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5GW Theory Timeline - Military
5GW Theory Timeline - Military
(June 2010)
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Forward
Forward
What follows will seem a ragged, haphazard collection of sources and summaries of sources discussing the theory of 5GW. As
anyone familiar with the subject will know, the depth and breadth of this document is laughable when compared to the many
discussions that have filled the last several years: not much that has been written in the past couple of years is included. Indeed,
many blog articles written even earlier do not appear here.
The 5GW Theory Timeline was a project that simply required more time than I wished to devote to it. That is unfortunate. But what
follows here might serve as a starting point for anyone newly coming into the discussion.
The original website included the following on its About page:
About
The 5GW Theory Timeline began as a project for collecting and collating sources that
discussed, however in passing, the theory of fifth generation warfare or fifth gradient
warfare.
Anyone familiar with the subject will notice glaring holes in the Timeline. Although
many very early references to 5GW are included, the Timeline is far from complete; few
of the many references post-2006 have yet to be added, for instance. Nonetheless, actual
discussion of 5GW did not begin until recently -- earliest on-line source thus far found is
from August 19, 2003 -- and users of the Timeline may find the earliest references helpful
in understanding how the theory of 5GW began to take root.
Since this is a reference tool that relies heavily on online sourcing, some links have broken
or changed between the time they were added to the Timeline and the present. Whenever
possible, we will update the links to direct back toward original sources. Some sources
have simply disappeared from the internet, some links to original sources will not work,
but those sources will remain as-is on the Timeline as a record of the development of the
theory of 5GW.
Summaries included on each entry are entirely the view of the Timeline author who added
the entry. Objectivity in summarizing the original source is our goal, but as with all
interpretation, bias cannot be ruled out. Length and breadth of summary, in my case, may
be a measure of the available content in the linked source or may be a measure of my own
interest in what the original source addressed. Occasionally, I have added interpolations
of my own, but I have tried to note when I have. Visitors are encouraged to leave
comments on entries with any notes of their own.
Curtis Gale Weeks
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Table of Contents
Table of Contents
Table of Contents
Notes on This Text.....................................................................................................................................2
Forward......................................................................................................................................................3
Table of Contents.......................................................................................................................................4
Entries........................................................................................................................................................9
The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation.....................................................................10
William S. Lind (October 15, 1989)
5th Generation Warfare.......................................................................................................................14
Oss.net (August 19, 2003)
Fifth Generation Warfare?...................................................................................................................15
William S. Lind (February 3, 2004)
The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century.........................................................................17
Colonel Thomas X. Hammes (September 12, 2004)
Unto the Fifth Generation of War........................................................................................................21
Mark Safranski (July 17, 2005)
Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop................................................................................23
Dan tdaxp (July 18, 2005)
5GW....................................................................................................................................................27
Younghusband (July 19, 2005)
Fifth Generation War in the OODA Loop...........................................................................................28
Mark Safranski (July 19, 2005)
Boot on Unrestricted War....................................................................................................................30
Curtis Gale Weeks (July 20, 2005)
Dreaming 5th Generation War.............................................................................................................31
Dan tdaxp (July 20, 2005)
Dreaming 5th Generation War: Comment...........................................................................................33
Curtis Gale Weeks (July 21, 2005)
Emerging NetWar / SecretWar Tactic: Stealth Shareholder Activism.................................................34
Dan tdaxp (July 22, 2005)
Blog Notice..........................................................................................................................................35
Curtis Gale Weeks (July 23, 2005)
SecretWarriors Walk Without Rhythm, Won't Attract the Worm........................................................37
Dan tdaxp (July 23, 2005)
SecretWar: Plain Jane Tries to Kill the Yakuza Boss..........................................................................39
Dan tdaxp (July 25, 2005)
5GW Reloaded: Reflecting on 5th Generation War Concepts............................................................41
Mark Safranski (July 25, 2005)
5GW Effectors.....................................................................................................................................43
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Table of Contents
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Table of Contents
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Table of Contents
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Table of Contents
from The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century....................................................143
from Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop...........................................................143
from Observing the Maturing World........................................................................................144
from Against William Lind, Against John Robb, in favor of 5GW.........................................144
from The Generations of War without the Jargon....................................................................144
from Pre-Modern Wars on a Pre-Modern Continent................................................................145
from XGW: Left of Boom - Right of Boom............................................................................145
from X vs X: Boom and the Generations in Conflict..............................................................145
from XGW as a System for the Classification of Doctrines....................................................145
from The XGW Framework: Classification and Creation of Doctrines for Conflict and
Confrontation...........................................................................................................................145
4GW..................................................................................................................................................147
from The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation.................................................147
from The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century....................................................147
from Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop...........................................................147
from Observing the Maturing World........................................................................................148
from Against William Lind, Against John Robb, in favor of 5GW.........................................148
from The Generations of War without the Jargon....................................................................149
from Pre-Modern Wars on a Pre-Modern Continent................................................................149
from XGW: Left of Boom - Right of Boom............................................................................149
from X vs X: Boom and the Generations in Conflict..............................................................149
from XGW as a System for the Classification of Doctrines....................................................150
from The XGW Framework: Classification and Creation of Doctrines for Conflict and
Confrontation...........................................................................................................................150
5GW..................................................................................................................................................151
from The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation.................................................151
from The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century....................................................151
from Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop...........................................................151
from Observing the Maturing World........................................................................................151
from Against William Lind, Against John Robb, in favor of 5GW.........................................152
from The Generations of War without the Jargon....................................................................152
from Pre-Modern Wars on a Pre-Modern Continent................................................................152
from XGW: Left of Boom - Right of Boom............................................................................152
from X vs X: Boom and the Generations in Conflict..............................................................153
from XGW as a System for the Classification of Doctrines....................................................153
from The XGW Framework: Classification and Creation of Doctrines for Conflict and
Confrontation...........................................................................................................................153
Appendix: Index of Entries: Authors...................................................................................................154
Appendix: Original Chronological Table..............................................................................................157
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Entries
Entries
Page 9
Summary for The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation:
This is the origin of the GMW, Generations of Modern Warfare, concept. It outlines in some
detail 1GW through 3GW and even gives some detail for 4GW while leaving 4GW open to further
discovery.
William Lind wrote this with Colonel Keith Nightengale (USA), Captain John F. Schmitt
(USMC), Colonel Joseph W. Sutton (USA), and Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson (USMCR)
(Summary written by Curtis Gale Weeks)
Page 10
On 1GW
"First generation warfare reflects tactics of the era of the smoothbore musket, the
tactics of line and column. These tactics were developed partially in response to
technological factors the line maximized firepower, rigid drill was necessary to
generate a high rate of fire, etc. and partially in response to social conditions and
ideas, e.g., the columns of the French revolutionary armies reflected both the lan of
the revolution and the low training levels of conscripted troops. Although rendered
obsolete with the replacement of the smoothbore by the rifled musket, vestiges of first
generation tactics survive today, especially in a frequently encountered desire for
linearity on the battlefield. Operational art in the first generation did not exist as a
concept although it was practiced by individual commanders, most prominently
Napoleon."
On 2GW
"Second generation warfare was a response to the rifled musket, breechloaders,
barbed wire, the machinegun, and indirect fire. Tactics were based on fire and
movement, and they remained essentially linear. The defense still attempted to prevent
all penetrations, and in the attack a laterally dispersed line advanced by rushes in
small groups. Perhaps the principal change from first generation tactics was heavy
reliance on indirect fire; second generation tactics were summed up in the French
maxim, "the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies." Massed firepower replaced
massed manpower. Second generation tactics remained the basis of U.S. doctrine until
the 1980s, and they are still practiced by most American units in the field."
Page 11
On 3GW
" Third generation warfare was also a response to the increase in battlefield firepower.
However, the driving force was primarily ideas. Aware they could not prevail in a
contest of materiel because of their weaker industrial base in World War I, the
Germans developed radically new tactics. Based on maneuver rather than attrition,
third generation tactics were the first truly nonlinear tactics. The attack relied on
infiltration to bypass and collapse the enemy's combat forces rather than seeking to
close with and destroy them. The defense was in depth and often invited penetration,
which set the enemy up for a counterattack.
While the basic concepts of third generation tactics were in place by the end of 1918,
the addition of a new technological element-tanks-brought about a major shift at the
operational level in World War II. That shift was blitzkrieg. In the blitzkrieg, the basis
of the operational art shifted from place (as in Liddell-Hart's indirect approach) to
time."
On 4GW
"In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and
largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the
vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable
battlefields or fronts. The distinction between "civilian" and "military" may disappear.
Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants' depth, including their
society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity. Major military facilities, such as
airfields, fixed communications sites, and large headquarters will become rarities
because of their vulnerability; the same may be true of civilian equivalents, such as
seats of government, power plants, and industrial sites (including knowledge as well
as manufacturing industries). Success will depend heavily on effectiveness in joint
operations as lines between responsibility and mission become very blurred. Again, all
these elements are present in third generation warfare; fourth generation will merely
accentuate them."
On 5GW
[No Description Given]
Notes for The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation:
[1] http://www.d-n-i.net
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From what I have seen thus far, honest attempts to discover a Fifth Generation
suggest that their authors have not fully grasped the vast change embodied in the
Fourth Generation. The loss of the states monopoly, not only on war but also on
social organization and first loyalties, alters everything. We are only in the earliest
stages of trying to understand what the Fourth Generation means in full and how it
will alter - or, in too many cases, end - our lives.
