DUE PROCESS

the scope of police power

1 Villegas vs Hiu Chong

G.R. No. L-29646, November 10, 1978
Facts:
Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 prohibits aliens from beinge m p l o y e d
or to engage or participate in any position or occupation
o r business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or
casual,without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of
Manila andpaying the permit fee of P50.00.

(2) Whether or Not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation that
infringes property rights.

Issue:
W h e t h e r o r n o t O rd i n a n c e N o. 6 5 3 7 o f t h e C i t y o f M a n i l a
v i o l a t e s the due process of law and equal protection rule of the
Constitution.
Held:
Yes. The ordinance violates the due process of law and equalprotection rule
of the Constitution.Re q u i r i n g a p e r s o n b e f o re h e c a n b e e m p l o y e d
t o g e t a p e rm i t f ro m t h e City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or
refuse it at will is tantamount todenying him the basic right of the people in
the Philippines to engage in am e a n s o f l i v e l i h o o d . W h i l e i t i s t r u e
that the Philippines as a State is notobliged to admit aliens
w i t h i n i t s t e rr i t o r y , o n c e a n a l i e n i s a d m i t t e d , h e c a n n o t
b e d e p r i v e d o f l i f e w i t h o u t d u e p ro c e s s o f l a w. T h i s
g u a r a n t e e includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection
under the dueprocess and equal protection clause is given to all persons,
both aliens andcitizens.
2 Kwong Sing Vs. City Of Manila [41 Phil 103; G.R. No. 15972; 11
Oct 1920]
Facts: Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who
has general and the same interest, filed a complaint for
a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiffs also questioned the validity of
enforcing Ordinance No. 532 by the city of Manila. Ordinance No. 532
requires that the receipt be in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed
showing the kind and number of articles delivered by laundries and dyeing
and cleaning establishments. The permanentinjunction was denied by the
trial court. The appellants claim is thatOrdinance No. 532 savors of class
legislation; putting in mind that they are Chinese nationals. It unjustly
discriminates between persons in similar circumstances; and that it
constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property rights. They also contest
that the enforcement of the legislation is an act beyond the scope of their
police power. In view of the foregoing, this is an appeal with the Supreme
Court.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act beyond

Held: Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are

permissible under the police power. The police power of the City ofManila
to enact Ordinance No. 532 is based on Section 2444, paragraphs (l) and
(ee) of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2744, authorizes
the municipal board of the city of Manila, with the approval of the mayor of
the city:
(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following: xxxx
xxxxxlaundries xxxx.
(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the
sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion
of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants.
The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid
disputes between laundrymen and their patrons and to protect customers of
laundries who are not able to decipher Chinese characters from being
defrauded. (Considering that in the year 1920s, people of Manila are more
familiar with Spanish and maybe English.)
In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that
theordinance invades no fundamental right, and impairs no
personalprivilege. Under the guise of police regulation, an attempt is not
made to violate personal property rights. The ordinance is neither
discriminatory nor unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public
laundries without distinction, whether they belong to Americans, Filipinos,
Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without exception, and each every one
of them without distinction, must comply with theordinance. The obvious
objection for the implementation of theordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of
the Administrative Code. Although, an additional burden will be imposed on
the business and occupation affected by the ordinance such as that of the
appellant by learning even a few words in Spanish or English, but mostly
Arabic numbers in order to properly issue a receipt, it seems that the same
burdens are cast upon the them. Yet, even if private rights of person or
property are subjected to restraint, and even if loss will result to individuals
from the enforcement of the ordinance, this is not sufficient ground for
failing to uphold the power of the legislative body. The very foundation of
the police power is the control of private interests for the public welfare.
Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the petition for
a preliminary injunction is denied, with costs against the appellants.

3 Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad

Facts

Act No. 2972 (An act to provide in what languages account books shall be
kept, and to establish penalties for its violation), also known as the Chinese
Bookkeeping Act, was passed by the Philippine Legislature and approved in
1921. It provides:

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, company, or

partnership or corporation engaged in commerce, industry or any other

activity for the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with
existing law, to keep its account books in any language other than English,
Spanish, or any local dialect.
Section 2. Any person violating the provisions of this act shall, upon
conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than ten thousand pesos, or

by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both.

Yu Cong Eng, a Chinese merchant, keeps the books of account of his lumber
business in Chinese, as he cannot read, write nor understand English,
Spanish, or any local dialect. He was arrested for violating Act No. 2972, and
his books were seized.

Trial was about to proceed when Yu Cong Eng and another petitioner Co
Liam (on behalf of all other Chinese merchants in the Philippines) filed a
petition against the fiscal, the collector of internal revenue, and the
presiding judge.
Arguments

A literal translation of the Act makes it unlawful for any Chinese

merchant to keep his account books in languages other than those listed
Another interpretation of the Act is that the Chinese merchant may
keep his account books in Chinese, but he has to keep another set of books
in the prescribed languages
A third construction is that the law only intended to require the
keeping of such books to facilitate governmental inspection of the same for
tax purposes. However, the law does not specify what kinds of books shall
be kept.
The Act is not unconstitutional under the Courts construction of the
law. A literal interpretation would render it unconstitutional, so the Court
made a reasonable construction to preserve the law.
A writ of certiorari was filed before the U.S. Supreme Court to review the
Philippine Supreme Courts decision denying an original petition for
prohibition against the enforcement of criminal prosecution of Act No. 2972,
on the ground of its invalidity.
Issues

WON the PH SC made a valid construction of Act No. 2972. NO

WON Act No. 2972 is unconstitutional. YES

By the petitioner
Even if he would employ a bookkeeper who could keep his
books in English or Spanish, he would have no means of verifying the
correctness of the books. If he would employ a translator or interpreter,
he might be at the mercy of his employees if they might cheat and defraud
him. According to the Act, he is prohibited from even keeping a duplicate set
of accounts in his own language and he will be compelled to remain in total
ignorance of the status of his business.

The enforcement of the Act would drive several Chinese

merchants out of business (They do 60% of the business in the country).

The enforcement of the Act would deprive the Chinese

merchants of their liberty and property without due process of law, and
deny them the equal protection of the laws.

Under the treaty in force between US and China, petitioners

are entitled to the same rights, privileges, and immunities as the citizens
and subjects of Great Britain and Spain.

The law is valid and necessary, and it is only the exercise of

proper legislative power. Due to the inability of internal revenue officials to
check the books of the Chinese merchants, the treasury loses large sums of
money corresponding to taxes.
Pronouncements of the Philippine Court

By the respondent

Issue # 1
WON the PH SC made a valid construction of Act No. 2972. NO
It is the duty of a court in considering the validity of an act to give it such
reasonable construction as can be reached to bring it within the
fundamental law. However, a court may not exercise legislative functions to
save the law from conflict with constitutional limitation.
What the court did was to change a penal prohibitive law to a mandatory
law of great indefiniteness to conform to what the court assumes was, or
ought to have been, the purpose of the legislature, and which in the change
would avoid a conflict with constitutional restriction. Such strained
construction, in order to make a law conform to a constitutional limitation,
cannot be sustained.
It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large
enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step
inside and say who could be rightfully detained and who should be set at

large. This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative
department of the government. (US v. Reese)
Issue # 2
WON Act No. 2972 is unconstitutional. YES
The law is invalid because it deprives Chinese persons of their liberty and
property without due process of law, and denies them the equal
protection of the laws.
Guarantees equivalent to the due process and equal protection clauses of
the 14th Amendment were extended to the PH; hence, said guarantees are
to be interpreted as meaning what the provisions meant at the time when
Congress made them applicable to the PH. (Serra v. Mortiga, citing Kepner v.
US)
PH government may make every reasonable requirement of its taxpayers to
keep records of their transactions. However, it is NOT within the police
power of the legislature to prohibit Chinese merchants from maintaining a
set of books in Chinese.
To justify the state in interposing its authority in behalf of the public, 1)
the interests of the publicrequire such interference and 2) the means are
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not oppressive upon
individuals. The determination as to what is a proper exercise of the
legislatures police power is subject to the courts supervision. (Lawton v.
Steel)
We are likely thus to trespass on the provision of the Bill of Rights that the
accused is entitled to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, and to violate the principle that a statute which requires the
doing of an act so indefinitely described that men must guess at its
meaningviolates due process of law.
Act No. 2972 deprives the Chinese merchants of something indispensable to
the carrying on of their business, and is obviously intended to affect them
(as distinguished from the rest of the community) is a denial of the equal
protection of the laws.
JUDGMENT REVERSED. ACT NO. 2972 IS INVALID.
4 Ichong v Hernandez
5 Layno v Sandiganbayan
HERNANDO C. LAYNO, SR., petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and
THE HONORABLE TANODBAYAN, respondents.
Cecilio L. Pe for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

