held that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any
disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the
exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court. The trial court is the best and
sole judge on what to do with the case before it. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the public
prosecutor should be addressed to the court who has the option to grant or deny the same. Contrary
to the contention of the petitioner, the rule applies to a motion to withdraw the Information or to
dismiss the case even before or after arraignment of the accused. The only qualification is that the
action of the court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People or
the private complainant to due process of law. When the trial court grants a motion of the public
prosecutor to dismiss the case, or to quash the Information, or to withdraw the Information in
compliance with the directive of the Secretary of Justice, or to deny the said motion, it does so not
out of subservience to or defiance of the directive of the Secretary of Justice but in sound exercise of
its judicial prerogative.
Petitioners also claim that since Judge Bay granted a Motion for Reinvestigation, he should have
"deferred to the Resolution of Asst. City Prosecutor De Vera withdrawing the case." Petitioners cite
11

the following portion of our Decision in People v. Montesa, Jr. :

12

In the instant case, the respondent Judge granted the motion for reinvestigation and directed the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to conduct the reinvestigation. The former was,
therefore, deemed to have deferred to the authority of the prosecution arm of the Government to
consider the so-called new relevant and material evidence and determine whether the information it
had filed should stand.13

Like what was done to our ruling in Sanchez, petitioners took specific statements from our Decision,
carefully cutting off the portions which would expose the real import of our pronouncements. The
Petition for Certiorari in Montesa, Jr. was directed against a judge who, after granting the Petition for
Reinvestigation filed by the accused, proceeded nonetheless to arraign the accused; and, shortly
thereafter, the judge decided to dismiss the case on the basis of a Resolution of the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor recommending the dismissal of the case. The dismissal of the case in
Montesa, Jr. was done despite the disapproval of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor’s Resolution by
the Provincial Prosecutor (annotated in the same Resolution), and despite the fact that the
reinvestigation the latter ordered was still ongoing, since the Resolution of the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor had not yet attained finality. We held that the judge should have waited for the conclusion
of the Petition for Reinvestigation he ordered, before acting on whether or not the case should be
dismissed for lack of probable cause, and before proceeding with the arraignment. Thus, the
continuation of the above paragraph of our Decision in Montesa, Jr. reads:
Having done so, it behooved the respondent Judge to wait for a final resolution of the incident. In
Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled:
Accordingly, we rule that the trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an accused's
motion for review of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for reinvestigation and defers
the arraignment until resolution of the said motion must act on the resolution reversing the
investigating prosecutor's finding or on a motion to dismiss based thereon only upon proof that such
resolution is already final in that no appeal was taken thereon to the Department of Justice.
The resolution of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rutor recommending the dismissal of the case
never became final, for it was not approved by the Provincial Prosecutor. On the contrary, the latter
disapproved it. As a consequence, the final resolution with respect to the reinvestigation is that of the
Provincial Prosecutor, for under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, no complaint or
information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating fiscal without the prior written authority or
approval of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor. Also, under Section l(d) of R.A. No.
5180, as amended by P.D. No. 77 and P.D. No. 911. 14

As can be clearly seen, the statement quoted by petitioners from Montesa, Jr. is not meant to
establish a doctrine that the judge should just follow the determination by the prosecutor of whether
or not there is probable cause. On the contrary, Montesa, Jr. states:
The rule is settled that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition
thereof, such as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound
discretion of the court. While the prosecutor retains the discretion and control of the prosecution of
the case, he cannot impose his opinion on the court. The court is the best and sole judge on what to
do with the case. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss the case filed by the prosecutor before or after the
arraignment, or after a reinvestigation, or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed
the records upon reinvestigation, should be addressed to the discretion of the court. The action of
the court must not, however, impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to
due process of law. 15

In a seemingly desperate attempt on the part of petitioners’ counsel, he tries to convince us that a
judge is allowed to deny a Motion to Withdraw Informations from the prosecution only when there is
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors moving for such withdrawal; and that, where
there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors, the denial of the Motion to
Withdraw Informations is void. Petitioners’ counsel states in the Memorandum:
6.10. Furthermore, the ORDER dated October 2, 2006 of the Respondent Judge BAY consisting of 9
pages which was attached to the URGENT PETITION did not point out any iota of grave abuse of
discretion committed by Asst. City Prosecutor De Vera in issuing his Resolution in favor of the sons
of the Petitioners. Hence, the ORDER issued by RJBAY is NULL and VOID in view of the recent
ruling of the Hon. Supreme Court in Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113216, September 5,
1997, 86 SCAD 695, 278 SCRA 657 which states that:
"In the absence of a finding of grave abuse of discretion, the court’s bare denial of a motion to
withdraw information pursuant to the Secretary’s resolution is void." (Underscoring ours).
6.11. It is therefore respectfully submitted that the Hon. Supreme Court disregard the argument of
the OSG because of its falsity. 16

This statement of petitioners’ counsel is utterly misleading. There is no such statement in our
Decision in Ledesma. The excerpt from Ledesma, which appears to have a resemblance to the
17

statement allegedly quoted from said case, provides:

No Grave Abuse of Discretion in the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice
In the light of recent holdings in Marcelo and Martinez; and considering that the issue of the
correctness of the justice secretary's resolution has been amply threshed out in petitioner's letter, the
information, the resolution of the secretary of justice, the motion to dismiss, and even the exhaustive
discussion in the motion for reconsideration - all of which were submitted to the court - the trial judge
committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to withdraw the information, based
solely on his bare and ambiguous reliance on Crespo. The trial court's order is inconsistent with our
repetitive calls for an independent and competent assessment of the issue(s) presented in the
motion to dismiss. The trial judge was tasked to evaluate the secretary's recommendation finding the
absence of probable cause to hold petitioner criminally liable for libel. He failed to do so. He merely
ruled to proceed with the trial without stating his reasons for disregarding the secretary's
recommendation. (Emphasis supplied.)
18

It very much appears that the counsel of petitioners is purposely misleading this Court, in violation of
Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
Rule 10.02 – A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the
language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly
cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repel or amendment, or assert as a fact that
which has not been proved.
Counsel’s use of block quotation and quotation marks signifies that he intends to make it appear that
the passages are the exact words of the Court. Furthermore, putting the words "Underscoring ours"
after the text implies that, except for the underscoring, the text is a faithful reproduction of the
original. Accordingly, we are ordering Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. to show cause why he should not
be disciplined as a member of the Bar.
To clarify, we never stated in Ledesma that a judge is allowed to deny a Motion to Withdraw
Information from the prosecution only when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
prosecutors moving for such withdrawal. Neither did we rule therein that where there is no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors, the denial of the Motion to Withdraw Information is
void. What we held therein is that a trial judge commits grave abuse of discretion if he denies a
Motion to Withdraw Information without an independent and complete assessment of the issues
presented in such Motion. Thus, the opening paragraph of Ledesma states:
When confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on the ground of lack of probable cause
based on a resolution of the secretary of justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an
independent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case,
the trial court is not bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding further
with the trial. While the secretary's ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. A trial court,
however, commits reversible error or even grave abuse of discretion if it refuses/neglects to evaluate
such recommendation and simply insists on proceeding with the trial on the mere pretext of having
already acquired jurisdiction over the criminal action. (Emphases supplied.)
19
1avvphi1.zw+

Petitioners also try to capitalize on the fact that the dispositive portion of the assailed Order
apparently states that there was no probable cause against petitioners:
WHEREFORE, finding no probable cause against the herein accused for the crimes of rapes and
acts of lasciviousness, the motion to withdraw informations is DENIED.
Let the case be set for arraignment and pre-trial on October 24, 2006 at 8:30 o’clock in the
morning. (Underscoring ours.)
20

Thus, petitioners claim that since even the respondent judge himself found no probable cause
against them, the Motion to Withdraw Informations by the Office of the City Prosecutor should be
granted.21

Even a cursory reading of the assailed Order, however, clearly shows that the insertion of the word
"no" in the above dispositive portion was a mere clerical error. The assailed Order states in full:
After a careful study of the sworn statements of the complainants and the resolution dated March 3,
2006 of 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, the Court finds that there was probable
cause against the herein accused. The actuations of the complainants after the alleged rapes and
acts of lasciviousness cannot be the basis of dismissal or withdrawal of the herein cases. Failure to
shout or offer tenatious resistance did not make voluntary the complainants’ submission to the
criminal acts of the accused (People v. Velasquez, 377 SCRA 214, 2002). The complainants’
affidavits indicate that the accused helped one another in committing the acts complained of.
Considering that the attackers were not strangers but their trusted classmates who enticed them to
go to the house where they were molested, the complainants cannot be expected to react forcefully
or violently in protecting themselves from the unexpected turn of events. Considering also that both
complainants were fifteen (15) years of age and considered children under our laws, the ruling of the
Supreme Court in People v. Malones, G.R. Nos. 124388-90, March 11, 2004 becomes very relevant.
The Supreme Court ruled as follows:
Rape victims, especially child victims, should not be expected to act the way mature individuals
would when placed in such a situation. It is not proper to judge the actions of children who have
undergone traumatic experience by the norms of behavior expected from adults under similar
circumstances. The range of emotions shown by rape victim is yet to be captured even by calculus.
It is, thus, unrealistic to expect uniform reactions from rape victims (People v. Malones, G.R. Nos.
124388-90, March 11, 2004).
The Court finds no need to discuss in detail the alleged actuations of the complainants after the
alleged rapes and acts of lasciviousness. The alleged actuations are evidentiary in nature and
should be evaluated after full blown trial on the merits. This is necessary to avoid a suspicion of
prejudgment against the accused. 22

As can be seen, the body of the assailed Order not only plainly stated that the court found probable
cause against the petitioners, but likewise provided an adequate discussion of the reasons for such
finding. Indeed, the general rule is that where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or
the fallo and the body of the decision, the fallo controls. However, where the inevitable conclusion
from the body of the decision is so clear as to show that there was a mistake in the dispositive
portion, the body of the decision will prevail.
23

In sum, petitioners’ resort to a Petition for Mandamus to compel the trial judge to grant their Motion
to Withdraw Informations is improper. While mandamus is available to compel action on matters
involving judgment and discretion when refused, it is never available to direct the exercise of
judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in
the exercise of either. The trial court, when confronted with a Motion to Withdraw an Information on
24

the ground of lack of probable cause, is not bound by the resolution of the prosecuting arm of the
government, but is required to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion, a
requirement satisfied by the respondent judge in the case at bar. 25

Finally, if only to appease petitioners who came to this Court seeking a review of the finding of
probable cause by the trial court, we nevertheless carefully reviewed the records of the case. After
going through the same, we find that we are in agreement with the trial court that there is indeed
probable cause against the petitioners sufficient to hold them for trial. We decided to omit a detailed
discussion of the merits of the case, as we are not unmindful of the undue influence that might result
should this Court do so, even if such discussion is only intended to focus on the finding of probable
cause.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Mandamus is DISMISSED. Let the records of this case be
remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the resumption of the proceedings therein.
The Regional Trial Court is directed to act on the case with dispatch.
Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. is ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be disciplined as a
member of the Bar for his disquieting conduct as herein discussed.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO* ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
 EN BANC
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC March 8, 2011
RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT
BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE
ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37 respondent law professors in
1

response to the Resolution dated October 19, 2010 (the Show Cause Resolution), directing them to
show cause why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of specific
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerated therein.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the Show Cause Resolution clearly dockets this as an
administrative matter, not a special civil action for indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, contrary to the dissenting opinion of Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Justice
Sereno) to the said October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution. Neither is this a disciplinary
proceeding grounded on an allegedly irregularly concluded finding of indirect contempt as intimated
by Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales (Justice Morales) in her dissenting opinions to both
the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution and the present decision.
With the nature of this case as purely a bar disciplinary proceeding firmly in mind, the Court finds
that with the exception of one respondent whose compliance was adequate and another who
manifested he was not a member of the Philippine Bar, the submitted explanations, being mere
denials and/or tangential to the issues at hand, are decidedly unsatisfactory. The proffered defenses
even more urgently behoove this Court to call the attention of respondent law professors, who are
members of the Bar, to the relationship of their duties as such under the Code of Professional
Responsibility to their civil rights as citizens and academics in our free and democratic republic.
The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved in this case are as follows:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and legal processes.

RULE 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of
paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal
or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them
to defeat the ends of justice.

CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper
authorities only.

CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety
which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.
Established jurisprudence will undeniably support our view that when lawyers speak their minds,
they must ever be mindful of their sworn oath to observe ethical standards of their profession, and in
particular, avoid foul and abusive language to condemn the Supreme Court, or any court for that
matter, for a decision it has rendered, especially during the pendency of a motion for such decision’s
reconsideration. The accusation of plagiarism against a member of this Court is not the real issue
here but rather this plagiarism issue has been used to deflect everyone’s attention from the actual
concern of this Court to determine by respondents’ explanations whether or not respondent
members of the Bar have crossed the line of decency and acceptable professional conduct and
speech and violated the Rules of Court through improper intervention or interference as third parties
to a pending case. Preliminarily, it should be stressed that it was respondents themselves who called
upon the Supreme Court to act on their Statement, which they formally submitted, through Dean
2

Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Dean Leonen), for the Court’s proper disposition. Considering the defenses
of freedom of speech and academic freedom invoked by the respondents, it is worth discussing here
that the legal reasoning used in the past by this Court to rule that freedom of expression is not a
defense in administrative cases against lawyers for using intemperate speech in open court or in
court submissions can similarly be applied to respondents’ invocation of academic freedom. Indeed,
it is precisely because respondents are not merely lawyers but lawyers who teach law and mould the
minds of young aspiring attorneys that respondents’ own non-observance of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, even if purportedly motivated by the purest of intentions, cannot be
ignored nor glossed over by this Court.
To fully appreciate the grave repercussions of respondents’ actuations, it is apropos to revisit the
factual antecedents of this case.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
Antecedent Facts and Proceedings
On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo) in
Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) was promulgated. On May 31, 2010, the
counsel for Vinuya, et al. (the "Malaya Lolas"), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Vinuya
3

decision, raising solely the following grounds:

I. Our own constitutional and jurisprudential histories reject this Honorable Courts’ (sic)
assertion that the Executive’s foreign policy prerogatives are virtually unlimited; precisely,
under the relevant jurisprudence and constitutional provisions, such prerogatives are
proscribed by international human rights and humanitarian standards, including those
provided for in the relevant international conventions of which the Philippines is a party. 4

II. This Honorable Court has confused diplomatic protection with the broader, if fundamental,
responsibility of states to protect the human rights of its citizens – especially where the rights
asserted are subject of erga omnes obligations and pertain to jus cogens norms. 5

On July 19, 2010, counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque) and
6

Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in G.R.
No. 162230, where they posited for the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds for
reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. Among other arguments, Attys. Roque and Bagares asserted
that:
I.
IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR THIS HONORABLE COURT’S JUDGMENT
OF APRIL 28, 2010 TO PLAGIARIZE AT LEAST THREE SOURCES – AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED
IN 2009 IN THE YALE LAW JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, A BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2005 AND AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2006 IN THE
CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW – AND MAKE IT APPEAR
THAT THESE SOURCES SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT’S ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSING THE
INSTANT PETITION WHEN IN TRUTH, THE PLAGIARIZED SOURCES EVEN MAKE A STRONG
CASE FOR THE PETITION’S CLAIMS. 7
They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact not only of extensive
plagiarism but of (sic) also of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized sources by the ponencia to
suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment for denying the Petition." 8

According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works allegedly plagiarized in the Vinuya decision were
namely: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s article "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens;" (2)9

Christian J. Tams’ book Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law; and (3) Mark Ellis’
10

article "Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime." 11

On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on July 19, 2010,
journalists Aries C. Rufo and Purple S. Romero posted an article, entitled "SC justice plagiarized
parts of ruling on comfort women," on the Newsbreak website. The same article appeared on the
12

GMA News TV website also on July 19, 2010. 13

On July 22, 2010, Atty. Roque’s column, entitled "Plagiarized and Twisted," appeared in the Manila
Standard Today. In the said column, Atty. Roque claimed that Prof. Evan Criddle, one of the
14

authors purportedly not properly acknowledged in the Vinuya decision, confirmed that his work, co-
authored with Prof. Evan Fox-Decent, had been plagiarized. Atty. Roque quoted Prof. Criddle’s
response to the post by Julian Ku regarding the news report on the alleged plagiarism in the
15

international law blog, Opinio Juris. Prof. Criddle responded to Ku’s blog entry in this wise:
The newspaper’s [plagiarism] claims are based on a motion for reconsideration filed yesterday with
16

the Philippine Supreme Court yesterday. The motion is available here:

http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging-plagiarism-in-the-supreme-court/
The motion suggests that the Court’s decision contains thirty-four sentences and citations that are
identical to sentences and citations in my 2009 YJIL article (co-authored with Evan Fox-Decent).
Professor Fox-Decent and I were unaware of the petitioners’ [plagiarism] allegations until after the
motion was filed today.
Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the court’s jus cogens discussion is that it implies
that the prohibitions against crimes against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture are not jus cogens
norms. Our article emphatically asserts the opposite. The Supreme Court’s decision is available
here: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/162230.htm 17

On even date, July 22, 2010, Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues on the Court in reply to the
charge of plagiarism contained in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. 18

In a letter dated July 23, 2010, another purportedly plagiarized author in the Vinuya decision, Dr.
Mark Ellis, wrote the Court, to wit:
Your Honours:
I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come to my attention in the last few days.
Much as I regret to raise this matter before your esteemed Court, I am compelled, as a question of
the integrity of my work as an academic and as an advocate of human rights and humanitarian law,
to take exception to the possible unauthorized use of my law review article on rape as an
international crime in your esteemed Court’s Judgment in the case of Vinuya et al. v. Executive
Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230, Judgment of 28 April 2010).
My attention was called to the Judgment and the issue of possible plagiarism by the Philippine
chapter of the Southeast Asia Media Legal Defence Initiative (SEAMLDI), an affiliate of the London-
19

based Media Legal Defence Initiative (MLDI), where I sit as trustee.

In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the extensive discussion in footnote 65, pp. 27-28,
of the said Judgment of your esteemed Court. I am also concerned that your esteemed Court may
have misread the arguments I made in the article and employed them for cross purposes. This
would be ironic since the article was written precisely to argue for the appropriate legal remedy for
victims of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.
I believe a full copy of my article as published in the Case Western Reserve Journal of International
Law in 2006 has been made available to your esteemed Court. I trust that your esteemed Court will
take the time to carefully study the arguments I made in the article.
I would appreciate receiving a response from your esteemed Court as to the issues raised by this
letter.
With respect,
(Sgd.)
Dr. Mark Ellis
20

In Memorandum Order No. 35-2010 issued on July 27, 2010, the Court formed the Committee on
Ethics and Ethical Standards (the Ethics Committee) pursuant to Section 13, Rule 2 of the Internal
Rules of the Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution also dated July 27, 2010, the Court referred
the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo to the Ethics Committee. The matter was subsequently
docketed as A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
On August 2, 2010, the Ethics Committee required Attys. Roque and Bagares to comment on the
letter of Justice Del Castillo.
21

On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" (the Statement), was posted in Newsbreak’s website and22

on Atty. Roque’s blog. A report regarding the statement also appeared on various on-line news
23

sites, such as the GMA News TV and the Sun Star sites, on the same date. The statement was
24 25

likewise posted at the University of the Philippines College of Law’s bulletin board allegedly on
August 10, 2010 and at said college’s website.
26 27

On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement of the University of the
Philippines College of Law Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the Court, through Chief Justice Renato C.
Corona (Chief Justice Corona). The cover letter dated August 10, 2010 of Dean Leonen read:
The Honorable
Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines

Through: Hon. Renato C. Corona

Chief Justice
Subject: Statement of faculty
from the UP College of Law
on the Plagiarism in the case of
Vinuya v Executive Secretary

Your Honors:
We attach for your information and proper disposition a statement signed by thirty[-]eight
(38) members of the faculty of the UP College of Law. We hope that its points could be considered
28

by the Supreme Court en banc.

Respectfully,
(Sgd.)
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
Dean and Professor of Law
(Emphases supplied.)
The copy of the Statement attached to the above-quoted letter did not contain the actual signatures
of the alleged signatories but only stated the names of 37 UP Law professors with the notation
(SGD.) appearing beside each name. For convenient reference, the text of the UP Law faculty
Statement is reproduced here:
RESTORING INTEGRITY
A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION
IN THE SUPREME COURT
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had
suffered abuse during a time of war. After they courageously came out with their very personal
stories of abuse and suffering as "comfort women", waited for almost two decades for any
meaningful relief from their own government as well as from the government of Japan, got their
hopes up for a semblance of judicial recourse in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
162230 (28 April 2010), they only had these hopes crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of
dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land.
It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law views the
charge that an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court committed plagiarism and misrepresentation
in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. The plagiarism and misrepresentation are not only affronts to the
individual scholars whose work have been appropriated without correct attribution, but also a serious
threat to the integrity and credibility of the Philippine Judicial System.
In common parlance, ‘plagiarism’ is the appropriation and misrepresentation of another person’s
work as one’s own. In the field of writing, it is cheating at best, and stealing at worst. It constitutes a
taking of someone else’s ideas and expressions, including all the effort and creativity that went into
committing such ideas and expressions into writing, and then making it appear that such ideas and
expressions were originally created by the taker. It is dishonesty, pure and simple. A judicial system
that allows plagiarism in any form is one that allows dishonesty. Since all judicial decisions form part
of the law of the land, to allow plagiarism in the Supreme Court is to allow the production of laws by
dishonest means. Evidently, this is a complete perversion and falsification of the ends of justice.
A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source material shows that the ponente merely
copied select portions of other legal writers’ works and interspersed them into the decision as if they
were his own, original work. Under the circumstances, however, because the Decision has been
promulgated by the Court, the Decision now becomes the Court’s and no longer just the ponente’s.
Thus the Court also bears the responsibility for the Decision. In the absence of any mention of the
original writers’ names and the publications from which they came, the thing speaks for itself.
So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from the ponente of this case and the spokesman
of the Court.
It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes from the original articles is a reference to
the ‘primary’ sources relied upon. This cursory explanation is not acceptable, because the original
authors’ writings and the effort they put into finding and summarizing those primary sources are
precisely the subject of plagiarism. The inclusion of the footnotes together with portions of their
writings in fact aggravates, instead of mitigates, the plagiarism since it provides additional evidence
of a deliberate intention to appropriate the original authors’ work of organizing and analyzing those
primary sources.
It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be expected to be familiar with all legal and
scholarly journals. This is also not acceptable, because personal unfamiliarity with sources all the
more demands correct and careful attribution and citation of the material relied upon. It is a matter of
diligence and competence expected of all Magistrates of the Highest Court of the Land.
But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original writers, Professors Evan Criddle and
Evan Fox-Descent, that the High Court actually misrepresents the conclusions of their work entitled
"A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens," the main source of the plagiarized text. In this article they argue
that the classification of the crimes of rape, torture, and sexual slavery as crimes against humanity
have attained the status of jus cogens, making it obligatory upon the State to seek remedies on
behalf of its aggrieved citizens. Yet, the Vinuya decision uses parts of the same article to arrive at
the contrary conclusion. This exacerbates the intellectual dishonesty of copying works without
attribution by transforming it into an act of intellectual fraud by copying works in order to mislead and
deceive.
The case is a potential landmark decision in International Law, because it deals with State liability
and responsibility for personal injury and damage suffered in a time of war, and the role of the
injured parties’ home States in the pursuit of remedies against such injury or damage. National
courts rarely have such opportunities to make an international impact. That the petitioners were
Filipino "comfort women" who suffered from horrific abuse during the Second World War made it
incumbent on the Court of last resort to afford them every solicitude. But instead of acting with
urgency on this case, the Court delayed its resolution for almost seven years, oblivious to the deaths
of many of the petitioners seeking justice from the Court. When it dismissed the Vinuya petition
based on misrepresented and plagiarized materials, the Court decided this case based on polluted
sources. By so doing, the Supreme Court added insult to injury by failing to actually exercise its
"power to urge and exhort the Executive Department to take up the claims of
the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled with false sympathy and nonchalance, belies
a more alarming lack of concern for even the most basic values of decency and respect. The
reputation of the Philippine Supreme Court and the standing of the Philippine legal profession before
other Judiciaries and legal systems are truly at stake.
The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute honesty in its decisions and cannot accept
excuses for failure to attain the highest standards of conduct imposed upon all members of the
Bench and Bar because these undermine the very foundation of its authority and power in a
democratic society. Given the Court’s recent history and the controversy that surrounded it, it cannot
allow the charges of such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass without sanction as this would only
further erode faith and confidence in the judicial system. And in light of the significance of this
decision to the quest for justice not only of Filipino women, but of women elsewhere in the world who
have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly
deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and misinterpreted texts.
The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without ensuring that its own
conduct, whether collectively or through its Members, is beyond reproach. This necessarily includes
ensuring that not only the content, but also the processes of preparing and writing its own decisions,
are credible and beyond question. The Vinuya Decision must be conscientiously reviewed and not
casually cast aside, if not for the purpose of sanction, then at least for the purpose of reflection and
guidance. It is an absolutely essential step toward the establishment of a higher standard of
professional care and practical scholarship in the Bench and Bar, which are critical to improving the
system of administration of justice in the Philippines. It is also a very crucial step in ensuring the
position of the Supreme Court as the Final Arbiter of all controversies: a position that requires
competence and integrity completely above any and all reproach, in accordance with the exacting
demands of judicial and professional ethics.
With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as
teachers in the profession of Law, it is the opinion of the Faculty of the University of the Philippine
College of Law that:

(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is

unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high standards of moral conduct and
judicial and professional competence expected of the Supreme Court;
(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and credibility of the entire
Supreme Court and undermines the foundations of the Philippine judicial system by
allowing implicitly the decision of cases and the establishment of legal precedents
through dubious means;
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence to
the primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all
those who have been left without legal or equitable recourse, such as the petitioners
therein;
(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the dishonesty and to
save the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court as an institution, it is necessary for
the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary to resign his position, without prejudice
to any other sanctions that the Court may consider appropriate;
(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review the manner by which it
conducts research, prepares drafts, reaches and finalizes decisions in order to
prevent a recurrence of similar acts, and to provide clear and concise guidance to the
Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research and writing in
pleadings, practice, and adjudication.

Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law, Quezon City, 27 July 2010.
(SGD.) MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Dean and Professor of Law
 (SGD.) FROILAN M. BACUNGAN (SGD.) PACIFICO A. AGABIN
Dean (1978-1983) Dean (1989-1995)

(SGD.) MERLIN M. MAGALLONA (SGD.) SALVADOR T. CARLOTA

Dean (1995-1999) Dean (2005-2008) and Professor of Law

REGULAR FACULTY

(SGD.) CARMELO V. SISON (SGD.) JAY L. BATONGBACAL

Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) PATRICIA R.P. SALVADOR DAWAY (SGD.) EVELYN (LEO) D. BATTAD

Associate Dean and Associate Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) DANTE B. GATMAYTAN (SGD.) GWEN G. DE VERA

Associate Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) THEODORE O. TE (SGD.) SOLOMON F. LUMBA

Assistant Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) FLORIN T. HILBAY (SGD.) ROMMEL J. CASIS

Assistant Professor Assistant Professor

LECTURERS

(SGD.) JOSE GERARDO A. ALAMPAY (SGD.) JOSE C. LAURETA

(SGD.) ARTHUR P. AUTEA (SGD.) DINA D. LUCENARIO
(SGD.) ROSA MARIA J. BAUTISTA (SGD.) OWEN J. LYNCH
(SGD.) MARK R. BOCOBO (SGD.) ANTONIO M. SANTOS
(SGD.) DAN P. CALICA (SGD.) VICENTE V. MENDOZA
(SGD.) TRISTAN A. CATINDIG (SGD.) RODOLFO NOEL S. QUIMBO
(SGD.) SANDRA MARIE O. CORONEL (SGD.) GMELEEN FAYE B. TOMBOC
(SGD.) ROSARIO O. GALLO (SGD.) NICHOLAS FELIX L. TY
(SGD.) CONCEPCION L. JARDELEZA (SGD.) EVALYN G. URSUA
(SGD.) ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA (SGD.) RAUL T. VASQUEZ
(SGD.) SUSAN D. VILLANUEVA 29

(SGD.) CARINA C. LAFORTEZA

(Underscoring supplied.)