Attempting to visualize a Fifth Generation from where we are now is like trying to
see the outlines of the Middle Ages from the vantage point of the late Roman Empire.
There is no telescope that can reach so far.
In other words, the fourth generation of warfare has yet to fully materialize (or: has not been fully
visualized, itself.)
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Summary for The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century:
[3]
Page 17
The book, which primarily considers 4GW, mentions 5GW briefly in three places near the end:
1. First, by stating that innovative leadership training will be required not just to deal with
the seventy-year-old phenomenon of 4GW but also to deal with 5GW as it evolves. [pages
274-275, paperback edition.]
2. Only a highly flexible organization can hope to succeed in 4GW and still be prepared to
deal with emerging 5GW & We can continue to man 3GW organizations using an
1890s personnel system.Or we can accept that 4GW has arrived and that 5GW is
evolving and organize ourselves accordingly. [page 289, paperback edition.]
3. Fourth-generation war has been around for more than seventy years; no doubt the fifth
generation is evolving even as we attempt to deal with its predecessor. We may not
recognize it as it evolves around us. Or we may look at several alternative futures and see
each as fifth-generation war. The bio-attacks on Capitol Hill anthrax and ricin are
considered a precursor of 5GW; Hammes emphasizes the superempowered destructive
individual or small group as a viable, perhaps defining aspect of 5GW. He then reiterates
his belief that the U.S. should reorganize its military and societal capability for dealing
with 4GW forces and 5GW forces that may evolve but does not suggest that America
should develop 5GW force structures itself. I.e., 4GW and 5GW will characterize the
opponent, not the U.S. [pages 290-291, paperback edition; last two pages of the book.]
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On 1GW
"The first generation of war grew not just from the invention of gunpowder but also
from the political, economic, and social structures that developed as Europe
transitioned from a feudal system to a system of nation-states ruled by monarchs...
Massed manpower had been the rule in ancient Greece and Rome and had even been a
major part of war during the Middle Ages. However, the combination of changes
across society provided the much larger armies and massed direct-fire weapons that
marked the culmination of the first generation of war at Waterloo."
On 2GW
"Several key factors normally associated with second-generation war (2GW) drove
the supremacy of the defense over the offense: machine guns, magazine-fed rifles,
rapid-fire artillery, and barbed wire. The combined effect of these elements took away
freedom of movement and forced both sides to rely on firepower--mostly indirect
firepower--in tactical engagements."
On 3GW
"Although still primarily an infantry army, the Germans organized their armored
forces into Panzer Corps and used them to shatter the cohesion of the Allied forces.
The result was another astonishing victory. Britain was evacuating its forces from
Dunkirk only sixteen days after the invasion. France lasted only another month. In
contrast to four bloody years of stalemate in World War I, the Germans conquered
France in weeks. The victory stunned the Western powers. They were certain the
Germans had created an entirely new form of warfare.
Third-generation warfare had arrived."
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On 4GW
"Fourth-generation warfare (4GW) uses all available networks--political, economic,
social, and military--to convince the enemy's political decision makers that their
strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. It is an
evolved form of insurgency. Still rooted in the fundamental precept that superior
political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military
power, 4GW makes use of society's networks to carry on its fight. Unlike previous
generations of warfare, it does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy's military
forces. Instead, via the networks, it directly attacks the minds of enemy decision
makers to destroy the enemy's political will. Fourth-generation wars are lengthy-measured in decades rather than months or years."
On 5GW
"Fourth-generation war has been around for more than seventy years; no doubt the
fifth generation is evolving even as we attempt to deal with its predecessor. We may
not recognize it as it evolves around us. Or we may look at several alternative futures
and see each as fifth-generation war."
Notes for The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century:
[1] http://www.zenithpress.com/
[2] http://www.zenithpress.com/Store/Product_Details.aspx?ProductID=16085
[3] http://www.amazon.com/gp/redirect.html%3FASIN=0760324077%26tag=phaticcommuni20%26lcode=xm2%26cID=2025%26ccmID=165953%26location=/o/ASIN/0760324077%253FSubscriptionId=0
B24FJ1ZKPWTZ1W4MBR2
[4] http://www.amazon.com/gp/redirect.html%3FASIN=0760324077%26tag=phaticcommuni20%26lcode=xm2%26cID=2025%26ccmID=165953%26location=/o/ASIN/0760324077%253FSubscriptionId=0
B24FJ1ZKPWTZ1W4MBR2
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Quantum Computing
Human Brain Research
Complexity and Chaos Theory
Nanotechnology
String Theory
In addition, the concept of driving deeper is specifically noted:
A strong possibility exists that given successive generations of warfare tend to drive
deeper into enemy territory, that 5GW will mean systemic liquidation of enemy
networks and their sympathizers, essentially a total war on a society or subsection of
a society.
An alternative conceptualization of potential fifth generation warfare is suggested with an early
reference to Thomas P. M. Barnetts[3] System Administration based Global Transaction
Strategy as a type of 5GW.
Colonel Thomas X. Hammes The Sling and the Stone is also quoted.
Page 22
[4]
Links to:
Unto the Fifth Generation of War posted on ZenPundit 07-17-2005
Page 23
1GWs, like the Napoleon Wars, were extremely fluid. Armies could march whenever mens
feet could carry them. Information was relatively symmetrical precise locations of either
army were unavailable to any commander, while general knowledge of the land was known
to all commanders....1GW was defined by conflict centered around an enemys ability
to decide and act. "
On 2GW
"
example: First World War
Page 24
2GWs, like the First World War, were sticky. Armies took marched, drove, or took trains to
the front line where they stopped. In 2nd Generation War, action is easy: charge. You
know exactly where you are, exactly where the enemy is, and exactly where you are going
to die...2GW was defined by conflict centered around an enemys ability to orient and
decide."
On 3GW
"
example: Second World War
characteristic: blitzkrieg, fast transitions from one maneuver to the next
method of fighting: tanks/bombers-to-cities/armies
3GWs, like the trenches for most of the Second World War or the Lawrence of Arabia
campaign in the First World War, were fluid again. But conflict kept burrowing deeper into
the OODA loop and redshifting further away from action. Victory in 3rd Generation Wars
required the ability to instill madness to mess with the enemys minds. The purpose of
3rd Generation Warfare is to paralyze the enemy with doubt. We move even deeper into the
OODA loop, to the red end of the rainbow. 3GW is defined by conflict centered around
an enemys ability to orient. "
On 4GW
"
Page 25
If older generations of war were like fluids, 4GW was like a gas. It spreads everywhere yet
regular armies have a hard time even finding battles. Like 3rd Generation Wars, 4th
Generation Wars focus on the picture inside the enemys head. But while 3GW tries to
destroy the picture, 4GW builds a new one....While 3GW tries to paralyze the enemy with
doubt, 4GW tries to deny him even that much 4GW drains the will of the enemy so he
waits and sees, robbing him of his ability to want to do anything. In practice, this means
4GW tries to destroy an enemys civil society, turning his population into mindless
cowards. To achieve this, 4GW is defined by conflict centered around Observe and
Orient."
On 5GW
" If traditional war centered on an enemys physical strength, and 4GW on his moral
strength, the 5th Generation of War would focus on his intellectual strength. A 5th
Generation War might be fought with one side not knowing who it is fighting. Or even, a
brilliantly executed 5GW might involve one side being completely ignorant that there ever
was a war. "
Notes for Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop:
[1] http://www.tdaxp.com/
[2] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2005/07/18/orientation-and-action-part-i-the-ooda-loop.html
[3] http://zenpundit.blogspot.com/
[4] http://www.flickr.com/photos/dreaming5gw/1240780391/
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5GW
5GW
Younghusband (July 19, 2005)
Blog Post published by Younghusband on July 19, 2005
Site: Coming Anarchy[1]
Permalink to original: "5GW[2]"
Links to:
Unto the Fifth Generation of War posted on ZenPundit 07-17-2005
Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop posted on tdaxp 07-18-2005
Fifth Generation War in the OODA Loop posted on ZenPundit 07-19-2005
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Whereas Mark Safranski had earlier conceived of a shift in battlespace deeper into enemy
territory, he now concedes that Dan tdaxps consideration of a shift in perspectives and the
decision making process that is deeper for each succeeding generation of warfare fits the xGW
framework very well.
Mark Safranski also ponders the distinct time frames associated with 4GW and, possibly, 5GW:
It occurs to me after reading Dans post the that a very powerful shift of longitudinal
perspective takes place. 4GW is executed over a very long time frame, sometimes
decades. 5GW is conceived in terms of strategic vision over an even longer time
frame, sometimes before an opponent realizes that they will be an opponent but the
execution time may be very short in comparison to 4GW.
Links to:
Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop posted on tdaxp 07-18-2005
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Page 29
Links to:
5GW posted on Coming Anarchy 07-19-2005
Unto the Fifth Generation of War posted on ZenPundit 07-17-2005
Page 30
Page 31
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The comment ponders a scenario in which multiple, seemingly unrelated events hurt one nation
(or a group of nations) repeatedly, as if the hand of God were behind those events as an example
of fifth generation war unfolding.
Page 33
The point is also made: that [shareholder activist] 5GW fighters need not influence all members of
a target population but only need influence the most powerful within that population or those
members of the population who are in a position to institute policy changes.