The validity of the mandatory provision of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, 1 suspending from office any public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under such statute, is
assailed in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding on the ground that it is
violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence. 2 Petitioner
Hernando Layno Sr.. is the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Lianga, Surigao
del Sur. He was accused in an information filed by respondent Tanodbayan
"of grave abuse of authority and evident bad faith in the exercise of his
official and/or administrative duties" for "knowing fully well that he has no
authority," he suspended and prohibited Vice-Mayor Bernardita Resus and
three Sangguniang Bayan members 3 from participating and exercising their
official functions" as such thus causing them injury "consisting of the
salaries due to said officials not [being] received by them." 4
The information against petitioner was filed by respondent Tanodbayan with
respondent Sandiganbayan on May 17, 1983. 5 He was charged with
violating paragraph (e), Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 as
amended. 6Petitioner was then arraigned on October 3, 1983, and he
pleaded not guilty. 7 There was earlier submitted as far back as August,
1983 with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente
Lite. 8 Notwithstanding petitioner's opposition to such motion, respondent
Sandiganbayan suspended him on October 26, 1983. 9Accordingly, on
October 3, 4 and 5, 1983, respondent Sandiganbayan conducted hearings
and received evidence of the prosecution. 10 It was further alleged that
respondent Sandiganbayan (Second Division) set the case for further
hearings on January 11, 12, and 13, 1984. 11
In the resolution issued by this Court on January 5, 1984, respondents were
required to file an answer within ten days from notice. That was done. There
was on the whole admission that the facts were as alleged. Respondents
denied, however, that the law is as set forth in the petition. More
specifically, it was asserted that the order of the Sandiganbayan
"suspending petitioner pendente lite does not violate the latter's
constitutional right to be presumed innocent." 12 Such a presumption "is a
guaranty that no person shall be convicted of a crime except upon his guilt
[being] established by proof beyond reasonable doubt." 13 Accordingly, such
suspension "does not impair petitioner's foregoing constitutional right since
the same is not a penalty or a criminal punishment, because it was not
imposed by the court in a judgment of conviction or as a result of judicial
proceeding." 14 Further: "The suspension is merely a precautionary or
preventive measure issued even before the case is tried on its merits,
purposely to ensure the fair and just trial of the case." 15

The plea for restraining order was not granted by this Court. Thereafter the
memoranda by both parties were submitted. Before a decision could be
rendered on the merits, there was an urgent motion to lift the order of
suspension filed on February 13, 1985 stressing the need for a resolution of
such question. This Court, after dealing on such motion as wen as on the
merits of the case, is of the view that this petition need not be resolved by a
ruling on the validity of the provision on mandatory suspension. It suffices at
this stage that this Court rules that there is an unconstitutional application
of the assailed provision of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
1. A succinct statement of the doctrine on unconstitutional application was
set forth in Pintacasi v. Court of Agrarian Relations 16 in these words: "A law
may be valid and yet susceptible to the charge of its being
unconstitutionally applied." 17 This is one such case.
2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur.
His term of office does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information
and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full
discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected
precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. It is a
basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage
that the people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their
choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be
proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In
either case, his culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a
criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of
innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance,
however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question.
For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold
office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice
suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise
on the people of Lianga. They were deprived of the services of the man they
had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo,
the protracted continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the
bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process
is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that
the order of suspension should be lifted.
3. Nor is it solely the denial of procedural due process that is apparent.
There is likewise an equal protection question. If the case against petitioner
Layno were administrative in character the Local Government Code would
be applicable. It is therein clearly provided that while preventive suspension
is allowable for the causes therein enumerated, there is this emphatic
limitation on the duration thereof: "In all cases, preventive suspension shall

not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension." 18 It may be
recalled that the principle against indefinite suspension applies equally to
national government officials. So it was held in the leafing case of Garcia v.
Hon. Executive Secretary. 19 According to the opinion of Justice Barrera: "To
adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed by the President,
facing administrative charges, can be preventively suspended indefinitely,
would be to countenance a situation where the preventive suspension can,
in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due hearing,
contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution and the Civil Service
law." 20 Further: "In the guise of a preventive suspension, his term of office
could be shortened and he could in effect, be removed without a finding of a
cause duly established after due hearing, in violation of the
Constitution." 21 Clearly then, the policy of the law mandated by the
Constitution frowns at a suspension of indefinite duration. In this particular
case, the mere fact that petitioner is facing a charge under the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act does not justify a different rule of law. To do so
would be to negate the safeguard of the equal protection guarantee.
4. Hence the conclusion reached by the Court as to the unconstitutional
application of the mandatory suspension as applied to petitioner in
accordance with the circumstances of this case.
WHEREFORE, this certiorari petition is granted and the preventive
suspension imposed on petitioner Hernando C. Layno, Sr. is set aside, thus
enabling him to assume once again the functions of municipal mayor of
Lianga, Surigao del Sur, without prejudice to the continuance of the trial of
the pending case against him in the Sandiganbayan. This decision is
immediately executory. No costs.

6 El Banco Espaol-Filipino vs Vicente Palanca

Judicial Due Process Requisites
Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as
security to his debt. His debt amounted to P218,294.10. His property is
worth 75k more than what he owe. Due to the failure of Engracio to make
his payments, El Banco executed an instrument to mortgage Engracios
property. Engracio however left for China and he never returned til he died.
Since Engracio is a non resident El Banco has to notify Engracio about their
intent to sue him by means of publication using a newspaper. The lower
court further orderdd the clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and that
itd be sent to Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El Banco petition
to execute Engracios property. 7 years thereafter, Vicente surfaced on
behalf of Engracio as his administrator to petition for the annulment of the

ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no due process as Engracio
never received the summons.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not observed.
HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for
judicial due process had been met. The requisites are;
1.
2.
3.
4.

There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial

power to hear and decide the matter before it.
Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the
defendant or over the property subject of the proceedings.
The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.
Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.

7 Ynot v IAC
8 People vs. Beriales, et al.
Facts: A case of three men who were charged for the murder of Saturnina on
Sept. 13, 1974. During the hearing on Nov. 26, 1974, upon motion of the
defense the Court ordered the re-investigation of the case pending
submission of the Fiscal of its reports. Couple of postponements was made
until Dec. 13, 1974 hearing when the Court proceeded with the arraignment
and trial in the absence of the Fiscal and its report on re-investigation, and
over the disagreement of the defense. The CFI of Leyte relied on the private
prosecutor being authorized by the Fiscal to present evidence and the
defense presumed to have waived its right over its disagreement. Trial then
proceeded and the 3 found guilty of he offense. Thus, this appeal on the
constitutional requirement of due process.
Issue: Whether or not due process of law had been observed.
Held: Constitutional due process was violated, thus, case remanded to CFI
for arraignment and trial. Court should have held in abeyance the trial while
the report on e-investigation was still pending. Consistent disregard of the
defense objection on the arraignment, trial, presentation of private
prosecutors evidence, and rendition of judgment violates due process.
Prosecutor or Fiscal entrusted with the investigation is duty bound to take
charge until final termination. They shall have direction and control of the
criminal prosecution over private prosecutors.
9 Ang Tibay v CIR
Ang Tibay vs Court of Industrial Relations
on November 6, 2010
Due Process Admin Bodies CIR

TeodoroToribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company which

supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio
caused the lay off of members of National Labor Union Inc. NLU averred that
Toribios act is not valid as it is not within the CBA. That there are two labor
unions in Ang Tibay; NLU and National Workers Brotherhood. That NWB is
dominated by Toribio hence he favors it over NLU. That NLU wishes for a
new trial as they were able to come up with new evidence/documents that
they were not able to obtain before as they were inaccessible and they were
not able to present it before in the CIR.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process of law.
HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. The SC
ruled that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process. They are;
(1)
The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested
or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2)
Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case
and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but
the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3)
While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide
right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of
having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing
to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4)
Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion but the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
(5)
The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected.
(6)
The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must
act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at
a decision.
(7)
The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can

know the vario issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.
The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred
upon it.

