Sergius of Reshaina

Introduction to Aristotle and His Categories, Addressed to Philotheos

 Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus

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 Sergius of Reshaina

Introduction to Aristotle and

His Categories, Addressed to
Philotheos

Syriac Text, with Introduction, Translation, and Commentary by

Sami Aydin

leiden | boston
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Aydin, Sami, 1979- author, editor, translator. | Aydin, Sami, 1979-
   editor, translator. | Sergius, Rescainae, -536, author. Introduction to
   Aristotle and his Categories, addressed to Philotheos. | Sergius,
   Rescainae, -536, author. Introduction to Aristotle and his Categories,
   addressed to Philotheos. English.
Title: Sergius of Reshaina : introduction to Aristotle and his Categories,
   addressed to Philotheos / Syriac text, with introduction, translation, and
   commentary by Sami Aydin.
Other titles: Introduction to Aristotle and his Categories, addressed to
   Philotheos
Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, [2016] | Series: Aristoteles
   semitico-latinus, issn 0927-4103 ; volume 24 | English and Syriac. |
   Slightly revised version of the author's thesis (doctoral)–Uppsala
   universitet, 2015. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: lccn 2016027429 (print) | lccn 2016033882 (ebook) | isbn
   9789004324954 (hardback : alk. paper) | isbn 9789004325142 (e-book)
Subjects: lcsh: Aristotle. Categoriae. | Aristotle. Physics. | Sergius,
   Rescainae, -536.
Classification: lcc B491.C26 A93 2016 (print) | lcc B491.C26 (ebook) | ddc
   185–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016027429

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To the memory of my father Ḥanna Aydın (1932–1993)

∵
Contents

Preface ix
Abbreviations xii

1 Introduction 1
1.1 Aim and Scope 2
1.2 Sergius’ Life 3

2 Sergius as Writer 10
2.1 Original Works 10
2.1.1 Philosophical Works Here Considered Authentic 10
2.1.2 Dubious Attribution of Philosophical Works 13
2.1.3 Philosophical Adaptations and Translations 15
2.1.4 A Lost Philosophical Work (?) and a Possible Translation 17
2.1.5 An Original Theological Introduction and a Translation 18
2.1.6 Lost Theological Works 20
2.1.7 Sergius’ Medical Adaptations and Translations 21
2.2 Some Rhetorical topoi in Sergius’ Extant Prefaces 26
2.3 Sergius’ Achievements as Translator 36

3 Sergius’ Educational Background 40

3.1 The City of Reshaina 40
3.2 The Various Curricula Offered at the Alexandrian School 41
3.3 The Medical Curriculum of the Alexandrian School 46
3.4 The Philosophical Curriculum of the Alexandrian School 47

4 Sergius as a Commentator of Aristotle 51

4.1 Why Sergius Composed Commentaries and Not Translations 51
4.2 Other Commentators Dealt with Here 52
4.3 Important Antecedent Commentators 52
4.4 Important Contemporary Commentators 54
4.5 Important Subsequent Commentators 58
4.6 The Question of Originality 61
4.7 Sergius’ Sources 63
4.8 Sergius and his School? 65
viii contents

5 Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories and Introduction to Aristotle

and His Categories 67
5.1 The Chronology of Sergius’ Two Texts 69
5.2 Aristotle’s Categories: How It Was Viewed and Read 70
5.3 A Synoptic Overview of the Contents of Sergius’ Two Works 72
5.4 Linguistic Observations, Especially of Some Particles 76
5.5 The Manuscript of Sergius’ Introduction 83
5.6 Concluding Remarks 88

6 Editorial Principles 91

7 Text and Translation of Sergius’ Introduction to Aristotle and His

Categories 94
7.1 Textual Notes 170

8 Commentary 176

9 Bibliography 261
10 Syriac-Greek Glossary 295
11 Greek-Syriac Glossary 303
12 Greek Names in Sergius’ Introduction 311
13 Syriac-English Index 312
14 English-Syriac Index 319
15 Name and Place Index 326
Preface

Syriac studies have slowly but gradually been flourishing during the last four
decades, with an increasing number of researchers engaged in the field. Much
research has, for understandable reasons, been devoted to theological works,
since the Syriac literature, with its high output of religious prosaic and poet-
ical texts, constitutes one of the most significant and beautiful witnesses to
the Eastern branch of Christianity. But the Syriac language is also the bearer
of many interesting and important literary works in other disciplines, which
deserve the proper attention of scholars. Interest in philosophical texts has
in fact increased in recent years, but many key texts in the field still remain
unedited. Therefore, future research will hopefully aim to publish, translate,
and elucidate thus far overlooked texts.
Even if some religious literature in Syriac appeals to me, especially hagio-
graphical material, yet since my early youth I have been equally interested in
philosophy and its history. As a consequence, the first courses that I took as an
undergraduate student were in the History of Ideas at Stockholm University,
where the focus was of course on the history of Western philosophy. Later on,
when I began my studies in Aramaic/Syriac at Uppsala University, new oppor-
tunities arose where I could combine my interest in the Syriac language with
a neglected philosophical tradition, which was specifically dear to me because
of my background. Besides, it felt right to be in search of this tradition’s source,
where I found Sergius of Reshaina, heaving already dealt with Mara bar Sera-
pion and Bardaisan in two papers in Swedish. It was truly fortunate that in 2010
I was given the chance to carry out my postgraduate studies at The Department
of Linguistics and Philology (Uppsala University) on a project about Sergius.
There are two related texts extant in Syriac written by the physician and
commentator Sergius of Reshaina (d. 536) about the philosophy of Aristotle.
This book provides a critical edition and a facing English translation of the
shorter of these texts. The edition is based on the single preserved manuscript
of the text (Berlin, Petermann i 9). An introduction to Sergius’ life and works,
and an analysis of the text in its intellectual context, is also provided. His
writing is one of the earliest analyses on Aristotelian philosophy in the Syriac
language and presents concepts that were taught at the Neoplatonist school of
Ammonius Hermeiou (d. 517–526) in Alexandria.
Sergius received his philosophical and medical education in Alexandria and
was active in the city of Reshaina as one of the first translators of profane Greek
material into Syriac. He translated chiefly medical works by Galen, especially
those that were studied in the Alexandrian school, but also the theological
x preface

corpus of Pseudo-Dionysius. Sergius composed some original works on Aris-

totle’s philosophy as well. Through his translation work and literary activity, he
paved the way for the later engagement in medicine and Aristotelian philoso-
phy among Syriac writers. His importance and influence is acknowledged by
the historical testimonies to him, as well as by the numerous ways in which his
works were read and used.
The text of Sergius, edited here, treats themes that are primarily found in
Aristotle’s Categories. After a preface, in which the author refutes potential crit-
icism and justifies his writing, he begins his work with a traditional division
of the philosophy into theory and practice with their respective subdivisions.
He also presents the Platonist notion of universals, before introducing the ten
categories of reality into which, according to him, Aristotle had arranged all
existing things. However, Sergius discusses the categories of substance, quan-
tity, quality, and relatives more extensively, since these four were considered
to be the main categories. Many problems related to these categories are pre-
sented together with proposed solutions. Other topics described by Sergius are
such as what is a distinctive property, the natural philosophers’ view of the four
elements, the modes of opposition and its difference from contrariety, and the
five kinds of priority. Moreover, Sergius provides a relatively lengthy discussion
of the nature of space and whether it belongs to the category of quantity. This
discussion is based on the Alexandrian commentators’ interpretations of Aris-
totle’s Physics rather than the Categories. In the commentary section of this
edition, Sergius’ line of thought is clarified and compared to some Greek com-
mentaries from the same tradition.
Many individuals deserve my appreciation for their help in bringing this
work, a slightly revised version of my dissertation, to a hopefully successful
close, though I alone am fully responsible for all its shortcomings. I want espe-
cially to thank those persons who have directed me during my research on
Sergius. First of all, I express my gratefulness to my principal supervisor Profes-
sor Mats Eskhult and assistant supervisor Witold Witakowski for the learned
discussions and wise advice they have offered me, and for the improvements
they have made to my text. I also wish to express my sincere gratitude to my sec-
ond assistant supervisor Daniel King (Cardiff University) for his many valuable
comments and for proofreading the entire text and also correcting my English.
At my final seminar, I had Professor John W. Watt (Cardiff University) as the
opponent, to whom I owe special thanks for several beneficial observations. In
the same way, I wish to acknowledge my debt of gratitude to Professor Sebas-
tian P. Brock (Oxford University), who was the faculty examiner of my thesis, at
it public defence, for all his improvements and valuable remarks. I address my
thanks also to Professor Denis Searby (Stockholm University), who read parts
preface xi

of my material and proposed many useful changes. I extend my thanks also to

Börje Bydén (University of Gothenburg), who offered a helpful course on the
Greek version of Aristotle’s Categories at Stockholm University.
I have often discussed various issues with my friend and colleague Ambjörn
Sjörs, whom I thank for his sensible opinions on many questions. I am grateful
also to Bo Isaksson, Lena Ambjörn, Anette Månsson, Jonathan Morén, Monica
Hedlund, Christian Braw, and all the members of the Semitic Seminar for their
comments and suggestions.
Facing its publication, my text was also read by Professor Hans Daiber
and Professor Jaap Mansfeld, who proposed many constructive remarks and
improvements. I would therefore like to express my gratitude to both of them,
as well as to the other general editors and members of the editorial board of
Brill’s Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus series, for their decision to include my book
in this esteemed series.
Finally, my thanks go to my friends and family, above all my mother Naze, for
encouraging and taking such good care of me, and also to my siblings for their
support. I would also like to thank my nephews and nieces, especially Sara, for
all the joy they have brought during my research on Sergius.

Sami Aydin
March 2016, Uppsala
Abbreviations

A Anonymous Syriac Categories: The Earliest Syriac Translation of

Aristotle’s Categories, (ed. King, 2010).
Anon. Anonymi categoriarum paraphrasis, (ed. Hayduck, 1883).
Ammon. Ammonius, In Categorias, (ed. Busse, 1895).
Anon. Syr. In Isag. Anonymous Syriac Commentary In Isagogen: Aristoteles bei den
Syrern vom v.–viii Jahrhundert, (ed. Baumstark, 1900).
Br./Sok. Sokoloff (2009), A Syriac Lexicon. A Translation … of C. Brockel-
mann’s Lexicon Syriacum.
Br.LS. Carl Brockelmann, Lexicon Syriacum, editio secunda aucta et
emendata, (Halis Saxonum, 1928).
Dexip. Dexippus, In Categorias, (ed. Busse, 1888).
Elias Elias, In Categorias, (ed. Busse, 1902).
G George, Bishop of the Arabs’ translation of the Categories: La
Categorie e gli Ermeneutici di Aristotele nella versione siriaca di
Giorgio delle Nazioni, (ed. Furlani, 1933).
H Hoffmann’s ‘Glossary’ in his: De hermeneuticis apud Syros Aris-
toteleis, (1869), pp. 154–216.
J Jacob of Edessa’s translation of the Categories: Les Catégories
d’ Aristote dans leurs versions syro-arabes, (ed. Georr, 1948).
Olymp. Olympiodorus, Prolegomena et In Categorias, (ed. Busse, 1902).
Philop. Philoponus, In Categorias, (ed. Busse, 1898).
Philop. Syr. In Isag. Philoponus’ (?) Syriac fragments of In Isagogen: Aristoteles bei den
Syrern vom v.–viii Jahrhundert, (ed. Baumstark, 1900).
Porph. Porphyry, In Categorias, (ed. Busse, 1887).
Simpl. Simplicius, In Categorias, (ed. Kalbfleisch, 1907).
Steph. Syr. In Isag. Stephanus’ Syriac remnants In Isagogen: Aristoteles bei den Syrern
vom v.–viii Jahrhundert, (ed. Baumstark, 1900).
TS. Thesaurus Syriacus, ed. Robert Payne Smith, (Oxford, 1878–1897).
(Reference to columns).
 chapter 1

Introduction

During the nineteenth century, when Western museums and libraries acquired
Syriac manuscripts in large numbers, the scholars attached importance pri-
marily to those manuscripts that contained Syriac translations of extant or lost
Greek works. For the extant texts, new textual evidence came to the disposal
of scholars, while a specific lost Greek work became available for the first time
to the modern reader, even though in translation. Therefore, there was a ten-
dency among the scholars of that period to edit the Syriac texts which were
based on Greek originals, and to translate them into modern languages. This
inclination to edit and translate Syriac translations of Greek works was espe-
cially applied to philosophical texts. Nonetheless, there were some exceptions,
such as Hoffmann’s edition of Proba’s commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpre-
tation in 1860, Land’s edition and translation of Paul the Persian’s treatise on
Aristotle’s logic in 1875, and Baumstark’s edition of some material concerning
Porphyry’s Eisagoge in 1900. A scholar who during the twentieth century made
some contribution to the edition of Syriac philosophical works was Giuseppe
Furlani (d. 1962). But many times, he confined himself to complete or partial
Italian translation of such texts. Thus, many works composed in Syriac in the
field of philosophy have remained unedited up to now.
One of the more influential commentators from the Syriac tradition is Ser-
gius of Reshaina. Yet, most of his few extant original philosophical texts have
remained unedited, in contrast to Aristotle’s Greek commentators, whose texts
were published more than a century ago in the famous series Commentaria
in Aristotelem Graeca (cag, 23 volumes, between 1882–1909). In addition to
the great importance of Sergius’ philosophical production in its own right, it
constitutes a significant complementary contribution to the Alexandrian Neo-
platonist tradition, to which he can be connected. His place and contribution
to this tradition increases our knowledge about the philosophical history and
education of late ancient Alexandria. As a forerunner in the field of Greek phi-
losophy and some other profane sciences in Syriac, he invented and adapted a
new philosophical and scientific terminology for the Syriac language.
However, due to the loss of most of his production, the unedited state of
those extant works, and the false ascription of some anonymous texts to him,
the individual with whom this study deals has yet not been properly assessed.
He was certainly a very influential person, a pioneer, who gave direction to the
subsequent engagement in certain parts of Greek philosophy and medicine

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2016 | doi: 10.1163/9789004325142_002

2 chapter 1

among Arameans/Syrians and later on among Arabs. He was a pragmatic trans-

mitter who took pains with the introduction of Greek logic and medicine in the
Syriac domain in order to serve an actual function, but also for its own purpose
and to form a living part of his own heritage. He was the priest, the translator,
the philosopher, and the physician Sergius of Reshaina.1

1.1 Aim and Scope

The chief aim of this work is to publish a critical edition of one of Sergius’
philosophical treatise, which centres on questions discussed by Aristotle in his
two works, Categories and Physics. In order to make Sergius’ text accessible also
to people who cannot read Syriac, a translation has been supplemented to the
edition.
Within the scope of the present book, a thorough introduction is given to
Sergius’ life and his works from available evidence. A historical overview to
his educational and intellectual background is also supplied, which enables
the reader to place his text in its philosophical context. A section on some
interesting linguistic matters in Sergius’ text is provided too in this first part.
The second part of the book presents the critical edition and an English
translation of Sergius’ Syriac text. The edition is based on the unique manu-
script that preserves his treatise. The edited text is accompanied by a section
that contains some textual notes, in addition to the necessary notes given in
the critical apparatus. The facing English translation is fairly literal and has a
vocabulary that is in use among translators of such texts from Greek, for the
purpose of recognition and familiarity.
The last part of this book consists of philological and philosophical annota-
tions to Sergius’ text edited here. Some of these comments are more detailed
than others, depending on the character of each issue and current discussions
among scholars. This commentary section is important in placing Sergius’ dis-
cussions in the contemporary philosophical context in which they were con-
ducted and to clarify his lines of reasoning. Finally, a Syriac-Greek glossary is
added, which is based on readings from the related passages in the works of
Greek commentators from the same tradition, as well as a Greek-Syriac glos-
sary and some other useful indices.

1 His name in Syriac is 焏q‫ܢ‬q‫ܥ‬rq‫ ܪ‬爿q‫ܓ‬r‫ ܣ‬Sargīs Rēšʿaynāyā or 焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܥ‬rq‫ ܕܪ‬爿q‫ܓ‬r‫ ܣ‬Sargīs dǝ-
Rēšʿaynā ‘Sargis of Rēšʿaynā’. I will be using the simplified form Sergius of Reshaina.
introduction 3

1.2 Sergius’ Life

Our sources related to Sergius’ life do not provide any information about the
date or place of his birth.2 However, because of the emissary assignment he
shouldered on behalf of Ephraem, the Chalcedonian patriarch of Antioch (526–
545), the last period of his life has been documented. The account of Sergius is
written by a Miaphysite monk from Amid (now Diyarbakır), who translated
the Greek chronicle of Zachariah of Mytilene (c. 465–after 536, also known
as Zacharias Scholasticus or Rhetor) into Syriac. The Ecclesiastical History of
Zachariah covered the time period from 451 to 491 (books 3–6) and was written
in Greek. It is now lost and what is extant is the Syriac version and continu-
ation of it by the anonymous monk from Amid, who is usually called Pseudo-
Zachariah Rhetor. In the Syriac version, some biographical notes about Sergius’
education, religious orientation, literary activity, and personal character are
recorded. This and some other available historical data about Sergius’ life and
works were presented and studied by Anton Baumstark in his 1894 study.3 Since
then, a new edition and English translation of Pseudo-Zachariah’s valuable
account of the events of his own time has appeared and therefore it is worth
quoting the passage concerning Sergius from this chronicle anew, together with
a translation.
After all, most of our biographical information about Sergius, as well as
that found in later historians such as Michael the Great (ca. 1126–1199) and
Bar ʿEbroyo (1226–1286), goes back to the record of Pseudo-Zachariah. Since
indeed, the account in the Chronicle of 846,4 the Chronicle5 of Michael the Great,
and the Ecclesiastical History6 of Bar ʿEbroyo are almost literal citations from
Pseudo-Zachariah’s chronicle, I will not include their texts, except when they
provide some additional information.

2 Nutton’s (1984: 13) note that Sergius was born at Antioch does not have any support in the
historical sources. Neither can he be the Σέργιος ὁ ἑρμηνεύς ‘Sergius the Interpreter’ (ibid. p. 13
n. 17) mentioned by the historian Agathias, since Agathias was born only in c. 532, about just
four years before Sergius’ death.
3 Baumstark, Lucubrationes Syro-Graecae (1894). Many of the historical testimonies are more
recently presented by Fiori (2010c: 79–118) in his unpublished doctoral dissertation in Italian.
4 The account of Sergius is found in Chronicon ad annum Domini 846 pertinens at 224.1–23 in
Chronica Minora ii, edited by E.W. Brooks, Latin translation by J.-B. Chabot, pp. 170f.
5 It is found in the unique Edessa/Aleppo manuscript of Michael’s Chronicle, at fol. 141vb36–
142ra30, which is numbered as pp. 286–287 in Gorgias Press’ facsimile edition of 2009, trans-
lated into English by M. Moosa (2014: 329) = Chabot, Vol. 4, pp. 283b36–284a30, French tr.
vol. ii, pp. 199f.
6 Chronicon Ecclesiasticum, vol. i, col. 205, 207, (eds. Abbeloos & Lamy), translated into English
by D. Wilmshurst (2016).
 4 chapter 1

The information about Sergius is found in book ix, chapter 19 in Pseudo-

Zacharias Rhetor’s chronicle, which is concerned with the schism between the
supporters and opponents of the confession of the Council of Chalcedon. The
individuals mentioned are the Chalcedonian Patriarch Ephraem of Antioch
(526–545) and his ally Agapetus i of Rome (pope 535–536) who were battling
against the Miaphysite bishops Severus of Antioch (patriarch 512–518, d. 538),
Theodosius i of Alexandria (patriarch 535–536, d. 566), Anthimus i of Con-
stantinople (patriarch 535–536)7 during the reign of Justinian i (emperor 527–
565). The Syriac text is taken from E.W. Brooks’ edition of 1924 (136.1–137.9,
137.13–16, 138.4–14). I have revised the English translation of Robert R. Phenix
and Cornelia B. Horn, (pp. 368–371) in the volume edited by Geoffrey Greatrex
(2011). It tells us the following about Sergius:

焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܥ‬rq‫ܘܣ ܕܪ‬rqqq‫ ܐܪ‬爿q‫ܓ‬r‫ ܕܣ‬爯q‫ܫ ܕ‬煟‫ܓ‬8
爏‫ܠ ܥ‬熏‫ܟ ܕܢܩܒ‬熏qq‫ܢ‬焏‫ ܠ‬犟‫ ܣܠ‬爯q‫ܐ ܗܠ‬r‫ܡ‬熏̈q‫ܒ‬
爟qr‫ܦ‬焏‫ܕܥ ܠ‬熏‫ ܡ‬煟q .爯‫ ܕܬܡ‬焏‫ܠ ܐܦܣܩܦ‬熏‫ܐܣ‬
焏‫ܐ ܗܘܐ ܗܢ‬r‫ ܘܓܒ‬.煿‫ ܡܢ‬qq‫ ܕܐܬܢ‬焏qrqrq‫ܦ‬
焏‫ܒ‬rq̈‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܢ‬qr‫ ܗܘܐ ܒܩ‬q‫ ܘܡܠ‬9焏‫ܢܢ‬r‫ܠ‬
̈
.爿q‫ܓܢ‬q‫ ܕܐܘܪ‬煿‫ܠܦܢ‬熏q‫ ܘܒ‬10焏q‫ܢ‬熏q‫ܐ ܕ‬焏q‫ܣܓ‬
̈ books of the Greeks, and in the teaching of Origen. He had
焏‫ ܕ̈ܡܠܦܢ‬焏‫ܒ‬rq̈‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܩ‬r熏‫ ܒܦ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬煿‫ܐ ܗܘܐ ܠ‬r‫ܩ‬
.焏‫ܥ‬q煟q 焏‫ ܙܒܢ‬焏q‫ܪ‬煟‫ܣܢ‬q‫ܠ‬焏‫ ܒ‬焏‫ܢ‬rq‫ܐ‬
It happened that Sergius, a chief physician of Reshaina, in
those days went up to Antioch in order to accuse Asylus,
the bishop there [i.e. of Reshaina], making known to Patri-
arch Ephraem that he had been harmed by him. He was
a man of eloquence and trained in the reading of many
studied the interpretation of books by other teachers in
Alexandria for some time. He knew Syriac, both reading

7 Michael the Great and Bar ʿEbroyo mention also the Syrian monk ‫ܪܐ‬熏‫ܝ ܙܥ‬r‫ ܡ‬焏rq煟‫ܩ‬
焏q‫ܢ‬熏q‫‘ ܐܣ‬The Holy Mar Zoora the Stylite’ as involved in these events on the side
of the Miaphysite bishops. He is also mentioned in the acts of these synods of 536 as
Ζωόρας τις Σύρος ‘Zooras a certain Syrian’. On him see 25.29–27.10, 32.35–33.9, 43.11–44.15,
111.24–125.35 passim in the Collectio Sabbaitica (ed. Schwartz), and its index at p. 245; and
especially John of Ephesus, Lives of the Eastern Saints, i, ed. Brooks, (1923: 18–36). None of
the Sergiuses mentioned in these acts is Sergius of Reshaina, since he died just before the
recorded gatherings.
8 Manuscript c (bl Add 12154) fol. 151v has a title here, which among others gives (p. 136
n. 1): ‫ܘܣ‬rqqq‫ ܐܪ‬爿q‫ܓ‬r‫ ܗ̣ܘܐ ܠܣ‬焏‫ܠܡ‬熏r 焏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܕܐ‬焏q熏q‫ܐ ܕܡ‬rq‫ܥ‬r‫‘ ܬ‬the account that
shows which end befell Sergius the archiatros’.
9
̈ ̈
The Chronicle of 846 has (224.3–5): 焏q‫ܢ‬熏q 焏‫ܒ‬rq‫ ܒ‬焏r‫ܪ‬煟‫ ܘܡ‬焏‫ܠ‬q‫ ܡܠ‬.焏‫ܢܢ‬r‫ܐ ܠ‬r‫ܓܒ‬
‫ ܗܘܐ‬rq‫ ܓܡ‬q‫ ܣܓ‬r‫ܐ ܕܠܒ‬r‫ܡ‬qq‫ ܘܐܦ ܒ‬.焏qqr熏‫‘ ܘܣ‬a man of eloquence, articulate
and experienced in Greek and Syriac books, and was also much accomplished in profane
wisdom’.
̈ ̈
10 Bar ʿEbroyo has (col. 207.1 f.): ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܣ‬焏‫ ܘܒ‬.焏qr熏‫ ܘܣ‬焏q‫ܢ‬熏q 焏‫ܒ‬rq‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܢ‬qr‫ ܒܩ‬qq̣‫ܕܡܠ‬
‫ ܗܘܐ‬爿‫ ܡܦ‬rq焏‫ܐ ܬܩܢ‬r‫‘ ܕܦܓ‬who was trained in the reading of books of the Greeks
and of the Syrians, and was firmly versed in the healing of the bodies’.
 introduction 5

.焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܘܠ‬ 焏‫ܢ‬qr‫ ܗܘܐ ܩ‬爟qq rq焏qq‫ܪ‬熏‫ܘܣ‬
焏‫ܡܢ‬q煿‫ ܡ‬煿‫ܢ‬q‫ܒ‬犏‫ ܘܒ‬11.‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ ܕܐܣ‬焏q‫ܒܠ‬q‫ܘ̈ܒ‬
焏‫ܩ‬r熏‫ ܘܦ‬.‫ܣ‬熏‫ܠܓ‬r‫ܕ ܐܦ ܦ‬煿‫ ܕܣ‬qq‫ܗܘܐ ܐ‬
‫ܣ‬熏‫ܓ‬焏‫ ܘܠ‬.煟‫ ̣ܥܒ‬rq焏‫ܡ‬q‫ ܠ‬焯q‫ܣ ܕ‬熏q‫ܣ‬熏‫ܢ‬q‫ܕܕ‬
焏‫ܒ‬q‫ܒ‬q q‫ܡ‬熏̈q‫ܬܐ ܒ‬熏‫ܡܢ‬q‫ ܗ‬爏‫ ܥ‬煿‫ ܠ‬煟q‫ܕܥܒ‬
‫ܗܝ‬熏‫̈ܢ‬熟‫ ܒ‬爯q‫ܡ ܕ‬r‫ ܒ‬.焏‫ܡܢ‬q煿‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܣ ܐܦܣܩܦ‬rq‫ܦ‬
̈
.焏r‫ ܢ‬r‫ܓ‬r‫ ܒ‬爿q‫ܓ‬r‫ ܣ‬焏‫ ܗܘܐ ܗܢ‬qqrr q‫ܣܓ‬
r‫ܡ‬qr‫ ܒ‬爯q‫ ܗܘܐ ܕ‬爯‫ܥ‬q .牯q‫ ܢ‬焏‫ ܗܘܐ ܘܠ‬爏q‫ܘܙܠ‬
煿qqr‫ ܘܐ‬爟qr‫ ܐܦ‬煿q‫ ܢܣ‬煟q 焏‫ܢ‬煿‫ ܠ‬.焏‫ܣܦ‬q
‫ܗܘܡ‬r‫ ܠ‬煟q .‫ܪ‬熏‫ܠ ܢܣܥ‬焏r‫ ܕ‬爏q‫ܘܕܝ ܕ‬rr‫ ܐ‬.‫ܪܫ‬煟‫ܕܡ‬
rq‫ ܪ‬焏qq‫ܬ ܐܓܦ‬熏‫ܬܐ ܠ‬r‫ܓ‬焏‫ ܒ‬煿‫ ܡܢ‬q‫ܠ‬rr‫ܢ‬
‫ ܘܐܙܕܘܕ‬爏‫ ܩܒ‬爯q‫ ̣ܗܘ ܕ‬.‫ܟ‬熏‫ܦ‬煿‫ ܘܢ‬爯‫ ܕܬܡ‬焏‫ܢ‬煿̈q
‫ܬ‬熏‫ܐ ܠ‬r‫̈ܒ‬qrq 爏‫ܩ‬r‫ ܘ‬.爟qr‫ ܐܦ‬爯‫ܐ ܡ‬r‫ܩ‬q焏‫ܒ‬
煟q 焏q‫ܠ‬q rq‫ ܐܘܣ‬煿‫ ܠ‬牯q‫ ܢܩ‬煟q .‫ܐ‬r‫ܓܒ‬
爏‫ ܥ‬焯q‫ ̇ܗܘ ܕܡ‬.煟‫ ܐܡ‬爯‫ܢ ܡ‬熏q‫ܩ‬qqq‫ܐܪ‬
焏q‫ ܢ‬焏‫ ܘܕܠܡ‬.‫ܝ‬rq熏‫ܡ ܕܢ‬煟‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܥ‬熏‫ ܣ‬爿q‫ܓ‬r‫ܣ‬
爯q煟‫ ܡ‬熏qq‫ ܐܬܡ‬.煿‫ ܠ‬焏‫ܒ ܐܢ‬rq‫ ܡ‬焏‫ ܠ‬焏q‫ܘ‬r‫ܠܩ‬
熏‫ܒ‬煿q‫ ܘ‬.焏qq‫ܬ ܐܓܦ‬熏‫ܗܘܡ ܠ‬r‫ ܠ‬爯q‫ܘܗܠ‬
‫ܬܗܘܢ‬r‫ܓ‬焏‫ ܒ‬q‫ ܘܐܬܗܢ‬.熏‫ܬܐ ܘܐܬܩܒܠ‬r‫ܐܓ‬
.煿‫ܢ‬q‫ܬܐ ܕܨܒ‬熏‫ܠܡ‬r 爯q煿‫ ܒ‬qqr‫ܐ ܕܐ‬r‫ܓܒ‬
‫ܕܪ‬焏‫ ܒ‬.爿q‫ܠ‬熏‫ܢܦ‬qq‫ܢ‬q‫ܣ‬熏‫ܘܢ ܠܩ‬煿‫ܘܐܬܐ ܥܡ‬
.‫ܘܪܐ‬焏‫ ܗܘܐ ܣ‬爯‫ ܬܡ‬煟q .焏q‫ܩ‬煟‫ܣܩ‬r‫ܣ‬q‫ ܕ‬焏qrq
焏qq‫ ]ـ ـ ـ[ ܐܓܦ‬.‫ ܗܘܐ‬焏‫ܢ‬煿̈q rq‫ܣ ܪ‬熏‫ܡ‬qr‫ܘܐܢ‬
爏‫ ܐܬܩܒ‬rq焏‫ ܪܘܪܒ‬焏q‫ܝ ܠܡܠ‬熟q‫ ܐܬ‬煟q 爯q‫ܕ‬
‫ ܕܐܬܪܐ‬焏‫ܢ‬煿̈q rq‫ ܘܪ‬.‫ ܗܘܐ‬煿‫ܢ‬r‫ ܠ‬r‫ ܕܒ‬.煿‫ܡܢ‬
[‫ ]ـ ـ ـ‬.煿‫ ܠ‬煟‫ܥܒ‬rr‫ ܘܐ‬r‫ܒ‬q‫ ܕܐܬ‬.焏q‫ܠ‬qq‫ܕܐ‬
‫ܗ‬煟‫ܬܗ̇ܘܢ ܘܥܒ‬熏‫ ܕܠ‬焏q‫ ܕܡܠ‬煿‫ܒ‬熏q‫ ܠ‬牯‫ܠ‬qr‫ܘ‬
.‫ܐ‬r‫ܢ‬q煟‫ ܡ‬爯‫ܢ ܡ‬熏‫ ܐܢ‬焏q‫ ܘܕ‬.‫ܐ‬rq焏‫ܘܢ ܒ‬煿q‫ܥܠ‬
‫ܘܪܣ‬焏‫ܣ ܘܣ‬熏‫ܡ‬qr‫ܕܐ ܐܢ‬煟q̈‫ ܠ‬熏q‫ܘܐܬܐܘ‬
爯‫ܡ‬r‫ܬܐ ܕܪ‬r‫ܓ‬焏‫ ܒ‬焏q‫ܪ‬煟‫ܣܢ‬q‫ ܕܐܠ‬爿q‫ܘܬܐܕܣ‬
and speaking, and the books of medicine. In his convic-
tion [lit. will] he was a believer, as also the prologue bears
witness, and the translation of Dionysius that he made
very correctly, and the treatise on faith that he wrote in
the days of the renowned Peter, the believing bishop.12
However, of his habits this Sergius was very lascivious in
the desire for women; he was wanton and shameless, and
greedy with love for money. When Ephraem examined
him and found him to be experienced, he promised to do
anything he would ask, if he would be sent from him to
Rome with letters for Agapetus, the head of the priests
there, and return. He accepted and was supplied with gifts
by Ephraem, and carried the writings to the man, while
he was accompanied by the youth Eustathius, an archi-
tect from Amid, who related about Sergius an act that is
strange, and lest it harms the reader, I do not record it.
Afterwards, they arrived at Rome before Agapetus, gave
the letters and they [i.e. the men] were received. The man
was pleased with their letters, in that he found agreement
with his conviction. He came with them to Constantino-
ple in the month of March in the fourteenth year of indic-
tion [i.e. 536], while Severus was there and Anthimus was
the head of the priests. [—] When Agapetus appeared
before the emperor, he was received by him magnificently,
because he (spoke) the same language and was the chief
of the priests of the region of Italy, which had been con-
quered and subjugated by him [i.e. Justinian]. [—] He [i.e.
Agapetus] changed the love of the emperor towards them
and turned him against them in anger, and he [i.e. Jus-
tinian] drove them out from the city.13 Anthimus, Severus,

11 Michael the Great has here (fol. 142ra5 f., p. 287): ‫ ܗܘܐ‬爿‫ܐ ܡܦ‬r‫ܬܐ ܕܦܓ‬熏q‫ܣ‬焏‫‘ ܘܒ‬and
he was versed in the healing of the body’.
12 The Chronicle of Pseudo-Zachariah Rhetor, ed. Greatrex (2011: 369 n. 300): “pz [i.e. Pseudo-
Zachariah] refers to Peter, bishop of Reshʿaina, banished in 519, who took part in the talks
of 532.”
13 The Chronicle of Pseudo-Zachariah Rhetor, ed. Greatrex (2011: 371 n. 310): “Incorrect: Severus
probably left Constantinople in March 536 (…), but Anthimus, having resigned his office,
remained there, hidden in a palace by Theodora, up to and beyond her death in 548.”
 6 chapter 1

爯‫ܘܪܣ ܡ‬焏‫ ܘܣ‬爿‫ܡ‬qr‫ ܐܢ‬熏q‫ܢ‬r‫ ܘ‬.rqr‫ ܠ‬爯‫ܡ‬ and Theodosius of Alexandria became united with one
‫ ܐܬܪ‬.rq焏qrq‫ܘܢ ܡ‬煿‫ ܡܢ‬煟q 煟q 焏q‫ ܕܢ‬.爯‫ܬܡ‬ another in the letters that we have copied out below, and
‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ ܡܠ‬r‫ܢ‬q煟‫ ܒܡ‬焏‫ܢ‬焏‫ ܡ‬爯q‫ ܗܘܐ ܕ‬.煿‫ ܠ‬q‫ܕܦܩ‬ Anthimus and Severus departed from there, so that each
爿q‫ܓ‬r‫ ܣ‬爯‫ ܬܡ‬爏‫ ܥܓ‬rq‫ ܘܡ‬.爿‫ܡ‬qr‫ܪ ܐܢ‬r‫ܒ‬ of them would live in hiding [in] the place that was suit-
‫ܘܢ‬煿‫ܪܗ ܒ‬r‫ ܒ‬焏qq‫ ܘܐܓܦ‬.‫ܘܣ‬rqqq‫ܐܪ‬ able to him. Menas [536–552] became [bishop] in the
煿‫ܢ‬r‫ ܠ‬r‫ܦ‬r‫ ܐܬܦ‬煟q ‫ܪܬܐ‬熏‫ܕܡ‬r‫ܐ ܒ‬r‫ܡ‬熏̈q‫ܒ‬ royal city after Anthimus. Sergius the archiatros suddenly
焏‫ܗܘܡ‬r‫ܪܗ ܒ‬r‫ ܘܗܘܐ ܒ‬.‫ܗܝ‬熏̈‫ܢ‬r‫ ܒ‬煿rr‫ܘܢ‬ died there, and Agapetus [died] after him in those days
.爿qr‫ܠܒ‬q‫ܣ‬ by a miracle, his tongue being cut off and he bit it with
his teeth. After him Silverius [536–537] became [bishop]
in Rome.

Book ten, chapter one begins (174.14–21, ed. Brooks):

焏‫ܡܢ‬q煿̈‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܢ‬煿̈q qrqr 爿‫ܡ‬qr‫ܘܪܐ ܘܐܢ‬焏‫ ܣ‬煟q
爏‫ ܠܥ‬爯‫ ܕܡ‬焏‫ܥ‬r‫ ܕܬ‬焏‫ܒ‬rr‫ ܒ‬rq‫ ܕܐܡ‬qq‫ܐ‬
r‫ܢ‬q煟‫ ܡ‬爯‫ ܡ‬熏q‫ܢ‬r‫ ܘ‬.焏q‫ ܡܠ‬爯‫ ܡ‬熏qq‫ܐܬܕ‬
.焏‫ ܕܪܗܘܡ‬焏qq‫ܗ ܕܐܓܦ‬r‫ܬܐ ܒܡܥܠ‬熏q‫ܡܠ‬
.rq‫ ܡ‬焏qrq ‫ܗ ܕܐܕܪ‬r‫ ܒܡܦܩ‬爏‫̇ܗܘ ܕܥܓ‬
‫ܣ‬rqqq‫ ܐܪ‬爿q‫ܓ‬r‫ ܘܣ‬.焏q‫ܩ‬煟‫ܣ ܩ‬r‫ܣ‬q‫ܕ‬
‫ܟ‬熏qq‫ܢ‬焏‫ ܕܒ‬爟qr‫ ܐܦ‬爯r‫ ܐܬܥ‬.煿‫ܒܠܢ‬q‫ܡ‬
.r‫ ܘܐܬܓܒ‬.焏q‫ܢ‬煟‫ܕܒܡ‬
When Severus and Anthimus, the believing chief priests,
were expelled by the emperor, as was said above in the
ninth book, and they departed from the royal city at the
entering of Agapetus of Rome, who suddenly died at the
end of the month of March of the fourteenth year of indic-
tion, also Sergius the chief physician who brought him
[died], Ephraem, who was in Antioch in the East, became
strong and powerful.

