AASJS vs.

Datumanong
G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2007

FACTS: This is an action for prohibition against the Secretary of Justice, the official tasked to implement
laws governing citizenship. According to petitioner, RA 9225 condones dual allegiance which is contrary
to the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9225 allows dual allegiance
HELD: It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting RA 9225 is to do away with the provision in
the CA 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized
citizens of other countries. What RA 9225 allows is dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who
have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its
face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the
person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Sec. 3, RA 9225 stayed clear of the
problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual
allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a
concern of RA 9225.

Xerxes Abadiano v. Spouses Martir

July 31, 2008

Facts: Inocentes Banares and the heirs of his wife, Feliciana Villanueva executed an Agreement of
Partition dated June 1, 1922 over Lot No. 1318. The lot was partitioned and distributed to the following:
(1) Demetrio Banares (Lot No. 1318-A), (2) Ramon and David Abadiano grandchildren of Inocentes and
Feliciana (Lot No. 1318-B) and (3) Amando Banares (Lot No. 1318-C). The partition is embodied in a
notarized Deed of Partition. In 1923, an Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 20641 was issued in the
name of the spouses. In 1939, David Abadiano, who was absent during the execution of the Agreement
of Partition, executed a Deed of Confirmation acknowledging and ratifying the document of partition.
OCT No. 20641 was administratively reconstituted in 1962 and in lieu thereof, OCT No. RO-8211 was
issued over Lot No. 1318, still in the name of the spouses. The Agreement of Partition and the Deed of
Confirmation were annotated at the back of the OCT. In 1957, Demetrio sold his share to his son
Leopoldo. The latter then filed a petition praying for confirmation of the Agreement and the Deed of
Confirmation and the Deed of Sale between him and his father, and for the issuance of a new title over
the property. The Court ordered the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of
Leopoldo, Amando, and Ramon and David. Petitioner insists that this is the valid and subsisting title over
the property and there was no other sale to anyone. Respondents allege however that prior to the
issuance of the TCT, Ramon for himself and on behalf of David, had already sold their rights and
interests over Lot No. 1318-C to Victor Garde, as evidenced by a notarized document of sale (Compra Y
Venta) dated June 3, 1922. They further allege that from the time of sale, Victor Garde and his heirs
were in continuous, public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession and occupation in the concept of an
owner of the Lot. Victors heirs sold the same to Jose Garde who in turn sold it to Lolita Martir in 1979.
Alleging that the Abadianos entered the property and harvested sugarcane from it, the spouses filed an
Action to Quiet Title and/or Recovery of Possession with Damages in 1982. The trial court ruled for the
Martirs, holding that the spouses and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
property for 60 years and the Abadianos therefore were guilty of laches. CA affirmed. Hence, this
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issue: WON the petitioner is guilty of laches.
Held: No. Under the Property Registration Decree, no title to registered land in derogation of the title of
the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Nonetheless, even if a
Torrens title is indefeasible and imprescriptible, the registered landowner may lose his right to recover

the possession of his registered property by reason of laches. Laches has been defined as neglect or
omission to assert a right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances causing
prejudice to an adverse party. The four basic elements are: 1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or
of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the
complaint seeks a remedy; 2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice of the defendants conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute
suit; 3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the
right on which he bases his suit; and 4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is
accorded to the complainant or the suit is not held to be barred. Petitioner had reasonable ground to
believe that the property, being still in the name of his predecessor in interest, continued to be theirs,
especially considering that the annotation of the purported sale was done only in 1982. That the
petitioner and his coheirs waited until the death of Amando to try and occupy the land is understandable
since any action may sow dissent within the family. In determining whether a delay in seeking to enforce
a right constitutes laches, the existence of a confidential relationship between the parties is an important
circumstance for consideration, a delay under such circumstances not being so strictly regarded as
where the parties are strangers to each other. The doctrine of laches is not strictly applied between near
relatives, and the fact that parties are connected by ties of blood or marriage tends to excuse an
otherwise unreasonable delay. In addition, several other factors militate against the finding of laches on
the part of the petitioner: a) no annotation was made of Compra Y Venta on the OCT or the TCT;
b)neither respondents nor any of their predecessors in interest participated in any of the proceedings for
the issuance of the OCT or the TCT; and c) the TCT bears out that the fact that the purported Compra Y
Venta was annotated thereon only in 1982. It is most telling that respondents, have themselves failed to
have the same property transferred in their name or even only to have the sale annotated on the title of
the property.

Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. CA

G.R. No. 100152, March 31, 2000

FACTS: Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit. Permit was
therefor issued, subject to certain conditions like prohibition of putting up an optical clinic, examining
and/or prescribing reading and similar optical glasses, etc. When it was found that petitioner violated
these conditions, its business permit was canceled.
ISSUE: Whether or not the imposition of special conditions by the public respondents were acts ultra
vires.
RULING: The authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business permits is beyond cavil. It
is provided for by law. However, the power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must always be
exercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of all concerned to due process
and equal protection of the law. But can city mayor cancel business permits or impose special
conditions? As aptly discussed by the Solicitor General in his Comment, the power to issue licenses and
permits necessarily includes the corollary power to revoke, withdraw or cancel the same. And the power
to revoke or cancel, likewise includes the power to restrict through the imposition of certain conditions.

Acme Shoe, Rubber and Plastic Corporation v. CA

G.R. No. 103576, Aug. 22, 1996

FACTS: Chua Pac, president and general manager of Acme Shoe, Rubber and Plastic Corporation,
executed a chattel mortgage in favor of Producers Bank of the Philippines, as a security for a corporate
loan in the amount of P3M. The chattel mortgage contained a clause that provided for the mortgage to
stand as security for all other obligations contracted before, during and after the constitution of the
mortgage. The P3M was paid. Subsequently, the corporation obtained additional financial

accommodations totaling P2.7M. This was also paid on the due date. Again, the bank extended another
loan to the corporation in the amount of P1M, covered by four promissory notes. However, the
corporation was unable to pay this at maturity. Thereupon, the bank applied for an extra-judicial
foreclosure of mortgage. For its part, the corporation filed an action for injunction with prayer for
damages. The lower court ultimately dismissed the case and ordered the extra-judicial foreclosure of
mortgage. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES: WON extra-judicial foreclosure of the chattel mortgage is proper. If not proper, WON the
corporation is entitled to damages as a result of the extra-judicial foreclosure.
HELD: Contracts of security are either personal or real. In contracts of personal security, such as a
guaranty or suretyship, the faithful performance of the obligation by the principal debtor is secured by
the personal commitment of another (the guarantor or surety). In contracts of real security, such as a
pledge, a mortgage or an antichresis, that fulfillment is secured by an encumbrance of property -- in
pledge, the placing of movable property in the possession of the creditor; in chattel mortgage by the
execution of the corresponding and substantially in teh form prescribed by law; in real estate mortgage,
by the execution of a public instrument encumbering the real property covered thereby; and in
antichresis, by a written instrument granting to the creditor the right to receive the fruits of an
immovable property with the obligation to apply such fruits to the payment of interest, if owing, and
thereafter to the principal of his credit -- upon the essential condition that if the obligation becomes due
and the debtor defaults, then the property encumbered can be alienated for the payment of the
obligation, but that should the obligation be duly paid, then the contract is automatically extinguished
proceeding from the accessory character of the agreement. As the law so puts it, once the obligation is
complied with, then the contract of security becomes, ipso facto, null and void.

Adaza v. Pacana Jr.

FACTS: Homobono Adaza and Fernando Pacana were elected as Governor and Vice-Governor
respectively. They both filed their certificate of candidacy during the Batasang Pambansa elections.
Adaza won while Pacana lost. Adaza took oath of office as a member of Batasang Pambansa and Pacana
took oath as the Governor of Misamis Oriental. Both started to perform their duties of the office they
were elected. Adaza petitioned that he be the Governor and exclude the respondent therefrom because
of the following reasons:
1. Petitioner was elected as Governor for a term of six years and remains as governor until expiration.
2. Pacana should be considered to have abandoned or resigned as vice governor when he ran for the
Batasang Pambansa
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Adaza can simultaneously be a member of the BP and the governor.
2. Whether or not Pacana can still be the vice governor and can succeed as the governor.
HELD:
Petition is dismissed.
1. Under the constitution, section 10 article 8, it is prohibited to be a member of the BP and a governor
at the same time. Section 10 A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa shall not hold
any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister
or member of the cabinet
2. Pacana can lawfully assume the office of governorship as provided by BP 697 Section 13. "Governors,
mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of
candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office."

