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Where is the Promise of his Coming? The Complaint of


the Scoffers in 2 Peter 3.4
EDWARD ADAMS
New Testament Studies / Volume 51 / Issue 01 / January 2005, pp 106 - 122
DOI: 10.1017/S0028688505000068, Published online: 07 February 2005

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0028688505000068


How to cite this article:
EDWARD ADAMS (2005). Where is the Promise of his Coming? The Complaint of the Scoffers in
2 Peter 3.4. New Testament Studies, 51, pp 106-122 doi:10.1017/S0028688505000068
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New Test. Stud. 51, pp. 106122. Printed in the United Kingdom 2005 Cambridge University Press
DOI:10.1017/S0028688505000068

Where is the Promise of his Coming? The


Complaint of the Scoffers in 2 Peter 3.4*
E DWAR D ADAM S
Department of Theology and Religious Studies, Kings College London,
Strand, London WC2R 2LS, England

A close analysis of the report of 2 Pet 3.4, paying attention to its precise wording, and
a careful reading of the authors response to it in the verses that follow show that the
prevailing interpretation of the scoffers eschatological mockery is unsound. The
target of the scoffers criticism was not so much the parousia of Jesus as the OT promise of a final, eschatological irruption underlying it. Their scepticism was founded
neither on the failure of Jesus to come back within a generation, nor on a denial of
divine intervention. Rather, it was based on the long period of time that had elapsed
since the promise was originally made and the assumption that the eschatological
promise involved the prospect of cosmic destruction, which the scoffers rejected on
philosophical grounds.

In 2 Pet 3.4, the author of this intriguing letter reports the words of those
whom he calls scoffers (3.3).1 These are evidently the same people that are
labelled false teachers in 2.1, and who are the target of his polemic throughout
that chapter.2 The first part of the citation consists of a taunt in the form of a

106

* This article has gone through a number of forms and has been presented as a paper on several occasions. The piece has benefited a great deal from general feedback received at these
times. Special thanks go to Professor Harold Attridge, Dr Douglas Campbell, Dr David
Horrell, Dr George van Kooten, and the anonymous reader of this article appointed by the
journal for their helpful comments. I am especially indebted to my colleague Professor
Judith Lieu for making a suggestion that now forms one of the main planks of my argument.
1 I take for granted the virtually unanimous scholarly opinion that 2 Peter is a pseudonymous
work of the late first or perhaps even early second century (though I will challenge one of the
bases on which this judgement rests, namely the alleged reference to the decease of the
apostles in 3.4). I also accept the consensus view that the false teachers and scoffers of
whom the author speaks are a clear and present threat (to the author) at the time of writing,
and not a force to be reckoned with at some point in the future, as the predictions of 2.13a
and 3.3 appear to suggest. The use of the present tense in 2.3b22 and 3.410 indicates that
the opponents are the writers contemporaries, with whom he is currently in dispute.
2 They are apparently members of the churches addressed who have developed heretical
views (2.1). They are still involved in the Christian community, participating in its meals
(2.13). They evidently carry some influence within the congregations (2.2).

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Where is the Promise of His Coming? 107

rhetorical question: Where is the promise of his coming? (pou' ejstin hJ ejpaggeliva
th'~ parousiva~ aujtou';)3 The implied answer to the question is, It is nowhere; it
has failed to materialise. The second part adds argumentative substance to the
taunt: For since the fathers fell asleep (i.e. died), all things remain just as they
were from the beginning of creation (ajf h|~ ga;r oiJ patevre~ ejkoimhvqhsan, pavnta
ou{tw~ diamevnei ajp j ajrch'~ ktivsew~).
The citation plainly mocks the expectation of a future parousia. It contains two
objections to this hope; certainly this is how the author interprets his opponents
words in the refutation that follows, responding to one objection in vv. 57 and
another in vv. 89 (taking his opponents arguments in reverse order). The initial
protest is evidently based on the non-fulfilment of the promise, the words since
the fathers died giving some chronological specificity to the problem of delay
already highlighted in the taunt/question. The second objection has to do with
the uniform continuance of pavnta, i.e. the universe,4 since the worlds foundation.
Scholars unvaryingly accept that the promise of his coming is a straightforward reference to Jesus return. The great majority of commentators think that the
opponents temporal objection relates to Jesus failure to come back within a generation, as he had apparently promised to do in sayings such as Mark 13.30  par.
The fathers are thus taken to be the apostles and their contemporaries. With
their decease, the cut-off point for the fulfilment of Jesus prediction has come
and gone. In recent interpretation (the past two decades or so), the opponents
second objection has been taken to reflect scepticism about the possibility of
divine engagement with the natural and human world. Influential in this regard
has been the work of Jerome Neyrey in setting the polemic of 2 Peter against an
Epicurean background. In an article published in 1980, Neyrey argues that while
the opponents stress the fact of unfulfilled prophecy, doubt was expressed
about divine action in the world, reflecting the Epicurean rejection of providence.5 Accepting much of Neyreys reconstruction, Richard Bauckham in his
landmark commentary on 2 Peter states: [t]he scoffers assumed that God does
not intervene in the world. They were influenced by a rationalistic skepticism
. . . to which the Epicurean denial of providence seems the closest pagan parallel.6
3 The form is Hebraistic; cf. Ps 42.3; 79.10; Jer 17.15; Mal 2.17.
4 As in John 1.3; Rom 11.36; 1 Cor 8.6; Eph 3.9; Col 1.1617, 20; Heb 1.2.
5 J. H. Neyrey, The Form and Background of the Polemic in 2 Peter, JBL 99 (1980) 40731, here
4201. See also idem, 2 Peter, Jude: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB
37C; New York: Doubleday, 1993) 231.
6 R. J. Bauckham, Jude, 2 Peter (WBC 50; Waco: Word, 1983) 294. Others who think that the
cosmological objection is based on an Epicurean-style rejection of divine intervention
include: D. G. Horrell, The Epistles of Peter and Jude (Peterborough: Epworth, 1998) 139176;
J. Knight, 2 Peter and Jude (NT Guides; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1995) 67; S. J.
Kraftchick, Jude, 2 Peter (Abingdon NT Commentaries; Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 2002)
1523. P. Perkins (First and Second Peter, James, and Jude [Interpretation; Louisville, KY:

