Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Positive Shock
Carlos Pascual, special envoy and coordinator for international energy affairs at the State Department, suggested at a Council on Foreign
Relations conference in December that the
maneuverability in using sanctions to deal with Iran and its nuclear aspirations.
The increased U.S. production of oil and natural gas is a positive supply shock for the economy and for national
security, said Philip Verleger, a former director of the office of energy policy at the Treasury Department and founder of PKVerleger LLC, a
consulting firm in Aspen, Colorado.
threatened to respond to punitive measures with more escalatory measures (such as enrichment to above 20 per
cent or withdrawal from the NPT) but so far has shied away from doing so . Some analysts view the recent cyberattack against Saudi Arabias most important oil company as a possible warning shot from Tehran an indication
it could resort to different tactics should the economic warfare against it intensify . Crisis Group telephone
interview, oil executive, Dubai, December 2012; Nicole Perlroth, In cyberattack on Saudi firm, U.S. sees Iran firing back, The New York
Times, 23 October 2012.
of sanctions expand, they not only miss their targets but play into the hands they intend to weaken. That those in power
are better equipped to navigate the economic obstacle is nothing new, a fact of life witnessed in Iraq under Saddam as well as in Gaza under
Hamas,257 among many others. The economic distortions to which sanctions give rise can be manipulated so that
rarefied goods are allocated to preferred constituencies, while those most prone to question their rulers are starved
of resources. Again, this lesson can be witnessed today in Syria, with the advent of a war economy from which regime cronies (but also some
rebel groups) can profit.258
The more sanctions threaten Irans internal stability, the more likely the ruling regime will be to pursue nuclear
deterrence and to confront the West to win the time Iran needs to reach that goal. Hard-line US Policy tips Iran toward belligerence,
Bloomberg, 5 January 2012.
Unions former arms-control envoy to the U.S. who is now at the Athens, Georgia-based Center for International
Trade and Security. Kazakhstan Meeting Iran, which maintains its atomic program is peaceful, has ruled out
suspending its activities as the UN Security Council demands. Its willing to discuss its nuclear work when it meets
world powers in Kazakhstan next week, Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi said Feb. 4. Talks between Iran and
IAEA officials that concluded Feb. 13 in Tehran failed to clinch a deal that would give investigators wider access to
alleged nuclear sites. While Iran allowed wider access to sites, including centrifuge-manufacturing workshops, until
2005, it reversed course after accusations about its nuclear work escalated. The first UN sanctions were imposed in
2006. The country hasnt restricted IAEA access to sites its legally bound to let inspectors visit. Diplomats should
focus on returning to greater transparency of Irans nuclear facilities rather than trying to enforce a ban on
enrichment, said Paul Ingram, executive director of the London-based British American Security Information
Council, a policy-advisory group. Iran has a sophisticated economy relative to most states outside of North
America, Europe and the Far East, so it should be no surprise that they can develop the technologies to substitute for
sanctioned materials, Ingram wrote in reply to questions. The experience of sanctions proves this time and time
again.
conventional military threat at all. It is also worth remembering that the US intelligence services have concluded that
Iran stopped research into producing a functioning nuclear weapon a decade ago. In other words, they do not believe
that Iran has a nuclear weapons program. In regards to the mental state of its leaders, whatever dubious statements some Iranian
politicians (including the outgoing president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad) have made about subjects like the Holocaust, Irans foreign policy
has been pragmatic for the most part, and geared towards securing Iranian interests.