First of all, the chronicle of Pseudo-Zachariah informs us that Sergius was

an archiatros,14 that is a ‘chief physician’ or civic physician at Reshaina, and
from the title of some of his works we know that he was a priest too. We
are told also that he was involved in a dispute with Asylus, the bishop of
his city, and therefore, in 535,15 he went up to Antioch to complain about

14 According to Nutton (1977), an archiatros was from beginning the title of the king’s
personal physician. This term for a royal physician came eventually to be used as a
general title for a court physician and later on applied also to a civic physician who
had tax immunity and was paid if he at the same time was teaching medicine. It is
likely that Sergius was teaching, but we do not know if this condition was valid in the
entire Roman Empire. However, Nutton (2002, col. 987) states: “In late antiquity, the
term designated in Greek as well as Latin any high-ranking and well-known physician
regardless of his occupational sphere (imperial court, city, or institutions such as hos-
pitals).” During the reign of Justinian the salary privilege was abolished for the archia-
troi.
15 The Chronicle of Pseudo-Zachariah Rhetor, ed. Greatrex (2011: 369 n. 302): “Since Agapetus
only became pope in May 535 (…) and Anthimus patriarch in June 535 (…), and one must
introduction 7

him to patriarch Ephraem. The ground for their conflict cannot have been
Christological, since Sergius is viewed as actually a man of “true faith”, which
means that he belonged to the Miaphysite confession, while Asylus, the bishop
of Reshaina, is known as one of the interrogators of bishop John of Tella (483–
538), a strong opponent of the Chalcedonian Dyophysite doctrine.16 We are told
also that Ephraem found Sergius learned and eloquent. He convinced Sergius
to take with him letters to the recently appointed bishop of Rome, Agapetus,
and bring him to Constantinople for a common fight against the opponents of
the Chalcedonian doctrine, and likely also against those who were opposed to
Ephraem’s position as the rightful patriarch of Antioch. We should take into
account that Ephraem saw his position threatened, because at this time the
deposed patriarchs Severus and Theodosius were in Constantinople under the
protection of Empress Theodora.17 The reason why Sergius, who is viewed as
a man of right faith, consented to Ephraem’s wish to bring his letters to Rome
may have been money, or at least it was perceived so, which might explain the
accusation against him of being a greedy man, who betrayed his confessional
group by accepting this mission (cf. Fiori 2014: 62). He was also accused of
having been a dissolute person with a strong desire for women, and the story
concerning him, that his fellow traveller Eustathius of Amid spread, but which
our Syriac chronicler from the same city considers to be deleterious to record,
was also probably of sexual character, if there was any such event at all. As noted
by Greatrex et al. (2011: 378 n. 302), the mention of Eustathius clearly indicates
that he was the source of our anonymous chronicler regarding the information
about Sergius.
In addition to Sergius’ postulated knowledge of Greek, we are told that he
could read and speak Syriac. That he was well-versed in Greek is assumed from
the fact that he had studied in Alexandria for some years and was a trained
physician, who along with the many Greek medical books had studied some

allow time for the news to reach Antioch, Sergius can only have been sent to Rome in late
summer 535 at the earliest, probably in October.”
16 Vita Iohannis Episcopi Tellae auctore Elia, 76.14f., Lat. tr. 18.27f., (ed. Brooks), cf. also
Honigmann (1951: 149 n. 4). Sergius would simply not go to a Chalcedonian patriarch to
lodge a complaint against one of his fellow believing bishops in a religious matter. The
chronicle tells us that Sergius accused Asylus of having harmed him.
17 Indeed, Pseudo-Zachariah writes (135.22–24): ‫ ܗܘܘ‬爯q‫ ܐܘ‬焏‫ܢ‬煿 ̈ q qrqr ‫ܐ‬r‫ ܬܠ‬爯q‫ ܗܠ‬煟q
̈
q‫ܟ ܘܣܓ‬熏qq‫ ܕܐܢ‬爟qr‫ ܐܬܪܗܒ ܐܦ‬.‫ ܗܘܘ‬爯qrqr‫ ܦ‬焏‫ܕܐ ܠ‬煟q 爯‫ܬܐ ܡ‬熏‫ܡܢ‬q煿‫ ܘܒ‬焏‫ܒ‬熏q‫ܒ‬
q‫‘ ܐܬܕܠ‬when these three heads of priests [i.e. Anthimus, Severus, and Theodosius] had
joined in love, and were inseparable from one another in faith, Ephraem of Antioch was
alarmed and became very disturbed’.
8 chapter 1

theological works as well, among them the works of Origen.18 After having
returned to Constantinople together with Agapetus from Rome in March, he
died unexpectedly there a short time before the death of Agapetus, which
occurred on 22 April 536. The year of Sergius’ death is also reported by Elias of
Nisibis (also ʾElīyā bar Šīnāyā, 975–1049), who in his Syriac/Arabic Chronicle, for
牟‫ܒ‬r‫ ܘ‬爯q‫ܐ ܘܐܪܒܥ‬焏‫ ܬܡܢܡ‬r‫ܢ‬r ‘the year 847’,19 among other things, writes
(119.19): ‫‘ وفيها مات سرجس الراسعينىّ الطبيب‬and in this (year) Sergius of Reshaina
the physician died’.
Strangely enough, our chroniclers do not mention Sergius’ philosophical
knowledge and writings, although Pseudo-Zachariah notes that he was “trained
in the reading of many books of the Greeks”. Nevertheless, he was certainly
known as an important philosopher too, as is indicated by the testimony of
the Melkite bishop Agapius (also known as Maḥbūb ibn Qusṭanṭīn) of Manbij
(Syriac Mabbog and Greek Hierapolis), who probably wrote his chronicle in the
940s. In his Universal History (written in Arabic), he gives the following account
of Sergius:20

And in that year [the year 8 of Justinian’s reign, i.e. 535], Sergius ar-Raʾsī
(‫ )الراسى‬was well-known, a man who was a philosopher, translator, and
interpreter of books, author of many works, and he was also a doctor.
He came to Ephraem, patriarch of Antioch, and stayed with him (some
time). Then, Ephraem sent him to Agapetus, bishop of Rome, about the
matters that had happened to him over there. He [i.e. Sergius] died in
Constantinople.21

18 Yet, as Fiori (2014: 63–67) emphasizes, there is no explicit accusation of Sergius being an
Origenist and the statement that he had read Origen does not imply such a thing, even if
it is sometimes interpreted so, cf. King (2011a: 208–211).
19 This year is given according the system of numbering years from the Seleucid era or “the
year of the Greeks” beginning in 312/1 bc. The year 847 minus 311 is 536.
20 For a list of these sources, see Martindale (1992: 1123f.).
21 Agapius (169.8–11). Its editor Vasiliev’s French translation on the same page as the Arabic
text is: “En cette année, se rendit célèbre Sergius de Râsʿayn, qui était philosophe, traduc-
teur et interprète des livres, auteur de nombreux ouvrages, et en outre médecin. Il arriva
près d’Éphrem, patriarche d’ Antioche, et resta (quelque temps) chez lui. Ensuite Éphrem
l’envoya chez Agapet, évêque de Rome, au sujet des affaires qui lui étaient arrivées là-bas.
Sergius mourut à Constantinople.” A similar account is found in Bar ʿEbroyo’s Arabic An
Abridged History of the States, based on his Syriac Secular Chronicle, (ed. Salihani, p. 149,
see also p. 201).
introduction 9

Furthermore, the East Syrian patriarch Timothy i (727/8–823) makes the

following request, in a letter to a priest also by name Sergius at the West
Syrian monastery of Mar Zena (焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܝ ܙ‬r‫)ܡ‬: 焏‫ܩ‬r熏‫ܘܢ ܦ‬煿‫ ܒ‬qqr‫ ܬ‬焏‫ܕܠܡ‬
爿q‫ܓ‬r‫ܣ ܐܘ ܕܣ‬熏‫ܦܢ‬q‫ ܐܘ ܕܐܣ‬.‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܠ‬q‫ ܕܡܠ‬焏‫̈ܒ‬rq 爯q‫ܪܘܣ ܕܗܠ‬煟q‫ܡܦ‬熏‫ܕܐܠ‬
‫ܪܘܣ‬煟‫ܣܢ‬q‫‘ ܐܘ ܕܐܠ‬whether you can find among them [i.e. the books of your
monastery] the commentary of Olympiodorus on the books of the logic, or of
Stephanus or of Sergius or of Alexander’.22 Also, Abdisho bar Berikha (d. 1318),
in his The Metrical Catalogue of Syriac Writers listing chiefly East Syriac writers
and their works, reports concerning Sergius that (p. 87, ed. Assemani): 爿q‫ܓ‬r‫ܣ‬
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܠ‬q‫ ܕܡܠ‬焏‫ܩ‬r熏̈‫ ܦ‬爟‫ ܣ‬焏q‫ܢ‬q‫ܥ‬rq‫‘ ܪ‬Sergius of Reshaina composed commen-
taries on logic’.
Evidently, along with being an experienced physician and translator of med-
ical books, Sergius was considered to be a celebrated philosopher and com-
mentator, whom patriarch Timothy i mentions along with some famous Greek
commentators of Aristotle.

22 Timothy i, Letter no. 19 (at 129.16–18, ed. Braun), cf. also Watt (2013: 30).
 chapter 2

Sergius as Writer

Many of the translations Sergius made and commentaries he composed were

part of the Alexandrian curriculum. From his preface to the Commentary on the
Categories (to Theodore), we understand that he had already translated some
medical works before he wrote this philosophical text. A more recent evalua-
tion of Sergius’ writings was done by Hugonnard-Roche in 1997 (reprinted in
2004: 123–142, and see now idem, 2016: 214–227).

2.1 Original Works

Sergius’ original works and translations will be arranged according to the sci-
entific branch, dealing, in the first place, with the extant works, beginning with
his philosophical production, which is most relevant to our study. The Syriac
headings will also be given in order to illustrate how Sergius and his works are
labelled:

2.1.1 Philosophical Works Here Considered Authentic

– Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, to Theodore of Karkh Guddan,1 which

in the later Syriac manuscripts (Paris and Mingana) bears the title:
‫ܬܗ‬熏‫ܒܢ‬rq̈‫ ܕܡ‬焏rq‫ ܢ‬爏‫ܘܣ ܥ‬rqqq‫ ܐܪ‬爿q‫ܓ‬r‫ܝ ܣ‬r‫ ܠܡ‬煟q‫ܬܐ ܕܥܒ‬熏‫ܒܢ‬rq‫ܡ‬

1 He was falsely identified with a Theodore, bishop of Merv (‫ܘ‬r‫ ܡ‬and ‫مرو‬, a city of Khurasan
in today’s Turkmenistan, see Renan 1852a: 320 n. 1), until Hugonnard-Roche (2004: 126 n. 2)
showed that he must be the little known Theodore, bishop of Karkh Guddan. This city is
known from Arabic sources as ‫ كرخ جدان‬Karḫ Ǧuddān (see e.g. Chronicle of Seert, 27.5, ed.
Scher). In Hunayn ibn Ishaq’s famous Risāla, he is called ‫“ ثيادورى أسقف الـكرخ‬Theodoros,
den Bischof von al-Karḫ” (Arabic text ١٢/12.22, tr. Bergsträsser 1925: 10), but in a different
recension of his Risāla ‫‘ ثياذورس اسقف كرخ جدان‬Theodore, bishop of Karḫ Ǧuddān’ is given
(p. 80.21f., ed. Bergsträsser 1932, see also p. 51.13). And Fiey (1968: 71 n. 8) states correctly that
Karkh Guddan is not the same city as Karkh Samarra, as some sources indicate (cf. e.g. Streck
& Lassner 1978: 653), but it was located close to the border between Iraq and Iran, opposite to
the landscape Khanaqin (‫ خانقين‬Ḫānaqīn), which forms the boundary between Shahrazur
(‫ شهرزور‬Šahrazūr) and Iraq (Fiey 1968: 71 f.; cf. also Takahashi 2014b: 36 n. 12). Theodore
of Karkh Guddan was closely associated with Sergius, to whom he dedicated several of his

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2016 | doi: 10.1163/9789004325142_003

sergius as writer 11

爿q‫ܠ‬qq‫ܣ‬q‫ ܕܐܪ‬爯q煿‫ܠ‬q ‘The writing composed by Mar2 Sergius the archiatros

on the aim of all of Aristotle’s writings’. This is Sergius’ major extant philo-
sophical work which, in spite of the Syriac title of these manuscripts, is a
proper commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, both to contents and disposi-
tion similar to those from the Alexandrian school of Ammonius. It is divided
into seven books and is preserved in five manuscripts.3 There is a partial
Italian translation of it by Furlani (1922) and also by Furlani (1937) an edi-
tion and translation of the section on Bardaisan (L.47ra1-vb26/P.87v17–89r6,
see comm. to §80–87). There is a French translation with discussion of its
prologue, which treats many of the introductory themes of the Alexandrian
introductions, by Hugonnard-Roche (2004: 165–186), and also of its first book
(ibid, pp. 187–231), and an English translation of parts of its introduction and
epilogue by Brock (1997: 201–204). Most recently, John W. Watt published an
English translation of the greater part of book two with commentaries (Watt
2014a). Sergius’s account at L.3ra14–29/P.17v1–8 of Aristotle’s logical works is
quoted almost word for word by Bar Bahlul (col. 289 f.) in his lexicon under
the entry 爿q‫ܠ‬熏q焏q‫ܣ‬q‫‘ ܐܪ‬Aristotle’.
– Introduction to Aristotle and his Categories, to Philotheos, who is otherwise
unknown, and it bears the Syriac title: 爿q‫ܓ‬r‫ ܠܣ‬rq‫ܐ ܕܐܡ‬r‫ܡ‬焏‫ܡ‬
焏‫ܦ‬熏‫ܠܣ‬q‫ ܦ‬爿q‫ܠ‬q熏q‫ܣ ܕܐܪܣ‬熏qr‫ܓ‬q‫ ܩ‬爏‫ ܥ‬焏q‫ܢ‬q‫ܥ‬rq‫ܘܣ ܪ‬rqqq‫‘ ܐܪ‬The
memra said by Sergius the archiatros of Reshaina on the Categories of Aristo-
tle the Philosopher’ in the unique Berlin manuscript (Petermann i 9, Sachau
Syr. no. 88, fol. 83v–104r), which is the object of the present study. Though
this is most likely written after the Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories (to
Theodore) and is in fact an abridgment or epitome of it, it should be per-
ceived as a general introduction to the philosophy of Aristotle, as stated
by Hugonnard-Roche (2004: 152). As a compromise, I have chosen the title
Introduction to Aristotle and his Categories. Most of its contents are to be
found in his commentary proper on the Categories, but to its form it is more

writings and who is also said to have assisted Sergius with his translation of some of Galen’s
works (see below at 2.1.7 and 4.8).
2 In spite of the unflattering description of Sergius by Pseudo-Zachariah, in some manuscripts,
he bears the title ‫ܝ‬r‫ ܡ‬Mār(y) ‘my lord’, which is an honorific title given to saints (!), but also
used before the assigned Christian name of bishops, being that of a saint.
3 These are: London bl Add 14658 (= L here), Paris BnF Syr. 354 (= P), Mingana Syr. 606,
Baghdad Chaldaean Monastery 169 and 171, see Hugonnard-Roche (2004: 187f.). The famous
manuscript of British Library, Additional 14658, is the oldest one and contains some of Sergius’
other texts. My readings from Sergius’ Commentary on the Categories, addressed to Theodore,
are based on L and P manuscripts.
12 chapter 2

like a manual. It includes, like the Commentary, some descriptions of Aristo-

tle’s philosophy not present in the Categories, but also a presentation of Pla-
tonic and Stoic ideas. Its Syriac title is most likely secondary and might have
been assigned to it by confusion with his commentary proper on the Cate-
gories or as an effect of their common contents.4 There is only a very partial
French translation of this work with some discussion also by Hugonnard-
Roche (2004: 143–164, and also 136–142).5
– On Genus, Species, and Individuality, which is extant in bl Add 14658 (fol.
124va30–129ra34) and still unedited, with the heading information:
6焏‫ ܓܢܣ‬爏‫ܐ ܕܥ‬rqqq‫ ܘܐܪ‬焏rqr‫ ܩ‬爿q‫ܓ‬r‫ܝ ܣ‬r‫ ܠܡ‬煟q‫ܐ ܕܥܒ‬r‫ܡ‬焏‫ܡ‬
‫ܬܐ‬熏q煟qqq‫ ܘܐ‬焏r̈‫‘ ܘܐܕ‬The memra written by Mar Sergius, the priest and
chief physician, on genus, species, and individuality’. To judge from its lan-
guage in general, its terminology and contents, it is certainly a genuine work
of Sergius. There is a full Italian translation of it by Furlani (1925).
– Concerning the Division of Substance, also extant in bl Add 14658 (fol. 168ra1–
172rb33) with the short heading: 焏q‫ ܐܘܣ‬焿‫ܠ‬熏‫ ܦ‬爏q‫‘ ܡ‬Concerning the
division of ousia’. It is not only concerned with the term ‘substance’ and its
division, but also some other philosophical matters are treated and clarified.
The tract is not attributed to Sergius in the ms, but is probably authored
by him, since it contains some quotations from his Introduction to Aristotle
and his Categories, to Philotheos,7 with which we are concerned here. To its
character, it is a synopsis of some philosophical questions and was probably
used in an educational context. It is sometimes referred to as A scholion
on the term ousia. Hugonnard-Roche (2004: 131) places it among the falsely
attributed or unfounded works of Sergius (“Attributions fausses ou non
fondées”).

4 For more on the relation of these two original works of Sergius, see below at chapter 5.
5 There is also an unpublished translation of excerpts from the Berlin ms into French (of §1–2)
and Latin (of §3, 98–99, and 105–109) in a block containing material from Sergius’ writings
and on him preserved (until recently) in the Monastery of the Dominican Friars of Mosul (see
Sony 1997, no. 152). This block has been digitized by Hill Museum & Manuscript Library (with
hmml Project Number dfm 00152, Shelf mark 152; see description at http://www.vhmml.us/
research2014/catalog/detail.asp?MSID=134327).
̈
6 At the end of the text (fol. 129ra31–34) the ms has 焏‫‘ ܓܢܣ‬genera’ (i.e. ‫ܝ‬r‫ܐ ܕܡ‬r‫ܡ‬焏‫ ܡ‬爟‫ܠ‬r
̈ ̈
‫ܬܐ‬熏q煟qqq‫ ܘܐ‬焏r‫ ܘܐܕ‬焏‫ ܓܢܣ‬爏‫ ܥ‬焏rqr‫ ܩ‬爿q‫ܓ‬r‫)ܣ‬.
7 And consequently from his Commentary on the Categories. For example the section at
169va28–b22 is an almost verbatim quotation of § 43 in my edition, and that at 170va35–b5
is part of §41, and 170vb24–38 of § 61. Cf. also the close relation of 171va7–27 with §66 and
that of 171va27–b7 with § 21.
sergius as writer 13

– A Natural Demonstration, preserved in bl Add 12155 and consisting of less

than one whole folio (178ra21-rb43) with the heading ‫ܐ‬rq‫ܢ‬qq ‫ܐ‬rq熏q‫ܬ‬
‫ܘܣ‬rqqq‫ ܐܪ‬爿q‫ܓ‬r‫‘ ܕܣ‬A natural demonstration by Sergius the archiatros’.
Though it is a very short scholion, it is important as it provides us with a
direct link to the first Syriac version of Porphyry’s Eisagoge, which is held
to be anonymous. A quotation from it in this tract indicates perhaps that
Sergius might be its translator (see 2.1.4). Furlani (1926: 140 f.) made an Italian
translation of it, but rejected Sergius as its author, even indirectly (ibid,
pp. 141f.), and instead proposed that an anonymous writer has compiled
it from various works. Nonetheless, its language and contents suggest that
Sergius is its source, though it is just in this scholion that we find the use
of 爟q‫ ̇ܗܘ ܕܣ‬for ὑποκείμενον ‘subject’ in Sergius.8 Neither does Hugonnard-
Roche (2004: 129) find Furlani’s arguments conclusive and chooses to keep
Sergius as its author. If not written by Sergius himself, it might at least be
written by a pupil of his, since both contents (in the form of citations) and
terminology can be traced to Sergius. This very short survey gives different
definitions and was also probably used in a didactic context.

2.1.2 Dubious Attribution of Philosophical Works

As Hugonnard-Roche (1989: 1ff.) notes, many of the anonymous philosophical
texts and translations concerned with Aristotle’s Organon in bl Add 14658,9
were attributed by Ernest Renan (1852a: 329f.) to Sergius. This manuscript con-
tains inter alia Sergius’ large Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, while the
attribution of other texts to Sergius was often made just on the basis that they
were compiled in the same manuscript as some of his original works. Later,
Sachau (1870) attributed also the translation of some gnomological tracts in
this manuscript to Sergius, and further translations of scientific works were
attributed to him by Baumstark (1894: 368ff.). These ascriptions were usually
accepted and repeated by later scholars. In his important studies from 1989 and
1997 (the latter reprinted 2004), Hugonnard-Roche reviewed all such attribu-
tions that were not well-founded and was able to exclude many of them from
Sergius’ list of translations. However, ancient scribes probably also made the
same mistake and attributed unidentified texts to a famous person such as

8 Yet, I believe that Sergius most likely coined the expression 爟q‫ ̇ܗܘ ܕܣ‬for ‘subject’, since there
were intimations of its usage in his texts, although it did not become his preferred alternative
(see also comm. to § 50).
9 For the contents of this manuscript, see Wright (1872, vol. 3, pp. 1154–1160), and especially for
the philosophical texts, see Furlani (1915: 297–300), and the recent extensive study of King
(2011a).
14 chapter 2

Sergius, particularly if he had composed works on similar topics. The follow-

ing ones are most likely examples of this tendency:

– A Scholion on the Term ‘schema’, preserved in bl Add 1466010 (fol. 79v–

81r), with the Syriac title: ‫ܐ‬熏q‫ ܕܡ‬焏q‫ܢ‬q‫ܥ‬rq‫ ܪ‬爿q‫ܓ‬r‫ ܠܣ‬煟q‫ ܕܥܒ‬爯q焏‫ܠ‬熏q‫ܣ‬
焏‫ܡ‬q‫ ܐܣ‬熏‫‘ ܕܡܢ‬A scholion written by Sergius of Reshaina, which shows
what schema (‘figure’) is’. Furlani (1926: 143–145) gave an Italian translation
of this scholion together with the previous one, and again, questioned its
Sergian authorship. Regarding this scholion I am much inclined to agree
with Furlani, even though it is ascribed to Sergius in the manuscript and
also Hugonnard-Roche (2004: 130) prefers to keep the attribution to Sergius.
Both the style and terminology are foreign to Sergius. Especially, the use of a
large number of Greek loan words is uncharacteristic of him. His usual term
for κατηγορεῖσθαι ‘predicated of’ is 爏‫ ܥ‬r‫ ܐܬܐܡ‬and nowhere in his original
works do we find 爏‫ܓ ܥ‬rq‫ <( ܐܬܩ‬κατηγορεῖσθαι), which is encountered in
this scholion. This loan word from Greek is used by many subsequent writers.
Furthermore, Sergius’ term for ‘syllogism’ is the Syriac ‫ܐ‬r‫ ܡܠ‬rq熏‫ܩ‬,11 while
this scholion has ‫ܣ‬熏‫ܣܡ‬q‫ܓ‬熏‫ܠ‬熏‫ <( ܣ‬συλλογισμός) without exception. Also
the use of 爿q‫ܣ‬q‫ܘ‬r‫ ܦ‬for πρότασις and 爿q‫ܣ‬焏‫ܦ‬熏‫ ܐܦ‬for ἀπόφασις is not
found in Sergius’ other extant works.
– On the Three Conversions, also preserved in bl Add 14658 (fol. 94rb35–
̈
99va15). This text has the title: 爯q‫ ܕܗܦ‬爯q‫ ܐܢ‬r‫‘ ܬܠ‬there are three (things)
that reciprocate’12 and does not bear Sergius’ name, but was ascribed to him
by Renan, who thought that it was “a tract on affirmation and negation corre-
sponding to the second part of Peri Hermeneias.”13 But already Furlani could
dismiss this description. He writes (1915: 299): “Renan and Wright thought it
treats about [sic] matters contained in the περὶ ἑρμηνείας. I have examined
it, but I cannot confirm their statement. It is a fragment of a work which

10 For the philosophical texts of this ms, see Wright (1872, vol. 3, pp. 1160–1162).
11 See the ms for his long Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, at P.13v2–6 (cf. also P.10v4–8),
and the French translation of Hugonnard-Roche (2004: 202), as well as that of Watt (2014a:
42).
12 The three reciprocations discussed are ‘universal negation’ (‫ܐ‬rq‫ܠܢ‬熏q 爿q‫ ܐܦܦܣ‬καθόλου
ἀπόφασιν), ‘universal affirmation’ (‫ܐ‬rq‫ܠܢ‬熏q 爿q‫ܦܣ‬q‫ ܩ‬καθόλου κατάφασιν), and ‘partial
affirmation’ (‫ܐ‬rqr‫ ܡܢ‬爿q‫ܦܣ‬q‫ ܩ‬κατάφασις ἐν μέρει).
13 Renan (1852a: 330): “Un traité de l’ affirmation et de la négation correspondant à la sec-
onde partie du Περὶ ἑρμηνείας.” This view and the attribution to Sergius was adopted by
Wright (1872, vol. 3, p. 1156), who gave it the title “A tract on negation and affirmation”, cf.
Hugonnard-Roche (1989: 2).
sergius as writer 15

deals with the Analytica Priora and gives a description of the syllogisms. It is
not identical with the treatise ‘on the Syllogisms in the Analytica (Priora)’ of
Aristotle by Severus Sabocht preserved in the Add 17, 156.” Also Hugonnard-
Roche (1989: 4) comes to the same conclusion. Similar arguments as those
raised against the previous work can be raised also against this one in dis-
missing Sergius as its author.

2.1.3 Philosophical Adaptations and Translations

Of probably several more or less free adaptations and faithful translations of
philosophical texts by Sergius only the following adaptations and translations
have survived:

– Adaptation of Alexander of Aphrodisias, On the Principles of the Universe.

The original Greek Vorlage of Alexander’s treatise is lost and its extant Arabic
versions are called Mabādiʾ.14 Also this text of Sergius is preserved in bl Add
̈
14658 (fol. 99va–107vb) and has there the Syriac title: ‫ܗ‬r‫ ܥܠܠ‬爏‫ܐ ܕܥ‬r‫ܡ‬焏‫ܡ‬
‫ܗ‬rq‫ ܬܪܥ‬qq‫܉ ܐ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܥ‬rq‫ ܕܪ‬焏rqr‫ ܩ‬爿q‫ܓ‬r‫ܝ ܣ‬r‫ ܠܡ‬rq‫ ܕܐܡ‬.爏q 焏‫ܕܗܢ‬
‫ܕܪܐ‬熏q ‫ܘܗܝ‬rq‫ ܐ‬焏‫ܢ‬qq‫ ܕܐ‬焏‫ܦ‬熏‫ܠܣ‬q‫ ܦ‬爿q‫ܠ‬q熏q‫ܣ‬q‫‘ ܕܐܪ‬A treatise on the
causes of all this [i.e. the principles of universe], written by Mar Sergius,
priest of Reshaina, according to the view of Aristotle the Philosopher, (show-
ing) how it is a circle’. This text was earlier considered to be an original work
of Sergius, until Miller (1994: 22ff.) described it as some kind of a free trans-
lation with possible interpolations of Alexander’s mentioned work. But to
judge from Sergius’ preface, it is not presented as a translation by him, as also
its Syriac title indicates. He addresses it to a person whom he calls q‫ܒ‬q‫ܒ‬q ‘my
friend’ and appeals to him in that way twice in the main text (at 136.32 and
143.10, ed. Fiori), as he also refers to three other of his own works. Daniel King
(2010a) made a thorough analysis of Sergius’ version in comparison with the
Arabic translation ascribed to Ibrahim ibn Abdallah al-Nasrani al-Katib (or
Ibrāhīm Ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Naṣrānī al-Kātib, who flourished in the first half of
9th century).15 There is also a shorter Arabic version produced by Abu Uth-
man al-Dimashqi (or Abū ʿUṯmān al-Dimašqī, d. after 914). As the study of
Fazzo and Zonta (2014) shows, the two Arabic versions are made from a Syr-

14 The most recent edition of the Arabic versions is by Genequand (2001), with an English
translation of the longer version, but a new edition is being prepared by Fazzo & Zonta
(2014: 92) based on the Syriac and Arabic recensions.
15 Fazzo & Zonta (2014: 101 f.) argue that this Arabic version cannot be taken as a faithful
rendering of Alexander’s lost Greek text, but that Sergius’ version and the two Arabic
translations are important together for any possible reconstructions of the Greek text.
16 chapter 2

iac translation by Hunayn ibn Ishaq (now lost). At the same time, it appears
that Hunayn based his Syriac translation of Alexander’s On the Principles of
the Universe on a Greek Vorlage plus Sergius’ adaptation of it and retained
from the latter some material, inter alia Sergius’ prologue, which therefore
is found in the Arabic versions too. Fazzo and Zonta (2014: 109 f.) suggest
also that a reference to a previous work by Sergius in his Commentary on
Aristotle’s Categories, to Theodore (P.2v10–17) is to this work and not to his
Introduction to Aristotle and his Categories as proposed by Hugonnard-Roche
(2004: 173).16 The Syriac text was for the first time edited and translated into
French by Fiori (2010b). Previously, only the Italian translation of Furlani
(1923) was available.
– Pseudo-Aristotle, On the Cosmos, (Gr. Περὶ κόσμου, Lat. De mundo).17 This
translation by Sergius is also preserved in bl Add 14658 (fol. 107v–122r) and
has the Syriac title: 爯‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܩ‬r‫ ܕܡܦ‬焏‫ܦ‬熏‫ܠܣ‬q‫ ܦ‬爿q‫ܠ‬q熏q‫ܬܐ ܕܐܪܣ‬r‫ܐܓ‬
‫ܐ‬r‫ܢ‬q煟‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܥ‬rq‫ ܕܪ‬焏rqr‫ ܩ‬爿q‫ܓ‬r‫ܝ ܣ‬r‫ܪܐ ܡ‬rq‫ ܠܡ‬焏qq‫ܪ‬熏‫ ܠܣ‬焏q‫ܢ‬熏q ‘The
letter of Aristotle the Philosopher that is translated from Greek into Syriac
by the excellent Mar Sergius, priest of the city of Reshaina’. It is described
̈
by Sergius as being 焏q‫ܐ ܕܗܘ‬r‫ܥ‬煟q‫ ܐ‬爏‫‘ ܥ‬On the knowledge of beings
(hǝwayyā)’ and its Syriac text was edited already in 1858 by Lagarde (pp. 134–
158), and the translation was philologically analyzed by Ryssel (1880: 4–48,
and 1881: 10–29, who praised it), by Baumstark (1894: 405–438), and by Elsas
(1968). More recently, a Greek and Syriac index of its vocabulary has been
prepared by McCollum (2009), who also studied its method of translating
(2011). McCollum finds this translation to be fine and faithful, without any
Christianizing features, and says (2011: 171): “To conclude, we may say that
Sergius, while not reticent to add words for clarification (and Syriac style?)
or omit words for smooth Syriac reading, has followed even the details of
the dm [De mundo], but not on a narrow level focused on individual words.”
From a most recent study by Takahashi (2014a) on the history of transmis-

16 They are probably right, but unfortunately their reproduction of this section contains
some mistakes. Furthermore, the punctuation of the Paris manuscript for the relevant
passage seems to be misleading. At P.2v15f. it should probably read ‫ܬܗ‬熏‫ ܡܠܦܢ‬煿̇‫ܠ‬q 爏‫ܥ‬
爏q 焏‫ܗ ܕܗܢ‬r‫ܥܠܠ‬ ̈ 爏q‫ ̇ܗܘ ܕܡ‬.焏‫ܡ‬qqq‫ ܕ‬and not .‫ ܗ̇ܘ‬焏‫ܡ‬qqq‫ܬܗ ܕ‬熏‫ ܡܠܦܢ‬煿̇‫ܠ‬q 爏‫ܥ‬
̈
爏q 焏‫ܗ ܕܗܢ‬r‫ ܥܠܠ‬爏q‫ܕܡ‬.
17 The text is most likely not addressed to Theodore of Karkh Guddan, as proposed by
Renan (1852a: 321) and retained by later scholars, but its tone of appeal indicates that the
addressee of it was a person of higher rank, whether he was an ecclesiastical or a secular
leader. This preface lacks the friendly and intimate tone of the other texts addressed to
Theodore.
sergius as writer 17

sion of the text, we know that Sergius’ translation was used by later writers,
such as Jacob/Severus bar Shakko (d. 1241) and Bar ʿEbroyo, and that at least
one of the Arabic versions is based on it, (cf. also Raven 2003; Daiber 2014).

2.1.4 A Lost Philosophical Work (?) and a Possible Translation

We do not have information of Sergius’ entire philosophical production, but
perhaps we have the testimony of an individual writing by him of a philosoph-
ical kind, which is now lost but mentioned in his adaptation of Alexander of
Aphrodisias’ On the Principles of the Universe, with the words (141.4 f.): 爏q‫ܡ‬
焏‫ܢ‬rq‫ ܐ‬焏‫ܒ‬rr‫ ܒ‬爯‫ܝ ܠ‬熏q‫ ܕܡ‬qq‫ ܐ‬:‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܥܢ‬q‫ܙ‬r‫ܘܗܝ ܕܡ‬rq‫ܐ ܐ‬rq熏r‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܕܙܒܢ‬
‘since time is a measure of motion, as we have shown in another book’, (cf. also
Hugonnard-Roche 2004: 128). We have Sergius’ treatment of time in his Com-
mentary on the Categories, in book four (see comm. to § 68–74), but since the
adaptation of Alexander’s treatise was composed long before the Commentary
on the Categories, this cannot refer to that treatment. As King (2010a: 173 n. 61)
has observed, also the second Arabic version of Alexander’s On the Principles
of the Universe has this sentence. Based on the findings of Fazzo and Zonta
(2014), this passage could constitute further material from Sergius’ adaptation
that Hunayn included in his Syriac translation of Alexander’s text and which
also crept into the Arabic versions that were based on Hunayn’s Syriac trans-
lation. But it might likewise be a reference to a work by Alexander and not by
Sergius, since a treatise with the title On Time in Arabic translation is attributed
to Alexander (see Sharples 1982), even if it seems equally strange that Sergius
would keep such a passage in his paraphrase, without ascribing it to Alexander
anywhere.
The first Syriac translation of Porphyry’s Eisagoge is preserved as an anony-
mous version also in bl Add 14658 (fol. 99va–107vb) and was attributed by Renan
(1852a: 330) to Sergius along with the anonymous translation of the Categories,
now edited by King (2010b). In his study of the vocabulary of the Syriac ver-
sions of the Categories, Hugonnard-Roche (1987, again in 2004: 23–37) could
correctly deny the attribution of the anonymous Syriac version of the Cate-
gories to Sergius, but the ascription of the first Syriac translation of Porphyry’s
Eisagoge cannot as easily be rejected.
In the separately published introduction to his edition of this anonymous
version of the Eisagoge (1988), Brock admitted that the vocabulary of this trans-
lation concurs with that of Sergius, as present in his Commentary on the Cate-
gories. However, Brock (1989: 46ff.) asserted that this was not enough to adduce
Sergius as its translator, since the rendition of Porphyry’s definition of accident
at Eisagoge 12.24f. (= Eis.Syr.i 29.2f.) is different in the present translation and
Sergius’ Commentary on the Categories (L.31ra4–8/P.39r9–11). In my comment
18 chapter 2

to §38, I argue that it is not a translation of Porphyry’s definition of accident

that Sergius provides, but rather a paraphrase or reformulated rendering of it.
Sergius is rather sparing of direct quotations from Porphyry and Aristotle in
his philosophical commentaries. Yet, if we accept the Sergian authorship of A
Natural Demonstration, as I propose above, then we have clear evidence that
Sergius at least quotes the definition of accident from this translation, where
he has (bl Add 12155, fol. 178rb9–11): 焏‫ܘܗܝ܉ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‬rq‫ ܐ‬焏r煟‫ ܕܓ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܡ‬熏q‫ܬ‬
煿‫ ܕ̇ܗܘܐ ܒ‬焏‫ ܕ̇ܗܘ ܡ‬焏‫ܒܠ‬q 爯‫ ܡ‬rq‫ ܣ‬犟qr‫‘ ܕ̇ܗܘܐ ܘܡ‬the definition of acci-
dent is: what occurs and goes away without the destruction of what it occurs
in’. This quotation, together with the coincidences of terminology also noted
by Brock, (1989: 46): “can be taken as evidence either for Sergius’ authorship of
Syr i, or alternatively, for Sergius’ knowledge and use of Syr. i.” Because of the
style, the expected method of translation and vocabulary, I believe that there is
some possibility that Sergius is the translator of the Syriac version of Porphyry’s
Eisagoge, though there is also evidence that speaks against this assumption.
Baumstark (1900: 139f.) does not provide any arguments for putting forward
Ibas of Edessa (焏q‫ ܐܘܪܗ‬焏‫ܒ‬q‫ ܗ‬Hībā ʾŪrhāyā, d. 457), bishop and teacher at
the so-called School of Persians in Edessa, as the possible translator of this first
version. Most Alexandrian commentators wrote commentaries on Porphyry’s
Eisagoge, but the majority of them are lost. And since we do not have any report
that Sergius wrote any such commentary or intended to write one, then he per-
haps made a translation of it instead. This procedure would be opposed to his
method of writing commentaries on Aristotle’s writings. If it was not Sergius
who translated this version of the Eisagoge, it must already have existed and
been available to him. In his study, Brock (1989: 42) could state that the second
Syriac rendering of Eisagoge by Athanasius of Balad (d. 686) is a revision of this
anonymous version and not an entirely new translation.

2.1.5 An Original Theological Introduction and a Translation

Even if Sergius’ main intellectual preoccupation was concentrated on medical
and philosophical works, we have evidence that he was also, like Philoponus,
engaged in the theological discussions of his days. Both the final episode of his
life and his lost and surviving works bear witness to this. In a new study, Fiori
(2014: 86ff.) even suggests that Sergius might have belonged to the philoponoi, a
Christian confraternity of laymen. Inspired by them, Sergius may have tried to
transfer in translation the books that were studied by them, both the religious
and the secular ones.18 Sergius’ extant and lost works are:

18 We ought not to forget that Sergius was a priest, either already when he went to study in
sergius as writer 19

– Discourse on the Spiritual Life (焏rqr‫ ܩ‬爿q‫ܓ‬r‫ܝ ܣ‬r‫ܐ ܕܡ‬r‫ܡ‬焏‫ܡ‬

‫ܘܣ‬rqqq‫)ܘܐܪ‬, is an original work which Sergius wrote before the transla-
tion of the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus (see §114, ed. Sherwood), and to which
he later attached it as a prologue. Especially, its end-title is interesting here:
焏‫ܒ‬rq ‫ܡ‬煟‫ܘܣ ܩ‬rqqq‫ ܘܐܪ‬焏rqr‫ ܩ‬爿q‫ܓ‬r‫ܐ ܠܣ‬煟q‫ܐ ܕܥܒ‬r‫ ܡܥܠ‬r‫ܠܡ‬r
‫ܣ‬熏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܕܐܬ‬焏‫ܦ‬熏‫ܣܩ‬q‫ܣ ܘܐܦ‬熏‫ܣ ܦܓ‬熏q‫ ܐܪ‬爯‫ ̇ܗܘ ܕܡ‬:‫ܣ‬熏q‫ܢܢܣ‬熏q‫ ܕ‬焏rq煟‫ܕܩ‬
‫ܐ‬r‫ܢ‬q煟‫(‘ ܡ‬here) ends the introduction written by Sergius, the priest and
chief physician, before the book of the holy Dionysius, who was from Arius
Pagus [Ἄρειος Πάγος, i.e. Areopagus] and bishop (episkopos) of Athens the
city’. After the title, the beginning words of the text are 焏q‫ܢ‬q‫ܘ‬r 焏qq̈ ‘the
spiritual life’. This treatise is mentioned also in the above-quoted passage
from Pseudo-Zachariah Rhetor (136.10) and a long passage from Sergius’ Dis-
course (§35b–39, ed. Sherwood) is quoted in, for example, a commentary by
Gabriel Qatraya (7th century) on the liturgical offices, but without mention-
ing Sergius as its source.19 The Discourse has been edited by Sherwood (1960
and 1961) with a French translation, and more recently translated into Italian
with an introduction by Fiori (2008), who based his translation on some fur-
ther important manuscripts. For this text see also Fiori (2009) and the short
discussion in Watt (2011: 242f.). This text proves that Sergius, in addition to
Pseudo-Dionysius, was much influenced by the theological teaching of Eva-
grius of Pontus, but also by Origen and perhaps by Clement of Alexandria
too, (cf. Fiori 2014: 77–88).
– Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, Dionysian Corpus (or Corpus Dionysia-
cum), translated by Sergius and preserved in a single manuscript, namely
Sinai Syriacus 52 (St. Catherine’s Monastery), whose beginning and end are
missing, though scattered fragments of these parts have been discovered
(see Fiori’s introduction to his edition from 2014: xiii–xvi, and Stang 2012: 24
n. 58). Sergius’ translation is one of the earliest testimonies of this anony-
mous corpus and it has, according to Perczel (2009: 29–33), retained an
earlier version of the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus than the preserved Greek
edition of John of Scythopolis (d. 550). Sergius’ version exercised a significant
influence, according to the testimony of Phocas of Edessa (late 7th century),
who in the preface to his revision of this translation says “which was trans-

Alexandria or later on when he returned to Mesopotamia. In any case, he cannot have

belonged to the guild of philoponoi at the same time as John Philoponus, the most famous
member of this scholastic group, since John associated himself with the group only from
the mid-520s, (see Watts 2006: 238 and 252).
19 I thank Sebastian Brock for this reference and for providing me with a copy of his 2016
article before its publication, where this quotation is given.
20 chapter 2

lated long ago from the Greek language into the idiom of the Syrians by the
chaste and illustrious Sergius, the priest and archiatros, in a translation that
all of us, the Syrians, have read.”20 Some writers have even proposed Sergius
was the true author of the corpus, among them more recently Arthur (2008:
138 and 197, but also pp. 116ff. and 184ff.). Only the first chapter of Mysti-
cal Theology (edited by Hornus 1970) and the Fourth Letter (by Perczel 2004:
423–425 with trans.) were available in critical editions until recently. Now,
a critical edition with Italian translation of Divine Names, Mystical Theol-
ogy, and Letters has been prepared by Fiori (2014).21 For Sergius’ version of
this collection, see the studies of Sherwood (1952), Perczel (2009, 2000), Mali
(2002), and Fiori (2010a), for the translation technique used by Sergius, see
Fiori (2011b), and for the manuscript tradition of the Dionysian corpus the
earlier study of Wiessner (1972), (see also Hugonnard-Roche 2004: 127).22

2.1.6 Lost Theological Works

– On the Faith, lost but mentioned in Pseudo-Zachariah Rhetor with the words
̈
(136.11–13): ‫ܣ‬rq‫ ܦ‬焏‫ܒ‬q‫ܒ‬q q‫ܡ‬熏q‫ܬܐ ܒ‬熏‫ܡܢ‬q‫ ܗ‬爏‫ ܥ‬煿‫ ܠ‬煟q‫ܣ ܕܥܒ‬熏‫ܓ‬焏‫ܘܠ‬
焏‫ܡܢ‬q煿‫ ܡ‬焏‫‘ ܐܦܣܩܦ‬and the treatise (logos) on faith that he wrote in the
days of the renowned Peter, the believing bishop [of Reshaina]’.
– On Incarnation, mentioned in Sergius’ adaptation of Alexander’s On the Prin-
ciples of the Universe (137.2f.): ‫ ܗܘܬ‬焏q犏‫ ܡ‬焏‫ ܕܠ‬爯qr‫ ܕܐܡ‬爯q‫ܠ‬q‫ ܐ‬爏‫ܩܒ‬熏‫ܠ‬
焏qr‫ܐ ܐܢ‬r‫ ܦܓ‬r‫ܐ ܢܠܒ‬煿‫‘ ܕܐܠ‬Against those who say that it would be impos-
sible that God assumes a human body’. For a discussion of this heading and
what it may reveal about Sergius’ theological orientation, see King (2010a:
178–183).