Page 34
Blog Notice
Blog Notice
Curtis Gale Weeks (July 23, 2005)
Blog Post published by Curtis Gale Weeks on July 23, 2005
Site: Phatic Communion[1]
Permalink to original: "Blog Notice[2]"
Links to:
Dreaming 5th Generation War posted on tdaxp 07-20-2005
Emerging NetWar / SecretWar Tactic: Stealth Shareholder Activism posted on tdaxp 0722-2005
SecretWarriors Walk Without Rhythm, Wont Attract the Worm posted on tdaxp 07-23-
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Blog Notice
2005
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Summary for SecretWarriors Walk Without Rhythm, Won't Attract the Worm:
This post uses John Boyds OODA loop to stress the importance of secrecy in fifth generation
warfare efforts:
In SecretWar, or 5GW, the fighter tries to hurt without being hurt at all. If the
world knows the SecretWarrior exists, she has already lost. 5th Generation War
allows very weak fighters to attack, because the world does not know about them. If
the world knew about a 5GWarrior she could be eliminated easily.
Dan tdaxp also quotes a comment left on an earlier post at tdaxp by Curtis Gale Weeks and
concludes that Secret Warriors [5GWarriors] must walk without rhythm to avoid detection.
Links to:
Dreaming 5th Generation War: Comment posted on tdaxp 07-21-2005
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Summary for SecretWar: Plain Jane Tries to Kill the Yakuza Boss:
The metaphor of a Plain Jain who tries to kill a Yakuza Boss is utilized to argue that
randomness is very attractive and would severely reduce the secrecy of a 5GW operation:
For a woman crossing the dance floor, tripping is even more noticeable than swaying
her hips.
The 5GWarrior must hide in the crowd, making the most probable explanation of her
behavior that she is just normal, not that she is attempting to murder a Boss.
I.e., where previously Dan tdaxp had argued that walking without rhythm[3] or, with
randomness would serve to obscure the 5GW attack, the argument is now made that the
assassin (in this metaphor) would present a rhythm that is normal and entirely expected; she
must shape the enemys observations by presenting normalcy.
The argument is applied to a comment previously left by Curtis Gale Weeks on another post at
tdaxp concerning a succession of random events utilized to attack a nation or group of nations,
with the conclusion that such a method of operation would be bad for a fifth generation warrior:
Because randomness is very attractive, a succession of random catastrophes
striking a nation will be very, very suspicious. People are superstitious they are
Page 39
Links to:
Unto the Fifth Generation of War posted on ZenPundit 07-17-2005
Dreaming 5th Generation War: Comment posted on tdaxp 07-21-2005
Fifth Generation War in the OODA Loop posted on ZenPundit 07-19-2005
5GW Reloaded: Reflecting on 5th Generation War Concepts posted on ZenPundit 07-252005
Page 40
Links to:
Dreaming 5th Generation War posted on tdaxp 07-20-2005
Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop posted on tdaxp 07-18-2005
Page 41
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5GW Effectors
5GW Effectors
Curtis Gale Weeks (July 26, 2005)
Blog Post published by Curtis Gale Weeks on July 26, 2005
Site: Dreaming 5GW[1]
Permalink to original: "5GW Effectors[2]"
A post dissecting what kind of activity the 5GWarrior would utilize. Specifically, a consideration
of rhythm and randomness leads to a questioning of the secrecy aspect assumed to exist in
fifth generation warfare, via a metaphor Dan tdaxp had already utilized: The female assassin that
targets a Yakuza Boss:
1. The yakuza boss, when killed, would no longer appear to be alive. That is, if an action
occurs, its effects are always observable, even if we dont happen to see the action itself.
2. What kind of effects will a 5GW warrior desire? What kind of activity will the 5GW
warrior attempt in order to obtain the results desired? Specifically, why would a 5GW
warrior engage in activity the results of which are entirely unobservable; would such
results truly be results, if they do not produce cascading effects or a changed reality?
3. If results are observable, to what degree can the secret in terms such as SecretWar and
SecretWarrior, obtain or persist?
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5GW Effectors
These questions lead to two alternative unfoldings for fifth generation warfare:
Crossing the Rubicon: in which the effects caused by the fifth generation attacker may be clearly
seen, but even if they are ultimately connected by the target to some enemy and understood to be a
concerted effort to defeat the target, the target has already been influenced to cross the rubicon,
unable to avoid the remaining negative effects of the fifth generation attack: A successful 5GW
will leave the target on a downward spiral into insignificance. The targets knowing it has been a
victim wont save the target from the spiral.
The SecretWarrior as Benefactor: The most influential members of a society able to operate
with no or very limited negative suspicion are those who can promise the most benefit to that
society; and, a society which believes it is moving toward a brighter future may also cross the
rubicon but without realizing that the achievements it has made are in fact much less than
what it might have achieved had the 5GW not occurred. Such a society might be quite happy and
content with its future prospects, never even knowing that a fifth generation war had targeted them
and limited them.
This post was later cross-posted to the blog Dreaming 5GW under the same name[3].
Links to:
SecretWarriors Walk Without Rhythm, Wont Attract the Worm posted on tdaxp 07-232005
SecretWar: Plain Jane Tries to Kill the Yakuza Boss posted on tdaxp 07-25-2005
5th Generation Thumbnail Sketches posted on tdaxp 07-26-2005
Page 44
5GW Effectors
[2] http://www.dreaming5gw.com/2006/10/5gw_effectors.php
[3] http://www.fifthgeneration.phaticcommunion.com/archives/2006/10/5gw_effectors.php
Page 45
and combines them in a consideration of who, exactly, may be the fifth generation warriors.
The 5GWers may in fact be citizens of the targeted population who desire that countrys defeat or
at least can be persuaded to act in a way that leads to that countrys defeat. The thumbnail sketches
are given in terms of 4GW:
In 4GW the enemy attempts to use the target countrys media as a vehicle to sap the
peoples and political leaders will to fight. In 5GW the enemy actually becomes the
media and the political leadership. In 4GW a terrorist organization might attack a
school or a courthouse in order to show that the government cant defend itself; in
5GW the enemy would become the teachers and judges.
Page 46
The point is also made that states will have virtually no role in such warfare, since the warfare is
intellectual in nature; furthermore, an early mention is made of defense against 5GW requiring the
development of 5GW tactics by the defender.
Links to:
Unto the Fifth Generation of War posted on ZenPundit 07-17-2005
Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop posted on tdaxp 07-18-2005
Page 47
Limitations of 5GW
Limitations of 5GW
Curtis Gale Weeks (August 2, 2005)
Blog Post published by Curtis Gale Weeks on August 2, 2005
Site: Dreaming 5GW[1]
Permalink to original: "Limitations of 5GW[2]"
A blog post that considers fifth generation war waged against whole societies: what features
should be considered?
Would small 5GW forces be able to defeat a large and complex society, given that a large
society is also comprised of many smaller sub-sets or groups?
[I]f attacking the intelligence is the primary modus operandi of the 5GW force, that force
would need to be, er, quite intelligent indeed in order to have any hope of success. The
attacker would need an extraordinary understanding a fundamental comprehension
of the targeted society or force.
Because of the complexity of a large society, the 5GW attacker would need to attack [the
intelligence of] the most influential members within that society who could then influence
large portions of that society; but many others would not be so easily fooled: the
disenfranchised, the sub- and counter-cultural groups in short: those who do not
subscribe to the worldviews shared by most members of that society.
Conclusion:
1. The 5GW attacker would need to influence the majority and the leaders of that majority,
Page 48
Limitations of 5GW
Page 49
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Page 51
SecretWar (5GW)
SecretWar (5GW)
Dan tdaxp (August 6, 2005)
Blog Post published by Dan tdaxp on August 6, 2005
Site: tdaxp[1]
Permalink to original: "SecretWar (5GW)[2]"
Points made:
Economy of force improves with each succeeding generation of warfare; so 5GW targeting
a society or culture will involve small 5GW forces able to defeat the larger societies or
cultures.
Contra CGW, these 5GW would not need to intellectually understand the targeted society
in-depth, but rather will need great fingertip feeling or fingerspitzengefuhl , or good
implicit knowledge rather than explicit knowledge of the targeted society.
An open society is naturally well-defended from a 5GW attack: transparency forces the
Secret Warrior to operate in the open, which risks the secrecy of the 5GW attack.
Contra CGW (?), merely influencing the most influential members of a society should be
sufficient for a 5GW attack since Universal buy-in has never been a prerequisite for
power. I.e., the dissenting voices of a small minority will be overlooked or, through
transparency and general great openness, conspiracies and dissent will be laid to rest.
Co-optation by SecretWarriors: the President wouldnt be a SecretWarrior, but he would
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SecretWar (5GW)
Links to:
Fifth Generation Warfare? posted on Defense and the National Interest 02-03-2004
Limitations of 5GW posted on Phatic Communion 08-02-2005
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The world is composed of a psychological terrain that has less and less to do with
topography or national boundaries.
This is a pdf article which introduces 4 elements within our modern world that will bear on the
development of 5GW, followed by 3 suggestions for defending against 5GW.
4 Elements promoting the shift to 5GW and/or describing 5GW:
Technological advances which may permit very small groups or individuals to cause major
effects upon the systems, mostly negative. (I.e., superempowerment defined through access
to technology.)
Cultural identities and cultures are weakening and may receive competition from
idiosyncratic identities or individualistic ideologies. Thus, certain individuals may see
themselves and their identities writ large across the fabric of humanity and history itself.
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Targeted groups or peoples will be turned against themselves by the 5GW attacker.
Specific changes in culture and ideology are not the primary goal, however; rather, such
reactions within the target are gratifying to the inside psychology of the initiating group.
The subsequent results leading from reactionary responses are the primary goal.