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108 edward adams

In what follows, I offer an alternative to this standard line of interpretation of


2 Pet 3.4. While it is normally assumed that the object of the scoffers mockery is
the parousia of Jesus, I try to make the case that the butt of their criticisms is more
precisely the OT expectation of the eschatological advent of God which Christians
took up and applied to Jesus. I contend that the opponents rejection of this
expectation is based neither on Jesus failure to come back within the lifetime of
the apostles nor on the assumption that God does not interrupt the course of history, but on (a) the very long stretch of time that has passed since the promise was
originally made, and (b) the conviction that the cosmos is unchanging and indestructible. The exegesis I wish to commend reiterates, to some extent, the views of
earlier commentators, most notably Charles Bigg in a commentary first published
in 1901.7 Central to my approach is the interpretative judgement that the nature of
the opponents position is to be discerned not only from a close analysis of the
report of v. 4, but also from a careful reading of the authors response to it in the
verses that follow.
The analysis operates on the assumption that in 2 Pet 3.413 the author represents his opponents views reliably and engages with them intelligently. That he
deliberately misrepresents their position in 3.4 is unlikely. To be sure, we ought to
be sceptical about the historical accuracy of much of the polemical portrait of the
opponents in chapter 2, with its accusations of immorality, underhand tactics and
impure motives, but when the writer gives explicit information about the content of
their teaching in 3.4, I think we can treat his account with some confidence. J. M. G.
Barclays rule of thumb for mirror-reading a NT polemical letter is applicable here:
statements about the character and motivation of . . . opponents should be taken
with a very large pinch of salt, but the letter is likely to reflect fairly accurately what
[the author] saw to be the main points at issue.8 The key issues in the debate
reflected in this letter emerge in 1.1621 and 3.413. Concern here is with the latter.
Certain shifts in the authors style at 3.4 and onward suggest that he is faithfully
Westminster John Knox, 1995] 189) finds similarity with Epicurean thinking, but does
not specifically connect the scoffers cosmological objection with Epicurean arguments
against providence. F. B. Craddock (First and Second Peter and Jude [Westminster Bible
Companion; Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1995] 119), M. Green (2 Peter, Jude
[TNTC; Leicester: IVP/Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, rev. edn, 1987] 1389) and A. Vgtle
(Der Judasbrief /Der zweite Petrusbrief [EKK 22; Benziger: Solothurn, Dsseldorf/Neukirchener: Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1994] 221) assume that the objection stems from a view
that the world is closed to divine involvement, but do not explicitly relate this to
Epicurean influence. So also S. Meier, 2 Peter 3:37 An Early Jewish and Christian
Response to Eschatological Skepticism, BZ 32 (1988) 2557.
7 C. Bigg, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistles of St. Peter and St. Jude (ICC;
Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1901; repr. 1910) 292.
8 J. M. G. Barclay, Mirror-reading a Polemical Letter: Galatians as a Test Case, JSNT 31 (1987)
7393, here 76.

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Where is the Promise of His Coming? 109

reproducing his opponents views. It is generally agreed that the author makes use
of the letter of Jude or something like it throughout chapter 2 and up to 3.3.9 It is
striking that the author drops his source at precisely this point and does not pick it
up again.10 Also, having harangued his opponents throughout chapter 2, he now
permits them to have a voice. Moreover, in v. 5 onwards he responds to their assertions with rational argument and defence (as he does in 1.1621), rather than with vitriolic denunciation. The sudden abandonment of his source material, the way in
which the writer presents the position of his opponents, in the form of direct speech,
and the manner of his reply, by carefully measured argumentation, strongly indicate
that what we have in 3.413 is a genuine attempt to convey accurately his adversaries claims and to interact with them sensibly.11 It is, of course, possible that the
author has seriously misunderstood his opponents. This is the basis for C. H.
Talberts view that the opponents, unbeknownst to the author, were actually
Gnostics.12 But such a possibility, I think, is quite a remote one: as Fornberg points
out, in all probability the letter would never have been preserved had the author
wrongly diagnosed the problem with which he was dealing, or had he failed to
satisfy his readers that he had properly engaged with the other side in the debate.13

1. The taunt: Where is the promise of his coming?

The wording of the taunt/question indicates that the target of the scoffers
derision here is the promise (ejpaggeliva) of the parousia. Most modern commentators think that the promise is Jesus own promise of his coming (or the promise imputed to him) in Gospel sayings such as Mark 13.247, 30, but in the light of
the dominant pattern of NT usage, the word ejpaggeliva would more naturally
mean a promise made by God in the OT.14 References to Jesus own promises are
extremely rare in early Christian literature.15 Bauckham claims that Christs promises are specifically mentioned in 2 Pet 1.4 and suggests that the word ejpaggeliva
in 3.4 echoes this prior reference.16 However, in 1.4 the identity of the one who has
given to believers the precious and very great promises (ta; tivmia kai; mevgista
. . . ejpaggevlmata) is not made explicit, and the subject of this clause could be
9 See T. Fornberg, An Early Church in a Pluralistic Society: A Study of 2 Peter (ConB NT 9; Lund:
Gleerup, 1977) 3359.
10 Bauckham (Jude, 2 Peter, 2835, 289) contends that the writer is now following a Jewish apocalypse which is no longer extant. But this is simply conjecture.
11 The actual wording of the citation, though, is probably the authors.
12 C. H. Talbert, II Peter and the Delay of the Parousia, VC (1966) 13745.
13 Fornberg, An Early Church, 65.
14 E.g. Luke 24.49; Acts 1.4; 2.33, 39; 7.17; 13.23; etc.; Rom 4.13, 14, 16, 20; etc.; Gal 3.14, 16, 17, 18, 21,
22, 29; etc.; Heb 4.1; 6.12; etc.
15 The clearest reference is in 2 Clem. 5.5. Cf. Bauckham, Jude, 2 Peter, 179.
16 In 1.4 ejpaggevlma is used. The word is only found here and at 3.13 in the NT.