20 From the French translation of van Esbroeck (1997: 171): “lesquels furent interprétés depuis
longtemps de la langue grecque dans l’ idiome syriaque par le saint et illustre Serge
prêtre et médecin-en-chef, dans une traduction que nous tous, les Syriens, avons lue.”
In his partial edition of this preface, Wiessner (1972: 198) excluded the second part of
this quotation: 焏‫ܬ ܩܠ‬r‫ ܠܒ‬焏q‫ܢ‬熏q 焏‫ܢ‬r‫ ܠ‬爯‫ܐ ܡ‬rq‫ ܢܓ‬焏‫ ܙܒܢ‬爯‫ ܗܘܬ ܡ‬焏‫ܩ‬r‫ܐ ܕܡܦ‬煟q‫ܐ‬
… ‫ܣ‬rqqq‫ ܘܐܪ‬焏rqr‫ ܩ‬爿q‫ܓ‬r‫ܐ ܣ‬rq煿‫ ܘܡ‬焏‫ܦ‬q‫܉ ܠܢ‬焏qqr熏‫ܕܣ‬. Again, a quotation from
Sergius’ translation of Divine Names 1.4 (at 8.8–20, ed. Fiori 2014) is found in Gabriel
Qatraya’s commentary on the liturgical offices.
21 An edition with facing Italian translation of the Divine Names was prepared by Fiori (2010c:
144–411) in his unpublished dissertation.
22 Antoine Guillaumont (1962: 214–227) suggested that Sergius might also be the translator of
the second Syriac version of Evagrius of Pontus’ Kephalaia Gnostica, but Perczel (2009: 37
n. 15) reports that a comparative analysis of this version and Sergius’ translation methods
does not confirm Guillaumont’s hypothesis; (see also Fiori 2014: 63f. n. 16 and pp. 66f.).
sergius as writer 21

– On Theory, again mentioned in his adaptation of Alexander’s On the Princi-

ples of the Universe (143.7f.): 爯‫ܝ ܠ‬熏q‫ ܡ‬焏q‫ ܬܐܘܪ‬爏‫ ̇ܗܘ ܕܥ‬焏‫ܒ‬rr‫ ܕܒ‬qq‫‘ ܐ‬as
we have shown in the book on theoria’.

2.1.7 Sergius’ Medical Adaptations and Translations

Being a physician, Sergius was foremost known as a translator and transmitter
of Galen’s medical writings into Syriac as they were studied in the Alexan-
drian school. The medical textbooks of this school consisted of sixteen books
by Galen and four by Hippocrates covering the basic fields of medicine.23 He
translated almost the entire canon of these medical texts from the Alexan-
drian tradition.24 In his Risāla or Letter, Hunayn reports twenty six works of
Galen translated by Sergius.25 Unfortunately, most of Sergius’ translations of
medical writings are lost,26 though some new discoveries have been made
in recent years. I give only extant works below, beginning with Sergius’ para-
phrases:

– On the Influence of the Moon according to the Doctrine of Astronomers, to

Theodore. Like many other texts by Sergius it is preserved in bl Add 14658
(fol. 141r–149v) and has been edited by Sachau (1870: 101–124). It has the Syr-

23 The books of this canon were later abridged and adapted into a medical compendium
called Summaria Alexandrinorum ‘Alexandrian summaries’, which is extant in Arabic,
Hebrew, and Latin translations, but not in its original Greek version. In Arabic it is labelled
‫ جوامع الإسكندرانيين‬Ǧawāmiʿ al-Iskandarāniyyīn, (cf. Gutas 1999: 169–174 and Overwien
2013).
24 According to the report of Hunayn, Sergius did not translate De sectis and De pulsi-
bus ad tirones by Galen (Hugonnard-Roche 2004: 125f.; cf. also Meyerhof 1926a: 703).
These two books of Galen were part of the sixteen books by him which constituted
the Alexandrian medical canon, together with four books by Hippocrates. On the other
hand, Ibn Abi Usaibia mentions that he has come across sixteen medical translations by
Sergius.
25 For a complete list of Sergius’ translations, see Degen (1981: 131–166), nos. 5–8, 10–12, 15, 32–
38, 47, 49–56, 59–61, 65, 77, 80, 84, 104–105, and 122; (see also Strohmaier 1994: 1997–1999).
For an earlier study listing all Sergius’ medical translations reported in Hunayn’s Letter,
see Pigulevskaya (1979: 149–168, esp. 159–163).
26 Fiori (2014: 67) writes that Sergius’ medical translations have not survived because Hunayn
outclassed him with his translations. However, most of Hunayn’s Syriac versions have in
fact not survived either. And as Brock suggests, (personal communication) the loss of
medical works in Syriac is rather due to the fact that Arabic later on took over as the
language of medicine and there was no need any more to copy manuscripts containing
medical texts in Syriac.
22 chapter 2

iac title: ‫ ̇ܗܝ‬爏‫ ܥ‬27‫ܬ ܬܐܘܕܪܐ‬熏‫ܘܣ ܠ‬rq焏q‫ ܐܪ‬爿q‫ܓ‬r‫ ܠܣ‬煟q‫ܐ ܕܥܒ‬r‫ܡ‬焏‫ܡ‬

28熏‫ܘܢܡ‬rq‫ܐ ܕܐܣ‬rq‫ ܬܪܥ‬qq‫ܪܐ ܐ‬煿‫ܗ ܕܣ‬煟‫ܥ ܥܒ‬煟‫ ܢ‬r‫ ܐܢ‬焏‫ܢ‬qq‫‘ ܕܐ‬a
memra written by Sergius of Reshaina, the archiatros, to Theodore, on how
someone may recognize the influence of the moon according to the doc-
trine of astronomers’. This is not a proper translation, but an abridgement
and adaptation of the third book of Galen’s On Critical Days (Περὶ κρίσιμων
ἡμερῶν βιβλία γ᾽, De diebus decretoriis libri iii: De creticis diebus, ed. Kühn,
vol. 9:5, pp. 769–941). Also a Syriac translation of De diebus decretoriis ‘On
critical days’ by Sergius is mentioned by Hunayn in his Letter (no. 19, Degen
1981 no. 54), and also discussed by Cooper (2011: 15–19 and 28) in his edition
and translation of the Arabic version of Hunayn, and also by King (2011a:
197f.).
– Paul of Alexandria, Introduction or Introductory Matters (Εἰσαγωγικά), chap-
ter 28.29 The Syriac text is a translation, with some further preliminary infor-
mation, of chapter 28 of Paul’s Introduction. In the manuscript (again bl Add
14658 fol. 149v, see Wright 1872, vol. 3, p. 1158) it is not attributed to Sergius,
obviously because it is found as an appendix to his previous work, namely
On the Influence of the Moon. Its heading is: ‫ܬܗ‬熏‫ܥܢ‬q‫ܬܙ‬r‫ ܡ‬爏q‫ܐ ܡ‬rq熏q‫ܬ‬
焏‫ܢ‬q焏‫ ܕܒ‬焏‫ܒܥ‬r‫ܝ ܕܡ‬r‫ ܐܡ‬爏q ‫ܥ‬煟‫ ܠܡ‬r‫ ܐܢ‬qqr‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܢ‬qq‫ ܘܕܐ‬焏r‫ܡ‬r‫ܕ‬
rq‫ܣ‬q rqrq ‫ܬܗ ܪܕܐ‬熏‫ ̈ܡܢ‬爯‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܢ‬q焏‫ܐ ܘܒ‬rq‫‘ ܒ‬a demonstration concern-
ing the motion of sun and that of how someone is able, whenever needed, to
know in which sign and approximately in which of its divisions it moves’.30
The Syriac text, also by Sachau (1870: 125–126) edited immediately after the
previous text as in the manuscript, was previously thought to be an original
text of Sergius, until Saliba (1995) identified it as chapter 28 of Paul’s Intro-
duction. Though it is not a medical text, the knowledge it conveys was clearly
considered by Sergius to be of relevance in order to determine the critical
days treated in the work it was supplemented to (cf. Takahashi 2011: 479).
– Galen, On the Mixtures and Powers of Simple Drugs (Περὶ κράσεως καὶ δυνά-
μεως τῶν ἁπλων φαρμάκων, De simplicium medicamentorum temperamentis

27 Sachau has ‫ ܬܐܕܘܪܐ‬in his edition (101.3), but Wright (1872, vol. 3, p. 1158) has given the
expected reading, though see also footnote 33 in this chapter.
28 The manuscript has 熏‫ܢܡ‬rq‫ܥ … ܕܐܣ‬煟q r‫ܐܢ‬, but the correct reading with ‫ܥ‬煟‫ ܢ‬is given
in the end title (124.22), while 熏‫ܘܢܡ‬rq‫ܣ‬焏‫ ܠ‬is found in the main text (102.6).
29 This introductory text to astrology by Paul of Alexandria was written in 378 ad as indicated
by the dedication to his son Cronamon.
30 Cf. the Greek title for this chapter κηʹ/28 (79.1–3, ed. Boer): Περὶ τῆς τοῦ Ἡλίου κινήσεως καὶ
τοῦ μαθεῖν ἐν ποίῳ ζῳδίῳ καὶ πόσων μοιρῶν ἐστὶν παχυμερῶς ‘On the motion of the sun and
learning in what sign and of how many divisions it is roughly’.
sergius as writer 23

et facultatibus, sometimes called just On Simple Drugs, ed. Kühn, vol. 11:9,
pp. 379–892). For a long time, only Sergius’ translation of books 6–8 (incom-
plete at the end) was known from bl Add 14661 (fol. 1v–73v, see the descrip-
tion of Wright 1872, vol. 3, p. 1187). The second part of this work of Galen
(books 6–11) constitutes the botanical section of the complete work and to
the beginning of each of the three previously known books Sergius has pre-
fixed a short introduction of his own and a Syriac-Greek list of the names of
plants occurring in it. Hunayn reports in his Letter (no. 53, Degen 1981 no. 59)
that Sergius had translated the second part of the work, though Sergius’
introduction to book six indicates that he had translated the previous five
books too.31 Also this translation is addressed to Theodore as we learn from
the heading of the sixth book: ⟨‫ܐ‬r‫ … ⟩ܥܠ‬焏qq̈r‫ ܦ‬焏‫ܡܢ‬ ̈ ‫ܐ ܕܣܡ‬rq‫ܦܢܩ‬
̈ ̈
爿q‫ܓ‬r‫ܐ ܠܣ‬煟q‫⟨ ܕܥܒ‬焏qqr‫ ⟩ܦ‬焏‫ ܣܡܡܢ‬爏‫ ܥ‬爿‫ܢ‬q‫ܐ ܕܓܠ‬rr‫ܐ ܕ‬r‫ܡ‬焏‫ܕܡ‬
焏rqr‫ܬ ܬ⟨ܐܕܘܪܐ ܩ‬熏‫ܘܣ ⟩ܠ‬rqqq‫ ܘܐܪ‬焏rqr‫‘ ܩ‬tablet of simple drugs (…) the
⟨reason⟩32 of sixth book of Galen on the ⟨simple⟩ drugs, which is written by
Sergius, the priest and chief physician, to Theodore the priest’.33 Most of the
text of this manuscript was edited by Merx (1885) with a German translation,
and remarks to the edition were provided by Löw (1886). Its terminology has
recently been analyzed by Bhayro (2005), and its translation technique by
Pormann (2012). Fortunately, in 2009 Sebastian Brock and Siam Bhayro were
able to identify a medical text beneath the script of a liturgical manuscript
from the 11th century containing hymns of the Byzantine and Melkite tradi-
tions. The underlying medical text turned out to be another copy of Sergius’
translation of Galen’s On Simple Drugs, which seems to have been copied
in the ninth century and is now named the Syriac Galen Palimpsest. This
manuscript is more extensive and has also some material from at least book 9
of Galen’s work. But judging from its size, the palimpsest contains at least

31 See On Simple Drugs 246.6, 16 f. (ed. Merx) and cf. also Bhayro & Brock (2013: 38ff.). In
the article “Medicine’s Hidden Roots in an Ancient Manuscript”, by Mark Schrope, in
The New York Times, June 1, 2015, it is reported that Grigory Kessel and his colleagues
have recognized some words from books 2 and 4 as well in one of the loose leaves of
the Syriac Galen Palimpsest (see http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/02/science/medicines
-hidden-roots-in-an-ancient-manuscript.html).
32 What is implicated in ‫ܐ‬r‫‘ ܥܠ‬reason’ in this context is both what we would denote
‘background’, or why the book is written, and by extension its ‘aim’ (焏rq‫)ܢ‬, cf. also Riad
(1988: 182f.).
33 Note again the Syriac spelling of the name of Theodore, and above all that he is called
焏rqr‫‘ ܩ‬a priest’ here, which sometimes was used for bishops too, but at that time Theo-
dore was perhaps still just a priest.
24 chapter 2

the whole second part of Galen’s On Simple Drugs, namely books 6–11. This
accords well with Hunayn’s report that Sergius translated the whole second
part of this work (Bhayro et al. 2013b: 144f.). As the only witness of books
9–11, this discovery is of great importance and is now being edited by Peter
E. Pormann, Siam Bhayro, and Bill Sellers, (see Bhayro et al. 2012, Bhayro &
Brock 2013, and other cited works by Bhayro et al.).
– Galen, The Art of Medicine, (Τέχνη ἰατρική, Ars medica, ed. Kühn, vol. 1:7,
pp. 305–412), preserved just as three vellum leaves (bl Add 17156, fol. 13–
15), which were part of a larger manuscript. As Wright (1872, vol. 3, p. 1188)
describes these leaves, they “are the remnants of a manuscript of the works
of Galen, probably in the translation of Sergius of Rās-ʾain.” These frag-
ments, which constitute a translation of chapters 23–24 and 28–31 of The Art
of Medicine, were edited by Sachau (1870: 88–94). Hunayn maintains that
Sergius translated this work before he yet mastered the art of translation
(Letter, no. 4, Degen 1981 no. 5).
– Galen, On the Properties of Foodstuffs, (Περὶ τροφῶν δυνάμεως, De alimento-
rum facultatibus, ed. Kühn, vol. 6:2, pp. 453–748), preserved also fragmentar-
ily in fol. 15 of bl Add 17156 corresponding to the end of chapter 58 onwards
of Galen’s book 2. Likewise, it was edited by Sachau (1870: 94–97). This book
was reported by Hunayn (Letter, no. 74, Degen 1981 no. 32) to have been trans-
lated into Syriac by Sergius. For remnants of Hunayn’s own translation of this
book, see Hawley (2008).
– Galen, Commentary to Hippocrates’ On Nutriment (Εἰς τὸ Ἱπποκράτους περὶ
τροφῆς ὑπομνήματα In Hippocratis librum de alimento commentarii, ed. Kühn,
vol. 15:3, pp. 224–417). Among the parts of several medical treatises of ms
New York, Jewish Theological Seminary of America 2761, Gerrit Bos and
Y. Tzvi Langermann identified recently an Arabic version of Galen’s com-
mentary to Hippocrates’ On Nutriment, which is written in Hebrew char-
acters. Sergius had translated the Greek commentary of Galen into Syriac,
which later apparently was translated into Arabic, including Sergius’ intro-
duction to it (Bos & Langermann 2009). This introduction is interesting for
the preliminary questions it treats. Sergius was not known to have translated
this Greek commentary of Galen, but Hunayn reports that he himself made
a Syriac version, now lost, for Salmawaih ibn Bunan (d. 840), (Letter, no. 100,
Degen 1981 no. 68). Obviously, Hunayn did not report all the previous Syriac
translations by Sergius, either because he was not aware of all of them, or it
was sometimes beneficial to him not to make known some of these transla-
tions.34

34 It must be borne in mind that during the Abbasid period the translational activity was a
sergius as writer 25

– Gesius, Commentary on Hippocrates’ Epidemics, Book 6, parts 5 through 8. In

an article from 2012, Grigory Kessel discusses a unique manuscript (ms 12/25)
in the Patriarchal Library of the Syrian Orthodox Church, (Maʿarrat Sayd-
nāyā, Damascus), which according to the opinion of Vööbus would con-
tain the Syriac translation by Job of Edessa (flourished about 817–832) of
Galen’s Commentary on the Epidemics (Kessel 2012: 94). In his analysis, Kessel
concludes that this Syriac version is not a translation of Galen’s commen-
tary, but of a lemmatic commentary on Hippocrates’ Epidemics, book six,
by the Iatrosophist Gesius of Petra and probably translated into Syriac by
Sergius. Gesius flourished during late fifth and early sixth centuries and was
a teacher of medicine in Alexandria.35 He may have been Sergius’ teacher
in medicine, since Sergius is supposed to have studied in Alexandria in the
470s–90s (Kessel 2012: 116f.). However, more evidence should be presented
before Sergius can definitely be claimed as the translator of the Syriac ver-
sion of this Greek commentary on Hippocrates’ Epidemics, book six.

Along with the above-mentioned medical books by Sergius, some excerpts

in The Book of Medicines (ed. Budge 1913) may belong to him. Furthermore,
in addition to Sergius’ original works and translations in Syriac,36 there are
indications that some of his writings were translated into Arabic too (see 2.3).
Therefore, it would not be surprising if new discoveries of his original writings
were made, as well as translations of him, rendered into Arabic.
It seems that Sergius did not make only translations and composed com-
mentaries, but also performed abridgments and synopses of some Greek works,
whose meanings could appear difficult in a traditional translation.

profitable business enterprise and that the patrons paid well for the books they commis-
sioned to be translated. The suppression of a previous translation or the characterization
of it as defective could be the reason that called for a new translation, which sometimes
could in fact be a quick revision of an existing version and thus be an easy way to make
money from an unsuspecting client.
35 For Gesius or Gessius/Gessios, see Schmid (1910), Nutton (2004), and Watts (2009).
36 For earlier surveys of Sergius’ writings and other works previously attributed to him, see
Wright (1894: 88–93), Duval (1907: 247–250), Baumstark (1922: 167–169), Georr (1948: 17–
23), Ortiz de Urbina (1965: 110 f.), Lumpe (1995), Brock (1997: 201–204), Bettiolo (2006:
463f.), and Fiori (2010c: 90–98), but especially Hugonnard-Roche (1989: 1–8 and 2004:
131f.).
26 chapter 2

2.2 Some Rhetorical topoi in Sergius’ Extant Prefaces

A quality that almost all ancient sources emphasize and ascribe to Sergius
is his eloquence and ability to express himself persuasively. It was his elo-
quence and erudition which probably induced Patriarch Ephraem to commis-
sion him with letters to Pope Agapetus. Besides perhaps having a natural tal-
ent as speaker, Sergius most probably studied rhetoric in Alexandria for some
time (cf. Hugonnard-Roche 2004: 171). There are indications that teaching in the
art of rhetoric was integrated into the curriculum of the Alexandrian school37
and that it occupied an important place in the students’ training. Also for
Christian scholars knowledge of rhetoric was of great value in the disputes
among them, but above all, with pagan philosophers. Zachariah of Mytilene
gives the following answer to Severus of Antioch, who urged him to follow
him to Beirut (46.11–47.1, ed. Kugener): 焏‫ ܐܢ‬犟q‫ ܣܢ‬爏qq煟‫ܬ ܕܥ‬r‫ ܐܡ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܐܢ‬
‫ܢ‬熏‫ ܗܢ‬焏‫ܢܦ‬q̈ 爏q‫ ܡ‬:‫ܐ‬r‫ ܐܩ‬rq‫ܐ‬rqrq 焏‫ܦ‬熏̈‫ܠܣ‬q‫ܐ ܘܕܦ‬rq‫ܗ‬r‫ܐ ܕ‬r‫ܡ‬焏‫ܕܡ‬
焏‫ܢ‬qq‫ ܐ‬:爯q‫ܪܘܪܒ‬r‫ ܡ‬爯q‫ܪܥ‬r‫ ܡ‬rq焏‫ ܪܘܪܒ‬爯q‫ ܗ‬qq‫ ܕܐ‬焏‫ܠܦܢ‬熏q̈ 爯q‫ܠ‬煿‫ܕܒ‬
‫ܫ‬rqr‫ ܢ‬爯q‫ܘܢ ܕܗܠ‬煿‫ ܘܡܢ‬rq焏‫ܩ‬qr‫ܢ ܦ‬熏‫ ܗܢ‬爏‫ܩܒ‬熏‫‘ ܕܠ‬I said that I still needed
to study further the speeches of the rhetoricians and philosophers, because
those pagans who excessively meditate upon such disciplines become exalted,
in order that we would (be able) to easily argue against them by means of their
own (tools)’.38
Taking my point of departure in Eva Riad’s Studies in the Syriac Preface
(Uppsala, 1988), I will now analyze all the extant prefaces that are attached to
Sergius’ own original writings and to his translations. It can almost be taken for
granted that Sergius usually wrote a preface to his works and sometimes also
epilogues (cf. Riad 1988: 28), as evident from those of his writings that we have
preserved in their entirety. The following works have some kind of a preface or
an introduction:

– Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, to Theodore of Karkh Guddan.

– Introduction to Aristotle and his Categories, to Philotheos,
– On the Influence of the Moon according to the Doctrine of Astronomers, to
Theodore.

37 Kustas (1973: 116 f., n. 5): “In Alexandria, for example, rhetoric was an integral part of the
curriculum, whereas in Athens it may not have been taught at all as an independent
discipline.” See also below at 3.2–4 the discussion on the school’s curriculum.
38 Two Early Lives of Severos, Patriarch of Antioch, trans. Brock (2013: 57) and The Life of
Severus, trans. Ambjörn (2008: 46), here revised by me.
sergius as writer 27

– On the Causes of the Universe, according to the view of Aristotle, addressee not
stated, but probably Theodore.39
– Translation of Pseudo-Aristotle, On the Cosmos, addressee not stated and
probably not Theodore.
– Epilogue to Discourse on the Spiritual Life to be perceived as a short preface
to his translation of the Pseudo-Dionysian Corpus, addressee not stated, but
a certain ‘Stephen’ is mentioned to have assisted him with the translation
(§123, ed. Sherwood).
– Translation of Galen’s Commentary to Hippocrates’ On Nutriment (Arabic ver-
sion in Hebrew characters), addressee not stated, but is probably Theodore.

These prefaces are, of course, very valuable sources and provide us with some
personal information as well as with the aim of a certain work and the circum-
stances that surrounded its composition. They are also important for distin-
guishing the genuine productions of Sergius from false attributions. Some very
common rhetorical topoi from both the Greek and Syriac traditions appear in
Sergius’ prefaces, which reveal his familiarity with all the tools of rhetoric.
An important contribution to the extant prefaces of Sergius was the discov-
ery in 2009 of his introduction to Galen’s commentary on Hippocrates’ book
On Nutriment in an Arabic translation with Hebrew characters. The most inter-
esting feature of this text is that it contains the preliminary questions, a so-
called schema isagogicum ‘introductory scheme’, which the Neoplatonist com-
mentators were dealing with in their prefaces before they proceeded to the
commentary itself. These kinds of preliminary questions were present even
before they appear in Ammonius’ preface to his Commentary on Porphyry’s Eis-
agoge (21.5–22.2), but they seem to have constituted an important part of his
school’s commentary tradition. The number of the preliminary questions that
needed to be settled before the study itself varied from six to eight, but some-
times even up to ten. Nevertheless, it does not mean that the commentators
dealt with all the preliminaries in every book, but rather that they adapted
the number of questions to the book they were expounding. They often made
use of other points too, which display some common rhetorical topoi found
in many prefaces, including Sergius’ other prefaces. There were in fact two
parallel sets of introductory schemes among the scholars of the Alexandrian
school.40

39 The prologue of this treatise belongs no doubt to Sergius and not Alexander, as suggested
by Fazzo & Zonta (2014: 111 ff.), with whom I side.
40 For the preliminary questions of Alexandrian introductions, see Hein (1985: 385–387);
28 chapter 2

Already Riad noted (1988: 52 n. 54) that “One would expect to find the same
[introductory] scheme” in Sergius’ prefaces. The list of the introductory themes
has the following points:41

1. The aim/purpose (ὁ σκοπός or ἡ πρόθεσις, in Syriac usually rendered with

焏rq‫ )ܢ‬of the book to be expounded.
2. Its utility/usefulness/value (τὸ χρήσιμον ‫ܬܐ‬熏qrq, 焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܗܢ‬, and 焏‫ܬܪܢ‬熏q).
3. Its authenticity (τὸ γνήσιον rq‫ܐ‬rqrq ‫ܘܗܝ‬rq‫ ܐ‬熏‫‘ ܕܡܢ‬to whom it really
belongs’).
4. Its place in the order of reading (ἡ τάξις τῆς ἀναγνώσεως 焏‫ܣ‬qq < τάξις
‘order’).
5. The reason for its title (ἡ αἰτία τῆς ἐπιγραφῆς 焏‫ܡ‬r‫ܐ ܕܪܘ‬r‫)ܥܠ‬.
̈ ‫ ܕܠܩ‬焏‫ܠܓ‬熏‫)ܦ‬.
6. Its division into chapters (ἡ εἰς τὰ κεφάλαια διαίρεσις 焏‫ܦܠ‬焏
7. To which part of philosophy/science does the writing belong (εἰς ποῖον μέρος τῆς
̇
φιλοσοφίας ἀνάγεται 犟‫ ܣܠ‬熏‫ܬ ܡܢ‬熏‫ܠ‬, i.e. 爟q̇‫ܬܐ ܠ‬熏‫ܐ ܕܐܘܡܢ‬r‫ܐ ܡܢ‬煟q焏‫ܠ‬
‘to which part of art does it fit’).
8. The manner of the teaching (ὁ τρόπος τῆς διδασκαλίας 焏‫ܒ‬rq‫ ܕ‬煿‫ ܕܡܡܠܠ‬焏‫ܙܢ‬
‫ܘܗܝ‬rq‫‘ ܐ‬the manner of speech of the book is’) used by the author.

The relevant passage from the Arabic version of Sergius’ introduction quoted
here in the translation of Bos & Langermann (p. 199, Arabic text, p. 193)
reads:

Since it is the custom of the Greeks, when beginning commentaries to

the books of the ancients, to lay down at the beginning of the books, eight
headings [ruʾūs], by means of which will become clear their aim [gharaḍ],
their causes [asbāb, i.e. reason for the title], their strength [quwwa],42
their limit [muntahā],43 their author [muʾallif, i.e. authenticity], their
number [ʿidda, i.e. division into chapters] (?), how they were executed

Hadot (1990b: 24–47), Mansfeld (1994: 10–19), Hoffmann (2006: 607–613), Bos & Langer-
mann (2009: 181–190), and also Wisnovsky (2013, with the literature quoted at p. 199
n. 4).
41 For these points see the quoted literature in the previous footnote and for the correspond-
ing Syriac terminology, mainly from Proba’s preface to On Interpretation (63.23–65.18, ed.
Hoffmann), except point eight, see Riad (1988: 42 f. and 48f.).
42 Perhaps ‘utility’, cf. Sergius’ On the Influence of the Moon (101.10f.): 焯‫ ܘܢܣ‬焏‫ܗܢ‬r‫ ܕܢ‬qqr‫ܡ‬
‫ܡ‬煟‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܠ‬qq 煿‫‘ ܡܢ‬he will be able to gain benefit and receive some strength from it [i.e.
the book]’.
43 Perhaps ‘order of reading’.
sergius as writer 29

[kayfiyyat ʿamalihā],44 where they are to be read [mawḍiʿu qirāʾatihā],45

by means of which they encourage people to read it.

Later on in the Arabic preface, Sergius explains each of the themes (which
seems to differ slightly from what is quoted above), but some of these passages
are missing in the surviving manuscript and cannot be completely evaluated.
Unfortunately, we do not have the original version of his text to decide the
exact Syriac words he used for these eight preliminaries and their explanations,
though it is possible to reconstruct some of them from their occurrences in the
works of other writers.
It is noteworthy that the number of preliminaries that Sergius mentions is
eight (against the seven found in Ammonius’ and Proba’s extant prefaces46)
and that they occur in the introduction to a medical commentary to Galen
and not in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories or Introduction to Aristotle
and his Categories. Nonetheless, we have examples of other commentators too,
who dealt with eight preliminary points in the introductions to medical works,
namely Stephanus of Alexandria47 in his commentary on Hippocrates’Prognos-
tic, and Palladius, another Alexandrian iatrosophist, in his commentary to the
Hippocratic Aphorisms, the latter extant only in Arabic. There are also writers
in the Arabic tradition, who discuss these eight headings in their introductions
to medical treatises and we may guess the partial influence of Sergius at work
here.48
At the same time, in the introduction to his Commentary on the Categories,
addressed to Theodore, he deals with a couple of the themes present mostly in
the first introductory scheme of the Neoplatonists. The points that he presents
and discusses here are the reasons for Aristotle’s deliberate obscurity, or the
difficult nature of some of his works, and the division and the classification of
Aristotle’s works (Hugonnard-Roche 2004: 169, 180 f., and 194 ff.).

44 Sergius’ explanation (op. cit., p. 199): “The seventh will make clear to which of the branches
of knowledge this book belongs.”
45 Sergius’ explanation (ibid.): “The eighth will declare which type of instruction Hippocrates
employed in this book.”
46 From Proba’s list point eight is missing, i.e. the manner of the teaching, cf. Riad (1988: 42).
47 This Stephanus might possibly be the same person as the one called Stephanus of Athens
and also Stephanus the Philosopher, a commentator of Aristotle, (see Wolska-Conus 1989).
If so, we would then have an interesting parallel to Sergius of a physician and philosopher
from the Alexandrian school.
48 See Joosse (2013: 503f.) on these writers, with relevant references. Cf. also Overwien (2012:
168).
30 chapter 2

We will now point out some common rhetorical topoi in Sergius’ extant
prefaces, which for the most part are in line with the features of many other
Syriac prefaces, as studied by Riad and whose main points are summarized
in her introduction, where she writes (1988: 15): “The skeleton of a personal
preface, or the personal part of the preface, mostly comprises a request, a
dedication, an expression of unwillingness to write due to the author’s alleged
incompetence, his reasons for writing, and a prayer for assistance.” All these
themes can be abstracted from Sergius’ prefaces and epilogues, as I will show
in what follows (cf. Hugonnard-Roche 2004: 170 f.).
As noted above, most of Sergius’ writings are addressed to a person, whose
name is stated or not, although some writers are supposed to have used even
fictitious addressees, which might have been the case for some of Sergius’
addresses too. The recipient of at least three of Sergius’ works is Theodore,
described by Hunayn ibn Ishaq as the bishop of Karkh Guddan. He is spoken
to as ‘our brother’ (‫ܢ‬熏q‫)ܐ‬,49 which may indicate that he was either a student
or close friend of Sergius, but who at the time of the composition of the text
probably did not have a higher religious office. This, in contrast to the addressee
of the Pseudo-Aristotelian On the Cosmos, who is spoken to as ‫ܬܟ‬熏q‫‘ ܓܒ‬elect
you’ (134.14), who has ‘ordered’ (煟‫ )ܦܩ‬him to translate the work and whose
commands Sergius is trying to fulfill. Even if such words are usually employed as
a sign of courtesy, a common topos in many prefaces, I think that the recipients
of these two texts are different persons. The whole preface of the Pseudo-
Aristotelian On the Cosmos gives indeed the impression that its translation
was not a priority to Sergius himself. When Sergius speaks to Theodore (or
Philotheos), he calls him a ‘brother’ who has ‘requested’ (爿q‫ )ܐܦ‬or ‘asked’
(‫ܠ‬焏r) him to write or translate a work, and not ‘ordered’. Also the recipient
of the Arabic version of Sergius’ preface is addressed as a ‘brother’ and is
very likely Theodore, since Sergius initially inscribed his medical translations
to him, as stated in his Commentary on the Categories. The addressee of the
Pseudo-Dionysian Corpus is on the other hand difficult to determine from the
information given in the epilogue/preface, but was probably not Theodore.
As far as we can gauge from Sergius’ prefaces, most of his literary produc-
tion came about in consequence of a request from a person, which was a
very common topos.50 In Sergius’ case, the requester is often Theodore. The

49 Note that Philotheos too, the addressee of his Introduction to Aristotle, is twice spoken
to as ‫ܢ‬熏q‫‘ ܐ‬our brother’ (§ 1 and § 80), and the latter passage is a literal excerpt from
the Commentary on the Categories (L.47vb5/P.88v23). Thus, ‘our brother’ of the two texts
denotes to two different persons!
50 On the request theme, see Riad (1988: 191 ff.).
sergius as writer 31

request needed sometimes to be repeated several times, as is said to have

been the case with three of Sergius’ works,51 since Sergius is unwilling and
hesitates because of the task’s great difficulty. The verbs used for the request
are 爿q‫‘ ܐܦ‬to demand’, ‘beseech’, ‘request’,52 ‫ܠ‬焏r ‘to ask’,53 and also 煟‫‘ ܦܩ‬to
order/command’, In the Arabic introduction we have saʾala ‘ask’ and ṭalaba
‘request’ (On Nutriment 192.16). The noun ‫ܐ‬r‫‘ ܒܥ‬demand’, ‘request’ (On the
Principles of the Universe 129.3); ‫ܐ‬r‫ܠ‬焏r ‘wish’, ‘request’ (Commentary on the
Categories P.2v20); and 焏‫ܢ‬煟‫ܩ‬熏‫‘ ܦ‬command’, ‘order’ (On the Cosmos 134.19,20)
are also found. The adaptation of Alexander’s On the Principles of the Universe
̈
refers especially to the requester’s many questions (129.6: qq‫ܐܠ‬熏r) concern-
ing the opinion of Aristotle on the primary causes or principles of the universe.
Therefore, it is said to have been written in order to offer answers to those ques-
tions.
Another theme found in many prefaces is that of modesty, where the writer
expresses his humility (the topos of mea mediocritas ‘my insignificance/weak-
ness’).54 Sergius gives expression to humility especially in his introduction to
the translation of the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus55 and that of On the Cosmos56
with words such as: q‫ܥ‬煟‫ܬܗ ܕܡ‬熏‫ܠ‬qq‫ܬ ܡ‬熏‫‘ ܠܦ‬according to the weakness of
my mind’ (Ps.-Dion. §114), ‫ܬܢ‬熏‫ܠ‬qq‫‘ ܡ‬our weakness’ (Ps.-Dion. § 122 and On the
Cosmos 134.23), ‫ܬܢ‬熏q熏q‫‘ ܗܕ‬our ignorance’ (Ps.-Dion. § 121). In his other intro-
ductions, he expresses much less humility. Like many other writers, Sergius
articulates his weakness in comparison with the elevated nature of the sub-
ject and the great difficulty of its execution (cf. Ps.-Dion. § 122 and Commentary
on the Categories P.2v9f.).
Sergius warrants his yielding to the request and the accomplishment of the
addressee’s wish with his 焏‫ܠܦܢ‬熏q r‫ܡ‬q‫‘ ܪ‬love of learning’ (Greek φιλομάθεια)57

51 Namely Commentary on the Categories, adaptation of Alexander’s On the Principles of the

Universe, and On Nutriment.
52 As in On the Influence of the Moon (101.7), adaptation of Alexander’s On the Principles of the
Universe (129.7), and Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories (P.2v7). I agree with Sebastian
Brock (1975: 88) that the more common meaning of 爿q‫ ܐܦ‬in Syriac is ‘request/entreat/
beseech’, and not ‘persuade’ as given in some dictionaries under the effect of its presup-
posed Greek origin from πεῖσαι (πείθειν).
53 As in his adaptation of Alexander’s On the Principles of the Universe (129.5), in Commentary
on the Categories (P.2r2), and in On the Cosmos (134.15).
54 On this theme, see Riad (1988: 198 ff.).
55 Probably because of the subject, namely the difficult theology of this text.
56 May depend on the requester of this translation, who seems to be a person of high degree.
57 At the Commentary on the Categories (P.2r6) and in the introduction to Galen, On the
Mixtures and Powers of Simple Drugs (246.17, ed. Merx), cf. Riad (1988: 81 and 155).
 32 chapter 2

and the great many general benefits offered by this kind of knowledge. In the
Arabic version of his translation of Galen’s Commentary to Hippocrates’ On
Nutriment we find (p. 192, tr. 198 by Bos & Langermann):

Dear brother, since you asked me and requested of me many times that
I translate for you some of the books of the Greeks into Syriac, but espe-
cially the treatise that Hippocrates composed about foods, and this was
on account of your love for all knowledge that the soul requires, I assented
and will not deny you that which you asked for and requested; for it is one
of the things that are required.

A further rhetorical technique that Sergius makes use of in order to capture

the goodwill of the reader and make him well-disposed is to ask the addressee
for assistance by asking them to supplement what he has missed to record
and correct his errors and shortcomings (the topos of captatio benevolentiae,
cf. Riad 1988: 102ff.). This approach is also connected in some way to the theme
of modesty.
In his original writings, he asks for the reader’s assistance, as for example in
the Introduction to Aristotle, addressed to Philotheos, where he writes (88.8–10):

爯‫ ܘ̣ܡ‬q‫ ܡܢ‬爯‫ܢ‬q‫ܠ‬焏r 煟q 爯‫ܥܢ‬q‫ ܗܐ ܐܬܬܙ‬焏r‫ ܗ‬Now, see how terrified we are when asking you and those
爯‫ܢ‬q‫ܪ‬犏‫ ܡܒ‬爯‫ܢ‬q‫ܡ ܕ‬煟‫ ܕ̇ܗܘ ܡ‬.‫ܬܟ‬熏q‫ ܕܐ‬爯q‫ܠ‬q‫ ܐ‬who are like you, to speak what we reduce, and to correct
焏‫ܣ‬qq 爯‫ ̣ܡ‬r‫ܡ ܠܒ‬煟‫ ܘܐܢ ܡ‬58.‫ܢ‬熏‫ܘܢ ܬܡܠܠ‬r‫ ܐܢ‬it if we say something out of place.
.‫ܘܢ ܬܬܪܨܘܢ‬r‫ ܐܢ‬爯‫ܢ‬qr‫ܐܡ‬

But when it comes to translations, he is keen on conveying the opposite mes-

sage for a different purpose, namely to assure his fidelity to the text he is trans-
lating in order to anticipate potential criticism, as he does in his translation of
Pseudo-Aristotle’s On the Cosmos by writing (134.23–27):

焏qq犏‫ ܒ‬rqqr‫ܡ ܕܐ‬煟‫ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‬rq‫ ܓ‬焏‫ܐܢ‬ For what I have found in the copy that was sent from you,
rq‫ ܠܡ‬r‫ܦ‬犏q 煿‫ ܠ‬.q‫ܒ‬熏q ‫ܬ‬熏‫ ܠ‬爯‫ܕܪ ܡ‬rr‫ܕܐ‬ beloved, that I have endeavored to keep in perfect com-
焏‫ ܐܢ‬牯‫ܣ‬熏‫ ܡ‬焏‫ ܠ‬煟q .‫ܬܐ‬rq‫ܬܐ ܓܡ‬熏‫ܠܡ‬r‫ܒ‬ pleteness, as I neither add anything to those things that
.爯‫ ܬܢ‬焏‫ܦ‬熏‫ܠܣ‬q‫ ܠܦ‬煿‫ ܠ‬爯‫̈ܒ‬rq‫ ܕܡ‬爯q‫ ܗܠ‬爏‫ܡ ܥ‬煟‫ܡ‬ are composed here by the Philosopher, nor do I subtract
.q‫ܠ‬qq qq‫ ܐ‬爯q煿‫ ܡܢ‬焏‫ܪ ܐܢ‬犏‫ ܬܘܒ ܡ̇ܒ‬焏‫ܘܠ‬ from them (anything) according to my ability.

