Indian Political Science Association

KHOMEINI: LEADER OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAN

Author(s): G. BHAGAT
Source: The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No. 1 (January - March 1987), pp. 31-41
Published by: Indian Political Science Association
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 KHOMEINI: LEADER OF ISLAMIC
REVOLUTION IN IRAN

G. BHAGAT

Quite earlyin the development,Islam ceased to remainmonolithic

because thefaithhad to adapt to social and cultural reality.1 Many
splintergroupssprangup but Islam was divided into two main sects:
Shii and Sunni. The latterdoes not significantlydeviate fromthe Pro-
phet and his teachings,whereastheShii lean to Ali, who was the son-in-
law of the Prophet,the firstImam and fourthCaliph.2

Ali, of course,aspired to succeed the Prophetbut was passed over

by the Prophet's ''companions". A war ensued betweenAli's forces
and thecompanionsin which Ali was defeatedand killed. Imam Ali
became a martyr. Eventually Ali's son Husayn and his familyand
associateswere,accordingto Shii tradition,brutallymurderedby the
evil Yazid's forceson the plains of Kerbala.3 These martyrdomsand
beliefin the saintlyImams of whichthereweretwelve,add a dimension
to Shii not foundin Sunni belief.

The martyrdomand betrayal enraged and united the minority

Shii and manybegan to seriously talk about perfidyand oppressionof
the rulers- be they Sunnis, Christians,Bahais or Jews. The Shii
would accept only Ali or his male descendants as the trueruler,for
"only thoseindividualswho were closely associated withor relatedto
the Prophet"could have possessedqualitiesof the Prophet,"and those
were none otherthan Ali and his male descendants."4

The twelfthImam, a small 11 year old boy, is rumouredto have

been secretlymurderedby the enemies. The Shii believe,however,
that he is simplyhidden in a state of occulation,or noncorporealexis-
tenceand one day he is expectedto returnas a Mahdi or rightlyguided
TheIndian ofPolitical
Journal Vol.48,No. 1,January
Science, -March, 1987.

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32 THEINDIANJOURNAL
OF POLITICALSCIENCE

one to usherin a reignofjustice and penance in a world fullof sin and

injustice. Says Eric Rouleau, "Every ruler- or rulingparty- is by
definitiona usurper,since by the very act of rulinghe is substituting
himselfforthe twelfthImam, the onlyone withthe rightto executethe
divine will/'5

As the clergy were "ideal" instrumentsof revolution/ the Shii

guided by themrebelledagainst the injustice and their"movementre-
presenteda populist ethnic reaction to the conqueringArab tribes.
They would accept no one as their ruler exceptthoserelated to Ali.
Or theybelievethat the presentday "Imam is the agent of Divine illu-
minationand medium of Divine Revelation." The presentrulersof
Iran, especiallyAyatollahKhomeini, fall in that category.

Today's Imams are "prone to take oppositionalrolesin theirrela-

tionshipto government. Their claim to authorityis derivedfromtheir
role as the deputiesof the absent Imam". Rouleau furtherexplains
that the "She"ite clergy'snatural tendencyhas thusbeen to contestthe
authorityand actionsof thevariousdynastiesthathave governedPersia,
and especiallyto contestthe royal powereverytimeit triedto open the
countryto foreigninfluenceapt to pervert Islam or introducecustoms
contraryto Muslim culture and tradition." The clergyhave always
been potentialrevolutionaries.

AyatollahKhomeini (Ayatollah means sign of God),7 the present

rulerof Iran, has been notedas theImam formorethan half a century.
As the Imam, Khomeiniis the moral, religious,and political leader of
all of Iran (and probably of Shii everywhere). As the Imam he is
"appointed" by Allah to restorereligiousand political power to the
clergy. As the custodian of the Koran, especially the Shariat which
embodiesIslamic law, he alone can interpret
and representthe Prophet
on earth. And the masses believehim. This gives Khomeini immense
power over the teemingmillions.

Ruhulla Musavi Khomeini was born in 1902 on the birthdayof

Fatima, the daughterof the ProphetMuhammed.8 A descendantof
ancestorswho migratedfromLucknow,India in thenineteenthcentury,
Khomeiniat age of27 began to teach religionand philosophyintheQum
seminarysystem.®The youngrevolutionary earnestlybelievedin popu-
lar Shii customsof worshippingin shrines,invokingsaintsand inter-

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 LEADEROF ISLAIÍICREVOLUTION
KHOMEINI: IN IRAN 33

medianes withGod, and various formsof mourningthe martyrdomof

theImams ... to veto legislation, and to live offdonationsand taxes.
As earlyas 1924, the fearlessand ferventanti-PahlaviKhomeinide-
nounced the new Shah Reza Khan, whohad come to powerin 1921 by
destroyingthe Qajar dynasty,itself not legitimatein theeyesof the
Shii. 'There has alwaysbeenpotentialoppositionfromtheShii Ulama
to the Shah".10 The last legitimate governmentin Iran, the Young
Imam maintained,ended in 661 A.D. Since thenall governments in
Iran have been illegitimate. The new crusader firmlybelievedthat
the dutyof the Shii was to become involved in the political and social
lifeof the country. The Ayatollahs have the rightand obligationto
challengethe unjustruler. All Shii clergybelieve that theirmain goal
is to restorethe regimeof Ali since all otherrulersare consideredus-
urpers.11

In 1941, duringthe second world war, Khomeini insisted that

the ordersof the dictatorial Reza Shah were valueless and all the
laws approved by the Parliament must be burned. Accordinglythe
imposedParliamenthad no rights. Khomeini stood steadfastin his
conviction.

AyatollahKhomeinialways denounced the Shah and oftenat the

riskof death. In Julyof 1963, he made violentspeechesagainst the
Shah before100,000people at the mosque in his homeland of Qum.
SAVAK, thesecretsecuritypolice of the Sfcah,opened fireand killed
20 youngmullahs. Khomeiniwas imprisoned,later releasedin 1964
and exiled to Iraq. The confidentShah thoughtit was the end of the
troublemaker.

Muhammed Reza Pahlavi was six years old when his fathercame
to the throne. The old Shah, an army colonel, had staged a coup
againstthe Qajar and seizedpower. Reza Shah was highlyinfluenced
by thenew democraticrulerof Turkey, Kemal Pasha and had wanted
to modernize Iran. Instead, he became Shah and was induced to
abandon his desireto change the traditional way of lifein Iran. The
Shii had won the firstround. His son, the young Shah, however,was
"stronglyinfluencedby his father'sdespotic rule." The new Shah hat-
ed the mullahsand "treatedtheurban middle class ... as he treatedthe
unrulytribes."1' He was particularlyhard on the clergy. The tyran-
p-5

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34 THÈ INDIANJOURNAL
OF POLITICALSCIENCE

Bical ruler "harassed the mullahs ... imprisonedthem... executed

them."18 Furthermore,he did all of thisdevoid of charisma^never
smilingand always stern, "his role inevitablykept him at arms length
fromotherpeople."14 The Shah seemed to justify his harsh,authori-
tativemeasuresby insistingthat a strictrule was inevitablein orderto
progressa backward country.
In a surprising1977 interviewwith Italian journalistOriana Fal-
laci, Shah states,
Believe me, when threequartersof a nation doesn't know how
to read or writeyou can provideforreformsonlyby the stric-
testauthoritarianism- otherwiseyou get nowhere.16

The Shah had underestimated his subjects. The youngmonarch

was called ''playboy" as the new ruler indulged in medieval and
modernluxuries. This became intolerable to the Shii, and radical
politiciansled by Prime MinisterMuhhamad Mossadegh rebelledin
1950. The Shah was exiled but returnedwithinthreemonthswhen,
in a coup led by the American CIA, Mossadegh was overthrownand
imprisoneduntilhis death in 1967.14 Upon his returnthe Shah matu-
red and took seriousstepsto stamp out any opposition.He strengthened
his armyand promotedit as a forcededicated to the royalty. Loyalty
was a keyissue in promotion.

The Shah and his forcesproceededto harass other establishments

in society. "Virtually everyindependentinstitutionwas subverted."17
Universitieswere keptunderwatch and the media includingtelevision,
newspaper,and radio struggled under heavy censorship. SA VAK,
the Shah's secretpolice, severelydealt withall dissenters. The ruthless
Shah "ruled more as an absolute than a . constitutionalmonarch,
the government in all its importantphases."11

The Shah now had two objectives: to legitimize his throneand

modernizeIran, Afterhis firstson was born on October 31, 1960, he
was crownedin 1967, forwithouta male descendant,no Shah could be
crowned.

His firststep to modernizecame in 1963 in the formof the White

Revolution. He gave womenthe rightto vote and take part in social
life,but the cornerstoneof the White Revolution was land reform.

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 LEADEROF ISLAMICREVOLUTION
KHOMEINI! IN IRAN 35

This made theold landholders,including the mullahs who held large

chunksof propertyfuriousand they"incited violentdemonstrations in
"la The mighty Shah crushed them instantly,but the
June 1963.
victimsdid not forgetthe oppressor. "Do notstep on Persian carpets
or mullahs,fortheywill increasein value,"" says a Persian proverb.

The Shah's modernizationplans mushroomedin the 1970s, especi-

ally afterthe 1973 oil embargo when his oil revenuesjumped from
millionsto billions. He began to pour untold money into infrastruc-
tures,modernhospitals,roads, buildings; but the major portionof his
wealth wentinto buyingcostlyWestern,especiallyAmerican weapons,
whichthe people thoughtto be quite unnecessary. The women, now
allowed equal rights,began to flock to schools and colleges, wear
Westerndresses,dance to Westernmusic- a complete departure from
the Shii tradition. Hundreds of modern shopping centers, mostly
owned and operatedby the Shah's friends,popped up all over Iran
seriouslyhurtingthe small shopkeepersor baazaris, the heart of the
cities'economicsystems.21InnumerableAmericansand otherWester-
nerswerelured to big positionsand thisbecame quite intolerable for
the new elite who had aspired to share the new prosperity in Iran.
The Shah invitedWesternvisitors,gave themextravagantparties often
servinghard liquor anathema to the Shii. Even though a Muslim,
althoughmanysuspectedthat the monarch has a "strong attraction
to Zoroastrianism,"22 the Shah was codemnedas anti-Shii, not a small
allegationin Iran. The clergy denounced the modernization which
had "violated Islamic laws/'23

The Shah's modernizationprogram created a consumer society

fora privilegedcourt,the powerful merchants, the speculators.24 It
boomeranged. The baazaris hated him for losing business to the
modern malls; the farm labourerswho flocked to cities found them
uninhabitableand unrewarding;"the villagers were uprooted"" ; and
thenewelite foundthemselvesshunnedin favourof theWesternfortune
seekers. Moreover,the educated class "found the medieval pomp (of
the Royal Family) and circumstanceshumiliatingand ridiculous."28
The mullahs,themselvesvictimsof the Shah's rule and White Révolu"
tion,and deprivedof any effectivevoice in government,struck hard.
Only thearmyremainedloyal. Even there,"except for the generals,
(the Shah) had fewfriendsor allies at home."*7 The Shah stillfelthe

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36 OF POLITICALSCIENCE
THE INDIANJOURNAL

could survive,but it was too late. On January 16, 1979, Muhammed

Reza Pahlavi, the last Shah of Iran, finally took a "long vacation''
never to returnto his countryhe loved so dearly. The NewYorkTimts
head-lineread: SHAH LEAVES IRAN FOR INDEFINITE STAY:
MANY EXPECT LONG EXILE.2# The one-timepowerfulmonarch,
wentfrom country to country(Egypt, Morocco, the Bahamas, the
USA, and back to Egypt),to seek a new home, but under the threatof
the Iranian revolutionaries,no one gave him shelter, not even the
mighty United States. The Shah finallyended up in Egyptwhere
presidentAnwar Sadat, a longtimeally, gave him protection. Suff-
ering from terminal cancer the Shah died in 1980. "Only one
Iranian kinghas died naturallywhilehe occupied the throne.

The Shah followingthe Western footstepstried to instrument

polity-separation secularization10in his policies, but in doing so he
became farremovedfromhis populace. Although liberal and more
compromisinggroupsexisted,Khomeini'sbold and simplisticapproach
to the nostalgicrootsof Islam appealed more to the masses.81

During his fifteenyears in exile in Iraq and later in Paris, the

AyatollahKhomeiniactively pursued his revolutionarygoals. Says
General Georges Buis, the retiredhead of the French Institute of
StrategicStudiesand respectedanalyst of the Iranian situation: "The
Ayatollahhas been a brillianttactician. He nevergot lost in details.
He insistedagain and again that he was the real Imam, the guardian
of theirinterests."82

While in Iraq Khomeinisettledin Najaf, the centerof Shii religi-

ous studies. There he influenced thousands of Iranian studentswho
carriedhis philosophies back to Iran." In 1971 he denounced the
celebrationsand festivitiescommemorating2500 years of the Persian
empireand the Shah's self-imposedtitle of Aryamehr,"light of the
Aryans".84 Once in Paris Khomeiniutilized Western technologyand
made tapes repudiating the Shah's regimewhich were sold on the
streetsof Tehran likehot pretzels. He urgedthe ulama to use religious
holidaysand functionsas a means to rally the people and even made
special tapes forthese occasions. Khomeini'spolitical astutenesscan
be seen in the way he courted each segmentof society,for example
the students.

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 IN IRAN
: LEADEROF ISLAMICREVOLUTION
KHOMEINI 37

Leadershipmustalways strive to raise people's awarenessby

explaining the legal, religious, social, economic,and political
solutionswhichIslam offers. The youthmust be saved from
the imperialists'attemptsat corruptingthem. Propaganda
work must reach the universitystudents because they are
the staunchestopponentsof repression,despotism,treachery,
agentsof imperialismand plunderersof national wealth.85

The Shah underestimated his opponentin his aloof self-confidence.

Khomeini elevated the ancient Shii notion of martyrdomto new
heights.Shii's believe thatto die injihad (holywar) is to attaininstant
salvation. So fewdenied Khomeini'scall forresistance.

The Ayatollah also believedthat the massesscould achieve victory

withoutresortingto armed violence. Mullahs throughoutIran recited
theKarbala paradigm referring to the Shah as the evil Yazd,86 killers
of Imams. The populace took to demonstrating in the streetsmarching
in rowsoftenfortyabreast.37 When policegunfirebrokeup theproces-
sion, the survivorsmarched again 40 days later commemoratingthe
deaths of the martyrsas is the Shii tradition. Again the Shah's forces
would kill in orderto disperse the crowd and 40 days later the latest
martyrswould be honouredwithanotherprocession.This cycle contin-
ued untilbeforeMuharramwhen the Shah fled.88

Everyrevolutionneedsan enemyand accordingto Khomeini,Iran

had two: the Shah and the United States of America. The Iranian
public had every reason to be hostile towardsthe U.S.A. American
leadershiphad committedalmosteverypossibleblunderin dealing with
the Middle East nation. Four U.S. Presidents, Eisenhower, Nixon,
Ford, and GartersupportedtheShah and acceptedhis totalitarianism.
Since the Shah 'showed enormous sensitivity" towards any kind of
internalintelligenceoperation,the U.S. "eroded" its undercoveracti-
vitiesin Iran. The American government, therefore,approached the
Iranian revolutionfroma position of almost unrelievedignorance.'*
Furthermore,the stakesin Iran were too highto really''see" and deal
with the unrest. The Shah was a provenally, situatedin a militarily
strategic location and supporting him was much morefeasible than
dealing witha new contingent.

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38 THE INDIANJOURNAL
OF POLITICALSCIENCB

From the Iranian viewpoint,some hostilityremainedfrom 1953,

whenthe Mossadeghgovernment was overthrownin favorofReza Shah
Pahlavi witha greatamountof helpfromtheCIA. The CIA also prim-
ed and trainedthe Shah's secretpolice S AVAK who thenproceededto
tortureIranian citizens.40

In his wish to make Iran the strongholdof the Middle East and
maybeout ofparanoia, theShah boughtmillionsand-Biillionsofdollars
worthof arms of the highestcalibre fromthe United States. The peo-
ple seeingtheseweapons as a threat used to subjugate themalso felt
that the governmentwas spendinguselesslyin a foreigneconomywith-
out any return.The Shah, immune to internalprotests,sincehe no
longerdepended on taxationforrevenuedue to oil wealth, ignoredthe
nationalunrestas usual.

Khomeinilambastedall Westerntraditionsthat had firsttrickled

and thenpoured into Iran, fromunveiledwomento hard liquor and
pornographic movies. Iranians, especially students,displayed their
disrespectforthe U.S. by taking the U.S. embassy hostage,by burn-
ing Americanflags,and throughmass demonstrations. By continuing
the enmityafterthe Shah's departure,Khomeiniprolongedthe masses
unitedzeal.

The Shah's downfallcould be a personal victoryfor Imam Kho-

meini. . "Khomeini had so many followersnot because of his religion,
but because of his transientattitudetowardstheShah"41 The S AVAK
had killedone of his sonsin 1977and eliminatedmanyfollowers.Many
say he is a vindictiveman and his whole campaign has been one of
revenge. He may be stubborn and strict, but Islam is a hard and
strictreligionto rule a fiercedesertpeople. .

Khomeinicould not have triumphedover the Shah alone. With

him he had had the supportof the Shii faithful,especially the clergy.
With200,000 mullahs,9000 mosques and hundredsof urban religious
centers,48"the clergywas the onlygroup equipped to engage in oppo-
sitionalactivities"4.8
because the royal regime had stamped out most
otherpolitical groups.44

Upon his returnto po'yer,Khomeini immediatelyeliminatedthe

loyal followersof the Shah, especially fromthe armed forces.44With

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 Khomeini:leader of islamio revolution in iran 39

utmostspeed the holy man removedany remnantsof the opposition.

FinallyIran was in the hands of the clergy, God's representatives.In
the December, 1980 referendum the constitution
instituteda parliament
and electeda presidentbut above thesesecular officeswill rule a Muslim
council and a "faquih", a jurisprudentwho mustapprove of the presi-
dent,holds vetopower over virtuallyeveryact of governmeat"4®Iran
was now in the unprecedentedstateof a theocracy.The Ayatollahhas
provenhimselfan excellent revolutionaryleader. When the anger at
the "great Satan" and Iraq dies down we will see if the Ayatolloah
Ruhulloah Musavi Khomeini can prove himselfto be equally revolu-
tionaryin domesticaffairs.

NOTES

1. Bates, D. and Rassam, A. Peoplesand Cultures

of theMiddle
East, Prestice-Hall,New Jersey,1983,p. 59.
2. Khan, M.Z. Muhammad : Seal of Prophets
, Routledge Paul
Kegan, London, 1980, p. 1.
3. Fischer, M.M.J. Iran: From ReligiousDispute to Revolution
Harvard UniversityPress, Cambridge,Mass. 1987,pp. 18-19.
4. Enayat, H. ModernIslamic Political Thought
, University of
Texas Press,Austin, 1982, p. 1.
5. Rouleau, E "Khomeini's Iran", ForeignAffairs,Fall 1980,
pp. 2-3.
6. Alpher,J. "The Khomeini International", The Washington
Quarterly, Autumn 1980, p. 55.
7. "The MysticWho Lit theFires of Hatred", Time,January7,
1980, p. 14.
8. Fischer,M.M.J. "Imam Khomeini: Four Levels of Under-
standing", in Voicesof Resurgent
Islam, edited by John L* Esposito,
OxfordUniversityPress,New York, 1983, p. 151.
9. Demieg, A. Sullivan, S. and Whitmore,J. "The Khomeini
Enigma", Newsweek , December 31, 1979, p. 27.
10. Keddie, R. "Religion and Irreligionin Early Iranian Natio-
nalism", in The IranianRevolutionandtheIslamic Republic
: Proceedings
of
a Conference
, edited by Nikki Keddie and Eric Hooglundj Middle East
Institute,1982, p. 290.
11. Ayoob, M. "Two Faces of Political Islam: Iran and Pakistan
Compared", AsianSurvey , June 1979, p. 542.

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40 THE INDIANJOURNAL
OF POLITICALSGIENOB

12. Rubin, B. "Paved with Good Intentions: The American

Experienceand Iran" PenguinBooks,New York, 1981,p. 15.
13. Bill,J.A. "Iran and theCrisis of "78", ForeignAffairs
, Spring
1983, p. 893.
14. Laqueur, W. "Why the Shah .Fell" Commentary
, March 1979,
p. 47.
15. New YorkTimes, 17 January,1979.
16. "The Mystic," Time, 7 January,1980, p. 13.
17. New TorkTimes, 17January 1979.
18. Rubin, op. cit.,p. 325.
19. "The Mystic," Time, 7 January,1980, p. 12.
20. Sciolino, E. "Iran's Durable Revolution," Foreign Affairs
,
Spring 1983, p. 893.
21. "The Mystic," Time, 7 January,1980, p. 12.
22. Leeden, M. and Lewis, W.L. "Carter and the Downfall of
the Shah: The Inside Story." Washington Spring 1980, p. 3.
Quarterly,
23. NetoTorkTimes, 17January1979.
24. Rouleau, op. cit., p. 3.
25. New TorkTimes, 17January, 1979.
26. Laqueur, W. op. cit., p. 11.
27. New TorkTimes, 17January,1979.
28. Ibid.,
29. Jenkins,L., Newsweek
, 12 February, 1979, p. 42.
¿ Yale Univer-
30. Smith,D.E. ReligionandPolitical Modernization
sityPress,New Haven, 1974, p. 8.
31. Keddie, N R. "Is Shi'ism Revolutionary?," in The Iranian
and theIslamic Republic
Reoolution of a Conference
: Proceedings , edited by
Nikki Keddie and Eric Hooglund, Middle East Institute,USA, 1982,
p. 95.
32. New TorkTimes, 30 January, 1979.
33. Ismael, J.S. and Ismael, T.Y. "Social Change in Islamic
Society: The Political Thought of Ayatollah Khomeini," Social Pro-
June 1980,p. 610.
blems,
34. Rouleau, E. op. cit.,p. 1.

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 KHOMEINI!LEADEROF ISLAMICREVOLUTION
IN IRAN 41

35. Ismael, T. S. and Ismael, T.Y. op,cit p. 613.

36. Fischer,Iran: FromReligiousDispute, op. cit., p. 205.
37. Ibid.
38. Sick, G. "Washington'sEncounterWith the Iranian Revolu-
andtheIslamicRepublic
tion in The IranianRevolution , op. cit.,p. 128.
39. Ibid.
40. Rouleau, E. op. cit., p. 8.
41. Laqueur, W. op.cit., p. 53.
42. Alpher,J. op. cit.,p. 55.
43. Leedan and Lewis, op. cit., p. 10.
44. J. op. cit., p. 55.
AJpher,
45. "The Mystic," Time,January7, 1980, p. 19.
46. Ibid.

p-6

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