Impt Point: It illustrates how decrees & issuances issued by one man
Marcosare in fact laws of genl application & provide for penalties. The
constitution afforded Marcos both executive & legislative powers.

10 Tanada v Tuvera

The generality of law (CC A14) will never work w/o constructive notice. The
ruling of this case provides the publication constitutes the necessary
constructive notice & is thus the cure for ignorance as an excuse.

Nature: Petition to review the decision of the Executive Assistant to the

President.

Ignorance will not even mitigate the crime.

Facts: Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public
concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 constitution,
petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette, of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. The
respondents would have this case dismissed on the ground that petitioners
have no legal personality to bring this petition. Petitioners maintain that
since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to
compel public duty, they need not show any specific interest. Respondents
further contend that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement
for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates.
Issue: WON publication in the Official Gazatte is an indispensable
requirement for the effectivity of the PDs, LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc.
where laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.
Held: Yes. It is the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern
& corollarily access to official records, & to documents & papers pertaining
to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizens
subject to such limitation as may be provided by law (6 AIV, 1973
Constitution). Laws, to be valid & enforceable, must be published in the OG
or otherwise effectively promulgated. The fact that a PD or LOI states its
date of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the OG as they
constitute important legislative acts. The publication of presidential
issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of
due process. Before a person may be bound by law, he must first be
officially informed of its contents.
Judgment: Respondents ordered to publish in Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances of general application, and unless so
published shall have no binding force and effect.

11 Perez v Subido
In this appeal from a decision finding for the petitioner in a mandamus suit,
the appellants pose the legal issue: Has the respondent Commissioner of
Civil Service the power and authority to invalidate ex-parte the examination
papers of petitioner, cancel his eligibility (as patrolman) derived therefrom,
and eventually terminate his services as patrolman in the Manila Police
Department? Our answer is: No.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
In his application for the Patrolman Examinations held by the Civil Service
Commission on 24 November 1962, the petitioner-appellee, Tomas M. Perez,
answered "yes" to question No. 6, which reads as follows:
6. Have you ever been accused of, indicted for or tried for the violation of
any law, ordinance, or regulation, before any court, or have you ever been
charged with or tried for any breach or infraction of military, naval, or
constabulary discipline before any military, naval, or constabulary tribunal
or other authority?

Petitioner-appellee mentioned only two of the criminal cases of which he

had been charged but failed to mention two other cases, namely, attempted
corruption of a public official and gambling. These cases were dismissed
before he took the examinations. He was thus cleared by the pertinent
government offices and law-enforcing agencies. When he passed the
examinations, a character investigation and a six-month training course at
the Manila Police Academy, petitioner Perez was appointed by Mayor
Antonio Villegas of Manila as a probational patrolman of the Manila Police
Department on 27 May 1963, with a compensation of P2,400 per annum.
The respondent-appellant Commissioner of Civil Service approved the
appointment. On 1 January 1964, appellee was extended a permanent
appointment with a salary adjusted to P2,940 per annum. This appointment
and a subsequent promotion in salary to P3,300 per annum were also
approved by the respondent
Commissioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On 20 October 1965, however, the Commissioner of Civil Service addressed
a letter to the City Mayor informing him of the invalidation of the
examination papers of appellee because of his failure to state the two other
criminal cases of which he had been charged in his application to take the
examinations, the cancellation of his civil service eligibility and the
termination of his employment as patrolman in the Manila Police
Department. Perez requested a reconsideration but was denied. The City
Mayor found no ground upon which to proceed against Perez and did not
dismiss him but respondent Commissioner transmitted copies of his letter to
the mayor to the City Treasurer and the City Auditor who, thereafter, refused
to pay the salary of Perez.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
On 12 April 1966, Tomas M. Perez filed a petition for mandamus with the
Court of First Instance of Manila praying for the nullification of the order of
the respondent Commissioner of Civil Service and to compel the other
respondents City Treasurer and City Auditor to authorize and pay the
petitioner's salary.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
After trial bused on a stipulation of facts, the lower court granted the
petition by declaring as null and void the Commissioner's order terminating
the petitioner's employment and ordering the payment of his
salary.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Respondent Commissioner appealed to this Court on the point of law stated
at the beginning of this decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

The situation of petitioner-appellee Tomas M. Perez is not unlike, and, even

better than, the petitioner in the case of Abaya vs. Villegas, et al., L-25641,
17 December 1966 (18 Sup. Ct. Rep. Anno. 1034). Speaking through Justice
Conrado Sanchez, this Court stated in said case:
Two acts adverse to petitioner were done: Appellant Commissioner's
cancellation of his eligibility, and respondent Mayor's order of dismissal.
Concededly, however, there was no investigation prior to the cancellation of
petitioner's civil service eligibility and before he was eased out of the
service. Consequently, petitioner was denied due process.
On the first adverse act, this Court said:
We go to the controlling principle. Rule II, Article 4, of the Civil Service Rules,
in its proviso, reads:
That when an applicant for examination intentionally makes a false
statement of any material fact in his application, or practices or attempts to
practice any deception or fraud in connection with his examination, the
Commissioner shall invalidate his examination and such offense shall be
ground for his removal from the service.
The accent is on the word intentionally. The fact that petitioner made an
answer which is at war with the truth does not connote the idea that it was
intentionally made. Conceivably, situations may exist which could bring up
that answer to the level of one given in good faith. Without evidence, we are
loathe to tar and feather petitioner as a perjurer. Short of an inquiry which
proves that the false answer was intentionally made, we cannot attribute
thereto a meaning which would make a felon out of petitioner. It should then
go without saying that the vitality of the constitutional principle of due
process cannot be allowed to weaken by sanctioning cancellation of an
employee's civil service eligibility and/or his dismissal from service - without
hearing - upon adoubtful assumption that he has admitted his guilt for an
offense against civil service rules. It is pertinent here to recall that good
faith is always presumed. In the context just presented, we are constrained
to state that petitioner received less than a fair treatment. Due process, in
the end, merely is "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play".
And on the second adverse act, this Court said:
1. The constitutionally protected security of tenure: "[N]o officer or
employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause as provided by law".chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

Section 32 of the Civil Service Law of 1959 echoes this precept with the
provision that "[N]o officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed
or suspended except for cause as provided by law and after due process."
Said Section 32 adds that the officer or employee complained of "shall be
entitled to a formal investigation if he so desires, in which case, he shall
have the right to appear and defend himself at said investigation in person
or by counsel, to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and
to have the attendance of witnesses and production of documents in his
favor by compulsory process or subpoena or subpoena duces tecum." A civil
service employee should be heard before he is condemned. Jurisprudence
has clung to this rule with such unrelentless grasp that by now it would
appear trite to make citation thereof.

into by him and Hilario M. Andaya, Valente M. Andaya, and Calixta M.

Andaya on December 4, 1969, 1 while the petitioners Carmen Urbano and
Manuela Urbano claim title to a portion with an area of 1,500 sq.m. by virtue
of a contract, dated May 4, 1951, and denominated DEED OF TRANSFER OF
RIGHTS TO, INTERESTS IN AND POSSESSION OF A RESIDENTIAL LOT entered
into by them and Tomasa F. de Salanga 2 who, in turn, acquired the property
from Pedro Deudor on March 2, 1949. 3 The petitioners Renato, Raquel,
Rosette, and Romeo, all surnamed de Guzman, upon the other hand, are
claiming title over a portion with an area of 1,700 sq.m. which they inherited
from their father Serafin de Guzman, who also acquired it from Tomasa F. de
Salanga on September 6, 1957. 4 The lot is part of the land which Tomasa F.
de Salanga acquired from Pedro Deudor on March 2, 1949. 5

It is, therefore, plain that the Commissioner of Civil Service is without power
or authority to cancel ex parte or without hearing the civil service eligibility
of a patrolman nor to terminate his employment without a formal
investigation.1chanrobles virtual law library

On August 3, 1959, Republic Act No. 2616, which authorized "the

expropriation of the Tatalon Estate jointly owned by the J.M. Tuason and
Company, Inc., Gregorio Araneta and Company, Inc., and Florencio Deudor,
et al.," for subdivision into small lots and its resale al cost to the bona
fide occupants thereof, took effect without executive approval. Thereafter,
the Land Tenure Administration was directed to institute the proceeding for
the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate. But, before the complaint for
eminent domain could be filed, the J.M. Tuason and Company, Inc., claiming
to be the owner of the Tatalon Estate which was sought to be condemned,
filed an action with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch,
for prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Land Tenure
Administration, praying that Republic Act No. 2616 be declared
unconstitutional, seeking in the meanwhile a writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain the Land Tenure Administration from instituting such expropriation
proceeding, thereafter to be made permanent after trial. After trial, the
lower court promulgated its decision holding that Republic Act No. 2616 is
unconstitutional and granting the writ of prohibition prayed for. Upon
appeal, however, this Court reversed the decision of the lower court and
denied the petition for prohibition. 6

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed.