58 As suggested by Daniel King (personal communication) ‫ܢ‬熏‫‘ ܬܡܠܠ‬to speak’ here might be
an error for ‫ܢ‬熏‫‘ ܬܡܠ‬to fill’, which would fit here as well, if not better.
sergius as writer 33

In the case of the translations, Sergius has to relate to an authority and the
integrity of his text and therefore maintain the ambition to render the text
faithfully,59 but when it comes to his original works it is a deep-laid technique
to ask for assistance.
The most remarkable, but not uncommon,60 theme that appears in sev-
eral of Sergius’ prefaces is his desire to defend himself by an apology (犟‫ܡܦ‬
焏q‫ܘ‬r‫ ܒ‬Ps.-Dion. §122, cf. Riad 1988: 179ff.) and in advance refute any criticism
that he expects to come because of envy (焏‫ܣܡ‬q) and malice (‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܥ‬qr‫)ܪ‬
or difficulty in understanding the meaning (焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܬܐ ܕܪܥ‬熏‫ )ܥܣܩ‬of some of
his works. Several of his prefaces contain the word ‘envy’ (焏‫ܣܡ‬q)61 and
‘blame’ or ‘criticism’ (焏q‫ܠ‬煟‫)ܥ‬62 and different forms of the verb ‫ܠ‬煟‫‘ ܥ‬to blame’,
‘reproach’.63 It seems that Sergius expects to be subjected to the envy and crit-
icism of others, perhaps because of his close association with Hellenistic cul-
ture.
As it has been noted, the criticism might according to Sergius depend on
envy and malevolence of some persons or the difficulty to comprehend the
meaning of a text. But instead of enviously criticizing him, which is to no
benefit, Sergius asks his readers to correct him mercifully (Ps.-Dion. § 122): 焏‫ܠ‬
‫ܬܪܨ‬r‫ܬܐ ܢ‬熏‫ܡܢ‬qr‫ ܒܡ‬焏‫ܠ ܐܠ‬煟‫ܥ‬r‫ ܢ‬焏‫ܣܡ‬q‫‘ ܒ‬we may not be reproached
with envy, but be corrected in mercy’, (cf. also Commentary on the Categories
P.3r23). He usually recommends his readers seek what is to the general help
and search for the benefits that are offered in the books in front of them. But if
the criticism comes from the difficulty of understanding the meaning of the
text, he recommends his readers reread a book several times if the topic so
requires and if he yet finds anything obscure, he should go to someone who
is able to instruct and explain it to him (Commentary on the Categories P.3r2–

59 A similar attitude is expressed also in his preface to the translation of Pseudo-Dionysius

(§121). For a brief discussion of its preface, see Fiori (2009: 43f.).
60 Riad (1988: 207): “A topos in the preface since antiquity is for the author to refute criticism
that he anticipates.”
61 In the Introduction to Aristotle (94.14,16), the Commentary on the Categories (P.3r10), Ps.-
Dion. (§122), and On Nutriment (192.16: ‫ حسد‬ḥasad ‘envy’).
62 In the Commentary on the Categories (P.3r12), On the Cosmos (134.23), and in the epi-
logue to Introduction to Aristotle (168.4). Some other words for criticism and censure
are also used: ‫ܬܐ‬熏rr‫‘ ܡ‬blame’, ‘reproach’ (Commentary on the Categories P.2v24, 3r8),
焏q‫ܢ‬熏̣‫‘ ܓ‬retort’, ‘reproach’ (Commentary on the Categories L.21rb33/P.61r16), 焏‫ܢ‬q‫‘ ܪܘ‬com-
plaint’, ‘murmuring’, and ‫ܐ‬rqq‫‘ ܨܘ‬insult’, ‘censure’ (epilogue to Introduction to Aristotle
168.4).
63 In the Introduction to Aristotle (94.10) and Ps.-Dion. (§122).
 34 chapter 2

5): 爯‫ܢ ܡ‬焏‫ ܢܡ‬爯q煟q‫ ܗ‬焏‫ ܘܐܦܠ‬.‫ܛ‬熏‫ܡ ܕܥܡ‬煟‫ܐ ܡ‬熟qr‫ ܢ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܘܐܦ ܗ‬爯q煟‫ܐܢ‬
‫ܥ‬煟q̇ 焏‫ ܕܠ‬焏‫ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‬煿‫ܐ ܠ‬熏q‫ܬܐ ܘܡ‬r‫ ܡ‬qqr‫ ܕܡ‬r‫ܬ ܐܢ‬熏‫ܙܠ ܠ‬焏‫‘ ܕܠܡ‬and also
in this way [i.e. after several readings] if something appears to be obscure, even
then he should not hesitate to go to someone who is able to instruct and show
him what he does not know’.
But the unusually long defense that Sergius offers in the preface to his
Commentary on the Categories made Hugonnard-Roche (2004: 173f.) wonder if
Sergius is not seeking to prevent certain resistance that might arise from the
reception of Aristotle among Syriac readers.64 And it might indeed be the case,
even if such anticipation of criticism was used as a rhetorical figure occasion-
ally. In fact, other writers such as Proba and Job of Edessa also defended their
sciences as the study of Eva Riad (1988: 171, 175ff., and 188) shows, as well as
George, Bishop of the Arabs (Miller 1993: 318f.). Since this anticipation of crit-
icism is present in several of Sergius’ prefaces, it would not be a defense only
of Aristotle, but also of all the new disciplines, of which Sergius was the first
promoter and introducer in the Semitic sphere in general and the Syriac in par-
ticular.
It might also be the case that he is not solely anticipating censure because of
an uncertainty regarding the reception of profane disciplines, but he is rather
responding to criticism that he already had been targeted with. For he does not
only feel compelled to defend his scholarship, but he also needs to point out
his orthodoxy to the Christian faith by renouncing any belief in the teaching
of Aristotle, when he writes in the preface to his Commentary on the Categories
(P.3v1–7):

熏‫ ܠ‬.‫ܐ‬r‫ ܕ̇ܩ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܐ‬爏qr‫ ܕܢܣ‬焏‫ ܐܢ‬r‫ ܐ̇ܡ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬爯q‫ܗܠ‬ I will say this in order that the one who reads will under-
‫ܐ܆‬r‫ܗ ܕܓܒ‬rq熏‫ܒ‬rr‫ ܒ‬焏‫ ܐܢ‬煟qq‫ ܕܐ‬爯‫ ̇ܡ‬qq‫ܐ‬ stand: it is not so that I hold the doctrine of the man [i.e.
‫ܒ‬rq‫ ̇ܡ‬焏r‫ ܗ‬.爿q ‫ܗ‬rq‫ ܬܪܥ‬r‫ܝ ܒ‬rq‫ܐܘ ܐ‬ Aristotle] or that I am of his opinion—God forbid!—that
爏q‫ ܡ‬焏‫ ܐܠ‬.‫ܬܗ‬熏‫ ܕܡܠܦܢ‬焏rq‫ ܢ‬爏‫ ܥ‬焏‫ܐܢ‬ I now compose about the aim of his teaching, but because
爯‫ܬ ̣ܡ‬r‫ ܕܐܡ‬焏‫ܢ‬qq‫ ܐ‬.q‫ܒ‬熏q 爯‫ ̣ܡ‬rq犏‫ܕܐܬܥ‬ I have been forced by you, beloved, as I mentioned above,
‫ ̇ܗܘܐ‬焏‫ ܪܒ‬焏r‫ ܕܕܘܪ‬焏‫ ܐܢ‬r‫ ܕܡ̣̇ܣܒ‬爏q‫ ܘܡ‬.爏‫ܠܥ‬ and because I think that a great erudition arises from
爯q‫ܠ‬q焏‫ܐ܆ ܠ‬r‫ܥ‬煟q ‫ܬ‬熏‫ ܠ‬焏‫ܬܪܐ ܪܒ‬熏‫ ܘܥ‬.爯q‫ ܗܠ‬爯‫̣ܡ‬ these things, and a great richness towards knowledge for
.爯q煿‫ ܒ‬爯qr‫ ̇ܩ‬rq焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܠ‬熏q‫ܕܣ‬ those who prudently read them.

Despite this, Sergius elsewhere gives expression to his appreciation of Aristotle

and can in fact be suspected as a Christian Peripatetic. Nevertheless, he would
have envisaged that the concept of a Christian as follower of Aristotle would be

64 On this process, see Brock (1982).

sergius as writer 35

controversial. Therefore, he tries to justify his intellectual activity by denying

any adherence to Aristotle and instead emphasizes the general usefulness of
such scholarship.
Another theme which many writers are expected to deploy in their prefaces
is to present the reasons for writing the work at hand. Also among the eight
preliminary questions of Neoplatonists we find two of them frequently repre-
sented in Sergius’ prefaces and epilogues, namely the aim of the book and its
utility. The first one, to present the aim (焏rq‫ )ܢ‬of the work is important in order
to inform the reader about the topic of the work and to attract his interest. In
this connection, beside the more personal prefaces of Sergius, we can men-
tion his more objective prefaces to each of the three books of his translation
of Galen’s On the Mixtures and Powers of Simple Drugs that have been known
to survive (book 6–8 of eleven). In these brief introductions he refers partially
to the contents of the preceding books and partially introduces the next one
by defining its purpose and presenting its contents. As Riad (1988: 105 n. 51)
states several prefaces to the individual parts of a book were recommended in
Antiquity.
A second theme, present in several of Sergius’ prefaces, concerns the bene-
fit or utility a certain book supplies. In his Commentary on the Categories and
Introduction to Aristotle, he stresses the usefulness of the definitions, divisions,
and rules of the art of logic as presented by Aristotle for the study and under-
standing of other disciplines as well, even theology. Also in his On the Influence
of the Moon, he highlights the value of such studies (101.9–11): r‫ ܐܢ‬煿‫ܐ ܠ‬r‫ ̇ܩ‬煟q‫ܕ‬
‫ܐ‬r‫ܥ‬煟q‫ܬ ܐ‬熏‫ ܠ‬煿‫ ܠ‬爏‫ܒ‬r‫ܡ ܕܡ‬煟‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܠ‬qq 煿‫ ܡܢ‬焯‫ ܘܢܣ‬焏‫ܗܢ‬r‫ ܕܢ‬qqr‫‘ ܡ‬that
when someone reads it [i.e. the book] he will be able to gain benefit and receive
some strength from it, which leads him towards knowledge’.
In this connection, we may think that his praises of logic and the emphasis
on its utility and value,65 as well as that of some other disciplines, is at the
same time a defense of them (cf. Riad 1988: 224). This fact is indicated also
by his keenness to anticipate criticism. This said, it is fitting to conclude our
survey with Sergius’ praising words of logic, which should be perceived as a
defense and apology for it, at the end of the epilogue to his Commentary on the
Categories (L.60vb21–27,b34–61ra3):66

65 Logic was considered to be an instrument in the study of science.

66 The passage was first quoted by Brock (1995: 43).
 36 chapter 2

‫ܬܐ‬熏̈‫ܒܢ‬rq‫ ܕܡ‬焏‫ܠ‬qq 焏‫܉ ܠ‬爯q‫ ܗܠ‬爯‫ ܡ‬煟‫ܒܠܥ‬
‫ܐ‬rq‫ ܬܪܥ‬焏‫ ܘܠ‬.‫ܕܪܟ‬r‫ܬܐ ܡ‬熏q‫ܕܐܣ‬
焏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܬܘܒ ܪܥ‬焏‫ ܘܠ‬.焏‫ܥ‬煟qr‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܦ‬熏̈‫ܠܣ‬q‫ܕܦ‬
rq‫ܐ ܓ‬rq‫ܕ‬r‫ )…( ܡ‬焏q煿̈‫ ܐܠ‬焏‫ܒ‬rq̈‫ܐ ܕ‬rqrr
̈ 煟q 爯q煿‫ܠ‬q ‫ܬ‬熏‫ ܕܠ‬焏‫ܒܠ‬熏r‫ܘ‬
焏‫ܠ‬qq 爯‫ ܕܡ‬qq‫ܐ ܐ‬r‫ܥ‬
煟q‫ ܐܢ ܒ‬焏‫ ܐܠ‬.‫ܘܐ‬煿‫ ܕܢ‬焏qqr‫ ܡ‬焏‫܉ ܠ‬焏qr‫ܐܢ‬
.‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܠ‬q‫ ܕܒܡܠ‬焏r‫ܕܘܪ‬
Without these [i.e. Aristotle’s logical writings] neither can
the effect of medical writings be comprehended, nor can
the opinion of the philosophers be understood, nor,
indeed, the true sense of the divine Scriptures (…). For
education and direction towards all the sciences, as far as
human ability is concerned, cannot take place except only
through training in logic.

2.3 Sergius’ Achievements as Translator

After having presented Sergius’ individual works and some rhetorical topoi
in their prefaces, I shall in translation quote the information about Sergius
provided by Ibn Abi Usaibia (‫ ا بن أبي أصيبعة‬Ibn ʾAbī ʾUṣaybiʿa, 1203–1270), a
physician and historian from Damascus, in his The Best Accounts of the Classes
of Physicians (in Arabic ʿUyūn al-Anbāʾ fī Ṭabaqāt al-Aṭibbāʾ, vol. i, p. 109, ed.
Müller, tr. Kopf):

The Alexandrians wrote many other compendia, of the philosophical

sciences and of medicine, based mostly on Galen’s books and his com-
mentaries on the works of Hippocrates. Among the physicians of note,
Christian and other, who were contemporaries or near-contemporaries of
those Alexandrians, the following may be mentioned: 1) Shamʿun [Simon]
the monk, known as Tibawayhi. [—] 13) Sergius of Raʾs al-ʿAyn. He is said
to have been the first to translate Greek works into Syriac. A man of learn-
ing, he also wrote many original works on medicine and philosophy.67

Following Ibn Abi Usaibia, a similar statement is made by Bar ʿEbroyo in

his Secular Chronicle, (Book viii: 57.16f., ed. Bedjan): 焏qqr熏‫ܘܗܘܘ ܐܦ ܣ‬
焏‫̈ܒ‬rq r‫ ܐܥܒ‬焏q‫ܡ‬煟‫ ܕ̣ܗܘ ܩ‬.焏q‫ܢ‬q‫ܥ‬r‫ ܪ‬爿q‫ܓ‬r‫ ܕܣ‬焏‫ܢ‬熟q‫ ܐ‬.‫ܐ‬rrq‫ܬܐ ܡ‬熏̈‫ܐܣ‬
焏qq‫ܪ‬熏‫ ܠܣ‬焏q‫ܢ‬熏q 爯‫ ̣ܡ‬焏qq‫ ܘܐ̈ܣ‬焏q‫ܦ‬熏̈‫ܠܣ‬q‫“ ܦ‬Also (some) Syrians have been
excellent physicians, e.g., Sergius of Rîshʿayn, who was the first to translate

67 This English translation was made by the orientalist Lothar Kopf (d. 1964), but was
never published, until it was made available online by Roger Pearse in 2011 (see http://
www.tertullian.org/fathers/index.htm#Ibn_Abi_Usaibia). An unsatisfactory edition of the
Arabic text was made by August Müller (Cairo, 1882). A new edition, based on the best
manuscripts, and a new English translation will be produced within the scope of the
project A Literary History of Medicine Project (see http://krc2.orient.ox.ac.uk/alhom/index
.php/en/).
sergius as writer 37

philosophical and medical works from Greek into Syriac” (tr. Budge 1932: 56f.;
slightly modified). This ancient tradition which describes Sergius as the first
translator of Greek philosophical and medical works into Syriac is taken up and
upheld also by modern scholars.68
Later on, Ibn Abi Usaibia says (vol. i, p. 189, ed. Müller, tr. Kopf): “I have
come across some of the Sixteen Books as translated from Greek into Syriac
by Sergius the Physician and from Syriac into Arabic by Musā ibn Khālid the
Interpreter.” The mention of Sixteen Books translated from Greek is probably a
reference to the sixteen medical books by Galen, which are assumed to have
been part of the Alexandrian medical curriculum and that Sergius translated
all of them into Syriac, according to Ibn Abi Usaibia. He records also that
Sergius’ Syriac versions of Galen were translated into Arabic by Musa ibn Khalid
(the Tarjuman), an associate translator of Hunayn. In his Risāla,69 Hunayn ibn
Ishaq (‫ حنين بن إسحاق‬Ḥunayn bin ʾIsḥāq) informs us that Sergius translated about
twenty six books from the Galenic corpus. That Sergius made a pioneering
and tremendous contribution to Syriac medical tradition is evident, as is the
enormous significance of his translations for later Arabic translations. It seems
that all subsequent physicians and translators of medical texts related to him.
Therefore, an episode present in Ibn Abi Usaibia is suggestive (vol. i, pp. 185 f.,
ed. Müller, tr. Kopf):

Then, one day, I visited Jibrāʾīl ibn Bakhtīshūʿ70—it was after his return
from al-Maʾmūn’s camp, a short time before his death—and found with
him Hunayn, who had translated for him parts of one of Galen’s anatomi-
cal works (according to the division made by some Greek writers). Jibrāʾīl
spoke to him respectfully, addressing him as Rabbān Hunayn, in other
words, teacher. This surprised me, and Jibrāʾīl, noticing my amazement,
said: ‘Do not think that the respect I pay to this youngster is exaggerated;
for, by Allāh, if he is granted long life, he will outshine Sergius and all
the other translators’. (This Sergius mentioned by Jibrāʾīl was from Raʾs
al-ʿAyn; he was the first to translate Greek scientific material into Syr-
iac.)71

68 Renan (1852b: 15): “atque inter eos Sergius Resainensis uno ore prædicatur, qui primus
Aristotelem syriacum fecit.” See also Brock (1982: 21) and Watt (2008: 764f.).
69 That is, Hunayn’s Letter on the Syriac and Arabic translations of Galen’s works, whose
original Arabic version with a German translation is edited by Bergsträsser (1925).
70 For the East Syrian Boḵtīšoʿ family, see Sourdel (1960: 1298).
71 This scenario and the final statement about Sergius are also found in Ibn al-Qifṭī’s Taʾrīḫ al-
Ḥukamāʾ (written in 1249), who states (١٧٥/175.4 f., ed. Lippert): ّ‫وسرجيس هذا الرأس ع َي ْنى‬
38 chapter 2

Bar ʿEbroyo too gives this scenario from Ibn Abi Usaibia in his Secular Chron-
icle, (Book x: 162.21–23): .[爯q‫ܢ‬熏q‫ܗ ]ܕ‬r‫ܥ‬煟q [‫ܥ‬熏rqrq熏‫ ܒ‬r‫ ܒ‬爏qr‫ ]ܓܒ‬q‫ ܢܣ‬煟q
焏qq̇ ‫ ܐܢ‬.焏‫̈ܒ‬qq‫ ܠܡ‬r‫ ܘܐܡ‬.‫ܗ‬煿‫ܡ‬r 爯q‫ܢ‬熏q 爯‫ ܘܪܒ‬.‫ܗ‬r‫ܩ‬q q‫ܐܣܓ‬
焏q‫ܢ‬q‫ܥ‬r‫ ܪ‬爿q‫ܓ‬r‫ ܠܣ‬焏‫ܗܕܢ‬熏‫ ܥ‬犟‫ܒ‬r 焏‫ ܠ‬.焏‫ܡ‬q‫ ܥܠ‬焏‫“ ܗܢ‬And when [Gabriel
Bôkht-Îshoʿ] had tested [Ḥûnain’s] knowledge, he honoured him greatly, and
he named him ‘Rabban Ḥûnain’. And he said to those who were present, ‘If this
young man lives he will not leave any reputation to Sargîs (Sergius) of Râsʿain’ ”
(tr. Budge pp. 147f.; slightly revised). So, when Hunayn in his Risāla disparages
the quality of Sergius’ translations,72 it might be a way to fulfill the statement of
this prophesy to his own advantage. As noted by Brock (1991: 151 f.), such depre-
ciations might also depend on the new lexical innovations and word-formation
in Syriac from the days of Sergius to that of Hunayn, and less likely be due
to the perception of translation techniques, since both Sergius and Hunayn
seem to have been reader-orientated translators with a more free approach to
the source text. And the discovery of the so called Syriac Galen Palimpsest has
revealed that “Ḥunayn is far more indebted to Sergius’ efforts than one would
guess from Ḥunayn’s own account of how he rendered Galen into Syriac and
Arabic.”73 This document seems to show also that the quality of Sergius’ trans-
lations of medical works is much better than the current predominant picture,
which has been influenced by Hunayn’s and Ibn Abi Usaibia’s statements.
There has been some discussion of Sergius’ degree of competence in the Syr-
iac language, and Fiori (2011b: 180–182) ventures the possibility that Sergius
was more versed in Greek than in Syriac. This question is induced by what
Sergius says in the preface to Pseudo-Dionysius, where he tells that he has been
assisted by a certain Stephen in the accomplishment of that translation. Also in
the introduction to his Commentary on the Categories, addressed to Theodore
(P.1v20–25), he reports that when he was translating some of Galen’s works the
same Theodore was correcting and adapting the wording of the language to the
natural idiom of Syriac. But this might indicate that some translators worked in
pairs according to a procedure where the more fluent translator in the source

ّ‫‘ م َن نقل علوم اليوناني ّين الى السر يانى‬and this Sergius of Reshaina is the one who translated
Greek sciences into Syriac’. I owe this reference to Iskandar (1976: 246).
72 See, for instance, his judgment of the translations of works by Sergius numbered 7, 11,
13, and 15 in Bergsträsser’s edition, (cf. Fiori 2010c: 84ff.). An unfavourable judgment of
Sergius’ translations is also made by Ibn Abi Usaibia (vol. i, p. 204), who probably bases it
on the information provided by Hunayn. Cf. also Baumstark (1894: 364f.), and esp. Bhayro
(2005: 152–157) on this view of Sergius’ translations.
73 Bhayro et al. (2013b: 143); cf. Bhayro & Brock (2013: 31, 40). See also above 2.1.3, the account
of Sergius’ adaptation of Alexander’s On the Principles of the Universe.
sergius as writer 39

language made an initial and rather literal translation of a text orally and the
assistant person, with less sufficient knowledge of the source language but in
good command of the target language, transferred it into a more idiomatic
expression in writing, as proposed by Sebastian Brock, (personal communica-
tion and Brock 2003: 16f.; cf. also Hugonnard-Roche 2004: 135). With reference
to Sergius’ report, Brock writes (2003: 17): “This suggests that Sergius himself
would provide an oral translation that was pretty literal, and this would be
put into more idiomatic Syriac by his colleague.” Also according to the report
of Hunayn, Sergius translated at least Galen’s book The Causes and Symptoms
twice (no. 14 in Bergsträsser’s edition), first before he studied in Alexandria and
again after his education there. This may mean that Sergius was from an early
age bilingual or that he had obtained some medical training and knowledge of
Greek somewhere in Syria before he travelled to the school of Alexandria for
advanced studies in medicine and philosophy. In this connection, it is worth
noting that Hunayn did not find Sergius’ Syriac defective, when he criticized
him, but rather that he did not understand the contents (see statement on no. 11
in Bergsträsser’s edition).
 chapter 3

Sergius’ Educational Background

3.1 The City of Reshaina

As already noted, Sergius was operating in Reshaina (焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܥ‬rq‫ ܪ‬Rēšʿaynā ‘spring-

head’, its translated Arabic name is ‫ رأس العين‬Raʾs al-ʿAyn, and the Greek name
is Theodosiopolis1), a border city near the ancient Guzana (the archaeolog-
ical site of Tell Ḥalaf), which was the capital of the Aramean kingdom Bet
Bagyan (or Bit Bahiani). The Turkish part of this nowadays divided city is called
Ceylanpınar ‘gazelle-spring’ and is located 115km west of Nisibis. The Aramaic
name of the city Rēšʿaynā goes back at least to the second century, since two
Greek renderings of it occur in Ptolemy’s (c. 90–168) Geography (book 5, ch. 18
sec. 10: Ῥίσινα Rhisina and book 5, ch. 18 sec. 13: Ῥέσαινα Rhesaina or Ῥαισάνα
Rhaisana). While Stephanus of Byzantium (fl. 6th century), in his geographical
dictionary entitled Ethnica, has the variant Ῥέσινα Resina with the following
accurate description (544.7): Ῥέσινα, πόλις περὶ τὸν Ἄβορον ποταμόν ‘Resina, a
city on the river Abor’.2 During the lifetime of Sergius the city of Reshaina was a
part of Roman Empire. Not much is known about the intellectual milieu of the
city, but we have evidence that it was a bishopric and during the last period of
Sergius’ life the bishop of the city was Asylus, as already mentioned. In The Life
of Mar Aha3 (焏q‫ܝ ܐ‬r‫ ܡ‬Mār(y) ʾAḥḥā, a near-contemporary from Reshaina),
just a couple of notices about the city are given. The story begins with touching
upon the events of 573 when the Romans attempted to take Nisibis from the
Persians, which caused uneasiness also in Reshaina, and king Khosrau i (r. 531–
579) had appointed the marzbān Adarmahān (called 焏‫ܠ‬qq ‫ܢ ܪܒ‬熏‫‘ ܢܒ‬Nabun
the army commander’) to be in charge of the Western frontier of his Sassanid
Empire, and who later in 578 and 580 twice destroyed Reshaina (Honigmann

1 In Greek: Θεοδοσιόπολις and Θεοδοσιούπολις, and the city received this name in 383 by Theo-
dosius i (347–395).
2 That is, Khabur River (Syriac ‫ܪ‬熏‫ܒ‬q Ḥabūr, Arabic ‫ الخابور‬al-Ḫābūr). It is a variant spelling
of Ἀβόρρας Aborras, which more often is written Χαβώρας Chabôras. In the chronography
of John Malalas (c. 491–c. 578), Reshaina is defectively written as Ῥοφαεινᾶ Rhophaeina
(267.84).
3 Vatican Syriac 37, fol. 176r–191v (unedited, but images of this manuscript are available on
the cd entitled Syriac Manuscripts from the Vatican Library, Vol. 1 (Bibliotheca Apostolica
Vaticana; Brigham Young University, 2005) and at http://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Vat.sir.37).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2016 | doi: 10.1163/9789004325142_004

sergius’ educational background 41

1995: 433). The Life of Mar Aha records that there was a big church in the city
where teaching in Bible and the books of Christian teachers was offered to the
children (176v1–10), and that beside the city there was a lake where Mar Aha’s
family used to fish (176r18–20), and that there was also a bridge to the west of
the city (176v14f.).4

3.2 The Various Curricula Offered at the Alexandrian School

If Hunayn’s report that Sergius had translated some Greek medical books
before studying in Alexandria (Letter, no. 14) is true, then Sergius must have
acquired knowledge in Greek and medicine somewhere in Syria, or possibly
in another Greek city. Moreover, we should not forget that bilingualism was
quite widespread in Syria during Late Antiquity (see Brock 1994). Sergius died
in 536 and we may assume that he received his more advanced education in
Alexandria sometime during the late fifth or early sixth century. This assump-
tion is based on the quite large-scale literary production he managed to pro-
duce before his death and the period when his supposed teacher of philos-
ophy, Ammonius Hermeiou, held the chair of philosophy at Alexandria, that
is from about 475 to sometime between 517 to 526, the time during which he
according to the evidence must have died (cf. King 2010a: 176 n. 73). Most likely,
Sergius went to Alexandria primarily in order to study medicine, but the medi-
cal curriculum of the Alexandrian school included comprehensive preparatory
studies in other topics too, although the Greek evidence for the arrangement
of this curriculum is meagre and not conclusive. It has been shown by Wes-
terink (1964) that the medical and philosophical teaching at the Alexandrian
school was closely related in the sixth and seventh centuries. Therefore, it has
been suggested that the teachers at this school were philosophers and physi-
cians at the same time, giving lectures both in the philosophy of Aristotle and
Plato and in the medicine of Hippocrates and Galen. In his study, Roueché
(1999) evaluates the evidence for some of the candidates being both φιλόσοφος
καὶ ἰατρός ‘philosopher and physician’ at Alexandria during the sixth century,
but does not find sufficient support for any of them being so in fact. Perhaps,
it is more fruitful to apply an inverted viewpoint on the situation, namely to
speak of a ἰατρὸς καὶ φιλόσοφος ‘a physician and philosopher’ or ‘a physician-
philosopher’ (cf. Iskandar 1976: 240, 248). An accomplished physician simply
was to a much higher degree expected to be well-versed in philosophy than

4 On Reshaina, see further Takahashi & Van Rompay (2011) and Fiori (2010c: 98f.).
42 chapter 3

a philosopher was to be well-versed in medicine. Therefore, some medicine

professors in Alexandria might have been giving courses also in elementary
philosophy. An authority like Galen “liked to style himself as a philosopher”
(Marasco 2010: 211) and had in his short tract That the Best Physician is also a
Philosopher advocated the message of the title, and had himself written philo-
sophical texts, among them a commentary on the Categories, now lost, (cf.
Barnes 2012: 235f. and Fiori 2014: 70f.). And we have a student from the Alexan-
drian school who undoubtedly was both physician and philosopher, namely
Sergius of Reshaina.5
Most likely, it is more accurate to speak of several curricula for the Alexan-
drian school, than one single curriculum for all students. We should also not
speak of a “Medical School of Alexandria” or a “Philosophical School of Alexan-
dria”, but just of Alexandrian schools, with training in various fields of knowl-
edge. The predominant conclusion among researchers is that different teachers
in Alexandria were giving instruction independently of one another in minor
“schools”. However, it is sometimes argued that several teachers were assem-
bled into one large educational complex for higher education, where they gave
tuition in their own main subject, as described by Athanassiadi (1999: 20 f.),
who speaks of “an exclusive college of higher education where the most famous
rhetors and philosophers in Alexandria taught a mixed audience of pagan and
Christian students from all over the Mediterranean world,” (cf. Watts 2006: 217
n. 76). Also some Arabic sources speak of a building in Alexandria where edu-
cation was organized (cf. Gutas 1999: 170f.). This position has gained some sup-
port from the findings of recent archaeological excavations at the site of Kom
el-Dikka in Alexandria (see below at 3.4). If we presuppose one large school
with several curricula, we may assume that there were different syllabuses,
which the students could follow, similar to a higher academic institution of
today. Some propaedeutic instruction probably involved joint studies for all
students with both optional and compulsory courses. As for the rest, the stu-

5 Perhaps also the little known physician, Asclepius, the namesake and fellow-pupil of Ascle-
pius of Tralles, who like Sergius, studied under Ammonius (see King 2010a: 177 n. 79). In his
commentary On Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Asclepius of Tralles has the following testimony to
him (143.31f., ed. Hayduck): Ἀσκληπιὸς ὁ τῆς ἰατρικῆς τέχνης διδάσκαλος ὁ σὺν ἡμῖν ἐνδιατρίψας
τοῖς μαθήμασιν ‘Asclepius, the professor of the medical art, who with us attended the lectures’
(of Ammonius), cf. Westerink (1964: 172 n. 11). As a parallel, Fiori (2014: 68) mentions also the
Neoplatonist Asclepiodotus of Alexandria (second half of the fifth century), who seems to
have received medical training with a certain Jacob/Jacobus Psychrestus; (on Asclepiodotus
and the medical knowledge of other Neoplatonists, see Wilberding 2014, and on Jacob Psy-
chrestus, see Prioreschi 2001: 80 f.).
sergius’ educational background 43

dents followed the curriculum of a certain subject, or the cursus that led to
a certain profession, whether medicine, philosophy, or grammar. For jurispru-
dence many students, like Severus of Antioch and Zachariah of Mytilene, chose
the famous Law School of Beirut (on which, see MacAdam 2001), after their
preparatory studies in Alexandria. Some kind of theological instruction was
certainly also offered to the Christian students in Alexandria, though probably
separately and independently from the secular or pagan teaching. Therefore,
we may also assume that different teachers gave lectures in their own spe-
cial branch of knowledge and that the students could have several teachers,
whose lectures they attended of their own interest for the optional courses
and of necessity for the compulsory ones. The chronology and great vestiges
of influence indicate clearly that Sergius’ teacher in philosophy (esp. logic) was
Ammonius Hermeiou (c. 440–c. 525), who instructed in philosophy at Alexan-
dria for a great part of his life and many famous students attended his lectures
and made notebooks from them. Thus, most likely, as a medical student, Sergius
was expected to attend the preparatory lectures in logic (and ethics) given by
Ammonius, which usually formed an important part of the elementary training
offered to the students of various branches of the sciences. But in his intro-
duction to Commentary on the Categories, Sergius hints at the fact that he has
received more advanced philosophical education than was offered within the
scope of the propaedeutics.
As noted, the evidence for what was included in the medical curriculum of
the Alexandrian school is scanty in the Greek tradition, but from the Arabic
tradition we have some reports by inter alia Ali ibn Ridwan (‫ علي بن رضوان‬ʿAlī bin
Riḍwān, d. 1061), even if the credibility of that material is questionable. Based
on the Arabic sources, mainly Ibn Ridwan, Iskandar (1976) has made a recon-
struction of the medical curriculum that the students of the Alexandrian school
probably followed (cf. also Gutas 1999: 158–168). In a schematic representation,
Iskandar (1976: 257f.) gives a list of the different preparatory courses, both the
optional ones, such as “language and grammar” (probably including rhetoric),
and the compulsory topics, such as “logic […], physics, arithmetic, numerals,
measurement, geometry, the compounding of drugs, astrology, and ethics”, (cf.
also Marasco 2010: 210). Especially, the study of logic and ethics was required of
the students, but there were different opinions about the order in which they
should be read, as discussed by Gutas (1985). Some of the Alexandrian teachers,
like Ammonius, viewed logic to be a tool or a discriminating instrument for all
disciplines, helping the students to understand the sciences and discern their
fallacies, and therefore they argued that one ought to start with logic before
philosophical ethics. Yet, these professors deemed awareness of morals impor-
tant and recommended some exercise in practical ethics, before logic, followed
44 chapter 3

by philosophical ethics,6 as part of the preparatory training of a student. For

grammar, we know of a certain Flavius Horapollon (son of Asclepiades), who
in The Life of Severus by Zachariah of Mytilene is described as follows (15.6 f., ed.
Kugener): “the grammarian Horapollon, someone who had a first-rate knowl-
edge of his profession and professed it excellently”7 and who was a companion
of Ammonius (22.12f.; Brock 2013: 39 and Ambjörn 2008: 20). At least from the
early 490s, he was teaching at the Alexandrian school and Sergius may well have
attended his lectures in grammar and rhetoric voluntarily.
The textbooks of logic that were read by all introductory studies consisted
of Porphyry’s Eisagoge, and Aristotle’s Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Ana-
lytics, and Posterior Analytics (also called Apodeictics).8 This list corresponds to
the study of the so called short or truncated Organon attributed to the Alexan-
drian and the Syriac traditions and being said to stop at Prior Analytics 1,7.9 The
assumption that the Syriac writers prior to the Abbasid era were not engaged
in the entire Organon has convincingly been shown to be untenable by Watt
(2008). However, viewed against this function of the first four books of the
Organon one should perhaps ascribe some precedence to the study of these
four initial books by Aristotle. Therefore, the limit, if any, should not be set
at Prior Analytics 1,7, as some surviving sources indicate and some researchers
claim, but at the end of the fourth book. Watt’s review (2010: 35–40) of the Syr-
iac Organon tradition points indeed towards this conclusion. But he does not
connect the division of the books of the Organon into the two units of “four
plus four”10 to the preparatory part of the Alexandrian cursus studiorum of all
students at this school, something that he tends to do just briefly in the earlier
study (Watt 2008: 774 n. 80). Nonetheless, the coincidence between the Alexan-
drian curriculum according to Ibn Ridwan, and the evidence of the greater

6 See also Miller (1993: 311 ff.). As Gutas (1985: 117f.) notes, there were those who had the
opinion that one should start with neither logic nor ethics, but with physics or mathe-
matics.
7 Two Early Lives of Severos, Patriarch of Antioch, trans. Brock (2013: 38); cf. also The Life
of Severus by Zachariah of Mytilene, translation by Ambjörn (2008: 12). For Horapollon,
see further Brock’s note 25 at p. 37 and the index at p. 163; or pp. 10, 18, 20, 24, and 30 in
Ambjörn’s translation; also Watts (2006: 217, 225, 253 n. 104) and Maspero (1914).
8 See Ibn Ridwan apud Iskandar (1976: 248 f., also 257) and Gutas (1999: 164); see also Simpl.
15.12–25.
9 Cf. Roueché (1999: 58–61) and Gutas (1999: 179–187 and 2012: 86 n. 18).
10 The first part consisting of the four books: Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics,
and Posterior Analytics and the second part of the other two books of Organon, being
Topics and Sophistical Refutations, plus Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics, which usually were
included in the Organon, (on this inclusion, see Black 1990: 31–36).
 sergius’ educational background 45

interest in the Organon’s four first books, constitute a mutual support for this
being the state of things.11 A further support for this claim is perhaps found
in the report of Dadisho Qatraya (焏qrq‫ܥ ܩ‬熏rq‫ ܕܕ‬Dadīšoʿ Qaṭrāyā, late sev-
enth century), who in his Commentary on the Book of Abba Isaiah (181.13–21, ed.
Draguet) says that some anchorites were tempted to continue reading these
preparatory works of Aristotle even after their entering into an ascetic way of
life:12

焏rq‫ ܒ‬焏‫ܒ‬r‫ ܩ‬焏‫ܢ‬煿‫ ܒ‬焏qr犏‫ܬܐ ܡ‬煿̈‫ ܐܒ‬q‫ܡ‬熏̈q‫ܒ‬
熏‫ ܒܓ‬焏q煟qq̈q 爟‫ܐ ܥ‬熏̈q‫ ܕ‬熏‫ܒ‬r‫ ܐܩ‬.焏q熏q‫ܘܢ‬
爯q‫ܦ‬qrq‫ܘܢ ܘ‬煿‫ ܗܘܘ ܒ‬爯q‫ ܕܪܕ‬爯q‫ܠ‬q焏‫ ܠ‬煟q ‫܇‬焏q‫ܠ‬r
焏‫ܠܦܢ‬熏q‫ܘܢ ܕܒ‬煿‫ ܗܘܘ ܠ‬爯q犏‫ܘܢ ܥ‬煿‫ܙܓ‬熏‫ܒܡ‬
‫ܘܘܢ‬煿‫ ܢ‬焏q‫ܢ‬熏̈q‫ܐ ܕ‬r‫ܡ‬qq‫ ܘܒ‬焏‫ܦ‬熏̈‫ܠܣ‬q‫ܕܦ‬
‫ܗܝ‬熏̈‫ܒ‬rq‫ ܒ‬爯q‫ ܘܗܪܓ‬爯qr‫ ܩ‬煟q .爯qqq‫ܡܠ‬
煿‫ ܠ‬爯q‫ܡ‬q‫ܢ ܕܣ‬熏‫ ̇ܗܢ‬.焏‫ܦ‬熏‫ܠܣ‬q‫ ܦ‬爿q‫ܠ‬qq‫ܕܐܪܣ‬
爯q‫ ܕ‬焏‫ ܐܢ‬r‫ ܐ̇ܡ‬.‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܠ‬q‫ ܕܡܠ‬焏‫ܠܦܢ‬熏q 爏‫ܥ‬
焏qrr‫ ܘ‬.焏‫ܩ‬q‫ܕܩ‬熏‫ ܘܐܦ‬爿‫ܡܢ‬rqr‫ ܘܦ‬.爿qr熏‫ܓ‬q‫ܩ‬
焏‫ܒܢ‬熏q ‫ܘܢ‬煿‫ܢ ܠ‬熏q‫ܢ ܕܡ‬熏‫܇ ̇ܗܢ‬爯q‫ ܗܠ‬qq‫ܕܐ‬
̈
.焏rq煟‫ ̈ܩ‬焏‫̈ܒ‬rq 爯‫ܐ ܕܡ‬rq熏qr‫ ܒ‬爿qr‫ܐܘܓ‬
In the days of the Egyptian fathers, in this evil and destruc-
tive war, the demons made war against the solitaries in-
side the retreat, urging those among them who were (bet-
ter) educated and (more) temperamental, to be studious
in the teaching of the philosophers and in the wisdom
of the Greeks, reading and reflecting on the writings of
Aristotle the philosopher, those which he wrote on the
knowledge of logic, I mean, the Categories, On Interpre-
tation, the Apodeictics [i.e. Posterior Analytics], and the
like, those which the blessed Evagrius rebukes with proofs
from the holy books.13

Note that also Dadisho counts up to the fourth book of the Organon, namely
to Posterior Analytics, even though the Prior Analytics is omitted here. The
fact that he refers to Evagrius of Pontus (345–399), who was anterior to the
Alexandrian school of Ammonius, is perhaps of lesser importance, and we
should deem the attraction that Aristotle’s works exercised on people as a
reflection of Dadisho’s age.
Even if Sergius’ extant philosophical commentaries and treatises are con-
cerned with themes dealt with primarily in the Categories, they include also dis-
cussions from On Interpretation and Porphyry’s Eisagoge, and even the Physics.
At the same time, we have Sergius’ testimony in the introduction to the Com-
mentary on the Categories, where he says that he plans to expound and intro-
duce all of Aristotle’s writings in separate commentaries, presented in a clear
way with the required proofs (see P.7r21–v2 and 9r1–8, L.3rb5–30/P.17v13–24,
and L.60vb1621, cf. Watt 2010: 29). And in the section on motion, he states

11 Also Gutas (1999: 181–184) seems to embrace the view that the first four books of Organon
were studied, apart from possibly the formal logic section of Posterior Analytics (i 8–22),
which can have been excluded from the curriculum that was studied with a teacher.
12 This reference is found in Brock (1982: 31 n. 13).
13 See the French translation of Draguet at p. 140.
46 chapter 3

that he will just in brief deal with motion and more fully in a book on Physics
(L.60ra15–26/P.109v2–5). At another place (P.51v13), he says that he plans to duly
treat the question on ‘matter’ (焏‫ < ܗܘܠ‬ὕλη) in a book on that subject.