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110 edward adams

either God or Christ.17 Even if Christ is the referent, the promises are not specifically said to be his. They are much more likely to be OT promises (cf. 3.13), which
(in the writers view) have now been imparted to Christians. That the promise of
3.4 is understood to be a promise made by God through the OT prophets is
strongly supported by the further use of promise terminology in vv. 9 and 13. In
v. 9, the author states that the Lord is not slow about his promise (ouj braduvnei
kuvrio~ th'~ ejpaggeliva~). This is certainly a reference back to the promise of v. 4.
The Lord is God, not Jesus, as the continuation of the verse makes clear (but is
patient with you, not wanting any to perish, but all to come to repentance). In v.
13 his promise (to; ejpavggelma aujtou') of a new heaven and new earth is unambiguously an allusion to the prophecies of Isa 65.17 and 66.22.
In 2 Pet 3.4, therefore, the object of ridicule is not the parousia of Jesus directly,
but the OT promises relating to it. This fits well with 1.202. The apologetic section, 1.1622, makes clear that the validity of belief in Jesus parousia is the main
issue in the debate reflected in 2 Peter (esp. 1.16). These verses also reveal that the
opponents attack not only the notion of Jesus return but also OT prophecy
associated with it. In vv. 202 the author replies to an accusation by his opponents
that the prophecies used by the apostles in support of the expectation of Jesus
return were not divinely inspired, but were merely human products.18 In response,
the writer affirms the divine origin of OT prophecy. It may be suggested, therefore,
that 3.4 picks up the prophetic aspect of the debate reflected in 1.202, rather than
the specifically christological aspect of it (which is to the fore in 1.1618).
The specific promise which gave rise to the scorn of the opponents is very
likely to have been the OT prophetic expectation of Gods coming, 19 together perhaps with that of the day of the Lord20 (specifically mentioned in 3.10 and 12); the
two motifs converged in late OT prophecy.21 OT prophecies concerning the

17 Bauckham (Jude, 2 Peter, 177, 192) thinks the subject of these verses is Christ. Neyrey (2 Peter,
Jude, 1556), on the other hand, argues that the subject is God. The ambiguity is generated by
the twin references to God and Christ in vv. 12.
18 Cf. Horrell, The Epistles of Peter and Jude, 159.
19 There are various prophetic oracles which predict a future coming of God. In pre-exilic and early
post-exilic prophecy, Gods coming is connected (though not necessarily identified) with an
upcoming political disaster: Micah 1.24; Nahum 1.35; Hab 3.315. In late OT prophecy, Gods
advent is more clearly an eschatological event with history-stopping consequences: Isa 64.13;
66.1516, 18; Zech 14.17. The eschatological coming of God is a feature of end-time expectation in
various post-biblical Jewish sources, e.g. 2 Apoc. Bar 48.39; 1 Enoch 1.29; 91.7; 102.13; 2 Enoch 31.2;
Jub 1.28; LAB 19.13; T.Abr. A 13.4; T.Mos. 10.37; T.Naph. 8.34: see also n. 24 below. In some Jewish
eschatological texts, the role of God in the final intervention is taken by his representative: 1 Enoch
52; 4 Ezra 13.113. See further L. Hartman, Prophecy Interpreted: The Formation of Some Jewish
Apocalyptic Texts and of the Eschatological Discourse Mark 13 par. (Lund: Gleerup, 1966) 3441.
20 Isa 13.913; 34.817; Joel 1.15; 2.12; 2.3031; 3.14; Amos 5.1820; Zeph 1.718; etc.
21 Zech 14.15; Mal 3.13.

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Where is the Promise of His Coming? 111

coming of God played an important role in the development (if not the origins) of
Christian belief in Jesus parousia. In various NT passages, prior texts which refer
to Gods end-time appearance are reinterpreted in terms of the return of Jesus.22
The interpretation I am proposing that the promise being derided is the
expectation of Gods eschatological coming which Christians transferred to Jesus
is consistent with a rather curious feature of 3.413 that is rarely observed: the
absence of any clear reference to Christ in the whole passage.23 The scoffers question does not actually specify whose promised coming is subject to doubt. In view
of 1.16, in which the parousia is explicitly identified with Jesus,24 the aujtou` in 3.4
must have Christ partially in view. But the lack of clarification would suit an
expectation which originally referred to God but was subsequently applied to
Christ.25 In the writers response to the scoffers denial in vv. 513, there is no direct
reference to Christ. Significantly, in 3.12 the writer speaks of the coming of the day
of God, th;n parousivan th'~ tou` qeou' hJmevra~. This unique phrase combines the
term parousiva with the notion of the day of the Lord and unambiguously connects both with God. What the writer seems to be defending in 3.513 is the expectation of a final divine intervention, with world-ending consequences; the
christological dimension of that hope is not the focus of attention.
That the object of scorn in 3.4 is the OT hope of Gods coming standing behind
Christian belief in the parousia of Jesus not only explains the omission of any
specific mention of Jesus in vv. 413, it also makes good sense of the reference to
the fathers in v. 4.
2. The first objection: Since the fathers died . . .