No costs.

12 Trocio v Labayo
13 Mendoza v NHA
SANTIAGO MENDOZA, CARMEN URBANO, MANUELA URBANO, RENATO DE
GUZMAN, RAQUEL DE GUZMAN, ROSETTE DE GUZMAN, and ROMEO DE
GUZMAN, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY and ANGELITO LAZARO, respondents.

CONCEPCION JR., J.:

Petition for prohibition, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order, to restrain the respondents from the
threatened demolition of the petitioners' houses situated in Barangay
Tatalon, Quezon City; and to declare Presidential Decree No. 1472
unconstitutional.
There is no dispute as to the material facts. The petitioners are occupants of
certain portions of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City. The petitioner Santiago
Mendoza claims ownership over a portion with an area of 8.5 hectares which
he acquired from the DEUDORS, as evidenced by an AGREEMENT entered

On October 27, 1972, the President of the Philippines, by Letter of

Instruction No. 34, issued pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, directed the
People's Homesite and Housing Corporation "to take immediate steps
towards the acquisition of the Tatalon Estate located at Quezon City, in its
entirety or so much thereof as may be necessary for the purposes stated in
Republic Act No. 2616, by negotiation with the known and registered owner
or owners thereof or, should this be not feasible, by expropriation pursuant
to the aforesaid law." In compliance therewith, the People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation, representing the Republic of the Philippines, filed a
complaint on January 23, 1973, with the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City Branch, docketed therein as Civil Case No. Q-17334, for the

condemnation of the Tatalon Estate covered by TCT No. 42774 and TCT No.
49235. 7
Upon a survey of the property to be condemned, it was discovered that the
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had disposed for a substantial portion of the Tatalon
Estate and only a portion, with an area of about 25.26 hectares, out of the
109 hectares originally comprising the Estate as appearing in the
certificates of title covering the land, TCT No. 42774 and TCT No. 49235,
remained unsold. It was also found that a portion of the Estate with an area
of about 8.1317 sq.m. was covered by another certificate of title - TCT No.
142624. In view thereof, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential
Decree No. 1261 on December 12, 1977, directing the expropriation of a
portion of the Tatalon Estate with an area of 25.26 hectares and designated
the National Housing Authority, which had been created not only to take
over the functions of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, but
also to develop and implement programs to provide housing for the greatest
number of the people, 8 as the administrator of the Tatalon Estate Housing
Project. The decree also provided guidelines for the development of the
Tatalon Estate, as well as for the allocation of the lots to the bona
fide occupants thereof, as follows:
SECTION 3. Allocation of lots and/or housing units in the
project area shall be made by the Authority according to the
following priority:
1. Present occupants who were listed in the 1958 Araneta
Census List of Occupants;
2. Present occupants as determined by the Authority in its
1976 Census Survey; and
3. Squatter families in the Tatalon Estate after the 1976
Census Survey.
In the event that the number of homelots in the
expropriated area is not sufficient to accommodate all
families falling under the foregoing categories, the Authority
shall accommodate such excess families in any of its sites
and services projects. 9
On July 28, 1978, the Republic of the Philippines, now represented by the
National Housing Authority, and the J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. submitted a
Compromise Agreement to the trial court and prayed that judgment be
rendered in accordance therewith; 10 and on September 15, 1978, the trial

court promulgated its decision, approving the compromise agreement and

enjoining the parties to strictly follow the terms and conditions thereof, as
follows:
Parties have submitted to this Court a joint Compromise
Agreement the terms of which are quoted as follows:
1. That the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines, represented
herein by the National Housing Authority and the defendant
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. have agreed conformably with Sec. 7
of P.D. 1261 that the just compensation for the expropriation
of the 25.26 hectares portion of the Tatalon Estate, subject
matter of the above entitled case is THIRTY NINE MILLION
EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
SIXTY FIVE (P39,841,365.00) PESOS, the owner's declared
value as of 1973 pursuant to P.D. No. 76, less the amount of
ELEVEN MILLION NINE HUNDRED FIFTY TWO THOUSAND
FOUR HUNDRED NINE & 50/100 (P11,952,409.50) PESOS,
representing 30% of the aforesaid declared market value "to
account for the prevalence of squatters in the area and for
the lack of development in some portion," so that, the
defendant is entitled only to a net total SUM OF TWENTY
SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT THOUSAND
NINE HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE & 50/100 (P27,888,955.50)
PESOS, as just compensation.
2. That the total sum of TWENTY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTY
FIVE & 50/100 (P27,888,955.50) PESOS shall be paid as
follows:
a) The amount of FIVE MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED SEVENTY SEVEN THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY ONE & 10/100
(5,577,791.10) PESOS shall be paid upon
signing of the Compromise Agreement.
b) The balance of 'TWENTY 'TWO MILLION
THREE HUNDRED ELEVEN THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SIXTY FOUR & 40/100
(P22,311,164.40) PESOS shag be paid in
four yearly equal installment of FIVE
MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY SEVEN
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY ONE &

10/100 (P5,577,791.10) PESOS, without

interest, as follows:
lst Installment on or before May 15, 1979;
2nd Installment on or before May 15, 1980;
3rd Installment on or before May 15, 1981;
4th Installment on or before May 15,1982.
3. That the defendant warrants and guarantees its absolute
titles to the aforesaid properties expropriated, free from all
aliens and encumbrances; that for and in consideration of
the foregoing payments, the defendant has consented and
agreed that titles to the parcels of land listed in Annex "A" of
the Compromise Agreement totalling 25.26 hectares which
are covered by its TCT Nos. 49235, 42774 and 142624 of the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City and subject matter of this
expropriation proceedings, be vested in the National
Housing Authority;
4. That the defendant herein has accepted, as it hereby
accepts and/or has waived and renounced, as it hereby
waives and renounces, any and all rights, if any, to impugn
or question the validity of P.D. No. 1261 promulgated on the
5th day of December, 1977 "AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO.
2616, PROVIDING ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR THE
ACQUISITION OF THE TATALON ESTATE AND DESIGNATING
THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY AS THE
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TATALON ESTATE HOUSING
AUTHORITY."
5. That the expropriation or condemnation of the 25.26
hectares portion of the Tatalon Estate subject of this
expropriation Civil Case No. Q-17334 pending before this
Court as mandated by Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 1261 be judicially
declared and confirmed by this Honorable Court subject to
the preceding paragraphs.
WHEREFORE, the Compromise Agreement, being not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy, is hereby approved, and judgment is hereby
rendered accordingly without costs. declaring defendant's

Tatalon Estate comprising of the parcels of land listed in

Annex "A" of the Compromise Agreement and covered by
TCT Nos. 49435, 42774 and 142624 of the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City as expropriated and condemned as
mandated by P.D. No. 1261; and ordering the cancellation
from the aforesaid Transfer Certificates of Titles the parcels
of land enumerated in Annex "A" and the issuance of the
corresponding Transfer Certificate of Titles in the name of
the National Housing Authority.
The parties are enjoined to strictly follow the terms and
conditions of the said agreement. 11
Meanwhile, on June 11, 1978, the President of the Philippines issued
Presidential Decree No. 1472, authorizing the National Housing Authority to
summarily eject any and all squatters from government resettlement
projects without the necessity of a judicial order.
Sec. 2. The National Housing Authority shall have the power
to summarily eject, without the necessity of judicial order,
any and all squatters from squatters' colonies of
government resettlement projects, as well as, any illegal
occupant in any homelot apartment or dwelling unit owned
or administered by it. In the exercise of such power, the
National Housing Authority shall have the right and
authority to request the help of the Barangay Chairman and
any peace officer in the locality. Illegal occupant as used in
this Decree shall mean to include those awardees or lessees
whose right to occupy or lease the subject homelot
apartment or dwelling unit has already ceased by reason of
his violation of the conditions of his award or lease
agreement executed in his favor by the National Housing
Authority or its predecessors-in-interest. In all these cases,
however, proper notice of ejectment either by personal
service or by posting the same in the lot or door of the
apartment as the case may be shall be given to the squatter
or illegal occupant concerned as the case may be at least 10
days before his scheduled ejectment from the premises. The
Provisions of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6026 that no
awardee shall be ejected unless he is transferred to another
housing project or to his hometown with the assistance of
the Department of Social Welfare is hereby repealed. 12