Iran not pursuing nuclear weapons
Fox News 13 (Rowhani 'halted nuclear weapon programme': ex-ambassador, Fox News, July 27, 2013,
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/07/27/rowhani-halted-nuclear-weapon-programme-ex-ambassador/)
Iranian President-elect Hassan Rowhani personally stopped the development of a clandestine nuclear weapon in 2003, a
former ambassador to the country said Saturday. Writing in the International Herald Tribune newspaper, Francois Nicoullaud, France's
ambassador to Iran from 2001 to 2005, said he believed Rowhani was the "main actor" in persuading the country's Supreme
Leader Ali Khamenei to halt the secret programme. Rowhani, who led the nuclear negotiating team under reformist former
president Mohammad Khatami from 2003-2005, will take power on August 3 after his election on June 15. "Based on conversations that I
had at the time, as French ambassador to Tehran, with high Iranian officials close to the matter, I firmly believe that Rowhani was the main actor
in the process," Nicoullaud wrote. "Of course, Iranians could not admit to a foreigner that such a program ever existed, and I cannot name the
officials I spoke to." Nicoullaud went on to describe a meeting with a "high-ranking official" after Iran had agreed with Western powers to
suspend enrichment in October 2003. After this agreement, the official "confided to me that ... Rowhani issued a general circular asking
all Iranian departments and agencies, civilian and military, to report in detail about their past and ongoing nuclear
activities. "The official explained to me that the main difficulty Rowhani and his team were encountering was learning exactly what was
happening in a system as secretive as Iran's. "A few weeks after, I heard from another official, a close friend of Rowhani: 'The Rowhani team is
having a hard time ... People resist their instructions ... But they will prevail'." After Nicoullaud advised the official to give researchers more time
to archive their work, his source later replied: "I conveyed your message ... It worked!" The retired diplomat confirmed to AFP Saturday he now
believes that the project Rowhani's team was working on was the Revolutionary Guard programme. " Uranium enrichment was the
visible part of it but there was a hidden section, the manufacture of a nuclear device -- once they had produced
enriched uranium, how to put it on the head of a missile and how to deliver it to 'friends' in the region -- that's the
programme Rowhani stopped," the former ambassador said. "I had known for a long time but now that Rowhani is becoming president I
had enough consistent information to prove that he was the principal figure, who made his decision known to the Supreme Leader," Nicoullaud
said. "Above all it was put into action, forcing the Revolutionary Guards to halt the programme that they held so very dearly," added the former
diplomat.
insistence, the administration later this year demands that China sharply cut Iranian oil imports and that Chinese
banks stop virtually any Iran-related transactions, Beijing will say no. If Washington retreats, the deterrent effect of secondary
sanctions will erode rapidly. Iran's oil exports are rising again, largely from Chinese demand. "If Washington sanctions major Chinese
banks and energy companies, Beijing will respond... by retaliating against US companies in China ." Once it becomes
evident Washington won't seriously impose secondary sanctions, growth in Iranian oil shipments to China and other non-Western economies (for
example, India and South Korea) will accelerate. Likewise, non-Western powers are central to Iran's quest for alternatives to US-dominated
mechanisms for conducting and settling international transactions - a project that will also gain momentum after Washington's bluff is called.
Conversely, if Washington sanctions major Chinese banks and energy companies, Beijing will respond - at least by taking
America to the WTO's Dispute Resolution Mechanism (where China will win), perhaps by retaliating against US companies in China.
Chinese policymakers are increasingly concerned Washington is reneging on its part of the core bargain that
grounded Sino-American rapprochement in the 1970s - to accept China's relative economic and political rise and not try to secure a
hegemonic position in Asia. Beijing is already less willing to work in the Security Council on a new (even watered-down) sanctions resolution
and more willing to resist US initiatives that, in its view, challenge Chinese interests (witness China's vetoes of three US-backed resolutions on
Syria). In this context, Chinese leaders will not accept American high-handedness on Iran sanctions. At this point, Beijing
has more ways to impose costs on America for violations of international economic law that impinge on Chinese interests than Washington has
levers to coerce China's compliance. As America's sanctions policy unravels, President Obama will have to decide whether to stay on a path of
open-ended hostility toward Iran that ultimately leads to another US-initiated war in the Middle East, or develop a very different vision for
America's Middle East strategy - a vision emphasising genuine diplomacy with Tehran, rooted in American acceptance of the Islamic Republic as
a legitimate political order representing legitimate national interests and aimed at fundamentally realigning US-Iranian relations.