The first and main objection to the promise of the eschatological parousia
concerns the problem of non-fulfilment. The issue of delay is implicit in the ques22 Mark 8.38 (Zech 14.5); 1 Thess 3.13 (Zech 14.5); 2 Thess 1.7 (Zech 14.5), 8 (Isa 66.15); Jude 1415
(1 Enoch 1.9); Rev 19.13, 15 (Isa 63.16); 22.12 (Isa 40.10). Cf. Bauckham, Jude, 2 Peter, 96.
23 The lack of christological reference was noted by E. Ksemann in his famous essay, An
Apologia for Primitive Christian Eschatology (E. Ksemann, Essays on New Testament
Themes [London: SCM, 1964] 16995). In Ksemanns view, the writer of 2 Peter defends a
non-christologically oriented eschatology (183).
24 The word parousiva in 1.16 could be referring to Jesus first coming, but it is much more likely
that it relates to his future coming; for the arguments see J. N. D. Kelly, The Epistles of Peter
and of Jude (Blacks NT Commentaries; London: A. & C. Black, 1969) 31718.
25 The use of the term parousiva, or its translational equivalent, for Gods eschatological
coming is attested in Jewish sources: 2 Enoch 32.1; Liv. Proph. Jer 13; T.Abr. A 13.4; T.Jud. 22.2
(very possibly Christian). In 2 Apoc. Bar 30.1 it is applied to the eschatological appearance of
the anointed one (possibly Christian). Josephus uses the term parousiva for Gods dramatic
entries into the human scene (theophanies): Ant. 3.80, 203; 9.55. On several occasions in the
NT, when his eschatological parousiva is spoken of, the coming one could be God rather
than Jesus (1 John 2.28; Jas 5.7, 8).

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112 edward adams

tion Where is the promise of his coming? The question indicates that the promise is unfulfilled at the time of writing and is surely going to remain so. The mention of the fathers decease in the sentence that follows serves as a time note
which is meant to add weight to the problem of frustrated expectation.
On the majority view, as noted above, the fathers are the apostles and their
generation, and their deaths are the deadline for the promises fulfilment, a deadline which has been exceeded, rendering the promise a failure. Thus, the objection of the scoffers, as Bauckham puts it, was not just that a long time had elapsed
since the promise was given, but that the promise itself had set a time-limit within
which it would be fulfilled and this time-limit had passed.26 But there are difficulties with this interpretation.
The words oiJ patevre~ would more readily refer to the OT fathers. As
Bauckham concedes, [i]n early Christian literature, continuing Jewish usage . . . oiJ
patevre~ means the OT fathers, i.e., the patriarchs or, more generally, the righteous men of OT times.27 The two passages sometimes adduced as parallels to the
recommended interpretation, 1 Clem. 23.3 and 2 Clem. 11.2, both citing an otherwise unknown scripture, do not exemplify the desired usage, but rather speak of
our fathers. In both texts, the fathers are the physical fathers of the speakers. If
the author of 2 Peter is using oiJ patevre~ as an honorific term for the apostles or
the first Christian generation, he is exhibiting a usage for which there is no parallel in Christian writing of the first two centuries ce. The issue here, it should be
stressed, is not the novelty of the proposed meaning (this is not in itself a problem), but rather its isolated nature.
That the death of the fathers is intended to denote a time limit for the promise
is grammatically doubtful. The words ajf h|~28 indicate that the emphasis is on
what has happened, or more exactly, not happened, since the fathers decease.29
The fathers deaths function as a chronological point from which the extent of the
delay can be judged; they do not designate a point beyond which there can be no
fulfilment. If the latter were the thought, the wording is more likely to have been:
the fathers have fallen asleep and yet/but all things remain as they were from the
beginning of creation (oiJ patevre~ kekoivmhtai, kai; (or ajlla;) pavnta ou{tw~
diamevnei ajp j ajrch'~ ktivsew~). The point of the temporal objection is not that the
fathers decease itself has rendered belief in the parousia unsustainable, but that
the time that has passed since their death makes it untenable.
26 Bauckham, Jude, 2 Peter, 291.
27 Ibid., 290. E.g. Matt 23.30, 32; Luke 1.55, 72; 6.23; etc.; John 4.20; 6.31; etc.; Acts 3.13, 25; etc.;
Rom 9.5; etc.; Heb 1.1; 3.9; etc. In Luke 1.17 and 1 John 2.14 fathers means actual physical
fathers.
28 The expression is an idiomatic form of ajf hJmevra~ h|, from the day on which.
29 Bauckham (Jude, 2 Peter, 291) recognises this but persists with his contention that the objection is really about the missing of a deadline.

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Where is the Promise of His Coming? 113

It is very significant that in vv. 89, where the author responds to the scoffers
temporal objection, he does not address the supposedly key issue that a deadline
has passed. In his reply, he makes no mention of a generation or any specific
time frame for fulfilment. He responds in two ways. First, he argues, on the basis
of Ps 90.4, that Gods apprehension of time is very different from that of human
beings. What seems to humans a long span of time a thousand years appears
very short a mere day to God. Second, he insists that God is not slow concerning his promise. He recognises that there has indeed been a delay in the fulfilment of the promise, but maintains that the postponement of the parousia is
due to Gods forbearance, so that people may have an extended opportunity for
repentance. Bauckham acknowledges that the author does not answer the
objection that a specific time-limit has passed;30 he maintains that the writers
strategy is to raise the issue of eschatological delay above the level of a datable
time limit.31 But if the writer does not overtly counter the criticism that a deadline has been missed, it is at least questionable whether such a criticism was
made at all.
Also difficult for the majority view is the scarcity of specifically Christian
elements in vv. 89.32 As Bauckham himself shows, the arguments of vv. 89 are
traditional Jewish responses to the problem of eschatological delay.33 If the author
is dealing with the specifically Christian problem of nonfulfilment within the lifetime of the apostles,34 as Bauckham contends, then why does the writer fail to
address this issue specifically?35
The temporal argument of the scoffers is best interpreted as an argument
based on the excessively long period of time that has passed since the promise of
the eschatological intervention was first announced. The mention of a thousand
years in v. 8 seems to presuppose a very lengthy time of waiting, over many generations. Implicit in the objection is the assumption that the original prophecies
of Gods coming did not envisage such an extensive time frame for fulfilment. The
prophets, of course, seemed to speak of Gods coming as a near rather than a distant event.36 Thus, the extreme delay in fulfilment, for the scoffers, shows that the
promise is ineffectual. The fathers may be understood either as the people to
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., 292.
32 The only feature of 3.513 that seems to derive from Christian tradition is the comparison of
the day of the Lord to a thief in 3.10 (cf. Matt 24.434; Luke 12.3940; 1 Thess 5.2; Rev 3.3; 16.15).
33 Bauckham, Jude, 2 Peter, 30414.
34 Ibid., 2912.
35 Bauckhams answer is that the writer is simply following his Jewish apocalyptic source. But
such presumed slavish dependence on source material is at odds with his creative use of
Jude or his Jude-like source in 2.13.3.
36 Isa 40.10; Micah 1.24; Nahum 1.35; Hab 2.3 (LXX). The latter is alluded to in 2 Pet 3.9. The
day of the Lord is portrayed as near in Joel 2.1; 3.14 and Zeph 1.7, 14.