Meanwhile, in a letter dated August 18, 2010, Prof. Christian J. Tams made known his sentiments on
the alleged plagiarism issue to the Court. We quote Prof. Tams’ letter here:
30

Glasgow, 18 August 2010

Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230)
Hon. Renato C. Corona, Chief Justice
Your Excellency,
My name is Christian J. Tams, and I am a professor of international law at the University of Glasgow.
I am writing to you in relation to the use of one of my publications in the above-mentioned judgment
of your Honourable Court.
The relevant passage of the judgment is to be found on p. 30 of your Court’s Judgment, in the
section addressing the concept of obligations erga omnes. As the table annexed to this letter shows,
the relevant sentences were taken almost word by word from the introductory chapter of my book
Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2005). I note
that there is a generic reference to my work in footnote 69 of the Judgment, but as this is in relation
to a citation from another author (Bruno Simma) rather than with respect to the substantive
passages reproduced in the Judgment, I do not think it can be considered an appropriate form of
referencing.
I am particularly concerned that my work should have been used to support the Judgment’s cautious
approach to the erga omnes concept. In fact, a most cursory reading shows that my book’s central
thesis is precisely the opposite: namely that the erga omnes concept has been widely accepted and
has a firm place in contemporary international law. Hence the introductory chapter notes that "[t]he
present study attempts to demystify aspects of the ‘very mysterious’ concept and thereby to facilitate
its implementation" (p. 5). In the same vein, the concluding section notes that "the preceding
chapters show that the concept is now a part of the reality of international law, established in the
jurisprudence of courts and the practice of States" (p. 309).
With due respect to your Honourable Court, I am at a loss to see how my work should have been
cited to support – as it seemingly has – the opposite approach. More generally, I am concerned at
the way in which your Honourable Court’s Judgment has drawn on scholarly work without properly
acknowledging it.
On both aspects, I would appreciate a prompt response from your Honourable Court.
I remain
Sincerely yours
(Sgd.)
Christian J. Tams 31

In the course of the submission of Atty. Roque and Atty. Bagares’ exhibits during the August 26,
2010 hearing in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, the Ethics Committee noted that Exhibit
"J" (a copy of the Restoring Integrity Statement) was not signed but merely reflected the names of
certain faculty members with the letters (SGD.) beside the names. Thus, the Ethics Committee
directed Atty. Roque to present the signed copy of the said Statement within three days from the
August 26 hearing. 32

It was upon compliance with this directive that the Ethics Committee was given a copy of the signed
UP Law Faculty Statement that showed on the signature pages the names of the full roster of the UP
Law Faculty, 81 faculty members in all. Indubitable from the actual signed copy of the Statement
was that only 37 of the 81 faculty members appeared to have signed the same. However, the 37
actual signatories to the Statement did not include former Supreme Court Associate Justice Vicente
V. Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) as represented in the previous copies of the Statement submitted by
Dean Leonen and Atty. Roque. It also appeared that Atty. Miguel R. Armovit (Atty. Armovit) signed
the Statement although his name was not included among the signatories in the previous copies
submitted to the Court. Thus, the total number of ostensible signatories to the Statement remained
at 37.
The Ethics Committee referred this matter to the Court en banc since the same Statement, having
been formally submitted by Dean Leonen on August 11, 2010, was already under consideration by
the Court.33

In a Resolution dated October 19, 2010, the Court en banc made the following observations
regarding the UP Law Faculty Statement:
Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on the allegations of
plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an established fact,
but a truth. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo’s explanation on
how he cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to
those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The
opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had
suffered abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as
a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x x.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the
resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the Court’s alleged
indifference to the cause of petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of
concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect. x x x. 34

(Underscoring ours.)
In the same Resolution, the Court went on to state that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic
society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of
criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These
potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the
judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an
orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass
the administration of justice."
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective
comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the
Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the
case on the comfort women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the
flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This
runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold
the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have
taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. x x x. (Citations
35

omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied.)

Thus, the Court directed Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin,
Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante
B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen
G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit,
Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra
Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C.
Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen
Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul T. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva and
Dina D. Lucenario to show cause, within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the Resolution,
why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and
36

Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 37

Dean Leonen was likewise directed to show cause within the same period why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting
through his letter dated August 10, 2010, during the pendency of G.R. No. 162230 and of the
investigation before the Ethics Committee, for the consideration of the Court en banc, a dummy
which is not a true and faithful reproduction of the UP Law Faculty Statement. 38

In the same Resolution, the present controversy was docketed as a regular administrative matter.
Summaries of the Pleadings Filed by Respondents in Response to the October 19, 2010 Show
Cause Resolution
On November 19, 2010, within the extension for filing granted by the Court, respondents filed the
following pleadings:

(1) Compliance dated November 18, 2010 by counsels for 35 of the 37 respondents,
excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul T. Vasquez, in relation to the charge of violation
of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility;
 (2) Compliance and Reservation dated November 18, 2010 by Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-
Bautista in relation to the same charge in par. (1);
(3) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Raul T. Vasquez in relation to
the same charge in par. (1);
(4) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsels for Dean Leonen, in relation to the
charge of violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03; and
(5) Manifestation dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Owen Lynch.

Common Compliance of 35 Respondents (Excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul Vasquez)
Thirty-five (35) of the respondent UP Law professors filed on November 19, 2010 a common
compliance which was signed by their respective counsels (the Common Compliance). In the
"Preface" of said Common Compliance, respondents stressed that "[they] issued the Restoring
Integrity Statement in the discharge of the ‘solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as teachers
in the profession of law,’ and as members of the Bar to speak out on a matter of public concern and
one that is of vital interest to them." They likewise alleged that "they acted with the purest of
39

intentions" and pointed out that "none of them was involved either as party or counsel" in the Vinuya
40

case. Further, respondents "note with concern" that the Show Cause Resolution’s findings and
conclusions were "a prejudgment – that respondents indeed are in contempt, have breached their
obligations as law professors and officers of the Court, and have violated ‘Canons [1], 11 and 13 and
Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility." 41

By way of explanation, the respondents emphasized the following points:

(a) Respondents’ alleged noble intentions

In response to the charges of failure to observe due respect to legal processes and the
42

courts and of tending to influence, or giving the appearance of influencing the Court in the
43 44

issuance of their Statement, respondents assert that their intention was not to malign the
Court but rather to defend its integrity and credibility and to ensure continued confidence in
the legal system. Their noble motive was purportedly evidenced by the portion of their
Statement "focusing on constructive action." Respondents’ call in the Statement for the
45

Court "to provide clear and concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the
highest quality of legal research and writing in adjudication," was reputedly "in keeping with
strictures enjoining lawyers to ‘participate in the development of the legal system by initiating
or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice’"
(under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility) and to "promote respect for the
law and legal processes" (under Canon 1, id.). Furthermore, as academics, they allegedly
46

have a "special interest and duty to vigilantly guard against plagiarism and misrepresentation
because these unwelcome occurrences have a profound impact in the academe, especially
in our law schools."47

Respondents further "[called] on this Court not to misconstrue the Restoring Integrity
Statement as an ‘institutional attack’ x x x on the basis of its first and ninth
paragraphs." They further clarified that at the time the Statement was allegedly drafted and
48

agreed upon, it appeared to them the Court "was not going to take any action on the grave
and startling allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation." According to respondents,
49

the bases for their belief were (i) the news article published on July 21, 2010 in the Philippine
Daily Inquirer wherein Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez was reported to have said
that Chief Justice Corona would not order an inquiry into the matter; and (ii) the July 22,
50

2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo which they claimed "did nothing but to downplay the gravity
of the plagiarism and misrepresentation charges." Respondents claimed that it was their
51

perception of the Court’s indifference to the dangers posed by the plagiarism allegations
against Justice Del Castillo that impelled them to urgently take a public stand on the issue.
(b) The "correctness" of respondents’ position that Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism
and should be held accountable in accordance with the standards of academic writing
A significant portion of the Common Compliance is devoted to a discussion of the merits of
respondents’ charge of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo. Relying on University of the
Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals and foreign materials and jurisprudence,
52

respondents essentially argue that their position regarding the plagiarism charge against
Justice Del Castillo is the correct view and that they are therefore justified in issuing their
Restoring Integrity Statement. Attachments to the Common Compliance included, among
others: (i) the letter dated October 28, 2010 of Peter B. Payoyo, LL.M, Ph.D., sent to Chief
53

Justice Corona through Justice Sereno, alleging that the Vinuya decision likewise lifted
without proper attribution the text from a legal article by Mariana Salazar Albornoz that
appeared in the Anuario Mexicano De Derecho Internacional and from an International Court
of Justice decision; and (ii) a 2008 Human Rights Law Review Article entitled "Sexual
Orientation, Gender Identity and International Human Rights Law" by Michael O’Flaherty and
John Fisher, in support of their charge that Justice Del Castillo also lifted passages from said
article without proper attribution, but this time, in his ponencia in Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v.
Commission on Elections. 54

(c) Respondents’ belief that they are being "singled out" by the Court when others have
likewise spoken on the "plagiarism issue"
In the Common Compliance, respondents likewise asserted that "the plagiarism and
misrepresentation allegations are legitimate public issues." They identified various published
55

reports and opinions, in agreement with and in opposition to the stance of respondents, on
the issue of plagiarism, specifically:

(i) Newsbreak report on July 19, 2010 by Aries Rufo and Purple Romero; 56

(ii) Column of Ramon Tulfo which appeared in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on July
24, 2010; 57

(iii) Editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer published on July 25, 2010;58

(iv) Letter dated July 22, 2010 of Justice Del Castillo published in the Philippine Star
on July 30, 2010; 59

(v) Column of Former Intellectual Property Office Director General Adrian Cristobal,
Jr. published in the Business Mirror on August 5, 2010; 60

(vi) Column of Former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban published in the Philippine
Daily Inquirer on August 8, 2010; 61

(vii) News report regarding Senator Francis Pangilinan’s call for the resignation of
Justice Del Castillo published in the Daily Tribune and the Manila Standard Today on
July 31, 2010; 62

(viii) News reports regarding the statement of Dean Cesar Villanueva of the Ateneo
de Manila University School of Law on the calls for the resignation of Justice Del
Castillo published in The Manila Bulletin, the Philippine Star and the Business Mirror
on August 11, 2010; 63

(ix) News report on expressions of support for Justice Del Castillo from a former
dean of the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila, the Philippine Constitutional
Association, the Judges Association of Bulacan and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines – Bulacan Chapter published in the Philippine Star on August 16,
2010; and
64

(x) Letter of the Dean of the Liceo de Cagayan University College of Law published
in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 10, 2010.65

In view of the foregoing, respondents alleged that this Court has singled them out for
sanctions and the charge in the Show Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010 that they
may have violated specific canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility is unfair and
without basis.
(d) Freedom of expression
 In paragraphs 28 to 30 of the Common Compliance, respondents briefly discussed their
position that in issuing their Statement, "they should be seen as not only to be performing
their duties as members of the Bar, officers of the court, and teachers of law, but also as
citizens of a democracy who are constitutionally protected in the exercise of free speech." In 66

support of this contention, they cited United States v. Bustos, In re: Atty. Vicente Raul
67

Almacen, and In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of
68

Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections. 69

(e) Academic freedom

In paragraphs 31 to 34 of the Common Compliance, respondents asserted that their Statement was
also issued in the exercise of their academic freedom as teachers in an institution of higher learning.
They relied on Section 5 of the University of the Philippines Charter of 2008 which provided that
"[t]he national university has the right and responsibility to exercise academic freedom." They
likewise adverted to Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology which 70

they claimed recognized the extent and breadth of such freedom as to encourage a free and healthy
discussion and communication of a faculty member’s field of study without fear of reprisal. It is
respondents’ view that had they remained silent on the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya decision they
would have "compromised [their] integrity and credibility as teachers; [their silence] would have
created a culture and generation of students, professionals, even lawyers, who would lack the
competence and discipline for research and pleading; or, worse, [that] their silence would have
communicated to the public that plagiarism and misrepresentation are inconsequential matters and
that intellectual integrity has no bearing or relevance to one’s conduct." 71

In closing, respondents’ Common Compliance exhorted this Court to consider the following portion
of the dissenting opinion of Justice George A. Malcolm in Salcedo v. Hernandez, to wit:
72

Respect for the courts can better be obtained by following a calm and impartial course from the
bench than by an attempt to compel respect for the judiciary by chastising a lawyer for a too
vigorous or injudicious exposition of his side of a case. The Philippines needs lawyers of
independent thought and courageous bearing, jealous of the interests of their clients and unafraid of
any court, high or low, and the courts will do well tolerantly to overlook occasional intemperate
language soon to be regretted by the lawyer which affects in no way the outcome of a case. 73

On the matter of the reliefs to which respondents believe they are entitled, the Common Compliance
stated, thus:
WHEREFORE:

A. Respondents, as citizens of a democracy, professors of law, members of the Bar and

officers of the Court, respectfully pray that:

1. the foregoing be noted; and

2. the Court reconsider and reverse its adverse findings in the Show Cause
Resolution, including its conclusions that respondents have: [a] breached their
"obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court, … and not to promote distrust in the administration
of justice;" and [b] committed "violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02
and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility."

B. In the event the Honorable Court declines to grant the foregoing prayer, respondents
respectfully pray, in the alternative, and in assertion of their due process rights, that before
final judgment be rendered:

1. the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing;

2. respondents be given a fair and full opportunity to refute and/or address the
findings and conclusions of fact in the Show Cause Resolution (including especially
 the finding and conclusion of a lack of malicious intent), and in that connection, that
appropriate procedures and schedules for hearing be adopted and defined that will
allow them the full and fair opportunity to require the production of and to present
testimonial, documentary, and object evidence bearing on the plagiarism and
misrepresentation issues in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, April
28, 2010) and In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate
Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC); and
3. respondents be given fair and full access to the transcripts, records, drafts, reports
and submissions in or relating to, and accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses who were or could have been called in In The Matter of the Charges of
Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-
SC).74

Compliance and Reservation of Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista

Although already included in the Common Compliance, Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista (Prof.
Juan-Bautista) filed a separate Compliance and Reservation (the Bautista Compliance), wherein she
adopted the allegations in the Common Compliance with some additional averments.
Prof. Juan-Bautista reiterated that her due process rights allegedly entitled her to challenge the
findings and conclusions in the Show Cause Resolution. Furthermore, "[i]f the Restoring Integrity
Statement can be considered indirect contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
such may be punished only after charge and hearing." 75

Prof. Juan-Bautista stressed that respondents signed the Statement "in good faith and with the best
intentions to protect the Supreme Court by asking one member to resign." For her part, Prof. Juan-
76

Bautista intimated that her deep disappointment and sadness for the plight of the Malaya Lolas were
what motivated her to sign the Statement.
On the point of academic freedom, Prof. Juan-Bautista cited jurisprudence which in her view
77

highlighted that academic freedom is constitutionally guaranteed to institutions of higher learning

such that schools have the freedom to determine for themselves who may teach, what may be
taught, how lessons shall be taught and who may be admitted to study and that courts have no
authority to interfere in the schools’ exercise of discretion in these matters in the absence of grave
abuse of discretion. She claims the Court has encroached on the academic freedom of the
University of the Philippines and other universities on their right to determine how lessons shall be
taught.
Lastly, Prof. Juan-Bautista asserted that the Statement was an exercise of respondents’
constitutional right to freedom of expression that can only be curtailed when there is grave and
imminent danger to public safety, public morale, public health or other legitimate public interest. 78

Compliance of Prof. Raul T. Vasquez

On November 19, 2010, Prof. Raul T. Vasquez (Prof. Vasquez) filed a separate Compliance by
registered mail (the Vasquez Compliance). In said Compliance, Prof. Vasquez narrated the
circumstances surrounding his signing of the Statement. He alleged that the Vinuya decision was a
topic of conversation among the UP Law faculty early in the first semester (of academic year 2010-
11) because it reportedly contained citations not properly attributed to the sources; that he was
shown a copy of the Statement by a clerk of the Office of the Dean on his way to his class; and that,
agreeing in principle with the main theme advanced by the Statement, he signed the same in utmost
good faith.79

In response to the directive from this Court to explain why he should not be disciplined as a member
of the Bar under the Show Cause Resolution, Prof. Vasquez also took the position that a lawyer has
the right, like all citizens in a democratic society, to comment on acts of public officers. He invited the
attention of the Court to the following authorities: (a) In re: Vicente Sotto; (b) In re: Atty. Vicente
80

Raul Almacen; and (c) a discussion appearing in American Jurisprudence (AmJur) 2d. He claims
81 82

that he "never had any intention to unduly influence, nor entertained any illusion that he could or
should influence, [the Court] in its disposition of the Vinuya case" and that "attacking the integrity of
83

[the Court] was the farthest thing on respondent’s mind when he signed the Statement." Unlike his
84
colleagues, who wish to impress upon this Court the purported homogeneity of the views on what
constitutes plagiarism, Prof. Vasquez stated in his Compliance that:
13. Before this Honorable Court rendered its Decision dated 12 October 2010, some espoused the
view that willful and deliberate intent to commit plagiarism is an essential element of the same.
Others, like respondent, were of the opinion that plagiarism is committed regardless of the intent of
the perpetrator, the way it has always been viewed in the academe. This uncertainty made the issue
a fair topic for academic discussion in the College. Now, this Honorable Court has ruled that
plagiarism presupposes deliberate intent to steal another’s work and to pass it off as one’s
own. (Emphases supplied.)
85

Also in contrast to his colleagues, Prof. Vasquez was willing to concede that he "might have been
remiss in correctly assessing the effects of such language [in the Statement] and could have been
more careful." He ends his discussion with a respectful submission that with his explanation, he has
86

faithfully complied with the Show Cause Resolution and that the Court will rule that he had not in any
manner violated his oath as a lawyer and officer of the Court.
Separate Compliance of Dean Leonen regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10 in relation to
his submission of a "dummy" of the UP Law Faculty Statement to this Court
In his Compliance, Dean Leonen claimed that there were three drafts/versions of the UP Law
Faculty Statement, which he described as follows:

• "Restoring Integrity I" which bears the entire roster of the faculty of the UP College of Law
in its signing pages, and the actual signatures of the thirty-seven (37) faculty members
subject of the Show Cause Resolution. A copy was filed with the Honorable Court by Roque
and Butuyan on 31 August 2010 in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
• "Restoring Integrity II" which does not bear any actual physical signature, but which
reflects as signatories the names of thirty-seven (37) members of the faculty with the
notation "(SGD.)". A copy of Restoring Integrity II was publicly and physically posted in the
UP College of Law on 10 August 2010. Another copy of Restoring Integrity II was also
officially received by the Honorable Court from the Dean of the UP College of Law on 11
August 2010, almost three weeks before the filing of Restoring Integrity I.
• "Restoring Integrity III" which is a reprinting of Restoring Integrity II, and which presently
serves as the official file copy of the Dean’s Office in the UP College of Law that may be
signed by other faculty members who still wish to. It bears the actual signatures of the thirty-
seven original signatories to Restoring Integrity I above their printed names and the notation
"(SGD.") and, in addition, the actual signatures of eight (8) other members of the faculty
above their handwritten or typewritten names. 87

For purposes of this discussion, only Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II are relevant since
what Dean Leonen has been directed to explain are the discrepancies in the signature pages of
these two documents. Restoring Integrity III was never submitted to this Court.
On how Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II were prepared and came about, Dean Leonen
alleged, thus:

2.2 On 27 July 2010, sensing the emergence of a relatively broad agreement in the faculty
on a draft statement, Dean Leonen instructed his staff to print the draft and circulate it among
the faculty members so that those who wished to may sign. For this purpose, the staff
encoded the law faculty roster to serve as the printed draft’s signing pages. Thus did the first
printed draft of the Restoring Integrity Statement, Restoring Integrity I, come into being.
2.3. As of 27 July 2010, the date of the Restoring Integrity Statement, Dean Leonen was
unaware that a Motion for Reconsideration of the Honorable Court’s Decision in Vinuya vs.
Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010) had already been filed, or that the
Honorable Court was in the process of convening its Committee on Ethics and Ethical
Standards in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
 2.4. Dean Leonen’s staff then circulated Restoring Integrity I among the members of the
faculty. Some faculty members visited the Dean’s Office to sign the document or had it
brought to their classrooms in the College of Law, or to their offices or residences. Still other
faculty members who, for one reason or another, were unable to sign Restoring Integrity I at
that time, nevertheless conveyed to Dean Leonen their assurances that they would sign as
soon as they could manage.
2.5. Sometime in the second week of August, judging that Restoring Integrity I had been
circulated long enough, Dean Leonen instructed his staff to reproduce the statement in a
style and manner appropriate for posting in the College of Law. Following his own
established practice in relation to significant public issuances, he directed them to reformat
the signing pages so that only the names of those who signed the first printed draft would
appear, together with the corresponding "(SGD.)" note following each name. Restoring
Integrity II thus came into being.
88

According to Dean Leonen, the "practice of eliminating blanks opposite or above the names of non-
signatories in the final draft of significant public issuances, is meant not so much for aesthetic
considerations as to secure the integrity of such documents." He likewise claimed that "[p]osting
89

statements with blanks would be an open invitation to vandals and pranksters." 90

With respect to the inclusion of Justice Mendoza’s name as among the signatories in Restoring
Integrity II when in fact he did not sign Restoring Integrity I, Dean Leonen attributed the mistake to a
miscommunication involving his administrative officer. In his Compliance, he narrated that:

2.7. Upon being presented with a draft of Restoring Integrity II with the reformatted signing
pages, Dean Leonen noticed the inclusion of the name of Justice Mendoza among the
"(SGD.)" signatories. As Justice Mendoza was not among those who had physically signed
Restoring Integrity I when it was previously circulated, Dean Leonen called the attention of
his staff to the inclusion of the Justice’s name among the "(SGD.)" signatories in Restoring
Integrity II.
2.8. Dean Leonen was told by his administrative officer that she had spoken to Justice
Mendoza over the phone on Friday, 06 August 2010. According to her, Justice Mendoza had
authorized the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement for him as he agreed
fundamentally with its contents. Also according to her, Justice Mendoza was unable at that
time to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement himself as he was leaving for the United States
the following week. It would later turn out that this account was not entirely
accurate. (Underscoring and italics supplied.)
91

Dean Leonen claimed that he "had no reason to doubt his administrative officer, however, and so
placed full reliance on her account" as "[t]here were indeed other faculty members who had also
92

authorized the Dean to indicate that they were signatories, even though they were at that time
unable to affix their signatures physically to the document."93

However, after receiving the Show Cause Resolution, Dean Leonen and his staff reviewed the
circumstances surrounding their effort to secure Justice Mendoza’s signature. It would turn out that
this was what actually transpired:

2.22.1. On Friday, 06 August 2010, when the dean’s staff talked to Justice Mendoza on the
phone, he [Justice Mendoza] indeed initially agreed to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement
as he fundamentally agreed with its contents. However, Justice Mendoza did not exactly say
that he authorized the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement. Rather, he inquired if
he could authorize the dean to sign it for him as he was about to leave for the United States.
The dean’s staff informed him that they would, at any rate, still try to bring the Restoring
Integrity Statement to him.
2.22.2. Due to some administrative difficulties, Justice Mendoza was unable to sign the
Restoring Integrity Statement before he left for the U.S. the following week.
 2.22.3. The staff was able to bring Restoring Integrity III to Justice Mendoza when he went to
the College to teach on 24 September 2010, a day after his arrival from the U.S. This time,
Justice Mendoza declined to sign. 94

According to the Dean:

2.23. It was only at this time that Dean Leonen realized the true import of the call he received from
Justice Mendoza in late September. Indeed, Justice Mendoza confirmed that by the time the hard
copy of the Restoring Integrity Statement was brought to him shortly after his arrival from the U.S.,
he declined to sign it because it had already become controversial. At that time, he predicted that the
Court would take some form of action against the faculty. By then, and under those circumstances,
he wanted to show due deference to the Honorable Court, being a former Associate Justice and not
wishing to unduly aggravate the situation by signing the Statement. (Emphases supplied.)
95

With respect to the omission of Atty. Armovit’s name in the signature page of Restoring Integrity II
when he was one of the signatories of Restoring Integrity I and the erroneous description in Dean
Leonen’s August 10, 2010 letter that the version of the Statement submitted to the Court was signed
by 38 members of the UP Law Faculty, it was explained in the Compliance that:
Respondent Atty. Miguel Armovit physically signed Restoring Integrity I when it was circulated to
him. However, his name was inadvertently left out by Dean Leonen’s staff in the reformatting of the
signing pages in Restoring Integrity II. The dean assumed that his name was still included in the
reformatted signing pages, and so mentioned in his cover note to Chief Justice Corona that 38
members of the law faculty signed (the original 37 plus Justice Mendoza.) 96

Dean Leonen argues that he should not be deemed to have submitted a dummy of the Statement
that was not a true and faithful reproduction of the same. He emphasized that the main body of the
Statement was unchanged in all its three versions and only the signature pages were not the same.
This purportedly is merely "reflective of [the Statement’s] essential nature as a ‘live’ public manifesto
meant to continuously draw adherents to its message, its signatory portion is necessarily evolving
and dynamic x x x many other printings of [the Statement] may be made in the future, each one
reflecting the same text but with more and more signatories." Adverting to criminal law by analogy,
97

Dean Leonen claims that "this is not an instance where it has been made to appear in a document
that a person has participated in an act when the latter did not in fact so participate" for he "did not
98

misrepresent which members of the faculty of the UP College of Law had agreed with the Restoring
Integrity Statement proper and/or had expressed their desire to be signatories thereto." 99

In this regard, Dean Leonen believes that he had not committed any violation of Canon 10 or Rules
10.01 and 10.02 for he did not mislead nor misrepresent to the Court the contents of the Statement
or the identities of the UP Law faculty members who agreed with, or expressed their desire to be
signatories to, the Statement. He also asserts that he did not commit any violation of Rule 10.03 as
he "coursed [the Statement] through the appropriate channels by transmitting the same to Honorable
Chief Justice Corona for the latter’s information and proper disposition with the hope that its points
would be duly considered by the Honorable Court en banc." Citing Rudecon Management
100

Corporation v. Camacho, Dean Leonen posits that the required quantum of proof has not been met
101

in this case and that no dubious character or motivation for the act complained of existed to warrant
an administrative sanction for violation of the standard of honesty provided for by the Code of
Professional Responsibility. 102

Dean Leonen ends his Compliance with an enumeration of nearly identical reliefs as the Common
Compliance, including the prayers for a hearing and for access to the records, evidence and
witnesses allegedly relevant not only in this case but also in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethical
investigation involving Justice Del Castillo.
Manifestation of Prof. Owen Lynch (Lynch Manifestation)
For his part, Prof. Owen Lynch (Prof. Lynch) manifests to this Court that he is not a member of the
Philippine bar; but he is a member of the bar of the State of Minnesota. He alleges that he first
taught as a visiting professor at the UP College of Law in 1981 to 1988 and returned in the same
capacity in 2010. He further alleges that "[h]e subscribes to the principle, espoused by this Court and
the Supreme Court of the United States, that ‘…[d]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials." In signing the Statement, he believes that "the
103

right to speak means the right to speak effectively." Citing the dissenting opinions in Manila Public
104

School Teachers Association v. Laguio, Jr., Prof. Lynch argued that "[f]or speech to be effective, it
105

must be forceful enough to make the intended recipients listen" and "[t]he quality of education
106

would deteriorate in an atmosphere of repression, when the very teachers who are supposed to
provide an example of courage and self-assertiveness to their pupils can speak only in timorous
whispers." Relying on the doctrine in In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re:
107

Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, Prof. Lynch believed
108

that the Statement did not pose any danger, clear or present, of any substantive evil so as to remove
it from the protective mantle of the Bill of Rights (i.e., referring to the constitutional guarantee on free
speech). He also stated that he "has read the Compliance of the other respondents to the Show
109

Cause Resolution" and that "he signed the Restoring Integrity Statement for the same reasons they
did."
110

ISSUES
Based on the Show Cause Resolution and a perusal of the submissions of respondents, the material
issues to be resolved in this case are as follows:

1.) Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their freedom of expression?
2.) Does the Show Cause Resolution violate respondents’ academic freedom as law
professors?
3.) Do the submissions of respondents satisfactorily explain why they should not be
disciplined as Members of the Bar under Canons 1, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility?
4.) Does the separate Compliance of Dean Leonen satisfactorily explain why he should not
be disciplined as a Member of the Bar under Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03?
5.) Are respondents entitled to have the Show Cause Resolution set for hearing and in
relation to such hearing, are respondents entitled to require the production or presentation of
evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R.
No. 162230) and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to
have access to the records and transcripts of, and the witnesses and evidence presented, or
could have been presented, in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-
SC)?