ADIONG v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 103956
March 31, 1992
FACTS: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers
granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other
election laws. Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. The following are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of
the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda.
It is unlawful:
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place,
whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or
billboards

Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the COMELEC's
Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other
moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election
Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places,
public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.
HELD: The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the
COMELEC providing that "decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas
provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof" is DECLARED NULL and VOID. The COMELEC's prohibition
on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in designated areas
provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly
infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article
III). Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that
of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express
his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him.
Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646) and as couched in the resolution is
void for overbreadth. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad
that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle
(The provisions allowing regulation are so loosely worded that they include the posting of decals or
stickers in the privacy of one's living room or bedroom.) In consequence of this prohibition, another
cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights
provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. (The right to
property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a "liberty"
interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and
irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.)
Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity
to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII,
section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and
stickers on cars and other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers
on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the
vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the
financial resources of the candidate.

In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private
except in the authorized areas designated

AGABON vs. NLRC

November 17, 2004

Facts: Virgilio and Jenny Agabon were cornice installers of Riviera Home Improvements, a company
engaged in the business of selling ornamental construction materials. They were employed from January
2, 1992 until February 23, 1999, when they were dismissed for abandonment of work. The Agabons filed
a complaint for illegal dismissal before the LA, who ruled in their favor. The NLRC reversed on appeal.
The CA sustained the NLRCs decision. The Agabons further appealed to the SC, disputing the finding of
abandonment, and claiming that the company did not comply with the twin requirements of notice and
hearing.
Issue: WON the Agabons were illegally dismissed.
Held: NO. Substantive due process (EEs must be dismissed for just or authorized cause): SC upheld the
finding of abandonment, because the act of the Agabons in seeking employment elsewhere clearly
showed a deliberate intent to sever the ER-EE relationship. Procedural due process (for just cause, there
must be a written notice informing him of grounds for termination, a hearing or opportunity to be heard,
and a final notice of termination stating the grounds therefor): There was no due process because ER did
not send the requisite notices to the last known address of the EEs. ER only gave a flimsy excuse that
the notice would be useless because the EEs no longer lived there. This is not a valid excuse, they
should have still sent a notice as mandated by law. For not sending the requisite notices, the ER should
be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.

Aglipay v. Ruiz

FACTS: On May 1936, respondent announced in the newspapers that he would order of postage stamps
commemorating the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress under Act No. 4052. Petitioner, Mons.
Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Phil. Independent Church (Aglipayan), seeks a writ of prohibition
to prevent respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the
said Congress. Petitioner alleges that respondent in issuing and selling the postage stamps violated the
Constitutional provision on the principle of separation of church and state, specifically section 13,
subsection 3, Art. VI which says: No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or
used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination or system
of religion
ISSUE: WON respondent violated the Constitution in issuing and selling the postage stamps.
HELD: No constitutional infraction.
History of Separation of Church and State: our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has
taught us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for occasions might arise when the
state will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their respective
ends and aims." This principle was recognized in the Malolos Constitution, inserted in the Treaty of Paris,
in the instructions of McKinley to the Phil. Commission and finally embodied in the Constitution as the
supreme expression of the Filipino people. Filipinos enjoy both civil and religious freedom guaranteed in
the Consti. What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not merely religious toleration.

AKAP vs. DOMINGUEZ

G. R. No. 164198, June 15, 2007

FACTS: Petitioner Alay sa Kapatid International Foundation, Inc. (AKAP) is a non-stock, non-profit, and
charitable corporation run by religious sisters. It employed Romulo Dominguez herein respondent as a
community organizer. It appearing that respondent submitted a letter to AKAP's Local and Extended
Board claiming that due to their membership to another organization, the Community Volunteers
Missionaries, they, herein respondent and two others employed by AKAP are deprived and oppressed by
members and officials of petitioner corporation. As a result thereof, respondent was dismissed withuot
being given the opportunity to explain his side of the controversy. Respondent then filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal which complaint was decided by the National Labor Relations Commission in favor of
respondent and partly affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed
to comply the twin requirements of notice and hearing hence they are liable. Petitioner then elevated the
case before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is liable.
RULING: Petitioner is liable. The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner indeed failed to observe the twin
requirement of notice and hearing before legally dismissing herein respondent. An employee, regular or
otherwise may only be terminated for a just cause. This is because even a probationary employee is
entitled to security of tenure. It is well-established that where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack
of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, this
is not the case in the instance petition. The facts of the case clearly show that respondent Dominguez
was dismissed without notice and hearing which is a right that is so vital in view of the constitutional
provision that the state protects labor. Hence, petitioner is liable. The employer is committing such
violation should indemnify the employee, however, in the form of nominal damages, for the violation of
his right to statutory due process. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of
the court, taking into account the relevant circumstances of the case.

