FUNDAO GETULIO VARGAS

MBA em Relaes Internacionais

Marc Dufour

Trabalho de Concluso do Curso Anlise de Poltica

Internacional

Qatar: a diversified strategy to integrate the

Liberal International Society

Rio de Janeiro
May 2011

1. Introduction
This study aims at analyzing the strategies Qatar is using for its insertion in the
global order, in the frame of a globalized liberal international society. While ensuring its
security through various defense agreements, the country developed also alternative
policies to leverage its position in global affairs. In particular this paper will focus on
some pillars like political economy, internal reforms, adhesion to International
Organizations as well as to global civil society and transnational networks, all this
creating a Qatar brand, enhancing finally its security. This strategy made of Qatar a
unique player in the Middle-East and this position will be analyzed finally in the frame
of the revolutionary Arab Spring on-going in the region. Understanding Qatars history
in such a volatile region will be the first step of the process to identify the drivers of the
countrys foreign policy.

2. Historical Context of modern Qatar1

Qatar is a peninsula of 160 km long and 80 km width, located on the south shore of
the Persian Gulf. It is flat and desert with around 1,7 millions habitants of which fewer
than 300.000 are Qatari citizens.2

For centuries, the peninsula was mostly populated by nomadic tribes from Saudi
Arabia, settling seasonally around sources of water. With its large coast, fishing and
pearling remained for a long time the principle economic activities, until oil was
discovered. The Peninsula was ruled by several great powers over its history: the
Abbasid (750-1258) settled in some areas, the Portuguese ruled from 1517 to 1538, the
Ottomans, Persia, Oman

1
2

Section mostly based on (Smyth, Toth, & Tartter, 1993)

(The Economist, 2010)

In the 1760s, the Al Khalifa emigrated from Kuwait to Qatar's northwest coast to
found the town of Zubarah, which became a center of trade and pearling. In 1783, the
Al Khalifa of Kuwait and Qatar along with Qatari tribes took over Bahrain from an
Omani sheikh who was regularly attacking the city of Zubarah. The Al Khalifa started
then to rule Bahrain from Qatar. Along the years, the Al Khalifa migrated to the more
desirable location of Bahrain and established a kingdom that still exists today. In the
same time, as the trading activities were also moved to Bahrain, the peninsula became
again a second zone of economic interests, seeing the increase of insecurity and
conflicts between local tributes. In the late 18th - early 19th centuries, the region saw
many conflicts involving the Al Khalifa, the Persians, the Omanis, the nascent
Wahhabis of Arabia and the Ottomans. In the same period, the British started to raise
their interest and power in the Persian Gulf because of their growing interest for a
secure passage for the East India Company ships, regularly attacked by pirates based in
the South-East of the Arabian Peninsula. The British finally imposed anti-piracy rules in
the region through the signature of The General Treaty of 1820 with what is now the
UAE. Bahrain entered in the Treaty at its own request in order to protect its ships from
piracy. At that time, Qatar was still assumed to be a dependency of Bahrain. In 1868,
regular conflicts prompted the British to impose a settlement between Bahrain and
Qatar. The resulting peace treaty was a milestone in Qatar's history: it recognized Qatar
as a distinct territory from Bahrain and acknowledged the position of the Al Thani
family3 as an important representative of the peninsula's tribes.
The expansion of the Ottoman Empire into eastern Arabia in 1871 started to
threaten Qatar and the Al Thani accepted Ottoman sovereignty in 1872, hoping that
with Ottoman support they could dominate those Sheiks in other towns who opposed
them and also rebuff Bahrain's claims on Zubarah. The ambivalent relations with the
Ottomans deteriorated and finally the Al Thani embraced the resurgent Wahhabis,
which marked de facto the end of Ottoman rule in Qatar.
In 1916 the Al Thani signed a treaty with Britain bringing the peninsula into the
trucial system that was prevailing among other Gulf entities. It meant that Qatar
abandoned its autonomy in foreign affairs for Britain's military protection regarding all
aggression by sea and for good offices in case of a land attack. However, the rule of the
Al Thani over the peninsula was far from secure as there were recalcitrant tribes, family
dissensions and threats from Bahrain and the Wahhabis. The British really started to
bring support to the Al Thani after the discovery of oil, when competition with the US
intensified in the region. In a 1935 treaty, Britain made more specific promises of