Thereafter, on May 8, 1980, the President of the Philippines, in line with the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1517, which declared the entire
Metropolitan Manila Area as an Urban Land Reform Zone, issued
Proclamation No. 1967, proclaiming 244 sites in Metropolitan Manila,
described in an annex appended thereto as "Areas for Priority Development
and Urban Land Reform Zones. 13 One of the sites mentioned is "An area
within Tatalon Estates, Bounded by Kaliraya Street on the North;
Kabignayan, Manungal, Kitanlad and Araneta Streets on the Southwest, and
Botolan Transmission lines on the Southeast. 14 It is indicated in the sketch
as that portion shaded in yellow. 15

In a letter dated August 27, 1981, the National Housing Authority also
ordered the petitioner Santiago Mendoza, "to demolish the illegal extension
of (his) structure located at Block 6, Lot 12, ERC-A, Tatalon Estate which
encroaches to the adjacent lot boundaries and pose obstruction/delay in the
allocation process", within 10 days from receipt thereof, otherwise the
National Housing Authority would summarily demolish the illegal
construction after the expiration of the period without further notice. 19

On January 27, 1981, the National Housing Authority wrote the petitioner
Manuela Urbano, informing her that her request for inclusion in the list of
Tatalon Estate beneficiaries could not be favorably considered, not even for
lot allocation under the third priority mentioned in Presidential Decree No.
1261, for being an absentee structure owner, and demanding that she
demolish her structure built on Lot Nos. 16 and 18, Block 523 of the Tatalon
Estate and vacate the premises within 15 days from receipt thereof,
otherwise, the National Housing Authority would summarily demolish her
structure after the expiration of the period without further notice. 16 The said
petitioner sought a reconsideration of the order of demolition and the
National Housing Authority, in a letter to Carmen and Manuela Urbano,
dated June 2, 1981, informed them that "after a careful re-evaluation of the
records of (their) petition as well as the records in the Project Office," they
may now "be considered for allocation under the third priority of the
squatter families in Tatalon Estate after the 1976 Census Survey established
in Section 3, Par. 3 of P.D. 1261." The reconsideration, however, did not in
any way alter the standing order of demolition of their structures in the lots
occupied by them. 17

The petitioners contend that the enforcement of Presidential Decree No.

1472 against them. is illegal and unconstitutional as it would deprive them
of their property without due process of law.

In a letter, dated June 5, 1981, the National Housing Authority also informed
the herein petitioners Romeo de Guzman and Renato de Guzman "that after
careful and judicious evaluation of the records of (their) petition, as well as
the records available in the Project Office, (the) Authority finds no ground to
justify a reversal of its previous decision and that (their) petition for lot
allocation under P.D. 1261, is denied for lack of merit." "The decision,
therefore, declaring (them) as absentee structure owners, denying (their)
petition for inclusion in the 1976 Census List of bona fide residents of
Tatalon Estate and ordering (them) to demolish (their) structure on the
subject lot stands as ordered without any further notice. The National
Housing Authority, however, offered to buy the structure in Lot 18 of Block
523 at a price to be determined by it in order to avoid economic waste, but
that if the owner was not willing to sell the structure, he should demolish the
same within 10 days from notice, otherwise the National Housing Authority
would summarily demolish the same without further notice. 18

In view of this treatened demolition of their houses, the petitioners have

filed the present recourse.

The petition is devoid of merit. To begin with, it is based upon the premise
that the petitioners are owners of the lots occupied by them for having
acquired them from DEUDORS, which is false, since the property occupied
by them belong to the Republic of the Philippines after the expropriation
proceedings made pursuant to Republic Act No. 2616, the administration
and control of which had been entrusted to respondent National Housing
Authority under Presidential Decree No. 1261, issued on December 12,
1977. As a matter of fact, the petitioners Manuela Urbano, Carmen Urbano,
Renato de Guzman, and Romeo de Guzman had admitted the title of the
Government over said lots when they applied for inclusion in the list of
"Tatalon Estate beneficiaries. 20 Besides, the land is registered in the name
of the Government and its title thereto had become indefeasible. The
petitioners, having actual knowledge of the expropriation of the Tatalon
Estate, ,should have vindicated their claim of ownership to the land claimed
by them in the expropriation proceedings, as intimated by the Court in the
case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration. 21 The then
Justice, now Chief Justice of the Philippines Enrique M. Fernando, speaking
for the Court, said:
xxx xxx xxx
7. The other points raised may be briefly disposed of. Much
is made of what the lower court considered to be the
inaccuracy apparent on the face of the challenged statute
as to the ownership of the Tatalon Estate. it could very wen
be that Congress ought to have taken greater pains to avoid
such imprecision. At any rate, the lower court unduly would
consider it a deprivation of property without due process of
law. Such a fear is unwarranted. In the course of the

expropriation proceedings, there undoubtedly would be a

judicial determination as to the party entitled to the just
compensation. As of now then, such a question would
appear at the very least to be premature. Reference is
likewise made as to the effect of the authorized
expropriation on those purchasers of lots located in the
Tatalon Estate. Again, on the occasion of the expropriation,
whatever contractual rights might, be possessed by vendors
and vendees could be asserted and accorded the
appropriate constitutional protection.
But petitioners failed to do so. They cannot therefore be said to be deprived
of property which is not legally theirs.
At any rate, Presidential Decree No. 1472 does not violate the constitutional
due process clause since it requires proper notice of ejectment to the
squatter or illegal occupant concerned either by personal service or by
posting the same in the lot or door of the apartment as the case may be at
least 10 days before his scheduled ejectment from the premises, which has
been amply complied with in the case of the petitioners. Here, notices of
ejectment were served upon the petitioners after it had been determined
that they are not "Tatalon Estate beneficiaries" and, consequently, squatters
on the land occupied by them. 22 As squatters, they are a public nuisance
which can be abated even without judicial proceedings. 23
The claim of the petitioners that the National Housing Authority has no
jurisdiction over them since the lots occupied by them "are outside the
perimeter of the appropriate area of the Tatalon Estate and are not also
embraced under Proclamation No. 1967", is utterly devoid of merit. The
complaint filed was for the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate covered,
among others, by TCT No. 42774. The said title covers an area of about
757,946.30 square meters, more or less, and more particularly described as
follows:
A parcel of land (boundary of plan Pcs-3824, being the
consolidation of Blocks Nos. 235 to 241, Street Lots 4 to 9
and all of plan Psd-36950 and Lot 4-B-3-C-2-B-2 of plan Psd18526, L.R.C. (G.L.R.). Record No. 7681, situated in Quezon
City. Bounded on the NW, by Block 233 and Street Lot No. 10
of plan Psd-36950 and Lot 4-D-3-C-2C of plan Psd -7576 (The
Commonwealth of the Philippines) on the NE. ' by the San
Juan River; on the E. by Lot 4-B-5 of plan Psd-13540 (Manila
Electric Co.); on the SE., by Lot 4-B-5 of plan Psd-3640
(Manila Electric Co.) and Blocks Nos. 232 and 231 and Street