C.I.A. based much of its conclusions about Iraqs purported biological weapons on an Iraqi exile who turned out to
be lying. Analysts are also required to include in their reports more information about the chain of logic that has led
them to their conclusions, and differing judgments are featured prominently in classified reports, rather than buried
in footnotes. When an unclassified summary of the 2007 intelligence estimate on Irans nuclear program was made
public, stating that it had abandoned work on a bomb, it stunned the Bush administration and the world. It
represented a sharp reversal from the intelligence communitys 2005 estimate, and drew criticism of the C.I.A. from
European and Israeli officials, as well as conservative pundits. They argued that it was part of a larger effort by the
C.I.A. to prevent American military action against Iran. The report was so controversial that many outside analysts
expected that the intelligence community would be forced to revise and repudiate the estimate after new evidence
emerged about Irans program, notably from the United Nations inspectors. Yet analysts now say that while there
has been mounting evidence of Iranian work on enrichment facilities, there has been far less clear evidence of a
weapons program. Still, Irans enrichment activities have raised suspicions, even among skeptics. What has been
driving the discussion has been the enrichment activity, said one former intelligence official. Thats made
everybody nervous. So the Iranians continue to contribute to the suspicions about what they are trying to do. Irans
efforts to hide its nuclear facilities and to deceive the West about its activities have also intensified doubts. But some
American analysts warn that such behavior is not necessarily proof of a weapons program. They say that one
mistake the C.I.A. made before the war in Iraq was to assume that because Saddam Hussein resisted weapons
inspections acting as if he were hiding something it meant that he had a weapons program. As Mr. Kay
explained, The amount of evidence that you were willing to go with in 2002 is not the same evidence you are
willing to accept today.
Sanctions fail
International Crisis Group 2-25-13
Middle East Report N138 25 February 2013
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iran%20Gulf/Iran/138-spider-webthe-making-and-unmaking-of-iran-sanctions.pdf
How effective sanctions can be in affecting fundamental Iranian policy choices is one important area of inquiry. At one level, its leaders appear
confident they can ride the storm, having endured far more devastating conditions in the past, notably during the eight-year war with Iraq.7
Beyond that, sanctions could be strangulating Irans economy, and Tehrans leaders might be willing to pay a tactical price for their removal
without this necessarily establishing that Irans basic goals will have changed. Irans economy without question is under tremendous strain,
having suffered a dramatic drop in oil exports and a no less significant collapse in the value of its currency. But evidence of a concomitant
impact on Tehrans policy choices is far less easy to detect. To this, there are several possible, non-mutually exclusive explanations. First, the
Iranian system might be relatively impervious to political manifestations (in terms of popular discontent or anger of
the business community) of even sharp economic distress.8 Secondly, the regime harbours the strong conviction that any policy
change would signal weakness and thus, rather than lessen pressure would be likely to augment it;9 hence its leaderships determination to prove
that, although sanctions might affect Iran, they never will yield the desired result.10 As a European official put it, Irans strategy
now boils down to resistance till victory, which stands in sharp contrast to t he Wests sanctions till victory.11 Even assuming their
efficiency as a political instrument, the second question concerns the practicality of their use: imposing sanctions in order to modify behaviour
is only useful if they can be removed in response to altered practice in a calibrated, flexible way. Without such nimbleness, the West will be
unable to offer Iran necessary incentives. The real measure of efficacy is not sanctions imposition. It is sanctions relief.
By the same token, the belief in Washington and Brussels that Tehran might surrender to pressure stands in sharp contrast to Irans selfperception. Western officials who believe crippling sanctions might force the Islamic Republic to rethink its calculations routinely invoke wellknown historical precedents in 1988, despite his war, war, till victory slogan, Ayatollah Khomeini drank the poisoned chalice and
accepted to end the essentially stalemated eight-year war with Iraq; then, in 2003, in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Tehran agreed to
suspend uranium enrichment and purportedly offered a grand bargain to Washington. The conclusion drawn from these rare policy reversals
tends to be clear: faced with an existential threat to the regime, Iran will budge.228 Yet, there are good reasons to believe that 2013
is akin neither to 1988 nor to 2003. The decision to end the war in 1988 certainly was a painful one, but from the Supreme Leaders
vantage point, it was a step that would ensure the Islamic Republics survival. By contrast, a compromise on the nuclear file delivered under
pressure to an entity (the U.S.) whose goal is believed to be regime change might do nothing of the sort. Compliance with Western demands, in
Ayatollah Khameneis mind, likely will not result in alleviation of pressure.229 Todays calculus, in other words, is not so clear-cut: a
concession risks projecting weakness both domestically and internationally and thus damage prospects of regime
survival rather than enhance it. Under this view, the deal, not its absence, could be the poison that brings down the Islamic Republic.230
Finally, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the 2003 offer was an invitation to the U.S. for discussing major issues of contention and not an
Iranian commitment to unilaterally and unconditionally reverse course.231 Moreover, and importantly, for many in the Iranian leadership
current hardships have an air of dj vu indeed, an air of something not nearly as bad as what previously has been seen. The country has
experienced two oil embargos in its modern history: the British-led boycott of Iranian oil between 1951 and 1953 (after
Iran nationalised its oil industry) proved highly effective, yet Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh did not budge;232 later, the U.S.
