Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Political Law Case Digests
Political Law Case Digests
DRAGON
Constitutional Law Digests
*Note: These digests all have Justice V. V. Mendoza as their ponente.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
DIGESTS
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
Expropriation
Manila attempted the other modes of acquisition as required in 9-10 of R.A. No. 7279.
ISSUE: Whether the CA was correct in enjoining expropriation proceedings because of the lack
of showing of conformity with the law regarding other modes of acquisition.
HELD: No. Once a proper complaint for expropriation is filed and a sufficient deposit is made,
the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial.
Whether the City of Manila has complied with the requirement of other modes of acquisition
requires the presentation of evidence something that is done in the expropriation proceedings.
Expropriation proceedings consist of two stages: first, condemnation of the property after it is
determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the
determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of private property which is made by
the court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners.
Eslaban v. Vda. de Onorio.
G.R. No. 146062. June 28, 2001.
FACTS: Vda. de Onorio is the owner of a lot upon which an irrigation canal was constructed by
the government. Despite demands, she was not paid just compensation.
ISSUE: Whether Vda. de Onorio is entitled to just compensation.
HELD: Yes. The defense of the government is that since the land was acquired by free patent,
there is an encumbrance upon it to give way to any canals. However, this provision of the Land
Registration Act applies only where the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of
the canal have been pre-determined. In this case, the land was registered before the
determination of the canals boundaries there should have been expropriation proceedings
and payment of just compensation.
BILL OF RIGHTS
Due Process
Administrative Due Process
FACTS: The accused confessed to the crime of murder to a policeman while the two were
eating in a store. He now claims that the confession was inadmissible, because he was not
warned of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel.
HELD: The Miranda rights are applicable only when the suspect has been taken into custody or
has otherwise been deprived of his freedom in a substantial way. In this case, the accused was
not in custody when he confessed. Therefore, the right is not applicable.
Freedom Of Expression
Libel
expression; and (4) if the incidental restriction on the freedom of expression is no greater than
essential to the furtherance of the interest.
The regulation fails rule #1 since there is a causal connection between expression and the
asserted government interest. It also fails rule #2 since it could have been more narrowly drawn;
prohibited speech such as erroneous, libelous or misleading surveys could have been punished
instead of suppressing all surveys.
Right To Travel
CITIZENSHIP
Mercado v. Manzano
G.R. No. 135036 May 26, 1999
FACTS: An opponent and a voter sought Edu Manzanos disqualification as candidate for vice
mayor on the ground that he was a dual citizen.
HELD: It is dual allegiance, not dual citizenship that is a ground for disqualification from running
for public office. For candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as dual
citizens.
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Non-Observance of Internal Rules
Joker P. Arroyo, et al v. Jose De Venecia, et al
G.R. No. 127255 June 20, 1998
FACTS: The Majority Leader of the House moved for the approval of a conference committee
report. The Chair asked if there was any objection to the motion. Rep. Joker Arroyo asked,
What is that, Mr. Speaker? The Chair declared the report approved without paying attention to
Arroyo. Petitioners claim that Arroyos question was a privileged question or a point of order
which under the rules of the house has precedence over other matters.
HELD: Arroyos question was neither a privileged question nor a point of order. A privileged
question is one affecting the duties, conduct, rights, privileges, dignity, integrity or reputation of
the House or its members. A point of order is used to require the House or any of its members
to observe its own rules. In this case, there was no violation of rules because it is an
established practice in the approval of a conference committee report for the Chair simply to ask
if there are objections to the motion for approval of the report. The law cannot be invalidated
simply because of an alleged non-observance of internal rules of the House.
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Legal Standing
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Kilosbayan v. Morato
G.R. No. 118910 July 17, 1995
FACTS: In Kilosbayan v. Guingona the Court invalidated the Contract of Lease between the
PCSO and the PGMC on the ground that it had been made in violation of the charter of the
PCSO. As a result, the parties entered into a new Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA).