The Al Thani family is originally Bedouin from Najd. After settling in Qatar, it engaged in
fishing, pearling, date palm cultivation, and trade

assistance than in earlier treaties in return for a 75 years concession granted to the
Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Oil exploration was also at the origin of several border
disputes with Bahrain and the Whabbis. Oil was finally discovered in Qatar in 1939, but
exploitation was stopped between 1942 and 1947 because of the World War II. The War
also disrupted food supplies and prolonged the period of economic hardship which
begun in the 20s as a result of the Japanese development of cultured pearls, the great
depression and the drop of demand.
Oil revenues started to flow in 1949, bringing prosperity, rapid immigration,
substantial social progress, and initiating Qatar's modern history. The structure of the
state developed in the 50s and the 60s under British guidance with the development of
government, police and public services. The Al Thani progressively shared the power
and revenues of oil with other branches of the family to extend the base of the regime.
However the regime stayed firm against any form of instability within the country4.
In 1968, the British announced their will to end their military commitments in the
region by 1971, forcing the seven trucial states5, Bahrain and Qatar to invent their
future. The 9 states planned to form a union of Arab emirates but as the termination date
of the British treaty relationship approached, they still had not agreed on the structure of
the union. Qatar then decided to declare its independence as a separate entity and
became the fully independent State of Qatar on September 3, 1971. The head of Qatar
was deposed by his cousin Sheikh Khalifa in 1972, with the tacit support of the key
members of the Al Thani family and Britain. The move took place without violence and
the new ruler had the political, financial, and military support of Saudi Arabia. He
modernized the state and invested in social programs like housing, health and education.
In the 1990s, Sheikh Hamad, son of Sheikh Khalifa, heir apparent and Minister of
Defense, had taken over much of the day-to-day running of the country. He deposed his
father in a bloodless coup in 1995.

3. Diversified strategies
In order to ensure its integration in the post-Cold War context, Sheikh Hamad
initiated various reforms of the countrys national and international policies after the
1995 coup. He secured first the countrys basic survival and developed afterwards a
range of soft policies in order to reveal Qatar to the world and to position it in the global
order.

For example the way the Emir managed the National Unity Front call for a general strike by
jailing fifty leading individuals and exiling the front's leaders
5
The actual UAE

3.1 Security
1) Providing Security through Defence Agreements
Before its independency, the peninsula has been under the protection of various
powers like the Al Khalifa, the Omanis, the Persians, the Ottomans, the Wahhabis and
the British. As a small territory, Qatar constantly looked for alliance and its leaders
developed a keen sense of managing regional relations to enhance their security and
develop their influence, for example by balancing the Al Khalifa with the British and
then the Ottomans, balancing afterwards the Ottomans with the Wahhabis and then the
British. Qatari history shown that nothing is permanent in the region, that friends of
yesterday might be the enemies of tomorrow, that great Empires arrive, settle, provide
security and eventually decay and die6. It taught two main lessons to Qatari leaders: a
small regional system with protection of neighbours was unstable and Empires can offer
protection but only for a limited time.7
Right after the independence, Qatar received tacitly the protection of Saudi Arabia,
following the countrys tradition to ally with regional powers. However, the Tanker
War, in which Americans had to provide umbrella for the oil ships in the Persian Gulf,
raised concerns about the ability of Saudi Arabia to protect Qatars interests8. The
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 and the following First Gulf War was probably the
event that raised Qatars interests for alternative models to provide security. Firstly, it
clearly underlined the inability of Saudi to protect the peninsula as Qatari armed forces
helped coalition troops to repel an Iraqi attack on the Saudi Arabian town of Kafji.
Secondly, the situation of Qatar in the region was quite similar to the one of Kuwait: a
small country, rich in resources and unable to defend itself, with regional powers that
ruled its territory in the past being at its doors (Iraq for Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iran
for Qatar). Right after the Gulf War, Qatar sought then the protection of the US and a
defence cooperation agreement9 was signed in June 1992
Once Sheikh Hamad took power in 1995, he launched a series of internal and
external reforms. On the international level, Sheikh Hamad moved away from his
fathers recognition of Saudi hegemony in the region10. He wanted first to increase
Qatars protection by the Americans and decided to build the Al Udeid air force base for
an estimated 1 Billion USD. It was an infrastructure well above the military needs of the