Factionalism will make identifying friend and foe very difficult. Reactionary factions may
seek to benefit from the upheaval, thus may cause more chaos and conflict even if they are
not behind the 5GW attack.
Concluding thoughts/summary within the article: Superempowerment will make possible and
more likely the attempt to write ones own identity large over the society/cultural system, in
particular with regard to those who are anti-social or indeed are sociopaths.
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A consideration of recent blog posts on tdaxp and Phatic Communion leads to the introduction of
the concept of white noise and 5GW. Those who hold the levers of power within a society may
be influenced to act in ways which produce indirect results desired by fifth generation attackers;
the actual changes or activities may not be the final goal but rather distractors which a) produce
other indirect outcomes, or emergence, desired by the 5GW attacker, and b) enable the 5GW
attacker to remain hidden.
Links to:
Limitations of 5GW posted on Phatic Communion 08-02-2005
SecretWar (5GW) posted on tdaxp 08-06-2005
On Fifth Generation Warfare? posted on Defense and the National Interest 08-06-2005
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Speculation of a label given to the effort to either pre-empt a 5GW attack or defend against one:
The War on Confusion.
The label is drawn from the present taxonomy being used to describe the pre-emption/defense
against 4GW The War on Terror.
It is suggested that either label points to the need for personal, individual development in a
4GW/5GW world, as a defense; furthermore, that superempowerment of individuals, which will
figure heavily in the future dynamics of the world, correlates with the suggestion of a necessity for
personal development.
It is thought that the poem might offer deep insights into the conflicts facing us by offering
insights into the very personal aspects of that conflict, the aspects of our own personal reactions
and the actions of those who oppose us.
Links to:
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I wont say that between Sun Tzu, Musashi, and tdaxp, you shall learn everything
you need to about 5GW.
But add VNV Nations Matter + Form, and you probably will.
Soundless, formless, polished, leading: These are attributes of a 5GW campaign/force.
A polished 5GW army will soundlessly and formlessly [lead] his enemy to where he
wants him to be: and that will be the end of the 5GW. The loser will never know he
lost. A repeated 5GW victim may sense his illness, but with 5GW attacking his
Observation capacity, the victims response will probable make his situation worse.
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Links to:
5GW: Soundless + Formless + Polished + Leading posted on tdaxp 02-04-2006
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Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop posted on tdaxp 07-18-2005
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Initiating 5GW
Initiating 5GW
Curtis Gale Weeks (March 14, 2006)
Blog Post published by Curtis Gale Weeks on March 14, 2006
Site: Dreaming 5GW[1]
Permalink to original: "Initiating 5GW[2]"
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Initiating 5GW
the sophistication of the target: Will the target have the forensic capabilities and organization
which will allow it to ultimately trace back the effects to the cause, should the 5GW force directly
create major disasters? Generally, the ideas that 1) all effects are observable and 2) being physical,
or a matter of physics, they are traceable, means that direct kinetic activities by 5GW forces are
quite dangerous for them, although given the sophistication or lack thereof of the target such
activities may have some use within 5GW.
Alternatively, 5GW forces may try to frame other parties when creating major disasters, to throw
off pursuit and also to set up conflict between two other parties. Preferably, these other parties
who are framed will be usual suspects and better yet, they will want to claim responsibility
for disasters even if they had nothing to do with those disasters. Again, however, this approach
may be dangerous for 5GW actors, not only because of the potential for incriminating forensic
evidence but also because the framed parties may reject claims of responsibility.
However, either of the above possibilities may work even if the cause is detected or traced back to
the 5GW force (or at least away from the framed party) if time-lag between the original
disaster/attack and the discovery of subterfuge is great enough to have left the targets in a
downward spiral from which they cannot escape or in a position of extreme weakness.
The blog post concludes from these considerations:
What things are hardest to track? Answer: memes.
Memetic engineering (though not so-called within the post) will offer the best possibility for
influence and manipulation of other forces without detection. A variety of examples and
possibilities are offered. The post finally answers a question implied by previous conversations on
other blogs:
So, then, how could a hidden 5GW force defeat a fuzzy 4GW force? Influence it to
fight another force, one it already despises and, preferably, one it cannot defeat.
Or, introduce dispute within it, of the sort that would paralyze its activities, create
massive amounts of in-fighting. Or, befriend it; give it real accomplishments (perhaps
by surreptitiously influencing other parties who can give them these) which,
nonetheless, lead to final outcomes quite different than it originally intended.
Because a 4GW force tends to be decentralized, dependent on local actors and local
activities, focus on influencing them. Do not try to destroy the 4GW force; focus on
changing it.
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Initiating 5GW
This blog post was later cross-posted to the blog Dreaming 5GW[3].
Links to:
Truly formless 5GW posted on Coming Anarchy 03-10-2006
Truly Formless 5GW: Comment posted on Coming Anarchy 03-11-2006
Truly Formless 5GW: Comment posted on Coming Anarchy 03-11-2006
Truly Formless 5GW: Comment posted on Coming Anarchy 03-10-2006
5GW: Soundless + Formless + Polished + Leading posted on tdaxp 02-04-2006
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considered in depth, in light of the previous sections of the post, with a reiteration of the
importance of EBO as characterized in the previous post in the series.
And Deeper in which a new mapping of xGW is offered, but onto the Revised OODA
designed by CGW, followed by notes explaining the implications and variations upon previous
mappings:
[5]
The blog post was later cross-posted to the blog Dreaming 5GW[6]. (Original site is now defunct.)
Links to:
Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop posted on tdaxp 07-18-2005
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On 3GW
"3GW also saw the improvement in observational capabilities a necessary improvement
if one is to know where ones enemy is, exactly, and how that enemys forces and
strongholds are organized, in order to know how to maneuver most effectively to disrupt
and overcome that enemys defenses. Again, improved air forces, communications
technologies, transportation, and firepower improved ones observational range and speed.
Keeping ones own forces in contact, and operating efficiently and not at cross-purposes,
also required quicker communications and observational capabilities."
On 4GW
"4GW continues the trend. The Internet, for instance, is being used by 4GWarriors even as
I type this. Satellite communications, cell phones, thumbnail disk drives, and the net of
media sources criss-crossing the globe allow the fast transmission of data, increasing
observational capability. Despite this fact, 4GW insurgents and terrorists are often quite
separate from their enemies: they may live among an enemy society, but they have yet to
infiltrate into the Deepest realm of their enemies forces; i.e., be among those forces
without being detected. (Admittedly, infiltration of the Iraqi defense forces has somewhat
occurred, and in all likelihood infiltration of the Iraqi government has also occurred at
some level. But infiltration of the U.S. armed forces or government? Unlikely, although
the theft of databases such as the recently-stolen armed forces personnel database
and intercept communications might give 4GW forces a window-peek into the U.S.
operations. Or else, the New York Times will boldly publish details of those operations.)"
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On 5GW
"5GW, as broadly outlined by Dan at tdaxp in the linked post and as Ive theorized[7],
might seek an even broader-ranged observational capability than that currently available to
4GW forces; namely, very deep-level infiltration of a society, a societys armed forces, and
a societys institutions and government, or else open communication of intentions from
proxy warriors who are nonetheless unaware that they are being so used....
5GW... is the deepest of all, so entrenched within the target, the target does not know that
the 5GW force exists. When the target makes any decision, the target believes it is in full
command of its decision-making ability. The 5GW force merely creates information in
relation to other information-sets it has not created; the target observes all information
available and continues on his way toward making a decision and acting. Selective
information creation will be the 5GW forces modus operandi, and the 5GW forces goal is
to have the target act on that information."
Notes for Observing the Maturing World:
[1] http://dreaming5gw.com
[2] http://www.dreaming5gw.com/2006/10/observing_the_maturing_world.php
[3] http://www.phaticcommunion.com/archives/2006/06/rethinking_the.php
[4] http://www.phaticcommunion.com/archives/2006/07/ebo_is_everythi.php
[5] http://www.flickr.com/photos/dreaming5gw/517144444/
[6] http://www.fifthgeneration.phaticcommunion.com/archives/2006/10/observing_the_maturing_world.php
[7] http://www.dreaming5gw.com/2006/10/initiating_5gw.php
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although a too-upfront and obvious approach to shaping the Gap may seem to be a weakness
The key phrase from Dans analysis that clicked it for me is that once youre
observed doing your thing in 5GW, the gig is up
in truth, transparency is the key to success, since it opposes the status quo of authoritarian
regimes.
Development-in-a-Box really gets you into 5GW because it alters the observed
realitypre-emptivelyin a sort of bribe-the-proles mode that steals the thunder of
the 4GW warrior of today in the same way that social welfare nets and trade unions
stifled the rise of socialism in Europe
<snip>
The sort of transparency-on-steroids made possible by rule-set automation and
enterprise/agency/national resilience (Steve DeAngelis dream and self-made new
industry) makes the Core too tough a venue for 4GWers to pull off anything more
than occasional pinpricks.
Essentially, then, the 5GW sandwich strategy would mean that the 5GW sandwich works after
the 3GW Leviathan force has successfully built a space for the SysAdmin to operate, not only
holding off potential 3GW opponent peer competitors but also by keeping 4GW opponents from
being able to expand beyond the Gap.