Petitioners again sought to declare the ELA invalid.
HELD: Petitioners have neither standing to bring this suit nor substantial interest to make them
real parties in interest within the meaning of Rule 3 2 of the Rules of Court. Justice Mendoza
ratiocinated that issues arising from the Declaration of Principles are NOT constitutional issues
enough for purposes of standing since they were merely guidelines for congressional action,
guidelines which, until given flesh by legislation, were not sources of constitutional rights.
Declaration of Principles does not offer basis for affirmative relief nor for striking down
official actions unless it speaks of a right conferred.
To establish standing, the parties must be able to show that they are in immediate
danger of sustaining direct injury in this case, no such potential injury is shown.
The previous case cannot be considered stare decisis because it was a departure form
the settled rule on standing.
Delay in Prosecution of Cases/Administrative Sanctions
First Lepanto v. CA
G.R. No. 110571. October 7, 1994
FACTS: Article 82 or the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code provided for direct appeals to the
Supreme Court from decisions and final orders of the BOI this was done without the
concurrence of the Supreme Court.
HELD: Since Article 82 increased the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its
advice and concurrence, such article never became effective and the original appellate body,
the Court of Appeals, retain its jurisdiction.
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
Commission on Audit
Umoso v. CSC.
G.R. No. 110276. July 29, 1994
FACTS: Umoso was appointed as Supervising Civil Engineer by the Secretary of Public Works
and Highways. Caronan filed a protest and the complaints committee recommended that he be
appointed instead, with Umoso filling his vacated position. The Secretary lent his approval.
Umoso filed a petition claiming that he is the next-in-rank, that his appointment was endorsed,
and the recommendation was approved by the Regional Director.
ISSUE: Whether the Secretary could appoint Caronan despite Umosos status as next in line
and the approval of his appointment by the Regional Director.
HELD: Yes. It has been declared time and again that even if petitioner occupies a "next-in-rank"
position, that fact alone does not impose on the appointing authority the duty to appoint
petitioner.
Also, appointing power is vested in the Department Secretary, and such power, however, may
be delegated to the Regional Director subject, however, to the approval, revision, modification
and reversal of the Department Secretary.
Lazo v. Civil Service Commission.
G.R. No. 108824. September 14, 1994
FACTS: The CSC, acting on a tip, checked its records and verified the eligibility exam scores of
Lazo. The rechecking disclosed that petitioners actual score was well below the minimum
requirement. It issued a resolution revoking his eligibility for being null and void.
Lazo now questions the revocation for being without due process.
ISSUE: Whether the CSC can revoke eligibility for being null and void, without notice and
hearing.
HELD: In this case, yes. This case is an exception to the general rule requiring notice and
hearing because all it required was the reevaluation of documents. No evidentiary hearing was
required.
The CSCs power to issue a certificate of eligibility carries with it the power to revoke a
certificate for being null and void.
Cuevas v. Bacal
G.R. No. 139382. December 6, 2000
FACTS: Ramos appointed Bacal, a civil servant with the rank of CESO III, to the post of Chief
Public Attorney, Public Attorneys Office, a post which requires the rank of CESO I her
appointment was later confirmed.
Estrada later appointed Demaisip to the same office and appointed Bacal to the post of
Regional Director, Public Attorneys Office, a post which requires the rank of CESO III.
Bacal filed a petition for quo warranto questioning her replacement the Court of Appeals held
that Bacal was lawfully entitled to the position in dispute.
ISSUE: Whether the transfer of an appointment of a civil servant to a position for which he or
she is not qualified can be considered permanent.
HELD: No, it is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued only to a person who meets
all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate
eligibility prescribed. Bacals appointment to an office requiring a higher rank can be considered
only to be in acting capacity and not permanent. Hence, Demaisips appointment is valid.