Allado v. Diokno
G.R. No. 113630 May 5, 1994
Facts: The crime alleged to petitioner Allado and Mendoza, by the PACC [Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission], is heinous crime of kidnapping with murder of Eugen Alexander Van Twest, a German
national, who is reportedly an international fugitive from justice. Other incidental crimes charged were
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, carnapping, and usurpation of authority. The whole
investigation was triggered by an extrajudicial confession by a Security Guard Escolastico Umbal, a
discharge of the Philippine Constabulary. Based on the confession of Umbal, Judge Barrios of RTC Br 11
issued a search warrant against petitioners. For the institution of criminal proceedings the DOJ took over
the case, after a new panel of prosecutors were recommended [cz petitioners claim the first set of
prosecutors were affiliated w/ Lacson head of PACC and could not be impartial] and after preliminary
investigation found probable cause that accused commited the crime and submitted the case for trial
which was assigned to Judge Diokno of Br 62. Judge Diokno after finding probable cause issued warrant
of arrest.
Issue: WON the judge erred in finding probable cause issuing the search warrant.
Ruling: Yes, there is no probable cause in this case. The probable cause test is an objective one, for in
order that there be probable cause the facts and circumstances must be such as would warrant a belief
by a reasonably discreet and prudent man that the accused is guilty of the crime which has just been
committed. There is serious doubt on Van Twest's reported death since the corpus delicti has not been
established, nor have his remains been recovered.
We are reminded of the leading case of U.S. v. Samarin, decided ninety-two years ago where this Court
ruled that when the supposed victim is wholly unknown, his body not found, and there is but one
witness who testifies to the killing, the corpus delicti is not sufficiently proved. In People v. Inting, we
emphasized the important features of the constitutional mandate: (a) The determination of probable
cause is a function of the judge; it is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the

judge and the judge alone makes this determination; (b) The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor
does not bind the judge. It merely assists him in making the determination of probable cause. The judge
does not have to follow what the prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the prosecutor's certification of
probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes (if any),
and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting
the judge in his determination of probable cause; and, (c) Judges and prosecutors alike should
distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held
for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries be conducted in the course of one and the same
proceeding, there should be no confusion about their objectives. The determination of probable cause for
the warrant is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper whether or not there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and therefore, whether or
not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is a function of the
prosecutor
The extrajudicial statement of Umbal suffers from material inconsistencies - In Lim v. Felix, where we
reiterated Soliven v. Makasiar and People v. Inting, we said
The Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can
perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be
a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. All these should be before
the Judge.

The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the
circumstances of each case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's
examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal
determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the
circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification
and investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant and witnesses
themselves to answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances of the case so require.

ALLIED BANKING CORP. vs. QUEZON CITY GOV'T, et. al.

G. R. NO. 154126, September 15, 2006

FACTS: The above-entitled case is a motion for clarification which shall be treated as a motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner. In light of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court where it held
null and void the proviso of Section 3, Quezon City Ordinance No. 357 Series of 1995 which provides for
the adoption of a method of assessment or appraisal of real property contrary to the Local Government
Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations and the Local Assessment Regulations No. 1-92,
petitioner asks for a refund of the tax paid by it pursuant to the above questioned proviso. Petitioner
contends that the return of the real property tax erroneously collected and paid is a necessary
consequence of the Supreme Courts decision finding that the proviso is invalid, hence, there is no need
to claim for a refund with the Local Board of Assessment Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is automatically entitled to the payment of a tax refund.
RULING: There is no doubt that petitioner is entitled to a refund of the taxes paid by it pursuant to the
declared invalid proviso of the questioned ordinance. However, to automatically effect the refund or tax
credit to petitioner or those similarly situated runs counter to the express provision of the Local
Government Code. It bears stressing that entitlement to a tax refund does not necessarily call for the
automatic payment of the sum claimed. The amount of the claim being a factual matter, it must still be
proven in the normal course and in accordance with the administrative procedure for obtaining a refund
of real property taxes, as provided under the Local Government Code. That is, the taxpayer must file a
written claim for refund or credit for taxes and interests with the provincial or city treasurer within two
(2) years from the date the taxpayer is entitled to such reduction or adjustment. Hence, petitioners
claim for refund must be pursued in accordance with the Local Government Code.

Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 101689, March 17, 1993
Facts: Petitioner was charged with malversation of public funds in 1990 after PI , petitioner had been
dismissed as Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Surigao del Sur when he was found to have
incurred a deficiency in his accounts in the amount of P31,612.50. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the
information for failure of the same to include a certification by the investigating fiscal that he conducted
a personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses during the preliminary investigation in
contravention of the requirement under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which provides:
"Sec. 4. Duty of the investigating fiscal. If the investigating fiscal finds cause to hold the respondent
for trial he shall prepare the resolution and corresponding information. He shall certify under oath that
he has examined the complainant and his witnesses, . . ."