(Roberts, Qatar's search for security, 2009)

(Roberts, Developing an Agenda for Security Studies in the Gulf - Qatari Mediation, 2010)
8
(Dargin, Qatar's Natural Gas: The Foreign Policy Driver, 2007)
9
(Smyth, Toth, & Tartter, 1993)
10
(Cooper & Momani, 2010)
7

country and a clear message addressed to the US, asking them to settle there. It worked
and the US access to the base was formalized late 2000. In 2003, the importance of
Qatar in the US military system in the Middle-East increased as the US Combat Air
Operations Center for the Middle-East moved from Saudi Arabia to Qatar, under the
pressure of both the Saudi Arabian opinion (presence of the US in their county) and the
US opinion (active participation of Saudi citizens in the 9/11 terrorist attacks).
On the other hand, Qatar also looked to diversify its security system by signing
other defence agreements with France and UK in the 1990s. For example 80% of
Qatari military equipments are coming from France, like the Mirage jet fighters. But
Qatar is not counting only on Western Powers for its security and is also developing
alternative relations with emerging powers of the East. For example India and Qatar
signed an Agreement on Defense Cooperation in 2008, in the frame of important long
term supply of Liquefied Gas to India, balancing the defence agreements it has with the
West11.
2) Promoting regional stability
The stability of the region is a key element of Qatars policy for security. In that
framework, Qatar maintained dialogue at some level with all the players present in the
Middle-East. It is a unique country which has relations with the US and Israel on one
side and with Iran, Syria and Hezbollah on the other side. It is constantly balancing the
interests in the area and working for stability through intensive mediation. For example
Qatar got support from Israel for its candidacy for a seat at the UN Security Council but
Qatars voting record was less than supportive to Israel.12
Qatar is also promoting regional integration and is a founding and active member of
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Border problems have been settled with Saudi
Arabia in 1999 and with Bahrain in 2001. It also supported the Dolphin project, a gas
integration initiative initially planned to link all the GCC countries but finally limited to
the supply of natural gas from Qatar to the UAE and Oman through a gas pipeline, with
the aim of developing political and economic ties among the participating countries
rather than for commercial reasons.13
The peninsula is positioned between the two hegemonies of the region: Saudi
Arabia and Iran. While Saudi Arabias ambitions are balanced within regional
integration and the GCC, Irans ambitions are balanced through US presence. But Qatar

11

(Roberts, Qatar's search for security, 2009)

(Rabi, 2007) ; Qatar also strongly condemned the Israelian invasion in south Lebanon while
pro-western states like Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt remained quiet, not willing to support the
Iranian-backed Hezbollah (Cooper & Momani, 2010)
13
(Dargin, The Ties that Bind: The Dolphin Project and Intra-GCC relations, 2009)
12

is also tightening its relations with Iran around their common interests in the production
of hydrocarbons as they share one of the biggest off-shore gas fields of the world. Qatar
also constantly promotes dialogue with Iran to disarm potential conflicts, inviting
Ahmadinejad to a GCC meeting in 2007 and using its 2006-2007 UN Security Council
seat to disagree to pressure Iran on nuclear proliferation. Its ties with Iran are also
strengthening along with its financial support to Hezbollah and Hamas.14
Qatars diplomacy is oriented towards the formation of alliances, the balancing of
powers and the stabilization of the region, trying to keep everybody happy and to avoid
conflicts that would threaten its survival.15