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114 edward adams

whom the promise was given, through the prophets (as in Heb 1.1), or as the
prophets and patriarchs who made the promise, beginning perhaps with Enoch.
On the basis of 1 Enoch 1.39, Enoch could be regarded as the first OT figure to
prophesy of Gods coming.37
The identification of the fathers as the OT fathers has been criticised by
Bauckham. On such an interpretation, he contends, the scoffers objection would
be a general one based on the non-fulfilment of OT prophecy over many centuries. He points out that [e]arly Christianity constantly argued that many OT
prophecies, after remaining unfulfilled for centuries, had quite recently been fulfilled in the history of Jesus.38 In such a climate, he argues, it does not seem very
relevant for the scoffers to object that OT prophecy remains unfulfilled since OT
times. But 2 Pet 1.201 indicates that the opponents did not have a high regard for
OT prophecy; thus, they may well have dissented from the supposedly shared
Christian assumption that scriptural prophecy had begun to be fulfilled with the
historical appearance of Jesus. In any case, the scoffers objection is not just that
prophecy has lain dormant since OT times, but more precisely that the specific
prediction of a soon-approaching (and world-stopping) event has remained
unfulfilled. It is because oracles of Gods coming present the ultimate event as
temporally near that they are falsified by the increasing passage of time.
The point the opponents seem to be making is that the expectation of Jesus
parousia is the re-expression of a longstanding prophecy of Gods awesome
coming. The imminent irruption was promised long ages ago, but it has never
come close to being realised. The scoffers no doubt exploited contemporary concerns about the delay of Jesus return, but, if my interpretation is correct, they
connected these more recent frustrations with the many centuries of disappointment the underlying expectation had generated.
3. The second objection: All things remain . . .

The second objection relates to the continuance of all things. The words

pavnta ou{tw~ diamevnei ajp j ajrch'~ ktivsew~ complete the temporal objection by
providing the proof that the promise has not been fulfilled: we know that the
prophecy is unrealised because the world remains as before. Yet, at the same time,
the clause expresses an additional objection to the promise of the parousia: it is
an argument from the nature and structure of the universe.
The standard view in recent interpretation is that the statement constitutes a
principled rejection of the possibility of divine intervention. The scoffers point is
37 The author of Jude clearly accepted 1 Enoch 1.9 as a genuine word spoken by the patriarch,
the seventh in descent from Adam (Jude 1415), and treated it as an authentic prediction of
the Lords (Jesus or Gods?) coming.
38 Bauckham, Jude, 2 Peter, 290.

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that the world carries on as it always has done, without divine interference. Their
objection, it is claimed, exhibits an Epicurean-like understanding of the world.
But this explanation is unsatisfactory.
There is little textual warrant for assuming that the issue is whether or not God
can get involved in the world. First, the scoffers make reference to the continuous
duration (diamevnei) of the cosmos as an unaltered (ou{tw~) physical structure
from the day of its creation, not to its closed nature, or its freedom from divine
activity. Second, as it stands, the statement is perfectly compatible with belief in
divine action in the ongoing history of the world; the words neither deny it nor
affirm it.39 Third, if the scoffers objection is that God does not/cannot intervene
in the human and natural world, especially for the purpose of judgement, it is very
strange that in his reply to it in vv. 57 the author does not recite other biblical
examples of Gods dramatic interventions for judgement, beyond the flood. He
could have mentioned the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, the plagues on
Egypt, the destruction of the Egyptians in the sea of reeds, the fall of Jericho, and
so on.40 He concentrates exclusively on the flood story, and his reason for doing so
is clear: it is the one biblical example of God intervening to destroy the world.41
This shows that the writer does not see the point at stake as whether or not God
can intervene to judge. Rather, for him, the question is whether the cosmos is subject to destruction.
That the cosmological assertion of the scoffers reflects Epicurean thought is
highly unlikely. The scoffers affirm the created nature of the universe (ktivs i~);
Epicureans totally repudiated the notion of the divine creation of the cosmos.
According to Epicurus, the world was formed as a result of the chance combination of atoms;42 the gods were not involved in the process in any way. Also, the
scoffers maintain that the world has endured without disturbance or change. But
Epicureans believed that the world has experienced many great disturbances and
has undergone very considerable change during the course of its life. According to
Lucretius, the advocate of Epicureanism in the Roman world, the world has been
subject to many terrible disasters in the past. Civilisations have perished by some
great upheaval of the world (de Rerum Natura 5.340-5). Previous episodes of
39 Cf. Meier, 2 Peter 3:37, 255.
40 In 2.310 the author does cite past examples of judgment (the judgment upon the sinful
angels, the flood, and the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah). He does so, however, not to
defend the principle of divine intervention, but to affirm the certainty of future judgment
(2.3, 9). In 3.47, 1013 the point at issue is not the fact of coming judgment, but the particular form that future judgment will take, namely total cosmic destruction.
41 In the Genesis flood narrative, the disaster is not conceived of as a total cosmic catastrophe,
but it is taken in this direction in 1 Enoch 83.34. In 2 Pet 3.6 the author states that oJ tovt e
kovsmo~ was destroyed by the flood; kovsmo~ here most probably means the physical cosmos,
since both the physical earth and the physical heavens are spoken of in vv. 5 and 7.
42 Diog. Laertius Lives of the Eminent Philosophers 10.734.