DISCUSSION
The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their freedom of expression.
It is respondents’ collective claim that the Court, with the issuance of the Show Cause Resolution,
has interfered with respondents’ constitutionally mandated right to free speech and expression. It
appears that the underlying assumption behind respondents’ assertion is the misconception that this
Court is denying them the right to criticize the Court’s decisions and actions, and that this Court
seeks to "silence" respondent law professors’ dissenting view on what they characterize as a
"legitimate public issue."
This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it was
neither the fact that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that they had charged one
of its members of plagiarism that motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism
and the contumacious language by which respondents, who are not parties nor counsels in
the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in the said pending case for
the "proper disposition" and consideration of the Court that gave rise to said Resolution. The Show
Cause Resolution painstakingly enumerated the statements that the Court considered excessive and
uncalled for under the circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication, and later submission to
this Court of the UP Law faculty’s Restoring Integrity Statement.
To reiterate, it was not the circumstance that respondents expressed a belief that Justice Del Castillo
was guilty of plagiarism but rather their expression of that belief as "not only as an established fact,
but a truth" when it was "[o]f public knowledge [that there was] an ongoing investigation precisely to
111

determine the truth of such allegations." It was also pointed out in the Show Cause Resolution that
112

there was a pending motion for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. The Show Cause
113

Resolution made no objections to the portions of the Restoring Integrity Statement that respondents
claimed to be "constructive" but only asked respondents to explain those portions of the said
Statement that by no stretch of the imagination could be considered as fair or constructive, to wit:
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The
opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had
suffered abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as
a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x x.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the
resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the Court’s alleged
indifference to the cause of petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of
concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect. x x x. 114

(Underscoring ours.)
To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized respondents’ freedom of expression when
it stated that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic
society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of
criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These
potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the
judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an
orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass
the administration of justice."
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective
comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the
Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the
case on the comfort women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the
flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This
runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold
the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have
taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. x x x. (Citations
115

omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied.)

Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in respondents’ submissions, this Court has
held that the right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the equally
primordial concern that the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or
interference. In cases where the critics are not only citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence
has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose statements regarding
the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair
comment and common decency.
As early as the 1935 case of Salcedo v. Hernandez, the Court found Atty. Vicente J. Francisco both
116

guilty of contempt and liable administratively for the following paragraph in his second motion for
reconsideration:
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court, denying
our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the
petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality
of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within our power in order that this error may
be corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we should not want that some
citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to
denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the
victim, and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of
each and every member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state
sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters
will necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of 'sakdalism' and make the public lose
confidence in the administration of justice. (Emphases supplied.)
117

The highlighted phrases were considered by the Court as neither justified nor necessary and further
held that:
[I]n order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied upon in his
argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said motion were
sufficient and the phrases in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is
highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco
has done, because both means are annoying and good practice can never sanction them by reason
of their natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene and impartial judgment,
particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of questions submitted for resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains a more
or less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein, after the author shows the course
which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the
press for the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of which his client has
been the victim; and because he states in a threatening manner with the intention of predisposing
the mind of the reader against the court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in
order to make it odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion
promote distrust in the administration of justice and increase the proselytes of sakdalism, a
movement with seditious and revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of public
knowledge, occurred in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of
the dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not
resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with
good reasons, that it has acted erroneously. (Emphases supplied.)
118

Significantly, Salcedo is the decision from which respondents culled their quote from
the minority view of Justice Malcolm. Moreover, Salcedo concerned statements made in a pleading
filed by a counsel in a case, unlike the respondents here, who are neither parties nor counsels in
the Vinuya case and therefore, do not have any standing at all to interfere in the Vinuya case.
Instead of supporting respondents’ theory, Salcedo is authority for the following principle:
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is
in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not only because it has
conferred upon him the high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being
what he now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. Rep., 492, 669), but also because
in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the administration of justice, and prevents
anybody from harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder,
thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those
who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief. (Emphases supplied.)
119

Thus, the lawyer in Salcedo was fined and reprimanded for his injudicious statements in his
pleading, by accusing the Court of "erroneous ruling." Here, the respondents’ Statement goes way
beyond merely ascribing error to the Court.
Other cases cited by respondents likewise espouse rulings contrary to their position. In re: Atty.
Vicente Raul Almacen, cited in the Common Compliance and the Vasquez Compliance, was an
120

instance where the Court indefinitely suspended a member of the Bar for filing and releasing to the
press a "Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title" in protest of what he claimed was a great
injustice to his client committed by the Supreme Court. In the decision, the petition was described,
thus:
He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our
pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by
this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of
hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the
members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme
Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustices committed by this Court," and
that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He
ends his petition with a prayer that
"x x x a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned
attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the
event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the
noblest profession." 121

It is true that in Almacen the Court extensively discussed foreign jurisprudence on the principle that a
lawyer, just like any citizen, has the right to criticize and comment upon actuations of public officers,
including judicial authority. However, the real doctrine in Almacen is that such criticism of the courts,
whether done in court or outside of it, must conform to standards of fairness and propriety. This case
engaged in an even more extensive discussion of the legal authorities sustaining this view. To 1awphi1

quote from that decision:

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over
the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and
abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is
a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux
and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more
basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He
vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity x x x to the courts;" and the Rules of Court
constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers." The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of
its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
"x x x the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take
upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution
and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This
obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but
includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges
personally for their judicial acts." (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those gifted
with superior intellect — are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
"The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it
may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline
and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the
effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal
appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful
submission." (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
xxxx
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one
time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations
or communications or in the course of a political campaign, if couched in insulting language as to
bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary
action. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
122

In a similar vein, In re: Vicente Sotto, cited in the Vasquez Compliance, observed that:
123

[T]his Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:

The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause, respecting the same, has
always been considered as misbehavior, tending to obstruct the administration of justice, and
subjects such persons to contempt proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to have their
causes tried fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public clamor.
Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have
justice administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law, free from outside coercion
or interference. x x x.
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the
decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well founded
it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well
taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or modifying its
decision. x x x.
xxxx
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately "so many
blunders and injustices," that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that
the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision
was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the
confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently
to lower or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines
is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for
their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose
their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they
cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and
disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts
Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court,
to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other
institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation. (Emphases
124

and underscoring supplied.)

That the doctrinal pronouncements in these early cases are still good law can be easily gleaned
even from more recent jurisprudence.
In Choa v. Chiongson, the Court administratively disciplined a lawyer, through the imposition of a
125

fine, for making malicious and unfounded criticisms of a judge in the guise of an administrative
complaint and held, thus:
As an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of administering justice,
graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts
and to show respect to its officers. This does not mean, however, that a lawyer cannot criticize a
judge. As we stated in Tiongco vs. Hon. Aguilar:
It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the court, he cannot criticize
the courts. That is his right as a citizen, and it is even his duty as an officer of the court to avail of
such right. Thus, in In Re: Almacen (31 SCRA 562, 579-580 [1970]), this Court explicitly declared:
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but
also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he
"professionally answerable to a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not
expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am Dec. 657, 665).
xxxx
Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned in Almacen:
But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and
abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is
a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct, that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.
xxxx
Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of
expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every right
carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom
with responsibility. x x x.
xxxx
Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in
courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration (Rheem, supra), or tends necessarily to
undermine the confidence of people in the integrity of the members of this Court and to degrade the
administration of justice by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949]); or of offensive and abusive
language (In re: Rafael Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]); or abrasive and offensive language
(Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42 [1975]; or of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless,
and malicious statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to the judge (Baja vs. Macandog, 158
SCRA [1988], citing the resolution of 19 January 1988 in Phil. Public Schools Teachers Association
vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 76180, and Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or of
disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for remarks (Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
177 SCRA 87 [1989]).
Any criticism against a judge made in the guise of an administrative complaint which is clearly
unfounded and impelled by ulterior motive will not excuse the lawyer responsible therefor under his
duty of fidelity to his client. x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
126

In Saberon v. Larong, where this Court found respondent lawyer guilty of simple misconduct for
127

using intemperate language in his pleadings and imposed a fine upon him, we had the occasion to
state:
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive
or otherwise improper.
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong
language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds
with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of
the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified. 128

Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement exceeded the limits of
fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free speech. Even In the Matter of Petition for
Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections, relied upon by respondents in the Common Compliance, held that:
129

From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not
susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the
press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude however a literal interpretation. Freedom of
expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist that at all times and under all
circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that
press for recognition. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
130

One such societal value that presses for recognition in the case at bar is the threat to judicial
independence and the orderly administration of justice that immoderate, reckless and unfair attacks
on judicial decisions and institutions pose. This Court held as much in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan
and Gonzales, where we indefinitely suspended a lawyer from the practice of law for issuing to
131

the media statements grossly disrespectful towards the Court in relation to a pending case, to wit:
Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to
deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of
speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of
expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of
equally important public interest. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the
integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free
expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and
maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning
and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent
institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community. x x x. (Emphases
132

supplied.)
For this reason, the Court cannot uphold the view of some respondents that the Statement
133

presents no grave or imminent danger to a legitimate public interest.

The Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondents’ academic freedom.
It is not contested that respondents herein are, by law and jurisprudence, guaranteed academic
freedom and undisputably, they are free to determine what they will teach their students and how
they will teach. We must point out that there is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that dictates
upon respondents the subject matter they can teach and the manner of their instruction. Moreover, it
is not inconsistent with the principle of academic freedom for this Court to subject lawyers who teach
law to disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue intervention in
favor of a party in a pending case, without observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in
their capacity as teachers.
A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it has not been passed upon in any previous
case before this Court, is the question of whether lawyers who are also law professors can invoke
academic freedom as a defense in an administrative proceeding for intemperate statements tending
to pressure the Court or influence the outcome of a case or degrade the courts.
Applying by analogy the Court’s past treatment of the "free speech" defense in other bar discipline
cases, academic freedom cannot be successfully invoked by respondents in this case. The implicit
ruling in the jurisprudence discussed above is that the constitutional right to freedom of expression of
members of the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to
the courts and to uphold the public’s faith in the legal profession and the justice system. To our mind,
the reason that freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers applies with
greater force to the academic freedom of law professors.
It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in view of the broad definition in Cayetano
v. Monsod, lawyers when they teach law are considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike
134

professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are bound
by their oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law
professors must be measured against the same canons of professional responsibility applicable to
acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably entwined with the
fact that they are lawyers.
Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents’ proposition in the Common Compliance that
their issuance of the Statement was in keeping with their duty to "participate in the development of
the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the
administration of justice" under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, we cannot agree
that they have fulfilled that same duty in keeping with the demands of Canons 1, 11 and 13 to give
due respect to legal processes and the courts, and to avoid conduct that tends to influence the
courts. Members of the Bar cannot be selective regarding which canons to abide by given particular
situations. With more reason that law professors are not allowed this indulgence, since they are
expected to provide their students exemplars of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole
and not just their preferred portions thereof.
The Court’s rulings on the submissions regarding the charge of violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13.
Having disposed of respondents’ main arguments of freedom of expression and academic freedom,
the Court considers here the other averments in their submissions.
With respect to good faith, respondents’ allegations presented two main ideas: (a) the validity of their
position regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo, and (b) their pure motive to
spur this Court to take the correct action on said issue.
The Court has already clarified that it is not the expression of respondents’ staunch belief that
Justice Del Castillo has committed a misconduct that the majority of this Court has found so
unbecoming in the Show Cause Resolution. No matter how firm a lawyer’s conviction in the
righteousness of his cause there is simply no excuse for denigrating the courts and engaging in
public behavior that tends to put the courts and the legal profession into disrepute. This doctrine,
which we have repeatedly upheld in such cases as Salcedo, In re Almacen and Saberong, should be
applied in this case with more reason, as the respondents, not parties to the Vinuya case,
denounced the Court and urged it to change its decision therein, in a public statement using
contumacious language, which with temerity they subsequently submitted to the Court for "proper
disposition."
That humiliating the Court into reconsidering the Vinuya Decision in favor of the Malaya Lolas was
one of the objectives of the Statement could be seen in the following paragraphs from the same:
And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest for justice not only of Filipino women, but
of women elsewhere in the world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in
times of war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered
and misinterpreted texts.
xxxx
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence to the primordial
function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all those who have been left
without legal or equitable recourse, such as the petitioners therein. (Emphases and underscoring
135

supplied.)
Whether or not respondents’ views regarding the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case had valid basis
was wholly immaterial to their liability for contumacious speech and conduct. These are two separate
matters to be properly threshed out in separate proceedings. The Court considers it highly
inappropriate, if not tantamount to dissembling, the discussion devoted in one of the compliances
arguing the guilt of Justice Del Castillo. In the Common Compliance, respondents even go so far as
to attach documentary evidence to support the plagiarism charges against Justice Del Castillo in the
present controversy. The ethics case of Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC), with the filing of
a motion for reconsideration, was still pending at the time of the filing of respondents’ submissions in
this administrative case. As respondents themselves admit, they are neither parties nor counsels in
the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. Notwithstanding their professed overriding interest in
said ethics case, it is not proper procedure for respondents to bring up their plagiarism arguments
here especially when it has no bearing on their own administrative case.
Still on motive, it is also proposed that the choice of language in the Statement was intended for
effective speech; that speech must be "forceful enough to make the intended recipients listen." One136

wonders what sort of effect respondents were hoping for in branding this Court as, among others,
callous, dishonest and lacking in concern for the basic values of decency and respect. The Court
fails to see how it can ennoble the profession if we allow respondents to send a signal to their
students that the only way to effectively plead their cases and persuade others to their point of view
is to be offensive.
This brings to our mind the letters of Dr. Ellis and Prof. Tams which were deliberately quoted in full in
the narration of background facts to illustrate the sharp contrast between the civil tenor of these
letters and the antagonistic irreverence of the Statement. In truth, these foreign authors are the ones
who would expectedly be affected by any perception of misuse of their works. Notwithstanding that
they are beyond the disciplinary reach of this Court, they still obviously took pains to convey their
objections in a deferential and scholarly manner. It is unfathomable to the Court why respondents
could not do the same. These foreign authors’ letters underscore the universality of the tenet that
legal professionals must deal with each other in good faith and due respect. The mark of the true
intellectual is one who can express his opinions logically and soberly without resort to exaggerated
rhetoric and unproductive recriminations.
As for the claim that the respondents’ noble intention is to spur the Court to take "constructive action"
on the plagiarism issue, the Court has some doubts as to its veracity. For if the Statement was
primarily meant for this Court’s consideration, why was the same published and reported in the
media first before it was submitted to this Court? It is more plausible that the Statement was
prepared for consumption by the general public and designed to capture media attention as part of
the effort to generate interest in the most controversial ground in the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration filed in the Vinuya case by Atty. Roque, who is respondents’ colleague on the UP
Law faculty.
In this regard, the Court finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of fidelity and due respect
to the Court, particularly when respondents knew fully well that the matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya
decision and the merits of the Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the Statement’s issuance, were
still both sub judice or pending final disposition of the Court. These facts have been widely
publicized. On this point, respondents allege that at the time the Statement was first drafted on July
27, 2010, they did not know of the constitution of the Ethics Committee and they had issued the
Statement under the belief that this Court intended to take no action on the ethics charge against
Justice Del Castillo. Still, there was a significant lapse of time from the drafting and printing of the
Statement on July 27, 2010 and its publication and submission to this Court in early August when
the Ethics Committee had already been convened. If it is true that the respondents’ outrage was
fueled by their perception of indifference on the part of the Court then, when it became known that
the Court did intend to take action, there was nothing to prevent respondents from recalibrating the
Statement to take this supervening event into account in the interest of fairness.
Speaking of the publicity this case has generated, we likewise find no merit in the respondents’
reliance on various news reports and commentaries in the print media and the internet as proof that
they are being unfairly "singled out." On the contrary, these same annexes to the Common
Compliance show that it is not enough for one to criticize the Court to warrant the institution of
disciplinary or contempt action. This Court takes into account the nature of the criticism and
137 138

weighs the possible repercussions of the same on the Judiciary. When the criticism comes from
persons outside the profession who may not have a full grasp of legal issues or from individuals
whose personal or other interests in making the criticism are obvious, the Court may perhaps
tolerate or ignore them. However, when law professors are the ones who appear to have lost sight of
the boundaries of fair commentary and worse, would justify the same as an exercise of civil liberties,
this Court cannot remain silent for such silence would have a grave implication on legal education in
our country.
With respect to the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance, considering that this
appears to be the first time these respondents have been involved in disciplinary proceedings of this
sort, the Court is willing to give them the benefit of the doubt that they were for the most part well-
intentioned in the issuance of the Statement. However, it is established in jurisprudence that where
the excessive and contumacious language used is plain and undeniable, then good intent can only
be mitigating. As this Court expounded in Salcedo:
In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states that it was not his intention to offend the court or
to be recreant to the respect thereto but, unfortunately, there are his phrases which need no further
comment. Furthermore, it is a well settled rule in all places where the same conditions and practice
as those in this jurisdiction obtain, that want of intention is no excuse from liability (13 C. J., 45).
Neither is the fact that the phrases employed are justified by the facts a valid defense:
"Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified by the facts
is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office should always be observed and
enforced." (In re Stewart, 118 La., 827; 43 S., 455.) Said lack or want of intention constitutes at most
an extenuation of liability in this case, taking into consideration Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's state
of mind, according to him when he prepared said motion. This court is disposed to make such
concession. However, in order to avoid a recurrence thereof and to prevent others, by following the
bad example, from taking the same course, this court considers it imperative to treat the case of said
attorney with the justice it deserves. (Emphases supplied.)
139

Thus, the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance should, notwithstanding their claim of
good faith, be reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13, to give due respect to the
courts and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on
pending matters or to denigrate the courts and the administration of justice.
With respect to Prof. Vasquez, the Court favorably notes the differences in his Compliance
compared to his colleagues. In our view, he was the only one among the respondents who showed
true candor and sincere deference to the Court. He was able to give a straightforward account of
how he came to sign the Statement. He was candid enough to state that his agreement to the
Statement was in principle and that the reason plagiarism was a "fair topic of discussion" among the
UP Law faculty prior to the promulgation of the October 12, 2010 Decision in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC
was the uncertainty brought about by a division of opinion on whether or not willful or deliberate
intent was an element of plagiarism. He was likewise willing to acknowledge that he may have been
remiss in failing to assess the effect of the language of the Statement and could have used more
care. He did all this without having to retract his position on the plagiarism issue, without demands
for undeserved reliefs (as will be discussed below) and without baseless insinuations of deprivation
of due process or of prejudgment. This is all that this Court expected from respondents, not for them
to sacrifice their principles but only that they recognize that they themselves may have committed
some ethical lapse in this affair. We commend Prof. Vaquez for showing that at least one of the
respondents can grasp the true import of the Show Cause Resolution involving them. For these
reasons, the Court finds Prof. Vasquez’s Compliance satisfactory.
As for Prof. Lynch, in view of his Manifestation that he is a member of the Bar of the State of
Minnesota and, therefore, not under the disciplinary authority of this Court, he should be excused
from these proceedings. However, he should be reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in
a Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of responsible and professional conduct to his
students even without the threat of sanction from this Court. For even if one is not bound by the
Code of Professional Responsibility for members of the Philippine Bar, civility and respect among
legal professionals of any nationality should be aspired for under universal standards of decency and
fairness.
The Court’s ruling on Dean Leonen’s Compliance regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10.
To recall, the Show Cause Resolution directed Dean Leonen to show cause why he should not be
disciplinary dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 and for submitting a
"dummy" that was not a true and faithful reproduction of the signed Statement.
In his Compliance, Dean Leonen essentially denies that Restoring Integrity II was not a true and
faithful reproduction of the actual signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, because looking at the text or
the body, there were no differences between the two. He attempts to downplay the discrepancies in
the signature pages of the two versions of the Statement (i.e., Restoring Integrity I and Restoring
Integrity II) by claiming that it is but expected in "live" public manifestos with dynamic and evolving
pages as more and more signatories add their imprimatur thereto. He likewise stresses that he is not
administratively liable because he did not misrepresent the members of the UP Law faculty who
"had agreed with the Restoring Integrity Statement proper and/or who had expressed their desire to
be signatories thereto."
140

To begin with, the Court cannot subscribe to Dean Leonen’s implied view that the signatures in the
Statement are not as significant as its contents. Live public manifesto or not, the Statement was
formally submitted to this Court at a specific point in time and it should reflect accurately its
signatories at that point. The value of the Statement as a UP Law Faculty Statement lies precisely in
the identities of the persons who have signed it, since the Statement’s persuasive authority mainly
depends on the reputation and stature of the persons who have endorsed the same. Indeed, it is
apparent from respondents’ explanations that their own belief in the "importance" of their positions
as UP law professors prompted them to publicly speak out on the matter of the plagiarism issue in
the Vinuya case.
Further, in our assessment, the true cause of Dean Leonen’s predicament is the fact that he did not
from the beginning submit the signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, to this Court on August 11, 2010
and, instead, submitted Restoring Integrity II with its retyped or "reformatted" signature pages. It
would turn out, according to Dean Leonen’s account, that there were errors in the retyping of the
signature pages due to lapses of his unnamed staff. First, an unnamed administrative officer in the
dean’s office gave the dean inaccurate information that led him to allow the inclusion of Justice
Mendoza as among the signatories of Restoring Integrity II. Second, an unnamed staff also failed to
type the name of Atty. Armovit when encoding the signature pages of Restoring Integrity II when in
fact he had signed Restoring Integrity I.
The Court can understand why for purposes of posting on a bulletin board or a website a signed
document may have to be reformatted and signatures may be indicated by the notation (SGD). This
is not unusual. We are willing to accept that the reformatting of documents meant for posting to
eliminate blanks is necessitated by vandalism concerns.
However, what is unusual is the submission to a court, especially this Court, of a signed document
for the Court’s consideration that did not contain the actual signatures of its authors. In most cases, it
is the original signed document that is transmitted to the Court or at the very least a photocopy of the
actual signed document. Dean Leonen has not offered any explanation why he deviated from this
practice with his submission to the Court of Restoring Integrity II on August 11, 2010. There was
nothing to prevent the dean from submitting Restoring Integrity I to this Court even with its blanks
and unsigned portions. Dean Leonen cannot claim fears of vandalism with respect to court
submissions for court employees are accountable for the care of documents and records that may
come into their custody. Yet, Dean Leonen deliberately chose to submit to this Court the facsimile
that did not contain the actual signatures and his silence on the reason therefor is in itself a display
of lack of candor.
Still, a careful reading of Dean Leonen’s explanations yield the answer. In the course of his
explanation of his willingness to accept his administrative officer’s claim that Justice Mendoza
agreed to be indicated as a signatory, Dean Leonen admits in a footnote that other professors had
likewise only authorized him to indicate them as signatories and had not in fact signed the
Statement. Thus, at around the time Restoring Integrity II was printed, posted and submitted to this
Court, at least one purported signatory thereto had not actually signed the same. Contrary to Dean
Leonen’s proposition, that is precisely tantamount to making it appear to this Court that a person or
persons participated in an act when such person or persons did not.
We are surprised that someone like Dean Leonen, with his reputation for perfection and stringent
standards of intellectual honesty, could proffer the explanation that there was no misrepresentation
when he allowed at least one person to be indicated as having actually signed the Statement when
all he had was a verbal communication of an intent to sign. In the case of Justice Mendoza, what he
had was only hearsay information that the former intended to sign the Statement. If Dean Leonen
was truly determined to observe candor and truthfulness in his dealings with the Court, we see no
reason why he could not have waited until all the professors who indicated their desire to sign the
Statement had in fact signed before transmitting the Statement to the Court as a duly signed
document. If it was truly impossible to secure some signatures, such as that of Justice Mendoza who
had to leave for abroad, then Dean Leonen should have just resigned himself to the signatures that
he was able to secure.
We cannot imagine what urgent concern there was that he could not wait for actual signatures
before submission of the Statement to this Court. As respondents all asserted, they were neither
parties to nor counsels in the Vinuya case and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The
Statement was neither a pleading with a deadline nor a required submission to the Court; rather, it
was a voluntary submission that Dean Leonen could do at any time.
In sum, the Court likewise finds Dean Leonen’s Compliance unsatisfactory. However, the Court is
willing to ascribe these isolated lapses in judgment of Dean Leonen to his misplaced zeal in pursuit
of his objectives. In due consideration of Dean Leonen’s professed good intentions, the Court deems
it sufficient to admonish Dean Leonen for failing to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings
with the Court as required under Canon 10.
Respondents’ requests for a hearing, for production/presentation of evidence bearing on the
plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in G.R. No. 162230 and A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, and for
access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are unmeritorious.
In the Common Compliance, respondents named therein asked for alternative reliefs should the
Court find their Compliance unsatisfactory, that is, that the Show Cause Resolution be set for
hearing and for that purpose, they be allowed to require the production or presentation of witnesses
and evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No.
162230) and the plagiarism case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have
access to the records of, and evidence that were presented or may be presented in the ethics case
against Justice Del Castillo. The prayer for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-
17-SC was substantially echoed in Dean Leonen’s separate Compliance. In Prof. Juan-Bautista’s
Compliance, she similarly expressed the sentiment that "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be
considered indirect contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be
punished only after charge and hearing." It is this group of respondents’ premise that these reliefs
141

are necessary for them to be accorded full due process.