3.2 Political Economy

Qatar is the worlds largest exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and has the
worlds third largest gas reserve and the worlds 14th largest oil reserve. The IMF
computed in 2010 a GDP per capita of 84000 USD, the highest in the world. Qatar had
achieved growth rates of 17% in 2007 and 13% in 2008. Despite the global financial
crisis, GDP growth remained at an impressive 9% in 2009.
Qatar is using its gas as a tool for foreign policy, for example to strengthen regional
political relations with its neighbours through the Dolphin project or through LNG
supply to Kuwait. Being an important supplier of gas for various countries around the
world increases also the interests of these countries in Qatars security. For example,
UK will receive 25% of its gas from Qatar by 2012. It is also a key supplier for big
Asian consumers like Japan, Korea and Singapore and for emerging ones like China and
India, all having interests in Qatars security for their energy needs.
Through its sovereign funds, Qatar is also investing its wealth in western
companies16, increasing its influence on the global scale. It also has interests in China
and Indonesia and has construction projects all around the Middle East, investing for
example 350 Million USD for a tourism project in Syria.17
Internally, Qatar liberalized its economy and is positioning itself as an open climate
for foreign investments18. This is part of an ambitious plan to prepare the post-

14

(Cooper & Momani, 2010)

(Worth, July 8, 2008)
16
like the US electric car manufacturer Fisker, the Barclays bank, Credit Suisse, Santander,
Volkswagen, the Britains third-biggest supermarket chain Sainsburry, Londons Canary Wharf,
Harrods and it recently bought the Hollywood film production company Miramax (The
Economist, 2010)
17
(Roberts, Developing an Agenda for Security Studies in the Gulf - Qatari Mediation, 2010)
18
It opened competition in the Telecom sector, ending the monopoly of state-owned Q-Tel and
seeing Vodafone entering the market
15

hydrocarbons era, working to develop a knowledge-based economy. For this, it has to

attract the best brains and the best companies, in competition with the other countries of
the region. Some state-run companies enjoy monopoly but feel more and more pressure
for privatization and liberalization19, and most infrastructure projects are public-private
partnerships. Encouraging strongly Foreign Direct Investments also increases the
interests of origin states in the security of Qatar as a lot of projects are financed through
national export credit agencies or by loans on the international financial markets. For
example, RasGas and QatarGas have been set up and are operated under Public Private
Partnerships, involving foreign companies like Total, Exxon or Shell.
Its active mediation policy also opens the road to new business initiatives,
tightening relationships with other governments and enhancing Qatars economic reach
and diversification. Some argues that the mediation effort in Sudan was related to the
access to new food markets in order to ensure food security through future investments
in the country.20
Since 1995, Qatar has liberalized its economy and developed partnerships with
foreign companies, encouraging investments in infrastructure projects and oil business.
It also trades LNG around the world and is now developing a knowledge-based
economy in order to prepare for the post-gas era. It is fully integrated in the global
economy.

3.3 Internal changes

The countrys extensive wealth works against the creation of political opposition.
The main opposition is coming from the conservative-religious circles which are
against the liberalization and the relations of the country with Israel and the US. Most
internal problems are related to the expatriate staff, coming mainly from the South and
South-East Asia.
Right after the seizure of the power by Sheikh Hamad in 1995, a series of changes
were progressively implemented, like the creation of Al-Jazeera or the organization of
the first elections for the Central Municipal Council21 in 1999, in which women were
both allowed to vote and be elected. The first woman was elected in 2003 and three
have been elected in 2009. In 2003, the Emir appointed a woman for being Minister of
Education, a premiere in the Persian Gulf. A new constitution was approved in 2003,
formalizing a power sharing system between the executive, the legislative and the
judicial powers, but also stating that Qatar is a kingdom to be ruled by the Al Thani