Petitioner also filed a supplemental motion to quash this time contending that the filing of the
information in this case is violative of his constitutional rights to due process and the speedy disposition
of the case against him, as enunciated in Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan since it took eleven years for him to
be charged.
Issue:
1. WON a certification by the investigating fiscal is an essential procedure in the filing of criminal charge.
2. WON the filing of the information violated petitioners constitutional rights to due process and speedy
trial.
Ruling: 1. A certification is not an essential part of the information itself and its absence cannot vitiate it
as such. What is not allowed is the filing of the information without a preliminary investigation having
been previously conducted and the injunction that there should be a certification is only a consequence
of the requirement that a preliminary investigation should first be conducted. That the fact was not
stated in the Information itself is merely a formal defect which does not prejudice the substantial rights
of the accused and, hence, does not warrant the quashal of the information .
2. No. There was no violation of petitioner's right to speedy trial for the simple reason that a fair and
rational consideration on both counts of the aforestated evidence on records shows that the preliminary
investigation in the present case was begun not in 1979 but only in 1989, and the corresponding
information was in due time filed in 1990. The affidavit of Prosecutor Quintin E.L. Paredes alleging
conducting PI in 1980 is considered hearsay because he was not presented on the witness stand to be
cross-examined by the prosecution The doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether or not that
right has been violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are the length of delay, the
reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice
caused by the delay. Considering the confusion and handicaps under which they had to operate and with
which they had to contend under a marital law regime during the parlous period material to this case.

JONAS AONUEVO, petitioner vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JEROME VILLAGRACIA,
respondent

Facts: The accident in question occurred on 8 February 1989, at around nine in the evening, at the
intersection of Boni Avenue and Barangka Drive in Mandaluyong (now a city). Villagracia was traveling
along Boni Avenue on his bicycle, while Aonuevo, traversing the opposite lane was driving his Lancer
car with plate number PJJ 359. The car was owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of
Aonuevos brother, Jonathan. Aonuevo was in the course of making a left turn towards Libertad Street
when the collision occurred. Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result, which necessitated his
hospitalization several times in 1989, and forced him to undergo four (4) operations.

On 26 October 1989, Villagracia instituted an action for damages against Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc.
and Aonuevo before the RTC.[2] He had also filed a criminal complaint against Aonuevo before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong, but the latter was subsequently acquitted of the criminal
charge.[3] Trial on the civil action ensued, and in aDecision dated 9 March 1990, the RTC rendered
judgment against Procter and Gamble and Aonuevo, ordering them to pay Villagracia the amounts of
One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150, 000.00). for actual damages, Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) for moral damages, and Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for attorneys fees, as well
as legal costs.[4] Both defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Court of Appeals Fourth Division affirmed the RTC Decision in toto. After the Court of Appeals denied the
Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution[7] dated 22 July 1997, Procter and Gamble and Aonuevo
filed their respective petitions for review with this Court. Procter and Gambles petition was denied by
this Court in a Resolution dated 24 November 1997. Aonuevos petition,[8] on the other hand, was
given due course,[9] and is the subject of this Decision.
In arriving at the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the factual findings of the RTC. Among
them: that it was Aonuevos vehicle which had struck Villagracia; that Aonuevos vehicle had actually
hit Villagracias left mid-thigh, thus causing a comminuted fracture; that as testified by eyewitness
Alfredo Sorsano, witness for Villagracia, Aonuevo was umaarangkada, or speeding as he made the left
turn into Libertad; that considering Aonuevos claim that a passenger jeepney was obstructing his path
as he made the turn. Aonuevo had enough warning to control his speed;[13] and that Aonuevo failed
to exercise the ordinary precaution, care and diligence required of him in order that the accident could
have been avoided.[14] Notably, Aonuevo, in his current petition, does not dispute the findings of
tortious conduct on his part made by the lower courts, hinging his appeal instead on the alleged
negligence of Villagracia. Aonuevo proffers no exculpatory version of facts on his part, nor does he
dispute the conclusions made by the RTC and the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the Court, which is not
a trier of facts, is not compelled to review the factual findings of the lower courts, which following
jurisprudence have to be received with respect and are in fact generally binding.
Aonuevo hypothesizes that Article 2185 should apply by analogy to all types of vehicles. He points out
that modern-day travel is more complex now than when the Code was enacted, the number and types of
vehicles now in use far more numerous than as of then. He even suggests that at the time of the
enactment of the Code, the legislators must have seen that only motor vehicles were of such public
concern that they had to be specifically mentioned, yet today, the interaction of vehicles of all types and
nature has inescapably become matter of public concern so as to expand the application of the law to
be more responsive to the times.
Its is easy to discern why Aonuevo chooses to employ this line of argument. Aonuevo points out that
Villagracias bicycle had no safety gadgets such as a horn or bell, or headlights, as invoked by a 1948
municipal ordinance. Nor was it duly registered with the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, as required by
the same ordinance. Finally, as admitted by Villagracia, his bicycle did not have foot brakes. Before this
Court, Villagracia does not dispute these allegations, which he admitted during the trial, but directs our
attention instead to the findings of Aonuevos own negligence. Villagracia also contends that, assuming
there was contributory negligence on his part, such would not exonerate Aonuevo from payment of
damages.
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle
has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating any traffic regulation.
The provision was introduced for the first time in this jurisdiction with the adoption in 1950 of the New
Civil Code. Its applicability is expressly qualified to motor vehicles only, and there is no ground to
presume that the law intended a broader coverage.
Issue: whether Article 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply by analogy to non-motorized vehicles?
In the same vein, Aonuevo insists that Villagracias own fault and negligence serves to absolve the
former of any liability for damages.
Held: What Aonuevo seeks is for the Court to amend the explicit command of the legislature, as
embodied in Article 2185, a task beyond the pale of judicial power. The Court interprets, and not

creates, the law. However, since the Court is being asked to consider the matter, it might as well
examine whether Article 2185 could be interpreted to include non-motorized vehicles.
At the time Article 2185 was formulated, there existed a whole array of non-motorized vehicles ranging
from human-powered contraptions on wheels such as bicycles, scooters, and animal-drawn carts such as
calesas and carromata. These modes of transport were even more prevalent on the roads of the 1940s
and 1950s than they are today, yet the framers of the New Civil Code chose then to exclude these
alternative modes from the scope of Article 2185 with the use of the term motorized vehicles. If
Aonuevo seriously contends that the application of Article 2185 be expanded due to the greater
interaction today of all types of vehicles, such argument contradicts historical experience. The ratio of
motorized vehicles as to non-motorized vehicles, as it stood in 1950, was significantly lower than as it
stands today. This will be certainly affirmed by statistical data, assuming such has been compiled, much
less confirmed by persons over sixty. Aonuevos characterization of a vibrant intra-road dynamic
between motorized and non-motorized vehicles is more apropos to the past than to the present.
There is a fundamental flaw in Aonuevos analysis of Art. 2185, as applicable today. He premises that
the need for the distinction between motorized and non-motorized vehicles arises from the relative mass
of number of these vehicles. The more pertinent basis for the segregate classification is the difference in
type of these vehicles. A motorized vehicle operates by reason of a motor engine unlike a non-motorized
vehicle, which runs as a result of a direct exertion by man or beast of burden of direct physical force. A
motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion. is capable of greater speeds and
acceleration than non-motorized vehicles. At the same time, motorized vehicles are more capable in
inflicting greater injury or damage in the event of an accident or collision. This is due to a combination of
factors peculiar to the motor vehicle, such as the greater speed, its relative greater bulk of mass, and
greater combustability due to the fuels that they use.
American jurisprudence has had occasion to explicitly rule on the relationship between the motorist and
the cyclist. Motorists are required to exercise ordinary or reasonable care to avoid collision with
bicyclists.[28] While the duty of using ordinary care falls alike on the motorist and the rider or driver of a
bicycle, it is obvious, for reasons growing out of the inherent differences in the two vehicles, that more is
required from the former to fully discharge the duty than from the latter.[29] The Civil Code
characterizes negligence as the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.[30]
However, the existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by the personal judgment of the
actor in a given situation, but rather, it is the law which determines what would be reckless or negligent.
[31]
The bare fact that Villagracia was violating a municipal ordinance at the time of the accident may have
sufficiently established some degree of negligence on his part, but such negligence is without legal
consequence unless it is shown that it was a contributing cause of the injury. If anything at all, it is but
indicative of Villagracias failure in fulfilling his obligation to the municipal government, which would then
be the proper party to initiate corrective action as a result. But such failure alone is not determinative of
Villagracias negligence in relation to the accident. Negligence is relative or comparative, dependent upon
the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the particular circumstances
reasonably require.[43] To determine if Villagracia was negligent, it is not sufficient to rely solely on the
violations of the municipal ordinance, but imperative to examine Villagracias behavior in relation to the
contemporaneous circumstances of the accident.
The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from the logical consequences of
the facts leading to the mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is undeniably useful as
a judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to impute culpability arising from the failure of the actor
to perform up to a standard established by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should not be rendered inflexible
so as to deny relief when in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory violation and the injury
sustained. Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in
fact.
The failure of the bicycle owner to comply with accepted safety practices, whether or not imposed by
ordinance or statute, is not sufficient to negate or mitigate recovery unless a causal connection is
established between such failure and the injury sustained. The principle likewise finds affirmation in

Sanitary Steam, wherein we declared that the violation of a traffic statute must be shown as the
proximate cause of the injury, or that it substantially contributed thereto. Aonuevo had the burden of
clearly proving that the alleged negligence of Villagracia was the proximate or contributory cause of the
latters injury.
Neither does Aonuevo attempt before this Court to establish a causal connection between the safety
violations imputed to Villagracia and the accident itself. Instead, he relied on a putative presumption that
these violations in themselves sufficiently established negligence appreciable against Villagracia. Since
the onus on Aonuevo is to conclusively prove the link between the violations and the accident, we can
deem him as having failed to discharge his necessary burden of proving Villagracias own liability.
Neither can we can adjudge Villagracia with contributory negligence. The leading case in contributory
negligence, Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf[58] clarifies that damages may be mitigated if the claimant in
conjunction with the occurrence, [contributes] only to his injury.[59] To hold a person as having
contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in
disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body. To prove contributory
negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the
negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when
it contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its occurrence.
As between Aonuevo and Villagracia, the lower courts adjudged Aonuevo as solely responsible for the
accident. The petition does not demonstrate why this finding should be reversed. It is hard to imagine
that the same result would not have occurred even if Villagracias bicycle had been equipped with safety
equipment. Aonuevo himself admitted having seen Villagracia from ten (10) meters away, thus he
could no longer claim not having been sufficiently warned either by headlights or safety horns. The fact
that Aonuevo was recklessly speeding as he made the turn likewise leads us to believe that even if
Villagracias bicycle had been equipped with the proper brakes, the cyclist would not have had
opportunity to brake in time to avoid the speeding car. Moreover, it was incumbent on Aonuevo to have
established that Villagracias failure to have installed the proper brakes contributed to his own injury. The
fact that Aonuevo failed to adduce proof to that effect leads us to consider such causal connection as
not proven.
All told, there is no reason to disturb the assailed judgment

Arnault v. Nazareno

Petition for habeas corpus to relieve petitioner Jean Arnault from confinement in the New Bilibid prison.
Denied.
Facts: In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress
Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of P4,500,000
and P500,000, respectively. P1,000,000 was paid for the first sum and P 500,000 to the second sum
both to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his two attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, as
represented by Jean L. Arnault, for both estates respectively. However, Ernest H. Burt was not the
original owner of the estate. He bought the first from San Juan de Dios hospital and the second from the
Philippine trust company. In both instances, Burt was not able to pay the necessary amount of money to
complete his payments. As such, his contract with said owners were cancelled.
On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the Tambobong
Estate to the Rural Progress Administration by an abolute deed of sale in consideration of the sum of
P750,000. The Philippine Government then, through the Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Rural Progress Administration and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
Philippine National Bank, from which the money was borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two
estates in the latter part of October, 1949, as stated at the outset.
On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which created a special committee to

investigate the transactions surrounding the estates. The special committee created by the resolution
called and examined various witnesses, among the most important of whom was Jean L. Arnault. An
intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was the apparent unnecessariness and
irregularity of the Government's paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of
only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949.
The committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at
the expense of the Government.
Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the
afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account in the name of Ernest
H. Burt with the Philippine National Bank in which he deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000;
and that on the same occasion he drew on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he
transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the Philippine National Bank, and
another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed.
It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave
rise to the present case. As Arnault resisted to name the recipient of the money, the senate then
approved a resolution that cited him for contempt. It is this resolution which brought him to jail and is
being contested in this petition.
Issues:
1. WON the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the
person to whom he gave the P440,000.
2. WON the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of
legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950.
3. WON the privilege against self incrimination protects the petitioner from being questioned.
HELD:
1. YES. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to
make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent
to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be
within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a
power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question
which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the
subject of the inquiry or investigation. The materiality of the question must be determined by its direct
relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible
legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and
character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a
result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question.
2. NO. Senate is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of
the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to
punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper bounds, i.e. abuse their power and
keep the witness in prison for life. If proper limitations are disregarded, Court isalways open to those
whose rights might thus be transgressed.
3. NO. Court is satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, which is the name
of that person to whom witness gave the P440,000, were obviously false. His insistent claim before the
bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied
that he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave P440,000 to a person to him unknown.
"Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as
contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable." Since according to the witness
himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a representative of Burt in
compliance with the latter's verbal instruction, Court found no basis upon which to sustain his claim that
to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him.

Astorga v. Villegas
April 30, 1974

Original action in the Supreme Court. Mandamus, injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary
mandatory prohibitory injunction. Denied.
Facts: House Bill No. 9266 which was filed in the House of Representatives passed on 3rd reading
without amendments. It was sent to the Senate for concurrence and it was referred to the appropriate
Senate Committee, which recommended approval with a minor amendment recommended by Senator
Roxas. (instead of the City Engineer it be the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should
succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latters incapacity to act as Mayor). When the bill was discussed
on the Senate Floor, substantial amendments to Section 1 was introduced by Senator Tolentino, which
amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of
Representatives that the House Bill had been passed by the Senate by the Senate with amendments.
Attached was a certification of the amendment, which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas, and
not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. House of
Representatives signified their approval. The printed copies were then certified and attested to by the
Secretaries of Senate and House of representatives and the Senate President. The bill with the Roxas
amendments were signed by the president of the Philippines and it was subsequently named RA 4065.
It was later made public by Senator Tolentino that the enrolled copy of HB 9266 signed into law by the
President was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate and approved on the Senate
Floor. Senate President admitted the mistake in a letter to the President. As a result, the president sent
a message to the presiding officer of both houses that he was officially withdrawing his signature from
HB 9266.
Mayor of Manila issued circulars ordering the disregard of the provisions of RA 4605. He also issued an
order recalling 5 members of the city police who had been assigned to the Vice-Mayor presumably under
the authority of RA 4065. Vice Mayor Astorga filed this petition with the court.
Respondents contend that RA 4065 never became law since it was not the bill actually passed by the
Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive
in the resolution of the issue.
Issues:
1. WON the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bills due enactment.
2. WON RA 4065 can be considered as valid in the absence of the attestation required
Held:
1. No. Senate President declared that his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent
clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been
approved by the Senate. This declaration should be accorded greater respect than the attestation that it
invalidated. Certification that was made by the presiding officer is merely a mode of authentication. The
essential thing is the approval of congress and not the signature of the presiding officers. Function of
attestation is not approval because a bill is considered approved after it has passed both houses.
Constitution does not even provide that the presiding officer should sign the bill before it is submitted to
the president. Rationale of the enrolled bill theory the signing by the speaker of the House of
Representatives and by the president of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official
attestation by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the president, that a bill, thus
attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and it is
delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be
presented to him. (Field vs. Clark) Enrolled bill theory based mainly on the respect due to coequal and
independent departments which requires the judicial department to accept as having passed Congress,
all bills authenticate in the manner stated.
2. No. Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but he argues that the disclaimer
thereof by the Senate President, granting that it to have been validly made, would only mean that there

was no attestation at all but would not affect the validity of the statute. The argument of the petitioner
would limit the courts inquiry to the presence or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its
absence upon the validity of the statute. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and
consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine within the bill
had been duly enacted? In such case, the entry in the journal should be consulted. The journal discloses
that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but
were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the president and signed by him. Bill was not duly
enacted and therefore did not become law.

Avelino v. Cuenco

FACTS: The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to declare
him the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco. In a session of the Senate,
Tanada's request to deliver a speech in order to formulate charges against then Senate President Avelino
was approved. With the leadership of the Senate President followed by his supporters, they deliberately
tried to delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his speech. The SP with his supporters employed
delaying tactics, the tried to adjourn the session then walked out. Only 12 Senators were left in the hall.
The members of the senate left continued the session and Senator Cuenco was appointed as the Acting
President of the Senate and was recognized the next day by the President of the Philippines.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction of the case.
2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved.
HELD:
1. The Court has no jurisdiction of the case because the subject matter is political in nature and in doing
so, the court will be against the doctrine of separation of powers. To the first question, the answer is in
the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs.
Quezon, 46 Phil. 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) and the
constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be
interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the Vera case even if
the rights of the electors of the suspended senators were alleged affected without any immediate
remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affect only
the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate
them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want
petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not in the Supreme Court.
2. It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23. In fine, all the four justice agree
that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty three senators who may
participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will
support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious
to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that
depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of
the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter
held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of
opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the said twelve senators who approved
the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a
doubt