The Court finds this contention unmeritorious.
Firstly, it would appear that the confusion as to the necessity of a hearing in this case springs largely
from its characterization as a special civil action for indirect contempt in the Dissenting Opinion of
Justice Sereno (to the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution) and her reliance therein on the
majority’s purported failure to follow the procedure in Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as her main
ground for opposition to the Show Cause Resolution.
However, once and for all, it should be clarified that this is not an indirect contempt proceeding and
Rule 71 (which requires a hearing) has no application to this case. As explicitly ordered in the Show
Cause Resolution this case was docketed as an administrative matter.
The rule that is relevant to this controversy is Rule 139-B, Section 13, on disciplinary proceedings
initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court, to wit:
SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators.—In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court
or in other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the
case for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a
lower court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in sections 6
to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly by the
Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a formal investigation, through a referral to the
specified officers, is merely discretionary, not mandatory on the Court. Furthermore, it is only if the
Court deems such an investigation necessary that the procedure in Sections 6 to 11 of Rule 139-A
will be followed.
As respondents are fully aware, in general, administrative proceedings do not require a trial type
hearing. We have held that:
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be
heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had been afforded the
opportunity to present his side. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential to due process, the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy. (Emphases supplied.)
142

In relation to bar discipline cases, we have had the occasion to rule in Pena v. Aparicio that:
143

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they
do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct
of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations
as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion
to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. (Emphases supplied.)
144

In Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk of Court – Br. 81, Romblon – On the
Prohibition from Engaging in the Private Practice of Law, we further observed that:
145

[I]n several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or resort to any formal
investigation where the facts on record sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of their
administrative liability.
In Prudential Bank v. Castro, the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any further investigation
after considering his actions based on records showing his unethical misconduct; the misconduct not
only cast dishonor on the image of both the Bench and the Bar, but was also inimical to public
interest and welfare. In this regard, the Court took judicial notice of several cases handled by the
errant lawyer and his cohorts that revealed their modus operandi in circumventing the payment of
the proper judicial fees for the astronomical sums they claimed in their cases. The Court held that
those cases sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of respondents' administrative
liability, without need for further inquiry into the matter under the principle of res ipsa loquitur.
Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy, that no evidentiary hearing is
required before the respondent may be disciplined for professional misconduct already established
by the facts on record.
xxxx
These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or formal investigation
of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately exercising its disciplining authority,
as long as the errant lawyer or judge has been given the opportunity to be heard. As we stated
earlier, Atty. Buffe has been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the present matter through her
letter-query and Manifestation filed before this Court. (Emphases supplied.)
146

Under the rules and jurisprudence, respondents clearly had no right to a hearing and their
reservation of a right they do not have has no effect on these proceedings. Neither have they shown
in their pleadings any justification for this Court to call for a hearing in this instance. They have not
specifically stated what relevant evidence, documentary or testimonial, they intend to present in their
defense that will necessitate a formal hearing.
Instead, it would appear that they intend to present records, evidence, and witnesses bearing on the
plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case and in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC on the
assumption that the findings of this Court which were the bases of the Show Cause Resolution were
made in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, or were related to the conclusions of the Court in the Decision in that
case. This is the primary reason for their request for access to the records and evidence presented
in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
This assumption on the part of respondents is erroneous. To illustrate, the only incident in A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC that is relevant to the case at bar is the fact that the submission of the actual signed
copy of the Statement (or Restoring Integrity I, as Dean Leonen referred to it) happened there. Apart
from that fact, it bears repeating that the proceedings in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethics case
against Justice Del Castillo, is a separate and independent matter from this case.
To find the bases of the statements of the Court in the Show Cause Resolution that the respondents
issued a Statement with language that the Court deems objectionable during the pendency of the
Vinuya case and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, respondents need to go no further than
the four corners of the Statement itself, its various versions, news reports/columns (many of which
respondents themselves supplied to this Court in their Common Compliance) and internet sources
that are already of public knowledge.
Considering that what respondents are chiefly required to explain are the language of the Statement
and the circumstances surrounding the drafting, printing, signing, dissemination, etc., of its various
versions, the Court does not see how any witness or evidence in the ethics case of Justice Del
Castillo could possibly shed light on these facts. To be sure, these facts are within the knowledge of
respondents and if there is any evidence on these matters the same would be in their possession.
We find it significant that in Dean Leonen’s Compliance he narrated how as early as September
2010, i.e., before the Decision of this Court in the ethics case of Justice Del Castillo on October 12,
2010 and before the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution, retired Supreme Court Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza, after being shown a copy of the Statement upon his return from abroad,
predicted that the Court would take some form of action on the Statement. By simply reading a hard
copy of the Statement, a reasonable person, even one who "fundamentally agreed" with the
Statement’s principles, could foresee the possibility of court action on the same on an implicit
recognition that the Statement, as worded, is not a matter this Court should simply let pass. This
belies respondents’ claim that it is necessary for them to refer to any record or evidence in A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC in order to divine the bases for the Show Cause Resolution.
If respondents have chosen not to include certain pieces of evidence in their respective compliances
or chosen not to make a full defense at this time, because they were counting on being granted a
hearing, that is respondents’ own look-out. Indeed, law professors of their stature are supposed to
be aware of the above jurisprudential doctrines regarding the non-necessity of a hearing in
disciplinary cases. They should bear the consequence of the risk they have taken.
Thus, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the records of, and evidence presented
in, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC should be denied for lack of merit.
A final word
In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have monolithic views on
any subject, be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers passionately and vigorously
propound their points of view they are bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal profession. This
Court is certainly not claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the Court demands is the
same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under established ethical standards. All
lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors or private practitioners, are officers of
the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for admission to the
Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the courts. There is no exemption from this
sworn duty for law professors, regardless of their status in the academic community or the law
school to which they belong.
WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:

(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his submission, the Court finds his
Compliance to be satisfactory.
(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen,
Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo
V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T.
Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba,
Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria
J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel,
Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose
C. Laureta, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc,
Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario, is found
UNSATISFACTORY. These 35 respondent law professors are reminded of their lawyerly
duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due
respect to the Court and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to
influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the Court and the administration of
justice and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
(3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen regarding the charge of
violation of Canon 10 is found UNSATISFACTORY. He is further ADMONISHED to be more
mindful of his duty, as a member of the Bar, an officer of the Court, and a Dean and
 professor of law, to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court and
warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is excused from these
proceedings. However, he is reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a
Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of responsible and professional conduct
to his students even without the threat of sanction from this Court.
(5) Finally, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-
7-17-SC are denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

See Dissenting Opinion Please see Dissenting Opinion

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice

On leave
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

I certify the Mr. Justice Brion left his concurring vote

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(No Part)
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

Pls see Separate Opinion

ROBERTO A. ABAD
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

I dissent and reserve the right to issue a Separate Opinion

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice

- DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Consistent with my dissent from the Court’s October 19, 2010 Resolution, I maintain my position
that, in the first place, there was no reasonable ground to motu proprio initiate the administrative
case, in view of (1) the therein discussed injudiciousness attending the Resolution, anchored on an
irregularly concluded finding of indirect contempt with adverse declarations prematurely describing
the subject Statement of the UP Law Faculty that could taint the disciplinary action, and (2) the
Court’s conventionally permissive attitude toward the "expression of belief" or "manner of criticism"
coming from legal academics, lawyer-columnists, and civic circles, in a number of high-profile cases,
most notably at the height of the "CJ Appointment Issue" during which time the motion for
reconsideration of the Court’s decision was similarly pending.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION
SERENO, J.:
The history of the Supreme Court shows that the times when it emerged with strength from tempests
of public criticism were those times when it valued constitutional democracy and its own institutional
integrity. Indeed, dangers from pressure and threat presented by what is usually constitutionally
deemed as free speech can arise only when the Court allows itself to be so threatened. It is
unfortunate when a tribunal admits that its core of independence can be shaken by a twelve-
paragraph, two-page commentary from academia. By issuing the Show Cause Order, and affirming
it in the current Decision, the Court puts itself in the precarious position of shackling free speech and
expression. The Court, which has the greater duty of restraint and sobriety, but which appears to the
public to have failed to transcend its instinct for self-preservation and to rise above its own hurt,
gains nothing by punishing those who, to its mind, also lacked such restraint.
I join the dissents of Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Conchita Carpio Morales, and Martin S. Villarama.
To be taken together with this Opinion is my earlier Dissenting Opinion dated 19 October 2010. The
effect and intent of the "Restoring Integrity" Statement must be examined in the context of what this
Court has done to contribute to the controversy as well as the reception by the public of the
pronouncements of this Court on the plagiarism charges in connection with the Decision in G.R. No.
162230, Vinuya, et al v. Executive Secretary, promulgated on 28 April 2010.
A few days after the Malaya Lolas (petitioners in G.R. No. 162230) filed a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration of the Vinuya Decision, the Acting Chief of the Court’s Public Information Office
informed the media that the Chief Justice had no plans of inquiring into the plagiarism charges
against Justice Mariano C. del Castillo raised in said motion. He stated further that: "You can’t
expect all justices in the Supreme Court to be familiar with all these journal articles." Justice del
1

Castillo defended himself by submitting his official statement to the Philippine Star, which published
it on 30 July 2010. In the meantime, Dr. Mark Ellis, one of several authors whose works was
allegedly plagiarized, sent a letter dated 23 July 2010 to the Court, expressing concern about the
alleged plagiarism of his work and the misreading of the arguments therein "for cross purposes."
On 31 July 2010, the Daily Tribune, the Manila Standard, and other newspapers of national
circulation reported that Senator Francis Pangilinan, a member of the bar, demanded the resignation
of Justice Del Castillo in order to "spare the judiciary from embarrassment and harm." On 25 July
2010, the Philippine Daily Inquirer discussed the plagiarism issue in their editorial entitled "Supreme
Theft." On 5 August 2010, another member of the bar wrote about plagiarism in his column entitled
"What’s in a Name?" published in the Business Mirror. On 8 August 2010, the Philippine Daily
2

Inquirer published former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban’s opinion, to the effect that the issue
"seeps to the very integrity of the Court." That same opinion also raised the question of whether the
justices who concurred in the Vinuya ponencia were qualified to sit as members of the Ethics
Committee.
Dean Marvic M.V. F. Leonen of the University of the Philippines College of Law transmitted to the
Court a statement entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement By The Faculty Of The University Of The
Philippines College Of Law On The Allegations Of Plagiarism And Misrepresentation In The
Supreme Court," the cover letter of which was dated 11 August 2010. Shortly thereafter, several
schools published their own declarations on the matter.
A week after the UP Law Faculty’s statement was transmitted to the Court, Professor Christian Tams
expressed his own views. In a letter addressed to the Chief Justice , Professor Tams said: "…I am at
3

a loss to see how my work should have been cited to support – as it seemingly has – the opposite
approach. More generally, I am concerned at the way in which your Honourable Court’s Judgment
has drawn on scholarly work without properly acknowledging it." Other authors soon followed suit,
articulating their own dismay at the use of their original works, through internet blogs, comments and
other public fora.
4

Thus, the negative public exposure caused by such acts of plagiarism cannot be attributed solely to
the UP Law Faculty. That the Court was put in the spotlight and garnered unwanted attention was
caused by a myriad of factors, not the least of which was Justice Del Castillo’s own published
defense entitled "The Del Castillo ponencia in Vinuya" pending the resolution of the complaint
against him by the Ethics Committee, and the categorical statement made by the Acting Chief of the
Court’s Public Information Office to the media that the Chief Justice had no plans of investigating the
plagiarism charges. These twin acts attracted negative reaction, much of which came from the legal
profession and the academe. The issue itself – alleged plagiarism in a judicial decision, including the
alleged use of plagiarized materials to achieve a result opposite to the theses of the said materials –
resonated in the public’s consciousness and stirred a natural desire in the citizenry to raise calls to
save an important public institution, namely, the judiciary. The responses published by different
sectors constituted nothing more than an exercise of free speech – critical commentary calling a
public official to task in the exercise of his functions.
The respondents herein, who were not parties to any pending case at the time, forwarded the
"Restoring Integrity" Statement as a public expression of the faculty’s stand regarding the plagiarism
issue. Such an open communication of ideas from the citizenry is an everyday occurrence – as
evidenced by dozens of letters of appeals for justice received regularly by this Court from a myriad of
people, and the placards displayed along Padre Faura Street every Tuesday. The commentators
and participants in the public discussions on the Vinuya Decision, both on the Internet and in
traditional media, included legal experts and other members of the bar, with even a former Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court numbered among them. Yet only members of the UP Law Faculty
were deemed to be the cause for the majority’s trepidation that the Court’s honesty, integrity, and
competence was being undermined. The Show Cause Order went so far as to hold the respondent
faculty members responsible for threatening the independence of the judiciary.
Despite the assertion that the present case is merely an exercise of the Court’s disciplinary authority
over members of the bar, a closer look reveals the true nature of the proceeding as one for indirect
contempt, the due process requirements of which are strictly provided for under Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court. The majority attempts to skirt the issue regarding the non-observance of due process by
insisting that the present case is not an exercise of the Court’s contempt powers, but rather is
anchored on the Court’s disciplinary powers. Whatever designation the majority may find convenient
to formally characterize this proceeding, however, the pretext is negated by the disposition in the
Resolution of 19 October 2010 itself and its supporting rationale.
The majority directed respondents to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of
the Resolution, why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar. Yet the substance therein
demonstrates that the present proceeding is one for indirect contempt, particularly in the following
portions:
We made it clear in the case of In re Kelly that any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the
court, the jury, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel with reference to the suit, or tending
to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable. 5

xxx xxx xxx

Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible
attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of
the judiciary.
6

xxx xxx xxx

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective
comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the
Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis
7

supplied)
The jurisprudence adverted to by the majority dwell on contempt, foremost of which is In re Kelly,
one of the first and leading cases discussing contempt. Citing Ex Parte Terry, the Supreme Court in
that case held that acts punishable as contempt are those "…tending to obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice, as inherent in courts as essential to the execution of their powers and to the
maintenance of their authority." Significantly, before he was cited for contempt, Respondent Amzi B.
8

Kelly was first given the opportunity to appear before the Court, submit a written Answer, and
present his oral argument.
The footnote citation in Footnote 4 of the 19 October 2010 Resolution, A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC, refers
to "In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet Published
in Malaya Dated September 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007," a case for indirect contempt lodged against
the publisher of a national daily.
In this case, the Court not only gave respondent a chance to explain himself, but also created an
Investigating Committee regarding the subject matter of the alleged contemptible act:
From October 30, 2007 to March 10, 2008, the Investigating Committee held hearings and gathered
affidavits and testimonies from the parties concerned.
The Committee invited respondent Macasaet, Dañguilan-Vitug, Delis, and ACA Marquez to a
preliminary meeting, in which they were requested to submit their respective affidavits which served
as their testimonies on direct examination. They were then later cross-examined on various dates:
respondent Macasaet on January 10, 2008, Dañguilan-Vitug on January 17, 2008, Delis on January
24, 2008, and ACA Marquez on January 28, 2008. The Chief of the Security Services and the
Cashier of the High Court likewise testified on January 22 and 24, 2008, respectively. 9

This approach of using jurisprudence on contempt to justify adverse findings against herein
respondents is continued in the current Decision. The majority cites the 1935 case Salcedo v.
Hernandez which identified the proceedings specifically as contempt, even though the respondent
10

was a member of the bar. The 1949 case of In Re Vicente Sotto , from which the majority quotes
11

heavily – and which the majority states is "still good law" – is explicitly identified as a proceeding for
contempt of court. In Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan and Gonzales, the Court issued a Resolution "to
require respondent Gonzalez to explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he
should not be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions…" only 12

after a Motion to Cite in Contempt was filed by the petitioner. Even as the Court discussed its
exercise of both its contempt powers and disciplinary powers over the respondent attorney in the
said case, it still gave him ample time and opportunity to defend himself by allowing him to file an
Omnibus Motion for Extension and Inhibition, a Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to Inhibit, a
Motion to Transfer Administrative Proceedings to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and an
Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time to File Explanation Ex Abundante Cautelam.
The case of In Re Almacen , also cited in the current Decision, was in the nature of a contempt
13

proceeding even as it adverted to duties of members of the bar, as can be gleaned from the
following:
So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be
invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending
case and not after the conclusion thereof, Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a
contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon to
account were made only after this Court had written finis to his appeal.
Atty. Almacen filed with the Court a "Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title," after his
clients had lost the right to file an appeal before the Court due to his own inadvertence. And yet, the
Court still gave him the "ampliest [sic] latitude" for his defense, giving him an opportunity to file a
written explanation and to be heard in oral argument.
All of the above negate the claim that this is not a contempt proceeding but purely an administrative
one.
The central argumentation in the Show Cause Order is evidence of the original intent of the
proceeding. The allegation and conclusion that the faculty members purportedly "undermine the
Court’s honesty, integrity, and competence," make it clear that the true nature of the action is one for
indirect contempt. The discussion in the Resolution of 19 October 2010 hinged on the tribunal’s need
for self-preservation and independence, in view of the "institutional attacks" and "outside
interference" with its functions – charges which more appropriately fall under its contempt authority,
rather than the authority to determine fitness of entering and maintaining membership in the bar.
The Show Cause Order failed to specify which particular mode of contempt was committed by the
respondents (as required in the Rules of Court). Its language and tenor also explicitly demonstrated
that the guilt of respondents had already been prejudged. Page three (3) of the Order states: "The
opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead." Page four (4)
makes the conclusion that: "The publication of a statement…was totally unnecessary, uncalled for,
and a rash act of misplaced vigilance."
The Order also violated respondents’ right to due process because it never afforded them the
categorical requirements of notice and hearing. The requirements for Indirect Contempt as laid out in
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court demand strict compliance: 1) a complaint in writing which may either
be a motion for contempt filed by a party or an order issued by the court requiring a person to appear
and explain his conduct, and 2) an opportunity for the person charged to appear and explain his
conduct.14

The essence of a court’s contempt powers stems from a much-needed remedy for the violation of
lawful court orders and for maintaining decorum during proceedings, as an essential auxiliary to the
due administration of justice. It is not an all-encompassing tool to silence criticism. Courts must
15

exercise the power of contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended as
a safeguard not for the judges but for the functions they fulfill. It must be wielded on the
16

preservative, rather than on the vindictive, principle. So careful is the approach ordinarily taken by
17

the Court in cases of contempt that it places a premium on the conduct of a hearing, to such a point
that it administratively sanctioned a lower court judge for issuing a Show Cause Order sua sponte
and finding the respondent guilty of criminal contempt without the benefit of a hearing. In the case of
Castaños v. Judge Escaño, Jr., the Court held:
18

It is an oft-repeated rule that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts so as to
preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the due administration of justice. Judges,
however, should exercise their contempt powers judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and
with the end in view of utilizing their contempt powers for correction and preservation, not for
retaliation or vindication.
It is true that, in the case at bench, respondent judge, after having received a copy of Agapito's
affidavit in connection with the petitioner's administrative charges against him, directed Agapito to
show cause within three days from notice why he should not be held in contempt of court…but,
without the benefit of hearing required in Rule 71, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, respondent judge,
in an Order, dated February 22, 1993, sentenced Agapito guilty for contempt of court on account of
the allegations he made in his affidavit, dated November 18, 1992. Such failure to afford Agapito the
opportunity to be heard as a matter of due process of law deserves administrative sanction.
In finding Judge Escaño, Jr. guilty of grave abuse of judicial authority, the Court stated:
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a
principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the
position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in
bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, the judge's dismissal is in order.
After all, faith in the administration of justice exists only if every party-litigant is assured that
occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.
Moreover, witnesses against erring judges cannot come out in the open to help the Judiciary in
disrobing its inept members if we allow judges to abuse their judicial discretion, more particularly
with respect to the exercise of their contempt powers.
As Justice Carpio Morales finds in her Dissenting Opinion to the Resolution of 19 October 2010, this
action of the Court is tainted with injudiciousness precisely because:
"…the Resolution is not what it purports to be. Ostensibly, the Resolution is a show cause order that
initiates what would become a newly docketed regular administrative matter. There is more than
meets the eye, however. When stripped of its apparent complexion, the Resolution shows its true
colors and presents itself as a pronouncement of guilt of indirect contempt without proper recourse
left to the parties."19

Thus, Justice Carpio Morales reiterates in her Dissenting Opinion to the current Decision her belief
that this proceeding is in essence one for indirect contempt:
"Consistent with my dissent from the Court’s October 19, 2010 Resolution, I maintain my position
that there was no reasonable ground to motu proprio initiate the administrative case, in view of (i) the
therein discussed injudiciousness attending the Resolution, which was anchored on an irregularly
concluded finding of indirect contempt with adverse declarations prematurely describing the subject
Statement, that could taint the disciplinary action."
The power to cite for contempt, as well as the power to discipline, are mechanisms to be exercised
solely towards the orderly administration of justice. Such powers must be weighed carefully against
the substantive rights of the public to free expression and academic freedom. In this critical
balancing act, the tribunal must therefore utilize, to the fullest extent, soundness and clarity of
reasoning, and must not appear to have been swayed by momentary fits of temper.
Instead of regarding criticism as perpetually adversarial, the judiciary would do well to respect it,
both as an important tool for public accountability, and as the only soothing balm for vindication of
felt injustice. Judicial legitimacy established through demonstrated intellectual integrity in decision-
making rightly generates public acceptance of such decisions, which makes them truly binding.
William Howard Taft, who served as a federal appellate judge before becoming the President of the
United States, understood the weight of public evaluation in this wise: "If the law is but the essence
of common sense, the protest of many average men may evidence a defect in a judicial conclusion
though based on the nicest reasoning and profoundest learning." 20

We who occupy this august chamber are right not because our word is accorded legal finality on
matters that are before us. We are right only when we have been proven right. There must always
reside, in the recesses of our minds, the clear distinction between what is merely legal and what is
legitimate. Legitimacy is a "tenuous commodity, particularly for unelected judges," and it can only be
21

maintained by a sustained perception of fairness, as well as by the retention of the moral authority of
individual judges. This required characteristic of the Court is diminished when its members do not
act through the rational strength of their decisions, but are instead perceived to have done so in the
misunderstanding of the Court’s disciplinary powers.
"To maintain not only its stature, but also, more importantly, its independence, the judiciary must
adhere to the discipline of judicial decision-making, firmly rooting rulings in the language of the
documents in issue, precedent and logic. That is, the strength of the judiciary's independence
depends not only on the constitutional framework, but also on the extent to which the judiciary
acknowledges its responsibility to decide ‘according to law’…" 22

Furthermore, as one American Federal Supreme Court decision said:

"Secrecy of judicial action can only breed ignorance and distrust of courts and suspicion concerning
the competence and impartiality of judges; free and robust reporting, criticism, and debate can
contribute to public understanding of the rule of law and to comprehension of the functioning of the
entire criminal justice system, as well as improve the quality of that system by subjecting it to the
cleansing effects of exposure and public accountability." 23

The Code of Judicial Conduct prescribes the standards for a judicial response to free speech which,
highly-charged though it may be, is necessarily protected. Rule 3.04 in particular states that: "A
judge should be patient, attentive and courteous to all lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to
litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously
falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts instead of the courts for the
litigants." The Supreme Court has itself, on occasion, demanded of lower court judges that they be
"dignified in demeanor and refined in speech, [and] exhibit that temperament of utmost sobriety and
self-restraint…"24

Nothing can be gained from the Court’s exercise of a heavy hand in a matter which has originated
from the Court itself. On the contrary, there is much to lose in imposing penalties on the outspoken
merely because the outspoken have earned the ire of the Court’s members.
They who seek to judge must first themselves be judged. By occupying an exalted seat in the
judiciary, judges in effect undertake to embrace a profession and lead lives that demand stringent
ethical norms. In his dealings with the public, a judge must exhibit great self-restraint; he should be
25

the last person to be perceived as a tyrant holding imperious sway over his domain, and must
26

demonstrate to the public that in the discharge of his judicial role, he "possess[es] the virtue
of gravitas. He should be…dignified in demeanor, refined in speech and virtuous in character…[H]e
must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint… a judge should
always keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose and overcome his reason." 27

In my view of a constitutional democracy, the judiciary is required to demonstrate moral authority

and legitimacy, not only legality, at all times. It has often been said that the rule of law requires an
independent judiciary that fairly, impartially and promptly applies the law to cases before it. The rule
of law requires a judiciary that is not beholden to any political power or private interests, whose only
loyalty is to the people and to the Constitution that the people have ordained as their fundamental
governing precept. It requires integrity, independence and probity of each individual judge. To be
independent, the judiciary must always remember that it will lose public support and in a certain
sense, its legitimacy, if it does not demonstrate its integrity in its judicial decisions. It must show a
keen nose for the fundamental importance of upholding right over wrong.
To maintain a life of intellectual integrity, those of us in the judiciary must be buffeted by the winds of
healthful criticism. Direct and informed criticism of judicial decisions strengthens accountability. As
Taft is noted for writing: "[n]othing tends more to render judges careful in their decisions and
anxiously solicitous to do exact justice than the consciousness that every act of theirs is to be
subject to the intelligent scrutiny of their fellow men, and to their candid criticism .... In the case of
judges having a life tenure, indeed, their very independence makes the right freely to comment on
their decisions of greater importance, because it is the only practical and available instrument in the
hands of a free people to keep such judges alive to the reasonable demands of those they serve." 28

This is where academic freedom, when exercised in appropriate measure, is most helpful. Milton
encapsulates free speech as simply the right to "argue freely according to conscience." The value of
29

academic freedom, as a necessary constitutional component of the right to freedom of expression,

lies in the ability of the common man, aided by the expertise available in the academe, to hold a
magistrate accountable in the exercise of his official functions, foremost of which is the issuance of
written decisions. Paragraph 23 of the United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of
Lawyers states:
30

Lawyers like other citizens are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly. In
particular, they shall have the right to take part in public discussion of matters concerning the law,
the administration of justice and the promotion and protection of human rights and to join or form
local, national or international organizations and attend their meetings, without suffering professional
restrictions by reason of their lawful action or their membership in a lawful organization…
The Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers "have been formulated to assist Member States in their
task of promoting and ensuring the proper role of lawyers," and these "should be respected and
taken into account by Governments within the framework of their national legislation and practice
and should be brought to the attention of lawyers as well as other persons, such as judges,
prosecutors, members of the executive and legislature, and the public in general." Thus, faced with
the duty of balancing lawyers’ fundamental right to free speech which has now been expressly
recognized in the international arena, against this Court’s desire to preserve its exalted role in
society by disciplining for offensive language, this Court must examine whether it has already
encroached into constitutionally-prohibited interference with the basic rights of individuals. The realm
of public opinion is where the academe, especially our schools and universities, plays a most crucial
role in ensuring judicial legitimacy. Not by blindly legitimizing its acts, but by constantly reminding the
judiciary of its presence as a helpful but critical ally. The academe is not to be an applause machine
for the judiciary; it is to help guide the judiciary by illuminating new paths for the judiciary to take, by
alerting the judiciary to its inconsistent decisions, and by identifying gaps in law and jurisprudence.
In this regard, the law school has a special place. Phoebe Haddon writes: "[t]he value and
preservation of academic freedom depend on an academic environment that nurtures, not silences,
diverse views. The law school faculty has a special responsibility to maintain a nurturing
environment for diverse views because of the importance of the marketplace of ideas in our teaching
and the value we theoretically place on the role of persuasive discourse in the quest for knowledge.
Faculty autonomy takes on significance because it can protect freedom of inquiry." In a certain
31

sense, therefore, because the law faculty can discharge a most meaningful role in keeping the
judiciary honest, there must be recognition given to the special role of the law faculty in upholding
judicial independence.
The testing ground for integrity in judicial decision-making is provided in large measure by the legal
academe, when it probes, tests and measures whether judicial decisions rise up to the definition of
just and well-reasoned decisions as they have been defined by centuries-old norms of legal
reasoning and legal scholarship. If we have a legal academe that is slothful, that is not self-
disciplined, that covets the closeness to the powers-that-be which an unprofessional relationship
with the judicial leadership can bring, then this refining role of the legal academe is lost. The legal
academe is the preserver of the noble standards of legal reasoning and legal scholarship. It must
itself demonstrate strength and independence and not be punished when doing so.
Those who occupy the most powerful positions in this country must always be ready to hold
themselves accountable to the people. I believe that the tradition of deference to the judiciary has
limits to its usefulness and these times do not call for the unbroken observance of such deference as
much as they call for a public demonstration of honesty in all its forms.
I dissent from the Majority Decision admonishing Dean Marvic M. V. F. Leonen and issuing a
warning to the thirty-five faculty members in connection with the "Restoring Integrity" Statement. I
find the Common Compliance of the thirty-five faculty members, dated 18 November 2010, as well
as the Compliance submitted by Professor Rosa Maria T. Juan Bautista on 18 November 2010 and
by Professor Raul Vasquez on 19 November 2010, to be satisfactory. I also find the separate
Compliance of Dean Leonen dated 18 November 2010 and of Professor Owen J. Lynch dated 19
November 2010 similarly satisfactory, and vote to consider this matter closed and terminated.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Associate Justice