19

(Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2009)

(Roberts, Developing an Agenda for Security Studies in the Gulf - Qatari Mediation, 2010)
21
which has an advisory role to the Ministry of Municipal and Agricultural Affairs
20

family. Today the power is hold by the Emir who appoints all the Ministers and the 45
members of the Advisory Council, somewhat similar to a Parliament. According to the
new constitution, 2/3 should be elected but elections have been constantly postponed
until nowadays.
The Emir promoted also the opening to other religious beliefs and even granted the
terrain on which the first Catholic Church of the country was built in 2008. Churches
and temples for Hindus, Buddhists and Bahais are projected and an Anglican Center is
under construction22. However, the Sunni Qatari majority remain uncomfortable with
the Shia minority, a common characteristic of the Gulf monarchies which fear Irans
influence in their territory.
Various institutions have been set up, promoting education, art and reforms, like the
Qatar Foundation, the Conference on Democracy and Reform and the Arab Foundation
for Democracy. The new foreign policy of Qatar, its new status on the international
scene and the new institutions contributed to create a national identity, an important
asset in the context of important immigrants flux and Irans rise in the region. This new
national identity should help Qatar to cement its citizens around the current structure of
the state.
Although not free, the country is engaged in a series of democratic reforms, giving
space for women and religious freedom. It is showing a new face of the Middle-East to
the world, enhancing its position within the international liberal society.

3.4 Adhesion to Multilateral Organizations

Multilateral institutions, with one country one vote structure, are adequate
organizations for a small state to leverage its power. Adhering to multilateral regimes
and other forums is also a basic element of integration in the International Society of
States, and Qatar indeed adhered to the traditional international regimes23, being an
active member in some of them. It hosted the famous Doha round in 2001 and the
Organization of Islamic Conference in 2003. It obtained a non-permanent seat at the UN
Security Council from 2005 to 2007 and used it to further develop its independent
foreign policy. Qatar is also a founding member of the GCC and part of the G-77.
At the image of its growing status in global affairs, Qatar joined the Global
Redesigning Initiative of the World Economic Forum, a channel to consolidate the

22

(Blanchard, 2007)
Qatar is member of ABEDA, AFESD, AL, AMF, ESCWA, FAO, G-77, GCC, IAEA, IBRD,
ICAO, ICRM, IDB, IFAD, IFRCS, IHO (pending member), ILO, IMF, International Maritime
Organization, Interpol, IOC, NAM, OAPEC, OIC, OPCW, OPEC, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO,
UNIDO, UPU, WCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, and WTO
23

views of small states in order to pressure the G-20 and draw its attention to their
concerns. It is a significant example of Qatars willingness to take a leadership role
within International Organizations.
Qatar also participated in UN peace-keeping missions, particularly in Lebanon.
After the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, most of the Arab states were
willing to keep away from participation to avoid showing support to the Iranian-backed
organization, while Qatar provided 300 troops for the UN mission24. It was a strong
commitment in that context, reflecting an unorthodox policy and the existing tights with
Iran. This move facilitated the contribution of Indonesia and Turkey to the UN force.
Recently, Qatar participated also in the intervention in Libya, under a UN mandate and
with Arab support as the no-fly zone was called by the Arab League25.
There are also regular speculations around the creation of a cartel of gas producers,
a kind of gas-OPEC, in which Qatar would occupy a significant place as being the
biggest exporter of LNG. It would comprises Russia, Iran, Qatar, Venezuela and
Algeria, controlling 73% of worlds gas reserve and 42% of its production, but
traditional obstacles to this organization remains: long-term contracts environment and
reliance on capital intensive gas pipelines.26
Qatar demonstrated a very active participation in the International Organizations
and is recognized as responsible and constructive member of these.