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116 edward adams

widespread destruction show that the world will eventually collapse completely
(5.34550). Like any other living organism, Lucretius argued, the cosmos experiences growth and decay. Time affects the nature of the world: nothing remains as
it was: all things move, all are changed by nature and compelled to alter (5.8301).
The earth is presently worn out by age and, in the opinion of Lucretius, is at this
moment approaching its end (2.115074). It is thus very hard to see how the affirmation pavnta ou{tw~ diamevnei ajp j ajrch'~ ktivsew~ could in any way be informed
by an Epicurean view of physical reality.43
According to Bigg, the scoffers cosmological claim is an expression of belief in
the immutability and imperishability of the cosmos, reflecting the Platonic and
Aristotelian doctrine of cosmic indestructibility.44 On this understanding, the
scoffers reject the expectation of the divine parousia on the grounds that it
involves the prospect of a total cosmic catastrophe. This, it seems to me, is the
most plausible interpretation of the scoffers cosmological objection.
In OT prophetic oracles of Gods coming, the divine intrusion is often depicted
as accompanied by terrifying geophysical upheaval.45 Prophecies of the day of the
Lord contain similar catastrophic imagery.46 In Jewish apocalyptic texts, the
eschatological advent of God is often portrayed as resulting in global and cosmic
destruction.47 Imagery of cosmic upheaval drawn from OT coming of God and
day of the Lord oracles is applied to the coming of the Son of man ( the parousia of Jesus) in Mark 13.247  par. The expectation of the final divine intervention
was thus associated with the threat of worldwide and cosmic catastrophe.
That the cosmos is immune from the forces of dissolution was apparently taught
by Hesiod, the father of Greek cosmology.48 It was formulated as a philosophical
thesis by Plato and then by Aristotle. Plato taught that the cosmos was the product
of a divine craftsman who took every effort to ensure that his work would last forever.49 Aristotle argued that the universe is eternal, having neither beginning nor
end.50 The Platonic and Aristotelian dogma of the indestructibility of the cosmos
43 This is not to rule out possible Epicurean influence on other aspects of the opponents teaching, insofar as other elements of their teaching can be identified with confidence.
44 Bigg, Epistles of St. Peter and St. Jude, 292. Cf. E. M. Sidebottom, James, Jude and 2 Peter (NCB;
London: Nelson, 1967) 119.
45 Micah 1.24; Nahum 1.35; Hab 3.315; Zech 14.45.
46 Isa 13.913; Joel 2.301; 3.1415.
47 1 Enoch 1.29; 102.13; T.Mos. 1.37; LAB 19.13.
48 Hesiod Theogony 1056; 116; 128. Cf. Philo De Aet. 17.
49 Plato Tim. 323. He describes his account of the worlds creation by the demiurge as a likely
story. The extent to which he meant it to be taken literally has been debated in ancient and
modern times.
50 Aristotle De Cael 1.10. Aristotle also defended his thesis of an eternal universe in his work De
Philosophia, which has not survived. Fragments of it, however, are preserved in Philo De Aet.
2044.

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Where is the Promise of His Coming? 117

was attacked by Stoics and Epicureans, both of whom argued that the world would
eventually dissolve. The Stoics contended that this would happen periodically by
means of a great conflagration.51 In Roman Stoicism, it was maintained that the
cosmos is subject to twin total destructions by water and fire.52 Aristotles thesis was
staunchly defended by his subsequent followers, and for centuries the issue was
debated between the Peripatetic and the Stoic schools.53
Bauckham doubts that the second assertion of the opponents amounts to an
affirmation of the Platonic/Aristotelian doctrine of cosmic indestructibility.
According to Bauckham, while the scoffers point out that everything continues as
it always has been, [t]here is no assertion that the nature of the universe is such
that everything must go on as it has always done.54 But in using the worlds freedom from major catastrophe during the period from creation to the present
moment as an argument against the parousia, the opponents evidently assume
that the worlds unswerving continuity from past to present ensures its future
constancy: the stability that the cosmos has evinced up till now serves as a guarantee of its stability in time ahead. That this is a stable, immutable world is their
premise. That it will remain so ruling out the parousia is their conclusion.55 It
should be noted that the present tense of diamevnw can carry the idea of permanent
and unending duration. In Heb 1.1012 (a citation of Ps 102.257) this tense of the
verb is used to express the concept of the Sons everlastingness. It is very likely that
the continuous aspect also expresses the notion of everlasting duration here in 2
Pet 3: all things remain and will always remain as they were from the beginning
of creation. Had the thought been of the continuity of the world only up to the
moment of speaking, the perfect tense would probably have been used.56 In terms
of both its argumentative logic and its linguistic formulation, therefore,
the cosmological statement of 3.4 is best taken as affirmation of cosmic indestructibility.
The scoffers argument may be compared to an argument advanced by
Critolaus, the head of the Peripatetic school in the second century bce. In a fragment preserved by Philo (De Aet. 61), he defends the eternity of the cosmos on
empirical grounds:57

51 On the cosmic cycle and the conflagration, see texts and commentary in A. A. Long and D. N.
Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers: Vol. 1 Translations of the Principal Sources with
Philosophical Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1987) 2749.
52 Seneca Nat Quest. 3.27, 29; Cons. Marc. 26.6. Cf. Origen Cont. Cels. 4.64.
53 Philos De Aeternitate Mundi serves as the best ancient record of this debate.
54 Bauckham, Jude, 2 Peter, 293.
55 Cf. Green, Second General Epistle of Peter, 140.
56 Cf. Luke 22.28.
57 Theophrastus also used empirical arguments in defence of Aristotles thesis of an eternal
cosmos: Philo De Aet. 11749.