SEPARATE OPINION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This treats of respondents’ compliance with the Court’s Resolution dated October 19, 2010, which
required respondents, who are professors of the University of the Philippines College of Law, to
show cause why they should not be disciplined as members of the bar for having published a
Statement entitled, "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the
Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme
Court" which appeared to contain statements that were disrespectful to the Court. The Court’s
directive reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico
A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador
Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D.
Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel
R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A.
Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La
Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S Quimbo, Antonio M.
Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul V. Vasquez, Susan
D. Villanueva, and Dina D. Lucenario, members of the faculty of the University of the Philippines
College of Law, are directed to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this
Resolution, why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of Canons 1 , 11,
1

and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Further, Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen is directed to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt
of this Resolution, why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules
10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting, through his letter dated August 10, 2010, during the pendency
of G.R. No. 162330, Vinuya v. Executive Secretary and of the investigation before the Committee on
Ethics and Ethical Standards, for the consideration of the Court En Banc, a dummy which is not a
true and faithful reproduction of the purported statement, entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement
by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism
and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court." x x x
In their Compliance, 35 of the respondents, excluding Professors Owen J. Lynch and Raul V.
Vasquez, take common defense that the statements contained in Restoring Integrity were mere
expressions of their opinion, dispensed in accordance with their duties as members of the bar and
as professors of law. They aver that they acted with the purest intentions, guided by their duty of
candor, fairness and good faith to the Court, and deny that it was their intention to malign the Court
as an institution for its decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. They claim that any reference
2

to Vinuya in their statement was made only to establish and accent the grave consequences of the
allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation allegedly committed by one of the Court’s members.
Indeed, they claim that the Statement was intended "to defend the integrity and credibility of the
entire Supreme Court" and ensure continued confidence in the legal system and the Judiciary by
calling on the Court to take constructive action in the face of the damaging allegations. They also
add that the Statement was meant to address what they perceived as indifference on the part of the
Court owing to certain statements reportedly made by Supreme Court Administrator and
spokesperson, Atty. Jose Midas P. Marquez (that Chief Justice Renato C. Corona would not take
any action on the charges) and their reading of Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo’s letter replying to the
allegations.
Respondents affirm their loyalty and respect for the Court and claim that as professors of law, they
have a special interest in guarding against plagiarism and misrepresentation to ensure intellectual
honesty among their students. They allegedly released the Statement in support of "efforts to
achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in
disseminating information regarding law and jurisprudence." Citing similar commentaries on the
issue, they likewise invoke freedom of speech and academic freedom to justify the publication of
their stand on the matter.
Finally, respondents argue that the Resolution amounted to a prejudgment of their liability for
contempt and breach of Canons 1, 11, 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Thus, they invoke their right to due process and plead for an opportunity to present
evidence relative to the proceedings in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC entitled In the Matter of the Charges of
Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo.
Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista, in her separate Compliance and Reservation, reiterates the
above reservation of her right to due process and request for hearing. She likewise supplements the
above submissions with additional arguments in support of her assertion that she signed the
Statement in the exercise of her freedom of expression.
As to Prof. Owen J. Lynch, Prof. Lynch filed a Manifestation invoking freedom of expression and
asserting that the statement did not pose a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the
State has a right to prevent. He also manifests that he is not a member of the Philippine Bar as he is
an American citizen who is a member of the bar of the State of Minnesota.
Prof. Raul V. Vasquez, for his part, likewise submits that he never had any intention of maligning the
Court and alleges that he signed the Statement as he was fundamentally in agreement with its
contents. He further states that he might have been remiss in correctly assessing the effects of the
language employed in the Statement and says that he could have been more careful.
As regards the charge of violating Canon 10 and Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting to the
Court a copy of the Restoring Integrity Statement that was not a true and faithful reproduction
thereof, Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen submitted the following explanations.
Dean Leonen denies misrepresenting the contents of the Statement or which faculty members
signed and/or signified their intention to sign the same. He avers that there are actually three
versions of the Statement, all with the same contents, but with different signature pages. Two
versions were submitted to the Court: one with the signature pages containing the full roster of
faculty members and the actual signatures of the signatories (which version he calls Restoring
Integrity I) and the other with the retyped signature page containing just the names of the members
who signed, with the notation "(SGD.)" beside their names. This second version he referred to as
Restoring Integrity II. According to him, these two copies arose because after the original version
containing the full roster of faculty members was circulated for signature, he had the signature pages
re-typed to eliminate the blanks prior to posting in the bulletin board. (He alleges that the practice of
re-typing the signature pages was meant to ensure the integrity of the public issuance as posting the
Statement with blanks would open it to vandalism.)
When the re-typed signature page was presented to him by his staff, he noticed that the name of
retired Justice Vicente V. Mendoza was indicated as a signatory even though the latter did not sign
the Statement. He asked his administrative staff about the inclusion and the latter claimed that she
spoke to Justice Mendoza on the phone before the latter flew for the United States. According to his
staff, Justice Mendoza allegedly authorized him to sign on behalf of Justice Mendoza since the latter
agrees with the contents of the Statement but was just unable to personally affix his signature
because he was leaving for the United States the following week. Dean Leonen claims that he did
not have any reason to disbelieve his staff because there were indeed other faculty members who
authorized him to sign the Statement for them. Thus, he placed full faith and confidence in his staff’s
claim and allowed the inclusion of Justice Mendoza’s name as one of the signatories in Restoring
Integrity II which he later submitted to the Court. Because of this information, also, he believed that
the total number of signatories to the Statement was already 38.
Dean Leonen adds that in September 2010, he received a call from Justice Mendoza, who said that
he will no longer sign the statement "considering that it had already become controversial and that
he did not wish to unduly aggravate the situation." On October 21, 2010, after receiving a copy of
this Court’s Show Cause Resolution, he met with his staff and reviewed what had transpired in
connection with their efforts to secure Justice Mendoza’s signature. It was then that he learned that
while Justice Mendoza initially agreed to sign the statement, Justice Mendoza did not exactly
authorize him to sign for the latter. Rather, Justice Mendoza merely inquired "if he could authorize
the dean to sign it for him as he was leaving for the United States." He then realized the full import of
the call he received from Justice Mendoza in September.
As regards the omission of the name of Atty. Miguel R. Armovit in the re-typed signature pages of
Restoring Integrity II, Dean Leonen explains that the omission was due simply to inadvertence.
After a careful study of the respondents’ submissions, I respectfully submit that the above
submissions are SATISFACTORY in view of respondents’ claim of good faith and the fact that a re-
examination of the Statement indeed admits of such claim. Consistent with respondents’ claims, the
tenor of the Statement was to call the Court’s attention to the grave allegations and its effects on the
integrity and credibility of the Court and the Judiciary. Indeed, the general wording of the Statement
and its ending paragraphs lend support to respondents’ averments that the Statement was prompted
by the sincere and honest desire to protect the integrity and credibility of the Judiciary, especially the
Supreme Court. Given such submissions, I am willing to afford respondents the benefit of the doubt
as to their intentions concerning the forceful language employed in certain portions of the Restoring
Integrity Statement. This is especially so considering that the subject statements present no clear
and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent as to take it out of the
protective mantle of the freedom of speech and expression under the Bill of Rights. A reading of the
Statement, with particular focus on its final paragraphs, will not leave the reader with feelings of
contempt for the Court but only a feeling that the Court must champion the cause of integrity.
Furthermore, it should be noted that our society has developed to the point where critical analysis of
information is not in short supply. The public is nowadays not only more well informed, but it has
access to information with which citizens could make their own independent assessment of pending
issues of public concern, including the fitness and integrity of the members of this Court to render
fair and impartial judgment on the cases before them. However, given the fact that some isolated
portions of the statement were arguably disrespectful, respondents should be reminded to be more
circumspect in their future statements.
As regards Dean Leonen, I likewise submit that his explanation is sufficient to exonerate him from
the charge of violation of Canon 10 and Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03, all of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. While it appears that Dean Leonen mistakenly relied on hearsay
information that Justice Mendoza had authorized him to indicate Justice Mendoza as a signatory to
the Statement, still, Dean Leonen’s lapses appear more the result of overzealousness rather than
bad faith or a deliberate intent to do falsehood or to mislead the Court. Indeed, under the
circumstances as they appeared to him, and considering that there were other professors who had
authorized him to indicate them as signatories, it was not all too remiss on his part to indicate
3

Justice Mendoza as a signatory to the Statement upon the information given to him by his
administrative staff. That he acted upon the wrong information given to him, though telling of some
degree of carelessness on his part, is not gross negligence that is tantamount to bad faith. Hence,
there being no intent or inexcusable negligence, there is no ground to find him liable under Canon 10
and Rules 10.01 and 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Similarly, there is no cogent reason to hold him liable for violation of Rule 10.03 as it likewise does
not appear that Dean Leonen violated any rule of procedure or misused any procedural rule to
defeat the ends of justice. The submission of the Statement to the Court, it should be noted, was ad
hoc.
I therefore vote to NOTE and CONSIDER the explanations submitted by respondents in their
Compliance/s SATISFACTORY with a REMINDER that they be more circumspect in their future
statements considering that the Court also has its own sensibilities.
I also vote to consider this administrative matter CLOSED and TERMINATED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC October 15, 2010

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case is concerned with charges that, in preparing a decision for the Court, a designated
member plagiarized the works of certain authors and twisted their meanings to support the decision.
The Background Facts
Petitioners Isabelita C. Vinuya and about 70 other elderly women, all members of the Malaya Lolas
Organization, filed with the Court in G.R. No. 162230 a special civil action of certiorari with
application for preliminary mandatory injunction against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of Justice, and the Office of the Solicitor General.
Petitioners claimed that in destroying villages in the Philippines during World War II, the Japanese
army systematically raped them and a number of other women, seizing them and holding them in
houses or cells where soldiers repeatedly ravished and abused them.
Petitioners alleged that they have since 1998 been approaching the Executive Department,
represented by the respondent public officials, requesting assistance in filing claims against the
Japanese military officers who established the comfort women stations. But that Department
declined, saying that petitioners’ individual claims had already been fully satisfied under the Peace
Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
Petitioners wanted the Court to render judgment, compelling the Executive Department to espouse
their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International
Court of Justice and other international tribunals.
On April 28, 2010, the Court rendered judgment dismissing petitioners’ action. Justice Mariano C.
del Castillo wrote the decision for the Court. The Court essentially gave two reasons for its decision:
it cannot grant the petition because, first, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative
under the Constitution and the law to determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claim against Japan;
and, second, the Philippines is not under any obligation in international law to espouse their claims.
On June 9, 2010, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s decision. More than a
month later on July 18, 2010, counsel for petitioners, Atty. Herminio Harry Roque, Jr., announced in
his online blog that his clients would file a supplemental petition "detailing plagiarism committed by
the court" under the second reason it gave for dismissing the petition and that "these stolen
passages were also twisted to support the court’s erroneous conclusions that the Filipino comfort
women of World War Two have no further legal remedies." The media gave publicity to Atty.
Roque’s announcement.
On July 19, 2010, petitioners filed the supplemental motion for reconsideration that Atty. Roque
announced. It accused Justice Del Castillo of "manifest intellectual theft and outright
plagiarism" when he wrote the decision for the Court and of "twisting the true intents of the
1

plagiarized sources … to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment." They charged Justice Del
2

Castillo of copying without acknowledgement certain passages from three foreign articles:

a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Yale Journal
of International Law (2009);
b. Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis, Case Western
Reserve Journal of International Law (2006); and
c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams, Cambridge University Press
(2005).

Petitioners claim that the integrity of the Court’s deliberations in the case has been put into question
by Justice Del Castillo’s fraud. The Court should thus "address and disclose to the public the truth
about the manifest intellectual theft and outright plagiarism" that resulted in gross prejudice to the
3

petitioners.
Because of the publicity that the supplemental motion for reconsideration generated, Justice Del
Castillo circulated a letter to his colleagues, subsequently verified, stating that when he wrote the
decision for the Court he had the intent to attribute all sources used in it. He said in the pertinent
part:
It must be emphasized that there was every intention to attribute all sources, whenever due. At no
point was there ever any malicious intent to appropriate another’s work as our own. We recall that
this ponencia was thrice included in the Agenda of the Court en banc. It was deliberated upon during
the Baguio session on April 13, 2010, April 20, 2010 and in Manila on April 27, 2010. Each time,
suggestions were made which necessitated major revisions in the draft. Sources were re-studied,
discussions modified, passages added or deleted. The resulting decision comprises 34 pages with
78 footnotes.
xxxx
As regards the claim of the petitioners that the concepts as contained in the above foreign materials
were "twisted," the same remains their opinion which we do not necessarily share. 4

On July 27, 2010, the Court En Banc referred the charges against Justice Del Castillo to its
Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, chaired by the Chief Justice, for investigation and
recommendation. The Chief Justice designated retired Justice Jose C. Vitug to serve as consultant
of the Committee. He graciously accepted.
On August 2, 2010, the Committee directed petitioners to comment on Justice Del Castillo’s verified
letter. When this was done, it set the matter for hearing.
In the meantime, on July 19, 2010, Evan Criddle wrote on his blog that he and his co-author Evan
Fox-Descent (referred to jointly as Criddle-Descent) learned of alleged plagiarism involving their
work but Criddle’s concern, after reading the supplemental motion for reconsideration, was the
Court’s conclusion that prohibitions against sexual slavery are not jus cogens or internationally
binding norms that treaties cannot diminish.
On July 23, 2010, Dr. Mark Ellis wrote the Court expressing concern that in mentioning his work, the
Court "may have misread the argument [he] made in the article and employed them for cross
purposes." Dr. Ellis said that he wrote the article precisely to argue for appropriate legal remedy for
victims of war crimes.
On August 8, 2010, after the referral of the matter to the Committee for investigation, the Dean of the
University of the Philippines (U.P.) College of Law publicized a Statement from his faculty, claiming
that the Vinuya decision was "an extraordinary act of injustice" and a "singularly reprehensible act of
dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land." The statement said that Justice
Del Castillo had a "deliberate intention to appropriate the original authors’ work," and that the Court’s
decision amounted to "an act of intellectual fraud by copying works in order to mislead and deceive." 5

On August 18, 2010 Mr. Christian J. Tams wrote Chief Justice Renato C. Corona that, although
relevant sentences in the Court’s decision were taken from his work, he was given generic reference
only in the footnote and in connection with a citation from another author (Bruno Simma) rather than
with respect to the passages taken from his work. He thought that the form of referencing was
inappropriate. Mr. Tams was also concerned that the decision may have used his work to support an
approach to erga omnes concept (obligations owed by individual States to the community of nations)
that is not consistent with what he advocated.
On August 26, 2010, the Committee heard the parties’ submissions in the summary manner of
administrative investigations. Counsels from both sides were given ample time to address the
Committee and submit their evidence. The Committee queried them on these.
Counsels for Justice Del Castillo later asked to be heard with the other parties not in attendance so
they could make submissions that their client regarded as sensitive and confidential, involving the
drafting process that went into the making of the Court’s decision in the Vinuya case. Petitioners’
counsels vigorously objected and the Committee sustained the objection. After consulting Justice
Del Castillo, his counsels requested the Committee to hear the Justice’s court researcher, whose
name need not be mentioned here, explain the research work that went into the making of the
decision in the Vinuya case. The Committee granted the request.
The researcher demonstrated by Power Point presentation how the attribution of the lifted passages
to the writings of Criddle-Descent and Ellis, found in the beginning drafts of her report to Justice Del
Castillo, were unintentionally deleted. She tearfully expressed remorse at her "grievous mistake" and
grief for having "caused an enormous amount of suffering for Justice Del Castillo and his family." 6

On the other hand, addressing the Committee in reaction to the researcher’s explanation, counsel
for petitioners insisted that lack of intent is not a defense in plagiarism since all that is required is for
a writer to acknowledge that certain words or language in his work were taken from another’s work.
Counsel invoked the Court’s ruling in University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of
Appeals and Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine, arguing that standards on plagiarism in the
7

academe should apply with more force to the judiciary.

After the hearing, the Committee gave the parties ten days to file their respective memoranda. They
filed their memoranda in due course. Subsequently after deliberation, the Committee submitted its
unanimous findings and recommendations to the Court.
The Issues
This case presents two issues:

1. Whether or not, in writing the opinion for the Court in the Vinuya case, Justice Del Castillo
plagiarized the published works of authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis.
2. Whether or not Justice Del Castillo twisted the works of these authors to make it appear
that such works supported the Court’s position in the Vinuya decision.

The Court’s Rulings

Because of the pending motion for reconsideration in the Vinuya case, the Court like its Committee
on Ethics and Ethical Standards will purposely avoid touching the merits of the Court’s decision in
that case or the soundness or lack of soundness of the position it has so far taken in the same. The
Court will deal, not with the essential merit or persuasiveness of the foreign author’s works, but how
the decision that Justice Del Castillo wrote for the Court appropriated parts of those works and for
what purpose the decision employed the same.
At its most basic, plagiarism means the theft of another person’s language, thoughts, or ideas. To
plagiarize, as it is commonly understood according to Webster, is "to take (ideas, writings, etc.) from
(another) and pass them off as one’s own." The passing off of the work of another as one’s own is
8

thus an indispensable element of plagiarism.

The Passages from Tams
Petitioners point out that the Vinuya decision lifted passages from Tams’ book, Enforcing Erga
Omnes Obligations in International Law (2006) and used them in Footnote 69 with what the author
thought was a mere generic reference. But, although Tams himself may have believed that the
footnoting in this case was not "an appropriate form of referencing," he and petitioners cannot deny
9

that the decision did attribute the source or sources of such passages. Justice Del Castillo did not
pass off Tams’ work as his own. The Justice primarily attributed the ideas embodied in the passages
to Bruno Simma, whom Tams himself credited for them. Still, Footnote 69 mentioned, apart from
Simma, Tams’ article as another source of those ideas.
The Court believes that whether or not the footnote is sufficiently detailed, so as to satisfy the
footnoting standards of counsel for petitioners is not an ethical matter but one concerning clarity of
writing. The statement "See Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (2005)" in
the Vinuya decision is an attribution no matter if Tams thought that it gave him somewhat less credit
than he deserved. Such attribution altogether negates the idea that Justice Del Castillo passed off
the challenged passages as his own.
That it would have been better had Justice Del Castillo used the introductory phrase "cited in" rather
than the phrase "See" would make a case of mere inadvertent slip in attribution rather than a case of
"manifest intellectual theft and outright plagiarism." If the Justice’s citations were imprecise, it would
just be a case of bad footnoting rather than one of theft or deceit. If it were otherwise, many would
be target of abuse for every editorial error, for every mistake in citing pagination, and for every
technical detail of form.
The Passages from Ellis
and Criddle-Descent
Petitioners also attack the Court’s decision for lifting and using as footnotes, without attribution to the
author, passages from the published work of Ellis. The Court made the following statement on page
27 of its decision, marked with Footnote 65 at the end:
We fully agree that rape, sexual slavery, torture, and sexual violence are morally reprehensible as
well as legally prohibited under contemporary international law. 65 xxx
Footnote 65 appears down the bottom of the page. Since the lengthy passages in that footnote
came almost verbatim from Ellis’ article, such passages ought to have been introduced by an
10

acknowledgement that they are from that article. The footnote could very well have read:
65 In an article, Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime, Case Western Reserve
Journal of International Law (2006), Mark Ellis said: The concept of rape as an international crime is
relatively new. This is not to say that rape has never been historically prohibited, particularly in war.
But modern-day sensitivity to the crime of rape did not emerge until after World War II. In the
Nuremberg Charter, the word rape was not mentioned. The article on crimes against humanity
explicitly set forth prohibited acts, but rape was not mentioned by name. (For example, the Treaty of
Amity and Commerce between Prussia and the United States provides that in time of war all women
and children "shall not be molested in their persons." The Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Between
his Majesty the King of Prussia and the United States of America, art. 23, Sept. 10, 1785, U.S.-
Pruss., 8 Treaties & Other Int'l Agreements Of The U.S. 78, 85. The 1863 Lieber Instructions
classified rape as a crime of "troop discipline." (Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in International
Humanitarian Law as a Norm of Jus cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine, 15 Duke J. Comp. Int’l. L. 219,
224). It specified rape as a capital crime punishable by the death penalty (Id. at 236). The 1907
Hague Convention protected women by requiring the protection of their "honour." ("Family honour
and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice,
must be respected." Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws & Customs of War on Land, art. 46, Oct.
18, 1907. General Assembly resolution 95 (I) of December 11, 1946 entitled, "Affirmation of the
Principles of International Law recognized by the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal"; General
Assembly document A/64/Add.1 of 1946; See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the
Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. Article 6(c)
of the Charter established crimes against humanity as the following:
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and
other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime
within the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country
where perpetrated.
The Nuremberg Judgment did not make any reference to rape and rape was not prosecuted. (Judge
Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, The International Criminal Tribunals Crime and Punishment in the
International Arena,7 ILSA J. Int’l. Comp. L. 667, 676.) However, International Military Tribunal for
the Far East prosecuted rape crimes, even though its Statute did not explicitly criminalize rape. The
Far East Tribunal held General Iwane Matsui, Commander Shunroku Hata and Foreign Minister
Hirota criminally responsible for a series of crimes, including rape, committed by persons under their
authority. (The Tokyo Judgment: Judgment Of The International Military Tribunal For The Far East
445-54 (1977).
The first mention of rape as a specific crime came in December 1945 when Control Council Law No.
10 included the term rape in the definition of crimes against humanity. Law No. 10, adopted by the
four occupying powers in Germany, was devised to establish a uniform basis for prosecuting war
criminals in German courts. (Control Council for Germany, Law No. 10: Punishment of Persons
Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, 3 Official
Gazette Control Council for Germany 50, 53 (1946))
The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War was the first modern-
day international instrument to establish protections against rape for women. Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 27, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entry into force Oct. 20, 1950) [hereinafter Fourth Geneva
Convention].Furthermore, the ICC, the ICTY, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) have significantly advanced the crime of rape by enabling it to be prosecuted as genocide, a
war crime, and a crime against humanity.
But, as it happened, the acknowledgment above or a similar introduction was missing from Footnote
65.
Next, petitioners also point out that the following eight sentences and their accompanying footnotes
appear in text on pages 30-32 of the Vinuya decision:
xxx In international law, the term "jus cogens" (literally, "compelling law") refers to norms that
command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are
considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be
modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority.71 1avvphi1

Early strains of the jus cogens doctrine have existed since the 1700s,72 but peremptory norms
began to attract greater scholarly attention with the publication of Alfred von Verdross's influential
1937 article, Forbidden Treaties in International Law.73 The recognition of jus cogens gained even
more force in the 1950s and 1960s with the ILC’s preparation of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties (VCLT).74 Though there was a consensus that certain international norms had attained
the status of jus cogens,75 the ILC was unable to reach a consensus on the proper criteria for
identifying peremptory norms.
After an extended debate over these and other theories of jus cogens, the ILC concluded ruefully in
1963 that "there is not as yet any generally accepted criterion by which to identify a general rule of
international law as having the character of jus cogens."76 In a commentary accompanying the draft
convention, the ILC indicated that "the prudent course seems to be to x x x leave the full content of
this rule to be worked out in State practice and in the jurisprudence of international tribunals."77
Thus, while the existence of jus cogens in international law is undisputed, no consensus exists on its
substance,77 beyond a tiny core of principles and rules.78
Admittedly, the Vinuya decision lifted the above, including their footnotes, from Criddle-Descent’s
article, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens. Criddle-Descent’s footnotes were carried into the Vinuya
11

decision’s own footnotes but no attributions were made to the two authors in those footnotes.
The Explanation
Unless amply explained, the above lifting from the works of Ellis and Criddle-Descent could be
construed as plagiarism. But one of Justice Del Castillo’s researchers, a court-employed attorney,
explained how she accidentally deleted the attributions, originally planted in the beginning drafts of
her report to him, which report eventually became the working draft of the decision. She said that, for
most parts, she did her research electronically. For international materials, she sourced these mainly
from Westlaw, an online research service for legal and law-related materials to which the Court
subscribes.
In the old days, the common practice was that after a Justice would have assigned a case for study
and report, the researcher would source his materials mostly from available law books and published
articles on print. When he found a relevant item in a book, whether for one side of the issue or for
the other, he would place a strip of paper marker on the appropriate page, pencil mark the item, and
place the book on his desk where other relevant books would have piled up. He would later
paraphrase or copy the marked out passages from some of these books as he typed his manuscript
on a manual typewriter. This occasion would give him a clear opportunity to attribute the materials
used to their authors or sources.
With the advent of computers, however, as Justice Del Castillo’s researcher also explained, most
legal references, including the collection of decisions of the Court, are found in electronic diskettes
or in internet websites that offer virtual libraries of books and articles. Here, as the researcher found
items that were relevant to her assignment, she downloaded or copied them into her "main
manuscript," a smorgasbord plate of materials that she thought she might need. The researcher’s
technique in this case is not too far different from that employed by a carpenter. The carpenter first
gets the pieces of lumber he would need, choosing the kinds and sizes suitable to the object he has
in mind, say a table. When ready, he would measure out the portions he needs, cut them out of the
pieces of lumber he had collected, and construct his table. He would get rid of the scraps.
Here, Justice Del Castillo’s researcher did just that. She electronically "cut" relevant materials from
books and journals in the Westlaw website and "pasted" these to a "main manuscript" in her
computer that contained the issues for discussion in her proposed report to the Justice. She used
the Microsoft Word program. Later, after she decided on the general shape that her report would
12

take, she began pruning from that manuscript those materials that did not fit, changing the positions
in the general scheme of those that remained, and adding and deleting paragraphs, sentences, and
words as her continuing discussions with Justice Del Castillo, her chief editor, demanded.
Parenthetically, this is the standard scheme that computer-literate court researchers use everyday in
their work.
Justice Del Castillo’s researcher showed the Committee the early drafts of her report in the Vinuya
case and these included the passages lifted from the separate articles of Criddle-Descent and of
Ellis with proper attributions to these authors. But, as it happened, in the course of editing and
cleaning up her draft, the researcher accidentally deleted the attributions.
First Finding
The Court adopts the Committee’s finding that the researcher’s explanation regarding the accidental
removal of proper attributions to the three authors is credible. Given the operational properties of the
Microsoft program in use by the Court, the accidental decapitation of attributions to sources of
research materials is not remote.
For most senior lawyers and judges who are not computer literate, a familiar example similar to the
circumstances of the present case would probably help illustrate the likelihood of such an accident
happening. If researcher X, for example, happens to be interested in "the inalienable character of
juridical personality" in connection with an assignment and if the book of the learned Civilist, Arturo
M. Tolentino, happens to have been published in a website, researcher X would probably show
interest in the following passage from that book:
xxx Both juridical capacity and capacity to act are not rights, but qualities of persons; hence, they
cannot be alienated or renounced.15
xxx
_____________________________
15 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.
Because the sentence has a footnote mark (#15) that attributes the idea to other sources, it is
evident that Tolentino did not originate it. The idea is not a product of his intellect. He merely lifted it
from Von Tuhr and Valverde, two reputable foreign authors.
When researcher X copies and pastes the above passage and its footnote into a manuscript-in-the-
making in his computer, the footnote number would, given the computer program in use,
automatically change and adjust to the footnoting sequence of researcher X’s manuscript. Thus, if
the preceding footnote in the manuscript when the passage from Tolentino was pasted on it is 23,
Tolentino’s footnote would automatically change from the original Footnote 15 to Footnote 24.
But then, to be of use in his materials-gathering scheme, researcher X would have to tag the
Tolentino passage with a short description of its subject for easy reference. A suitable subject
description would be: "The inalienable character of juridical personality.23" The footnote mark, 23
From Tolentino, which researcher X attaches to the subject tag, serves as reminder to him to
attribute the passage in its final form to Tolentino. After the passage has been tagged, it would now
appear like this:
The inalienable character of juridical personality.23
xxx Both juridical capacity and capacity to act are not rights, but qualities of persons; hence, they
cannot be alienated or renounced.24
xxx
_____________________________
23 From Tolentino.
24 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.
The tag is of course temporary and would later have to go. It serves but a marker to help researcher
X maneuver the passage into the right spot in his final manuscript.
The mistake of Justice Del Castillo’s researcher is that, after the Justice had decided what texts,
passages, and citations were to be retained including those from Criddle-Descent and Ellis, and
when she was already cleaning up her work and deleting all subject tags, she unintentionally deleted
the footnotes that went with such tags—with disastrous effect.
To understand this, in Tolentino’s example, the equivalent would be researcher X’s removal during
cleanup of the tag, "The inalienable character of juridical personality.23," by a simple "delete"
operation, and the unintended removal as well of the accompanying footnote (#23). The erasure of
the footnote eliminates the link between the lifted passage and its source, Tolentino’s book. Only the
following would remain in the manuscript:
xxx Both juridical capacity and capacity to act are not rights, but qualities of persons; hence, they
cannot be alienated or renounced.43
_____________________________
43 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.
As it happened, the Microsoft word program does not have a function that raises an alarm when
original materials are cut up or pruned. The portions that remain simply blend in with the rest of the
manuscript, adjusting the footnote number and removing any clue that what should stick together
had just been severed.
This was what happened in the attributions to Ellis and Criddle-Descent. The researcher deleted the
subject tags and, accidentally, their accompanying footnotes that served as reminder of the sources
of the lifted passages. With 119 sources cited in the decision, the loss of the 2 of them was not
easily detectable.
Petitioners point out, however, that Justice Del Castillo’s verified letter of July 22, 2010 is
inconsistent with his researcher’s claim that the omissions were mere errors in attribution. They cite
the fact that the Justice did not disclose his researcher’s error in that letter despite the latter’s
confession regarding her mistake even before the Justice sent his letter to the Chief Justice. By
denying plagiarism in his letter, Justice Del Castillo allegedly perjured himself and sought to
whitewash the case. 13

But nothing in the July 22 letter supports the charge of false testimony. Justice Del Castillo merely
explained "that there was every intention to attribute all sources whenever due" and that there was
never "any malicious intent to appropriate another’s work as our own," which as it turns out is a true
statement. He recalled how the Court deliberated upon the case more than once, prompting major
revisions in the draft of the decision. In the process, "(s)ources were re-studied, discussions
modified, passages added or deleted." Nothing in the letter suggests a cover-up. Indeed, it did not
preclude a researcher’s inadvertent error.
And it is understandable that Justice Del Castillo did not initially disclose his researcher’s error. He
wrote the decision for the Court and was expected to take full responsibility for any lapse arising
from its preparation. What is more, the process of drafting a particular decision for the Court is
confidential, which explained his initial request to be heard on the matter without the attendance of
the other parties.
Notably, neither Justice Del Castillo nor his researcher had a motive or reason for omitting attribution
for the lifted passages to Criddle-Descent or to Ellis. The latter authors are highly respected
professors of international law. The law journals that published their works have exceptional
reputations. It did not make sense to intentionally omit attribution to these authors when the decision
cites an abundance of other sources. Citing these authors as the sources of the lifted passages
would enhance rather than diminish their informative value. Both Justice Del Castillo and his
researcher gain nothing from the omission. Thus, the failure to mention the works of Criddle-Decent
and Ellis was unquestionably due to inadvertence or pure oversight.
Petitioners of course insist that intent is not material in committing plagiarism since all that a writer
has to do, to avoid the charge, is to enclose lifted portions with quotation marks and acknowledge
the sources from which these were taken. Petitioners point out that the Court should apply to this
14

case the ruling in University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals and
Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine. They argue that standards on plagiarism in the academe
15

should apply with more force to the judiciary.