embargo on Iranian oil imposed in the wake of the 1979 hostage crisis likewise failed to meet its objective, as American diplomats
remained in captivity for 444 days.233 Iran also has dealt with two foreign currency crises in the recent past. Oil revenues dropped from $21
billion in 1983 to $6 billion in 1987, at a time when the country was engaged in a full-fledged war with Iraq. A decade later, amid the Asian
financial crisis, oil income fell once more, from $19 billion in 1996 to $10 billion in 1998.234 The situation today despite shrinking resources
and rising prices is nowhere near the deprivation experienced during the 1980s, when the drain of war had caused widespread shortages and
frequent blackouts. Ayatollah Khamenei, who presided over these previous crises, first as president and then as Supreme Leader, said: [The]
challenges the Islamic Republic is currently faced with are not new. And this is not an analysis, it is a fact. There was a day when our ships
and oil tankers were targeted in the Persian Gulf. There was a day when [Iraq] bombed our main oil terminal in Kharg Island. There were days
when the enemy used to drop bombs on all our industrial centres. These are the things that we have witnessed with our own eyes. We have
experienced these things before: they are not new to us.235 In response, U.S. and EU officials occasionally argue that the more recent round of
sanctions is unprecedented in scope and thus should be given enough time to sink in.236 They see the accumulated impact of punitive
measures, not the effect of their periodic intensification, as the force that eventually might compel the regime to alter its stance in fundamental
ways. A senior U.S. official said, when we think about the impact of sanctions on Irans oil and gas sector, we think long-term. Imagine what
will happen five to ten years from now, when Iranians cannot even keep up oil production for their domestic consumption.237 Yet, the Iranian
leadership offers a mirror image, persuaded that time is on its side. An official argued: The West will realise in due course that strongarming Iran is an exercise in futility. But even if it doesnt, fatigue will eventually set in, and the sanctions regime will start
haemorrhaging.238 To this end, Iran is preparing itself for a potentially prolonged confrontation. At the core of its strategy is its so-called
economy of resistance,239 which equates survival with victory.240 From this perspective, dissuading its foreign foes from toppling it and
establishing the fact of regime endurance is well worth suffering such costs.241
deters aggression and that weakness invites it. The only game changer in a proliferating world is, and will continue
to be, a strong U.S. nuclear deterrent.
Russia conducted the first flight test of a new inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) that Russian officials say is designed to
defeat U.S. missile defenses. The prototype ICBM was launched yesterday from Moscows Kapustin Yar missile range, a spokesman for
Russian Defense Ministry told state media. U.S. and Russian officials describe the new missile as a road-mobile missile known as Yars-M
that is slated for deployment later this year . On Friday, Russian Deputy Premier Dmitri Rogozin said the new missile was designed
specifically to defeat U.S. missile defensesa key Russian priority for its strategic nuclear arms buildup. We closely watched last
nights events. They were successful. We tested an intercontinental ballistic missile which I call a missile defense killer, Rogozin was
quoted by Interfax as saying. Neither modern nor future American missile defense means will be able to stop this missile
from hitting its target directly. No details on the characteristics of the new missile were made public. However, U.S. officials said the
new ICBM is believed to use a high-technology fuel that allows higher speeds needed to outfly high-speed U.S. missile defense interceptors.