Links to:
Dreaming 5th Generation War posted on tdaxp 07-20-2005
Truly formless 5GW posted on Coming Anarchy 03-10-2006
Unto the Fifth Generation of War posted on ZenPundit 07-17-2005
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Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop posted on tdaxp 07-18-2005
Fifth Generation War in the OODA Loop posted on ZenPundit 07-19-2005
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A Strategic Dagwood
A Strategic Dagwood
Mark Safranski (October 8, 2006)
Blog Post published by Mark Safranski on October 8, 2006
Site: ZenPundit[1]
Permalink to original: "A Strategic Dagwood[2]"
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A Strategic Dagwood
The threat today to Globalization does not come from Nasserites or Baathists, their
ideology is dead, but from apocalyptic Islamism. Reducing the appeal of Islamist
extremism with practical improvements and nonzero sum partnership is vital.
Strategy cannot be compartmentalized into separate boxes anymore.
Links to:
The sandwich generations-of-war strategy posted on Thomas P. M. Barnett 10-08-2006
5GW and Ruleset Automation posted on tdaxp 10-08-2006
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Links to:
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U.S. 3GW in the Gap would only produce opponents who would necessarily be forced to operate
at the next generational level; stopping the development of 4GW in the Gap with a superior 3GW
(assuming that would be possible) would force our enemies to develop a 5GW strategy.
However,
the idealized version of Barnetts system would likely produce it is hoped a
world view paradigm shift within a significant portion of the Gap populace that
would serve to preempt opposition
Even so, the attempt to create that paradigm shift openly, as prescribed by Thomas Barnett, would
keep it from being 5GW,
simply because the cards held in hand are displayed openly for whatever opposition
exists at the outset, and because 5GW will be about having others make the decisions
and act as if they were acting entirely on their own. That kind of decision to believe
in a reality is the kind most likely to stick. It is in fact the kind of decision, leading to
perseverance, any opposition within the Gap will have.
The post concludes by quoting a portion of Mark Safranskis reaction to Thomas Barnetts post
citing increased connectivity and openness as a potential vehicle for empowering Global
Guerrillas [re: John Robb] and then considering the possibility that so many millions within
the gap may be greatly influenced by a handful of superempowered individuals.
Links to:
A Strategic Dagwood posted on ZenPundit 10-08-2006
5GW and Ruleset Automation posted on tdaxp 10-08-2006
The sandwich generations-of-war strategy posted on Thomas P. M. Barnett 10-08-2006
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Its clear we are in a phase transition from classic 4GW guerrilla warfare to
something worse.
That something worse is: the super-empowered individual that can use the technologies of selfreplication to collapse/kill on a grand scale which John Robb calls the defining aspect of
5GW.
Links to:
A Strategic Dagwood posted on ZenPundit 10-08-2006
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Links to:
Lots of discussion of what 5GW is posted on John Robbs Weblog 10-09-2006
Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop posted on tdaxp 07-18-2005
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Links to:
Can Georgia become a MicroPower? posted on Global Guerrillas 10-07-2006
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Summary for THE CHANGING FACE OF WAR: Into the 5th Generation (5GW):
Citing William Linds The Changing Face War: Into the Fourth Generation[3], John Robb
expands the xGW framework from Linds stopping point and into a consideration of fifth
generation warfare.
Much of this new generation was derived and accelerated in cauldron of Iraq, just as
the basis for 3rd generation of warfare was proved out in the Spanish Civil war.
Three key elements appear to be emerging:
Open Source Warfare This new structure doesnt only radically expand the number
of potential participants, it shrinks the group size well below any normal measures of
viability.
Systems Disruption broad-spectrum sabotoge, perhaps often occurring as a Black
Swan[4], may undermine and reorder global systems.
Virtual States black globalization, or military/economic integration outside the
normal channels protected by nation-states, may enable diverse non-state groups to gain
greater degrees of independence and financial wealth through the warfare they conduct.
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The point is made that 9/11 was Osamas reach for 5GW-level strategy but did not actually
achieve a 5GW level.
Thomas Barnett gives an xGW perspective on his two published books while offering a look at the
still-as-yet-unwritten third book:
Im in that reaching mode toward Vol. III more and more. To me, PNM was all about
moving off 3GW and recognizing the realities of 4GW, while BFA suggested the
institutional changes and strategic alliance choices necessary to move us beyond
4GW engagement (the Long War, as we call it now) and into what I would call 5GW
shaping of the future battlespace (by locking down Asia and gaining its strategic aid
in shrinking the Gap in all those places where our enemies areto datenot yet
strong, such as the entire Gap outside of the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan/Pakistan).
Finally, a 5GW scenario is suggested, in which America takes a false beating in Afghanistan and
Iraq as long as a strategic alliance can be built with China:
I push China toward the self-realization of strategic alliance with the United States in
a number of ways: 1) letting their infiltration of the rest of the Gap go unchecked
(Oh, how lax of me!) and 2) by moving them closer to the identification as the new
face of globalization
I.e., by withdrawing in seeming defeat, America can not only force China to take a stand in
helping to shrink the Gap, but allow China to become an alternative to America in the eyes of
those living in the Gap even if in reality America and China have very common goals with
respect to the Gap.
Links to:
Dreaming 5GW: In Surround Sound posted on Dreaming 5GW 10-09-2006
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Totally unreal
Totally unreal
John Robb (October 16, 2006)
Blog Post published by John Robb on October 16, 2006
Site: John Robb's Weblog[1]
Permalink to original: "Totally unreal[2]"
Links to:
My own personal 5GW dream posted on Thomas P. M. Barnett 10-16-2006
THE CHANGING FACE OF WAR: Into the 5th Generation (5GW) posted on Global G
uerrillas 10-16-2006
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Summary for A thousand flowers will bloom on 5GW, and countless more weeds:
Responding to John Robbs accusation that he is attempting to refashion global guerrillas as his
big idea, Thomas P. M. Barnett affirms that he did not employ 5GW in his books but thought
that his own published ideas correlate with some contemporary, blogospheric discussion of fifth
generation warfare.
To me, the shifting of the conversation from 4GW to 5GW that this universe of
bloggers is pursuing seems natural enough: since 4GW is viewed as an asymmetrical
response to our overmatch in 3GW capabilities, its only natural that our attempted
response to 4GW be cast as some further iteration.
The claim is made that John Robbs sensitivity since he offers his own, particularly striking
definition of 5GW may be related to the fact that John Robbs book is nearing publication;
also, that his own (Barnetts) attempt to fit his ideas within the framework of 5GW has come as a
result of having his own ideas already discussed within that context by other bloggers.
Although appreciating John Robbs exploration of the dynamic of Global Guerrillas
specifically some of his descriptions of the dynamics well meet from nonstate actors in coming
years Thomas Barnett does not believe the GG phenomenon constitutes a new form of
warfare, nor that the threats explored by John Robb are as serious as John Robb describes them:
I see them primarily as friction in globalizations advance, just the latest (and most
cynical and self-serving) iteration of individual-level resistance to the global
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economys advance.
Finally, TPMB considers the Long War and notes that much more friction will occur within the
Gap:
But make no mistake, there will be future decisions to open fronts in this Long War
many of them over time. I believe all will be located within the Gap. I also
recognize that all will be considered hopeless diversions to some, and God knows
that some will be, as were unlikely to make wise choices throughout a decades-long
struggle.
But I dont believe this Long War will become the defining reality of globalization,
because I dont see nonstate actors, nor their networks, becoming stronger over time,
much less dominant. John sees these networked tribes as being already dominant, a
view I often run into in this business, but one that I find pointlessly hyperbolic
hence my complete lack of desire to claim any of it for my own definitions of future
warfare.
Links to:
Totally unreal posted on John Robbs Weblog 10-16-2006
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Not very secret, is it? It would inspire domestic and foreign opposition; this is a nod
to the idea that 5GW requires secrecy.
I wish he would stop thinking about other countries for a bit and think about the American
psyche. referring to Thomas Barnetts idea that America could welcome a false
defeat in order to shape views in China and the Gap; the implication is that shaping
domestic memes is also very important.
I do like Barnetts thinking, however, and hes far more right than wrong
On John Robbs 5GW speculations:
His method is disingenuous, to say the least, since he has previously:
1. Argued that GG is 4GW; because Lind said so.
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2. Argued that its just too, too early to call 5GW. (And this less than a week
ago!) Even worse, he usually says such things while saying, in effect, I agree
with Lind: too early to call er!
3. And now, he pulls a Lind, steals a title, and his destruction-oriented mythical
creatures have become 5GW Warriors
However, with respect to John Robb, Robb may be more right than wrong, at least on some
particulars:
as Ive argued before, Robbs outlining a phenomenon rather than a generation of
warfare or any type of coherent operational methodology. When I read GG, I pay
close attention to what Robb is saying, because he is in large part describing a
significant aspect of the environment that will face us
that follows a consideration of the role of non-state actors, or what John Robb calls Global
Guerrillas, which concludes with the assertion that John Robb has failed to consider the role of
angels in the system who might naturally oppose the demons he has drawn for us to consider.
Links to:
My own personal 5GW dream posted on Thomas P. M. Barnett 10-16-2006
THE CHANGING FACE OF WAR: Into the 5th Generation (5GW) posted on Global G
uerrillas 10-16-2006
Totally unreal posted on John Robbs Weblog 10-16-2006
A thousand flowers will bloom on 5GW, and countless more weeds posted on Thomas P.
M. Barnett 10-17-2006
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Summary for 5GW is Closed Source (and Global Guerillas Theory is Incoherent):
An attack on John Robbs concept of Global Guerrillas, particularly Robbs linking of Global
Guerrillas to 5GW theory.
Dan tdaxp resonds,
5GW is not open source. 5GW is closed source.
Primarily, secrecy which will be important for fifth generation operations means that, unlike
the open source warfare suggested by Robb for Global Guerrillas, fifth-generation warfare will
necessarily be closed source.
Links to:
THE CHANGING FACE OF WAR: Into the 5th Generation (5GW) posted on Global G
uerrillas 10-16-2006
A thousand flowers will bloom on 5GW, and countless more weeds posted on Thomas P.
M. Barnett 10-17-2006
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Summary for Against William Lind, Against John Robb, in favor of 5GW:
Dan of the blog tdaxp, contributor to the blog Dreaming 5GW, suggests two problems with the
way 5GW theory has been approached, singling out William Lind and John Robb as examples.
In the first case, worthless academic philosophy may swamp the theory of 5GW making it
similarly worthless. As an example, Dan suggests that William Linds use of the idea of a
dialectically qualitative shift[3] to describe succeeding Generations within GMW theory has
shades of Hegelian-Marxist-Dialectic b.s. about it.
In the second case, Dan uses John Robb as an example of those who would latch onto, and attempt
to co-opt, the phrases 5GW or fifth-generation warfare as buzzwords upon which they can place
their own pre-existing theories: These writers seek to use deception to push their own agenda, by
hijacking a more respected and developed theorys terminology to push their own.
Dan suggests a safeguard against both these twin evils of academic theosophy and marketing
buzzwordspeak: by using G in xGW to describe a scale measuring the kinetic intensity of
conflict. 0GW, then, would be the most violent genocidal and, at the other end of the scale,
5GW would be the least kinetically intense.
In giving such a structure, it is implied that a rational, verifiable framework for xGW would
safeguard the theory from haphazard and opportunistic uses.
Links to:
5GW and Ruleset Automation[4] posted on tdaxp 10-08-2006
Fifth Generation Warfare?[5] posted on Defense and the National Interest 02-03-2004
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On 4GW
"By the time we get to 4G Warfare almost none of the battle is in the field, but in the
minds of men who will live regardless. "
On 5GW
"This 5GW we talk of seems to be even more mental and less physical, seeking to
leave the men, material, and even will of the enemy essentially unchanged. If kinetic
intensity is seen as morally bad, then every new G is a moral improvement. 5GW may
truly be moral war, compared to everything that has come before."
Notes for Against William Lind, Against John Robb, in favor of 5GW:
[1] http://dreaming5gw.com
[2] http://www.dreaming5gw.com/2006/10/against_william_lind_against_j.php
[3] http://www.d-n-i.net/lind/lind_2_03_04.htm
[4] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2006/10/08/5gw-and-ruleset-automation.html
[5] http://www.d-n-i.net/lind/lind_2_03_04.htm
[6] http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/johnrobb/2006/10/totally_unreal.html
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Links to:
5GW And Beyond posted on Shlok Vaidyas Thinking 10-09-2006
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On 3GW
"The third generation, or 3GW, emphasizes maneuver. The most famous 3GW was the
German Blitz against France in 1940, where the force that could break through and
carry the commanders intent would win the day."
On 4GW
"The fourth generation, or 4GW, emphasis networks. The most famous 4GW were the
Communist insurgencies in Asia, where the force that could alienate the population
from the other side through unconventional means would prevail in the end. Both
3GW and 4GW are made possible by maximizing your enemys fog of war, so he is
unable to properly command his troops (3GW) or rely on his population (4GW)."
On 5GW
"The fifth generation of modern warfare, or 5GW, is more speculative. It is assumed
that as each generation of modern warfare goes deeper into the enemys social
thinking (from where he concentrates soldiers, to where he prepares for an artillery
barrage, to how he springs back from a blitz that seems to come from everywhere, to
what he does when faced with insurgents who kill the tax collector), 5GW will go
deeper yet. As each higher generation of war looks less like traditional war than the
generation before it, it has been argued that 5GW will not even appear to be a war at
all"
Notes for The Generations of War without the Jargon:
[1] http://www.tdaxp.com
[2] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2007/08/07/the-generations-of-war-without-the-jargon.html
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On 2GW
[No Description Given]
On 3GW
[No Description Given]
On 4GW
"Steve Pampinella, a friend of this blog, sent me a link to a very solid article, which
wonders of the African Wars should be considered as part of the fourth generation of
modern war (4GW)....
[R]eferring to the pre-modern African wars as 4GW demonstrates a poor
understanding of both Africa and 4GW."
On 5GW
[No Description Given]
Notes for Pre-Modern Wars on a Pre-Modern Continent:
[1] http://www.tdaxp.com/
[2] http://www.tdaxp.com/archive/2007/09/06/pre-modern-wars-on-a-pre-modern-continent.html
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On 1GW
"1GW Operative Action: Organization and concentration of mass to move toward or
from key points on the field of battle.
Hannibal to Napoleon, the great captains of history knew the key to victory lay in
attacking into and from, or holding, the key points of the battlefield. To do this most
effectively, they organized their army, and the force represented by its mass, in order
to most effectively and efficiently accomplish this. The organization and placement of
mass in 1GW puts it just to the left of Boom on the continuum."
On 2GW
"2GW Operative Action: Destruction of an opponents mass in order to weaken the
opponent to the point that resistance is impossible.
As the King of the Battlefield artillery ruled the muddy trenches of World War 1,
just as air power shattered any resistance inside the Kill Box of the First Gulf War,
and with the Shock and Awe of the Second Gulf War. Both are examples of the
2GW effort to cause enough direct attrition of enemy forces that the opponent is
unable to organize and concentrate its mass, becoming unable to effectively resist.
However, without the kinetic action the attrition does not occur. This places 2GW just
to the right of the Boom."
On 3GW
"3GW Operative Action: Dislocation of the opponent by attacking and defending
critical vulnerabilities.
When an opponent is dislocated positionally, functionally, morally or temporally, the
opponent loses the ability to oppose effectively, this is the essence of 3GW/Manuever
warfare. In relation to kinetics, however, does 3GW move to fight or fight to move?
This question has a direct bearing on the placement of 3GW relative to the Boom.
While a boom may occur before the movement occurs, the dislocative aspect of the
movement prior to the Boom (or the overwhelming threat of the Boom on a critical
vulnerability of the opponent), places 3GW on the timeline farther to the left of both
the Boom and 1GW."
Page 119
On 4GW
"4GW Operative Action: Using a disruptive attack or threat of disruptive attack to
cause the perception of an unwinnable situation in an opponent, resulting in a loss of
morale or will until the opponent is rendered incapacitated.
Even more than 3GW, 4GW employs a threat of kinetic action more than actual
kinetic action. At first glance it may seem that the threat of attack always precedes the
Boom. However, without the Boom or the perceived threat of the Boom there is no
effective attack on the will of the opponent. This places the operative action of 4GW
on the continuum farther to the right than the Boom and 2GW."
On 5GW
"5GW Operative Action: Manipulation and influence in order to define and shape
outcomes and effects.
5GW embodies an overwhelming focus on positional manipulation and shaping of the
battlefield so that when kinetic action or the threat of kinetic action occurs the
outcome is essentially predetermined. The opponent is, as a result, without resistance
because the response is by the targets own choice or follows a previously established
pattern that is familiar to the target. This places 5GW far to the left of 3GW, 1GW and
the Boom on the timeline."
Notes for XGW: Left of Boom - Right of Boom:
[1] http://dreaming5gw.com
[2] http://www.dreaming5gw.com/2007/10/xgw_left_of_boom_right_of_boom.php
Page 120
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Page 122
On 5GW
"5GW defeats 4GW by refining memetic engineering, mulitplying domains to be
shaped, and thus operating outside the scope of the 4GW observational range.
Changes which occur within an agricultural sector in a far removed nation-state (or
T.A.Z.) may ultimately lead to effects within the 4GW forces acknowledged field of
battle; etc. Indeed, the 4GW forces concept of the field of battle may be altered."
Notes for X vs X: Boom and the Generations in Conflict:
[1] http://dreaming5gw.com
[2] http://www.dreaming5gw.com/2007/10/x_vs_x_boom_and_the_generation.php
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involved in conflict?)
Links to:
Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop posted on tdaxp 07-18-2005
Fifth Generation War in the OODA Loop posted on ZenPundit 07-19-2005
Page 125
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Page 127
Page 128
On 3GW
"3GW is for doctrines that dislocate the strength of an enemy with a strike at the
essential weakness of an enemy (2GW is strength on strength, and 3GW is strength on
weakness). The German bypassing of the Maginot Line is an example of avoiding
strength to attack weakness and displacing the enemy. This kind of displacement may
be positional, temporal, material and/or moral. The Mongols were masters of this, so
was Stonewall Jackson and Erwin Rommel."
On 4GW
"4GW makes the jump into the moral that 3GW starts. 4GW doctrines strike at the
enemys perceived ability to continue fighting. Scorched earth is an example of 4GW
in that even before an invader feels the pinch of not being able to provide for
themselves from conquered territory (even if alternative supply can be arranged) they
begin to feel unable to continue the fight in the face of such destruction and
resolution."
On 5GW
"5GW is even more subtle, its activity goes below perception into the context of
conflict. What a target observes is manipulated in order to cause the target to react in a
specific and completely natural manner."