Lot No. 13 of plan Psd-36950; on the S. by Espana Extension

and Block No. I of plan Psd-12582 (Philippine Trust Co.) on
the SW. by Street Lot No. 2 of plan Psd-18527 and Street Lot
No. 10 of plan Psd-26950; and on the W. by Block Nos. 229,
230, 231, 331, and 232 and Street Lots Nos. 1, 2, and 3 of
plan Psd-36950, ... . 24
Street Lot No. 10 of plan Psd-36950 and Lot No. 4-D-3-C-2-C of plan Psd7576 (Commonwealth of the Philippines, boundaries on the Northwest, are
commonly called Banawe Street and Quezon Boulevard Extension,
respectively, while Lot 4-B-5 of plan Psd-13540 (Manila Electric Co.) is known
as the Botolan Transmission Line. Referring to the plan, 25 the parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 42774 would, therefore, be that circumscribed by
Banawe Street, Quezon Boulevard Extension, the San Francisco River (a
branch of the San Juan River), the Manila Electric Co. Transmission Line, and
Espana Extension. However, J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had the property
subdivided under subdivision plan Psd-57920 and disposed of a
considerable portion thereof, such that of the original area of the land of
757,946.30 sq.m., more or less, only a portion of about 185,157.50 sq.m.,
more or less, was left unsold. These unsold lots form part of the 25.26
hectares expropriated and whose titles have been transferred to the
Government pursuant to the decision of the trial court of September 15,
1978. 26 Among these lots are Lot Nos. 16, 18, 20 of Block 523 and Block
Nos. 527, 528, 529, 530, and 531. 27 Since the petitioners admit that "the
acquired residential lots of petitioners DE GUZMAN and URBANO, are
Identical to Lot Nos. 16,18, and 20, Block 523 of the Tatalon Estate, while
that of SANTIAGO MENDOZA, is Identical to Blocks Nos. 527, 528, 529, 530,
and 531 of the Tatalon Estate, it is beyond question that the lots occupied or
claimed by the petitioners are among those expropriated by the
Government. The fact that the said lots are not included within the area
proclaimed for priority development under Proclamation No. 1967, dated
May 8, 1980, does not preclude the National Housing Authority from
exercising administrative control and supervision over the disposition of said
lots. The National Housing Authority was created by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 757, dated July 31, 1975, not only to take over the functions of
the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, but also to develop and
implement housing programs, and was expressly designated, under
Presidential Decree No. 1261, dated December 12, 1977, the Administrator
for the national government of the Tatalon Estate. Since the lots occupied or
claimed by the herein petitioners are, as previously stated. within the
Tatalon Estate, the National Housing Authority has supervision and control
over the disposition of the said lots. WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as
it is hereby, DISMISSED. With costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

14 In re: Wenceslao Laureta

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY.
WENCESLAO LAURETA, AND OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA
MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE in G.R. No. 68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE,
vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL."
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Before us are 1) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta's Motion for Reconsideration of the
Per Curiam Resolution of this Court promulgated on March 12, 1987, finding
him guilty of grave professional misconduct and suspending him indefinitely
from the practice of law; and 2) Eva Maravilla-Ilustre's Motion for
Reconsideration of the same Resolution holding her in contempt and
ordering her to pay a fine of P1,000.00.
Essentially, Atty. Laureta maintains that the Order of suspension without
hearing violated his right to life and due process of law and by reason
thereof the Order is null and void; that the acts of misconduct imputed to
him are without basis; that the charge against him that it was he who had
circulated to the press copies of the Complaint filed before the Tanodbayan
is unfounded such that, even in this Court's Resolution, his having
distributed copies to the press is not stated positively; that the banner
headline which appeared In the Daily Express is regrettable but that he was
not responsible for such "misleading headline;" that he "did nothing of the
sort" being fully conscious of his responsibilities as a law practitioner and
officer of the Court; that as a former newspaperman, he would not have
been satisfied with merely circulating copies of the Complaint to the press in
envelopes where his name appears; "he himself would have written stories
about the case in a manner that sells newspapers; even a series of juicy
articles perhaps, something that would have further subjected the
respondent justices to far worse publicity;" that, on the contrary, the press
conference scheduled by Ilustre was cancelled through his efforts in order to
prevent any further adverse publicity resulting from the filing of the
complaint before the Tanodbayan; that, as a matter of fact, it was this
Court's Resolution that was serialized in the Bulletin Today, which
newspaper also made him the subject of a scathing editorial but that he
"understands the cooperation because after all, the Court rendered a
favorable judgment in the Bulletin union case last year;" that he considered
it "below his dignity to plead for the chance to present his side" with the
Editor, Mr. Ben Rodriguez, "a long-time personal friend" since he "can afford
to be the sacrificial lamb if only to help the Honorable Court uphold its
integrity;" that he was called by a reporter of DZRH and was asked to

comment on the case filed before the Tanodbayan but that his remarks were
confined to the filing of the case by Ilustre herself, and that the judgment of
the trial Court had attained its finality long ago; that he is not Ilustre's
counsel before the Tanodbayan and did not prepare the complaint filed
before it, his professional services having been terminated upon the final
dismissal of Ilustre's case before this Court; that similarities in the language
and phraseology used in the Ilustre letters, in pleadings before this Court
and before the Tanodbayan do not prove his authorship since other lawyers
"even of a mediocre caliber" could very easily have reproduced them; that
the discussions on the merits in the Per Curiam Resolution are "more
properly addressed to the Tanodbayan, Justice Raul M. Gonzales being
competent to deal with the case before him;" that he takes exception to the
accusation that he has manifested lack of respect for and exposed to public
ridicule the two highest Courts of the land, all he did having been to call
attention to errors or injustice committed in the promulgation of judgments
or orders; that he has "not authorized or assisted and/or abetted and could
not have prevented the contemptuous statements, conduct, acts and
malicious charges of Eva Maravilla Ilustre who was no longer his client when
these alleged acts were done; that "he is grateful to this Court for the
reminder on the first duty of a lawyer which is to the Court and not to his
client, a duty that he has always impressed upon his law students;" and
finally, that "for the record, he is sorry for the adverse publicity generated
by the filing of the complaint against the Justices before the Tanodbayan."
In her own Motion for Reconsideration, Eva Maravilla-Ilustre also raises as
her main ground the alleged deprivation of her constitutional right to due
process. She maintains that as contempt proceedings are commonly treated
as criminal in nature, the mode of procedure and rules of evidence in
criminal prosecution should be assimilated, as far as practicable, in this
proceeding, and that she should be given every opportunity to present her
side. Additionally, she states that, with some sympathetic lawyers, they
made an "investigation" and learned that the Resolution of the First Division
was arrived at without any deliberation by its members; that Court
personnel were "tight-lipped about the matter, which is shrouded mystery"
thereby prompting her to pursue a course which she thought was legal and
peaceful; that there is nothing wrong in making public the manner of voting
by the Justices, and it was for that reason that she addressed Identical
letters to Associate Justices Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, Isagani
Cruz and Florentino Feliciano; that "if the lawyers of my opponents were not
a Solicitor General, and member of the Supreme Court and a Division
Chairman, respectively, the resolution of May 14, 1986 would not have
aroused my suspicion;" that instead of taking the law into her own hands or
joining any violent movement, she took the legitimate step of making a
peaceful investigation into how her case was decided, and brought her

grievance to the Tanodbayan "in exasperation" against those whom she felt
had committed injustice against her "in an underhanded manner."

the complainant" at his address of record. Of note, too, is the fact that it was
he who was following up the Complaint before the Tanodbayan and, after its
dismissal, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of dismissal.

We deny reconsideration in both instances.

The argument premised on lack of hearing and due process, is not
impressed with merit. What due process abhors is absolute lack of
opportunity to be heard (Tajonera vs. Lamaroza, et al., 110 SCRA 438
[1981]). The word "hearing" does not necessarily connote a "trial-type"
proceeding. In the show-cause Resolution of this Court, dated January 29,
1987, Atty. Laureta was given sufficient opportunity to inform this Court of
the reasons why he should not be subjected to dispose action. His Answer,
wherein he prayed that the action against him be dismissed, contained
twenty-two (22) pages, double spaced. Eva Maravilla-Ilustre was also given
a like opportunity to explain her statements, conduct, acts and charges
against the Court and/or the official actions of the Justices concerned. Her
Compliance Answer, wherein she prayed that the contempt proceeding
against her be dismissed, contained nineteen (19) pages, double spaced.
Both were afforded ample latitude to explain matters fully. Atty. Laureta
denied having authored the letters written by Ilustre, his being her counsel
before the Tanodbayan, his having circularized to the press copies of the
complaint filed before said body, and his having committed acts unworthy of
his profession. But the Court believed otherwise and found that those letters
and the charges levelled against the Justices concerned, of themselves and
by themselves, betray not only their malicious and contemptuous character,
but also the lack of respect for the two highest Courts of the land, a
complete obliviousness to the fundamental principle of separation of
powers, and a wanton disregard of the cardinal doctrine of independence of
the Judiciary. Res ipsa loquitur. Nothing more needed to have been said or
proven. The necessity to conduct any further evidentially hearing was
obviated (See People vs. Hon. Valenzuela, G.R. Nos. 63950-60, April 19,
1985, 135 SCRA 712). Atty. Laureta and Ilustre were given ample
opportunity to be heard, and were, in fact, heard.
(1)
In his Motion for Reconsideration, Atty. Laureta reiterates his allegations in
his Answer to the show-cause Resolution that his professional services were
terminated by Ilustre after the dismissal of the main petition by this Court;
that he had nothing to do with the contemptuous letters to the individual
Justices; and that he is not Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan.
Significantly enough, however, copy of the Tanodbayan Resolution
dismissing Ilustre's Complaint was furnished Atty. Laureta as "counsel for