But petitioners’ theory ignores the fact that plagiarism is essentially a form of fraud where intent to
deceive is inherent. Their theory provides no room for errors in research, an unrealistic position
considering that there is hardly any substantial written work in any field of discipline that is free of
any mistake. The theory places an automatic universal curse even on errors that, as in this case,
have reasonable and logical explanations.
Indeed, the 8th edition of Black’s Law Dictionary defines plagiarism as the "deliberate and knowing
presentation of another person's original ideas or creative expressions as one's own." Thus,
16

plagiarism presupposes intent and a deliberate, conscious effort to steal another’s work and pass it
off as one’s own.
Besides, the Court said nothing in U.P. Board of Regents that would indicate that an intent to pass
off another’s work as one’s own is not required in plagiarism. The Court merely affirmed the
academic freedom of a university to withdraw a master’s degree that a student obtained based on
evidence that she misappropriated the work of others, passing them off as her own. This is not the
case here since, as already stated, Justice Del Castillo actually imputed the borrowed passages to
others.
Second Finding
The Court also adopts the Committee’s finding that the omission of attributions to Criddle-Descent
and Ellis did not bring about an impression that Justice Del Castillo himself created the passages
that he lifted from their published articles. That he merely got those passages from others remains
self-evident, despite the accidental deletion. The fact is that he still imputed the passages to the
sources from which Criddle-Descent and Ellis borrowed them in the first place.
This is best illustrated in the familiar example above. After the deletion of the subject tag and,
accidentally, its footnote which connects to the source, the lifted passage would appear like this:

xxx Both juridical capacity and capacity to act are not rights, but qualities of persons; hence,
they cannot be alienated or renounced.43
_____________________________
43 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.
Although the unintended deletion severed the passage’s link to Tolentino, the passage remains to be
attributed to Von Tuhr and Valverde, the original sources that Tolentino himself cites. The text and
its footnote reference cancel out any impression that the passage is a creation of researcher X. It is
the same with the passages from Criddle-Descent and Ellis. Because such passages remained
attributed by the footnotes to the authors’ original sources, the omission of attributions to Criddle-
Descent and Ellis gave no impression that the passages were the creations of Justice Del Castillo.
This wholly negates the idea that he was passing them off as his own thoughts.
True the subject passages in this case were reproduced in the Vinuya decision without placing them
in quotation marks. But such passages are much unlike the creative line from Robert Frost, "The17

woods are lovely, dark, and deep, but I have promises to keep, and miles to go before I sleep, and
miles to go before I sleep." The passages here consisted of common definitions and terms, abridged
history of certain principles of law, and similar frequently repeated phrases that, in the world of legal
literature, already belong to the public realm.
To paraphrase Bast and Samuels, while the academic publishing model is based on the originality
18

of the writer’s thesis, the judicial system is based on the doctrine of stare decisis, which encourages
courts to cite historical legal data, precedents, and related studies in their decisions. The judge is not
expected to produce original scholarship in every respect. The strength of a decision lies in the
soundness and general acceptance of the precedents and long held legal opinions it draws from.
Third Finding
Petitioners allege that the decision twisted the passages from Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis. The
Court adopts the Committee’s finding that this is not so. Indeed, this allegation of twisting or
misrepresentation remains a mystery to the Court. To twist means "to distort or pervert the meaning
of." For example, if one lifts the lyrics of the National Anthem, uses it in his work, and declares that
19

Jose Palma who wrote it "did not love his country," then there is "twisting" or misrepresentation of
what the anthem’s lyrics said. Here, nothing in the Vinuya decision said or implied that, based on the
lifted passages, authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis supported the Court’s conclusion that the
Philippines is not under any obligation in international law to espouse Vinuya et al.’s claims.
The fact is that, first, since the attributions to Criddle-Descent and Ellis were accidentally deleted, it
is impossible for any person reading the decision to connect the same to the works of those authors
as to conclude that in writing the decision Justice Del Castillo "twisted" their intended messages.
And, second, the lifted passages provided mere background facts that established the state of
international law at various stages of its development. These are neutral data that could support
conflicting theories regarding whether or not the judiciary has the power today to order the Executive
Department to sue another country or whether the duty to prosecute violators of international crimes
has attained the status of jus cogens.
Considering how it was impossible for Justice Del Castillo to have twisted the meaning of the
passages he lifted from the works of Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis, the charge of "twisting" or
misrepresentation against him is to say the least, unkind. To be more accurate, however, the charge
is reckless and obtuse.
No Misconduct
On occasions judges and justices have mistakenly cited the wrong sources, failed to use quotation
marks, inadvertently omitted necessary information from footnotes or endnotes. But these do not, in
every case, amount to misconduct. Only errors that are tainted with fraud, corruption, or malice are
subject of disciplinary action. This is not the case here. Justice Del Castillo’s acts or omissions were
20

not shown to have been impelled by any of such disreputable motives. If the rule were otherwise, no
21

judge or justice, however competent, honest, or dedicated he may be, can ever hope to retire from
the judiciary with an unblemished record. 22

No Inexcusable Negligence
Finally, petitioners assert that, even if they were to concede that the omission was the result of plain
error, Justice Del Castillo is nonetheless guilty of gross inexcusable negligence. They point out that
he has full control and supervision over his researcher and should not have surrendered the writing
of the decision to the latter.
23
But this assumes that Justice Del Castillo abdicated the writing of the Vinuya decision to his
researcher, which is contrary to the evidence adduced during the hearing. As his researcher
testified, the Justice set the direction that the research and study were to take by discussing the
issues with her, setting forth his position on those issues, and reviewing and commenting on the
study that she was putting together until he was completely satisfied with it. In every sense, Justice
24

Del Castillo was in control of the writing of the report to the Court, which report eventually became
the basis for the decision, and determined its final outcome.
Assigning cases for study and research to a court attorney, the equivalent of a "law clerk" in the
United States Supreme Court, is standard practice in the high courts of all nations. This is dictated
by necessity. With about 80 to 100 cases assigned to a Justice in our Court each month, it would be
truly senseless for him to do all the studies and research, going to the library, searching the internet,
checking footnotes, and watching the punctuations. If he does all these by himself, he would have to
allocate at least one to two weeks of work for each case that has been submitted for decision. The
wheels of justice in the Supreme Court will grind to a halt under such a proposition.
What is important is that, in this case, Justice Del Castillo retained control over the writing of the
decision in the Vinuya case without, however, having to look over his researcher’s shoulder as she
cleaned up her draft report to ensure that she hit the right computer keys. The Justice’s researcher
was after all competent in the field of assignment given her. She finished law from a leading law
school, graduated third in her class, served as Editor-in Chief of her school’s Law Journal, and
placed fourth in the bar examinations when she took it. She earned a master’s degree in
International Law and Human Rights from a prestigious university in the United States under the
Global-Hauser program, which counsel for petitioners concedes to be one of the top post graduate
programs on International Law in the world. Justice Del Castillo did not exercise bad judgment in
assigning the research work in the Vinuya case to her.
Can errors in preparing decisions be prevented? Not until computers cease to be operated by
human beings who are vulnerable to human errors. They are hypocrites who believe that the courts
should be as error-free as they themselves are.
Incidentally, in the course of the submission of petitioners’ exhibits, the Committee noted that
petitioners’ Exhibit J, the accusing statement of the Faculty of the U.P. College of Law on the
allegations of plagiarism and misinterpretation, was a mere dummy. The whole of the statement was
reproduced but the signatures portion below merely listed the names of 38 faculty members, in solid
rows, with the letters "Sgd" or "signed" printed beside the names without exception. These included
the name of retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, a U.P. professor.
Because the Committee declined to admit a mere dummy of Exhibit J, it directed Atty. Roque to
present the signed copy within three days of the August 26 hearing. He complied. As it turned out,
25

the original statement was signed by only a minority of the faculty members on the list. The set of
signatories that appeared like solid teeth in the dummy turned out to be broken teeth in the original.
Since only 37 out of the 81 on the list signed the document, it does not appear to be a statement of
the Faculty but of just some of its members. And retired Justice V. V. Mendoza did not sign the
statement, contrary to what the dummy represented. The Committee wondered why the Dean
submitted a dummy of the signed document when U.P. has an abundance of copying machines.
Since the above circumstances appear to be related to separate en banc matter concerning the
supposed Faculty statement, there is a need for the Committee to turn over the signed copy of the
same to the en banc for its consideration in relation to that matter.
WHEREFORE, in view of all of the above, the Court:

1. DISMISSES for lack of merit petitioner Vinuya, et al.’s charges of plagiarism, twisting of
cited materials, and gross neglect against Justice Mariano C. del Castillo;
2. DIRECTS the Public Information Office to send copies of this decision to Professors Evan
J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Dr. Mark Ellis, and Professor Christian J. Tams at their
known addresses;
3. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to provide all court attorneys involved in legal research and
reporting with copies of this decision and to enjoin them to avoid editing errors committed in
 the Vinuya case while using the existing computer program especially when the volume of
citations and footnoting is substantial; and
4. Finally, DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to acquire the necessary software for use by the
Court that can prevent future lapses in citations and attributions.

Further, the Court DIRECTS the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards to turn over to the en
banc the dummy as well as the signed copy of petitioners’ Exhibit J, entitled "Restoring Integrity," a
statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law for the en banc’s
consideration in relation to the separate pending matter concerning that supposed Faculty
statement.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner’s Exhibit A, p. 5.
2
Id. at 3.
3
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 1, at 5.
4
Justice Del Castillo’s Verified Letter, p. 3, Exhibit G of the petitioners.
5
Statement of the University of the Philippines College of Law Faculty dated July 27, 2010,
Exhibit J of the petitioners.
6
Transcript of Stenographic Notes taken on August 26, 2010, p. 31.
7
G.R. No. 134625, August 31, 1999, 313 SCRA 404.
8
Webster’s New World College Dictionary, Third Edition, Macmillan USA, p. 1031.
9
Exhibit I for the petitioners.
 10
Breaking the Silence of Rape as an International Crime, 38 Case W. Res. J. Int’l. L. 225
(2006).
11
34 Yale J. Int’l. L. 331 (2009).
12
Memorandum for Justice Del Castillo, paragraphs 25-35.
13
Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 26-27.
14
Supra note 6, at 41.
15
Supra note 7.
16
Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).
17
Stopping by the Woods on a Snowy Evening (1923).
18
Bast and Samuels, Plagiarism and Legal Scholarship in the Age of Information Sharing:
The Need for Intellectual Honesty, 57 CATH. U. L. REV 777, 800 (2008).
19
Webster’s New World College Dictionary, 3rd Edition, p. 1445.
20
Atty. Alberto P. Quinto v. Judge Gregorio S. Vios, Municipal Trial Court, Kapatagan, Lanao
del Norte, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1551, May 21, 2004, 429 SCRA 1; Tolentino v. Camano, Jr.,
A.M. No. RTJ 10-1522, January 20, 2000, 322 SCRA 559.
21
Daracan v. Natividad, A.M. No. RTC-99-1447, September 27, 2000, 341 SCRA 161.
22
Guerrero v. Villamor, A.M. No. RTJ-90-483, September 25, 1998, 296 SCRA 88; Tan v.
Adre, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1898, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 145.
23
Supra note 13, at 25.
24
Supra note 6, at 27-30.
25
Order dated August 26, 2010, Committee Records, pp. 382-383.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION
SERENO, J.:
What is black can be called "white" but it cannot turn white by the mere calling. The unfortunate
ruling of the majority Decision that no plagiarism was committed stems from its failure to distinguish
between the determination of the objective, factual existence of plagiarism in the Vinuya
decision and the determination of the liability that results from a finding of plagiarism. Specifically, it
1

made "malicious intent", which heretofore had not been relevant to a finding of plagiarism, an
essential element.
The majority Decision will thus stand against the overwhelming conventions on what constitutes
plagiarism. In doing so, the Decision has created unimaginable problems for Philippine academia,
which will from now on have to find a disciplinary response to plagiarism committed by students and
researchers on the justification of the majority Decision.
It has also undermined the protection of copyrighted work by making available to plagiarists "lack of
malicious intent" as a defense to a charge of violation of copy or economic rights of the copyright
owner committed through lack of attribution. Under Section 184 of R.A. 8293 ("An Act Describing the
Intellectual Property Code and Establishing the Intellectual Property Office, Providing for Its Powers
and Functions, and for Other Purposes"), or the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, there is
no infringement of copyright in the use of another's work in:
(b) the making of quotations from a published work if they are compatible with fair use and only to
the extent justified for the purpose, including quotations from newspaper articles and periodicals in
the form of press summaries: Provided that the source and the name of the author, if appearing
on the work, are mentioned. (Emphasis supplied)
Because the majority Decision has excused the lack of attribution to the complaining authors in
the Vinuya decision to editorial errors and lack of malicious intent to appropriate ─ and that therefore
there was no plagiarism ─ lack of intent to infringe copyright in the case of lack of attribution may
now also become a defense, rendering the above legal provision meaningless. 2

TABLES OF COMPARISON
The tables of comparison below were first drawn based on the tables made by petitioners in their
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. This was then compared with Annex "A" of Justice
Mariano del Castillo's letter, which is his tabular explanation for some of the copied excerpts. The3

alleged plagiarism of the cited excerpts were then independently verified and re-presented below,
with the necessary revisions accurately reflecting the alleged plagiarized works and the pertinent
portions of the decision. A few excerpts in the table of petitioners are not included, as they merely
refer to in-text citations.
TABLE A: Comparison of Christian J. Tams’s book, entitled Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in
International Law (2005), hereinafter called "Tams’s work" and the Supreme Court’s 28 April 2010
Decision in Vinuya, et. al. v. Executive Secretary.

Christian J. Tams, Enforcing Erga Omnes
Obligations in International Law (2005).
1. xxx The Latin phrase ‘erga omnes’ thus has
become one of the rallying cries of those
sharing a belief in the emergence of a value-
based international public order based on law.
xxx
As often, the reality is neither so clear nor so
bright. One problem is readily admitted by
commentators: whatever the relevance of
Vinuya, et. al. v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
162230, 28 April 2010.
*The Latin phrase, ‘erga omnes,’ has since
become one of the rallying cries of those
sharing a belief in the emergence of a value-
based international public order. However, as
is so often the case, the reality is neither so
clear nor so bright. Whatever the relevance of
obligations erga omnes as a legal concept, its
full potential remains to be realized in
practice. (p. 30, Body of the 28 April 2010
[FN69]

obligations erga omnes as a legal concept, its Decision)

full potential remains to be realised in practice.
xxx Bruno Simma’s much-quoted observation Bruno Simma’s much-quoted observation
[FN69]

encapsulates this feeling of disappointment: encapsulates this feeling of disappointment:

‘Viewed realistically, the world of obligations
erga omnes is still the world of the ‘‘ought’’
rather than of the ‘‘is’’.
(pp. 3-4 of the Christian Tams’s book)
‘Viewed realistically, the world of obligations
erga omnes is still the world of the "ought"
rather than of the "is"’ The Charter of the
United Nations: A Commentary 125 (Simma,
ed. 1995). See Tams, Enforcing Obligations
Erga omnes in International Law (2005).

*The decision mentioned Christian Tams’s

book in footnote 69.

TABLE B: Comparison of Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent’s article in the Yale Journal of
International Law, entitled A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens (2009), hereinafter called "Criddle’s &
Fox-Decent’s work" and the Supreme Court’s 28 April 2010 Decision in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive
Secretary.

Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Vinuya, et. al. v. Executive Secretary, G.R.
Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 Yale J. No. 162230, 28 April 2010
Int'l L. 331 (2009).

1. In international law, the term "jus cogens" In international law, the term "jus cogens"
(literally, "compelling law") refers to norms that (literally, "compelling law") refers to norms
 command peremptory authority, superseding
conflicting treaties and custom. xxx Jus
cogens norms are considered peremptory in
the sense that they are mandatory, do not
admit derogation, and can be modified only by
general international norms of equivalent
authority.
[FN2]
See Vienna Convention on the Law of
[FN2]
Treaties art. 53, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679
[hereinafter VCLT].
(pp. 331-332 of the Yale Law Journal of Int’l
Law)
2. Peremptory norms began to attract greater
scholarly attention with the publication of
Alfred von Verdross's influential 1937 article,
Forbidden Treaties in International Law. [FN10]
[FN10] For example, in the 1934 Oscar Chinn
Case, Judge Schücking's influential dissent
stated that neither an interna-tional court nor
an arbitral tribunal should apply a treaty
provision in contradiction to bonos mores.
Oscar Chinn Case, 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 63, at 149-50 (Dec. 12) (Schücking, J.,
dissenting).
(p. 334 of the Yale Law Journal of Int’l Law)
3. Classical publicists such as Hugo Grotius,
Emer de Vattel, and Christian Wolff drew upon
the Roman law distinction between jus
dispositivum (voluntary law) and jus scriptum
(obligatory law) to differentiate consensual
agreements between states from the
"necessary" principles of international law that
that command peremptory authority,
superseding conflicting treaties and custom.
Jus cogens norms are considered
peremptory in the sense that they are
mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can
be modified only by general international
norms of equivalent authority. (pp. 30-31,
[FN70]
Body of the 28 April 2010 Decision)
See Vienna Convention on the Law of
[FN70]
Treaties art. 53, opened for signature May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679
[hereinafter VCLT].
xxx but peremptory norms began to attract
greater scholarly attention with the
publication of Alfred von Verdross's influential
1937 article, Forbidden Treaties in
International Law. (p. 31, Body of the 28
[FN72]
April 2010 Decision)
Verdross argued that certain discrete rules
[FN72]
of international custom had come to be
recognized as having a compulsory character
notwithstanding contrary state agreements.
At first, Verdross's vision of international jus
cogens encountered skepticism within the
legal academy. These voices of resistance
soon found themselves in the minority,
however, as the jus cogens concept gained
enhanced recognition and credibility following
the Second World War. (See Lauri
Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus
cogens) in International Law: Historical
Development, Criteria, Present Status 150
(1988) (surveying legal scholarship during the
period 1945-69 and reporting that "about
eighty per cent [of scholars] held the opinion
that there are peremptory norms existing in
international law").
Classical publicists such as Hugo Grotius,
[FN71]
Emer de Vattel, and Christian Wolff drew
upon the Roman law distinction between jus
dispositivum (voluntary law) and jus scriptum
(obligatory law) to differentiate consensual
agreements between states from the
"necessary" principles of international law
 bind all states as a point of conscience that bind all states as a point of conscience
regardless of consent. [FN6]
regardless of consent.

[FN6] See Hugonis Grotii, De Jure Belli et (p. 31, Footnote 71 of the 28 April 2010
Pacis [On the Law of War and Peace] (William Decision)
Whewell ed. & trans., John W. Parker, London
2009) (1625); Emer de Vattel, Le Droit des
Gens ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle [The
Law of Nations or Principles of Natural Law]
§§ 9, 27 (1758) (distinguishing "le Droit des
Gens Naturel, ou Nécessaire" from "le Droit
Volontaire"); Christian Wolff, Jus Gentium
Methodo Scientifica Pertractorum [A Scientific
Method for Understanding the Law of Nations]
¶ 5 (James Brown Scott ed., Joseph H. Drake
trans., Clarendon Press 1934) (1764).

(p. 334 of the Yale Law Journal of Int’l Law)

4. Early twentieth-century publicists such as xxx Early twentieth-century publicists such

[FN71]

Lassa Oppenheim and William Hall asserted
confidently that states could not abrogate
certain "universally recognized principles" by
mutual agreement. Outside the academy,
[FN9]
judges on the Permanent Court of
International Justice affirmed the existence of
peremptory norms in international law by
referencing treaties contra bonos mores
(contrary to public policy) in a series of
individual concurring and dissenting
opinions. xxx
[FN10]
as Lassa Oppenheim and William Hall
asserted that states could not abrogate
certain "universally recognized principles" by
mutual agreement. xxx Judges on the
Permanent Court of International Justice
affirmed the existence of peremptory norms
in international law by referencing treaties
contra bonos mores (contrary to public policy)
in a series of individual concurring and
dissenting opinions. xxx

(p. 31, Footnote 71 of the 28 April 2010

William Hall, A Treatise on International Law Decision)
[FN9]

382-83 (8th ed. 1924) (asserting that

"fundamental principles of international law"
may "invalidate [], or at least render voidable,"
conflicting international agreements); 1 Lassa
Oppen-heim, International Law 528 (1905).

For example, in the 1934 Oscar Chinn

[FN10]

Case, Judge Schücking's influential dissent

stated that neither an interna-tional court nor
an arbitral tribunal should apply a treaty
provision in contradiction to bonos mores.
Oscar Chinn Case, 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 63, at 149-50 (Dec. 12) (Schücking, J.,
dissenting).

(pp. 334-5 of the Yale Law Journal of Int’l Law)

5. William Hall, A Treatise on International Law
[FN9]
382-83 (8th ed. 1924) (asserting that
"fundamental principles of international law"
may "invalidate [], or at least render voidable,"
conflicting international agreements) xxx
(Footnote 9 of the Yale Law Journal of Int’l
Law)
6. For example, in the 1934 Oscar Chinn
[FN10]
Case, Judge Schücking's influential dissent
stated that neither an international court nor an
arbitral tribunal should apply a treaty provision
in contradiction to bonos mores. Oscar Chinn
Case, 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 63, at 149-
50 (Dec. 12) (Schücking, J., dissenting).
(Footnote 9 of the Yale Law Journal of Int’l
Law)
7. Verdross argued that certain discrete rules of
international custom had come to be
recognized as having a compulsory character
notwithstanding contrary state agreements. [FN12]
[FN12]
[Von Verdross, supra note 5.]
(pp. 335 of the Yale Law Journal of Int’l Law)
8. At first, Verdross's vision of international jus
cogens encountered skepticism within the
legal academy. xxx These voices of resistance
soon found themselves in the minority,
however, as the jus cogens concept gained
enhanced recognition and credibility following
the Second World War.
(pp. 335-6 of the Yale Law Journal of Int’l Law)
9. See Lauri Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms
[FN18]
(Jus Cogens) in International Law: Historical
Development, Criteria, Present Status 150
(1988) (surveying legal scholarship during the
period 1945-69 and reporting that "about
eighty per cent [of scholars] held the opinion
xxx (William Hall, A Treatise on
[FN71]
International Law 382-83 (8th ed. 1924)
(asserting that "fundamental principles of
international law" may "invalidate [], or at
least render voidable," conflicting
international agreements) xxx
(p. 31, Footnote 71 of the 28 April 2010
Decision)
xxx (For example, in the 1934 Oscar
[FN71]
Chinn Case, Judge Schücking's influential
dissent stated that neither an international
court nor an arbitral tribunal should apply a
treaty provision in contradiction to bonos
mores. Oscar Chinn Case, 1934 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A/B) No. 63, at 149-50 (Dec. 12) (Schücking,
J., dissenting).
(p. 31, Footnote 71 of the 28 April 2010
Decision)
Verdross argued that certain discrete rules
[FN72]
of international custom had come to be
recognized as having a compulsory character
notwithstanding contrary state agreements.
xxx
(p. 31, Footnote 72 of the 28 April 2010
Decision)
xxx At first, Verdross's vision of
[FN72]
international jus cogens encountered
skepticism within the legal academy. These
voices of resistance soon found themselves
in the minority, however, as the jus
cogens concept gained enhanced recognition
and credibility following the Second World
War. xxx
(p. 31, Footnote 72 of the 28 April 2010
Decision)
xxx (See Lauri Hannikainen, Peremptory
[FN72]
Norms (Jus cogens) in International Law:
Historical Development, Criteria, Present
Status 150 (1988) (surveying legal
scholarship during the period 1945-69 and
reporting that "about eighty per cent [of
scholars] held the opinion that there are
 that there are peremptory norms existing in
international law").
(Footnote 18 of the Yale Law Journal of Int’l
Law)
10. xxx the 1950s and 1960s with the United
Nations International Law Commission's (ILC)
preparation of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (VCLT). [FN20]
[FN20] VCLT, supra note 2.
(p. 336 of the Yale Law Journal of Int’l Law)
11. In March 1953, Lauterpacht submitted for the
ILC's consideration a partial draft convention
on treaties which stated that "[a] treaty, or any
of its provisions, is void if its performance
involves an act which is illegal under
international law and if it is declared so to be
by the International Court of Justice."[FN21]
[FN21] Hersch Lauterpacht, Law of Treaties:
Report by Special Rapporteur, [1953] 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 90, 93, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/63.
(p. 336 of the Yale Law Journal of Int’l Law)
12. Lauterpacht's colleagues on the ILC generally
accepted his assessment that certain
international norms had attained the status of
jus cogens. Yet despite general agreement
[FN23]
over the existence of international jus cogens,
the ILC was unable to reach a consensus
regarding either the theoretical basis for
peremptory norms' legal authority or the
proper criteria for identifying peremptory
norms.
peremptory norms existing in international
law").
(p. 31, Footnote 72 of the 28 April 2010
Decision)
xxx the 1950s and 1960s with the ILC’s
preparation of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (VCLT). [FN73]
(p. 31, Body of the 28 April 2010 Decision)
In March 1953, the ILC's Special
[FN73]
Rapporteur, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht,
submitted for the ILC's consideration a partial
draft convention on treaties which stated that
"[a] treaty, or any of its provisions, is void if its
performance involves an act which is illegal
under international law and if it is declared so
to be by the International Court of Justice."
Hersch Lauterpacht, Law of Treaties: Report
by Special Rapporteur, [1953] 2 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 90, 93, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/63.
In March 1953, the ILC's Special
[FN73]
Rapporteur, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht,
submitted for the ILC's consideration a partial
draft convention on treaties which stated that
"[a] treaty, or any of its provisions, is void if its
performance involves an act which is illegal
under international law and if it is declared so
to be by the International Court of Justice."
Hersch Lauterpacht, Law of Treaties: Report
by Special Rapporteur, [1953] 2 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 90, 93, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/63.
(p. 31, Footnote 73 of the 28 April 2010
Decision)
Though there was a consensus that certain
international norms had attained the status of
jus cogens, the ILC was unable to reach a
[FN74]
consensus on the proper criteria for
identifying peremptory norms.
(p. 31, Body of the 28 April 2010 Decision)
See Summary Records of the 877th
[FN74]
Meeting, [1966] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 227,
230-231, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/188 (noting that
the "emergence of a rule of jus cogens
 See Hannikainen, supra note 18, at 160-61
[FN23]
(noting that none of the twenty five members
of the ILC in 1963 denied the existence of jus
cogens or contested the inclusion of an article
on jus cogens in the VCLT); see, e.g.,
Summary Records of the 877th Meeting,
[1966] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 227, 230-231,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/188 (noting that the
"emergence of a rule of jus cogens banning
aggressive war as an international crime" was
evidence that international law contains
"minimum requirement[s] for safeguarding the
existence of the international community").
(p. 336 of the Yale Law Journal of Int’l Law)
13. xxx see, e.g., Summary Records of the
[FN23]
877th Meeting, [1966] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n
227, 230-231, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/188 (noting
that the "emergence of a rule of jus cogens
banning aggressive war as an international
crime" was evidence that international law
contains "minimum requirement[s] for
safeguarding the existence of the international
community").
(Footnote 23 of the Yale Law Journal of Int’l
Law)
14. After an extended debate over these and other
theories of jus cogens, the ILC concluded
ruefully in 1963 that "there is not as yet any
generally accepted criterion by which to
identify a general rule of international law as
having the character of jus cogens." xxx In
[FN27]
commentary accompanying the draft
convention, the ILC indicated that "the prudent
course seems to be to . . . leave the full
content of this rule to be worked out in State
practice and in the jurisprudence of
international tribunals." xxx
[FN29]
Second Report on the Law of Treaties,
[FN27]
[1963] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1, 52, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/156.
Second Report on the Law of Treaties,
[FN29]
supra note 27, at 53.
(p. 337-8 of the Yale Law Journal of Int’l Law)
banning aggressive war as an international
crime" was evidence that international law
contains "minimum requirement[s] for
safeguarding the existence of the
international community").
See Summary Records of the 877th
[FN74]
Meeting, [1966] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 227,
230-231, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/188 (noting that
the "emergence of a rule of jus
cogens banning aggressive war as an
international crime" was evidence that
international law contains "minimum
requirement[s] for safeguarding the existence
of the international community").
(p. 31, Footnote 74 of the 28 April 2010
Decision)
After an extended debate over these and
other theories of jus cogens, the ILC
concluded ruefully in 1963 that "there is not
as yet any generally accepted criterion by
which to identify a general rule of
international law as having the character of
jus cogens." In a commentary
[FN75]
accompanying the draft convention, the ILC
indicated that "the prudent course seems to
be to x x x leave the full content of this rule to
be worked out in State practice and in the
jurisprudence of international
tribunals." xxx [FN76]
(p. 32, Body of the 28 April 2010 Decision)
Second Report on the Law of Treaties,
[FN75]
[1963] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1, 52, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/156.
[76]
Id. at 53.
15. In some municipal cases, courts have declined xxx In some municipal cases, courts have
[FN77]

to recognize international norms as declined to recognize international norms as

peremptory while expressing doubt about the peremptory while expressing doubt about the
proper criteria for identifying jus cogens. proper criteria for identifying jus cogens.
[FN72]

(See, e.g., Sampson v. Federal Republic of

See, e.g., Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1149 (7th Cir.
[FN72]

Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1149 (7th Cir. 2001) 2001) (expressing concern that jus cogens
(expressing concern that jus cogens should be should be invoked "[o]nly as a last resort")).
invoked "[o]nly as a last resort"). xxx

(p. 346 of the Yale Law Journal of Int’l Law) (p. 32, Footnote 77 of the 28 April 2010
Decision)

16. In other cases, national courts have accepted xxx In other cases, national courts have
[FN77]

international norms as peremptory, but have accepted international norms as peremptory,

hesitated to enforce these norms for fear that
they might thereby compromise state
sovereignty. xxx In Congo v. Rwanda, for
[FN73]
example, Judge ad hoc John Dugard observed
that the ICJ had refrained from invoking the jus
cogens concept in several previous cases
where peremptory norms manifestly clashed
with other principles of general international
law. Similarly, the European Court of Human
[FN74]
Rights has addressed jus cogens only once, in
Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, when it famously
rejected the argument that jus cogens
violations would deprive a state of sovereign
immunity.
See, e.g., Bouzari v. Iran, [2004] 71 O.R.3d the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda)
[FN73]
but have hesitated to enforce these norms for
fear that they might thereby compromise
state sovereignty. (See, e.g., Bouzari v. Iran,
[2004] 71 O.R.3d 675 (Can.) (holding that the
prohibition against torture does not entail a
right to a civil remedy enforceable in a foreign
court)).
In Congo v. Rwanda, for example, Judge ad
hoc John Dugard observed that the ICJ had
refrained from invoking the jus
cogens concept in several previous cases
where peremptory norms manifestly clashed
with other principles of general international
law. (See Armed Activities on the Territory of

675 (Can.) (holding that the prohibition against (Judgment of February 3, 2006), at 2
torture does not entail a right to a civil remedy (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Dugard))
enforceable in a foreign court).
Similarly, the European Court of Human
See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Rights has addressed jus cogens only once,
[FN74]

Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda) in Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, when it

(Judgment of Feb. 3, 2006), at 2 (dissenting famously rejected the argument that jus
opinion of Judge Dugard) xxx. cogens violations would deprive a state of
sovereign immunity. Al-Adsani v. United
(pp. 346-7 of the Yale Law Journal of Int’l Law) Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 61).