The new ICBM will have a range of up to 6,835 miles and 10 multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles. The new
ICBM is a setback for President Barack Obamas efforts to engage the Russians in a new round of strategic arms reduction talks. The president
sent a letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin several weeks ago that a Russian official said addresses problems of military policy, including
the missile defense and nuclear arsenals issues. The new missile appears to be one of Moscows responses to plans by the United States and
NATO to deploy missile defenses in Europe against Iranian missiles. Russia is opposing the missile defenses, claiming they will be used to
defeat Russian strategic offensive forces. The Obama administration has denied the defenses can or will be used to defeat the Russian strategic
missile arsenal. The Obama administration twice has made concessions to Russia on the defenses. First, it canceled a plan to place long-range
missile defense interceptors in Poland in 2009. Then in March the Pentagon canceled a plan to deploy a ground-based version of the Navys SM-3
interceptor missile that is being designed to counter Iranian long-range missiles. Rogozin said in a speech to Moscows Civil University that the
military will continue building up a force that will allow us to ensure our absolute freedom of action, should our country encounter any
aggression. The Russian Federations state weapons procurement program will set such parameters of weapons and military hardware that will
only be linked with responding to the threat of sixth-generation wars, he said. The strategic missile test comes as Russia has been conducting
several Cold War-style strategic bomber incursions into U.S. air defense zones. Russia also announced recently that Moscow will
resume ballistic missile submarine patrols. The new ICBM is part of a major strategic nuclear buildup by Russia. In
addition to the new road-mobile missile, Moscow is developing a rail-mobile ICBM, similar to the dismantled Soviet-era rail-mobile SS-24.
Russia also is building a new ballistic missile submarine that will carry new submarine-launched Bulava missiles, and a new strategic bomber to
be deployed by 2020. Another new strategic weapon is Russias new Kh-102 air-launched cruise missile and a new Kaliber submarine launched
cruise missile under development. Asked about the Russian ICBM test, Rick Lehner, spokesman for the Pentagons Missile Defense Agency
said: Our missile defense technology doesnt threaten the Russian strategic deterrent force in any way. Igor Yegorov, a ministry spokesman for
strategic missile troops, said the test was carried out at 9:45 p.m. Moscow time on Thursday (1:45 p.m. in Washington) from a mobile launch
system. The missile facility at Kapustin Yar is located near the southern Russian city of Volgograd. The launch has been recognized as
successful; the combat payload arrived at Balkhash range at the scheduled time, Yegorov said. Balkash is an impact zone in Kazakhstan. The
tasks of the launch were to receive confirmation that the characteristics of the missile system and of all its elements correspond to those described
in the tactical and technical specifications, to ascertain the flight-technical characteristics of the missile and those of the units of the missile
system in general, to experimentally ascertain the reliability of the operation of the missile system, said Yegorov. It was reportedly the fourth
test of the new missile. The ICBM test comes as President Obama is set to approve a new plan for cutting U.S. strategic nuclear warheads called
the Nuclear Posture Review Implementation study. The new plan will call for seeking a new round of strategic arms cuts with Russia aimed at
cutting deployed strategic warheads to 1,000. Under the 2010 New START arms treaty, the United States and Russia agreed to cut their deployed
strategic warhead arsenals to 1,550 warheads. After the treaty was made public, it was disclosed that Russia had already reached that level and
thus the treaty unilaterally cuts U.S. strategic forces. A U.S. official familiar with strategic nuclear issues said the Obama administration is
seeking to conclude a missile defense deal with Russia this month. The objective of that agreement is to pave the
way for a future agreement between Obama and Russian President Vladimir Putin to announce a new round of strategic arms
cuts, possibly to begin in September or October. Jack Caravelli, a former CIA specialist on Russia, said the new Russian ICBM may use a
depressed trajectory flight to avoid or defeat missile defenses. Russian claims of having developed a new missile capable of penetrating
current or future US missile defense may or may not be true, said Caravelli, now with the private intelligence firm Lignet. Russia fears the
United States may deploy large numbers of missile defense interceptors in the future with the theoretical capability to degrade a large-scale
Russian missile attack on the United States, he said.