Of import, as well, is the report of Lorenzo C. Bardel, a process server of this

Court, that after having failed to serve copy of the Per Curiam Resolution of
March 12, 1987 of this Court on Ilustre personally at her address of record,
"101 F. Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City," having been informed that she is 6
not a resident of the place," he proceeded to the residence of Atty. Laureta
where the latter's wife "voluntarily received the two copies of decision for
her husband and for Ms. Maravina-Ilustre" (p. 670, Rollo, Vol. 11).
That Ilustre subsequently received copy of this Court's Resolution delivered
to Mrs. Laureta is shown by the fact that she filed, as of March 27, 1987, a
"Petition for Extension of Time to file Motion for Reconsideration" and
subsequently the Motion for Reconsideration. In that Petition Ilustre
acknowledged receipt of the Resolution on March 12, 1987, the very same
date Mrs. Laureta received copy thereof. If, indeed, the lawyer-client
relationship between her husband and Ilustre had been allegedly completely
severed, all Mrs. Laureta had to do was to return to the Sheriff the copy
intended for Ilustre. As it was, however, service on Atty. Laureta proved to
be service on Ilustre as well. The close tie- up between the corespondents is
heightened by the fact that three process servers of this Court failed to
serve copy of this Court's Per Curiam Resolution on Ilustre personally.
Noteworthy, as well, is that by Atty. Laureta's own admission, he was the
one called by a "reporter" of DZRH to comment on the Ilustre charges
before the Tanodbayan. If, in fact, he had nothing to do with the complaint,
he would not have been pinpointed at all. And if his disclaimer were the
truth, the logical step for him to have taken was to refer the caller to the
lawyer/s allegedly assisting Ilustre, at the very least, out of elementary
courtesy and propriety. But he did nothing of the sort. " He gave his
comment with alacrity.
The impudence and lack of respect of Atty. Laureta for this Court again
surfaces when he asserts in his Motion for Reconsideration that he
"understands the cooperation" of the Bulletin Today as manifested in the
serialized publication of the Per Curiam Resolution of this Court and his
being subjected to a scathing editorial by the same newspaper "because
after all, the Court rendered a favorable judgment in the Bulletin union case
last year." The malice lurking in that statement is most unbecoming of an
officer of the Court and is an added reason for denying reconsideration.

Further, Atty. Laureta stubbornly contends that discussions on the merits in

the Court's Per Curiam Resolution are more properly addressed to the
Tanodbayan, forgetting, however, his own discourse on the merits in his
Answer to this Court's Resolution dated January 29, 1987. He thus
incorrigibly insists on subordinating the Judiciary to the executive
notwithstanding the categorical pronouncement in the Per Curiam
Resolution of March 12, 1987, that Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code has
no application to the members of a collegiate Court; that a charge of
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that a
collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper; plus the clear and extended
dissertation in the same Per Curiam Resolution on the fundamental principle
of separation of powers and of checks and balances, pursuant to which it is
this Court "entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with
finality all justifiable disputes, public and private. No other department or
agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust' upon
controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound practice."
Atty. Laureta's protestations that he has done his best to protect and uphold
the dignity of this Court are belied by environmental facts and
circumstances. His apologetic stance for the "adverse publicity" generated
by the filing of the charges against the Justices concerned before the
Tanodbayan rings with insincerity. The complaint was calculated precisely to
serve that very purpose. The threat to bring the case to "another forum of
justice" was implemented to the fun. Besides, he misses the heart of the
matter. Exposure to the glare of publicity is an occupational hazard. If he
has been visited with disciplinary sanctions it is because by his conduct,
acts and statements, he has, overall, deliberately sought to destroy the
"authenticity, integrity, and conclusiveness of collegiate acts," to
"undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all
justifiable disputes," and to subvert public confidence in the integrity of the
Courts and the Justices concerned, and in the orderly administration of
justice.
In fine, we discern nothing in Atty. Laureta's Motion for Reconsideration that
would call for a modification, much less a reversal, of our finding that he is
guilty of grave professional misconduct that renders him unfit to continue to
be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to an attorney
and officer of the Court.
(2)
Neither do we find merit in Ilustre's Motion for Reconsideration. She has
turned deaf ears to any reason or clarification. She and her counsel have
refused to accept the untenability of their case and the inevitability of losing

in Court. They have allowed suspicion alone to blind their actions and in so
doing degraded the administration of justice. "Investigation" was utterly
uncalled for. All conclusions and judgments of the Court, be they en banc or
by Division, are arrived at only after deliberation. The fact that no dissent
was indicated in the Minutes of the proceedings held on May 14, 1986
showed that the members of the Division voted unanimously. Court
personnel are not in a position to know the voting in any case because all
deliberations are held behind closed doors without any one of them being
present. No malicious inferences should have been drawn from their
inability to furnish the information Ilustre and Atty. Laureta desired The
personality of the Solicitor General never came into the picture. It was
Justice Abad Santos, and not Justice Yap, who was Chairman of the First
Division when the Resolution of May 14, 1986 denying the Petition was
rendered. Thereafter Justice Yap inhibited himself from any participation.
The fact that the Court en banc upheld the challenged Resolutions of the
First Division emphasizes the irrespective of Ilustre's case irrespective of the
personalities involved.
Additionally, Ilustre has been trifling with this Court. She has given our
process servers the run-around. Three of them failed to serve on her
personally her copy of this Court's Per Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987
at her address of record. Mrs. Laureta informed process server Lorenzo C.
Bardel that Ilustre was residing at 17-D, Quezon St., Tondo, Manila. Romeo
C. Regala, another process server, went to that address to serve copy of the
Resolution but he reported:
4. That inspite of diligent efforts to locate the address of
ms.Eva Maravilla-Ilustre, said address could not be located;
5. That I even asked the occupants (Cerdan Family) of No.
17 Quezon Street, Tondo, Manila, and they informed that
there is no such Ms. Eva Maravilla-Ilustre in the
neighborhood and/or in the vicinity; ... (p. 672, Rollo, Vol.
11).
The third process server, Nelson C. Cabesuela, was also unable to serve
copy of this Court's Resolution on Ilustre. He reported:
2. On March 17, 1987, at about 9:30 A.M., I arrived at the
house in the address furnished at; the notice of judgment
(101 Felix Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City), and was
received by an elderly woman who admitted to be the
owner of the house but vehemently refused to be Identified,
and told me that she does not know the addressee

Maravilla, and told me further that she always meets

different persons looking for Miss Maravilla because the
latter always gives the address of her house;

instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are
entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to
two appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and thereafter to the SC.

3. That, I was reminded of an incident that I also

experienced in the same place trying to serve a resolution
to Miss Maravilla which was returned unserved because she
is not known in the place; ... (p. 674, Rollo, Vol. II).

ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal

protection insofar as appeals would be concerned.

And yet, in her Petition for Extension of Time and in her Motion for
Reconsideration she persists in giving that address at 101 Felix Manalo St.,
Cubao, Quezon City, where our process servers were told that she was not a
resident of and that she was unknown thereat. If for her contumacious
elusiveness and lack of candor alone, Ilustre deserves no further standing
before this Court.
ACCORDINGLY, the respective Motions for reconsideration of Atty. Wenceslao
G. Laureta for the setting aside of the order suspending him from the
practice of law, and of Eva Maravilla Ilustre for the lifting of the penalty for
contempt are DENIED, and this denial is FINAL. Eva Maravilla Ilustre shall
pay the fine of P1,000.00 imposed on her within ten (10) days from notice,
or, suffer imprisonment for ten (10) days upon failure to pay said fine within
the stipulated period.
SO ORDERED.