3.3 The Medical Curriculum of the Alexandrian School

After the preparatory courses in grammar (optional), and logic and ethics
(compulsory), which probably were joint for all the students, the medical stu-
dents of the Alexandrian school proceeded their medicine training proper,
reading four chosen books of Hippocrates and sixteen works by Galen.14 Galen’s
books are said to have been studied in seven consecutive grades. Taken this
into account, the close relation of philosophy and medicine, and the common
arrangement of the introductions to medical and philosophical commentaries,
can be explained by the joint classes of the propaedeutic training at the Alexan-
drian school during this period, where such elementary themes and methods
were taught. Furthermore, for medicine, we have the above mentioned Gesius,
who seems to have taught the subject of medicine in the late fifth and early sixth
centuries and, and as suggested by King (2010a: 175 n. 68 and 177 n. 79), might
have been Sergius’ teacher in medicine. According to the record of Zachariah of
Mytilene, in his Ammonius, Gesius himself attended, in his youth, Ammonius’
philosophical lectures together with Zachariah (see lines 5, 10, 359–370, ed.
Colonna, trans. Gertz 2012: 101, 112, and Watts 2006: 232 n. 1). Another candidate
who may have been Sergius’ teacher in medicine is Asclepius, a medical profes-
sor, who together with his namesake Asclepius of Tralles (if not the same per-
son), attended Ammonius’ lectures on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (see above note 5
in this chapter). What is interesting here is that Asclepius, though a medicine
professor and at the time of the course still a student, followed the complete
curriculum of Aristotelian texts culminating with the Metaphysics (cf. West-
erink 1964: 172). As already stated, Sergius most likely did the same and attended
all of Ammonius’ lectures on Aristotle and was determined to, in Syriac, adapt
and present all of Aristotle’s separate works that were part of Ammonius’ philo-
sophical curriculum. Thus, Sergius had probably several teachers in differ-

14 For the title of these 20 books and their (differing) orders, see Ibn Ridwan apud Iskandar
(1976: 249f., also 258) and Ibn Jumay (‫ ا بن جميع‬ʾIbn Ǧumayʿ, d. 1198) at §79 (Arabic text
p. ٢٦/26 and Eng. tr. p. 19, ed. Fähndrich); see also Westerink (1992: 11f.), Roueché (1999:
557ff.), and Overwien (2012: 166 f.). As stated, both Ibn Ridwan and Ibn Jumay inform us
that four medical books by Hippocrates and sixteen by Galen were studied (cf. Gutas 1999:
164, 167 and 172).
sergius’ educational background 47

ent disciplines; in grammar and rhetoric perhaps Horapollon, in philosophy

Ammonius, and in medicine Gesius or Asclepius.
Solid evidence points to the conclusion that Sergius carried out his medical
studies in Alexandria, including the school’s preparatory philosophical instruc-
tion and beyond. The contents of his training were probably formed by a cur-
riculum similar to those reconstructed above. Later on, back in Reshaina, he
evidently translated most of the books constituting the medical curriculum
of the Alexandrian school, if not all of them, plus some additional works, as
also the quoted passage from Usaibia indicates. He might have translated the
Eisagoge and composed a commentary on the Categories (later abridged for
Philotheos) which most likely was intended to function as a substitute for pure
translations of Aristotle’s works. However, as pointed out, he had plans to com-
pose works on all of Aristotle’s writings, while in the case of Galen he made
translations into Syriac (but note his On the Influence of the Moon, which is
an adaptation of Galen’s On Critical Days). In the following, we will present
the philosophical curriculum of the Alexandrian school. We will then discuss
Sergius’ choice to provide commentaries in the case of Aristotle, and to produce
chiefly translations in the case of Galen.

3.4 The Philosophical Curriculum of the Alexandrian School

As already noted, the study of the first four books (Categories, On Interpretation,
Prior Analytics, and Posterior Analytics) of the Organon had a propaedeutic role
in the education of the students. In turn, they were preceded by Porphyry’s
Eisagoge, since it was viewed as an introduction to the Categories or even to
Aristotle’s entire logic. It is also worth remembering that most of the teachers
and philosophers of the Alexandrian school are characterized as Neoplaton-
ists. Therefore, even if there is a high number of commentaries on Aristotle’s
works extant by the professors of this school than by those from the school
of Athens, these two groups of professors probably considered the study of
the more practical Aristotle to be propaedeutic to the more idealistic and
sublime Plato.15 It has been shown that a philosophical reading curriculum
was established at the time of Proclus (412–485), a student in Alexandria and
later in Athens, who later on became a teacher at the Academy of Athens

15 But that there would be a distinction between the school of Athens and that of Alexan-
dria in their interest in and attitude to the philosophy of Aristotle and Plato has been
questioned by Hadot (2015: 13 ff., passim).
48 chapter 3

and counted Ammonius among his students. As already stated, after the read-
ing of some popular texts for the purpose of moral edification,16 the philos-
ophy students followed a cursus studiorum, beginning with the study of the
three initial subjects consisting of grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric, (the triv-
ium), followed by study of arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy (the
quadrivium). As Marasco (2010: 212–214) shows, the training in rhetoric, math-
ematics, geometry, and astronomy was equally important for the medical stu-
dents, who in a concrete way made practical application of the knowledge
they obtained from these disciplines in their profession as physicians. The
propaedeutic studies of philosophy students proceeded with the reading of
some ethical discourses. The philosophical instruction proper began with Por-
phyry’s Eisagoge, followed by the logical writings of Aristotle’s Organon, con-
tinuing with his practical writings, such as the Ethics and Politics, then with
his theoretical writings, those dealing with both physics and mathematics,17
and finally his theology, as found above all in the Metaphysics. After the read-
ing of Aristotle’s writings, which were considered propaedeutic to those of
Plato, the following dialogues of Plato were studied in two successive cycles:
Alcibiades i, Gorgias, Phaedo, Cratylus, Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman, Phae-
drus, Symposium, Philebus, Timaeus (important for physical matters), and Par-
menides (which was held to contain the highest theological wisdom).18 Notably,
when Sergius signifies his intentions to introduce and comment on Aristotle’s
different writings he presents them in the order they were studied accord-
ing the curriculum of the Alexandrian school, beginning with the Categories
and the other logic books of what is called Organon, and continuing with the
books on ethics, physics and mathematics, and finally the theological ones
(see L.3rb5–30/P.17v13–24; cf. also Hugonnard-Roche 2004: 80 and Watt 2011:
240f.).
This state of arrangement had its foundation in the Neoplatonists’ esteem of
Plato being a superior philosopher to Aristotle (for this, see Hadot 1992: 422 ff.),
although the Neoplatonists usually argued for there being an essential har-

16 Ethical texts such as Pythagoras’ Golden Verses and Epictetus’ Handbook/Encheiridion

were probably studied here. That is perhaps the reason why the latter was expounded
by Simplicius.
17 Works relating to physics consisted most likely of Aristotle’s Physics, On the Heavens,
On Generation and Corruption, Meteorology, On the Soul, On Plants, and On Animals, see
Opsomer (2010: 706).
18 A more detailed survey of the Neoplatonic cursus of study for the philosophy students
can conveniently be found in Hoffmann (2006: 605–607) and Tarrant (2014), where also
the relevant literature is cited (see also Reis 2007: 116–118).
sergius’ educational background 49

mony between the two philosophers (Moreau 1976; Hoffmann 2006: 603f. and
Gerson 2006). It is reasonable to assert that the students at the Alexandrian
school could follow the lectures given by the professors in these textbooks,
even if their main subject was medicine or something else, as in the case of
Sergius. In fact, Sergius’ planned enterprise to explicate all of Aristotle’s writings
indicates that he at least attended most of the lectures dealing with Aristotle’s
teaching. And in contrast to most Neoplatonists, he was enough impressed by
Aristotle’s achievements as philosopher and introducer of a useful system into
the sciences, that he should, no doubt, be viewed as a Christian Aristotelian,
rather than a Neoplatonist. The Neoplatonists usually gave priority to Plato over
Aristotle, in cases where they could not conciliate their standpoints, whereas
Sergius is usually faithful to Aristotle and once even refutes Plato’s position in
a ridiculing way (see comm. to §68–74). Nevertheless, he perhaps found some
Platonic ideas attractive and therefore translated the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus
into Syriac, a work that been shown to contain some Neoplatonic theological
elements. But the Peripatetic Sergius agrees with his master Aristotle regarding
the opinion that logic is an instrument of philosophy and not a part, as advo-
cated by the Platonists. He agrees also with him concerning the question of
names being conventional and not natural (see comm. to § 5), and he upholds
Aristotle’s definition of space (see comm. to §68–74). But if Aristotle were set
into opposition to the Bible or Pseudo-Dionysius, Sergius would most probably
espouse the latter.
Moreover, recent archeological discoveries made at the site of Kom el-Dikka,
in Alexandria, where Polish excavations started already in the 1960s, have
revealed a large complex of lecture halls, so far twenty auditoria from probably
the late fifth to the early sixth centuries. Some of these lecture halls have
rectangular shapes, while others have the plan of horseshoe, whose lower
sidewalls are constituted of tiers or rows of benches to serve as seats for the
students. At the end of the rooms a high seat of honour (a thronos) is found
for the lecturer, while in addition to the tiered seats for the students, there
is a central stone block placed on the ground in the classrooms, probably to
function as a pulpit for recitations by one of the students from the books
discussed. The lecture halls had wide entrances without any doors, apparently
enabling also people outside to hear what was said. Likewise, the Roman
theatre at the site was most likely not only for play-acting, but should be viewed
as “the auditorium par excellence, destined presumably for public orations or
rhetorical declamations presented before larger audiences.”19 Sergius might

19 Majcherek (2010: 475); see also Watts (2011: 137ff.) and Sorabji (2014: 30–39).
50 chapter 3

very well have prowled these classrooms and attended the lectures of different
professors in medicine and philosophy.
The main theological work that Sergius showed interest in and translated
into Syriac was the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus. As first proposed by Bettiolo
(2005: 97f.) and followed by others, the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus was (along
with Evagrius of Pontus’ spiritual writings) perhaps envisaged by Sergius as
a substitute for the Platonic writings that constituted the final stages of the
philosophical curriculum of that school. Considering that Pseudo-Dionysius
was indebted to the Platonic theology of Proclus,20 it is likely that Sergius
regarded it proper to transfer a Christian version of this theology purged from
pagan elements. He may actually have been aware of the correct tradition of
the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus and even known its real author (cf. Stang 2012:
25), but it is perhaps more likely to assume that he believed that “Dionysius”
in fact had anticipated the Neoplatonic philosophy of Proclus and others.
Pseudo-Zachariah Rhetor reports that Sergius was “trained in the reading of
many books of the Greeks, and in the teaching of Origen. He had studied the
interpretation of books by other teachers in Alexandria for some time” (see
above p. 4). The “many books of the Greeks” may refer to the philosophical
textbooks of the Alexandrian school, while the “books by other teachers” may
refer to works by Evagrius of Pontus and Pseudo-Dionysius among others.

20 On this, see Saffrey (1966, 1979, and 1998), Perl (2010), and cf. Stang (2012: 26–31).
 chapter 4

Sergius as a Commentator of Aristotle

4.1 Why Sergius Composed Commentaries and Not Translations

The question why Sergius did not make a translation of the Categories, but con-
fined himself to a commentary, is touched upon by Hugonnard-Roche (2004:
81) and discussed more in detail by Watt (2010: 29–34). Watt believes that
Sergius envisaged his commentary to be read together with the Greek version
of the Categories by a well-informed intellectual elite with sufficient knowl-
edge of the Greek language. This is a probable presumption, though a signif-
icant fact speaks against it, which also displays the major difference between
Sergius’ commentary and the nearest related compositions from the Alexan-
drian school, especially those of Ammonius and Philoponus. I refer to the differ-
ent structure of the commentaries at hand. Ammonius’ and Philoponus’ texts
are formed as lemmatic commentaries, where a lemma or portion from the Cat-
egories is quoted and explicated, while Sergius’ text is thematically organized
and various questions briefly introduced and discussed in a way that the line
of reasoning is comprehensible even independently from the text of Aristotle.1
The study of a source text obviously benefits from a lemmatic commentary and
therefore, if Sergius intended his exposition to be used as a complement to the
Categories, also he ought to have formed it in that way. At the same time, if
his commentary was intended to be read in a school setting one must assume
that at least the teacher should have access to the complete Greek version of
the Categories. Of course, certain Syriac readers who were bilingual and had
access to Aristotle’s original writings in Greek would be able to read them in
an unexpurgated form. Worth noting is that when Sergius announces his plans
to comment on all of Aristotle’s writings he does not mention anything about
translating any of them. As I have shown in the exposition of the rhetorical
features of Sergius’ prefaces (at 2.2), the introduction of Aristotle’s philosophy
in Syria was not unproblematic, at least in some of its pagan aspects, in con-
trast to Galen’s medicine which served a practical usage. So, by choosing to
write commentaries on Aristotle’s writings, Sergius was in a better position
to decide what would be transmitted and what should not be. In a transla-

1 For the different kinds of commentaries that were written and how they were arranged, see
Hadot (2004).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2016 | doi: 10.1163/9789004325142_005

52 chapter 4

tion he would not have the same freedom, so long as he stayed close to the
text. Although the Categories does not contain much controversial material,
problems could arise during Sergius’ long-range plans of transposing Aristo-
tle’s other works into the Syriac milieu. In some of his works, Sergius exhibits
a Christianizing tendency and plays down some pagan ideas, especially in his
adaptation of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ On the Principles of the Universe (see
King 2010a: 167ff.)2 and it may be the main reason why Sergius did not make
a regular translation of that work. Adaptations of a similar nature could have
been a possibility for Sergius also in translating Aristotle’s works. However, the
expository approach enabled Sergius to include also the discussion on Aristo-
tle’s separate works as they were expounded at the school of Ammonius and
not the text of Aristotle’s treatise alone, which had a demanding level of diffi-
culty.

4.2 Other Commentators Dealt with Here

Next, I will present the significant philosophers and commentators from earlier
periods and those active in Alexandria during the approximate time of Sergius,
especially those who evidently had an important impact on Sergius and appear
frequently in the commentary section of my present book. Three categories
of thinkers must be taken into account here: the earlier commentators whose
writings influenced Sergius directly or indirectly, the contemporary ones who
orally and in writing formed Sergius’ world of ideas, and the later ones with
whom Sergius shared a common legacy of ideas. The focus will be on their
commentaries on the Aristotelian writings.

4.3 Important Antecedent Commentators

Among the earlier individuals whose ideas are reflected in Sergius’ philosophi-
cal writings we mention first Alexander of Aphrodisias, perhaps the best known
Peripatetic commentator of Aristotle (cf. Fazzo 2004: 6–11). He was appointed
professor of Aristotelian philosophy in Athens some time between 198 and 211
and composed commentaries on most of Aristotle’s logical works, among them
on the Categories and On Interpretation, which are lost, and on Aristotle’s the-

2 The first Syriac translation of Porphyry’s Eisagoge, which might have been translated by
Sergius, displays also a few Christianized features.
sergius as a commentator of aristotle 53

oretical works.3 Sergius made an adaptation of Alexander’s On the Principles of

the Universe and also mentions him by name in his Commentary on the Cate-
gories, to Theodore.
The second important philosopher and commentator is Porphyry (c. 234–
c. 305). Though a Neoplatonist and a pupil of Plotinus (204/5–270), he was the
first in the Platonic tradition to write extensive commentaries on Aristotle and
in them argued for an essential agreement between Plato and Aristotle. Por-
phyry wrote his Eisagoge/Isagoge (Εἰσαγωγή ‘Introduction’) to Aristotle’s logic
and this short treatise became very popular and was itself commented upon.
He composed also two commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories: one compre-
hensive, now lost, which was addressed to a certain Gedaleios4 and an almost
entirely surviving shorter one having the catechetical form of question-and-
answer. Porphyry’s Eisagoge and the two commentaries on the Categories were
very influential and gave a secure place to Aristotle’s logic in the curriculum
of the Neoplatonists in Alexandria. Porphyry’s influence on Sergius is appar-
ent and Sergius may have translated his Eisagoge into Syriac. Yet, it is difficult
to determine whether Sergius had direct access to Porphyry’s commentaries
on the Categories or was confined to Ammonius’ extensive use of them in his
lectures on Aristotle’s treatise. Porphyry is also known to have composed com-
mentaries on Aristotle’s On Interpretation and Physics (the first five books),
which are lost.5
A commentator that was partially dependent on Porphyry’s interpretations
is the Neoplatonist philosopher Iamblichus of Chalcis (c. 245–c. 326), who
presumably was a pupil of Porphyry and who for a short period also studied
with Anatolius of Laodicea (d. 283). Following in the footsteps of Porphyry,
he wrote a commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, which is lost, but the extant
fragments indicate that it was much indebted to Porphyry’s exegesis. Concern-
ing it Dillon (2010: 371) says: “in his commentary he is mainly concerned with
defending Aristotle’s coherence and correctness against the attacks of the ear-
lier anti-Aristotelian Platonist tradition, including Plotinus in Enn. 6.1–3. The
other salient characteristic of his exegesis of the Categories is what Simplicius
terms his noera theoria, or ‘transcendental interpretation’, which essentially
consists in trying to show that, contrary to what Plotinus would maintain, Aris-

3 A listing of Alexander’s lost and extant works can be found in Sharples (1987: 1182–1194).
4 Greek Πρὸς Γεδάλειον and Latin Ad Gedalium ‘To Gedaleios’, see Simpl. (10.21, 33.14, 34.1,13).
Assumed discovered remnants of it were recently published and translated by Chiaradonna
et al. (2013).
5 For Porphyry, see also ch. 8 n. 21, and Strange (1987), Ebbesen (1990), Karamanolis (2004, 2006:
243–330, and 2014), and Smith (2010).
54 chapter 4

totle’s list of categories is true, in an analogical way, for all levels of reality.” In
turn, Iamblichus’ commentary on the Categories influenced that of his pupil
Dexippus (fl. 350) on the same treatise, as well as that of Simplicius. He wrote
a commentary on Prior Analytics and also probably On Interpretation, but both
are lost.6

4.4 Important Contemporary Commentators

The next group begins with the main individual among the philosophy profes-
sors at the Alexandrian school, namely Ammonius, son of Hermeias. Around
470, about twenty years after his father Hermeias’ death in c. 450, he became
a lecturer in philosophy at Alexandria. Hermeias had studied with Syrianus
(died c. 437), the Neoplatonist professor of the Academy of Athens, and later
introduced the doctrine of that school in Alexandria (on him, see Westerink
1990: 325f.), while his son Ammonius had studied with Proclus (412–485) in
Athens. Ammonius’ reputation rests mainly on his lectures on Aristotle and the
commentaries they generated, but also on the eminent students that emerged
from his school. By his own hand we have only the commentary On Interpre-
tation,7 but some recordings of his lectures by some of his pupils are extant.
Such dictated commentaries are usually said to have come about apo phônês
‘from the voice of’ a lecturing teacher (see Richard 1950). Among these works
edited by his pupils, that on Eisagoge, Categories, and Prior Analytics i bear
Ammonius’ name, while that on Metaphysics bears the name of his student
Asclepius of Tralles.8 Also four of John Philoponus’ commentaries on Aristo-
tle are stated to be recordings of Ammonius’ lectures on them: Prior Analyt-
ics, Posterior Analytics, On Generation and Corruption, and On the Soul. How-

6 For Iamblichus, see also ch. 8 n. 22, and Dillon (2010), Griffin (2012), and Karamanolis (2014).
7 Blank (2010: 661): “Of his writings, the only one which survives in the written form he himself
published is his commentary (hupomnēma) on the De interpretatione, which is based on
Proclus’ lectures on that text, with the addition of other material, especially from Porphyry’s
huge commentary.”
8 Westerink (1990: 326): “Asclepius, having nothing of his own to add, mixed his lecture notes
with extracts from Alexander, but only as far as the fourth book, 5, 6 and 7 being apparently
pure Ammonius.” For a study on Ammonius’ metaphysics as recorded by Asclepius, see
Verrycken (1990: 204–210 and 218–223). Also a second extant text under Asclepius’ name,
the Commentary to Nicomachus’ Introduction to Arithmetic, is believed to be based on a
course by Ammonius, since a related commentary bearing Philoponus’ name has survived
too.
sergius as a commentator of aristotle 55

ever, Philoponus usually added observations of his own9 and of others to his
editions (Westerink 1990: 326). As my annotations to Sergius’ introduction to
Aristotelian philosophy edited here clearly indicate, his expositions on the
Categories, to a high degree, rely upon Ammonius’ lectures as well. In addi-
tion to Sergius, Asclepius, and Philoponus, we find among Ammonius’ stu-
dents Simplicius and also probably Olympiodorus and Eutocius, while among
those who only attended some of his lectures there are Damascius (c. 458–
after 538), Gesius, and Zachariah of Mytilene. Because of this, Blank (2010:
661) writes: “For us, Ammonius is indeed most important as a commentator
on Aristotle and as the founder of the tradition of Aristotelian commentary in
Alexandria which continued through his pupils Asclepius, Philoponus, Simpli-
cius and Olympiodorus, who were in turn followed by Elias, David, Ps.-Elias and
Stephanus.”10
Among all of Ammonius’ pupils, John Philoponus (c. 490–c. 570, also known
as John of Alexandria and John the Grammarian), became the most distin-
guished. He probably entered Ammonius’ school around 510 (Watts 2006: 237),
but did not succeed Ammonius as a professor of philosophy at the Alexan-
drian school, as noted by Westerink (1990: 328): “Philoponus never held the
chair, for he is always given the title of grammatikos (professor of philology),
never that of philosophos.”11 Even if he might have taught philosophy for a
short time after 529, he was more likely teaching grammar. MacCoull (1995:
49 n. 13 and 51f.) believes that Philoponus was bilingual in Greek and Cop-
tic. As already mentioned, he is responsible for the edition of some commen-
taries, which are said to be the results of Ammonius’ lectures, to which he
also added some “observations” of his own. Philoponus’ literary production
was both versatile and extensive.12 Seven of his commentaries on Aristotle are

9 For example his On Generation and Corruption has the title: Ἰωάννου Γραμματικοῦ Ἀλε-
ξανδρεύς σχολικαὶ ἀποσημειώσεις ἐκ τῶν συνουσιῶν Ἀμμωνίου τοῦ Ἑρμείου μετά τινων ἰδίων
ἐπιστάσεων εἰς τό πρῶτον τῶν περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς Ἀριστοτέλους ‘John the Grammar-
ian of Alexandria’s school notes from the seminars of Ammonius, son of Hermeias, with
some of his own observations on the first of the books On Generation and Corruption of
Aristotle’.
10 For Ammonius, see Westerink (1990: 325–328), Wildberg (1990), and Blank (2010).
11 For a description of the titles of the teachers in various subjects, see Szabat (2007: 181–
208). A teacher of grammar was called γραμματικός; that of rhetoric σοφιστής or ῥήτωρ;
that of philosophy φιλόσοφος; that of medicine ἰατροσοφιστής; and that of law was called
ἀντεκήνσωρ (< Latin antecessor/antecensor).
12 A complete list of Philoponus’ works can be found in Sorabji (2010: 271–275). According
to Strohmaier (2003) the remnants of a commentary on Galen’s On the Usefulness of the
Parts of the Body (Περὶ χρείας τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπου σώματι μορίων, De usu partium corporis
56 chapter 4

extant, the above-mentioned four from the lectures of Ammonius and three
which do not purport to be direct results of such lectures. Those that do not
mention Ammonius as their source are On Categories, On Physics (on books
1 to 4, with fragments on books 5 to 8), and On Meteorology i. Furthermore,
he was one of the pagan Ammonius’ Christian pupils, who from about 520
joined the philoponoi and turned against Ammonius’ teaching. He came par-
tially to put his philosophical education in the service of Christianity and for
that purpose composed some theological works. Some of his religious writ-
ings are extant only in Syriac and were edited by Šanda (1930) and van Roey
(1979, 1980, and 1984). Also philosophically he was the most independent and
original among the Neoplatonists of Alexandria and came to criticize certain
aspects of Plato’s and Aristotle’s thinking, especially in his Against Proclus on
the Eternity of the World and Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World (only
fragments extant), but also in his digressions on space and void in On Physics
(see ch. 8 n. 154). Motivated by his Christian faith, Philoponus attacked Aris-
totle’s view on the eternity of the world/matter13 and disagreed with him on
other philosophical matters such as the nature of space, existence of void, the
need of a fifth element, and on dynamics and optics. He might have written a
now lost commentary on Porphyry’s Eisagoge too, of which Baumstark (1900:
167ff. and 173ff.) claimed to have found some fragments in Syriac. In my com-
ments, I refer sometimes to these fragments, though their authenticity is not
ascertained yet. Philoponus’ commentary on the Categories, which is one of
his early works and probably written some time before 517 (see Sorabji 2010:
78 and 81), contains much material from that of Ammonius (edited by one of
his pupils), but it is sometimes more critical and contains independent obser-
vations too. According to the analysis of Laramée (2000: 309–323), 40 % of
Philoponus’ commentary has literal or approximate correspondences to that of
Ammonius, while the remaining 60% does not display any apparent parallel.
Also Sergius’ commentary seems to share some parts with that of Philoponus.
Especially, the same Christian elements are found in both of them (see comm.
too §24–34).14
Sergius might have known Philoponus personally, though he was probably
older and studied under Ammonius before Philoponus, who is supposed to

humani) in the Arabic translation of Ibn Zurʿa (943–1008) belongs to Philoponus. If true,
it is interesting that Philoponus composed medical texts too.
13 In his adaptation of Alexander’s On the Principles of the Universe, Sergius too excludes
passages that imply the eternity of the world, (cf. King 2010a: 168ff.).
14 For Philoponus, see Wildberg (1998), Watts (2006: 237–256 passim), Verrycken (2010),
Sorabji (2010), Giannakis (2011), and Henry (2011).
sergius as a commentator of aristotle 57

have entered Ammonius’ school around 510. It is also possible that Sergius
encountered Philoponus’ early writings, especially his commentaries on the
Categories and Physics, even if it is more likely that some shared features in their
texts depend on the fact that Ammonius is their common source. Furthermore,
Sergius and Philoponus were not the only Christian students of Ammonius
and some shared Christian elements in their texts can be attributed to the fact
that the Christian students in Alexandria inspired and exhorted one another
to take a critical stand towards some pagan aspects of their masters’ teaching,
which were conceived to be incompatible with Christianity. Even if Sergius
did perhaps not belong to the philoponoi, as suggested by Fiori (2014: 87f.), we
know that they tried to influence the Christian students to avoid some pagan
teachers’ religious rituals, but also to influence the school’s instruction in order
to play down its strongly anti-Christian ideas (Watts 2006: 215 f. and 237–246).
In a way, Christianity may have freed the Christian philosophers like Sergius
and Philoponus from the total dominance of Plato and Aristotle and enabled
them to criticize their teaching whenever they found it inaccurate or just to
disregard the inconvenient parts of their ideas.15
Because of the many parallels between Sergius and Philoponus, Furlani
(1925: 36 and 1926: 139) assumed that Sergius was a student of Philoponus,
rather than of Ammonius. This suggestion has been repeated by some later
scholars too, but relative chronology speaks against this idea, as well as the
lack of solid data for Philoponus’ teaching career (cf. also King 2010a: 176
n. 73 and 177 n. 78). Therefore, it is more reasonable to presuppose Ammonius
as the common source of both of them, and also to take into account the
mutual inspiration that the Christian students probably exercised upon one
another. It is noteworthy that nowhere in his writings does Sergius mention
Ammonius (or Philoponus) by name, but at one occasion he says that he has
acquired knowledge about the nature of space and time from some Christian
philosophers (see my comm. to §68–74). That Sergius does not mention his
presumed teacher Ammonius by name might depend on the fact that he did
not want to be associated with the pagan philosopher. This is understandable if
we take into consideration that the Iamblichian inspired Neoplatonist teaching
in Alexandria, which also included some pagan religious practices, caused at
times strong tensions between its protagonists and those Christian students
who opposed such rites, as clearly depicted in The Life of Severus by Zachariah
of Mytilene. Likewise, in his Discourse on the Spiritual Life, Sergius does not

15 I thank Professor John W. Watt for the insight that Christianity perhaps freed the Christian
philosophers from the strong intellectual authority of Plato and Aristotle.
58 chapter 4

mention two of his sources of inspiration (Fiori 2014: 78f.), namely Evagrius
of Pontus and Origen, probably because both them were accused of heresy.

4.5 Important Subsequent Commentators

After the presentation of the most significant antecedents to Sergius and the
associated contemporaries, in the third group we found those subsequent
philosophers who are reliant upon the same learning tradition and with whom
Sergius shared some ideas and features of exegesis. The direct inheritor of the
chair of philosophy after Ammonius was probably the little-known Eutocius
of Ascalon (c. 480–c. 525), who most likely was a pupil of Ammonius and is
above all known as a mathematician, but seems to have taught the Organon for
a few years and, according to the Armenian text of David, he wrote a commen-
tary on Eisagoge.16 Eutocius was succeeded by Olympiodorus (c. 495–c. 570),
who most likely was another of Ammonius’ students. He was also a pagan
and held the chair of philosophy for circa 35 years, from around 525 to his
death. Those of his commentaries that have come down to us consist of anno-
tations taken by his students from his lectures and reflect the texts that were
studied within the philosophical curriculum of Alexandrian school. Five of his
commentaries on the following works survive, on Aristotle’s Categories and
Meteorology, and on Plato’s dialogues Alcibiades i, Gorgias, and Phaedo. Also
a commentary on Porphyry’s Eisagoge is attributed to him, but is now lost. The
commentary on the Categories is prefaced by a prolegomena, being a character-
istic introduction from the Alexandrian school to Aristotle and the Categories.
The commentary proper derives for the most part from Ammonius. One thing
that Olympiodorus shares with Sergius is the discussion on the question of
the function or nature of logic, whether it is an instrument or part of philos-
ophy. They present this discussion in their introductions to the Categories and
not, as most other commentators do, in those to the Prior Analytics17 (Olymp.

16 Westerink (1990: 328). The testimony of David the Invincible is found in his commentary
on Prior Analytics 46.24 f. (ed. Topchyan 2010). Of Eutocius’ works (Knorr 1989: 229) “only
his mathematical efforts survive. These consist of his commentaries on Archimedes’
Sphere and Cylinder Books i and ii, Dimension of the Circle, and Plane Equilibria Books i and
ii, and his commentaries on the first four books of Apollonius’ Conics.” For their edition,
see ibid, p. 243 n. 35. For more on Eutocius, see also Bulmer-Thomas (1971).
17 Cf. Westerink (1961: 131f. and 1990: 343). For more on the question of the nature of logic,
see Hein (1985: 153–162), Correia (2004), Sorabji (2004b: 32–36 with cited literature), and
Adamson (2011: 7–18) for the Arabic tradition.
sergius as a commentator of aristotle 59

14.13–18.12 and Sergius P.9r13–13v10). In the West, Boethius too deals with the
question of logic as part or instrument of philosophy in his commentary on the
Categories (see Magee 2010: 798). Elias (In Analyt. Pr. 134.4 f.) and David, in the
preserved Armenian version of his commentary on Prior Analytics (46.24 f.),
report that Eutocius treated this question in the commentary on Eisagoge.
Olympiodorus might have been the last non-Christian Neoplatonist teacher in
Alexandria.18
In addition to these philosophers, we have three commentaries on Por-
phyry’s Eisagoge, namely the ones by Elias, David, and someone called Pseudo-
Elias by the editor Westerink (1967). Concerning all these three, well-founded
information is very scanty. Other extant works under Elias’ name consist of a
commentary on the Categories and only the beginning of that on Prior Analyt-
ics, where also he discusses the nature of logic. The Eisagoge commentary of
Elias has a prolegomena or a general introduction to philosophy, which can be
placed within the tradition of Alexandrian school. Because of the many par-
allels between the works of Olympiodorus and Elias, the latter is assumed to
have been a student of the former. Elias shares with Philoponus and Sergius the
reserved stance towards the commonly held idea that blindness, a privation,
cannot change into the state of sight again, a stand motivated by their Chris-
tian belief in miracles (see my comm. to §95–98). It seems that Elias himself
became a professor at the Alexandrian school, teaching both philosophy and
medicine, the former subject perhaps comprising only the preparatory courses
of the curriculum of his school.19
Likewise, the commentary on Eisagoge attributed to David is prefaced by
a quite extensive Prolegomena or Introduction to Philosophy. David’s name is
often associated with that of Elias and the same text in various manuscripts
is attributed to either of them. His Prolegomena and commentary on Eisagoge
indicate dependence on those of Elias; therefore he might have been a pupil of
Elias or perhaps as fellow-students both of them attended the lectures of Olym-
piodorus, whom David refers to four times. Also he gave lectures on Aristotle’s
logic and physics and perhaps on Plato. In the Armenian tradition there are sev-
eral texts attributed to David, known as David the Invincible (Arm. Anhaght).20
I have not consulted the anonymous lectures on Eisagoge attributed to Pseudo-
Elias and edited by Westerink in 1967. In his introduction (p. xvi), Westerink

18 For Olympiodorus, see Beutler (1931), Vancourt (1941: 1–7), Westerink (1990: 328–336),
Saffrey (2005), Watts (2006: 234–237), and Opsomer (2010).
19 For Elias, see Blumenthal (1981), Westerink (1990: 336–339), Wildberg (1990), and Goulet
(2000).
20 For David, see Westerink (1990: 339 f.), Barnes (2009), and Calzolari (2009).
60 chapter 4

says that it rather may have been composed at Constantinople in the seventh
century, and according to Mueller-Jourdan (2007: xxv) more specifically in the
first half of that century.
Though not definitely certain, the succession of the philosophy professors
at the Alexandrian school has been outlined. It begins with Hermeias and
continues with his son Ammonius and then Eutocius, (also perhaps Philo-
ponus), Olympiodorus, Elias, David, and Stephanus of Alexandria (c. 550–
c. 635). Stephanus was summoned from Alexandria to Constantinople by
Emperor Heraclius (c. 575–641) sometime about 610 in order to teach philos-
ophy, and perhaps medicine. Even if Neoplatonic teaching at Alexandria might
have continued until the Islamic invasion in 642, there is no clear evidence for
that or for any teacher after Stephanus.
A contemporary to Olympiodorus and student of Ammonius, but not a
teacher at the Alexandrian school, was Simplicius of Cilicia (c. 480–c. 560),
another pagan philosopher. He studied first with Ammonius in Alexandria, but
then departed to Athens and there studied with Damascius. After the “closure”
of the Athenian schools in 529, Simplicius left Athens too and took refuge at
the court of the Persian king Chosroes in Ctesiphon. In 532, Chosroes and Jus-
tinian signed a treaty, which among other things guaranteed the safe return of
pagan philosophers to the Roman Empire without requirement of conversion
to the Christianity. However, it is unclear whether Simplicius ever returned to
Athens, or stayed in Persia, or settled in Harran, as has also been suggested.
What seems clear is that it was after 532 that Simplicius composed his exten-
sive commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories, On the Heavens, Physics, and On the
Soul (authorship disputed), and on Epictetus’ Handbook. His commentary on
the Categories contains many of the ideas discussed by the Alexandrian com-
mentators who emerged from Ammonius’ school, but he quotes many passages
directly from the now lost commentaries of Porphyry and Iamblichus on that
work. However, also formally, Simplicius’ commentary seems neither to be a
direct result of any classroom seminars nor intended to be used in any class-
room teaching.21
In my commentaries to Sergius’ text, occasionally and only for the sake of
comparisons and indications of the conservative nature of this commentary
tradition, I refer to an anonymous Greek commentary on the Categories.22 The

21 For Simplicius, see Hadot (1990a) and Baltussen (2010).

22 It is published in the famous series Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca by Michael Hay-
duck (1883), with the title Anonymi categoriarum paraphrasis. Most of the mentioned
works by Alexandrian commentators are published in this series.
sergius as a commentator of aristotle 61

author of this anonymous paraphrase is sometimes identified with the Byzan-

tine monk Sophonias (13th–14th century). Another introduction to philosophy
that I refer to is the Dialectica or Philosophical Chapters (Κεφάλαια φιλοσοφικά)
by John of Damascus (c. 650–c. 745).23
There are some further commentaries or compendia on Porphyry’s Eisa-
goge and Aristotle’s Categories, though not directly dependent on one another,
which may yet supply useful comparisons to Sergius’ texts and reveal the
broader frame of the reading tradition of similar writings. They are those
of Theodore of Raithu, a monk from Egypt (about 6th–7th centuries),24 and
Byzantine writers such as Patriarch Photius i (c. 810–c. 893), Arethas of Cae-
sarea (c. 860–944), and Michael Psellos (1017/8–1078).25 In the Arabic tradition,
the commentaries of (Abū al-Faraj ʿAbdallāh) Ibn al-Ṭayyib (980–1043) on Eis-
agoge (ed. K. Gyekye) and the Categories (ed. C. Ferrari) might be of interest.
Due to limitations of time and space I have not consulted these latter works.26
In my introduction, I have focused on Sergius’ background and his literary
efforts. His influence on later commentators and translators has only occasion-
ally been touched upon. For the later Syriac and Arabic Aristotelian traditions,
I refer to the available studies of others. For the Syriac Aristotelian translation
and commentary tradition, see Brock (1993), Hugonnard-Roche (2001, 2004,
and 2007), Watt (2004, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014b–c and 2015), and Daiber
(2012); and especially for Syriac translations of and commentaries on the Cate-
gories, see King (2010b: 1–38). For Aristotle and the Arabic Aristotelian tradition
in general, see Gutas (1998 and 2010), D’Ancona (2005 and 2012), Rashed (2006),
and Adamson (2013).