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118 edward adams

Has the earth too grown so old that it may be thought to have been
sterilized by length of time? On the contrary it remains as it was ever young
(ajll ejn oJmoivw/ mevnei neavzousa ajeiv), because it is the fourth part of the All
and is bound to remain undecayed in order to conserve the sum of things,
just as also its sister elements, water, air and fire, continue to defy old age.

He offers as proof of the worlds immutability the perpetual fruitfulness of the


earth (De Aet. 625). Far from displaying signs of age and decay, it remains in its
ever-youthful condition. Its long continuity in the same stable condition indicates
that it will endure forever. A similar line of reasoning is apparent in 2 Pet 3.4.
That the writer of 2 Peter himself interprets the cosmological objection of the
opponents as a denial of cosmic destructibility emerges from his response to this
objection in vv. 57. The response contains three interwoven lines of argumentation, though interpreters have often failed to distinguish them clearly. Each is a
defence of the principle of cosmic destructibility.58 The first directly addresses the
opponents argument about the worlds freedom from catastrophe. The writer
disputes their premise that the world has continued in an unbroken line from creation to the present day. In making this claim, he points out, the scoffers deliberately ignore the fact of the flood. During the flood, the world as it was then was
totally destroyed by water. If the world was undone once before, it can be ruined
again. On the Day of Judgment, the world will be destroyed by fire. Underlying the
authors argument seems to be the notion that the Noahic flood is a typological
precursor of the final judgment.59
The second line of argument may be discerned from the authors reference to
creation and his stress on the divine word. The cosmos was formed by the word of
God (tw'/ tou` qeou' lovgw/, v. 5). By Gods word (di w|n, v. 6) it was flooded and
reduced to water.60 By the same word (tw'/ aujtw'/ lovgw/) God has ordained that the
world will be destroyed by fire (v. 7). The author thus argues for cosmic destruction from belief in the divine creation of the world, a belief to which his opponents
58 The writer is, therefore, able to recognise and indulge in Graeco-Roman cosmological
polemics. So also F. G. Downing, Cosmic Eschatology in the First Century: Pagan, Jewish
and Christian, LAntiquit Classique 64 (1995) 99109, here 108. This fits with the degree of
acculturation exhibited by the author of this letter. He writes in a type of Greek known as
Asiatic, a style of writing fashionable at the time: see B. Riecke, The Epistles of James, Peter,
and Jude: Introduction, Translation and Notes (AB; New York: Doubleday, 1964) 1467. His
ability to meet a particular literary taste and his wish to do so indicate an educated command of Greek and a certain openness to the values of Hellenistic culture. He betrays a
knowledge of Greek mythology (2.4): see Bauckham, Jude, 2 Peter, 249. He is aware of the
Hellenistic religious and philosophical idea of becoming like God (1.34). He is also
acquainted with Stoic moral theory and terminology (1.57): see Fornberg, An Early Church,
97101.
59 E.g. 1 Enoch 10; LAB 3.910.
60 The plural di w|n here probably refers to water and the divine word together: so, e.g.,
Bauckham, Jude, 2 Peter, 298.

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Where is the Promise of His Coming? 119

also subscribed (which suggests that the adversaries held to the original Platonic
version of the doctrine of cosmic destructibility, rather than its Aristotelian form).
It is Platos axiom that only the creator himself can unmake the world he has created.61 The writer accepts and builds on this principle. He contends that the divine
word by which the world was made is the very same word by which it was once
and will again be destroyed.
The third line of argument develops in three steps, the first two forming the
basis for the third,62 and hinges on the references to water and fire. This is a physical argument for cosmic destructibility which draws specifically on Stoic physics.
As noted above, the Stoics disputed the Platonic/Aristotelian theorem of cosmic
indestructibility; they advanced their own theory of the genesis and destruction of
the cosmos. They maintained that the cosmos originated in fire; the primordial fire
subsequently changed into water, and out of the water the cosmos was formed.63
The world is periodically resolved into water and fire, and is generated out of these
elements again; the process continues endlessly. The author adopts the Stoic
physical principle articulated by Seneca: Water and fire dominate earthly things.
From them is the origin, from them the death.64 He does not take on board the
cyclic dimension of the Stoic understanding of the world, but presses the physical
theory into a lineartemporal scheme. His three-step argument may be clarified as
follows. First, the world was formed out of fire and water (v. 5). The formulation ejx
u{dato~ kai; di u{dato~ in v. 5 (which commentators labour to explain solely in
terms of Gen 1) reflects a merging of Gen 1 with the distinctively Stoic view of
cosmic origins, according to which the world was formed out of water, which was
in turn a material transformation (di u{dato~) of the substance fire, the originating
stuff of material reality.65 Since the ordered world emerged from these elements, it
is destined to return to them.66 Second, the cosmos was destroyed by water at the
time of the flood, when it returned to its primeval watery state (v. 6). Third, the
world is fated to be resolved into fire (puriv), its primal element (v. 7).67
61
62
63
64
65

Plato Tim. 32C.


Cf. Horrell, Epistles of Peter and Jude, 176.
Diog. Laertius Lives of Eminent Philosophers 7.136, 142.
Seneca Nat. Quest. 3.28
I argue for this interpretation more fully in my essay Creation out of and through Water
in 2 Peter 3.4, The Creation of Heaven and Earth, (ed. G. H. Van Kooten. Thomes in Biblical
Narrative 9. Leiden: Brill, Forthcoming).
66 On the standard ancient assumption that the destruction of the cosmos would involve its
returning to a pre-cosmic condition.
67 The belief that the universe will be destroyed in an all-consuming conflagration is a characteristically Stoic idea. The notion is not found in the OT, and in post-biblical Jewish writings
up to the early second century ce it is securely attested only in certain passages of the
Sibylline Oracles (2.196213; 3.8092; 4.17192; 5.15561), where the influence of Stoicism is
apparent. See P. W. van der Horst, The Elements will be Dissolved with Fire: The Idea of