Notes for XGW as a System for the Classification of Doctrines:
[1] http://dreaming5gw.com
[2] http://www.dreaming5gw.com/2008/05/xgw_as_a_system_for_the_classi.php
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The XGW Framework: Classification and Creation of Doctrines for Conflict and Confrontation
Summary for The XGW Framework: Classification and Creation of Doctrines for Conflict and
Confrontation:
Arherring, on the blog Dreaming 5GW (and cross-posted to Red Herrings[3]), first notes the
distinction between GMW (Generations of Modern Warfare) and xGW; second, outlines five
broad subject areas which must be considered for an understanding of the xGW model:
1. Premise of Conflict and Confrontation
2. Premise of Basic Principles
3. Kinetic and Non-kinetic Force
4. Technology
5. Classification and Application
Third, Arherring gives short descriptions of each gradient of warfare, 0GW - 5GW.
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The XGW Framework: Classification and Creation of Doctrines for Conflict and Confrontation
Page 131
The XGW Framework: Classification and Creation of Doctrines for Conflict and Confrontation
On 3GW
"Third Gradient - Maneuver Warfare - 3GW
Maneuver Warfare doctrines are based upon the principle of avoiding the strength of
the opponent in order to attack the critical vulnerability of the opponent.
Note: The principles of 2GW and 3GW are informed mostly by the thinking of Col.
Robert Leonhards books, The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver Warfare Theory and
AirLand Battle[5], and The Principles of War for the Information Age.[6] He bases
these principles upon the concepts and writings of Sun-Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz,
John Boyd, William Lind, and B. H. Liddell-Hart, among others."
On 4GW
"Fourth Gradient - Moral Warfare - 4GW
Fourth gradient doctrines are based upon the principle of the attainment of a
functional invulnerability that prevents the opponent from being able to orient upon a
threat and creates a perception that saps the ability of the opponent to function
effectively."
On 5GW
"Fifth Gradient - Contextual Warfare - 5GW
Fifth gradient doctrines are based upon the principle of manipulation of the context of
the observations of an opponent in order to achieve a specific effect."
Notes for The XGW Framework: Classification and Creation of Doctrines for Conflict and Confrontation:
[1] http://dreaming5gw.com
[2] http://www.dreaming5gw.com/2009/01/the_following_is_an_attempt.php
[3] http://arherring.wordpress.com/2009/01/26/the-xgw-framework-classification-and-creation-of-doctrines-forconflict-and-confrontation/
[4] http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0871136643
[5] http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0891415327
[6] http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0891417133
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0GW
0GW
from The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation
[No Description Given]
from The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century
[No Description Given]
from Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop
[No Description Given]
from Observing the Maturing World
[No Description Given]
from Against William Lind, Against John Robb, in favor of 5GW
It seems to be that G measures the kinetic intensity of conflict, which every new G
being approximately 20 times less intense than the one below it.
This holds up under a first analysis. Pre-Modern Warfare (the Zeroth Generation of
Modern Warfare, 0GW, about 0Gs) is unremittingly genocidal. If the AD 1900s had
the same fatality-from-war rate as the 6000s BC, we should have seen something like
two billion war deaths. We might say that form the dawn of man to the dawn of
agriculture war meant from measuring around 0.1 Gs on the kinetic intensity scale
to .9 Gs.
Or think of it another way: 0G Warfare focuses on ending an enemys ability to fight
by killing their men. (Dan tdaxp, October 30, 2006.)
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0GW
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0GW
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1GW
1GW
from The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation
First generation warfare reflects tactics of the era of the smoothbore musket, the
tactics of line and column. These tactics were developed partially in response to
technological factors the line maximized firepower, rigid drill was necessary to
generate a high rate of fire, etc. and partially in response to social conditions and
ideas, e.g., the columns of the French revolutionary armies reflected both the lan of
the revolution and the low training levels of conscripted troops. Although rendered
obsolete with the replacement of the smoothbore by the rifled musket, vestiges of
first generation tactics survive today, especially in a frequently encountered desire for
linearity on the battlefield. Operational art in the first generation did not exist as a
concept although it was practiced by individual commanders, most prominently
Napoleon. (William S. Lind, October 15, 1989.)
from The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century
The first generation of war grew not just from the invention of gunpowder but also
from the political, economic, and social structures that developed as Europe
transitioned from a feudal system to a system of nation-states ruled by monarchs...
Massed manpower had been the rule in ancient Greece and Rome and had even been
a major part of war during the Middle Ages. However, the combination of changes
across society provided the much larger armies and massed direct-fire weapons that
marked the culmination of the first generation of war at Waterloo. ( Colonel Thomas
X. Hammes, September 12, 2004.)
from Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop
example: Napoleonic War
characteristic: mass armies
method of fighting: man-to-man
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1GW
1GWs, like the Napoleon Wars, were extremely fluid. Armies could march whenever
mens feet could carry them. Information was relatively symmetrical precise
locations of either army were unavailable to any commander, while general
knowledge of the land was known to all commanders....1GW was defined by
conflict centered around an enemys ability to decide and act. (Dan tdaxp, July
18, 2005.)
from Observing the Maturing World
While it is true that 1GW forces had a bit more observational capability
reconnaissance capability ..., ones own scouts or the spies in an enemys
encampment would have been greatly limited in what they could observe and report.
In the first place, their reports would have been old news by the time they were
received by ones generals perhaps months old in the case of espionage activity;
perhaps days old if movement from the enemy forces to ones own force (to report)
required days. Individual movements on the battlefield once battle had commenced
would be too chaotic, ever-shifting, man-to-man, making the scout relatively useless.
Furthermore, a limited range weapon must still be targeted, and targeting elements
behind the enemy lines or beyond the range of those weapons would have been
relatively useless. In the case of limited long-range capabilities, the targeting
mechanisms then in use were relatively primitive; it was enough if the cannonball or
shell hit somewhere the enemy was if it hit behind the front line. ( Curtis Gale
Weeks, July 5, 2006.)
from Against William Lind, Against John Robb, in favor of 5GW
[No Description Given]
from The Generations of War without the Jargon
The first generation, or 1GW, emphasizes concentration-of-soldiers. The most
famous 1GW was the Napoleonic Wars, where the commander who could throw the
most soldiers at the decisive point would in the war. (Dan tdaxp, August 7, 2007.)
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1GW
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2GW
2GW
from The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation
Second generation warfare was a response to the rifled musket, breechloaders, barbed
wire, the machinegun, and indirect fire. Tactics were based on fire and movement,
and they remained essentially linear. The defense still attempted to prevent all
penetrations, and in the attack a laterally dispersed line advanced by rushes in small
groups. Perhaps the principal change from first generation tactics was heavy reliance
on indirect fire; second generation tactics were summed up in the French maxim, "the
artillery conquers, the infantry occupies." Massed firepower replaced massed
manpower. Second generation tactics remained the basis of U.S. doctrine until the
1980s, and they are still practiced by most American units in the field. (William S.
Lind, October 15, 1989.)
from The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century
Several key factors normally associated with second-generation war (2GW) drove the
supremacy of the defense over the offense: machine guns, magazine-fed rifles, rapidfire artillery, and barbed wire. The combined effect of these elements took away
freedom of movement and forced both sides to rely on firepower--mostly indirect
firepower--in tactical engagements. ( Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, September 12,
2004.)
from Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop
example: First World War
characteristic: mass armies
method of fighting: fixed-artillery-to-men
2GWs, like the First World War, were sticky. Armies took marched, drove, or took
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2GW
trains to the front line where they stopped. In 2nd Generation War, action is easy:
charge. You know exactly where you are, exactly where the enemy is, and exactly
where you are going to die...2GW was defined by conflict centered around an
enemys ability to orient and decide. (Dan tdaxp, July 18, 2005.)
from Observing the Maturing World
2GW observational capabilities were improved by speed of communication as well as
targeting of weaponry. The telegraph and railway sped up long-range
communications, and rifles and artillery had better aim as well as better reach.
Primitive air forces also increased, and sped up, observational capabilities. Greater
fire power in artillery and aerial bombings meant that one could more accurately
target more enemies whenever one used these things (unlike, say, a cannonball in the
previous generation that might have hit nothing when it fell or only one or a handful
of enemies. I.e., increased destruction capability actually helped limit the need to
know an exact enemy placement.) ( Curtis Gale Weeks, July 5, 2006.)
from Against William Lind, Against John Robb, in favor of 5GW
[No Description Given]
from The Generations of War without the Jargon
The second generation, or 2GW, emphasizes concentration-of-force. The most
famous 2GW was the western front of World War I, where the force that could
concentrate the most artillery and explosive power at one point could win the day.
Both 1GW and 2GW are made possible by reducing your fog of war, so that you
know where your soldiers (1GW) or artillery (2GW) should go. (Dan tdaxp, August
7, 2007.)
from Pre-Modern Wars on a Pre-Modern Continent
[No Description Given]
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2GW
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3GW
3GW
from The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation
Third generation warfare was also a response to the increase in battlefield firepower.
However, the driving force was primarily ideas. Aware they could not prevail in a
contest of materiel because of their weaker industrial base in World War I, the
Germans developed radically new tactics. Based on maneuver rather than attrition,
third generation tactics were the first truly nonlinear tactics. The attack relied on
infiltration to bypass and collapse the enemy's combat forces rather than seeking to
close with and destroy them. The defense was in depth and often invited penetration,
which set the enemy up for a counterattack.
While the basic concepts of third generation tactics were in place by the end of 1918,
the addition of a new technological element-tanks-brought about a major shift at the
operational level in World War II. That shift was blitzkrieg. In the blitzkrieg, the basis
of the operational art shifted from place (as in Liddell-Hart's indirect approach) to
time. (William S. Lind, October 15, 1989.)
from The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century
Although still primarily an infantry army, the Germans organized their armored
forces into Panzer Corps and used them to shatter the cohesion of the Allied forces.