3.5 Niche Diplomacy

In order to differentiate itself from its neighbours and build a reason for its very
own existence in the International System, Qatar deployed a multi-dimensional
mediation strategy in the Middle-East and in other parts of the world, positioning itself
as a neutral state, able to speak with all the stakeholders of a conflict thanks to its
relations with all the parties. It also uses its wealth to increase the chance of success of
its mediation efforts, from offering unlimited support for talks in Doha to promising aid
or investments, and even sometimes by offering personal gifts for delegation members
in case of success.27
Qatar mediated various conflicts, for example in Morocco, in Indonesia, in Darfur,
in Yemen, between the Fatah and the Hamas in Palestine... It acted sometimes as an
intermediary between Israel and the Arab world, or between Hamas and the US and
Israel. The biggest success of Qatari mediation happened in 2008, when it broke a peace

24

(The Economist, 7th Sep 2006)

(Roberts, Punching Above Its Weight, 2011)
26
(Dargin, Qatar's Natural Gas: The Foreign Policy Driver, 2007)
27
(Roberts, Developing an Agenda for Security Studies in the Gulf - Qatari Mediation, 2010)
25

10

deal for Lebanon, known as the Doha Agreement. For 18 months, various mediators
like France, the Arab League, or Saudi Arabia28 tried to resolve the conflicts between
the Hezbollah and other Lebanese factions, without success. The neutral position of
Qatar, without any particular interests in the conflict but with ties and capacity to talks
with all the parties from Iran to the US, was a key element of the mediation which
resulted in a power-deal between the different Lebanese factions, a major success of
Qatars Diplomacy.29
Qatar, through its niche diplomacy, is defining a new space between the alignment
with the West and the traditional Arab Nationalism30, positioning itself as a kind of
Norway of the region: neutral, not threatening anyone, active in mediation with the
financial capabilities to back up its ambitions. However, it is also a risk-taker, mediating
in some areas where success was not certain. For example its action in Eritrea led
Ethiopia to break off relations with Qatar, telling that it was a source of instability in the
region.31
This Niche Diplomacy strategy helped to shape the position of Qatar on the global
scene, building a rationale for its existence and relative importance in the International
System.

3.6 Insertion in the Global Society

The most interesting tool of Qatar to integrate the global civil society is the creation
of the Al-Jazeera TV network in 1996. The government provided the original funding of
147 Millions USD and ensures most of the channels revenues32. Al-Jazeera born as a
free media compared to the regional standards, addressing controversial themes in the
Middle-East. It became an instrument of protection for Qatar, a way to promote its
independence, a tool to affirm its Islamic credentials and also a political tool to use
against its neighbours.33 It is quite a controversial channel, regularly criticized by the
US and by the countries of the region as most of them already raised official claims
against the channel, leading sometimes to the repatriation of their ambassadors in
protest to some programs34. All these critics increased the popularity of the network
within the Arab Streets, network that is playing a crucial role in the on-going Arab
Spring of 2011. The fact that Qatar is an open channel giving voice to Islamists as well

28

Which always supported the Hariri family

(Roberts, Developing an Agenda for Security Studies in the Gulf - Qatari Mediation, 2010)
30
(Cooper & Momani, 2010)
31
(Worth, July 8, 2008)
32
Advertising only covers 35 to 40% of operational expenses (Blanchard, 2007)
33
(Roberts, Developing an Agenda for Security Studies in the Gulf - Qatari Mediation, 2010)
34
Like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia
29