4.6 The Question of Originality

One issue that has been mentioned in passing, but which needs to be explored
in greater detail is the conservative character of the commentary tradition and
the continuous process of recycling ideas and modes of exegesis from previous

23 For John of Damascus and his text, see also Roueché (1974: 65–67), Frede (2005: 166–170),
and Erismann (2011).
24 For Theodore of Raithu, see Chase (forthcoming).
25 For editions of their texts and those of some other Byzantine scholars, see Ierodiakonou
(2005).
26 For the Arabic tradition of Aristotelian and Porphyrian writings, see Geoffroy (2011) and
D’Ancona (2011), and for the oriental tradition of Porphyry’s writings Hugonnard-Roche
(2012).
62 chapter 4

writers and works. This state of affairs is also connected to the question of origi-
nality. Westerink (1990: 348) makes the following concluding statement relating
to the introductions to Eisagoge, Categories or Aristotle from the Alexandrian
school: “In spite of successive additions, the main scheme has remained the
same for a century; but not only the outline is traditional, a great many details,
arguments, illustrative citations and anecdotes, too, have been passed on from
generation to generation.” Already during the second century ad, the commen-
tators began to adopt an archaizing approach towards the classics and to view
the legacy they left behind with greatest respect and highest esteem. Generally,
many philosophers from Late Antiquity and onwards considered that all truth
had already been put forward by Plato and Aristotle, and could not be super-
seded, and that their own aim was to search for it in their writings and faithfully
reveal it to their own students and readers. These commentators had almost the
same approach to the works of Plato and Aristotle as the Christian exegetes had
to Bible. They did not conceive their goal to be that of introducing a new doc-
trine or “religion”, but rather to interpret and explain the truth as it in varying
degrees was hidden in the works of Plato and Aristotle, or in the Bible. There-
fore, it was fully natural for the commentators to appropriate the interpreta-
tions and mode of expositions from earlier commentaries on certain works of
Plato and Aristotle. Especially, if the existing elucidations were considered to
be accurate and useful, they were expected to be borrowed. The commentators’
own ambitions were therefore restricted to providing new insights and present-
ing a clearer and more accessible interpretation than those already available.
After all, among the preliminary points that were dealt with in the prefaces of
these professors and writers, we find the question of the qualities and charac-
teristics that an exegete (ἐξηγητής) was required to have (cf. Hoffmann 2006:
610), and not the question of how to be a good or original philosopher. Above
all, we may not forget the primary point of departure for these exegetes, namely
that their mission was not to come up with some of their own ideas and opin-
ions, but to faithfully and intelligibly lay out the teaching of the masters, as they
understood it. Thus, it was not an ideal among the commentators of this period
to come up with a new “original” philosophy in our sense.27

27 For these conditions and the conservatism of this exegetical commentary tradition, see
Fazzo (2004: 5 f.), and for a discussion on originality, Barnes (2009: 10f.).
sergius as a commentator of aristotle 63

4.7 Sergius’ Sources

Having outlined Sergius’ educational context and presented the influential

philosophers of his era, we need to discuss the question of which sources
Sergius may have been using when he composed his books on Aristotle. From
the information about Sergius that our sources convey and the many simi-
larities of his texts to those of Ammonius and his students, we know that he
had studied in Alexandria and most likely attended Ammonius’ lectures on
philosophy. In my explanations to the present edition, I have demonstrated
that, in addition to Ammonius, Philoponus and some subsequent commen-
tators such as Elias, Sergius included material which can be assigned to Por-
phyry. For the earlier commentators like Porphyry and Alexander, one of whose
works he adapted, Sergius had presumably direct access to their writings when
he composed his philosophical texts. He might also have been recalling what
was read from Porphyry’s and others’ books during the sessions of Ammo-
nius in connection to the target texts of Aristotle under discussion. Certainly,
Ammonius’ own presentation and explication of both Aristotle and his ear-
lier commentators is essential too, but we ought again to bear in mind that
we are dealing with a very conservative tradition which made abundant use
of previous exegesis. Ammonius himself derived much from his teacher Pro-
clus’ lecturing. In the Commentary on the Categories, Sergius himself tells the
addressee Theodore that he is introducing Aristotle (P.2v5f.) 煟q煿‫ܡ ܕܥ‬煟‫ ܡ‬爯‫ܡ‬
rq‫‘ ܗܘ‬from what I was remembering’, (P.51v24) 焏‫ܕ ܐܢ‬煿‫ܥ‬ ̇ ‫ ܕ‬焏‫‘ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‬what I
remember’, and (L.53vb34–38/P.100r4–6) ‫ܐ܉‬r‫̈ܩ‬q‫ ܒܦܣ‬爯q煿q‫ ܥܠ‬爯q煟‫ ܡ‬爯‫ܢ‬qr‫ܐ̇ܡ‬
煿‫ ܠ‬爯‫ܢ‬q‫ܕ‬煿‫ܥ‬ ̇ ‫ ܘ‬爯‫ ܠ‬牯q‫ܠ‬q ‫ܬܐ‬焏q‫ܐ ܣ̈ܓ‬rqq̈‫ ܕܘ‬爯‫ ܕܡ‬焏‫‘ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‬we say thus about
them in brief what we have learned from many places and remember it’.28 Nei-
ther Hugonnard-Roche (2004: 208 n. 3) nor King believes that Sergius had the
edited versions of Ammonius’ lectures, or of any contemporary author, when
he composed his expositions. King (2011a: 230) writes: “we can say with some
confidence that Sergius’ commentary was written on the basis of his own, inde-
pendent notes on Ammonius’ lectures rather than being dependent on any
one particular literary realization of those lectures (including those of others
of his students, such as Philoponus and Olympiodorus).” Since many of the
other commentaries from the Alexandrian school of Ammonius are the result
of orally presented material, which later on was written up by his students, it is

28 See also L.60va29–31: q‫ ܠ‬r‫ܡ‬r‫ܕ ܪ‬煿‫ ܕܐܬܥ‬rq犏‫ ܕܐܬܡ‬qq‫‘ ܐ‬as I was able to remember,
I have outlined for you’. However, such expressions probably were sometimes used as a
topos.
64 chapter 4

reasonable to assume that Sergius’ texts are also the products of both personal
school notes and memories ‘from the voice of’ Ammonius, or ἀπὸ φωνῆς, as the
background of these lecture commentaries is called in Greek. But when Sergius
is engaged with for example Porphyry, he may either be dependent on what
Ammonius included in his oral teaching from him, or partially on Porphyry’s
own written commentaries, while Sergius certainly had studied the Eisagoge.
Some Christian elements which Sergius shares with Philoponus indicate that
they were in some way connected. Their relation was either direct, as a result of
personal exchange, or indirect, as both of them can have taken part of common
material that was prevailing among Ammonius’ Christian students. A quite rea-
sonable assumption is that during the lectures of Ammonius there was room
for fairly free debates and that the Christian students were able to add their own
viewpoints and remarks to the discussions, possibly as pictured by Zachariah of
Mytilene in his largely fictitious dialog named Ammonius. Worth remembering
is that we certainly do not possess everything that Ammonius taught during
his lectures nor everything that was said by others during those discussions.
Neither was everything recorded, nor has all that once existed in written form
survived. The extant commentaries which are stated to be from the lectures of
Ammonius contain only a portion of his teaching according to the annotations
and memories of certain students. In spite of the conservatism of this school,
we may assume a degree of dynamism in Ammonius’ teaching and in the dis-
cussions connected to them, and not that exactly the same things were said
year after year or lecture after lecture. Thus, no session was presumably just the
same as the previous one and the different groups of students of various years
could be exposed to slightly different presentations and involved in divergent
discussions. Some small variations in the commentaries can be ascribed to this
circumstance.
However, what the parallel passages in Sergius’ texts and the later commen-
tators such as Elias, Olympiodorus, and Simplicius indicate is that some ideas
and wordings have an earlier history than their presently known recorders
and that Sergius represents another important source for the oral teaching
of Ammonius. Since we can rule out that Sergius is dependent on the lec-
tures of Ammonius published by those commentators who are later in date,
we can with considerable certainty conclude that he at least gained some of
his material directly from Ammonius’ oral lectures and that Sergius’ texts there-
fore constitute a significant supplementary source to Ammonius’ philosophical
teaching. A more systematic study of Sergius’ Commentary on the Categories
and extant Greek commentaries from the same tradition will provide fruitful
results and uncover new interrelations.
sergius as a commentator of aristotle 65

4.8 Sergius and His School?

The next question is whether Sergius founded a school or at least was teach-
ing any group of students. Indeed, some of his writings were composed at the
request of persons such as Theodore and these texts are didactically designed
to be suitable for classroom teaching.29 Theodore is not depicted as a distant
patron, as the introduction to the Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories shows,
but appears to be an assistant and student of Sergius, who during the read-
ing and translation of Galen’s works asks Sergius from where Galen’s method
of education comes, whether he has received it by himself or by a precur-
sor. It was in this connection that Sergius articulated his words of praise for
Aristotle (Commentary on the Categories P.2r7–10): ‫ܐ‬r‫ ܘܥܠ‬焏q‫ܪ‬熏r‫ ܘ‬焏rq‫ܕܪ‬
‫ܘܗܝ‬r‫ܒ‬q 焏‫ܢ‬rq焏‫ܣ ܘܠ‬熏‫ܢ‬q‫ܕ ܠܓܠ‬熏q‫ ܒܠ‬熏‫ ܠ‬.‫ܣ ܗܘܐ‬熏q‫ܠ‬qq‫ܣ‬q‫ܬܐ ܐܪ‬熏q‫ ܪܕ‬煿̇‫ܠ‬q‫ܕ‬
爯‫ܐ ܕܗܘܘ ܡ‬煿‫ܡ‬r̈‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܦ‬熏‫ܠܠ̈ܣ‬q‫ ܦ‬焏‫̈ܒܢ‬rq‫ܘܢ ܡ‬煿‫ܠ‬q‫ ܘܐܦ ܠ‬焏‫ ܐܠ‬.‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܐ̈ܣ‬
‫ܪܗ‬r‫‘ ܒ‬that Aristotle has become the beginning, start, and principle of all edu-
cation, not only for Galen and for his physician friends, but also for all the
famous philosopher writers who have been after him’. Hearing these words,
Theodore desires to know more about the aim of the philosophy of Aristotle
and convinces Sergius to compose commentaries about his individual writings.
Sergius consents to the request and decides to make a written record of (P.2v8)
qq‫ܡ‬煟‫ ܩ‬rq‫ ܗܘ‬焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܐ ܡ‬r‫ܡ ܕܒܡܠ‬煟‫‘ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‬what I [earlier] was verbally say-
ing in front of you’, which would indicate that he was giving oral lectures.
In addition to Theodore, a certain Stephen is mentioned in the introduction
to the translation of Pseudo-Dionysius, who might have been a student of
Sergius. We have of course also Philotheos, the addressee of the Introduction
to Aristotle and his Categories, but we cannot decide whether he was a pupil
of Sergius. That Sergius should be perceived as a teacher to at least Theodore
is evident from another passage, where Sergius says to Theodore (L.53vb38–
54ra6/P.100r6–9): qrq̇ ‫ ܐܘ‬rqrq‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܢ‬rq‫ܡ ܐ‬煟‫ ܡ‬熏qqr‫ܐ ܠܡ‬犏‫ ܡ‬r‫ ܐܢ‬爯q‫ܐܢ ܕ‬
爯‫ ܕܠ‬爯‫ ܡ‬rqrq ‫ܢ‬熏q‫ ܐ̃ܘ ܐ‬牯‫ ܠܡܩ‬q‫ܘ ܙܕ̇ܩ ܠ‬煿̇‫܉ ܠ‬爯‫ܢ‬qr‫ ܕܐ̇ܡ‬焏‫ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‬爯‫ ܡ‬焯q ‘if
someone is able to find any additional thing or handle (the topic) better than
what we say, O our brother, you should follow him rather than us’.
These testimonies, the formal structure of Sergius’ Commentary, the intro-
ductory prefaces added to his medical translations, and also the persons that
appear around him, lead to the assumption that he probably was a lecturing

29 We ought also to be aware that most of Sergius’ Syriac readers were yet not well acquainted
with such philosophical discussions, even if they were bilingual, and a didactic exposition
might have taken into account this circumstance too.
66 chapter 4

teacher of medicine and Aristotelian philosophy. As such, he would also be the

source of the Syriac medical and philosophical schools, although we do not
have evidence for any physical school that can be traced to him.
 chapter 5

Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories and

Introduction to Aristotle and His Categories

Though the text I edit and translate here is specified as a ‘tract’ (‫ܐ‬r‫ܡ‬焏‫ )ܡ‬on
the Categories in the single manuscript it is found in, I do not believe that it
is a correct characterization of it. In contrast to Sergius’ traditional Commen-
tary on the Categories, addressed to Theodore, where he mentions Aristotle’s
treatise several times, nowhere in the text to Philotheos does he bring up Aris-
totle’s Categories as the book under discussion. Instead, he calls his own writing
five times meltha (‫ܐ‬r‫ ܡܠ‬melləṯā) ‘discourse’ and twice memra (‫ܐ‬r‫ܡ‬焏‫ܡ‬
m(ʾ)ēmrā) ‘tract/treatise’. Also, its disposition is not that of a typical commen-
tary. In spite of the many coincidences of Sergius’ two texts, the discourse to
Philotheos is not an ordinary commentary on the Categories of Aristotle, even if
it is most likely an abridgment of the commentary proper to Theodore. He per-
haps meant it to be a general introduction to Aristotle’s philosophy.1 Support for
this view is also to be found in other products of the Alexandrian school from
which it originates. As Westerink (1990: 341f.) declares, most of the Alexandrian
philosophers are represented “by an introduction to philosophy in general and
to Porphyry’s Isagoge or by one to Aristotle and the Categories, or by both.”
While the discourse on Aristotle’s philosophy, addressed to Philotheos,
should be reckoned as one of these introductions, the Commentary on Aris-
totle’s Categories (to Theodore) is Sergius’ first composition of many planned
on the separate writings of Aristotle. Because it was the initial part of a greater
project, it is prefaced with a traditional prolegomena, in which he undertakes
to specify his enterprise and deals with the common preliminary questions
discussed in the introductions of the Alexandrian commentators.2 Although
this treatise To Philotheos covers many of the themes found in the Categories,
nonetheless it is better categorised as a general introduction. Because the Cat-
egories was the first book of the Organon, any general introduction to Aris-
totelian logic was bound to focus more on that work than any other. Nonethe-
less, both of Sergius’ texts cover topics from Aristotle’s On Interpretation and

1 Or possibly, as Hugonnard-Roche (2013: 243) states, we can distinguish two literary genres
from such texts, one being manuals or textbooks and another exegetical commentaries.
2 For the preliminary schemes and the points discussed, see above, pp. 27–29 and ch. 2 n. 40.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2016 | doi: 10.1163/9789004325142_006

68 chapter 5

Physics too. In any case, his Introduction to Aristotle can be placed in the same
tradition as the Eisagoge ‘Introduction’ of Porphyry, aiming at defining the nec-
essary philosophical concepts and terminology of Aristotle. But Sergius’ intro-
duction differs from those of Olympiodorus, Elias, and David in that it does not
treat the set of preliminary questions usually discussed in their prolegomena,
(on the contents of these, see Westerink 1990: 341–348).
The main difference between Sergius’ two texts can briefly be defined in
what follows. Sergius usually supplied his translations with introductions,
which have a didactic character and show how they were intended for an edu-
cational context in the Syriac environment he was operating in. From his time
in Alexandria, Sergius received direct experience of studying philosophy and
other topics in classrooms and composed his works in a way intended to be
used in a classroom setting (see esp. Watts 2011: 147–149). In fact, many of the
commentaries from the Alexandrian school are products of classroom teach-
ing, recorded school annotations by students from the lectures of the profes-
sors. The form of Sergius’ Introduction to Aristotle and His Categories, on the
other hand, seems to indicate that it was not designed to be a textbook, but
a general introduction to Aristotle’s philosophy intended for a more educated
circle. However, it is not an uncommon procedure to write doublets of com-
mentaries on a certain text. Porphyry composed two commentaries on the
Categories, one extensive and one abridged, as also Boethius did on the same
book in Latin, and Al-Farabi composed two commentaries on On Interpretation
in Arabic.
The verbal overlaps between Sergius’ two texts are many. Most of the con-
tents of the Introduction to Aristotle (addressed to Philotheos) are also found
in the Commentary on the Categories (to Theodore), many times in verbatim
agreement. If we accept that the Commentary, as I will try to show, was written
before the Introduction, then we can say that entire passages in the Introduction
are literal quotations and excerpts from the Commentary. These exact overlaps
make the manuscripts of the Commentary useful in correcting scribal errors in
the single manuscript of the Introduction, except where Sergius may have made
deliberate changes in the process of abbreviating the longer text. The two main
manuscripts of the Commentary have therefore been used and specified in the
critical apparatus of my edition.
Along with much additional material, the Commentary is sometimes more
elaborate and thorough in its discussion of the same topic (cf. also Hugonnard-
Roche 2004: 149ff.). The sections in the Commentary, which are left out from the
Introduction, are primarily the didactic and introductory transitions from one
theme to another. The shifts in the Introduction are sometimes very abrupt and
the reader is unprepared for what is to come, whereas the shifts in the Commen-
sergius’ two texts on categories 69

tary are usually marked by introductory prefaces and sometimes summarizing

epilogues of its different books. Thus, the Introduction is more compact and
presents the core material of the discussions, while the Commentary is more
instructive and prepares and introduces the reader for the subject that will be
treated. In that way, the Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, mostly being the
result of lectures, is designed to be used for teaching in classrooms, but the
same cannot unambiguously be said about his Introduction to Aristotle and his
Categories. The Introduction seems to be an extracted version of the former and
meant either for a well-informed audience or to be used in a classroom under
the instruction of a teacher. The Commentary was composed on the request
of an assistant and student, namely Theodore, who demanded an instructive
exegetical commentary. In that way, the Introduction differs also from the cate-
chetical question-and-answer commentary of Porphyry and synopses and sum-
maries of logic by some subsequent Christian writers to be studied by Christian
students. The most notable synopsis of this kind is the Philosophical Chapters
of John of Damascus.3

5.1 The Chronology of Sergius’ Two Texts

In neither of these two works does Sergius make any explicit reference to the
other, which would reveal for us their sequence of composition or chronology.
But some traces in the Introduction seem to indicate that it was written after
the Commentary and can indeed be characterized as an abridgment or epitome
of it.4 A similar procedure of writing is found in commentators like Porphyry
too, who composed his extensive commentary first and later on produced an
abbreviated version of it. This seems to be also Sergius’ line of action. The
fact that many of the initial questions related to Aristotle and his writings are
discussed in the prologue to the Commentary, and not in the preface of the
Introduction, shows also that the former was written before the latter. Moreover,
the didactic form of the Commentary makes it more suitable as a first work to
encounter than is the compact composition of the Introduction.
Besides, we have indeed a phrase in the Introduction, which can be taken
as a strong evidence for its later composition. Sergius begins the discussion
on locomotion with the following words (§107): “But since we have sufficiently

3 For examples of latter works from the seventh century, see Roueché (1974).
4 Also Furlani was of this opinion, as he writes (1936: 433): “Il trattato minore sulle Categorie,
diretto a un certo Filoteo, è un estratto del maggiore.”
70 chapter 5

(rq焏‫ )ܣܦܩ‬spoken above (爏‫ ܠܥ‬爯‫ܡ‬ ̣ ) about all the modes of change” (cf. also
the end of §106). Yet, this is not a true statement. Previously (at § 89), he had
only enumerated the six modes of change, without actually treating them.
However, in his Commentary (L.54ra9–55va19/P.100r10–102v8), he has a more
thorough description of these kinds of changes. Because sections § 106–107
of the Introduction coincide literally with that of the Commentary (L.60ra26-
va28/P.109v5–28+lacuna), they must be considered to be excerpts from it,
which explains also how the adverb rq焏‫‘ ܣܦܩ‬sufficiently’ found its way into
our text. In the Commentary (L.60rb11/P.109v14), this adverb appears in its
proper context.
Two significant terms found in the Introduction, but not in the Commentary,
suggest also clearly that the former was written later. Nowhere in the Commen-
tary, it seems, does Sergius mention or use the technical word ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܢ‬q‫ §( ܐ‬9)
or ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬q‫§( ܐ‬12) for the category of ‘quality’. He usually uses 焏‫ ܙܢ‬but also
焏‫ܙܓ‬熏‫ ܡ‬and 焏‫ܠ‬qq (see comm. to §12), when we would expect that he would
at least mention ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܢ‬q‫ ܐ‬or ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬q‫ܐ‬. Also, the fact that the fourth kind of a
statement, the ‘declarative’, has the form 犟‫ ̇ܗܘ ܕܦܣ‬in the Commentary, while
in the Introduction it has received the form 焏‫ܩ‬熏‫ܦܣ‬, a form that is harmonized
with the other three kinds of statements, supports this claim. Sergius’ other
minor philosophical works exhibit some progress and development in his ter-
minology too.
To conclude, Sergius composed his Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories first
and later on made an abridgment of it, here called Introduction to Aristotle and
his Categories, which he addressed to a certain Philotheos.

5.2 Aristotle’s Categories: How It Was Viewed and Read

The treatise called Categories (Gr. Κατηγορίαι) is one of Aristotle’s very influ-
ential and much commented upon works.5 Already the question of its aim,
namely what it was dealing with, was a matter of great dispute among its inter-
preters. Likewise, many other questions were fiercely discussed by both the
Peripatetics and Platonists from the early period of the commentary tradition,
sometimes even questions of minute details.6 It came also to occupy the ini-
tial position among the philosophical textbooks studied at the Alexandrian

5 The literature on the Categories is very extensive, for some general works see Husik (1952),
Owens (1960), Frede (1987), Anton (1992), Mann (2000), and Sanford (2004). There is a
considerable discussion on the original title of the work too.
6 For good surveys of the early commentators on the Categories, see Gottschalk (1990: 69–
sergius’ two texts on categories 71

school. In Sergius’ Commentary (L.3ra15/P.17v1), the name 焏qqr̈‫ ܦ‬焏q‫ܢ‬熏q (kun-

̈
nāyē pǝšīṭē ‘simple appellations’) is used for Aristotle’s Categories, a desig-
nation found also in Gabriel Qatraya and in Bar Bahlul’s Lexicon (see Brock
2016).
One of the reasons why the Categories was used as a preliminary work in edu-
cational settings is that it was placed at the beginning of the entire Aristotelian
corpus in the ancient edition of Andronicus of Rhodes (first century bc), and
also because already Porphyry (c. 234–c. 305) considered it to be an elemen-
tary introduction to logic and philosophy intended for beginners. This notion
was embraced by the Alexandrian commentators of the sixth century.7 The Cat-
egories is indeed a difficult text for beginners, but among the commentators
there was the concept of Aristotle’s deliberate obscurity (ἐπετήδευσε ἀσάφειαν)
used for the purpose of frightening away the lazy students from the very start.8
The initial position of the Categories was conducive also to its high popularity
and many commentaries were produced dealing with the questions discussed
in it.
That the Categories was placed first in Aristotle’s Organon was founded on
how its contents were conceived and what it was supposed to treat. The subject
of Categories was thought to be about simple terms and/or simple objects signi-
fied and predicated by the defined terms. Therefore, one should start with the
predications in the Categories in order to be able to proceed to the prepositions
in On Interpretation, and onwards to the assertoric syllogisms/deductions of
Prior Analytics, and then to the demonstrative syllogisms of Posterior Analytics.
But not all the commentators considered the Categories to be a mere linguistic
or logical work, only specifying the simple terms that would be used in Aris-
totle’s subsequent works of logic. Some commentators preferred to regard it
as dealing with ontology, that is, how reality is constituted and the way it is
divided into categories of existence. There are merits to this viewpoint since
some questions found in the Categories are treated also in the Metaphysics, that
is, Aristotle’s more ontological work. Because of this, one of the questions that

81), Reinhardt (2007), Sharples (2008 and 2010: 47–69), Tarrant (2008), Barnes (2012), Griffin
(2015), and Moraux (1973: 97–113, 147–164, 182ff.; 1984: 212 f., 216–221, 222f., 227ff., 315ff., 336ff.,
366–374, 485ff., 519–527, 530–563, 585–601, 608–623, 692–700; and 2001: 3–15).
7 See Porph. (56.28–30, 134.28f.), Ammon. (13.4, 36.11, 53.6, 55.12f.), Philop. (50.11, 87.24,
58.19, 153.19), and Sergius (L.24ra2–7/P.65r4–6, L.34ra10–18/P.42v10–13, L.35vb1–4/P.44r26f.,
L.50vb3–7/P.93r9–11; L.53va13–17/P.99r7 f.; and L.60va38–b3).
8 For discussions on the notion of Aristotle’s deliberate obscurity, see Kustas (1973) and Barnes
(1992); cf. also Kanthak (2013). For a translation of the relevant section from Sergius’ Commen-
tary with a note, see Watt (2014a: 35 f. and 49).
 72 chapter 5

was intensely discussed in the introductions of the commentators was the sub-
ject matter of the Categories (see my comm. to § 4).

5.3 A Synoptic Overview of the Contents of Sergius’ Two Works

Below, I present a brief overview of the contents of these two texts, to serve
as some kind of a synopsis, but also as a thematic presentation of Sergius’
texts. Because of its length, its prior origin, and the greater number of ques-
tions discussed in the Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, I give the contents
of its different books first and then supply the corresponding paragraphs (§)
of the Introduction to Aristotle and his Categories added by me to this edition.
In fact, parallel passages of the two texts can also be obtained from the critical
apparatus of my edition, where I provide the exact places for the supplemen-
tations and emendations I have made in the text, on the basis of the two main
manuscripts of the Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories. The asterisk (*) added
to the paragraph numbers indicates that I have written a commentary on the
topic or question under discussion, found after my edition and translation of
the Introduction.

Commentary on the Categories Introduction

to Aristotle

Book i (tr. by Hugonnard-Roche 2004: 167–170, 191–202):

– Sergius’ prologue.
– The parts of philosophy or its division into theory and practice. § 3*
– The division of Aristotle’s works.
– Whether logic is part of philosophy or its instrument.
– A brief epilogue.

Book ii (translation by Watt 2014a: 32–40):

– A brief prologue.
– The nature of logic: a discriminating instrument used to distinguish what is
truly a good or bad act [i.e. in practice] and what is truly knowledge or
falsehood [i.e. in theory] (cf. P.15rf),9 and therefore logic should be studied
before ethics, physics, and metaphysics.

9 Cf. Ibn Ridwan apud Iskandar (1976: 254) and Adamson (2011: 9ff.).
 sergius’ two texts on categories 73

Commentary on the Categories Introduction

to Aristotle

– The sequence of the logical works of Aristotle and whether also rhetoric
belongs to the art of logic as an instrument.
– The reasons for Aristotle’s obscurity or the difficult nature of some of his
writings.
– The aim of Aristotle’s different works and whether the Categories is about § 4–5*
simple things, simple notions or simple words, including the question
regarding the being of the universalia. § 7*
– The four kinds of speech or statements. § 6*
– The genera and species or “Porphyry’s tree”, that is, the gradation and division § 20*
of substance.
– Aristotle and the Peripatetics on the ten categories. § 9–19*
– Homonyms, polyonyms, heteronyms and synonyms. § 21*
– Charts of some points treated in this book.

Book iii (on substance):

– A brief prologue.
– Everything is either substance or accident, general or particular.
– Pythagoras’ view of the first causes/principles of everything, of numbers and
elements.
– Aristotle’s view of the first causes and elements.
– Aristotle on accidents.
– Eleven manners of being in something. § 23–34*
– Discussion on Aristotle’s definition of accident and accident not being part of § 36–37*
its substrate.
– When a definition becomes wrong (P.37r9f.), or the criteria for a correct
definition (P.47v18).
– The problem of smells as accidents.
– Porphyry’s and others’ dispute on Aristotle’s definition of accident. § 38–40*
– On the generals and particulars.
– Simple and compound substances and their differences. § 41*
– About the differences of objects. § 42–43*
– About the differences of quantity.
– More on the generals and particulars.
– Some statements on substance.
– The dispute on the division of substances into primary and secondary ones. § 44–48*
– On the priority of secondary substances. § 49–52*
 74 chapter 5

(cont.)

Commentary on the Categories Introduction

to Aristotle

– An adequate definition of substance cannot be given, since there is no more

general genus and therefore its properties are supplied to describe it.
– The manners of a property or particularity. § 53–58*
– On the subject of the categories (substance, quantity, and quality) and their
mutual order.
– On quantity: discrete and continuous quantities and its seven kinds. § 66*
– On the four elements. § 65*
– The parable of unworked bronze.
– The dispute on parts and accidents, and parts being in a substance. § 62–63*
– The distinctions of substance and quantity.
– End of book three on substance.

Book iv (on quantity):

– A brief prologue.
– On quantity and the reasons for its treatment after substance.
– Whether number is a quantity.
– Whether language is a quantity. § 66*
– Whether a mark is a quantity. § 67*
– On space. § 68–70*
– Plato’s view of space.
– Zeno’s view of space. § 71*
– Whether space is a quantity. § 72–73*
– On time.
– End of the seven divisions of quantity.
– The Stoics’ and Plato’s view of quantity.
– On the properties of quantity.
– End of the book on quantity.

Book v (on relatives):

– A brief prologue.
– On relatives. § 74*
– Some properties of relatives.
– Some earlier criticism of Plato’s Gorgias.
– That which reciprocates.
– The simultaneity of relatives. § 75–79*
 sergius’ two texts on categories 75

Commentary on the Categories Introduction

to Aristotle

– The dispute about the parts of substances: particulars and generals.

– A new definition of relatives.
– End of book five.

Book vi (on quality):

– A brief prologue.
– On quality.
– Different designations for quality in Syriac. § 80*
– The Stoics’ and Bardaisan’s view of qualities.
– Discussion on the different kinds of quality and how to give a definition of it. § 83–87*
– Only quality has opposites.
– Also more and less is a property of quality.
– There are only four main categories (substance, quantity, relatives, and
quality), but only substance has self-subsistence, while the others have their
existence in relation to substance.
– End of book six.

Book vii:
– A brief prologue.
– Book seven is on change, opposites, motion.
– On change. § 89*
– On motion.
– Opposition and contrariety are not the same.
– The different kinds of opposition. § 88–94*
– On the distinctions of opposition. § 95–98*
– On priority and posteriority. § 99–105*
– On simultaneity.
– More on motion. § 106–107*
– Epilogue.

Thus, the Commentary covers most of the points discussed in the Introduction
too, as well as it treats some further themes found usually in the Alexandrian
commentaries on the Categories and the Physics in addition to being more
elaborate in some of its discussions.
76 chapter 5

5.4 Linguistic Observations, Especially of Some Particles

As a translator, Sergius was a reader-orientated expositor who was faithful to

the inward sense of a whole sentence rather than interested in transposing
every single word. His main concern was to convey the meaning of a text to
his Syriac readers in a comprehensible and familiar idiom. He was sparing
with loan words from Greek, but made use of those already incorporated into
the Syriac language. Apart from some proper names of individuals and philo-
sophical schools, almost all of the Greek words in Sergius’ Introduction were
already extant in Syriac. Even the calques in Sergius’ text are few. Instead of
coining calques like rq‫ܐ‬rq‫ ܒ‬for οἰκείως and rq焏‫ܢ‬r‫ ܡ‬for κυρίως, adopted by
later translators, he construes the adverb rq焏‫ܢ‬qq‫ ܡ‬from the existing adjec-
tive 焏‫ܢ‬qq‫ ܡ‬for the former, which can be characterized as a semantic loan
(German Lehnbedeutung, cf. King 2014: 64f.), and for the latter he employs
the semantically equivalent Syriac rq‫ܐ‬rqrq (see comm. to 49). Also for the
Greek technical adverb μεταφορικῶς he utilizes the approximately semantic
Syriac rq焏‫ܠ‬q焏r (see comm. to §53–60). Many times, he extends the mean-
ing of an etymologically corresponding Syriac term or expression to receive
a more technical sense, in the way he assigns the meaning of Greek τέλος
‘end/goal/purpose’ to the Syriac 焏q‫ܡܠ‬熏r ‘completion/perfection’ (see comm.
to §24–34).
It is quite common for Sergius to extract new meanings from Syriac words,
which on a semantic level are related to the Greek words they represent. Some-
times it is more or less easy to deduce the new intended sense of a word based
on its common usage, such as ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܡ‬q for ποσότης ‘quantity’, ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܢ‬q‫ ܐ‬for
ποιότης ‘quality’ (§12), and 焏r煟‫ ܓ‬for συμβεβηκός ‘accident’. Other times it is
not as easy to predict the technical meaning of a loan translation or calque
like ‫ܡ‬煟‫ܬ ܡ‬熏‫ ܕܠ‬for τὰ πρός τι ‘relatives’. Neither in Greek can the technical
implication of πρός τι for ‘relatives’ have been apparent to the uninitiated
reader.
For further terminological transpositions in Sergius’ text, the reader is re-
ferred to what is discussed in the commentary section and also given in the
Greek-Syriac glossary. In the following, I will instead discuss especially some
particles, which have not received an accurate or proper treatment in Syriac
lexicons or grammars. They are:

(a) 焏‫ ܠ‬爯q‫ ܘܐܢ ܕ‬and 焏‫ ܠ‬爯q煟‫‘ ܘܐܢ‬otherwise’, ‘or else’ (at § 5, 47, and 80).

This syntagm is recorded in Thesaurus Syriacus (col. 250), but only its Greek
corresponding εἰ δὲ μή has been offered there with reference to its occurrence
sergius’ two texts on categories 77

in John 14:11. Also Hoffmann records it in his glossary10 based on its attestation
in the Syriac translations of Porphyry’s Eisagoge, and provides the following
equivalences (H.158a34f.): “焏‫ ܠ‬爯q‫ = والّا ܘܐܢ ܕ‬ἐπεί quia alioquin”. And indeed
the Arabic ‫وإلّا‬11 is constituted of the same units, except the particle 爯q‫ <( ܕ‬Greek
δέ).
The Greek particle combination εἰ δὲ μή γε or εἰ δὲ μήγε, meaning ‘but if not,
or else, otherwise’, occurs eight times in the Greek New Testament (Luke 5:36,
5:37, 10:6, 13:9, 14:32, Matthew 6:1, 9:17, and 2Cor. 11:16; cf. Thrall 1962: 9 f.).
Its first instance at Luke 5:36 is not reproduced in Peshitta, but at 5:37 the
Peshitta text has 焏‫ ܠ‬爯q‫ ܘܐܢ ܕ‬for it. However, at 10:6 Peshitta has the 爯q‫ܐܢ ܕ‬
焏‫ ܠ‬without the conjunction ‫ܘ‬, but the Old Syriac Curetonian version has the
expected 焏‫ ܠ‬爯q‫ܘܐܢ ܕ‬. At 13:9 Peshitta, Curetonian and Sinaitic versions all
have 焏‫( ܘܐܠ‬cf. Arabic ‫)وإلّا‬. And at 14:32 Peshitta has 焏‫ ܠ‬爯q‫ܘܐܢ ܕ‬, while the
Curetonian and Sinaitic versions have again 焏‫ܘܐܠ‬.
At Matthew 6:1 the Peshitta version has 焏‫ܘܐܠ‬, while the Curetonian and
Sinaitic versions give just 焏‫ܕܠ‬, which also occurs in all three versions at its
second instance at 9:17. Finally, it appears at 2Cor. 11:16 for which we find in
the Peshitta 焏‫ ܘܐܢ ܠ‬or 焏‫ ܘܐܠ‬depending on edition or manuscript. When it
occurs without the emphasizing γε (i.e. εἰ δὲ μή which is its usual combination
in classical literature, Thrall 1962: 10), as at John 14:2,11,12 Peshitta gives again
焏‫ ܘܐܢ ܠ‬or 焏‫ܘܐܠ‬.
Its original Aramaic form seems to have been 焏‫( ܘܐܢ ܠ‬cf. Nöldeke § 374d),
and writing as one word 焏‫ܘܐܠ‬, which is indicated also by its occurrence in
Daniel 3:15 being ‫ ְוֵהן ָלא‬, for which Peshitta has indeed 焏‫ ܘܐܢ ܠ‬and 焏‫ܘܐܠ‬.
The conjunction ‫ ܘ‬was initially probably adversative, but later became weaker
in this sense and under Greek influence the additional particle 爯q‫ <( ܕ‬δέ) was
incorporated into the syntagm for greater emphasis, in the same way as a γε
was added to this phrase in koiné Greek.
The other equivalent Greek particle ἐπεί13 occurs in Porphyry’s Eisagoge five
times and is variously rendered into Syriac, but at Eis. 11.2,3 the two Syriac ver-
sions have 焏‫ ܠ‬爯q‫( ܘܐܢ ܕ‬Eis. Syr.i 24.14–17), where it clearly means ‘otherwise’
(cf. also Porph. 80.13). Also in the Arabic rendering of the Eisagoge by Abu Uth-
man al-Dimashqi, we find ‫ وإلّا‬at Eis. 11.2 (٧٩/79.9, ed. al-Ahwani, 1952).

10 That is, the Glossarium in Hoffmann (1873: 154–216).

11 Wehr (1979: 28): “‫ والا‬wa-illā (and if not =) otherwise, or else.”
12 For just εἰ δέ μή, see also Mark 2:21,22 and Revelation 2:5,16 (the version of British Foreign
Bible Society edition).
13 lsj, B.1: ἐπεὶ freq. with past tenses with ἄν, esp. in the sense, for otherwise.
78 chapter 5

In Sergius’ texts, the expression 焏‫ ܠ‬爯q‫ ܘܐܢ ܕ‬consistently seems to mean

‘otherwise’, ‘or else’ and appears several times in his other writings too. For
example in his Commentary, we have (L.29vb7–12/P.57v15–17): ‫ ̣ܗܝ‬:焏‫ ܠ‬爯q煟‫ܘܐܢ‬
焏‫ ̇ܗܝ ܕܠ‬:焏r煟‫ܐ ܘܓ‬煟qq‫ ܐ‬焏q‫ ܐܘܣ‬煿̇qrq‫ ܗܘܬ ܕܐ‬焏qqrr‫ܬܐ ܡ‬熏‫ ̣ܗܝ ܨܒ‬煟q
‫ ܕܬܗܘܐ‬焏q犏‫‘ ܡ‬otherwise the same object would be found to be substance
and accident at the same time, what is impossible to be’. See also the occurrence
of 焏‫ ܠ‬爯q‫ ܘܐܢ ܕ‬in Sergius’ adaptation of Alexander’s On the Principles of the
Universe at 134.15,30 and 137.4f. At any rate, when variations on this form appear,
they do not have the same meaning, as here at § 77 we have 焏‫ ܠ‬爯q煟‫‘ ܐܢ‬but if
not’.

(b) 焯q 煟q ‘even though’, ‘although’, (lit. ‘while much’) (once at § 55).

I have not found any adequate exposition of this expression in the Syriac lex-
icons or grammars. In the context of Sergius’ text here, it evidently means
‘though’, ‘even though’, ‘although’. Fortunately, this reading is supported by
Sergius’ translation of On the Cosmos, where 焯q 煟q once (at 137.11, ed. Land
= Ps.Arist. De Mundo 392a17) corresponds to the Greek καίπερ (lsj: ‘although’,
‘albeit’) and once to καίτοι (lsj.iii: “with a participle, much like καίπερ”, at
149.5/397a28).14 The single occurrence of καίπερ in Porphyry’s Eisagoge (20.22)
is rendered in the first Syriac translation (Eis.Syr.i 45.11) by 焯q 煟q too. In a simi-
lar context, I have come across the following formulation in a Syriac manuscript
containing questions and answers on Aristotle’s Categories (3r2 f.):15 焏‫ܢ‬qr‫ܣ‬
‫ܘܢ‬煿‫ ܡܢ‬煟q 爏q ‫ܘܗܝ‬rq‫ܬܐ ܐ‬熏qq 焯q 煟q .焏rq‫ܘܢ ܪ‬煿‫ ܠ‬rq‫܉ ܠ‬焏‫ܒ‬r‫ ܘܥܩ‬rq‫ܓ‬
‘but the crab and the scorpion do not have a head, even though each of them is
an animal’.

(c) ‫‘ ܐܘ … ܐܘ‬irrespective of whether … or whether’ (§ 3).

In addition to the attested meanings of the combination of two ‫‘ ܐܘ‬or’, I think

one can discern the given sense of ‘irrespective of whether … or whether’ in
English. Its recorded meanings are: Thesaurus Syriacus (col. 47): aut … aut; vel
… vel, sive … sive; Payne Smith (1903: 4): ‘either … or’, ‘if or no’; Sokoloff (2009:

14 See also 焯q 煟q in On the Cosmos at 154.2 (/399b12) and at 154.2 (/399b12). When it has
the form 焯q 煟q‫ܘ‬, with conjunction, it does not have the same sense, as indicated by its
occurrence at 135.2 (/391a4).
15 Vatican Syriac 568, defective, all in all 7 folios, (unedited, but images of this manuscript are
available on the cd entitled Syriac Manuscripts from the Vatican Library, Vol. 1 (Bibliotheca
Apostolica Vaticana; Brigham Young University, 2005)).
sergius’ two texts on categories 79

12): ‘if … but if’, ‘whether … or’; and Nöldeke (§ 258): ‘either … or’, ‘whether
… or whether’. In Porphyry’s Eisagoge (7.4–6) ‫ ܐܘ … ܐܘ‬represents among
other constructions such as the Greek ἢ … ἢ ‘either … or’ (Eis. Syr.i 15.14–16.1)
found in Payne Smith. This additional implication can be conceived as a natural
extension of these other meanings.

(d) ‫ ̣ܗܘ‬煟q ‫‘ ̣ܗܘ‬at the same time’, ‘simultaneously’ (§ 7, 10, 20, and 36).

The common meaning of 煟q between two pronouns is ‘the same’. But also an
extended temporal dimension of that sense can be discerned from Sergius’ text.
An attestation of the meaning ‘at the same time’ is found in the same context of
discussion in the Syriac translations of Porphyry’s Eisagoge as well. At Eis. 4.19
and 8.5 the Greek τὰ αὐτά is rendered by ‫ܢ‬熏‫ ܗܢ‬煟q ‫ܢ‬熏‫( ܗܢ‬Eis. Syr.i 9.12 f. and
18.6). The same translation is also offered by Athanasius of Balad.

(e) ‫ ܕ̣ܗܘ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܐ‬and ‫ܐ ܕ̣ܗܝ‬煟q‫‘ ܐ‬whatsoever’, ‘whichever’, and so on (indefinite

pronouns).