(p. 32, Footnote 77 of the 28 April 2010

Decision)

TABLE C: Comparison of Mark Ellis’s article in the Case Western Reserve Journal of International
Law, entitled Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime (2006-7), hereafter called "Ellis’s
work" and the Supreme Court’s 28 April 2010 Decision in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary.
 Mark Ellis, Breaking the Silence: Rape as an Vinuya, et. al. v. Executive Secretary,
International Crime, 38 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 225 G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010.
(2006-2007).

1. The concept of rape as an international crime is The concept of rape as an

[FN65]

relatively new. This is not to say that rape has never international crime is relatively new.
been historically prohibited, particularly in war. The This is not to say that rape has never
[FN7]

1863 Lieber Instructions, which codified customary been historically prohibited, particularly
inter-national law of land warfare, classified rape as a
in war. But modern-day sensitivity to
crime of "troop discipline." It specified rape as a
[FN8]
the crime of rape did not emerge until
capital crime punishable by the death penalty. The after World War II. xxx (For example,
[FN9]

1907 Hague Convention protected women by the Treaty of Amity and Commerce
requiring the protection of their "honour." But
[FN10]
between Prussia and the United States
modern-day sensitivity to the crime of rape did not provides that in time of war all women
emerge until after World War II. and children "shall not be molested in
their persons." The Treaty of Amity and
For example, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce
[FN7] Commerce, Between his Majesty the
Prussia and the United States provides that in time of King of Prussia and the United States
war all women and children "shall not be molested in of America, art. 23, Sept. 10, 1785,
their persons." The Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Pruss., 8 Treaties & Other Int'l
Between his Majesty the King of Prussia and the Agreements Of The U.S. 78, 85[)]. The
United States of America, art. 23, Sept. 10, 1785, 1863 Lieber Instructions classified rape
U.S.-Pruss., 8 TREATIES & OTHER INT'L as a crime of "troop discipline."
AGREEMENTS OF THE U.S. 78, 85, available at xxx. (Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in
International Humanitarian Law as a
David Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in
[FN8] Norm of Jus cogens: Clarifying the
International Humanitarian Law as a Norm of Jus Doctrine, 15 DUKE J. COMP. INT’L. L.
Cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine, 15 DUKE J. COMP. 219, 224). It specified rape as a capital
INT'L L. 219, 224. crime punishable by the death penalty
(Id. at 236). The 1907 Hague
Convention protected women by
Id. at 236.
[FN9]

requiring the protection of their

"honour." ("Family honour and rights,
"Family honour and rights, the lives of persons,
[FN10]
the lives of persons, and private
and private property, as well as religious convictions property, as well as religious
and practice, must be respected." Convention (IV) convictions and practice, must be
Respecting the Laws & Customs of War on Land, art. respected." Convention (IV) Respecting
46, Oct. 18, 1907, available at http://www.yale the Laws & Customs of War on Land,
.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/hague04.htm #art46. art. 46, Oct. 18, 1907[)]. xxx.

(p. 227 of the Case Western Law Reserve Journal of (p. 27, Footnote 65 of the 28 April 2010
Int’l Law) Decision)

2. After World War II, when the Allies established the xxx In the Nuremberg Charter, the
[FN65]

Nuremberg Charter, the word rape was not
mentioned. The article on crimes against humanity
explicitly set forth prohibited acts, but rape was not
mentioned by name. [FN11]
See generally, Agreement for the Prosecution and
[FN11]
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the Euro-
word rape was not mentioned. The
article on crimes against humanity
explicitly set forth prohibited acts, but
rape was not mentioned by name.
xxx See Agreement for the Prosecution
and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8,
 pean Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S.
279.
(p. 227 of the Case Western Law Reserve Journal of
Int’l Law)
3. The Nuremberg Judgment did not make any
reference to rape and rape was not
prosecuted. xxx. [FN13]
It was different for the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East. xxx The Tribunal
[FN15]
prosecuted rape crimes, even though its Statute did
not explicitly criminalize rape. The Far East
[FN17]
Tribunal held General Iwane Matsui, Commander
Shunroku Hata and Foreign Minister Hirota criminally
responsible for a series of crimes, including rape,
committed by persons under their authority. [FN18]
Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, The International
[FN13]
Criminal Tribunals Crime and Punishment in the
International Arena, 7 ILSA J. INT'L COMP L. 667, at
676.
See Charter of the International Tribunal for the
[FN15]
Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. 1589.
[FN17]
See McDonald, supra note 13, at 676.
THE TOKYO JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT OF THE
[FN18]
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FAR EAST 445-54 (B.V.A. Roling and C.F. Ruter
eds., 1977).
(p. 228 of the Case Western Law Reserve Journal of
Int’l Law)
4. The first mention of rape as a specific crime came in
December 1945 when Control Council Law No. 10
included the term rape in the definition of crimes
against humanity. Law No. 10, adopted by the four
[FN22]
occupying powers in Germany, was devised to
establish a uniform basis for prosecuting war
criminals in German courts.
Control Council for Germany, Law No. 10:
[FN22]
Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes
Against Peace and Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945,
3 Official Gazette Control Council for Germany 50, 53
(1946), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts
/instree/ccno10.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2003). This
1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
xxx.
(p. 27, Footnote 65 of the 28 April 2010
Decision)
xxx The Nuremberg Judgment did
[FN65]
not make any reference to rape and
rape was not prosecuted. (Judge
Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald, The International Criminal
Tribunals Crime and Punishment in the
International Arena,7 ILSA J. Int’l.
Comp. L. 667, 676.) However,
International Military Tribunal for the
Far East prosecuted rape crimes, even
though its Statute did not explicitly
criminalize rape. The Far East Tribunal
held General Iwane Matsui,
Commander Shunroku Hata and
Foreign Minister Hirota criminally
responsible for a series of crimes,
including rape, committed by persons
under their authority. (The Tokyo
Judgment: Judgment Of The
International Military Tribunal For The
Far East 445-54 (1977). xxx
(p. 27, Footnote 65 of the 28 April 2010
Decision)
xxx The first mention of rape as a
[FN65]
specific crime came in December 1945
when Control Council Law No. 10
included the term rape in the definition
of crimes against humanity. Law No.
10, adopted by the four occupying
powers in Germany, was devised to
establish a uniform basis for
prosecuting war criminals in German
courts. (Control Council for Germany,
Law No. 10: Punishment of Persons
Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against
Peace and Against Humanity, Dec. 20,
 law set forth a uniform legal basis in Germany for the 1945, 3 Official Gazette Control Council
prosecution of war criminals and similar offenders, for Germany 50, 53 (1946)) xxx
other than those dealt with under the International
Military Tribunal. See id. at 50. (p. 27, Footnote 65 of the 28 April 2010
Decision)
(pp. 228-9 of the Case Western Law Reserve Journal
of Int’l Law)

5. The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the xxx The 1949 Geneva Convention
[FN65]

Treatment of Prisoners of War was the first modern-
day international instrument to establish protections
against rape for women. However, the most
[FN23]
important development in breaking the silence of rape
as an international crime has come through the
jurisprudence of the ICTY and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Both of these
Tribunals have significantly advanced the crime of
rape by enabling it to be prosecuted as genocide, a
war crime, and a crime against humanity. xxx.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
[FN23]
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art.
27, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entry into force
Oct. 20, 1950) [hereinafter Fourth Geneva
Convention].
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War was the first modern-day
international instrument to establish
protections against rape for women.
Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 27, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entry into force
Oct. 20, 1950) [hereinafter Fourth
Geneva Convention]. Furthermore, the
ICC, the ICTY, and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
have significantly advanced the crime
of rape by enabling it to be prosecuted
as genocide, a war crime, and a crime
against humanity. xxx.

(p. 229 of the Case Western Law Reserve Journal of (p. 27, Footnote 65 of the 28 April 2010
Int’l Law) Decision)

Forms of Plagiarism
There are many ways by which plagiarism can be committed. For the purpose of this analysis, we
4

used the standard reference book prescribed for Harvard University students, "Writing with Sources"
by Gordon Harvey.
Harvey identifies four forms of plagiarism : (a) uncited data or information; (b) an uncited idea,
5 6

whether a specific claim or general concept; (c) an unquoted but verbatim phrase or passage; and
7 8

(d) an uncited structure or organizing strategy. He then explains how each form or mode of
9

plagiarism is committed. Plagiarism is committed in mode (a) by "plagiarizing information that is not
common knowledge." Mode (b) is committed when "distinctive ideas are plagiarized," "even though
10

you present them in a different order and in different words, because they are uncited."11

Even if there has been a prior citation, succeeding appropriations of an idea to make it appear as
your own is plagiarism, because the "[previous] citation in [an earlier] passage is a deception." Mode
(c) is committed when "you … borrowed several distinctive phrases verbatim, without quotation
marks…" Mode (d) is committed when, though the words and details are original, "(y)ou have,
however, taken the structural framework or outline directly from the source passage … even though,
again, your language differs from your source and your invented examples are original." 12

These forms of plagiarism can exist simultaneously in one and the same passage. There may be a
complete failure to use quotation marks in one part of the sentence or paragraph while combining
that part with phrases employing an uncited structure or organizing strategy. There may be
patchwork plagiarizing committed by collating different works or excerpts from the same work
without proper attribution.
13
These acts of plagiarism can also be committed in footnotes in the same way and at the same
degree of unacceptability as plagiarized passages in the body. This is especially frowned upon in
footnotes that are discursive or "content" footnotes or endnotes. Harvey explains that a discursive
footnote or endnote is "a note that includes comments, not just publication information . . . when you
want to tell your reader something extra to the strict development of your argument, or incorporate
extra information about sources."14

Violations of Rules against

Plagiarism in the Vinuya Decision
Below are violations of the existing rules against plagiarism that can be found in the Vinuya decision.
The alphanumeric tags correspond to the table letter and row numbers in the tables provided above.

A.1 Failure to use quotation marks to indicate that the entire paragraph in the body of the
decision on page 30 was not the ponente’s original paragraph, but was lifted verbatim from
Tams’s work. The attribution to Tams is wholly insufficient because without the quotation
marks, there is nothing to alert the reader that the paragraph was lifted verbatim from Tams.
The footnote leaves the reader with the impression that the said paragraph is the author’s
own analysis of erga omnes.

The "See Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga omnes in International Law (2005)" line in footnote 69 of
the Vinuya decision does not clearly indicate that the statement on Simma’s observation was lifted
directly from Tams’s work; it only directs the reader to Tams’s work should the reader wish to read
further discussions on the matter.

B.1 Failure to use quotation marks to indicate that the two sentences were not the ponente’s,
but were lifted verbatim from two non-adjoining sentences found on pages 331 and 332 of
the Yale Law Journal of International Law article of Criddle & Fox-Decent and with absolutely
no attribution to the latter.
B.2 Failure to use quotation marks to indicate that the sentence fragment on peremptory
norms was not the ponente’s original writing, but was lifted verbatim from page 334 of the
Yale Law Journal of International Law article of Criddle & Fox-Decent with absolutely no
attribution to the authors.
B.3 Failure to use quotation marks to indicate that the first sentence in discursive footnote
number 71 was not the ponente’s idea, but was lifted verbatim from Criddle & Fox-Decent’s
work at page 334.
B.4 Failure to use quotation marks to indicate that the third sentence in discursive footnote
number 71 was not the ponente’s idea, but was lifted from Criddle & Fox-Decent’s work at
334-335.
B.5 Failure to indicate that one footnote source in discursive footnote 71 was lifted verbatim
from discursive footnote 9 of Tams; thus, even the idea being propounded in this discursive
part of footnote 71 was presented as the ponente’s, instead of Criddle’s & Fox-Decent’s.
B.6 Failure to indicate that the last discursive sentence in footnote 71 and the citations
thereof were not the ponente’s, but were lifted verbatim from footnote 9 of Criddle & Fox-
Decent’s work.
B.7 Failure to indicate that the first discursive sentence of footnote 72 was not the ponente’s,
but was lifted verbatim from page 335 of Criddle & Fox-Decent’s work.
B.8 Failure to indicate that the second discursive sentence of footnote 72 was not the
ponente’s, but was lifted verbatim from pages 335-336 of Criddle and Fox-Decent’s work.
B.9 Failure to indicate that the citation and the discursive passage thereon in the last
sentence of footnote 72 was not the ponente’s, but was lifted verbatim from discursive
footnote 18 of Criddle & Fox-Decent’s work.
B.10 Failure to use quotation marks to indicate that a phrase in the body of the decision on
page 31 was not the ponente’s, but was lifted verbatim from page 336 of Criddle & Fox-
Decent’s work.
 B.11 Failure to indicate that the entirety of discursive footnote 73 was not the ponente’s, but
was lifted verbatim from page 336 of Criddle & Fox-Decent’s work.
B.12 Failure to indicate that the idea of lack of "consensus on whether certain international
norms had attained the status of jus cogens" was a paraphrase of a sentence combined with
a verbatim lifting of a phrase that appears on page 336 of Criddle & Fox-Decent’s work and
was not the ponente’s own conclusion. This is an example of patchwork plagiarism.
B.13 Failure to indicate that the entirety of discursive footnote 74 on page 31 of the Decision
was not the ponente’s comment on the source cited, but was lifted verbatim from footnote 23
of Criddle & Fox-Decent’s work.
B.14 Failure to indicate through quotation marks and with the proper attribution to Criddle
that the first two sentences of page 32 were not the ponente’s, but were lifted verbatim from
two non-adjoining sentences on pages 337-338 of Criddle & Fox-Decent’s work.
B.15 Failure to indicate through quotation marks and the right citation that the discursive
sentence in the second paragraph of footnote 77, and the citation therein, were not the
ponente’s, but were lifted verbatim from page 346 of the body of Criddle & Fox-Decent’s
work in the instance of the discursive sentence, and from footnote 72 of Criddle & Fox-
Decent’s work in the instance of the case cited and the description thereof.
B.16 Failure to indicate that the choice of citation and the discursive thereon statement in the
second sentence of the second paragraph of discursive footnote 77 was not the ponente’s,
but was lifted verbatim from footnote 72 of Criddle & Fox-Decent’s work.
B.17 Failure to indicate through quotation marks and the right citations that the entirety of the
discursive third to fifth paragraphs of footnote 77 were not the product of the ponente’s own
analysis and choice of sources, but were lifted verbatim from footnotes 73 and 77 on pages
346-347 of Criddle & Fox-Decent’s work.
C.1 to C.6 Failure to use quotation marks and the right citations to indicate that half of the
long discursive footnote 65, including the sources cited therein, was actually comprised of
the rearrangement, and in some parts, rephrasing of 18 sentences found on pages 227-228
of Mr. Ellis’s work in Case Western Law Reserve Journal of International Law.

This painstaking part-by-part analysis of the Vinuya decision is prompted by the fact that so many,
including international academicians, await the Court’s action on this plagiarism charge ─ whether it
will in all candor acknowledge that there is a set of conventions by which all intellectual work is to be
judged and thus fulfill its role as an honest court; or blind itself to the unhappy work of its member.
The text of the Decision itself reveals the evidence of plagiarism. The tearful apology of the legal
researcher to the family of the ponente and her acknowledgment of the gravity of the act of omitting
attributions is an admission that something wrong was committed. Her admission that the correct
attributions went missing in the process of her work is an admission of plagiarism. The evidence in
the text of the Vinuya Decision and the acknowledgment by the legal researcher are sufficient for the
determination of plagiarism.
The Place of the Plagiarized
Portions in the Vinuya Decision
The suspect portions of the majority decision start from the discursive footnotes of the first full
paragraph of page 27. In that paragraph, the idea sought to be developed was that while rape and
sexual slavery may be morally reprehensible and impermissible by international legal norms,
petitioners have failed to make the logical leap to conclude that the Philippines is thus under
international legal duty to prosecute Japan for the said crime. The plagiarized work found in
discursive footnote 65 largely consists of the exposition by Mr. Ellis of the development of the
concept of rape as an international crime. The impression obtained by any reader is that the ponente
has much to say about how this crime evolved in international law, and that he is an expert on this
matter.
There are two intervening paragraphs before the next suspect portion of the decision. The latter
starts from the second paragraph on page 30 and continues all the way up to the first paragraph of
page 32. The discussion on the erga omnes obligation of states almost cannot exist, or at the very
least cannot be sustained, without the plagiarized works of Messrs. Tams, Criddle and Decent-Fox.
There is basis to say that the plagiarism of this portion is significant.
How the Majority Decision
Treated the Specific Allegations
of Plagiarism
The majority Decision narrates and explains:
"The researcher demonstrated by Power Point presentation how the attribution of the lifted passages
to the writings of Criddle-Descent and Ellis, found in the beginning drafts of her report to Justice Del
Castillo, were unintentionally deleted. She tearfully expressed remorse at her "grievous mistake" and
grief for having "caused an enormous amount of suffering for Justice Del Castillo and his family."
On the other hand, addressing the Committee in reaction to the researcher’s explanation, counsel
for petitioners insisted that lack of intent is not a defense in plagiarism since all that is required is for
a writer to acknowledge that certain words or language in his work were taken from another’s work.
Counsel invoked the Court’s ruling in University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of
Appeals and Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine, arguing that standards on plagiarism in the
academe should apply with more force to the judiciary.
xxx xxx xxx
"… although Tams himself may have believed that the footnoting in his case was not "an appropriate
form of referencing," he and petitioners cannot deny that the decision did attribute the source or
sources of such passages. Justice Del Castillo did not pass off Tam’s work as his own. The Justice
primarily attributed the ideas embodied in the passages to Bruno Simma, whom Tam himself
credited for them. Still, Footnote 69 mentioned, apart from Simma, Tam’s article as another source
of those ideas.
The Court believes that whether or not the footnote is sufficiently detailed, so as to satisfy the
footnoting standards of counsel for petitioners is not an ethical matter but one concerning clarity of
writing. The statement "See Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (2005)" in
the Vinuya decision is an attribution no matter if Tams thought that it gave him somewhat less credit
than he deserved. Such attribution altogether negates the idea that Justice Del Castillo passed off
the challenged passages as his own.
That it would have been better had Justice Del Castillo used the introductory phrase "cited in" rather
than the phrase "See" would make a case of mere inadvertent slip in attribution rather than a case of
"manifest intellectual theft and outright plagiarism." If the Justice’s citations were imprecise, it would
just be a case of bad footnoting rather than one of theft or deceit. If it were otherwise, many would
be target of abuse for every editorial error, for every mistake in citing pagination, and for every
technical detail of form."
xxx
"Footnote 65 appears down the bottom of the page. Since the lengthily passages in that footnote
came almost verbatim from Ellis’ article, such passages ought to have been introduced by an
acknowledgement that they are from that article. The footnote could very well have read:
65 In an article, Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime, Case Western Reserve
Journal of International Law (2006), Mark Ellis said.) x x x
"But, as it happened, the acknowledgment above or a similar introduction was missing from Footnote
65.
xxx
"Admittedly, the Vinuya decision lifted the above, including their footnotes, from Criddle-Descent’s
article, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens. Criddle-Descent’s footnotes were carried into the Vinuya
decision’s own footnotes but no attributions were made to the two authors in those footnotes.
"Unless amply explained, the above lifting from the works of Ellis and Criddle-Descent could be
construed as plagiarism. But one of Justice Del Castillo’s researchers, a court-employed attorney,
explained how she accidentally deleted the attributions, originally planted in the beginning drafts of
her report to him, which report eventually became the working draft of the decision. She said that, for
most parts, she did her research electronically. For international materials, she sourced these mainly
from Westlaw, an online research service for legal and law-related materials to which the Court
subscribes.
xxx
"With the advent of computers, however as Justice Del Castillo’s researcher also explained, most
legal references, including the collection of decisions of the Court, are found in electronic diskettes
or in internet websites that offer virtual libraries of books and articles. Here, as the researcher found
items that were relevant to her assignment, she downloaded or copied them into her "main
manuscript," a smorgasbord plate of materials that she thought she might need. The researcher’s
technique in this case is not too far different from that employed by a carpenter. The carpenter first
gets the pieces of lumber he would need, choosing the kinds and sizes suitable to the object he has
in mind, say a table. When ready, he would measure out the portions he needs, cut them out of the
pieces of lumber he had collected, and construct his table. He would get rid of the scraps.
"Here, Justice Del Castillo’s researcher did just that. She electronically "cut" relevant materials from
books and journals in the Westlaw website and "pasted" these to a "main manuscript" in her
computer that contained the Microsoft Word program. Later, after she decided on the general shape
that her report would take, she began pruning from that manuscript those materials that did not fit,
changing the positions in the general scheme of those that remained, and adding and deleting
paragraphs, sentences, and words as her continuing discussions with Justice Del Castillo, her chief
editor, demanded. Parenthetically, this is the standard scheme that computer-literate court
researchers use everyday in their work.
"Justice Del Castillo’s researcher showed the Committee the early drafts of her report in the Vinuya
case and these included the passages lifted from the separate articles of Criddle-Descent and of
Ellis with proper attributions to these authors. But, as it happened, in the course of editing and
cleaning up her draft, the researcher accidentally deleted the attributions.
"The Court adopts the Committee’s finding that the researcher’s explanation regarding the accidental
removal of proper attributions to the three authors is credible. Given the operational properties of the
Microsoft program in use by the Court, the accidental decapitation of attributions to sources of
research materials is not remote."
Contrary to the view of my esteemed colleagues, the above is not a fair presentation of what
happens in electronically generated writings aided by electronic research.

First, for a decision to make full attribution for lifted passages, one starts with block quote
formatting or the "keying-in" of quotation marks at the beginning and at the end of the lifted
passages. These keyed-in computer commands are not easily accidentally deleted, but
should be deliberately inputted where there is an intention to quote and attribute.
Second, a beginning acknowledgment or similar introduction to a lengthy passage copied
verbatim should not be accidentally deleted; it must be deliberately placed.
Third, the above explanation regarding the lines quoted in A.1 in the majority Decision may
touch upon what happened in incident A.1, but it does not relate to what happened in
incidents B.1 to C.6 of the Tables of Comparison, which are wholesale lifting of excerpts from
both the body and the footnotes of the referenced works, without any attribution, specifically
to the works of Criddle & Fox-Decent and of Ellis. While mention was made of Tams’s work,
no mention was made at all of the works of Criddle & Fox-Decent and of Ellis even though
the discussions and analyses in their discursive footnotes were used wholesale.
Fourth, the researcher’s explanation regarding the accidental deletion of 2 footnotes out of
119 does not plausibly account for the extensive amount of text used with little to no
modifications from the works of Criddle & Fox-Decent and Ellis. As was presented in Tables
B and C, copied text occurs in 22 instances in pages 27, 31, and 32 of the Vinuya decision.
All these instances of non-attribution cannot be remedied by the reinstatement of 2
footnotes.
Fifth, the mention of Tams in "See Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga omnes in International
Law (2005)" in footnote 69 of the Vinuya decision was not a mere insufficiency in "clarity of
writing," but a case of plagiarism under the rule prohibiting the use of misleading citations.
 Sixth, the analogy that was chosen ─ that of a carpenter who discards materials that do not
fit into his carpentry work ─ is completely inappropriate. In the scheme of "cutting and
pasting" that the researcher did during her work, it is standard practice for the original
sources of the downloaded and copied materials to be regarded as integral parts of the
excerpts, not extraneous or ill-fitting. A computer-generated document can accommodate as
many quotation marks, explanatory notes, citations and attributions as the writer desires and
in multiple places. The limits of most desktop computer drives, even those used in the
Supreme Court, are in magnitudes of gigabytes and megabytes, capable of accommodating
200 to 400 books per gigabyte (with each book just consuming roughly 3 to 5 megabytes).
The addition of a footnote to the amount of file space taken up by an electronic document is
practically negligible. It is not as if the researcher lacked any electronic space; there was
simply no attribution.
Seventh, contrary to what is implied in the statement on Microsoft Word’s lack of an alarm
and in paragraph 4 of the decretal portion of the majority Decision, no software exists that
will automatically type in quotation marks at the beginning and end of a passage that was
lifted verbatim; these attribution marks must be made with deliberate effort by the human
researcher. Nor can a software program generate the necessary citations without input from
the human researcher. Neither is there a built-in software alarm that sounds every time
attribution marks or citations are deleted. The best guarantee for works of high intellectual
integrity is consistent, ethical practice in the writing habits of court researchers and judges.
All lawyers are supposed to be knowledgeable on the standard of ethical practice, if they
took their legal research courses in law school and their undergraduate research courses
seriously. This knowledge can be easily picked up and updated by browsing many free
online sources on the subject of writing standards. In addition, available on the market are
software programs that can detect some, but not all, similarities in the phraseology of a work-
in-progress with those in selected published materials; however, these programs cannot
supply the citations on their own. Technology can help diminish instances of plagiarism by
allowing supervisors of researchers to make partial audits of their work, but it is still the
human writer who must decide to give the proper attribution and act on this decision.