15 Nunez v Sandiganbayan
Rufino Nuez vs Sandiganbayan & the People of the Philippines
on November 15, 2010
Equal Protection Creation of the Sandiganbayan
Nuez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as
amended by PD 1606. He was accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa
through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in
connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. It
is the claim of Nuez that PD1486, as amended, is violative of the due
process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. He
claims that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates Nuezs right to equal
protection, because appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a
mere matter of discretion; appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to
questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and
there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC,

HELD: The SC ruled against Nuez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for
the creation of a special court that shall have original jurisdiction over cases
involving public officials charged with graft and corruption. The constitution
specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the
Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which
cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that
those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware
as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into
force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether a private
citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the classification therein
set forth met the standard requiring that it must be based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the
purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
must apply equally to each member of the class. Further still, decisions in
the Sandiganbayan are reached by a unanimous decision from 3 justices - a
showing that decisions therein are more conceivably carefully reached than
other trial courts.

16 Montemayor v Araneta University

F: Petitioner was a professor at the Araneta University Foundation. On
7/8/74, he was found guilty of making homosexual advances on one
Leonardo De Lara by a faculty investating committee. On 11/8/74, another
committee was appointed to investigate another charge of a similar nature
against petitioner. Petitioner, through cousel, asked for the postponement of
the hearing set for 11/18 and 19, 1974, but the w/c motion was denied. The
committe then proceeded to hear the testimony of the complainants and on
12/5/74, submitted its report recommending the separation of petitioner
from the University. On 12/12/74, the University applied w/ the NLRC for
clearance to terminate petitioner''''s employment. Meanwhile, petitioner
filed a complaint w/ the NLRC for reinstatement and backwages. Judgement
was rendered in petitioner''''s favor, but on appeal to the Sec. of Labor, the
latter found petitioner''''s dismissal to be justified. Hence, this petition for
certiorari.
HELD: The Consti. assures to workers security of tenure. In the case of
petitioner, this guarantee is reinforced by the provision on academic
freedom. In denying petitioner''''s motion for postponement of the hearing,
the committee did not accord procedural due process to the petitioner. This

was, however, remedied at the mediation conference called at the Dept. of

Labor during w/c petitioner was heard on his evidence. There he was given
the fullest opportunity to present his case. Petition dismissed. Petitioner
filed a MFR contending that the hearing in the NLRC did not conform to ther
requirements of due process as the witnesses against petitioner were not
called so that petitioner could cross-examine them.
HELD: Pettioner did not object to the presentation of the testimony of the
complainant and the witnesses at the school investigation and did not
assert his right to cross-examine them. Petitioner waived his right to
confront the witnesses, relying solely on the strength of his evidence. Nor
was it incumbent on resp. to present the witnesses in the NLRC.
Petitioner''''s only right is to be heard. VV. Tanada v. Phil. Atomic Energy
Commission, 141 SCRA 307 (1986) Bias as Disqualification in Administrative
Investigations F: Petition for prohibition brought by taxpayers, questioning
the competence of members of the PAEC to pass judgment on the safety of
the Bataan Power Plant and charging them w/ bias and prejudgment, based
on their publications stating that the plant was safe. HELD: (1) Where the
validity of an appointment is not challenged in an appropriate proceeding,
the question of competence is not w/in the filed of judicial inquiry. The
question of competence is a matter addressed to the appointing power. (2)
In these publications, PAEC clearly indicated its prejudgement that the
nuclear plant is safe. The first was published in 1985. The other 2 were
issued earlier, but as the majority of the PAEC commissioners even then
were already occupying responsible positions in the PAEC, they cannot
escape responsibility for these publications. Petition granted and PAEC
restrained from acting in the proceedings for issuance of license.
17 In re Letter to Mrs. Maria Coronel
In re Letter to Mrs. Maria Coronel, 238 SCRA 619 F: Benito Mapilisan was
dismissed by the Supreme Court for dishonestry amounting to gross
misconduct occasioned by the loss, while in his custody, of a registered mail
letter, the contents of which were pilfered, as the P25,000 bank draft
contained therein, eventually found its way for encashment with payee
bank, PNB. The contentions of this MFR hinge on the alleged violation of
procedural due process by claiming that there was no formal administrative
complaint filed against him by either complainant Maria Coronel or the CA
nor was there a formal investigation conducted. Accroding to him, the letter
complaint of Maria Coronel failed to properly and formally charge the former
since the letter complaint was neither suscribed nor sworn to by the
complainant.
ISSUE: W/N there was a violation of procedural due process.
HELD: NO Under Sec. 6, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme
Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof. By this power, the Supreme Court can act on a subject
complaint, particularly where , as in this case, an investigation thereon had
already been conducted and concluded by the CA prior to its referral to SC,
with the recommendation that movant be charged with gross negligence.
The complaint, though defective as to form, has been fully substantiated on
the basis of the accompanying independent investigation Report and
Recommendation submitted to SC. As a matter of fact, the Court even

entertains anonymous complaints where the charge can be fully borne out
by the evidence offered, or continues proceeding with the administrative
case despite withdrawal by complainant of his complaint where an
investigation thereto has been made by the Acting Court Administrator prior
to the filing of the complaint. Thus, what is given paramount importance by
this Court in instances where its power of administrative supervision over
court employees is invoked is the substantiation of the complaint rather
than its conformity with the formal requirements.
18 Agustin v Edu
Agustin vs Edu
on November 22, 2010
Generally Accepted Principles of International Law Police Power
Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity
of Letter of Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have
early warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair of reflectorized
triangular early warning devices. Agustin is arguing that this order is
unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public.
Cars are already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to
provide warning to other motorists. And that the mandate to compel
motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant
and would only make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.
HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive
redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already
equipped with 1) blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,
2) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles, 3) built-in
reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles, or 4) welllighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being universal
among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and
visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters,
any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a
reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the roads,
highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere
along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a
motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or
endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of
the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps
will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still
think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a
law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in

the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger
of collision.
On Police Power
The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police
power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of
respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that while
embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process and
equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point
was mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police
power which was originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American
Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as nothing more or less than the
powers of government inherent in every sovereignty was stressed in the
aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: Justice Laurel, in the first leading
decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams,
identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare. Persons and property could thus be subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and
prosperity of the state. Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v.
Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. The
concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a preCommonwealth decision as that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and
welfare of society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted
by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in
the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It
is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, the most essential, insistent, and at least
illimitable powers, extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out to all the
great public needs. Its scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of the
times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough
room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances
thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo:
Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the
present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes
with the time. The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague
and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in
organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to
safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an
individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the
enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace,
safety, good order, and welfare.

It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by

the fact that the particular police power measure challenged was clearly
intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for
this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None
has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The
latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector
Law, an enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v.
Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was:
To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on roads and streets
designated as national roads . . . As a matter of fact, the first law sought to
be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National
Defense Act, with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by
the imperative demands of public safety.

19 Vera v Cuevas
F: Respondents are engaged in the manufacture and sale of filled milk
products. They brought an action in the CFI for a declaration of their rights
in respect of section 169 of the Tax Code. This provision required that "all
condensed skimmed milk in whatever form, from which the fatty part has
been removed totally or in part or put on sale in the Philippines shall be
clearly and legibly marked on its immediate containers with the words: This
milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age.
HELD: Sec. 169 of the Tax Code has been repealed by RA 344. At any rate,
Sec. 169 applied only to skimmed milk and not to filled milk. Sec. 169 is
being enforced only against respondent manufacturers of filled milk but not
against manufacturers of skimmed milk, thus denying them the equal
protection of the laws.
20 Sison jr. V Ancheta
Facts: Batas Pambansa 135 was enacted. Sison, as taxpayer, alleged that
its provision (Section 1) unduly discriminated against him by the imposition
of higher rates upon his income as a professional, that it amounts to class
legislation, and that it transgresses against the equal protection and due
process clauses of the Constitution as well as the rule requiring uniformity in
taxation.
Issue: Whether BP 135 violates the due process and equal protection
clauses, and the rule on uniformity in taxation.
Held: There is a need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead
to a conclusion that there was a violation of the due process and equal
protection clauses. Absent such showing, the presumption of validity must
prevail. Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or
kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The

taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural

classifications for purposes of taxation. Where the differentitation conforms
to the practical dictates of justice and equity, similar to the standards of
equal protection, it is not discriminatory within the meaning of the clause
and is therefore uniform. Taxpayers may be classified into different
categories, such as recipients of compensation income as against
professionals. Recipients of compensation income are not entitled to make
deductions for income tax purposes as there is no practically no overhead

expense, while professionals and businessmen have no uniform costs or

expenses necessaryh to produce their income. There is ample justification
to adopt the gross system of income taxation to compensation income,
while continuing the system of net income taxation as regards professional
and business income.