Various indefinite pronouns are construed in Sergius’ texts with a combination

of an interrogative followed by the particle ‫ ܕ‬and a personal pronoun in the sin-
gular. The following forms are at least attested in Sergius: ‫ ܕ̣ܗܘ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫( ܐ‬mask.)16
and ‫ܐ ܕ̣ܗܝ‬煟q‫( ܐ‬fem.)17 for ‘whatsoever’, ‘whichever’, and the plural form 爯q‫ܠ‬q‫ܐ‬
‫ ܕ̣ܗܘ‬is found in his Commentary (L.35vb24/P.44v9 and L.39ra13f.,b31 f./P.48r15,
v11).18 Other indefinite markers that occur are: ‫ ܕ̣ܗܘ‬爯qq‫‘ ܐ‬howsoever’, ‘in any
way whatever’19 (at §86 and at L.50ra8/P.92r4f., while ‫ ܕ̣ܗܘ‬焏‫ܢ‬qq‫ ܐ‬at § 85

16 In Sergius’Introduction (at § 7, 27, 44, 52, 67, 72, 73, 92, 100, and 106). In Sergius’ Commentary
(L.36ra6/P.44v18) and in his adaptation of Alexander’s On the Principles of the Universe
(130.24).
17 In the Introduction (at § 24, 83, 102, and 104) and Commentary (P.9v21, L.45va19,b29 /P.85r1,
19, and L.49rb37 f./P.91r13).
18 The feminine plural ‫ ܕ̣ܗܝ‬爯q‫ܠ‬q‫ ܐ‬occurs in for example Simeon of Beth Arsham’s letter on
the martyrs of Najran, at 511.2, as edited by Ignazio Guidi, “La lettera di Simeone vescovo
di Bêth-Arśâm sopra i martiri omeriti”, Atti della Reale Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei,
Serie Terza: Memorie della Classe di Scienze morali, storiche e filologiche 7 (1881), pp. 471–
515.
19 Strangely enough, the first Syriac version of Porphyry’s Eisagoge has ‫ܐ ܕ̣ܗܝ‬煟q‫( ܐ‬at 18.13)
for the Greek ὁπωσοῦν (at Eis. 8.9), which is accurately changed to ‫ ܕ̣ܗܘ‬爯qq‫ ܐ‬by Athana-
sius of Balad in his revision. At any rate, both Syriac versions have ‫ ܕ̣ܗܘ‬爯qq‫ ܐ‬for the Greek
πως (at Eis. 1.21, 9.22/Eis.Syr.i 2.15, 22.7). This expression is also found in Sergius’ On the
Influence of the Moon (焿‫ܩܒ‬/123.6).
80 chapter 5

is used for ‘in some way’). Again, we find ‫ ܕ̣ܗܘ‬焏‫ܡ‬q for ‘how many soever’
(at §11, 15 and at L.18ra30f.,37/P.69v11 and L.18ra36f.). In Sergius’ Commentary,
we have also ‫ܝ ܕ̣ܗܘ‬r‫‘ ܐܡ‬whenever’ (L.36vb32 f. /P.45v17) and 焏‫ܢ‬rq‫ܡ ܐ‬煟‫ܡ‬
‫‘ ܕ̣ܗܘ‬something else whatsoever’, (P.53r3). Compare to the ‫ܢ ܕ̣ܗܘ‬熏‫‘ ܡ‬anything
whatsoever’ in Sokoloff (2009: 778 “any”). Cf. especially Nöldeke § 353.
An interesting record of some of these indefinite pronouns is found in the
Greek and Syriac versions of Dionysius Thrax’s Grammar (ιβʹ/12.85 f. no. 13,
ed. Lallot): ἀόριστον δέ ἐστι τὸ τῷ ἐρωτηματικῷ ἐναντίως λεγόμενον, οἷον ὅστις
ὁποῖος ὁπόσος ὁπηλίκος20 焏‫ܠܢ‬焏r‫ ܡ‬爏‫ܩܒ‬熏‫ܘܗܝ ̇ܗܘ ܕܠ‬rq‫ ܐ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܡܢ‬qr‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܠ‬
.‫ ܕ̣ܗܘ‬爯qq‫ ܐ‬.‫ ܕ̣ܗܘ‬焏‫ܡ‬q .‫ ܕ̣ܗܘ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܐ‬.‫ ܕ̣ܗܘ‬爯‫ ̇ܗܘ ܕܡ‬qq‫܉ ܐ‬r‫ܐܡ‬r‫( ܡ‬57.21–23,
ed. Merx). In addition to those indefinites found in Sergius’ texts, we have here
‫ ܕ̣ܗܘ‬爯‫‘ ̇ܡ‬whosoever’.

(f) 煿‫ ܘܠ‬煿‫ ܡܢ‬or 煿̇‫ ܘܠ‬煿̇‫‘ ܡܢ‬by itself’, ‘of itself’, ‘in its own right’ (§ 88).

This expression which is inflected after number and gender occurs once in
Sergius’ Introduction, but several times in his Commentary21 and is equivalent
to the Greek καθ᾽ αὑτό (cf. Arist. Cat. 5b4,8,9,21, and 31).

(g) 焏‫ … ܐܠ‬爯‫( ܐܦ‬also 焏‫‘ )ܐܦ ܐܢ … ܐܠ‬even though … still’, ‘even if … yet’
(concessive conditional clauses).

A quite frequent conditional clause that Sergius construes is that whose prota-
sis begins with 爯‫‘ ܐܦ‬even if/even though’ and the apodosis has 焏‫‘ ܐܠ‬yet/still’
(see § 37, 57, 63, 72, 78, and 104). The apodosis is sometimes negated and is given
as 焏‫ ܠ‬焏‫ ܐܠ‬or 熏‫ ܠ‬焏‫ܐܠ‬. In the first Syriac translation of Porphyry’s Eisagoge
(2.25) the Greek εἰ καὶ … ἀλλ’ οὐ is rendered by 焏‫ ܠ‬焏‫ … ܐܠ‬爯‫( ܐܦ‬Eis.Syr.i 5.5 f.,
cf. also Eis. 3.6–8/Eis.Syr.i 6.3–5). For this kind of concessive conditional sen-
tence, see esp. Nöldeke §374e.

(h) ‫ ܗܝ‬焏‫ܥ‬q煟q \ ‫ ܗܝ‬焏q‫‘ ܐܢ … ܓܠ‬if …, (then) it is obvious’, (conditional

clauses).

20 In the English translation of Kemp (1987: 179 no. 13): “An indefinite noun is one which
conveys an opposite sense to that of the interrogative, for instance ‘whoever, whatever
sort, however much, however great’.” And he has a note (1987: 187 n. 18): “‘Opposite’ as
lacking the specificity of the interrogative, which requires a definite answer.”
21 See among other at L.14rb21/P.34v25, L.15vra31f./P.36r23, L.33va30/P.42r12, L.34rb20/
P.43r1f., L.41vb6/P.77v3, L.45rb7/P.84v6, and L.47rb14f./P.88r17.
sergius’ two texts on categories 81

Another frequent conditional clause is that which is construed of a protasis

that has various forms of ‘if’ and is resolved by a conclusion that has 焏q‫ܓܠ‬
‫(‘ ܗܝ‬then) it is obvious’ or ‫ ܗܝ‬焏‫ܥ‬q煟q ‘(then) it is clear’ as its apodosis. See the
following variants:

‫ ܗܝ‬焏q‫ … ܓܠ‬rq‫§( ܐܢ ܓ‬77).

‫ ܗܝ‬焏q‫ … ܓܠ‬熏‫§( ܐܠ‬68).
‫ ܗܝ‬焏‫ܥ‬q煟q … 爏qq‫§( ܐܢ ܗ‬68).
‫ ܗܝ‬焏‫ܥ‬q煟q … rq‫ܘ ܓ‬煿̣‫§( ܐܢ‬40, 47, 52, 73).
‫ ܗܝ‬焏‫ܥ‬q煟q … 爯q煟‫§( ܐܢ‬26, 49, 51).
‫ ܗܝ‬焏‫ܥ‬q煟q … rq‫§( ܐܢܓ‬47, 69, 70).

To be compared with the following instance in Aristotle’s Categories:

Cat. (13a25–27): ἐὰν δὲ ἅπαξ κἂν μικρὰν ἐπίδοσιν λάβῃ, φανερὸν ὅτι ἢ τελείως
ἂν μεταβάλοι ἢ πάνυ πολλὴν ἂν ἐπίδοσιν λάβοι.22

Anon. Syr. (156.11f.): 焏q‫܉ ܓܠ‬焯‫ ܢܣ‬焏qr熏r 爏q‫ ܘܩܠ‬爯‫ܐ ܙܒ‬煟q 爯q‫ܐܢ ܕ‬
.焏qr熏r q‫ ܣܓ‬煟q 牯‫ܠ‬qrr‫ ܢ‬rq焏q‫ܡܠ‬r‫ܕܡ‬

Jacob (295.21–23): 焏‫ܥ‬q煟q ‫܉‬焯‫ܪܐ ܢܣ‬熏‫ ܙܥ‬焏qr熏r 爯‫ ܐܦ‬爯‫ܐ ܙܒ‬煟q 爯q煟‫ܐܢ‬

‫ܐ‬焏q‫ ܣܓ‬焏qr熏r q‫ ܣܓ‬煟q ‫ ܐܘ‬牯‫ܠ‬qrr‫ ܢ‬rqq rq焏q‫ܡܠ‬r‫ܗܝ ܕܐܘ ܡ‬
̇
.焯‫ܢܣ‬
̇
George (39.17–19): ‫܉‬焯‫ܬܐ ܢܣ‬熏qqr‫ ܡ‬爏q‫ ܩܠ‬爯‫ ܐܦ‬爯‫ܐ ܙܒ‬煟q‫ ܕ‬爯q‫ܘ ܕ‬煿݂‫ܐܢ‬
‫ܬܐ‬焏q‫ܬܐ ܣ̈ܓ‬熏̈qqr‫ ܐܘ ܡ‬牯‫ܠ‬qrr‫ ܢ‬rq焏q‫ܡܠ‬r‫ ܗܝ ܕܐܘ ܡ‬焏q‫ܓܠ‬
̇
.q‫ ܣܓ‬焯‫ܢܣ‬

Compare also Cat. (8b12f.) with Anon. Syr. (132.28), Jacob (279.9f.), and George
(28.1f.).

(i) Future perfect: ‘shall have seen’.

In Sergius’ text there is also an interesting case of a verb in the perfect tense
used to express a conditional event in the future, what is called future perfect,
as described by Nöldeke (§258). The perfect form of the verb is followed by a

22 Ackrill’s trans.: “And if he once made even a little progress it is clear that he might either
change completely or make really great progress.”
82 chapter 5

̇
participle here (at §7): 煿‫ܗܕܢ‬熏‫ ܒܥ‬煿̇r‫ ܐܦ ܐܕ‬焯‫ ܢܣ‬爯q煟q‫ ܗ‬.r‫̇ܗ ܐܢ‬熟q‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܡ‬
‘when someone shall have seen it [i.e. the object], then he receives its form in
his memory too’.

(j) ‫ ܕ‬焏‫‘ ܡ‬if’ (§41).

Another case is concerned with the temporal conjunction ‫ ܕ‬焏‫‘ ܡ‬when’, here
denoting ‘if’, and followed by a verb in the imperfect to form a conditional
clause. Nöldeke (§258, 377) has described such temporal conditional clauses
only with the perfect.

(k) Use of negation

Note also the negation at §36: ‫ ܐܦ‬焏‫ܕ … ܐܠ‬熏q‫ ܒܠ‬熏‫‘ ܠ‬not only … but also’
(cf. Nöldeke §328b). As well as the use of 熏‫ ܐܠ‬with a negation to express an
impossible condition of events, as at §98: ⟨‫ܘܗܝ ⟩ܗ̣ܘܐ‬rq‫ ܐ‬熏‫ ܬܘܒ ܐܠ‬焏‫ܘܠ‬
‫ܚ ܗ̣ܘܐ‬r‫‘ ̇ܦ‬not even if he [i.e. Socrates] ⟨were⟩ present would he fly’ (cf. Nöldeke
§375).

(l) The preposition ‫ ܕ‬煟q‫( ܒ‬at §50)

Notice again the causal use of the preposition ‫ ܕ‬煟q‫ ܒ‬at § 50: 爯q‫ܕܥ‬熏r‫ ܕܡ‬煟q‫ܒ‬
爯q煿‫‘ ܠ‬by signifying them [i.e. the primary substances]’, which is briefly describ-
ed by Nöldeke (§360a).

(m) ‫ܗܝ‬熏‫ܓܠ‬r 爯q‫‘ ܕܬܪܬ‬two-footed’ (adjectival formation of nouns).

A peculiar formation of adjectives from nouns is found in Sergius’ texts. It con-

sists usually of an ordinal (a cardinal prefixed with ‫ )ܕ‬followed by a noun suf-
fixed with the possessive pronouns. We have three times ‫ܗܝ‬熏‫ܓܠ‬r 爯q‫‘ ܕܬܪܬ‬two-
footed’ and once 爯q煿q‫ܓܠ‬r 爯q‫( ܕܬܪܬ‬at §55 and 59). Two comparable exam-
ples are found in Sergius’ Commentary (L.20ra16/P.59r29): ‫ܗܝ‬熏‫ܡ‬q̈‫ܐ ܩ‬r‫ܕܬܠ‬
‘three-dimensional’ (see textual note to 136.15/B.94r18f.) and (L.48vb23/P.90v1):
‫ܘܢ‬煿q‫ܓܠ‬r 爏q‫‘ ܩܠ‬swift/fleet-footed’.23 The forms ‫ܗܝ‬熏‫ܓܠ‬r 爯q‫ܬ‬r‫‘ ܕܬ‬two-footed’
(24.18,26, 27.2f.) and 煿̇q‫ܓܠ‬r r‫‘ ܕܐܪܒܥ‬four-footed’ (12.27) are found in Paul
the Persian’s Treatise on the Logic of Aristotle as well, and what appears to be

23
̈
The expression ‫ܘܢ‬煿q‫ܐ ܓܦ‬rr‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܦ‬r‫‘ ܣ‬six-winged seraphs’ is found in prayer books of
the Syriac Orthodox Church.
sergius’ two texts on categories 83

the abstract form of the former, being ‫ܗܝ‬熏‫ܓܠ‬r 爯q煿q‫ܬ‬r‫‘ ܕܬ‬two-footedness’

(26.17,18). However, in his text other variants occur too, such as 焏‫ܓܠ‬r 爯q‫ܬ‬r‫ܕܬ‬
‘two-footed’ (24.25, 27.8), 焏‫ܓܠ‬r r‫‘ ܐܪܒܥ‬four-footed’ (25.15,16), and ‫ܬ‬熏‫ܥ‬q‫ܕܪܒ‬
焏‫ܓܠ‬r ‘four-footedness’ (8.5). What we have here is an adjective followed by a
suffixed noun. This feature was probably more common in ancient texts, but
later on became repressed by other standardized forms.
In some older texts, these kind of expressions are paralleled by substantives
in apposition that are joined to proper names, such as ‫ܗ‬r‫ܡ‬qq̈‫ ܕ‬爟qr‫ܝ ܐܦ‬r‫ܡ‬
‘Mar Ephrem the Wise’ and 煿‫ܢ‬熏q‫ܢ ܕܐܣ‬熏‫ܡܥ‬r 焏‫ܒܢ‬熏q ‘The Blessed Simeon
the Stylite’ (Chronicon Edessenum 5.7f. and 8.9f., in Chronica Minora i, ed. & tr.
Guidi 1903).

(n) A serial verb construction opening with 牯‫ܣ‬熏‫ √( ܡ‬ysp) ‘continue to …’

(lit. ‘to increase, to do more’).

The verb 爯‫ܢ‬q‫ܣܦ‬熏‫ ܡ‬with the meaning ‘we continue to …’ occurs three times,
where it twice (§21 and 62) introduces a verbal form in the infinitive that it
governs and once (§90) is syndetically followed by another active participle.

5.5 The Manuscript of Sergius’ Introduction

To our knowledge, Sergius’ Introduction to Aristotle and his Categories has sur-
vived only in a single manuscript, now preserved at The Berlin State Library.
The manuscript has been described by Sachau (1899: 321–335) in detail in
his catalogue of the Syriac mss of that library and its history and acquisi-
tion by Kellermann (1965: 8–12, non vidi, cited in Brock 2014: 102f. n. 19). Brief
manuscript description:

B Berlin, Petermann i 9 (Sachau Syr. no. 88), Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin.

Number of folios: 238ff. (a few folios are missing from the beginning and the
end; there are also a few other gaps inside it). Sergius’ text is at fol. 83v–
104r24 and is complete.

24 Fol. 86–90 are in disorder, the correct sequence being: 83v–85, 87, 86, 89, 88, 90–104.
Already Hoffmann (1869: 216) had observed this disorder. He included some of the vocab-
ulary of Sergius’ Introduction in his ‘Glossary’ (pp. 154–216), where Sergius is stated with
just an S (= Sergi archiatri Resaenensis commentatio de categoriis, as specified at p. 216).
84 chapter 5

Provenance: unknown.
Date: 1259/1260 ad (as indicated at f. 36r and f. 112r, where the Seleucid era
year of 1571 is given: 焏‫ܥ‬.‫ܩ‬.‫ܬ‬.‫)ܐ‬.
Script: East Syriac.
Scribe: Unidentified.
Size: 26,5 × 17,5cm.
Format: Bound.
Material: Paper (has become brittle, especially the later part of the manu-
script, fol. 180r–238v, is heavily damaged, either because of moisture or
strong heat).25
Text shape: Undivided, except for fol. 8v–36r which have two columns.
Line number: For Sergius’ text, between 29 and 37 lines.
Vocalization and punctuation: The Syriac text is generally unvocalized, apart
from some scanty vowels, the dots of quššāyā and rukkāḵā and some other
diacritic marks. Also the Arabic texts are without vowels. However, its
punctuation is extensive and according to Sachau in line with that of older
manuscripts.26

Contents: The manuscript is a collection of texts in philosophy (logic), grammar,

and theology, mostly in Syriac, but a few also in Arabic (sometimes Garshuni).
Thus, it is a compilation of texts by various writers, but Sachau (1899: 334)
believes that it was copied by one single scribe in spite of some striking dif-
ferences in the preservation of the paper and the divergent contents. He says
that the various pieces of texts were possibly written at different times and
not with equal care. The numbers of all quires seem to have been written by
the same hand, even if the name or place of residence of the scribe is not
specified. However, two owners of the manuscript are recorded. At f. 126v we
have (in Sachau 1899: 334f.): 焏‫ܢ‬q̈qq 焏‫ܬܐ ܡܠ‬熏‫ܠ‬q‫ ܕܡܠ‬焏‫ ܗܢ‬焏‫ܒ‬rq‫ ܠ‬焏‫ܩܢ‬
⟨焏‫⟩ܦ‬熏‫ܐ ܐܦܣܩ‬煿‫ܒ ܐܠ‬煿q ‫ܝ‬r‫ܢ ܡ‬熏‫ܗܝ ܕܐܒ‬熏q‫ ܐ‬爯q煟‫ ܓܠܠ‬r‫ܥ ܒ‬熏rqr‫ܣܒ‬

25 According to a restoration report put at the end of the manuscript by Hans Heiland, the
commissioned book restorer, it was repaired and restored in 1961. It is said that about
100 leaves were taped with a large number glassine slips and many of the remaining
leaves were lobed and glued over at the edges. All 239 leaves were separately cleaned and
removed from the oxidized iron. Two new sheets were added at the beginning and the
end, as well as a new calf leather used as jacket cover. The original leather book-cover and
spine was then again wrapped on.
26 Digital pictures of the entire manuscript are now available at Digitalisierte Sammlungen
der Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin (http://resolver.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/
SBB0000144400000005).
sergius’ two texts on categories 85

煿q‫ ܐܦ‬r‫ܢ‬r‫ ܒ‬r‫ܠܡ‬熏‫‘ ܕܓ‬The full of sins, Sabrisho bar Galaldin [Saḇrīšoʿ bar
Gallaldīn], brother of Father Mar Yaballaha [Mār Y(h)aḇallāhā] bishop of Gul-
mar, purchased this book of logic in the year 1825 (= 1514)’,27 and on the left
side of one of the end leaves without text we have (f. 239r): 焏‫ܒ‬rq ‫ܘܗܝ‬rq‫ܐ‬
焏‫ ܡܡ‬焏q‫ ܡܢ‬r‫ ܒ‬焏‫ܩ‬q‫ܘܠ‬r‫ܢ ܩ‬熏‫ܡܥ‬r ‫ܝ‬r‫ܬܐ ܕܡ‬熏‫ܠ‬q‫ ܕܡܠ‬焏‫‘ ܗܢ‬this book of
logic belongs to Mar Shemon the Catholicos, the son of the late Mama’. This
mentioned Shemon was the Catholicos of the Church of the East from 1539
to 1558, who is titled ‫ܒ‬煿q‫ܥ‬熏rq 焏q‫ܥ‬q‫ܒ‬r ‫ܢ‬熏‫ܡܥ‬r Šemʿon Šǝḇīʿāyā Īšoʿy(h)aḇ
‘Shemon vii Ishoyab’, and is buried in the monastery of Rabban Hormizd
(near Alqosh).28 According to a notice at f. 4r the manuscript was once in
the possession of San Pietro in Montorio (Lat. Sancti Petri in Monte Aureo) in
Rome.
What is provided here is a brief list of the texts brought together in the
manuscript, many of them very short. For a more detailed description, the
account of Sachau should be consulted.29 The texts of the manuscript are as
follows:

– A chart of some logical terms (no. 3 in Sachau).

– The end of an incomplete East Syrian prayer (no. 4).
– Porphyry’s Eisagoge in the translation of Athanasius of Balad (no. 5).30
– A Syriac grammar by Yoḥannan bar Zoʿbi (and some other minor grammat-
ical pieces), (no. 6).
– The rules of accents and explanation of their names by Elias of Tirhan (no. 7,
8).31

27 Wilmshurst (2000: 148): “Before the fourteenth century the Berwārī region, sometimes
called Julmar (probably after the town of Julamerk) or Beṯ Tannūrā (the name of a large
Jewish village in the Beduh valley) in Syriac colophons, was part of the diocese of Dāsen.
Nothing is known of the region’s history in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, but a
diocese of Berwārī is mentioned in a manuscript of 1514 [sic!] by the scribe Sabrīshōʿ bar
Galalin [sic!], ‘brother of the bishop Yahballāhā of Julmar’.” Sabrisho bar Galaldin is the
scribe of only this colophon and not the manuscript, except its purchaser, and the date of
1514 is not that of the composition of the manuscript, but its purchase.
28 On him, see Wilmshurst (2000: 21 f. passim), as also specified in the index at p. 835 for
Shemʿōn vii Īshōʿyahb.
29 There is also a list of the philosophical texts of this manuscript in Hugonnard-Roche (2004:
91f.).
30 Partial edition (up to 4.20) by Aron Freimann, Die Isagoge des Porphyrius in den syrischen
Uebersetzungen, Diss., (Berlin: H. Itzkowski, 1897), pp. 27–32.
31 Edited by Adalbert Merx, Historia artis grammaticae apud Syros, (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus,
1889), pp. 194–200.
86 chapter 5

– Another tract on Syriac accents (no. 9).32

– Explanation of some Greek words (no. 10).
– A treatise by Joseph/Ishoyab bar Malkon, on dots (no. 11).
– A recipe in Arabic for a preparation with quince as aid for good digestion (or
against constipation), (no. 12).
– A chapter of an Arabic grammar attributed to Mubārak ibn Muḥammad ibn
Yaʿqūb al-Naḥwī (no. 13).
– A speech in Arabic about the transience of everything and of death (no. 14).
– Prayers in Syriac for the deceased (no. 15).
– An unnamed Arabic translation of Porphyry’s Eisagoge (no. 16).
– Fragments of an anonymous Arabic translation of Aristotle’s On Interpreta-
tion (no. 17).33
– Severus Sebokht’s discussion on three questions: the first question relates to
the third chapter of On Interpretation, second question to the Prior Analytics
and its relations to Aristotle’s other writings, and the third question to the
meaning of the Greek term schêma ‘figure’ at the end of chapter 7 of Prior
Analytics. The text with the discussion on the last question was thought by
Sachau to be identical with A Scholion on the Term ‘schema’ attributed to
Sergius, which I above argue to be spurious (no. 18).
– An anonymous scholion on Aristotle’s Categories (no. 19).34
– A scholion by Eusebius of Alexandria on Aristotle’s Categories (no. 20).35
– Sergius of Reshaina’s Memra on Aristotle’s Categories, edited here and enti-
tled Introduction to Aristotle and his Categories (no. 21).
– An anonymous translation of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics 1,7 (no. 22).36
– An anonymous translation of Aristotle’s On Interpretation (no. 23).37
– The commentary of Proba to On Interpretation (no. 24).38

32 Also edited by Adalbert Merx, Historia artis grammaticae apud Syros, (Leipzig: F.A. Brock-
haus, 1889), pp. 189–194.
33 Edited by Hoffmann (1869: 55–61).
34 Edited by Giuseppe Furlani, “Contributi alla storia della filosofia greca in Oriente. Testi
siriaci, i”, Rendiconti della Reale Accademia dei Lincei, Ser. 5, Vol. 23 (1914), pp. 154–175, at
167–175.
35 Edited by Giuseppe Furlani, “Uno scolio d’Eusebio d’Alessandria alle Categorie d’Aristotele
in versione siriaca”, Rivista trimestrale di studi filosofici e religiosi 3:1 (1922), pp. 1–14.
36 Partial edition (up to 25b23) by Isidor Friedmann, Aristoteles’ Analytica bei den Syrern,
Diss., (Berlin: H. Itzkowski, 1898).
37 Edited by Hoffmann (1869: 23–55).
38 Also edited by Hoffmann (1869: 62–90).
sergius’ two texts on categories 87

– An Arabic translation by Ibn al-Ṭayyib from a Syriac version of the Pseudo-

Aristotelian On Virtue (no. 25).39
– An Arabic text about the unity of God (no. 26).
– A short text on the seven eyes of God with which he watches the entire world
(no. 27).
– Letter in Arabic by Ishoyab (i.e. Joseph bar Malkon) in defense of the “Nesto-
rian” church (no. 28).
– Anonymous texts in Syriac (a little piece also in Arabic) on the true faith of
the church (no. 29).
– Various minor texts on grammar, philosophy and other topics by Dawid bar
Paulus (no. 30).
– Text by the monk Henanisho against Isaiah of Tahal and against the Chal-
cedonians (no. 31).
– Notice by Ishobokht on the term ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬q̈犏‫ܡ‬r‫‘ ܡ‬possibilities’ (no. 32).
– Anonymous elucidation of difficult passages in On Interpretation (no. 33).
– The so called Liber definitionum, which gives explanations of various philo-
sophical and theological definitions. For some time it was attributed to
Michael Badoqa (also called Bazud/Bazwad and Abzud/Abzwad), but this
attribution is now proven false and its author remains unknown (no. 34).40
– The Syriac grammar of Elias of Tirhan (no. 35).41
– An anonymous tract on Syriac accents (no. 36).42
– An anonymous tract on the birth of Christ trying to prove the Nestorian
doctrine on two persons and two natures (no. 37).
– An astrological tract in Arabic on the 30 days of the month attributed to Jafar
al-Sadiq ( Jaʿfar aṣ-Ṣādiq), (no. 38).

As shown by this list, the manuscript contains diverse philosophical texts, espe-
cially the first part of Aristotle’s Organon, but also of grammar and theology, and
a few other brief tracts.

39 Edited by Mechthild Kellermann, Ein pseudoaristotelischer Traktat über die Tugend: Edi-
tion und Übersetzung der arabischen Fassungen des Abū Qurra und des Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, Diss.,
(Erlangen-Nürnberg, 1965).
40 Edited by Giuseppe Furlani, “ ‘Il libro delle definizioni e divisioni’ di Michele l’Interprete”,
Atti della Reale Accademia dei Lincei. Memorie della classe di Scienze Morali, Storiche e
Filologiche, ser. 6, vol. 2:1 (1926), pp. 17–99; and see Hein (1985: 36).
41 Edited by Friedrich Baethgen, 焏qq‫ܪ‬熏‫ ܣ‬焏‫ ܬܘܪܨ ܡܡܠܠ‬oder Syrische Grammatik des Mar
Elias von Tirhan, (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1880).
42 Edited by Adalbert Merx, Historia artis grammaticae apud Syros, (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus,
1889), pp. 183–189.
88 chapter 5

5.6 Concluding Remarks

Sergius of Reshaina was a physician and philosopher whose intellectual activity

was centred on three disciplines of the Greek tradition, namely the medicine
of Galen, the philosophy of Aristotle, and the Platonising theology of Pseudo-
Dionysius. Sergius was also influenced by the books of Evagrius of Pontus and,
according to Pseudo-Zachariah Rhetor, those of Origen. His Introduction to
Aristotle and Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories present the same discussions
and ideas that were taught in the Alexandrian school by, above all, Ammonius
and found in the texts of the Greek commentators that directly or indirectly
were dependent on his teaching. Sergius should simply be counted among
Ammonius’ pupils, who operated within another cultural setting and com-
posed his writings in Syriac instead of Greek. The fact that most of his work
has remained unedited has constituted an obstacle which prevented his texts
from being taken into consideration and analyzed in studies on the Alexan-
drian philosophical tradition. The inaccessible state of Sergius’ philosophical
texts explains why he has been overlooked and has not yet received due atten-
tion and recognition.
Since Sergius received his education in an environment where oral teaching
dominated and the lectures of the professors were later written down by their
students, Sergius constitutes a further witness to the teaching of Ammonius,
whose lectures he most likely attended. The fact that in Sergius’ books we
find formulations and discussions, which in the Greek texts are found only
in the writings of later philosophers like Olympiodorus and Elias, support this
assumption. Such attestations indicate that certain ideas and topics of exegesis
had an earlier tradition and that Sergius’ writings will form another source
for more accurately reconstructing these ideas and ascribing them to their
first authors. The correspondences of passages in the writings of Sergius with
commentators such as Olympiodorus and Elias will prove useful not only in
assigning this common material to the teaching of Ammonius, but also insofar
as it shows to what extent these ideas were already found in authors whose
texts were used in the Alexandrian curriculum, authors such as Alexander and
Porphyry. A more systematic comparison that takes its starting point in Sergius’
Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories will in a clearer way depict the history of
some ideas as prevalent in the Greek tradition of Alexandria.
At least in one respect, Sergius deviates from the Greek tradition and makes
his contribution somehow original. He seems to give preference to Aristotle
over Plato and introduces a Christian Aristotelian tradition, which becomes
prevalent for a long time both in the Syriac and Arabic domains. Also, more
than in any of his contemporary and near-contemporary colleagues, Sergius
sergius’ two texts on categories 89

combined in his person the profession of being a physician and philosopher at

the same time. As such, he both composed original works but also functioned
as a translator of important texts in these two disciplines. The juxtaposition of
these two professions in one person turned out to become a very characteristic
feature of the subsequent scholars operating in the Arabic setting, who were
both court physicians and translators.43 We ought not to forget that Sergius
himself is called an archiatros ‘chief physician’, though the context for his activ-
ity as a medical doctor is not known to us. Another salient feature that has
its background in Sergius’ preoccupation is the great interest in Aristotle and
Galen that both the Syriac and Arabic traditions display. Sergius’ two main
subjects, Aristotle’s logic and Galen’s medicine became the two predominant
fields of research among Syriac and Arabic scholars. Logic, considered to be a
hermeneutic instrument, was chosen for its utility for the mind in the interpre-
tations of all kinds of books, and medicine for its utility in the healing of bodies.
Also the interest in the Pseudo-Dionysian corpus and the writings of Evagrius
may partly be ascribed to Sergius’ efforts and ambitions, at the expense of Plato
and his writings in their pagan raiment. A special study investigating Sergius’
legacy will surely reveal his very conspicuous significance to the later Syriac and
Arabic traditions of medicine and Aristotle. Especially, in Arabic literature we
may expect to find more testimonies relating to Sergius and his achievements.
He was certainly considered to be an important writer and translator, and evi-
dently some of his medical translations, including the introductory sections,
were translated into Arabic from Syriac, as is proven by the recent discovery of
an Arabic version of his introduction to Galen’s Commentary to Hippocrates’ On
Nutriment and the testimony of Ibn Abi Usaibia that a certain Musa ibn Khalid
translated into Arabic Sergius’ Syriac translations of Galen. It is not unlikely
that some of his original writings were also translated into Arabic. In Syriac, his
translations were certainly used, but also underwent revisions according the
requirements of later periods’ desire for more literal translations. A new termi-
nology, or at least, the need for a more up-to-date word-formation praxis is also
a major factor here.
Sergius’ efforts in the Syriac language in the East have been aptly compared
to those of Boethius in Latin in the West (by among others Peters 1968: 58
and Hugonnard-Roche 2004: 79f.). In contrast to Boethius’ approach, Sergius
expresses his preference to expound and comment upon all the works of Aristo-
tle, rather than translating them. However, also Boethius wrote commentaries
in addition to the few translations he managed to perform before his execution.

43 Note that the Arabic ‫( حكيم‬ḥakīm) can mean both ‘philosopher’ and ‘physician’.
90 chapter 5

Sergius’ method of commenting without translating can partly be explained by

his pedagogical and religious aims and partly by his wish to transmit not only
the works of Aristotle, but also the interpretations and proposed solutions of
other commentators. Some difficult passages and ideas in Aristotle’s thinking
required special elucidation, since they were apparently obscurely expressed
and potentially open to dispute. He may also have hoped to contribute some
of his own original thoughts and interpretations. Furthermore, he says that he
does not want to restrict himself only to what Aristotle has written in the Cat-
egories, but wishes to clarify and explain his ideas (L.50vb25–38/P.93r21–v3).
Evidently, he was planning to go beyond the preparatory works of medicine
too. And since he designed his works to be suitable for use in an educational
setting, the chosen method of presentation enabled him to adapt the mate-
rial to the audience it was meant for. At a couple of places in his Commentary
on Aristotle’s Categories (L.37ra8–18/P.45v23–27), Sergius says that he will not
only present the doctrine of Aristotle clearly, but also interpret his thought with
demonstrations.
 chapter 6

Editorial Principles

The text edited and presented here is that of the Berlin, Petermann i 9 (Sachau,
no. 88) manuscript (B = Berlin) of Sergius’ treatise, here renamed Introduction
to Aristotle and his Categories. This is a critical edition which to some extent
aims to reconstruct Sergius’ original text from the available evidence. The pri-
mary authority of the single Berlin manuscript has been acknowledged and its
readings have been kept, except where they are clearly faulty. The reason why
a modified diplomatic edition is not provided here is that many passages of
Sergius’ Introduction are paralleled in his Commentary on the Categories. Since
the former is most likely an epitome of the latter, it seemed to justify emen-
dations and supplementations to Sergius’ text, whenever the reading of the
manuscript has appeared defective. Thus, changes in the text of the Berlin
manuscript have only been introduced when its readings are obviously erro-
neous or some words are clearly missing, judging from grammar or contents, or
whether for some other reason, as for example through homoioteleuton (as at
§72, 74, and 94). The emendations and additions are made mainly from literal
or very literal corresponding passages of his longer commentary. These addi-
tions and changes are based on British Library Additional 14658 (L = London)
and Bibliothèque nationale de France Syr. 354 (P = Paris) of the Commentary
and have always been recorded in the critical apparatus. When the reading of
B appears good and acceptable, it has usually been kept even if that of L or P
is better. The decision to use readings from another work, although by Sergius,
in order to establish the text of present edition may seem controversial and
unconventional, but since the goal is to present an accurate version of Sergius’
text as restored from scribal mistakes, rather than to give the recension of a
specific manuscript, this approach may serve the reader better.
For this edition the punctuation of the manuscript is maintained, but is
reduced and slightly changed where the dots were obviously making a break
in a phrase.
The text of the manuscript is not vocalized, except some words which are
vocalized according to East Syriac system and all these vowels have been
removed. The vocalization of a few words (at § 40, 49, 67, and 107) is not
accurate, or at least not conventional, and the vocalized form of these words
has been given in the critical apparatus.
The emendations are given in the main text and the readings of B are given
in the apparatus without a siglum. Readings from L and P are specified with
folio and line numbers.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2016 | doi: 10.1163/9789004325142_007

92 chapter 6

Errors corrected by the scribe himself in the text above or below the words
or in the margin are not indicated, especially if such corrections are in accor-
dance with the reading of L and P and no other reasons call for comment.
Furthermore, the few deletions made by me from the reading of manuscript
are enclosed with square bracket ([…]) and placed in the critical apparatus,
and not kept in the main text, as it is more customarily done. They are at § 43,
49, 62, 67, 72, 74, 75, and 96.
In many places, the ms lacks the plural points for verbs in the feminine
plural. I have supplied these points without marking this omission more than
once, namely at the first instance at §1 (B.83v9), where it has ‫ܪܢ‬煟‫ܡܥ‬. However
when the two dots marking the plural form of nouns (so called sǝyāmē/焏‫ܡ‬q̈‫)ܣ‬
are missing, I have indicated this.
Scribal abbreviations are expanded and this is indicated in the critical appa-
ratus, except for the very frequent abbreviation in the ms, namely ‫ ܗ‬for 熏‫ܗܢ‬
爯q‫‘( ܕ‬that is’), which is indicated only at its first occurrence (at § 3).
Only the uncommon or unexpected solid writings are separated and written
in two or more words, and this is indicated in the critical apparatus.

Sigla for the Manuscripts

B Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Petermann i 9, (Sachau, no. 88) of the Introduction.

L London, British Library Additional 14658 of the Commentary.
P Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, ms Syr 354 of the Commentary.

Signs Used in the Edited and Translated Text

⟨…⟩ Additions supplied by the editor.

] Separates emendations put in the main text from the readings of B.
[ ] Encloses deletions, applies only to the edition part, which are put in the critical
apparatus.
editorial principles 93

Some Latin Abbreviations and Terms Used in the Critical

Apparatus

comm. commentarii ‘notes’, ‘annotations’ (textual notes and not the commen-
taries on the contents).
em./emend. emendavi ‘I have emended’, usually on the basis of L and P.
exp. expunxit ‘he (the scribe) has deleted/erased’.
possis ‘you could’, that is, consider this tentative conjecture.
suppl. supplevi ‘I have supplied’ from L and P, unless otherwise stated.
vd. vide ‘see’!
vid. videtur ‘seems’ to be.
 ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫‪Text and Translation of Sergius’ Introduction to‬‬

‫‪Aristotle and His Categories‬‬

‫‪83v5‬‬ ‫ܬܘܒ ܡ‪焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܐ ܕܐܡ‪ rq‬ܠܣ‪r‬ܓ‪ 爿q‬ܐܪ‪rqqq‬ܘܣ ܪ‪rq‬ܥ‪q‬ܢ‪焏q‬‬

‫ܥ‪ 爏‬ܩ‪q‬ܓ‪熏qr‬ܣ ܕܐܪܣ‪q熏q‬ܠ‪ 爿q‬ܦ‪q‬ܠܣ‪熏‬ܦ‪焏‬܉ ܡ‪r‬ܢ ܥ‪煟‬ܪ‪q‬ܢ‪.q‬‬

‫‪§1‬‬ ‫ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܗ‪ 爏qq‬ܕܐܬ‪ rq熟q‬ܠ‪ 爯‬ܐ̃ܘ ܐ‪熏q‬ܢ ܦ‪q‬ܠ‪r‬ܐ̇ܘܣ܆ ܕ‪ 焯q‬ܐ‪̣ 煿̇qrq‬ܡ‪爯‬‬
‫ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕ‪ 爯qr̈q‬ܘ‪rqrq‬ܐ‪ rq‬ܡܥ‪r煟‬ܢ ܠ‪煟q‬ܥ‪r‬ܐ ܘ‪熏q‬ܠܦܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ̇ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕܒ‪爏qq‬‬
‫ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܥ‪ 爏‬ܕܘܪ‪ 焏r‬ܕ‪熏q‬ܠ̈ܦܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܦ‪q‬ܠܣ‪熏‬ܦ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܕܒ‪焏‬ܘܡܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܡܠ‪q‬ܠ‪r‬ܐ‪̇ .‬ܗܝ‬ ‫‪5‬‬
‫ܕܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܠ‪̈煿‬ܘܢ‪ 焏‬ܘܣ̈‪q熏‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܕܦ‪q‬ܠܣ‪熏‬ܦ‪熏‬ܬܐ‪ :‬ܥ‪ 爟‬ܩܢ̈‪熏‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܘܦ‪熏‬ܠ̈ܓ‪ 焏‬ܘ‪̈qq‬ܣ‪焏‬‬
‫ܕܐܘܡܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܢ‪q‬ܢ‪ r‬ܠ‪ q‬ܒ‪rqrq‬ܐ ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܡ‪ 焏qqr‬ܥܠ‪ 煿̇q‬ܥ‪ 爏‬ܗܕܐ‪.‬‬

‫‪§2‬‬ ‫ܗ‪ 焏r‬ܗܐ ܐܬܬܙ‪q‬ܥܢ‪焏r 煟q 爯‬ܠ‪q‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܡܢ‪ q‬ܘ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܐ‪q‬ܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܐ‪熏q‬ܬܟ‪ .‬ܕ̇ܗܘ‬
‫ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܕ‪q‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܡܒ‪犏‬ܪ‪q‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܐܢ‪r‬ܘܢ ܬܡܠܠ‪熏‬ܢ‪ .‬ܘܐܢ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܠܒ‪̣ r‬ܡ‪qq 爯‬ܣ‪焏‬‬
‫ܐܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܐܢ‪r‬ܘܢ ܬܬܪܨܘܢ‪ 煟q .‬ܠ‪ 熏‬ܠ‪熏‬ܬ ̇ܗܝ ܕܬܥ‪煟‬ܠ‪熏‬ܢ ܒܡܠ‪r‬ܐ ܪܗ‪rqq‬ܘܢ‪.‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬
‫ܐܠ‪rqrq 焏‬ܐ‪ rq‬ܠ‪熏‬ܬ ̇ܗܝ ܕܡܥ‪煟‬ܪܐ ܠܓ‪熏‬ܐ ܡ‪qr‬ܦ‪rqq‬ܘܢ‪ .‬ܘܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܡܢ‪煿‬‬
‫ܕ‪熏r‬ܪ‪ 焏q‬ܕܡܠ‪r‬ܢ ܠ‪熏‬ܬܟ ‪rq‬ܒܢ‪ 爯‬ܒ‪煟‬ܡܦܣ‪q‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܕܡܥ‪ 煟‬ܗ̣ܘ ܣ‪q‬ܢ‪̇ :焏‬ܗܘ ܣܢ‪焏‬ܐ‬
‫ܕ‪熏q‬ܬܪܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܓ‪熏‬ܐ܇ ܕܐܡ‪r‬ܝ ܕܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܕܥ‪熏‬ܕܪܢ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪熏‬ܢ‪ 焏q‬ܡܣ‪r‬ܥ‪.r‬‬
‫ܙ̇ܩ‪ r‬ܠ‪焏‬ܢ̈‪ 爯qr‬ܕܢ‪r‬ܬܥ‪rq‬ܘܢ ܒ‪q‬ܣܡ‪焏‬܇ ܘ‪煟q 煟q‬ܥ‪ 爯q‬ܠ̣‪ 煿‬ܠ‪rr‬ܪ̇ܗ ܕܡܠ‪r‬ܐ‬
‫ܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ̇‪ 煿‬ܩ‪q‬ܡ‪ .爯q‬ܘ‪q‬ܠ‪ 牯‬ܕܢܒܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܘܢ‪r‬ܒܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܒ‪熏q‬ܒ‪ 焏‬ܣ‪q‬ܦ‪ 爯q‬ܘܡܣ‪qr‬ܦ‪爯q‬‬ ‫‪15‬‬
‫ܒ‪q‬ܣܡ‪ .焏‬ܘ‪ 煟q‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܥ‪煟‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪煿‬ܪ‪ 焏q‬ܣ̈ܦܩ‪ .爯‬ܡ‪r‬ܦܢ‪q‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܠ‪ 爯‬ܥ‪ 爏‬ܢ‪焏rq‬‬
‫ܕ‪熏r‬ܪ‪ 焏q‬ܕܡܠ‪r‬ܢ ܡ‪ 爯‬ܗܐ ܡ‪.焏q‬‬

‫ܥܠܩ‪q‬ܓ‪熏qr‬ܣ ‪2‬‬ ‫ܡܥ‪煟‬ܪܢ ‪4‬‬ ‫ܕܒ‪焏‬ܘܡ ‪5‬‬

‫‪© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2016 | doi: 10.1163/9789004325142_008‬‬

 The Memra spoken by Sergius, the chief physician of Reshaina, on
the Categories of Aristotle the Philosopher. Our Lord help me!