Ontiveros v. CA
G.R. No. 145401. May 7, 2001
FACTS: During the subsistence of the Provisional Constitution, Ontiveros was dismissed from
the civil service for inefficiency, incompetence, and unauthorized absences. His appeal with the
CSC was denied; the ruling stating that jurisdiction over the appeal was vested in the Review
Committee created under EO17.
ISSUE: Whether the CSC had jurisdiction over the appeal from the dismissal.
HELD: No. The Provisional Constitution provided for the summary nature of dismissal required
by post-revolutionary government reorganization. EO17 was promulgated to limit the broad
authority given to administrative agencies pursuant to the Provisional Constitution. Because of
the prevailing circumstances, ordinary Civil Service rules and procedures were inapplicable.
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Alonzo v. Capulong.
G.R. No. 110590. May 10, 1995.
FACTS: Fajardo was preventively suspended from her post at the Pag-ibig Fund Foundation.
The decision for her preventive suspension was based on a recommendation by Pag-ibigs legal
department, which found a prima facie case after investigating the circumstances surrounding a
letter sent to the CEO of Pag-ibig by a contractor complaining of improper conduct on Fajardos
part.
Fajardo claims she was deprived of due process for being suspended on the basis of an
unverified letter and not being allowed to give her side.
HELD: It is now settled that the preventive suspension of a civil service employee or officer can
be ordered even without a hearing because such suspension is not a penalty but only a
preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The purpose is to prevent the accused from
using his position or office to influence prospective witnesses or tamper with the records which
may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him.
PCGG
FACTS: After conducting several investigations, the UP Board of Regents found that private
respondent had committed plagiarism in her dissertation. The Board withdrew her doctroral
degree. Private respondent filed a petition for mandamus to compel UP to restore her degree.
HELD: The writ of mandamus is not available to restrain UP from the exercise of its academic
freedom. Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through
fraud, a university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus
conferred. Private respondent was not denied due process because she was given notice and
the chance to be heard in the investigations conducted by the Board.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
REMOVAL OF LICENSE REQUIREMENT
Chiongbian v. Orbos.
G.R. No. 96754. June 22, 1995.
FACTS: Petitioners challenged the power of the President to merge, by administrative
determination, the remaining regions after the establishment of the Autonomous Region. The
power, which was granted by law, is challenged as being a derogation of legislative power and
for not having a sufficient standard.
ISSUE: Whether the provision granting the President the power to merge regions, by
administrative determination, is valid.
HELD: Yes. Congress did not grant the President power to merge or reorganize for political
representation or territorial subdivision, but only for purposes of administration, which has been
traditionally within the scope of the executive department. There is also a sufficient standard
imposed by Congress for the exercise of the power: to promote simplicity, economy and
efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for
accelerated social and economic development and to improve the service in the transaction of
the public business.
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ABOLISHMENT OF ORGANIZATION
Dy v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 121587 March 9, 1999
FACTS: The DENR seized and forfeited two vehicles and pieces of illegally cut lumber. Two
months after the forfeiture, petitioner filed a suit for replevin in the RTC. The RTC issued the
writ.
HELD: The replevin suit was premature. Before a party may be allowed to seek the intervention
of the court, he must first exhaust available administrative remedies. In this case, the forfeited
trucks and lumber were under the custody of the DENR, and all actions seeking to recover
possession should first be directed to that agency.
of the agreement. However, as such, the petition is premature. There had not even been an
investigation only a recommendation for one to be conducted.
Jurisdictional issue: The State also raised the issue that the court issued the
injunction/prohibition in violation of the law that no court shall issue an injunction against
administrative acts or controversies which involve facts or exercise of discretion in technical
cases this was not discussed by the SC for being not ripe for determination, it being decided
that the injunction was premature.
ELECTION LAW
POWER OF COMELEC TO PROSECUTE ELECTION OFFENSES
Angelia v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 135468. May 31, 2000
FACTS: Tan received four votes less than Angelia, denying him a slot in the Sangguniang
Bayan. He filed a petition to annul the proclamation of Angelia, attaching a copy of the election
returns showing a miscount. The COMELEC annulled the proclamation of Angelia and, based
on a verification of the results, proclaimed Tan. Angelia now questions the actions of the
COMELEC for being done without notice and hearing.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELECs annulment of the proclamation and the subsequent
proclamation of another candidate violated due process.
HELD: Yes. The COMELEC rules of procedure dictate that the proper procedure was to
reconvene and, after notice and hearing to the parties, to effect the necessary corrections on
the certificate of canvass and proclaim the winning candidate or candidates on the basis
thereof.
Perez v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 133944 October 28, 1999
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FACTS: Petitioner filed in the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent
as a candidate for the House of Representatives on the ground that he had not been a resident
of the district for at least one year immediately before the day of the elections. The COMELEC
dismissed the petition. Private respondent was subsequently elected, proclaimed, and sworn in
office. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC decision, which was
denied.
HELD: The COMELEC has no more jurisdiction over the case since private respondent had
already been proclaimed. It is the HRET that has exclusive original jurisdiction over the petition
for the declaration of private respondents ineligibility. On the merits, the fact that a person was
previously registered as a voter in one district is not proof that he is not domiciled in another
district.
JURISDICTION OVER SK ELECTIONS
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HELD: What the COMELEC contemplated was not the outright nullification of petitioners
proclamation but a hearing before the MBC after which the proclamation of petitioner may be
set aside, if proper. These proceedings before the MBC should be summary and may be
appealed to the COMELEC en banc. There is no need to file an election protest because where
a proclamation is null and void, the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive
the COMELEC of the power to annul the proclamation.
Cipriano B. Peaflorida et al v. COMELEC et al
G.R. No. 122013 March 26, 1997
FACTS: Petitioners were candidates for mayor and vice mayor in the May 1995 elections. They
sought a nullification of the canvass on the ground that the board of canvassers had been
illegally constituted and the canvass irregularly conducted. The Board of Canvassers did not
act on the petition, so the petitioners appealed with the COMELEC. A month later, the case was
declared terminated in an Omnibus Resolution of the COMELEC in view of the beginning of the
term of office of elective officials the next day. Petitioners claim that the COMELEC abused its
discretion when it deliberately sat on the petition to render it moot and academic.
HELD: The COMELEC issued the resolution not to render moot and academic pending preproclamation contests but to prevent many offices from having no incumbents at the beginning
of the term of office. Petitioners have not shown that the COMELEC deliberately sat on their
protest. If the COMELEC had in fact done so, petitioners should have filed for mandamus to
compel it to resolve the case on time. At any rate, they can file an election protest and prove
their claim in the appropriate forum.
Jose C. Ramirez v. COMELEC, et al
G.R. No. 122013, March 26, 1997
FACTS: Petitioner was proclaimed winner in the 1995 election for vice mayor by the Municipal
Board of Canvassers (MBC). Private respondent filed in the COMELEC a petition for the
correction of manifest errors in the addition of his votes in the Statement of Votes. The
COMELEC en banc issued 2 resolutions directing the MBC to reconvene and recompute the
votes in the Statement of Votes. Petitioner contends that (1) the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction because it resolved the case without it first having been acted upon by one of its
divisions, and (2) the MBC had already made a correction of the manifest errors in the
Statement of Votes in its certification, and it was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to
order a re-computation of votes.
HELD:
(1) The Rules of the COMELEC expressly provides that pre-proclamation controversies
involving manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of the results may be filed directly
with the COMELEC.
(2) Corrections should be made either by inserting the corrections in the Statement of Votes
prepared and submitted by the MBC or by preparing an entirely new Statement of Votes.
Moreover, these corrections should be based on the election returns, not on the
Certificates of Votes. In this case, what the COMELEC should have ordered the MBC to
do was not merely to recompute the number of votes for the parties, but to revise the
Statement of Votes using the election returns for this purpose.
Amer Balindong v. COMELEC, et al
G.R. No. 124041 August 9, 1996
FACTS: Petitioner, losing candidate for mayor, filed in the COMELEC a Petition to Suspend
and/or Annul Proclamation of the winning candidate on the ground that one polling place had
been transferred without prior notice and hearing, resulting in the failure of 63 voters to cast
there votes. Petitioner also prayed for a technical examination of the signatures and
thumbmarks in the list of voters and voters affidavits from that precinct.
HELD: The mere fact that the transfer of polling place was not made in accordance with the law
does not warrant a declaration of failure of election and the annulment of the proclamation of the
winning candidate, unless the number of uncast votes will affect the result of the election. In
this case, since the 63 votes uncast will not materially affect the result of the election, there
should be no declaration of failure of election. A technical examination in a pre-proclamation
controversy is allowed only if it is manifestly obvious that the election returns are manufactured,
and not when, as in this case, there is no obvious badge of fraud. Petitioner's remedy is to raise
his issues in an election protest before the RTC.
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Dagloc v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 138969 December 17, 1999
FACTS: Private respondent filed a PETITION TO DECLARE A FAILURE OF ELECTION
AND/OR ANNUL THE ELECTION RESULTS. Several weeks later, private respondent also filed
an election protest. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the election protest on the ground that it
was filed more than 10 days from the date of proclamation.
HELD: The election protest was filed out of time. The Election Code provides that the filing of a
pre-proclamation controversy suspends the running of the reglementary period for filing an
election protest. However, the earlier petition to declare a failure of election filed by private
respondent was not in the nature of a pre-proclamation controversy. Therefore, it did not
suspend the running of the period for filing the election protest.
DISQUALIFICATION OF WINNING CANDIDATE
Patoray v. COMELEC.
G.R. No. 120823. October 24, 1995.
FACTS: There were discrepancies between the taras and the written figures in Election Return
A. Election Return B, on the other hand, was incomplete in the sense that it lacked data as to
provincial and congressional candidates. The COMELEC ordered the exclusion of both Election
Returns A and B.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC was correct in ordering the exclusion of the two election
returns.
HELD: A was properly excluded, B was not.
However, pursuant to the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, the COMELEC should have
used the Certificate of Votes for Election Return A or ordered a recount of the ballots in order to
avoid disenfranchisement of the voters.
As to Election Return B, the exclusion was erroneous because the defect was material.
The Omnibus Election Code provides that in case of material defects, the board of election
inspectors should complete the necessary data in the election returns.
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Claudio v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 140560. May 4, 2000
FACTS: Within the one-year period after Pasay City Mayor Claudio assumed office, several
barangay chairs convened a Preparatory Recall Assembly and discussed the possibility of filing
a petition for recall against him. One day after the one-year period of his assumption to office
elapsed, the petition was filed.
Claudio questions the validity of the petition alleging that the PRA convened prior to the
expiration of the one-year statutory prohibition. Claudio alleges that there is a prohibition that no
recall shall be conducted within one year from a regular/local election where local election
includes the entire election period.
ISSUE: Whether the one-year post-assumption prohibition includes the convening of the PRA,
and whether the term of the one-year pre-election prohibition includes the entire election period.
HELD: No to both. As long as the election is held outside the one-year period, the preliminary
proceedings to initiate a recall can be held even before the end of the first year in office of a
local official. The law is unambiguous in providing that no recall shall take place within one year
immediately preceding a regular local election. Had Congress intended this limitation to refer to
the campaign period, which period is defined in the Omnibus Election Code, it could have
expressly said so.
TRANSFER OF EMPLOYEES DURING ELECTION PERIOD
PUBLIC OFFICERS
VALIDITY OF DECISION
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THREE-TERM LIMIT
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
FORMATION OF MUNICIPALITIES
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