The result was another astonishing victory. Britain was evacuating its forces from
Dunkirk only sixteen days after the invasion. France lasted only another month. In
contrast to four bloody years of stalemate in World War I, the Germans conquered
France in weeks. The victory stunned the Western powers. They were certain the
Germans had created an entirely new form of warfare.
Third-generation warfare had arrived. ( Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, September 12,
2004.)
from Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop
example: Second World War
characteristic: blitzkrieg, fast transitions from one maneuver to the next
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3GW
3GWs, like the trenches for most of the Second World War or the Lawrence of Arabia
campaign in the First World War, were fluid again. But conflict kept burrowing
deeper into the OODA loop and redshifting further away from action. Victory in 3rd
Generation Wars required the ability to instill madness to mess with the enemys
minds. The purpose of 3rd Generation Warfare is to paralyze the enemy with doubt.
We move even deeper into the OODA loop, to the red end of the rainbow. 3GW is
defined by conflict centered around an enemys ability to orient. (Dan tdaxp, July
18, 2005.)
from Observing the Maturing World
3GW also saw the improvement in observational capabilities a necessary
improvement if one is to know where ones enemy is, exactly, and how that enemys
forces and strongholds are organized, in order to know how to maneuver most
effectively to disrupt and overcome that enemys defenses. Again, improved air
forces, communications technologies, transportation, and firepower improved ones
observational range and speed. Keeping ones own forces in contact, and operating
efficiently and not at cross-purposes, also required quicker communications and
observational capabilities. ( Curtis Gale Weeks, July 5, 2006.)
from Against William Lind, Against John Robb, in favor of 5GW
[No Description Given]
from The Generations of War without the Jargon
The third generation, or 3GW, emphasizes maneuver. The most famous 3GW was the
German Blitz against France in 1940, where the force that could break through and
carry the commanders intent would win the day. (Dan tdaxp, August 7, 2007.)
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3GW
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3GW
Maneuver Warfare doctrines are based upon the principle of avoiding the strength of
the opponent in order to attack the critical vulnerability of the opponent.
Note: The principles of 2GW and 3GW are informed mostly by the thinking of Col.
Robert Leonhards books, The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver Warfare Theory and
AirLand Battle, and The Principles of War for the Information Age. He bases these
principles upon the concepts and writings of Sun-Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, John
Boyd, William Lind, and B. H. Liddell-Hart, among others. (Arherring, January 6,
2009.)
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4GW
4GW
from The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation
In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and
largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the
vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable
battlefields or fronts. The distinction between "civilian" and "military" may
disappear. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants' depth,
including their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity. Major military
facilities, such as airfields, fixed communications sites, and large headquarters will
become rarities because of their vulnerability; the same may be true of civilian
equivalents, such as seats of government, power plants, and industrial sites (including
knowledge as well as manufacturing industries). Success will depend heavily on
effectiveness in joint operations as lines between responsibility and mission become
very blurred. Again, all these elements are present in third generation warfare; fourth
generation will merely accentuate them. (William S. Lind, October 15, 1989.)
from The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century
Fourth-generation warfare (4GW) uses all available networks--political, economic,
social, and military--to convince the enemy's political decision makers that their
strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. It is an
evolved form of insurgency. Still rooted in the fundamental precept that superior
political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military
power, 4GW makes use of society's networks to carry on its fight. Unlike previous
generations of warfare, it does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy's military
forces. Instead, via the networks, it directly attacks the minds of enemy decision
makers to destroy the enemy's political will. Fourth-generation wars are lengthy-measured in decades rather than months or years. ( Colonel Thomas X. Hammes,
September 12, 2004.)
from Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop
example: Vietnam War
characteristic: dispiriting the enemy
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4GW
If older generations of war were like fluids, 4GW was like a gas. It spreads
everywhere yet regular armies have a hard time even finding battles. Like 3rd
Generation Wars, 4th Generation Wars focus on the picture inside the enemys head.
But while 3GW tries to destroy the picture, 4GW builds a new one....While 3GW
tries to paralyze the enemy with doubt, 4GW tries to deny him even that much
4GW drains the will of the enemy so he waits and sees, robbing him of his ability
to want to do anything. In practice, this means 4GW tries to destroy an enemys civil
society, turning his population into mindless cowards. To achieve this, 4GW is
defined by conflict centered around Observe and Orient. (Dan tdaxp, July 18,
2005.)
from Observing the Maturing World
4GW continues the trend. The Internet, for instance, is being used by 4GWarriors
even as I type this. Satellite communications, cell phones, thumbnail disk drives, and
the net of media sources criss-crossing the globe allow the fast transmission of data,
increasing observational capability. Despite this fact, 4GW insurgents and terrorists
are often quite separate from their enemies: they may live among an enemy society,
but they have yet to infiltrate into the Deepest realm of their enemies forces; i.e., be
among those forces without being detected. (Admittedly, infiltration of the Iraqi
defense forces has somewhat occurred, and in all likelihood infiltration of the Iraqi
government has also occurred at some level. But infiltration of the U.S. armed forces
or government? Unlikely, although the theft of databases such as the recentlystolen armed forces personnel database and intercept communications might give
4GW forces a window-peek into the U.S. operations. Or else, the New York Times
will boldly publish details of those operations.) ( Curtis Gale Weeks, July 5, 2006.)
from Against William Lind, Against John Robb, in favor of 5GW
By the time we get to 4G Warfare almost none of the battle is in the field, but in the
minds of men who will live regardless. (Dan tdaxp, October 30, 2006.)
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4GW
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4GW
CoGs may include the morale of the population supporting the 3GW force; the CoGs
may include destruction and murder within civilian populations, at any point civilians
can be found. (Curtis Gale Weeks, October 24, 2007.)
from XGW as a System for the Classification of Doctrines
4GW makes the jump into the moral that 3GW starts. 4GW doctrines strike at the
enemys perceived ability to continue fighting. Scorched earth is an example of 4GW
in that even before an invader feels the pinch of not being able to provide for
themselves from conquered territory (even if alternative supply can be arranged) they
begin to feel unable to continue the fight in the face of such destruction and
resolution. (Arherring, May 26, 2008.)
from The XGW Framework: Classification and Creation of Doctrines for Conflict and
Confrontation
Fourth Gradient - Moral Warfare - 4GW
Fourth gradient doctrines are based upon the principle of the attainment of a
functional invulnerability that prevents the opponent from being able to orient upon a
threat and creates a perception that saps the ability of the opponent to function
effectively. (Arherring, January 6, 2009.)
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5GW
5GW
from The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation
[No Description Given]
from The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century
Fourth-generation war has been around for more than seventy years; no doubt the
fifth generation is evolving even as we attempt to deal with its predecessor. We may
not recognize it as it evolves around us. Or we may look at several alternative futures
and see each as fifth-generation war. ( Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, September 12,
2004.)
from Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop
If traditional war centered on an enemys physical strength, and 4GW on his moral
strength, the 5th Generation of War would focus on his intellectual strength. A
5th Generation War might be fought with one side not knowing who it is fighting. Or
even, a brilliantly executed 5GW might involve one side being completely ignorant
that there ever was a war. (Dan tdaxp, July 18, 2005.)
from Observing the Maturing World
5GW, as broadly outlined by Dan at tdaxp in the linked post and as Ive theorized,
might seek an even broader-ranged observational capability than that currently
available to 4GW forces; namely, very deep-level infiltration of a society, a societys
armed forces, and a societys institutions and government, or else open
communication of intentions from proxy warriors who are nonetheless unaware that
they are being so used....
5GW... is the deepest of all, so entrenched within the target, the target does not know
that the 5GW force exists. When the target makes any decision, the target believes it
is in full command of its decision-making ability. The 5GW force merely creates
information in relation to other information-sets it has not created; the target observes
all information available and continues on his way toward making a decision and
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5GW
acting. Selective information creation will be the 5GW forces modus operandi, and
the 5GW forces goal is to have the target act on that information. ( Curtis Gale
Weeks, July 5, 2006.)
from Against William Lind, Against John Robb, in favor of 5GW
This 5GW we talk of seems to be even more mental and less physical, seeking to
leave the men, material, and even will of the enemy essentially unchanged. If kinetic
intensity is seen as morally bad, then every new G is a moral improvement. 5GW
may truly be moral war, compared to everything that has come before. (Dan tdaxp,
October 30, 2006.)
from The Generations of War without the Jargon
The fifth generation of modern warfare, or 5GW, is more speculative. It is assumed
that as each generation of modern warfare goes deeper into the enemys social
thinking (from where he concentrates soldiers, to where he prepares for an artillery
barrage, to how he springs back from a blitz that seems to come from everywhere, to
what he does when faced with insurgents who kill the tax collector), 5GW will go
deeper yet. As each higher generation of war looks less like traditional war than the
generation before it, it has been argued that 5GW will not even appear to be a war
at all (Dan tdaxp, August 7, 2007.)
from Pre-Modern Wars on a Pre-Modern Continent
[No Description Given]
from XGW: Left of Boom - Right of Boom
5GW Operative Action: Manipulation and influence in order to define and shape
outcomes and effects.
5GW embodies an overwhelming focus on positional manipulation and shaping of
the battlefield so that when kinetic action or the threat of kinetic action occurs the
outcome is essentially predetermined. The opponent is, as a result, without resistance
because the response is by the targets own choice or follows a previously established
pattern that is familiar to the target. This places 5GW far to the left of 3GW, 1GW
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