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120 edward adams

The author thus provides in vv. 57 a three-line defence of cosmic destructibility. The first line of argumentation contradicts the argument of the opponents
that since all things have endured without change from creation, they will always
endure. The second and third lines offer additional support for belief in the future
destruction of the cosmos, on theological and physical grounds.
It is noteworthy that the writers theological and physical arguments contain
neat replies to standard Platonic and Aristotelian objections to the idea of cosmic
destructibility. Plato, as noted above, stressed that only the creator could decreate what he has made. But he insisted that the demiurge could have no possible motivation for destroying the world; therefore the cosmos will endure
unceasingly.68 Aristotle refined this argument, considering then dismissing hypothetical motives.69 By emphasising that the divine word that brought about creation is the same word that has decreed its destruction, the writer of 2 Peter meets
Platos requirement. He also supplies a motivation for Gods destruction of the
world: the eradication of human wickedness.70 God destroys the world in order to
effect judgement on the ungodly who have polluted the world (v. 7; cf. v. 13).
Plato and Aristotle also argued against cosmic destructibility on physical
grounds. According to Plato, destruction is caused by external or internal means.
Since all existing matter was used up in the construction of the cosmos, there is
nothing outside the cosmos that can cause it harm.71 Since the four elements are
combined in perfect harmony, no one element can gain ascendancy over the rest.
Hence, the world is not susceptible to destruction from within.72 Neither cause of
destruction being possible, the cosmos is completely unassailable, totally free
from age, privation and decay. The argument was reiterated by Aristotle, who
made the additional point that destruction from within, through one element
(such as fire) usurping the others, would entail the logical impossibility of a part
being able to bring down the whole (Philo De Aet. 22). The author of 2 Peter provides a response to this line of argument. By indicating that the world is subject to
destruction by water and fire, he shows that the cosmos is susceptible to destruction from within; the universe contains the material for its own ruin.73 His

68
69
70
71
72
73

Cosmic Conflagration in Hellenism, Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity, Hellenism,


Judaism, Christianity: Essays on Their Interaction (ed. P. W. van der Horst; Kampen: Kok
Pharos, 1994) 22751. There is no clear-cut reference to an eschatological cosmic conflagration elsewhere in the NT.
Plato Tim. 29A.
Philo De Aet. 3943.
Neither Plato nor Aristotle considered the punishment of the wicked and obliteration of evil
as one of the possible reasons God might have for destroying the world.
Plato Tim. 33A.
Plato Tim. 32C.
J. Calvin, The Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Hebrews and the First and Second Epistles of St
Peter (trans. W. B. Johnston; Calvins Commentaries; Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1963) 362.

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Where is the Promise of His Coming? 121

adoption of Stoic physical theory gives him an answer to Aristotles objection that
the whole cannot be undone by one of its parts.74 An element may destroy the
whole if it was itself once the whole and again becomes the whole. When the
cosmos was destroyed by water, it was resolved into a material condition that
presently constitutes a part, but at one time formed the whole (3.5). At the conflagration, it will return to its original state of pure fire.
The way the author of 2 Peter responds to the scoffers cosmological objection
to the parousia promise, invoking Stoic theory and argumentation relating to the
cosmic conflagration, confirms our interpretation of the nature and philosophical
underpinning of that objection. The opponents not only reject the expectation of
the parousia on the basis that it is a failed prophecy, they dismiss it on the grounds
that it entails an impossible prospect the destruction of the cosmos.
The authors summary statement in 2 Pet 3.11, that all these things will be dissolved (touvtwn . . . pavntwn luomevnwn), serves as a summary rebuttal of the
scoffers insistence that all things endure (pavnta . . . diamevnei).

Conclusions and implications

In summary, the object of the scoffers ridicule in 3.4, I suggest, is not belief
in Jesus return as such but the underlying OT promise of an eschatological
advent. They scoff at this expectation because of the immensely long period of
time that has passed since it was first articulated. The divine advent has been
promised for many centuries, they mock, and nothing has happened. The adversaries also disparage the notion of a world-ending catastrophe which, in their
view, the expectation of Gods coming involved. Such an idea is ridiculous
because, from their philosophical perspective, the cosmos is by nature everlasting.
If my conclusions are persuasive, several consequences would seem to follow.
First, 2 Pet 3.4 may not be used as evidence for a crisis in the early church provoked by the deaths of the apostles and their contemporaries. There may well
have been such a crisis in early Christianity near the close of the first century ce
(the passing away of the apostles is likely to have caused some level of disappointment), but this verse neither establishes nor presupposes it. Second, 2 Pet
3.413 serves as evidence that belief in a coming world-ending catastrophe was
held in at least some early Christian circles. The scoffers apparently took for
granted that it was entailed in the expectation of Gods/Jesus parousia and
attempted to rebut it; the author defended it as a cardinal tenet of the faith. The

74 Cf. J. Mansfeld, Providence and the Destruction of the Universe in Early Stoic Thought,
Studies in Hellenistic Religion (ed. M. J. Vermaseren; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1979) 12988, here
1445.

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122 edward adams

debate reflected in 2 Pet 3.413 thus contradicts the claim of N. T. Wright that
belief in the coming end of the world was not part of the eschatology of the early
church.75 Third, the passage shows that Graeco-Roman philosophical disputations were making an impact on conflicts within the church.76 The issue of the validity of belief in the parousia was linked by both the author and his adversaries to
the philosophical debate on whether the cosmos endures or passes away, with the
opponents adopting the Platonic/Aristotelian position and the author invoking
the Stoic view. The influence of Graeco-Roman philosophical controversies on
disputes in the early Christian movement was of course to become a prominent
feature of second-century developments.

75 N. T. Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God (London: SPCK, 1996) 321.
76 G. H. van Kooten in his fascinating study, Cosmic Christology in Paul and the Pauline School:
Colossians and Ephesians in the Context of Graeco-Roman Cosmology, with a New Synopsis of
the Greek Texts (WUNT 171; Tbingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), argues that debates within
Graeco-Roman cosmology, especially on the coherence and future of the cosmos, had an
effect on debates within the Pauline school, as reflected in the divergent cosmologies of
Colossians and Ephesians.

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