The Russians know such future deployments are unlikely but are
probably hyping the new ICBM capability to demonstrate the futility of any such large scale missile defense
plan , Caravelli said. Congressional Republicans are concerned that the administration will make its next arms pact an executive agreement to
avoid another difficult treaty ratification fight, as occurred in 2010 with the New START treaty. Secretary of State John Kerry, during his Senate
confirmation hearing, did not rule out the use of an executive agreement for a new arms treaty. One sign of impending strategy force cuts was the
recent directive to the Air Force from the office of the secretary of defense to conduct an impact statement of dismantling an entire wing of U.S.
land-based ICBMs. The current START treaty calls for no similar reduction in land-based missile forces.
Russia wont build permanent military operations in Cuba
Meyer 8 Bill, reporter at Cleveland.com, Vladimir Putin says Russia has no need for permanent military bases in Cuba or
Venezuela, December 4 2008, Cleveland.com,
http://www.cleveland.com/world/index.ssf/2008/12/vladimir_putin_says_russia_has.html
MOSCOW -- Russia
does not need to build permanent naval bases in Cuba or Venezuela, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said
on Thursday, speaking amid a Kremlin push to increase Moscow's influence in Latin America. In an annual televised
question-and-answer session with Russians, Putin said Russia has "very warm traditional ties" with Cuba and Venezuela. They were prominent
stops on a Latin America tour that his protege, President Dmitry Medvedev, ended late last month by meeting with Soviet-era ally Fidel Castro.
"Today there is no need to build permanent bases" in Cuba and Venezuela, Putin said in response to a question. He said Russia has an
agreement allowing its warships to use Venezuelan ports for refueling and resupply, "and I think the Cuban leadership
would not refuse this." The Russian nuclear-powered missile cruiser Peter the Great and destroyer Admiral Chabanenko conducted joint
exercises with Venezuelan forces in the Caribbean Sea on Monday, an activity unprecedented since the Cold War. The warships sailed across the
Atlantic at the invitation of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who campaigns against U.S. influence in the hemisphere, adding to his growing
military ties with the Kremlin. On Friday, one of the vessels is to be the first Russian warship since World War II to sail
through the Panama Canal -- long a symbol of U.S. regional clout. As the Kremlin signals hope for improved U.S. ties under the
administration of President-elect Barack Obama, the remarks may have been aimed at assuring Washington that Russia's recent flurry of
activity in Latin America is not part of a Cold War-style power struggle with the United States. At the same time, Putin
suggested Russia's military and political ties are growing, regionally and globally. "We have quite a lot of opportunities, and not only with the
countries that you mentioned, but also at the ports of other states," he said. "I want to tell you a 'terrible military secret,'" Putin said. "When we
announced that our military ships would go to Venezuela for joint exercises, we received very many inquiries -- frankly speaking, I didn't expect
this -- from many countries with requests that our ships visit their ports."
New cold war not coming war would be Russian economic suicide
Wagstyl 8 Stefan, Current Bureau Chief of Berlins Financial Times and has been covering emerging eastern markets for 20
years, March 1 2008, Return of the Cold Warriors, FT.com, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/fd9d7e48-e372-11dc-87990000779fd2ac.html#axzz2adCtei90
Lucas admits there
is little chance of another armed confrontation with the west. The US alone runs a defense budget
25 times bigger than Russias. While Russia possesses some smart new high-tech weapons, its factories can no longer
produce them on any scale. But Lucas says this isnt important when the west is so eager for Russian oil and gas, and Russian money.
During the Cold War, western politicians and officials who took money from the Kremlin risked professional disgrace and even prosecution.
Now business is business. The long-run consequences of this are problematic, he says: If you believe that capitalism is a system in which
money matters more than freedom you are doomed when people who dont believe in freedom attack using money. Lucas does well to make
clear the Kremlins dark and dangerous side. But in his rush to recruit soldiers for the new cold war, he overstates his case. For example, it
doesnt seem realistic to say: If the Kremlin cracks Estonia the chances for the rest of eastern Europe look bleak. What about Poland, with a
population 20 times larger than Estonias and a long history of resisting its powerful neighbors? If there is a new cold war, it is by no
means clear that the west is losing. Even since Putin took power in 2000, the west has, in geopolitical terms, made great
gains in the former Soviet empire through the eastward enlargement of Nato and the EU. Ukraine and Georgias democratic
revolts have yet to run their course, but both have resulted in defeats for the Kremlin. Both states have this year applied for Nato membership
action plans. The Kremlins gains over these years are significant they include provoking political tensions in the Baltic states, securing
Germanys backing for a gas pipeline under the Baltic and winning support in the Balkans for a southern gas route. But the Kremlins victories
pale in comparison with those of the west. Also, as the Kremlin is fighting largely on the economic battlefield, there will be
economic limits to its advances. If Gazprom, for example, tries to exploit its dominance by raising prices too much, consumers will
go elsewhere. Meanwhile, even the Kremlins hawks have links with Russian companies that profit from co-operation
with the west. They wont want to impoverish the west to the point that itll become uncomfortable for the business
oligarchs to spend time in London or the south of France. Finally, there is little discussion of Russias inherent economic
weakness. While Lucas acknowledges that Putins regime is based on high energy prices, he barely considers how vulnerable Russia is
to future price swings. If boom becomes a bust, the cash could run out for financing the Kremlins ambitious policies.
Russia, in other words, is weaker than it appears. These arguments are well made by Yegor Gaidar, the architect of Russias economic
reforms in the early 1990s under the late president Boris Yeltsin. Collapse of an Empire is a warning to todays Russian leaders to
avoid the disastrous mistakes of their Soviet predecessors. Gaidar, who had a ringside seat at the Soviet Unions collapse, argues
that the root cause of its end was the Soviet economys failure to feed its people. Under Stalin, the peasants were forced at
gunpoint to deliver food to the growing industrial cities. After his death, the Kremlin struggled to satisfy the urban populations growing needs
and imported ever more foodstuffs. By the 1980s, a country which had before the first world war supplied 45 per cent of the worlds grain
exports, had become the globes biggest importer. Gaidar vividly describes how Mikhail Gorbachev grappled with a crisis that eventually
overwhelmed him, trying to buy time by obtaining western loans in return for allowing Soviet satellite states to go free. But it was not enough.
With foreign debt exceeding $120bn, Gorbachev was reduced to sending begging letters, including one to John Major, British prime minister and
then co-ordinator of the Group of Seven rich countries. It read: Dear John! Help! Gaidar dismisses the arguments that either the oil price
collapse of the late 1980s or Ronald Reagans decision to accelerate the arms race brought down the Soviet Union. Pope John Paul II, who many
observers credit with stirring up Polish resistance to communism, is not mentioned. Instead, in Gaidars view, it was Stalins errors that destroyed
the Soviet Union the empire-builder himself was responsible.
Relations with the United States will, as always, also remain a prime subject for debate. For all his talk of Russia
becoming a Great Power and looking out for its own interests internationally, Putin on the whole pursued
cooperation with the U.S. to a significant degree. Whether offering a strategic partnership and the right to base
troops in the CIS following September 11 or calmly swallowing American withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the
Putin administration was about as pro-American as a Russian government could have afforded to be, given the
political configuration then prevailing in Moscow. When Moscow started to believe that the U.S. was taking
advantage of this accommodating attitude to strengthen its own position relative to Russia, it began pushing back,
culminating in it invasion of U.S. ally Georgia in August 2008. As U.S. Russian relations improved in the context
of the Obama-Medvedev reset, which provided Russia the recognition and seat at the table for which it had long
clamored, cooperation between the two countries rapidly expanded into new areas, including sensitive ones such as
missile defense and security assistance in Central Asia.
No US-Russian war:
Perry, et al 2009 (William J. (former United States Secretary of Defense, Americas Strategic Posture The Final Report of the Congressional
Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, http://media.usip.org/reports/strat_posture_report.pdf)
It is important, moreover, to bear in mind that despite our many disappointments, Russia has not