Plagiarism and Judicial Plagiarism

Plagiarism is an act that does not depend merely on the nature of the object, i.e. what is plagiarized,
but also hinges on the process, i.e. what has been done to the object. The elements of this process
are the act of copying the plagiarized work and the subsequent omission in failing to attribute the
work to its author. Plagiarism thus does not consist solely of using the work of others in one's own
15

work, but of the former in conjunction with the failure to attribute said work to its rightful owner and
thereby, as in the case of written work, misrepresenting the work of another as one's own. As the
work is another's and used without attribution, the plagiarist derives the benefit of use from the
plagiarized work without expending the requisite effort for the same ─ at a cost (as in the concept of
"opportunity cost") to its author who could otherwise have gained credit for the work and whatever
compensation for its use is deemed appropriate and necessary.
If the question of plagiarism, then, turns on a failure of attribution, judicial plagiarism in the case at
bar "arises when judges author opinions that employ materials from copyrighted sources such as law
journals or books, but neglect to give credit to the author." Doing so effectively implies the staking of
16

a claim on the copied work as the judge's own. Note that there is no requirement of extent of
17

copying or a minimum number of instances of unattributed usage for an act to be considered a

plagiarist act, nor is the intent to deceive or to copy without attribution a prerequisite of plagiarism. In
Dursht's exhaustive analysis of judicial plagiarism she cites the case of Newman v. Burgin wherein
18

the court said that plagiarism may be done "through negligence or recklessness without intent to
deceive." Dursht in addition notes that intent may also be taken as the intent to claim authorship of
19

the copied work, whether or not there was intent to deceive, citing Napolitano v. Trustees of
Princeton Univ. 20

George describes the following among the types of judicial plagiarism:

Borrowed Text: When quoting a legal periodical, law review, treatise or other such source, the
judicial writer must surround the borrowed text with quotation marks or use a block quote. . . .
Additionally, the source should be referenced in the text . . .
Using another's language verbatim without using quotation marks or a block quote is intentional, as
opposed to unintentional, plagiarism.
Reference errors: The judge may fail to put quotation marks around a clause, phrase or paragraph
that is a direct quote from another's writing even though he cites the author correctly. This is
plagiarism even though it may be inadvertent. 21

While indeed the notion of having committed judicial plagiarism may be unsettling to contemplate, as
it may raise in the mind of a judge the question of his or her own culpability , it is a grievous mistake
22

to overlook the possibility of the commission of judicial plagiarism or the fact that judicial plagiarism
is categorized by its very definition as a subset of plagiarism. That a judge, in lifting words from a
source and failing to attribute said words to said source in the writing of a decision, committed
specifically judicial plagiarism does not derogate from the nature of the act as a plagiarist act. Nor
does any claim of inadvertence or lack of intent in the commission of a plagiarist act change the
characterization of the act as plagiarism.
Penalties for Plagiarism and
Judicial Plagiarism
In the academe, plagiarism is generally dealt with severely when found out; many universities have
policies on plagiarism detailing the sanctions that may be imposed on students who are found to
have plagiarized in their coursework and other academic requirements. These run the gamut from
an automatic failing grade in the course for which the offending work was submitted, or in more
egregious cases, outright expulsion from the university. Sanctions for plagiarism in the academe
operate through "the denial of certification or recognition of achievement" to the extent of rescinding
23

or denying degrees. In the case of law students who do manage to obtain their degrees, their
admission to the bar may be hindered due to questions about their "character or fitness to practice
law." Indeed, plagiarism, due to the severity of the penalties it may incur, is often identified with the
24

punishment of "academic death." The academe justifies the harshness of the sanctions it imposes
25

with the seriousness of the offense: plagiarism is seen not only to undermine the credibility and
importance of scholarship, but also to deprive the rightful author of what is often one of the most
valuable currencies in the academe: credit for intellectual achievement ─ an act of debasing the
coinage, as it were. Thus the rules of many academic institutions sanctioning plagiarism as a
violation of academic ethics and a serious offense often classed under the broader heading of
"academic dishonesty."
The imposition of sanctions for acts of judicial plagiarism, however, is not as clear-cut. While George
recognizes the lack of attribution as the fundamental mark of judicial plagiarism, she notes in the
same breath that the act is "without legal sanction." Past instances of censure notwithstanding (as
26

in examples of condemnation of plagiarism cited by Lebovits et al , most particularly the censure of

27

the actions of the judge who plagiarized a law-review article in Brennan ; the admonition issued by
28

the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal in the case of Apotex ) there is still no strictly prevailing
29

consensus regarding the need or obligation to impose sanctions on judges who have committed acts
of judicial plagiarism. This may be due in a large part to the absence of expectations of originality in
the decisions penned by judges, as courts are required to "consider and usually . . . follow
precedent." In so fulfilling her obligations, it may become imperative for the judge to use "the legal
30

reasoning and language [of others e.g. a supervising court or a law review article] for resolution of
the dispute." Although these obligations of the judicial writer must be acknowledged, care should be
31

taken to consider that said obligations do not negate the need for attribution so as to avoid the
commission of judicial plagiarism. Nor do said obligations diminish the fact that judicial plagiarism
"detracts directly from the legitimacy of the judge's ruling and indirectly from the judiciary's
legitimacy" or that it falls far short of the high ethical standards to which judges must adhere . The
32 33

lack of definitiveness in sanctions for judicial plagiarism may also be due to the reluctance of judges
themselves to confront the issue of plagiarism in the context of judicial writing; the apprehension
caused by "feelings of guilt" being due to "the possibility that plagiarism has unknowingly or
intentionally been committed" and a "traditional" hesitance to consider plagiarism as "being
applicable to judicial writings."
34

Findings of judicial plagiarism do not necessarily carry with them the imposition of sanctions, nor do
they present unequivocal demands for rehearing or the reversal of rulings. In Liggett Group, Inc., et
al v Harold M. Engle, M.D. et al , a U.S. tobacco class action suit, "[the] plaintiffs' counsel filed a
35

motion for rehearing alleging that the appellate opinion copied large portions of the defendants'
briefs. . . . without attribution." The result of this, the plaintiffs claimed, was the creation of the
"appearance of impropriety," the abdication of judicative duties, the relinquishing of independence to
defendants, the failure to maintain impartiality, and therefore, as an act of judicial plagiarism, was "a
misrepresentation of the facts found by the trial court and denied plaintiffs due process of law." The
36

three-judge panel denied the motion. In addition, "courts generally have been reluctant to reverse for
the verbatim adoption of prepared findings." In Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, North Carolina it
37 38

was held that even though the trial judge's findings of fact may have been adopted verbatim from the
prevailing party, the findings "may be reversed only if clearly erroneous." 39

On Guilt and Hypocrisy

It is not hypocrisy, contrary to what is implied in a statement in the majority Decision, to make a
finding of plagiarism when plagiarism exists. To conclude thus is to condemn wholesale all the
academic thesis committees, student disciplinary tribunals and editorial boards who have made it
their business to ensure that no plagiarism is tolerated in their institutions and industry. In accepting
those review and quality control responsibilities, they are not making themselves out to be error-free,
but rather, they are exerting themselves to improve the level of honesty in the original works
generated in their institution so that the coinage and currency of intellectual life – originality and the
attribution of originality – is maintained. The incentive system of intellectual creation is made to work
so that the whole society benefits from the encouraged output.
In the case of judicial plagiarism, it is entirely possible for judges to have violated the rules against
plagiarism out of ignorance or from the sheer fact that in order to cope with their caseloads, they
have to rely on researchers for part of the work. That would have been a very interesting argument
to consider. But ignorance is not pleaded here, nor is the inability to supervise a legal researcher
pleaded to escape liability on the part of the ponente. Rather, the defense was that no plagiarism
existed. This conclusion however is unacceptable for the reasons stated above.
As noted above, writers have ventured to say that the reluctance to address judicial plagiarism may
stem from fear, nay, guilt. Fear that the judge who says plagiarism was committed by another is
40

himself guilty of plagiarism. But that is neither here nor there. We must apply the conventions
against judicial plagiarism because we must, having taken on that obligation when the Court took
cognizance of the plagiarism complaint, not because any one of us is error-free. In fact, the
statement on hypocrisy in the majority Decision betrays prejudgment of the complainants as
hypocrites, and a complaint against a sitting judge for plagiarism would appear impossible to win.
In a certain sense, there should have been less incentive to plagiarize law review articles because
the currency of judges is stare decisis. One wonders how the issue should have been treated had
what was plagiarized been a court ruling, but that is not at issue here. The analysis in this opinion is
therefore confined to the peculiar situation of a judge who issues a decision that plagiarizes law
review articles, not to his copying of precedents or parts of the pleadings of the parties to a case.
As earlier said, a determination of the existence of plagiarism in decision-making is not conclusive
on the disciplinary measure to be imposed. Different jurisdictions have different treatments. At the
very least however, the process of rectification must start from an acknowledgment and apology for
the offense. After such have been done, then consideration of the circumstances that mitigate the
offense are weighed. But not before then.
The Unfortunate Result of
the Majority Decision
Unless reconsidered, this Court would unfortunately be remembered as the Court that made
"malicious intent" an indispensable element of plagiarism and that made computer-keying errors an
exculpatory fact in charges of plagiarism, without clarifying whether its ruling applies only to
situations of judicial decision-making or to other written intellectual activity. It will also weaken this
Court’s disciplinary authority ─ the essence of which proceeds from its moral authority ─ over the
bench and bar. In a real sense, this Court has rendered tenuous its ability to positively educate and
influence the future of intellectual and academic discourse.
The Way Forward
Assuming that the Court had found that judicial plagiarism had indeed been committed in the Vinuya
decision, the Court could then have moved to the next logical question: what then is the legal
responsibility of the ponente of the Vinuya decision for having passed on to the Court en banc a
ponencia that contains plagiarized parts?
There would have been at that point two possible choices for the Court vis-à-vis the ponente ─ to
subject him to disciplinary measures or to excuse him. In order to determine whether the acts
committed would have warranted discipline, the Court should have laid down the standard of
diligence and responsibility that a judge has over his actions, as well as the disciplinary measures
that are available and appropriate.
The Court could also have chosen to attribute liability to the researcher who had admitted to have
caused the plagiarism. In In re Hinden, disciplinary measures were imposed on an attorney who
plagiarized law review articles.
41

Response to the Decretal

Portion of the Majority Decision
In view of the above, it is my opinion:

1. That Justice Mariano C. del Castillo and his unnamed researcher have committed
plagiarism in the drafting and passing on of the ponencia in the Vinuya decision;
2. That this Court should request Justice del Castillo to acknowledge the plagiarism and
apologize to the complaining authors for his mistake;
3. That this Court should cause the issuance of a corrected version of the Vinuya decision in
the form of a "Corrigendum";
4. That court attorneys should be provided with the appropriate manuals on writing and legal
citation, and should be informed that the excerpts complained of and described in Tables A,
B, and C of this opinion are acts of plagiarism and not mere editing errors or computer-
generated mistakes;
5. That the refusal of the majority to pronounce that plagiarism was committed by Justice del
Castillo means that any judicial opinion on his liability or that of his researcher would be
academic and speculative, a ruling which this Dissenting Opinion will not venture to make a
pronouncement on; and
6. That a copy of this Dissenting Opinion should be circulated by the Public Information
Office in the same manner as the Majority Decision to the complaining authors Christian J.
Tams, Mark Ellis, Evan Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

EN BANC
G.R. No. 162230 August 13, 2014
ISABELITA C. VINUY A, VICTORIA C. DELA PENA, HERMINIHILDA MANIMBO, LEONOR H.
SUMA WANG, CANDELARIA L. SOLIMAN, MARIA L. QUILANTANG, MARIA L. MAGISA,
NATALIA M. ALONZO, LOURDES M. NAVARO, FRANCISCA M. ATENCIO, ERLINDA
MANALASTAS, TARCILA M. SAMPANG, ESTER M. PALACIO, MAXIMA R. DELA CRUZ,
BELEN A. SAGUM, FELICIDAD TURLA, FLORENCIA M. DELA PENA, EUGENIA M. LALU,
JULIANA G. MAGAT, CECILIA SANGUYO, ANA ALONZO, RUFINA P. MALLARI, ROSARIO M.
ALARCON, RUFINA C. GULAPA, ZOILA B. MANALUS, CORAZON C. CALMA, MARTA A.
GULAPA, TEODORA M. HERNANDEZ, FERMIN B. DELA PENA, MARIA DELA PAZ B.
CULALA,ESPERANZA MANAPOL, JUANITA M. BRIONES, VERGINIA M. GUEVARRA, MAXIMA
ANGULO, EMILIA SANGIL, TEOFILA R. PUNZALAN, JANUARIA G. GARCIA, PERLA B.
BALINGIT, BELEN A. CULALA, PILAR Q. GALANG, ROSARIO C. BUCO, GAUDENCIA C. DELA
PENA, RUFINA Q. CATACUTAN, FRANCIA A. BUCO, PASTORA C. GUEVARRA, VICTORIA M.
DELA CRUZ, PETRONILA 0. DELA CRUZ, ZENAIDA P. DELA CRUZ, CORAZON M. SUBA,
EMERINCIANA A. VINUYA, LYDIA A. SANCHEZ, ROSALINA M. BUCO, PATRICIA A.
BERNARDO, LUCILA H. PAYAWAL, MAGDALENA LIWAG, ESTER C. BALINGIT, JOVITA A.
DAVID, EMILIA C. MANGILIT, VERGINIA M. BANGIT, GUILERMA S. BALINGIT, TERECITA
PANGILINAN, MAMERTA C. PUNO, CRISENCIANA C. GULAPA, SEFERINA S. TURLA,
MAXIMA B. TURLA, LEONICIA G. GUEVARRA, ROSALINA M. CULALA, CATALINA Y. MANIO,
MAMERTA T. SAGUM, CARIDAD L. TURLA, et al. in their capacityand as members of the
"Malaya Lolas Organizations," Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS DELIA DOMINGOALBERT, THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, and THE HONORABLE SOLICITOR
GENERAL ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Supplemental Motion for
1

Reconsideration, praying that the Court reverse its decision of April 28, 2010, and grant their petition
2

for certiorari.
In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners argue that our constitutional and jurisprudential
histories have rejected the Court’s ruling that the foreign policy prerogatives ofthe Executive Branch
are unlimited; that under the relevant jurisprudence and constitutional provisions, such prerogatives
are proscribed by international human rights and international conventions of which the Philippines is
a party; that the Court, in holding that the Chief Executive has the prerogative whether to bring
petitioners’ claims against Japan, has read the foreign policy powers of the Office of the President in
isolation from the rest of the constitutional protections that expressly textualize international human
rights; that the foreign policy prerogatives are subject to obligations to promote international
humanitarian law as incorporated intothe laws of the land through the Incorporation Clause; that the
Court must re-visit its decisions in Yamashita v. Styer and Kuroda v. Jalandoni which have been
3 4

noted for their prescient articulation of the import of laws of humanity; that in said decision, the Court
ruled that the State was bound to observe the laws of war and humanity; that in Yamashita, the
Court expressly recognized rape as an international crime under international humanitarian law, and
in Jalandoni, the Court declared that even if the Philippines had not acceded or signed the Hague
Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare, the Rules and Regulations formed
part of the law of the nation by virtue of the Incorporation Clause; that such commitment to the laws
ofwar and humanity has been enshrined in Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides "that the Philippines…adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and
amity with all nations."
The petitioners added that the statusand applicability of the generally accepted principles of
international law within the Philippine jurisdiction would be uncertain without the Incorporation
Clause, and that the clause implied that the general international law forms part of Philippine law
only insofar as they are expressly adopted; that in its rulings in The Holy See, v. Rosario, Jr. and
5

U.S. v. Guinto the Court has said that international law is deemed part of the Philippine law as a
6

consequence of Statehood; that in Agustin v. Edu, the Court has declared that a treaty, though not
7

yet ratified by the Philippines, was part of the law of the land through the Incorporation Clause; that
by virtue of the Incorporation Clause, the Philippines is bound to abide by the erga omnesobligations
arising from the jus cogensnorms embodied in the laws of war and humanity that include the
principle of the imprescriptibility of war crimes; that the crimes committed against petitioners are
proscribed under international human rights law as there were undeniable violations of jus
cogensnorms; that the need to punish crimes against the laws of humanity has long become jus
cogensnorms, and that international legal obligations prevail over national legal norms; that the
Court’s invocation of the political doctrine in the instant case is misplaced; and that the Chief
Executive has the constitutional duty to afford redress and to give justice to the victims ofthe comfort
women system in the Philippines. 8

Petitioners further argue that the Court has confused diplomatic protection with the broader
responsibility of states to protect the human rights of their citizens, especially where the rights
asserted are subject of erga omnesobligations and pertain to jus cogensnorms; that the claims
raised by petitioners are not simple private claims that are the usual subject of diplomatic protection;
that the crimes committed against petitioners are shocking to the conscience of humanity; and that
the atrocities committed by the Japanese soldiers against petitionersare not subject to the statute of
limitations under international law. 9

Petitioners pray that the Court reconsider its April 28, 2010 decision, and declare: (1) that the rapes,
sexual slavery, torture and other forms of sexual violence committed against the Filipina comfort
women are crimes against humanity and war crimes under customary international law; (2) that the
Philippines is not bound by the Treaty of Peace with Japan, insofar as the waiver of the claims of the
Filipina comfort women against Japan is concerned; (3) that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the
Executive Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to espouse the claims of
Filipina comfort women; and (4) that petitioners are entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction against the respondents.
Petitioners also pray that the Court order the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive
Secretary to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort women for an official apology,legal compensation
and other forms of reparation from Japan. 10

In their Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners stress that it was highly improper for
the April 28, 2010 decision to lift commentaries from at least three sources without proper attribution
– an article published in 2009 in the Yale Law Journal of International Law; a book published by the
Cambridge University Press in 2005; and an article published in 2006 in the Western
ReserveJournal of International Law – and make it appear that such commentaries supported its
arguments for dismissing the petition, when in truth the plagiarized sources even made a strong
case in favour of petitioners’ claims. 11

In their Comment, respondents disagree withpetitioners, maintaining that aside from the statements
12

on plagiarism, the arguments raised by petitioners merely rehashed those made in their June 7,
2005 Memorandum; that they already refuted such arguments in their Memorandumof June 6, 2005
that the Court resolved through itsApril 28, 2010 decision, specifically as follows:

1. The contentions pertaining tothe alleged plagiarism were then already lodged withthe
Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards of the Court; hence, the matter of alleged
plagiarism should not be discussed or resolved herein. 13

2. A writ of certioraridid not lie in the absence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, in view of the failureof petitioners to show any arbitrary or
despotic act on the part of respondents,the relief of the writ of certiorariwas not warranted.
14

3. Respondents hold that the Waiver Clause in the Treaty of Peace with Japan, being valid,
bound the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to the international law principle of pacta sunt
servanda.The validity of the Treaty of Peace was the result of the ratification by two mutually
consenting parties. Consequently, the obligations embodied in the Treaty of Peace must be
carried out in accordance with the common and real intention of the parties at the time the
treaty was concluded. 15

4. Respondents assert that individuals did not have direct international remedies against any
State that violated their human rights except where such remedies are provided by an
international agreement. Herein, neither of the Treaty of Peace and the Reparations
Agreement,the relevant agreements affecting herein petitioners, provided for the reparation
of petitioners’ claims. Respondents aver that the formal apology by the Government of Japan
 and the reparation the Government of Japan has provided through the Asian Women’s Fund
(AWF) are sufficient to recompense petitioners on their claims, specifically:
a. About 700 million yen would be paid from the national treasury over the next 10 years as
welfare and medical services;
b. Instead of paying the money directly to the former comfort women, the services would be
provided through organizations delegated by governmental bodies in the recipient countries
(i.e., the Philippines, the Republic of Korea,and Taiwan); and
c. Compensation would consist of assistance for nursing services (like home helpers),
housing, environmental development, medical expenses, and medical goods. 16

Ruling
The Court DENIESthe Motion for Reconsiderationand Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration for
being devoid of merit.
1. Petitioners did not show that their resort was timely under the Rules of Court.
Petitioners did not show that their bringing ofthe special civil action for certiorariwas timely, i.e.,
within the 60-day period provided in Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 4. When and where position filed. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
daysfrom notice of judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from
notice of the denial of said motion.
As the rule indicates, the 60-day period starts to run from the date petitioner receives the assailed
judgment, final order or resolution, or the denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial timely
filed, whether such motion is required or not. To establish the timeliness of the petition for certiorari,
the date of receipt of the assailed judgment, final order or resolution or the denial of the motion for
reconsideration or new trial must be stated in the petition;otherwise, the petition for certiorarimust be
dismissed. The importance of the dates cannot be understated, for such dates determine the
timeliness of the filing of the petition for certiorari. As the Court has emphasized in Tambong v. R.
Jorge Development Corporation: 17

There are three essential dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65.
First, the date when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution was received; second, when a
motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed; and third, when notice of the denial thereof was
received. Failure of petitioner to comply with this requirement shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition. Substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict
observance with the Rules. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court has further said in Santos v. Court of Appeals: 18

The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is for the
purpose of determining its timeliness. Such a petition is required to be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment, order or Resolution sought to be assailed. Therefore, that the
petition for certiorariwas filed forty-one (41) days from receipt of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration is hardly relevant. The Court of Appeals was notin any position to determine when
this period commenced to run and whether the motion for reconsideration itself was filed on time
since the material dates were not stated. It should not be assumed that in no event would the motion
be filed later than fifteen (15) days. Technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the
ends of justice. These are provided to effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus
effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be
rationalized by harking on the policy ofliberal construction. 19

The petition for certioraricontains the following averments, viz:

82. Since 1998, petitioners and other victims of the "comfort women system," approached
the Executive Department through the Department of Justice in order to request for
assistance to file a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the
establishment of the "comfort women" stations in the Philippines;
 83. Officials of the Executive Department ignored their request and refused to file a claim
against the said Japanese officials and military officers;
84. Undaunted, the Petitioners in turnapproached the Department of Foreign Affairs,
Department of Justice and Office of the of the Solicitor General to file their claim against the
responsible Japanese officials and military officers, but their efforts were similarly and
carelessly disregarded; 20

The petition thus mentions the year 1998 only as the time when petitioners approached the
Department ofJustice for assistance, but does not specifically state when they received the denial of
their request for assistance by the Executive Department of the Government. This alone warranted
the outright dismissal of the petition.
Even assuming that petitioners received the notice of the denial of their request for assistance in
1998, their filing of the petition only on March 8, 2004 was still way beyond the 60-day period. Only
the most compelling reasons could justify the Court’s acts of disregarding and lifting the strictures of
the rule on the period. As we pointed out inMTM Garment Mfg. Inc. v. Court of Appeals: 21

All these do not mean, however, that procedural rules are to be ignored or disdained at will to suit
the convenience of a party. Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly administration of
justice, namely: to ensure the effective enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system
that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes. Hence,
it is a mistake to suppose that substantive law and procedural law are contradictory to each other, or
as often suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it would result
in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants.
As we have repeatedly stressed, the right to file a special civil action of certiorariis neither a natural
right noran essential element of due process; a writ of certiorariis a prerogative writ, never
demandable as a matter of right, and never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion.
Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorarimust apply for it only in the manner and strictly in
accordance with the provisions of the law and the Rules.
Herein petitioners have not shown any compelling reason for us to relax the rule and the
requirements under current jurisprudence. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
2. Petitioners did not show that the assailed act was either judicial or quasi-judicial on the part of
respondents.
Petitioners were required to show in their petition for certiorarithat the assailed act was either judicial
or quasi-judicial in character. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Courtrequires such showing, to wit:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order, or resolution
subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn
certification of nonforum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
However, petitioners did notmake such a showing.
3. Petitioners were not entitled to the injunction.
The Court cannot grant petitioners’ prayer for the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
Preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy that is adjunct to the main case, and is subject
to the latter’s outcome. It is not a cause of action itself. It is provisional because it constitutes a
22

temporary measure availed of during the pendency of the action; and it is ancillary because it is a
mere incident in and is dependent upon the result of the main action. Following the dismissal of the
23

petition for certiorari, there is no more legal basis to issue the writ of injunction sought. As an
auxiliary remedy, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction cannot be issued independently of the
principal action.
24
In any event, a mandatory injunction requires the performance of a particular act. Hence, it is an
1âwphi1

extreme remedy, to be granted only if the following requisites are attendant, namely:
25

(a) The applicant has a clear and unmistakable right, that is, a right in esse;
(b) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right; and
(c) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and no
other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable
injury.
26

In Marquez v. The Presiding Judge (Hon. Ismael B. Sanchez), RTC Br. 58, Lucena City, we 27

expounded as follows:
It is basic that the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court, conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive right of the applicant which should
be protected. It is an extraordinary, peremptory remedy available only on the grounds expressly
provided by law, specifically Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, extreme caution
must be observed in the exercise of such discretion. It should be granted only when the court is fully
satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it. The very foundation of the
jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in the existence of a cause of action and in the
probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the prevention of
multiplicity of suits. Where facts are not shown to bring the case within these conditions, the relief of
injunction should be refused. 28

Here, the Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign relations for
the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners' claim against the Government of Japan is left
to the exclusive determination and judgment of the Executive Department. The Court cannot
interfere with or question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive
Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct the Executive Department, either by writ of certiorari or
injunction, to conduct our foreign relations with Japan in a certain manner.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(no part)
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice Associate Justice

No part
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

EN BANC
A.M. No. 10-1-13-SC March 20, 2012
Re: Subpoena Duces Tecum dated January 11, 2010 of Acting Director ALEU A. AMANTE,
PIAB-C, Office of the Ombudsman.
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. 10-9-9-SC
Re: Order of the Office of the Ombudsman Referring the complaint of Attys. OLIVER O.
LOZANO and EVANGELINE J. LOZANO-ENDRIANO Against Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
[ret.].
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
We resolve the separate successive letter-petitions of Atty. Oliver O. Lozano, addressed to the
1

Supreme Court en banc, for the lifting of the indefinite suspension from the practice of law imposed
by the Court in its Resolution of June 15, 2010.
In our Resolution of June 15, 2010, we found Atty. Lozano and Atty. Evangeline Lozano-Endriano
guilty of grave professional misconduct when they misquoted or misused constitutional provisions in
their pleadings in order to impute unjust acts to members of this Court. Subsequently, we have
2

reinstated Atty. Lozano-Endriano in our August 23, 2011 Resolution, because of circumstances
indicating lesser culpability on her part.
Professional misconduct involving the misuse of constitutional provisions for the purpose of insulting
Members of this Court is a serious breach of the rigid standards that a member of good standing of
the legal profession must faithfully comply with. Thus, the penalty of indefinite suspension was
imposed. However, in the past two years during which Atty. Lozano has been suspended, he has
repeatedly expressed his willingness to admit his error, to observe the rules and standards in the
practice of law, and to serve the ends of justice if he should be reinstated. And in these two years,
this Court has not been informed of any act that would indicate that Atty. Lozano had acted in any
unscrupulous practices unsuitable to a member of the bar.
While this Court will not hesitate to discipline its erring officers, it will not prolong a penalty after it
has been shown that the purpose for imposing it had already been served. From Atty. Lozano’s
letters-petitions, we discern that his suspension had already impressed upon him the need for care
and caution in his representations as an officer of this Court.
Under these circumstances, this Court decides to grant Atty. Lozano’s letters-petitions with the
expectation that he shall now avoid going to the extreme of employing contortions of and misusing
legal provisions and principles to justify his positions, and instead focus his energies and talents
towards a lawyer’s primary aim of promoting the speedy and efficient administration of justice. 1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby LIFT the indefinite suspension from the practice of
law of Atty. Oliver Lozano and REINSTATE him to the status of a member in good standing in so far
as the suspension imposed him by this Court is concerned.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Leave)
ROBERTO A. ABAD
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice