The Late Spouses Alejandro Ramiro and Felicisima Llamada, et al. vs.

Spouses Bacaron
G.R. No. 196874, February 6, 2019

FACTS:
 Respondent spouses Bacaron claimed that the father of petitioners, the late
Alejandro Ramiro, was the registered owner of Lot 329 and covered by OCT
which was sold to spouses Bacaron as evidenced by DOS executed on Oct. 20,
1991. That spouses Bacaron took possession after the sale. However, was
mortgaged by spouses Ramiro to the DBP that spouses Bacaron paid DBP
P430,150.00 for the redemption of property and in June 1998, petitioners forcibly
dispossessed spouses Bacaron of the property
 Petitioners denied the material allegations raising the ff affirmative defenses: (a)
RTC does not have jurisdiction over the case considering that it involves
recovery of possession of the property; (b) the DOS should be interpreted as an
equitable mortgage; and (c) laches has barred respondents from instituting
complaint.
 RTC rendered decision in favor of spouses Bacaron (were able to prove
preponderance of evidence although the original copy of DOS was lost)
 Petitioners’ appeal to CA. They argued that the main thrust of the complaint was
to recover the property; failed to allege its assessed value; RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
 CA upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC; the amended complaint alleged causes of
action for the declaration of validity of the DOS or specific performance, and
recovery of possession, damages, attorney’s fees and injunction all of which are
incapable of pecuniary estimation, joinder in the RTC is allowed by the ROC.

ISSUE:
WON RTC acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.

RULLING:
NONE The nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of
relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective
of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein. (When
the main relief sought specific performance, the action is incapable of pecuniary
estimation within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. When the action, primarily
involves title to, possession of land, the court which has exclusive original jurisdiction
over the same is determined by the assessed value of the property.) Since the main
reliefs prayed for by respondents are the declarations of validity if the DOS and specific
performance, the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. *Since respondents neither
alleged the assessed value of the property. The Court cannot take judicial notice of the
assessed or market value of lands. Thus, absent any allegation in the complaint of the
assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined which between the RTC or the
MTC had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the respondents’action. Consequently,
the complaint filed before the RTC should be dismissed.
ADDITIONAL INFOR:
*Further, it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory
pleading but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court
with jurisdiction over the subject matter of nature of the action. Since the
respondents did not allege the assessed value of the property in their
amended complaint. They also did not allege estimated value. As a result,
the correct docket fees could not have been computed and paid by
respondents and the RTC could not have acquired jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case. All the proceedings before are consequently null
and void.
(https://pdfcoffee.com/gr-no-196874-digest-pdf-free.html )

G.R. No. L-26430, March 11, 1969 ROSA GONZALES VDA. DE

PALANCA, SEVERINA G. PALANCA, ANTONIO G. PALANCA, MILAGROS
PALANCA-FURER, LEONARDA PALANCA-ARENAS, CARLOS PALANCA,
JR., MACARIO G. PALANCA, RAMON G. PALANCA, AND LA TONDEÑA,
INC., PETITIONERS,
VS.
CHUA KENG KIAN, AND THE COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION)
RESPONDENTS.
(Gonzales vs. Ca G.R. No. L-26430 March 11, 1969)

DECISION
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals setting aside an
order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in Civil Case No. 54295 thereof
dismissing the appeal taken by Chua Keng Klan from a decision of the
Municipal Court of Manila in the present detainer case.

The same was, on December 12, 1962, commenced by Roman Ozaeta, as

executor of the estate of the late Carlos Palanca y Tanguinlay, in Special
Proceedings No. 12126 of the Court of First Instance of Manila.The estate
included a lot of about 801.20 square meters, with the improvements
thereon, located at No. 1089 Aguilar St., Manila, which had been leased to
Chua Keng Kian, since the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, at a
monthly rental of 200, on a month-to-month basis.

Prior to the institution of said case, or on March 3, 1962, defendant had

received a letter from Ozaeta stating that the lease of the premises was
thereby terminated as of April 30, 1962, because the heirs of the deceased
intended to construct an apartment house on the lot aforementioned, and
urging the defendant to vacate the same, on or before the date last
mentioned.The defendant having refused to do so, despite repeated
demands, said case was filed on the date adverted to above.

Defendant's answer in the Municipal Court averred that the alleged intent to
construct an apartment house was merely a ruse to impose upon him a
higher rate of rental.He, moreover, set up a counter claim for P22,500, said
to represent one-half of the cost of improvements he claimed to have
introduced on the lot in question, with the alleged authority of its deceased
owner, Carlos Palanca.In due course, the Municipal Court rendered
judgment, on May 28, 1963, sentencing the defendant to vacate the
property in litigation; to pay to plaintiff the sum of P1,600, as rentals for the
period from May to December, 1962, and P600 a month from January, 1963,
up to such time as the defendant shall have vacated said property, as
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation thereof, in addition to
attorney's fees in the sum of P300 and the costs.

The defendant seasonably appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila,

where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 54295, and he filed an
answer, dated June 28, 1963, reproducing, in effect, the one submitted in
the Municipal Court.Plaintiff moved, on July 2, 1963, to dismiss defendant's
counterclaim, and, on August 16, 1963, to be allowed to withdraw the
deposits made by the defendant.The latter was denied on August 24, 1963
and the former on August 29 of the same year.

Over a year later, or on October 20, 1964, the Court of First Instance motu
propio dismissed defendant's appeal, for "lack of interest to prosecute the
same.A motion for reconsideration of the order to this effect having been
denied, defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals which, after appropriate
proceedings, rendered the decision appealed from, setting aside the order of
dismissal of the Court of First Instance and remanding the case thereto for
trial on the merits.Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, to which we
gave due course.

Prior thereto, or while the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, the
project of partition among the heirs of the deceased Carlos Palanca had been
approved by the probate court, in view of which said heirs substituted
Roman Ozaeta as plaintiff in this case.

Plaintiffs herein raise two questions, namely: (1) whether the Court of
Appeals had jurisdiction to entertain defendant's appeal from the order of
dismissal of the Court of First Instance; and (2) whether the Court of
Appeals erred in setting aside said order of dismissal.
As regards the first question, it is urged that since the defendant's appeal
from said order of dismissal raised a question purely of law, namely,
whether he had unduly failed to prosecute the appeal, the same was within
the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, so that the
decision of the Court of Appeals must be deemed null and void ab initio.We
deem it, however, unnecessary to pass upon this question because, whether
we deal with the proceedings before Us as one for review on certiorari of
said decision of the Court of Appeals, or as a direct appeal from the order of
dismissal of the Court of First Instance, the result is' the same.

Indeed, it is not disputed that the question whether or not a case should be
dismissed for "failure to prosecute" is mainly addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court.As a consequence, the action taken by said court
should not be disturbed by an appellate court unless it appears affirmatively
that the former had abused its aforementioned discretion.In other words,
the trial court must be presumed to have acted correctly, unless and until
the contrary is satisfactorily established.[1]In the case at bar, the Court of
Appeals adopted, in effect, the opposite procedure, for it assumedthat "in all
probability, the court" - of first instance - "could not have heard the case
immediately even if there was a motion to set it for hearing, because of the
pendency of other urgent or similar matters" and that "this is the reason
why the clerk of court did not x x xinclude this case in the calendar," during
the period it had not been included therein.

Then again, the Court of Appeals acted upon the false premise that the
decision of a municipal court against the defendant in illegal detainercases is
vacated on appeal taken by said defendant.As early as January 23, 1948,
such premise had been explicitly rejected by this Court, in Torres vs.
Ocampo[2], in which it held that:

" x x xjudgment rendered by an inferior court in forcible entry or illegal

detainer is not vacated by the appeal until after the rendition of judgment by
the Court of First Instance; but it continues in force and may be executed
upon failure on the part of the appellant to put up the supersedeas bond and
monthly deposits required by law, during 'the pendency of the appeal."
Over twelve (12) years later, this was reiterated in Acierto vs. Laperal1, in
the following language:

"The only issue posed in this petition is whether the appeal taken by
plaintiffs from the decision of the Municipal Court of Manila to the court of
first instance had the effect of vacating said decision as is the case in
ordinary actions as provided for in Section 9, Rule 40, of the Rules of Court.
"While in an ordinary action a perfected appeal shall operate to vacate the
judgment of the justice of the peace or of the municipal court, and the action
when duly entered in the court of first instance shall stand de novo upon its
merits in accordance with the regular procedure in that court as though the
same had never been tried before and had been originally there commenced
(Sec. 9, Rule 40), this rule only applies to ordinary actions, and not to cases
of ejectment which are governed by Sec. 8, Rule 72.This rule sets out a
particular procedure that may be deemed to be an exceptionto the
provisions of Sec. 9, Rule 40 x x x"
Indeed, the appeal taken by the defendant in a forcible entry or illegal
detainer case from a decision rendered against him does not bar its
execution during the pendency of the appeal.To stay executionhe must file a
bond - which would be unnecessary if the decision had been vacated, for
there would then be nothing to execute, and, hence, nothing to stay - and
must deposit the amount due to the plaintiff "as found by the judgment"
appealed from.As a consequence, the appealed judgment is thereby
enforced or enforceable one way or the other - either by ordinary execution
or by deposit of said amount, coupled with a bond to stay said execution.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that the period from June 28, 1963,
when defendant filed his answer, to October 20, 1964, when the order of
dismissal was issued, or over one (1) year and three (3) months, during
which defendant had not asked the case to be set for hearing in the Court of
First Instance, is not long enough to warrant dismissal of the appeal for
failure to prosecute.This is contrary to the position taken by this Court in
Chuan vs. De la Fuente2, Villanueva vs. Secretary of Public Works3, and
Insurance Co. of North America vs. Republic1, in which we upheld orders of
dismissal based upon inaction for a similar length of time.

One other factor must be taken into account.This unlawful detainer case is a
special civil action which, by its nature, is meant to be summary in
character.Besides, it is a matter of common knowledge that there is a
considerable number of cases of this kind pending before our courts; that
appeals therefrom have only too often been resorted to for purposes of
delay; and that such cases and the appeals therein taken contribute
materially to the clogging of court dockets and, hence, to the delay in the
disposition of other cases deserving of more attention.In short,
considerations of public policy warrant that greater diligence be demanded
from defendants-appellants in forcible entry and detainer cases to expedite
the disposal thereof.

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of the Court of First Instance of Manila is

hereby affirmed, with costs against defendant Chua Keng Kian.
IT IS SO ORDERED
(https://www.digest.ph/decisions/gonzales-vs-ca-16 )
 Refugia, et al. vs. CA, et al.,
G.R. No. 118284, July 5, 1996

FACTS:

Unfortunately can’t find case digest regarding here.

Caniza vs. CA, 335 Phil. 1107

G.R. No. 110427. February 24, 1997

NARVASA, C.J.

FACTS:
Being then ninety-four (94) years of age, Carmen Caniza was declared
incompetent by judgment in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her
niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. Caniza was the owner of a house and lot. Her
guardian Amparo Evangelista commenced a suit to eject the spouses Pedro
and Leonora Estrada from said premises.

The complaint was later amended to identify the incompetent Caniza as

plaintiff, suing through her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista. The
amended Complaint pertinently alleged that plaintiff Caniza was the absolute
owner of the property in question; that out of kindness, she had allowed the
Estrada Spouses, their children, grandchildren, and sons-in-law to
temporarily reside in her house, rent-free; that Caniza already had urgent
need of the house on account of her advanced age and failing health, “so
funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support, maintenance and
medical treatment;” among others.

The defendants declared that they had been living in Caniza’s house since
the 1960’s; that in consideration of their faithful service they had been
considered by Caniza as her own family, and the latter had in fact executed
a holographic will by which she “bequeathed” to the Estradas the house and
lot in question. The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by
Caiza clearly denotes her intention that they remain in possession thereof,
and legally incapacitated her judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from
evicting them therefrom, since their ouster would be inconsistent with the
ward’s will. Such will has not been submitted for probate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged will may be given effect

RULLING:
No. A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator’s death,
it may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect
whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite
explicit: “No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court” An owner’s
intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his
tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former’s taking back possession in the
meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. And that, in this case, there
was sufficient cause for the owner’s resumption of possession is apparent:
she needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical
infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.
(https://www.micvillamayor.com/caniza-v-ca/ )

Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. vs. Cruz,

G.R. No. 151212, September 10, 2003

Facts:
A complaint for ejectment was filed by [Petitioner Ten Forty Realty and
Development Corporation] against x x x  [Respondent Marina Cruz...
etitioner came to know that Barbara Galino sold the same property on April
24, 1998 to Cruz, who immediately occupied the property and which
occupation was merely tolerated by petitioner... petitioner is not qualified to
own the residential lot in dispute, being a public land; according to Barbara
Galino, she did not sell her house and lot to petitioner but merely obtained a
loan from Veronica

Lorenzana;

Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) ordered respondent to vacate the

property and surrender to petitioner possession thereof.  It also directed her
to pay, as damages for its continued unlawful use

(RTC) of Olongapo City (Branch 72) reversed the MTCC

CA held that petitioner had failed to make a case for unlawful detainer,
because no contract -- express or implied

Issues:

[r]espondent's occupation or possession of the property in question was

merely through the tolerance or permission of the herein [p]etitioner;...
ejectment case should have been a forcible entry case where prior physical
possession is indispensable... r]espondent's possession or occupation of the
said property is in the nature of an exercise of ownership which should put
the herein [p]etitioner on guard

Ruling:
The Petition has no merit.
dmittedly, no express contract existed between the parties. Not shown either
was the corporation's alleged tolerance of respondent's... possession.
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, the permission or tolerance must
have been present at the... beginning of the possession
CA correctly ruled that the ejectment case should have been for forcible
entry -- an... action that had already prescribed
In a contract of sale, the buyer acquires the thing sold only upon its delivery
"in any of the ways specified in Articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other
manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the
vendor to the vendee.
Article 1498 lays down the general rule: the execution of a public instrument
shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing that is the object of the
contract if, from the deed, the contrary does not appear or cannot be
clearly... inferred.
it maintains that Galino's continued stay in the premises from the time of the
sale up to the time respondent's... occupation of the same on April 24, 1998,
was possession held on its behalf and had the effect of delivery under the
law.
The ownership of immovable property sold to two different buyers at
different times is governed by Article 1544 of the Civil Code, which reads as
follows:
"Article 1544.  x  x  x
"Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Its claim of an unattested and unverified notation on its Deed of Absolute
Sale[40] is not equivalent to registration... rivate corporations are
disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain
Petition is DENIED
Principles:
execution of a public instrument gives rise only to a prima facie presumption
of delivery.  Such presumption is destroyed when the delivery is not effected
because of a legal impediment
(https://lawyerly.ph/digest/cb912?user=7625 )