11

as dissidents, rebels, US officials and even Israeli, works as a mirror of Qatari mediation
strategy: it strengthens the diplomacy effort of the country and increases the image of
neutrality and impartiality for mediation. Indeed, the name of Qatar is constantly
associated to the media with This is Al-Jazeera, in direct from Doha. However, even
if being free in its editorial line regarding other countries, Al-Jazeera still exercises
some degree of self-censorship35, particularly regarding the Emir and his close family.
Qatar founded in 1995 the Qatar Foundation, chaired by the second wife of the
Emir. This foundation is at the origin of the Doha Debate36, a free forum in which
political and cultural questions of interests for the Arab community are addressed in a
free debate, turning Doha the platform of free expression in the Arab world. The Qatar
Foundation invested also heavily in education and founded the Education City in
2003, a modern complex built to host famous foreign universities37 which attract more
than 50 nationalities. All this integrate Qatar in the network of global education and
knowledge, a key asset for developing the post-gas economy and attract the best brains.
Qatar had also a very ambitious program to develop culture by building top-class
museums, like the Museum of Islamic Art designed by Pei, famous for the Pyramid of
the Louvres in France. It hosted also the Tribeca film festival and established a branch
of Sothebys auction house in Doha.
Qatar also uses humanitarian and international aid as a way to integrate the global
society. It gave for example 100 MUSD for the victims of Katrina, sent substantive aid
for reconstruction of South Lebanon after the attacks of Israel in 2006 and transferred
22 Millions USD to the Hamas to pay salaries in the public service after Israel attacked
Gaza in 2008. Also, right after the Doha Agreement in 2008, Qatar sent 300 Millions
USD for the reconstruction of Lebanon. It also intervened in the Bulgarian nurses affair
in Libya and allegedly paid around 460 Millions USD to the victims in order to secure
the release of the nurses.38
It developed also a strong business around the MICE industries (meetings,
incentives, conference and exhibitions), highlighting its competency, establishing links
with corporations and business men from various industries around the world. It has
become a hotspot for international conferences, attracting a wide and diverse variety of

35

Formal censorship in the media was abolished in 1995 right after Sheikh Hamad took power
Broadcasted by BBC World News
37
Virginia Commonwealth University in Qatar School of the Arts, Weill Cornell Medical
College in Qatar, Texas A&M University at Qatar, Carnegie Mellon University in Qatar,
Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, Northwestern University in Qatar,
University College London in Qatar
38
(Roberts, Developing an Agenda for Security Studies in the Gulf - Qatari Mediation, 2010)
36

12

global events.39 It worked for the promotion of sport, organizing the Asian games and
holding major annual tournaments of cycling, tennis and golf. It won the bid for
organizing the world cup 2022 and the Qatiri bin Hammam, actual president of the
Asian federation, is currently running for the FIFA presidency.
Finally, the expatriate staffs working in Qatar represents 80 to 85% of the
population and creates naturally links between Qatar and their countries of origin,
particularly true for India.
Beside its insertion in the global economy, Qatar is also part of the global society as
a result of various initiatives led by the government. Al-Jazeera is a formidable
ambassador which also gives access to the large community of the international media.
Investing a lot in education, culture and sports, Qatar is putting itself on the map of
these different networks. Winning the organization of the World Cup will probably
transform the country. The international aid and charity as well as its meditation efforts
help also to integrate the networks of NGOs related to humanitarian help and conflicts
resolution which are important political levers on the international scene.

3.7 Qatar: a new Brand

All the previous elements show that Qatar developed a smart strategy to position
itself on the map. It raised its status both in the region and on the international level. Its
Niche Diplomacy build on peaceful mediations gives Qatar a special edge within the
Global Society, building the image of a peaceful member promoting conflicts
resolution, delivering aid and seeking to resolve differences. Al-Jazeera has a
recognition value all over the world and plays in favour of Qatars public diplomacy. It
liberalized its economy and welcomes foreign investments while its status of largest
LNG exporter creates economic ties with major importers, both in Asia and in Western
countries. The modernization of the state and the on-going liberalization of its society
make Qatar an appealing country in a region which is mostly conservative.
Its brand is a modern, business-oriented, attractive, stable, neutral, progressive and
reliable partner.40 It makes Qatar a better place for foreign investments in the region,
attracting capital, technology and skills required to develop its post-gas economy. The
Brand Qatar creates a comparative advantage to other countries in the region in terms of
future development.

39
40

13

(Roberts, Punching Above Its Weight, 2011)

(Peterson, Autumn 2006)

4. How Qatar fits in the Arab Revolutions?

After the Cold War, the actual Emir took power through a bloodless coup and
started the modernization of the country as well as its deeper integration within the new
global context. He ensured the security of the peninsula through agreements with the
US, which gave him the space to start an independent policy, firstly within the region
and later on a global scale. Qatar has been able to attract international financing and
expertise to develop its off-shore gas fields and became an important supplier of gas for
various countries. It is branding itself and is offering its citizens a new national identity
based on the new direction the country is taking, a kind of Qatar Experience, unique
in the Middle-East.
The wealth of Qatar and its ruling structure co-opting social groups and classes,
along with on-going internal reforms, created a very stable system with very little
domestic opposition41. In that context, the foreign policy of Qatar is not challenged at
home and therefore the Emir has all latitude to lead diplomacy without fearing internal
pressures. This is a great asset that allowed Qatar to develop unorthodox solutions for
its global insertion, enhancing its global reach and gaining increasing recognition as
well as support from both regional hegemonies and global powers. Economic transition
from a pure rent-based economy to a more knowledge-based and services oriented
economy is also on its way.
The Arab Revolutions that are taking place in various countries of the region dont
find the same resonance in Qatar. As explained, there is no internal dissident and the
only disagreed group would be the conservative side fearing the liberalization of the
society. Also, the tools for improving democracy are in place and the government has
just to trigger them to mitigate possible revolts. Indeed, as early as 1995, the Emir
started to take various actions to open the way to some democracy, abolishing the
Ministry of Information, creating Al-Jazeera and programming political reforms, all this
in a peaceful way as there was no internal nor strong external pressures for these
changes.
However, the political transition in Qatar has always been a violent process based
on bloodless coup dtat within the Al Thani family: instability in the Middle-East
might be an opportunity to overthrow Sheikh Hamad. Indeed some rumours circulated
in March 2011 about a coup attempted against the regime. Anyway, in order to follow
the wave of democratization and anticipate possible protests like in Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain, two other Gulf Monarchies and members of the GCC, the Prime Minister
announced that the elections for the Advisory Council will be organized soon. In that

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(Darwich, 2011)

sense, the clear advantage of Qatar is that the structure for reforms was ready, being
able to propose an advance in democracy in a known framework, without threatening
the actual structure of power. One can say that the Arab Revolutions will have very
limited impact inside of Qatar. The government also clearly explained what the long
term strategy for the country is and how it is all about the development of Qatari human
capital.
On the other hand, the position of Qatar in the region might evolve towards a
greater leadership, as it did in Libya. Indeed, the multilateral intervention required Arab
involvement in order to catalyze regional support and Qatar took the lead within the
region, under the mandate of the International Community (UN resolution) and the Arab
League (calling for a no-fly zone). It is also branding itself as an example of how Arab
regimes could evolve. Its large relations and contacts could also serve private
diplomacy, aiming at finding solutions for regimes in difficulties. Participating in
transition solutions within the countries could also offer Qatar some future business
opportunities, like for example the marketing of oil controlled by Libyans rebels42.
However, Qatar remains a small state in the region and its ties with other regimes,
particularly Gulf monarchies, could threaten its image of a peace builder country. In
particular, its support to the repression in Bahrain and to the Saudi action in that country
could be difficult to manage in terms of image if it had to repeat.
Without threatening too much its internal stability, the Arab Revolutions offer a
great opportunity for Qatar to enhance its position both among its regional peers but
also among global powers as they are trying to drive emergent regimes to the liberal
international society, which Qatar started to embrace in 1995 with some success.

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(Roberts, Punching Above Its Weight, 2011)

5. Bibliography
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Cooper, A., & Momani, B. (2010). Qatar and expanded contours of Small State
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Darwich, M. (2011). Political Stability: the mysterious case of Qatar. Middle East
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York Times .

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