[Preface]

Because it has appeared to us, O our brother Philotheos, that (something) §1

good comes out of these things that are useful and to a greater extent
help in knowledge and learning those who are concerned with the study
of philosophical sciences in the art of logic, (namely) that which relates to
the meanings and understandings of philosophy, together with the rules,
divisions, and arrangements of the art (of logic). We will (therefore) gather
for you as briefly as possible (material) concerning this subject.

Now, see how terrified we are when asking you and those who are like you, §2
to speak what we reduce, and to correct it if we say something out of place,
not by rushing to find fault in a discourse that you complain of, but rather by
encouraging what is in general helpful. We have written this for you at the
beginning of our discourse, as we are convinced that Satan, the enemy of the
common good, whenever something is done that is to the general benefit, is
accustomed to goad some people to be stirred up with envy, and though they
recognize the truth of the speech they rise against it. And instead of edifying
and being edified in love they throw themselves and get overthrown into
envy. Since this (that we have said) is enough for now, let us turn henceforth
to the aim of the beginning of our discourse.
 ‫‪96‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫‪§3‬‬ ‫ܐܡ‪ 爯qr‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܐ‪q‬ܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܒ‪qq‬ܡ‪r‬ܐ ܥ‪qq 爏‬ܡ‪r‬ܐ ܡܠܠ‪熏‬܆ ܕܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪̇ rq‬ܡ‪爯‬‬
‫̣ܗܝ ܦ‪q‬ܠܣ‪熏‬ܦ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܡ‪r‬ܦܠܓ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪r‬ܪܬ‪ 爯q‬ܡܢ̈‪熏‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܗܢ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܠ‪r‬ܐܘܪ‪焏q‬‬
‫ܥ‪r‬ܐ‬ ‫ܘܠܣܥ‪熏‬ܪܘܬܐ‪ .‬ܐܦ ܗܝ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܬܘܒ ܬܐܘܪ‪ 焏q‬ܡ‪r‬ܦܠܓ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪̈ 煟q‬‬
‫̈‬ ‫̣̈‬
‫ܕܐܠ‪rq̈煿‬ܐ ܘܠܡܠܠ‪熏‬ܬ ‪qq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܘܠ‪熏q‬ܠܦܢ‪ .焏‬ܗܢ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕܡ‪rq‬ܘܬܐ‪ .‬ܘܕܡܢ‪熏q‬ܬܐ‪.‬‬
‫ܘܕܐܣ‪rq‬ܘܢ‪熏‬ܡ‪ .焏q‬ܘܕܡ‪熏‬ܣ‪q‬ܩ‪r‬ܘܬܐ‪ .‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ ܐܦ ܣܥ‪熏‬ܪܘܬܐ‬ ‫‪5‬‬
‫ܡ‪r‬ܦܠܓ‪ 焏‬ܠܡ‪煟‬ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܕܓ‪熏‬ܐ ܕ‪q‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܥܡ‪ .焏‬ܘܠܡ‪煟‬ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܕܒ‪rq‬ܗ‬
‫ܕܐܢ‪ .r‬ܘܠܡ‪煟‬ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܕܩܢ‪熏‬ܡ‪ 煿‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕܘܗܝ‪̇⟩ 爏q .‬ܡ‪ ⟨爯‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܕ̇ܣܥ‪ r‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܕ‪焯q‬‬
‫̇‬
‫ܐܘ ܕܒ‪ .rq‬ܐܘ ܒ‪q‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܥܡ‪ 煿‬ܘܒܡ‪q煟‬ܢ‪r‬ܗ ܣܥ‪ .r‬ܐܘ ܒܒ‪rq‬ܗ ܐܘ ܢܦ‪.煿r‬‬
‫‪84r‬‬ ‫ܐܘ ‪̇ 煟q‬ܣ‪焏‬ܡ ܢܡ̈‪熏‬ܣ‪̈q 焏‬ܒ‪ | 焏‬ܐܘ ̈ܒ‪ 焏rq‬ܘܡ‪r‬ܢ‪ .爯qrq‬ܐܘ ‪ 煟q‬ܣ‪焏‬ܡ ܘܠ‪焏‬‬
‫̇‬
‫ܡ‪r‬ܢ‪ 爏q .爯qrq‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܢܡ‪熏‬ܣ‪q 焏‬ܒ‪ 焏‬ܐܘ ܒ‪ 焏rq‬ܒܡ‪q煟‬ܢ‪r‬ܗ ܐܢ‪̇ r‬ܣ‪焏‬ܡ‪ .‬ܐܘ‬ ‫‪10‬‬
‫ܒܒ‪rq‬ܗ ܐܘ ܒܩܢ‪熏‬ܡ‪ .煿‬ܘ‪ 爏q‬ܕܠܩܢ‪熏‬ܡ‪ 煿‬ܠ‪ 爟qq̇ 焏‬ܕܢ‪ 爿q݁q‬ܒܣ‪ 爟q‬ܢܡ̈‪熏‬ܣ‪焏‬܉‬
‫ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܠܒ‪rq‬ܗ‪ .‬ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܠܡ‪q煟‬ܢ‪r‬ܗ ‪煟q‬ܥ ܕܢ‪r‬ܪܨ‪̇ .‬ܗܘ ܓ‪ rq‬ܕ̇ܣ‪焏‬ܡ ܢܡ̈‪熏‬ܣ‪焏‬܆ ܒ‪熟‬ܒ‪爯‬‬
‫ܐ‪ qq‬ܣ̇‪焏‬ܡ ܢܡ̈‪熏‬ܣ‪ 焏‬ܙܕܩ ܠ‪ 煿‬ܕܢ‪煿‬ܘܐ‪ .‬ܘܒ‪熟‬ܒ‪ 爯‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܕ̇‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܘܬܒ‪熏‬ܥ‪ 焏‬ܕܥܒ‪r‬ܝ‬
‫̈‬
‫ܢܡ‪熏‬ܣ‪熏‬ܗܝ‪.‬‬

‫‪§4‬‬ ‫ܘ‪⟩ 煟q‬ܗܠ‪ ⟨爯q‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ rqqܹ 焏‬ܩܢ‪熏‬ܢ‪̈ rq焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܦܠܓ‪爯‬܉ ܬܘܒ ܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ‬ ‫‪15‬‬
‫ܒ‪煟q焏‬ܐ ܒ‪煟q焏‬ܐ ܩ‪r‬ܒ‪q‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܘܣ‪q‬ܡ‪q‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܒ‪qq‬ܣ̇‪ 煿‬ܕܐܘܡܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܡܠ‪q‬ܠ‪r‬ܐ‪.‬‬
‫ܘܐ̇ܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪̣ 爯‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܒ‪r‬ܪ ܦ‪熏‬ܠܓ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪q‬ܠ̇‪ 煿‬ܕܦ‪q‬ܠܣ‪熏‬ܦ‪熏‬ܬܐ܉ ܕ‪q‬ܠ‪ 爯q煿‬ܐ‪q‬ܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܦ̈‪爯qqr‬‬
‫ܒܥܠܡ‪焏‬܉ ܐܘ ̈ܒܢ‪̈ r‬ܩܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪ 爯q煿qrq‬ܐܘ ‪r‬ܥ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܡ‪熏r‬ܕܥ‪ 爯q‬ܠ‪̈犏‬ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ‬
‫ܥ‪̈ .爯‬ܒܢ‪̈ r‬ܩܠ‪̇ 焏‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܦ̈‪rqqr‬ܐ܉ ܐ‪r qq‬ܡ‪焏‬‬‫ܕܒܥܠܡ‪ 焏‬ܐܘ ܨ̈ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܕܡ‪̈ 煟qr‬‬
‫ܘ‪熏q‬ܢ‪ 焏q‬ܕ‪煟q 爏q‬ܐ ܡܢ‪ 爯q煿‬ܕܨ̈ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܐܢ‪ r‬ܢ‪焏‬ܡ‪ r‬ܣ‪熏‬ܩ‪ 爿qqr‬ܐܘ‬ ‫‪20‬‬
‫ܦܠ‪熏q‬ܢ‪ .‬ܐܘ ܐܢ‪ r‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪̣ 焏‬ܡ‪̈ 爯‬ܒܢ‪q‬ܢ‪r .焏r‬ܥ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕܡ‪熏r‬ܕܥ‪ 爯q‬ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ‬
‫̇ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕܥ‪煟q 爏q 爏‬ܐ ‪煟q‬ܐ ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܨ̈ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܡ‪r‬ܪܥ‪q‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܘܩܢ‪q‬ܢ‪ .爯‬ܨ̈ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ‬
‫ܥ‪ 爯‬ܐ‪爯q煿qrq‬܉ ܐ‪焏q qq‬ܦ‪ 焏‬ܘܩ‪q‬ܣ‪ 焏‬ܘ‪焏qrr‬‬ ‫ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܦ̈‪rqqr‬ܐ ܕܡ‪̈ 煟qr‬‬
‫ܕܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ‪.‬‬

‫‪§5‬‬ ‫̈ܒܢ‪̈ r‬ܩܠ‪̇ 焏‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܠ‪qq 熏‬ܢ‪ rq焏‬ܐ‪ 爯q煿qrq‬ܒܥܠܡ‪ .焏‬ܘܐܦ‪qq 爯‬ܢ‪ rq焏‬ܐ‪爯qrq‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬
‫̈ܡܠ‪q‬ܠ‪ .焏‬ܘܐܢ‪ 爯q煟‬ܠ‪焏‬܉ ܒ‪ 爏q‬ܥܡ̈ܡ‪̇ 爯q‬ܗܢ‪̇ 煟q 爯q‬ܗܢ‪ 爯q‬ܡ‪̈r‬ܡܠܠ‪ 爯‬ܘܡ‪r‬ܩ‪爯qr‬‬
‫̈ܗܘܝ‪ .‬ܨ̈ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܕ‪qq 爯q‬ܢ‪ rq焏‬ܐ‪ 爯q煿qrq‬ܒܥܠܡ‪ .焏‬ܘܡ‪ 爏q‬ܗܢ‪ 爏q 焏‬ܐ‪焏qq‬‬

‫ܗ ]ܗܢ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪2 爯q‬‬ ‫ܐܦ̣‪3 爯q煟q煿‬‬ ‫‪7 suppl. ex P.6v6‬‬ ‫‪; em. ex P.6v7‬ܥܡ‪8 焏‬‬ ‫‪15 add.‬‬ ‫‪17‬‬
‫ܕܦ‪熏‬ܠܣ‪熏‬ܦ‪熏‬ܬܐ‬
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 97

[Division of philosophy]

Those, who in wisdom have spoken about wisdom, say firstly that philoso- §3
phy is divided into two parts, that is into theory and practice. Again, theory in
turn is divided into theology [i.e. metaphysics], into science of natural things
[i.e. physics], and into mathematical sciences, that is geometry, arithmetic,
astronomy, and music. In the same way, also practice is divided into general
government of a whole people, into the government of someone’s house-
hold, and into the government of the individual person. For everyone who
does something that is good or bad, he does that either to his entire people
and to his city, or to his own household, or to himself. Irrespective of whether
he institutes good or bad laws and they are kept, or whether he institutes
them and they are not kept. For a person institutes every good or bad law in
his city, in his household or in his own person, and whoever is not capable
of disposing his person by legislation, neither knows to direct his household,
nor his city. For the one who institutes laws needs sometimes to be like a
legislator, and sometimes like a judge and a punisher of those who break his
laws.

[Simple things]

As ⟨these things⟩ are in this way regularly divided, we further approach the §4
other things one by one and put them into the order of the art of logic. After
the division of philosophy, we say that all things that are simple in the world
are either words or concepts that signify the objects that are in the world,
or objects that are perceived. The simple words are such as a (proper) name
and an appellation of every single object, as someone would say: ‘Socrates’
or ‘Plato’, or some other person among men. And concepts that signify are
those that we think about with regard to each and every one of the objects
and we possess. And the simple objects that are perceived are like ‘a stone’
and ‘a log’, and the rest of such things.

(Appellative) words do not by nature exist in the world, although we are by §5

nature rational,1 otherwise the same (words) would be spoken and uttered
among all peoples. Objects, however, exist by nature in the world, and

1 That is, we are endowed with speech and reason and are holders of words/concepts, see
also the last section of the commentary to § 36.
 ‫‪98‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫ܕܬܐܙܠ‪ .‬ܗܝ ܨܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܐ‪ 煿̇qrq‬ܐ‪ 煿̇qrq‬ܒ‪qq‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܐܦ ‪r‬ܥ‪q‬ܢ‪焏‬‬

‫ܕܩܢ‪q‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܥܠ‪ 爯q煿q‬ܕܨ̈ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ‪qq‬ܢ‪ rq焏‬ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ‪ .‬ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕ‪q‬ܠ‪̈ 爯‬ܒܢ‪q‬ܢ‪qq 焏r‬ܢ‪rq焏‬‬
‫ܡܠ‪q‬ܠ‪.焏‬‬‫ܐ‪̈ 爯qrq‬‬

‫‪§6‬‬ ‫‪ 焏r‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕ‪q‬ܠ̇‪ 煿‬ܕܡܠ‪r‬ܐ ܕܓ‪熏‬ܐ ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ ܐܪܒܥ‪ .焏‬ܗܢ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܦܩ‪熏‬ܕܐ‪.‬‬ ‫ܐܕ ̈‬
‫̇‬
‫ܡ‪犏‬ܠ‪q‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܡ‪焏r‬ܠܢ‪ .焏‬ܦܣ‪熏‬ܩ‪ ..焏‬ܦܩ‪熏‬ܕܐ ܡ‪爯‬܉ ܐ‪qq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܐܢ‪ r‬ܢ‪焏‬ܡ‪r‬‬ ‫‪5‬‬
‫ܡ‪r‬ܠ‪ rq焏q‬ܠ̇ܡ‪ 爯‬ܕܡ‪r‬ܥܒ‪ 煟‬ܠ‪ .煿‬ܕܙܠ ܣܥ‪熏‬ܪ ܣ‪熏‬ܥ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܦܠ‪ .爯‬ܡ‪犏‬ܠ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪爯q‬܉‬
‫ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܐܢ‪ r‬ܕܢܩ‪熏‬ܡ ܒ‪rqr‬ܦ‪r‬ܐ ܕܢ‪焏r‬ܠ ܣ‪熏‬ܥ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ‪ .‬ܡ‪焏r‬ܠܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪爯q‬܉‬
‫ܐ‪̇ qq‬ܗܝ ܕܢ‪焏r‬ܠ ܐܢ‪ r‬ܠ‪q‬ܒ‪r‬ܗ‪ .‬ܕܡ‪ 爯‬ܐ‪ 焏qq‬ܐܬܐ ܐܢ‪ r‬ܘܠ‪ 焏qq焏‬ܐܙܠ‬
‫ܐܢ‪ .r‬ܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕܐܪܒܥ‪ 焏‬ܘܐ‪⟩ 焏qrq‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ⟨ ̇ܗܘ ܕ̇ܦܣ‪ .犟‬ܐ‪qq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܐܢ‪r‬‬
‫ܢ‪焏‬ܡ‪ .r‬ܕ‪ 爏q‬ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏r‬ܕ‪ qq‬ܢ‪r‬ܡ‪r‬ܐ ܐ‪ rq‬ܒ‪ .煿‬ܐܘ ܕ‪ 爏q‬ܢܦ‪ 焏r‬ܡܠ‪q‬ܠ‪r‬ܐ ܠ‪焏‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬
‫ܡ‪熏q‬ܬܬܐ ܐ‪ .煿̇qrq‬ܥ‪ 爏‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܬܠ‪r‬ܐ ܐܕ̈‪ 焏r‬ܩ‪̈煟‬ܡ‪ 焏q‬ܕܡܠ‪r‬ܐ܉ ܠ‪焏‬‬
‫̈‬
‫ܡܥܩܒ‪ 爯q‬ܦ‪q‬ܠܣ‪熏‬ܦ‪ .焏‬ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܡܡ‪r‬ܘܡ ܡ‪熏r‬ܕܥ‪rr 爯q‬ܪܐ ܐܘ ܕܓܠ‪熏‬ܬܐ‪.‬‬

‫‪§7‬‬ ‫ܘ‪ 煟q‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܐܕ̈‪ 焏r‬ܕܡܠ‪r‬ܐ ܐܘܡܢ‪ rq焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܦܠܓ‪爯q‬܉ ܘܐܦ ̇ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܐܕ̈‪焏r‬‬
‫‪84v‬‬ ‫ܘܓ̈ܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪q‬ܠ‪ 爯q煿‬ܕܨ̈ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܡ‪r‬ܦܠܓ‪ .爯q‬ܕܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ | ܡܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܒ‪r‬ܘ‪焏q‬܉‬
‫ܘܡ‪r‬ܩ‪ 爯qr‬ܦ̈‪ 焏qqr‬ܘܩ‪̈煟‬ܡ‪ .焏q‬ܘܡܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܒ‪煿‬ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ܉ ܘܡ‪rr‬ܡ‪爯q煿‬‬ ‫‪15‬‬
‫̈ܗܘܠܢ‪ 焏q‬ܘ̈‪qq‬ܢ‪ .焏q‬ܘܡܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܒ‪r‬ܪܥ‪rq‬ܐ ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ܉ ܘܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪ 爯q‬ܐ‪焏qrq‬‬
‫ܘ‪r‬ܥ‪q‬ܢ‪ .焏q‬ܘ̇ܗܢ‪ 爯q‬ܐܠܦ‪ 熏‬ܥ‪ 爏‬ܐܕ̈‪ 焏r‬ܘܓ̈ܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܦܠ‪熏q‬ܢ ܥ‪焏qrr 爟‬‬
‫ܕ̇ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܐܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪ 煟q 焏q‬ܐܡ‪ .爯qr‬ܕ‪ 爏q‬ܨܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܐ‪煟q‬ܐ ܕ‪qq‬ܢ‪ rq焏‬ܐ‪煿̇qrq‬‬
‫ܒܥܠܡ‪ .焏‬ܐ‪ rq‬ܠ̇‪ 煿‬ܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܕܩܢ‪熏‬ܡ̇‪煿‬܉ ܘܩܢ‪ 焏q‬ܬܘܒ ܐܦ ܐܕ‪焏r‬‬
‫‪ r‬ܘܐܬ ݀‬
‫ܬ‬ ‫ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܒ‪r‬ܘ‪ .煿̇q‬ܕܐ‪ rq‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܩ‪q熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪rq‬ܗ‪ .‬ܕܒ‪ 煿‬ܐܬ‪q‬ܒܥ ݀‬ ‫‪20‬‬
‫̇‬
‫ܬܢ‪ 爯‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘ‪ .焏q‬ܘܬܘܒ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪̇熟q‬ܗ ܐܢ‪ .r‬ܗ‪ 爯q煟q‬ܢܣ‪ 焯‬ܐܦ ܐܕ‪ 煿̇r‬ܒܥ‪熏‬ܗܕܢ‪.煿‬‬
‫ܘ̇ܗܘܐ ܠ̇‪ 煿‬ܩ‪q熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܒ‪r‬ܪܥ‪rq‬ܗ‪ .‬ܐ‪qq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܢ‪̣ qqrr‬ܗܘ ܗܢ‪ 焏‬ܐܕ‪焏r‬‬
‫ܬܠ‪rq‬ܐ‪ .rq‬ܗܢ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܒ‪r‬ܘ‪ 焏q‬ܘܒ̇‪ 煿‬ܒ‪犏‬ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܘܒܥ‪熏‬ܗܕܢ‪ 煿‬ܕ̇ܗܘ ܕ‪̇熟q‬ܗ‪.‬‬
‫ܐܘ‪ 爟qq̇ rqq‬ܠ̇‪ .煿‬ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܕܐܡ‪ 爯qr‬ܕܢܓ‪r‬ܐ ܐܘ ܐܘܡܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪焏‬‬

‫ܕ‪q‬ܠ‪; em. ex L.4va17/P.19r22 9 suppl. ex L.7va2/P.23r17 14 爯q煿q‬ܐ‪] 爯q煿qrq‬ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ ‪2‬‬

‫‪ r‬ܘܐܬܸܬ ‖ )‪ (vd. comm.‬ܕܐ‪ rq‬ܠ̇‪ 煿‬ܩ‪q熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܵ‪̇rq‬ܗ‪ .‬ܕܒ̇‪(vd. comm.) 20 煿‬‬ ‫‪ (vd.‬ܐܬ‪q‬ܒܥ ܸ‬
‫)‪comm.‬‬
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 99

because of this wherever you go an object exists as it is to nature. In this way,

likewise the concepts that we possess of the objects exist by nature, because
all we human beings are by nature rational.

[The types of speech, and the forms and genera of objects]

The types2 of speech in general are four, namely imperative, precative, inter- §6
rogative, and declarative. Imperative is the way someone authoritatively tells
the one who is subject to him: “go and do a particular deed”. Precative is the
way someone in supplication sets about to ask for a certain deed. Interroga-
tive is like when someone asks another one: “wherefrom are you coming and
whither are you going?” The fourth and last type ⟨is⟩ the one that declares in
the way someone says: “every man who is alive has breath”, or “every ratio-
nal soul is immortal”. The philosophers do not inquire into these first three
types of speech, because they never signify truth or falsity.

As the types (ʾādšē) of speech in this way are divided according to the art (of §7
logic), so also are the forms (ʾādšē)3 and genera of the objects divided (in the
same way). Some of them [i.e. the forms] are with the Creator and are called
simple and primary, and some of them are in matter and are named material
and physical, and some of them are in mind and are designated last and
conceptual. In this way, Plato and the rest of those of the Academy taught
these things about forms and genera by saying: every object that naturally
exists in the world has a certain form of its own and possesses also a certain
form with its Creator, which [i.e. the form] has self-subsistence, through
which (the object) has been imprinted and come into being here (in this
world). And again, when someone shall have seen it, then he receives its form
in his memory too, and it obtains subsistence in his mind, so that this form is
found threefold, namely with the Creator, in the object, and in the memory
of the one who has seen it, that is to say, knows it. Just as they [i.e. the
Platonists] say that the carpenter or any other artisan, who at first imprints in

2 The Syriac word here is ʾādšā (焏r‫)ܐܕ‬, which is a pre-existing Greek loan word from eidos
(εἶδος) and in conformity with the underlying Greek it can mean both ‘species’, ‘form’ or
just ‘kind/sort/type/class’.
3 Since Sergius in this section is dealing with the Platonic forms and the Syriac ʾādšā
(焏r‫ )ܐܕ‬is representing both Greek concepts eidos (εἶδος) and idea (ἰδέα), I render it by
‘form’ here as also the Greek εἶδος is more often rendered by ‘form’ and not ‘species’ in such
contexts, see also the commentary to § 7.
 100 chapter 7

煿‫ ܡܢ‬爯q̈‫ܬܐ ܕ̇ܗܘ‬熏‫ ܕܨ̈ܒ‬焏‫ܡ‬qq̈‫ ܘܐܣ‬焏r̈‫ ܐܕ‬牟‫̇ܒ‬q rq‫ܡ‬煟‫ ܩ‬.‫ ܕ̣ܗܘ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܐ‬

‫ܪܗ‬r‫ ܒ‬焏‫ܢ‬rq‫ ܕܐܬܐ ܐ‬焏‫ ܘܡ‬.爯q煿‫ ܠ‬爯‫ܩ‬r‫ ܘܡ‬牯‫ ̇ܓܠ‬爯q‫ ܘ‬.‫ܗ‬rq‫ ܬܪܥ‬熏‫ܒܓ‬
q‫ ܘܠ̇ܒ‬煟q̇‫ ܘܐ‬.煿‫ܗܕܢ‬熏‫ܐ ܒܥ‬煟‫ܥܒ‬ ̈ ‫ܘܢ ܕ‬煿‫ ܡܢ‬爯q煿‫ ܠ‬焯‫ ܢ̇ܣ‬爯q煟q‫ ܗ‬.爯q‫ܐ ܐܢ‬熟q‫ܘ‬
爯q‫ ̇ܗܢ‬煟q 爯q‫ ܕ̇ܗܢ‬爯q‫ܐ ̈ܙܢ‬r‫ܠ‬r‫ ܒ‬爯q‫ ܗܠ‬爯qq̈rr‫ ܘܡ‬.‫ܗ‬rq‫ ܬܪܥ‬熏‫ ܒܓ‬爯q煿‫ܠ‬
煿‫ܗܕܢ‬熏‫ܐ܉ ܘܒܥ‬煟‫ܥܒ‬ ̈ ‫ܘܢ ܒ‬煿‫ ܘܒ‬.焏‫ܐ ܕܐܘܡܢ‬rq‫ܪܥ‬r‫ ܒ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬熏‫ ܗܢ‬.爯‫ܡ‬q̈‫ܡܩ‬ 5
.爯q煿‫ܐ ܠ‬熟q̇‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܢ‬rq‫ܕ̇ܗܘ ܐ‬

§8 rq焏qrq‫ ܐ‬q‫ ܐܬܪܥ‬:爏q 焏‫ܕܐ ܕܗܢ‬熏‫ ܘܥܒ‬焏‫ܡ‬qqq 焏q‫ܘ‬r‫ ܐܦ ̇ܗܘ ܒ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܗ‬

‫ܘ܉‬煿‫ ܢܒ‬焏qrq‫ ܐ‬爯‫ ܕ̣ܡ‬爯‫̇ܡ‬q‫ ܐ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܥ‬r ‫ܢ‬熏‫ܬܐ܉ ܘ̣ܗܢ‬熏‫ ܨ̈ܒ‬爯q‫ ܕܗܠ‬焏q‫ ܗܘ‬爏‫ܥ‬
⟨爯q煿‫ܠ‬q⟩ 爟q‫ ܘܐܩ‬牯‫ ܘܓܠ‬牟‫ܒ‬q 爯q‫ܠ‬煿‫ܘܢ ܒ‬煿‫ܗ܇ ܘܒ‬r‫ܥ‬rr‫ ܗܘܘ ܒ‬焏‫ܡ‬熏‫ܩܢ‬
̈
焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܥ‬r 爯q‫ܠ‬煿‫ܘܢ ܒ‬煿‫ ܒ‬.爟‫ܠ‬熏r 焏‫ ܘܕܠ‬爏qq煟‫܇ ܘܐܦ ܥ‬爯‫ ܕܬܢ‬爯q‫ܬܐ ܗܠ‬熏‫ܨ̈ܒ‬ 10
‫ ܘܬܘܒ‬.‫ܬܗ‬熏q‫ܘ‬r‫ܬܐ ܕܒ‬熏‫ܘܡܢ‬焏‫ ܒ‬qrqr‫ ܡ‬煟q ‫܇‬爏q 爯qq‫ ܨܐܪ ܘ̇ܡ‬焏q‫̈ܡ‬煟‫ܩ‬
‫ܐ܉‬rq̈‫ܢ‬qq ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫̈ܒ‬犏‫ ܠ‬爯q煿‫ ܠ‬爯‫ܢ‬q熟q .爯‫ ܙܒ‬爯‫ܒ‬熟‫ ܒ‬爯‫ܢ‬q‫ ܕܗܘ‬焏r‫ܢ‬q‫ ̈ܒܢ‬爯‫ܢ‬q
.爯q煿q‫ ܕܥܠ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܥ‬r 爯‫ܗܕܢ‬熏‫ ܥ‬熏‫ ܒܓ‬爯‫ܢ‬q 爯‫ܢ‬q‫ ܘ̇ܩܢ‬爯q‫ܗ‬r‫ܥ‬煟q ‫ܬ‬熏‫ ܠ‬爯‫ܢ‬q‫ܒ‬r‫ܩ‬r‫ܘܡ‬
‫ܘܢ‬煿qrq‫ ܐ‬rq焏‫ܡ‬熏‫ ܕܩܢ‬爯qr‫ܕܐ ܕܐܡ‬熏‫ܬ ܥܒ‬熏‫ ܕܠ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܥ‬r 爏qq‫ܢ ܗ‬熏‫ܢ‬煿̇‫ܠ‬
.‫ܘܢ‬煿qrq‫ ܕܐ‬爯qr‫ܬܐ ܐܡ‬熏‫ ܕܨ̈ܒ‬焏q‫ܡ‬ ̈ 煟‫ ܩ‬爯q煿qr̈‫ ܘܐܕ‬爯q煿q‫ܬܗ܉ ܓܢ̈ܣ‬熏‫ܠ‬ 15
‫܉‬焏‫ܢ‬qq‫ ܗܕܐ ܕ‬焏‫ܘܠ‬煿‫ ܒ‬爯‫ ܬܢ‬爯q‫ ܗܠ‬爯‫ ̣ܡ‬爯q‫ ܕ̇ܗܘ‬焏‫ ܘ̈ܓܠܦ‬焏‫̈ܒܥ‬q 爯q‫ܢ ܕ‬熏‫ܢ‬煿̇‫ܠ‬
̈
‫ܢ‬熏‫ܢ‬煿̇‫ ܘܠ‬.‫ܘܢ‬煿‫ ܠ‬爯q煿‫ܡ‬r‫ܬܐ⟨ ܡ‬熏‫ ⟩ܕܨ̈ܒ‬焏q‫ܢ‬qq̈ 焏r̈‫ ܬܘܒ ܘܐܕ‬焏‫ܓ̈ܢܣ‬
.爯q‫ܗ‬r‫ܥ‬煟q 爏‫ ܥ‬爯‫ܗܕܢ‬熏‫ ܥ‬熏‫ ܒܓ‬爯qr‫ܢ‬qr‫ܬܐ ܡ‬熏‫ ܕܨ̈ܒ‬爯q煿‫ ܕܡܢ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܥ‬r ‫ܬܘܒ‬
‫ܢ‬熏‫ ̇ܗܢ‬爏‫ ܕܥ‬爯q‫ ܘܗܠ‬.‫ܘܢ‬煿‫ ܠ‬爯qr‫ܬܐ ܩ‬熏‫ ܕܨ̈ܒ‬焏qrq‫ ܐ‬焏r̈‫ ܬܘܒ ܘܐܕ‬焏‫ܓ̈ܢܣ‬
̈
.爯‫ ܣܦܩ‬焏q‫ܪ‬煿‫ ܠ‬焏‫ܡ‬煟‫ܥ‬ 20

85r § 9 r‫ܡ⟨ ܕܐ̇ܡ‬煟‫ ⟩ܡ‬爯‫ܢ‬q‫ܡ‬q‫ | ܘܣ‬爯‫ܢ‬q‫ܦܢ‬r‫ ܡ‬爿q‫ܠ‬q熏q‫ ܐܪܣ‬爯‫ ܕ̣ܡ‬爯q‫ܬ ܗܠ‬熏‫ ܠ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬煟q
̈
:爯q‫ ܓܢܣ‬爿‫ ܓܢ‬爯q煿‫ܡ‬rr‫ܢ ܕܡ‬熏‫ ̇ܗܢ‬焏qrqr‫ ܘ‬焏q‫ܡ‬ ̈ 煟‫ ܩ‬焏‫ ܕܓ̈ܢܣ‬.爟qr‫ܘܡ‬
qqrr‫ ܕܢ‬焏q犏‫ ܡ‬焏‫ ܘܠ‬.爯q煿qrq‫ ܘܕܐ‬爯q̈‫ܬܐ ܕ̈ܗܘܝ ܘܕ̇ܗܘ‬熏‫ ܨ̈ܒ‬爯q煿‫ܠ‬q 爯qr‫̇ܒ‬q‫ܕ‬
̇
.焏q‫ ܐܘܣ‬:爯q‫ܘܢ ܗܠ‬煿qrq‫ܘܢ܉ ܐ‬煿‫ ܡܢ‬煟q rqq‫ ܬ‬爏‫ ܢܦ‬焏‫ܘܡ ܕܠ‬r‫ܡ ܡ‬煟‫ܡ‬
̇
.煟‫ ܕܥܒ‬.爟q‫ ܕܣ‬.rq‫ ܕܐ‬.‫ܝ‬r‫ ܐܡ‬.焏qq‫ ܐ‬.‫ܡ‬煟‫ܬ ܡ‬熏‫ ܕܠ‬.‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܢ‬q‫ ܐ‬.‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܡ‬q 25
.‫ܫ‬焏q‫ܕ‬

7 rq焏q‫ ;ܐܬ‬em. ex L.5va32/P.20v21 8 ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ ܨ̈ܒ‬爯q‫ ܕܗܠ‬焏q‫ ܗܘ‬爏‫( ܥ‬vd. comm.) ‖ 焏q‫;ܐܬ‬
em. ex L.5va35/P.20v23 9 suppl. ex L.5vb1/P.20v24 13 焏‫ܢ‬q‫ ;ܪܥ‬sǝyāmē suppl. ex
L.5vb13/P.21r4 15 爯q煿qr‫ ܘܐܕ‬爯q煿‫ ;ܓܢܣ‬em. et sǝyāmē suppl. ex P.21r6, (cf. L.5vb18) 16
焏‫̈ܦ‬q‫ ;ܘܓܠ‬em. ex L.5vb22/P.21r8 17 suppl. ex L.5vb25/P.21r9 21 vid. 爯‫ܢ‬q‫ ;ܣܡ‬em. et add.
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 101

his mind the forms and the figures of the objects that are being made by him,
and then carves and shapes them, and when someone else comes after him
and sees them [i.e. the objects], then he receives them from the crafts into his
memory and lays hold of and grasps them in his mind. And these (objects)
are found in three ways, whereby they subsist simultaneously, namely in the
mind of the artisan, in the crafts, and in the memory of the other one who
sees them.

In this way did also the wise Creator and Maker of the Universe think §8
essentially of the coming into being of these objects, and these notions
emanated as if from an essence, became suddenly realities, and through
them he imprinted, carved, and set up ⟨all⟩ these objects that are here
(in this world). Also still and without end he is forming and ordaining
everything through these primary thoughts, as he conducts the art of his
creatorship. Even we human beings, who from time to time come into
being, see physical objects and acquire knowledge of them and possess the
concepts of them in our memory. Therefore, concerning the thoughts with
the Maker, which they say are essentially with him, they consider them to be
the primary genera and forms of objects. And they name those imprints and
carvings, which come into being from these (thoughts) here in this matter of
physical things, the physical genera and forms ⟨of objects⟩. And again, they
call those concepts, which accumulate from objects in our memory by the
acquaintance of them, the last genera and forms of objects. These (words)
about those things are enough so far.

[Aristotle’s ten categories]

We turn to the (words) of Aristotle and present ⟨what⟩ he says and defines. §9
The primary and main genera that are named the most generic genera,4
which contain all the objects that have come into being, are coming into
being and (already) exist, and it is impossible that something will ever be
found which does not fall under one of them, are these: substance, quantity,
quality, toward something, where, when, having, placed, doing, (and) being-
affected.5

4 Literally ‘the genus of genera’, that is, ‘the most generic/general genera’.
5 The last seven categories are traditionally designated: relatives/relation, location/place,
time, habit/state, position/posture, action, and affection/passion.
 ‫‪102‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫‪§ 10‬‬ ‫ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕ‪rqrq‬ܐ‪ rq‬ܢ‪̈煿‬ܘ‪ 爯q‬ܦ‪q̈r‬ܩ‪ 爯‬ܘ̈ܓܠ‪ 爯q‬ܘ‪q̈煟q‬ܥ‪ 爯‬ܠܩ‪r‬ܘ‪ :焏q‬ܥ‪爏q 爏‬‬
‫‪煟q‬ܐ ܡܢ‪ 爯q煿‬ܬܘܒ ܥ‪q‬ܦ‪q‬ܢ‪ 煟q 爯‬ܐܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪ .爯‬ܕܐܘܣ‪̇ 焏q‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܒ‪q‬ܠ‪熟‬ܒ‪ 爯‬ܓܢܣ‪焏‬‬
‫ܐ‪ .煿̇qrq‬ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕܠ‪ rq‬ܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܠܒ‪ r‬ܡܢ̇‪ .煿‬ܘܒ‪煟‬ܓ‪熏‬ܢ ܓܢ‪ 爿‬ܓܢ̈ܣ‪爯q‬‬
‫ܡ‪rr‬ܡ‪煿‬ܐ‪ .‬ܘܣ‪熏‬ܣ‪ 焏q‬ܬܘܒ ܕܓ‪熏‬ܐ ܒ‪q‬ܠ‪熟‬ܒ‪ 爯‬ܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܗܘ‪ .‬ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕܠ‪rq‬‬
‫ܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܠܒ‪ r‬ܡܢ‪̇ .煿‬ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕܒܡ‪犏‬ܥ‪r‬ܐ ܕܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ ‪熏qq‬ܬܐ‬ ‫‪5‬‬
‫ܘܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܢܦ‪r‬ܢ‪焏‬܉ ܐܕ̈‪ 焏r‬ܘܓܢ̈ܣ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ ̣ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ‪̣ 煟q‬ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ‪ .‬ܐܠ‪焏‬‬
‫ܐܕ̈‪̇ 焏r‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܕ̇ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪煿q‬ܘܢ‪ .‬ܓܢ̈ܣ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕ̇ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕܒ‪r‬ܪܗܘܢ‪̣ .‬ܗܘ ܗ‪爏qq‬‬
‫ܗܢ‪ 焏‬ܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܕܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪ q‬ܘܪ‪qrq‬܉ ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕ‪̇q‬ܒ‪ r‬ܓܢ̈ܣ‪ 焏‬ܘܐܕ̈‪ 焏r‬ܣ̈ܓ‪焏q‬ܐ܉‬
‫̈‬
‫ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܒ‪r‬ܬ ܩܠ‪ 焏‬ܦ‪rqqr‬ܐ ܕܡ‪熏r‬ܕܥ‪ 焏‬ܨ̈ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܦ̈‪rqqr‬ܐ ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܡܢ‪.爯q‬‬
‫ܒ‪ 煟q‬ܪܥ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܦ‪ 焏qqr‬ܕܥ‪煟q 爏q 爏‬ܐ ‪煟q‬ܐ ܡܢ‪爯q煿‬܉ ܘܡ‪rr‬ܡ‪煿‬ܐ ܐܘܣ‪.焏q‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬

‫‪§ 11‬‬ ‫ܐ‪ rq‬ܬܘܒ ܨ̈ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ ܒܥܠܡ‪焏‬܉ ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܩ‪q熏‬ܡ‪ 爯q煿‬ܒ̇‪煿‬‬
‫ܒ‪焏‬ܘܣ‪焏q‬܉ ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܢ ܒܡ‪rq̈r熏‬ܐ ܘܒܡܢ̈‪q‬ܢ‪焏‬܉ ܐ‪qq‬ܢ‪rqqܹ 焏‬‬
‫ܕܡܥ‪q煟‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܠܡ‪焏‬ܡ‪ .r‬ܬܪܬ‪ 爯q‬ܐ̈ܡ‪ 焏‬ܘܬܠ‪ r‬ܐ̈ܡ‪ .焏‬ܘܦ‪ 焏qr‬ܬܘܒ ⟩‪ ⟨煟q‬ܐܘ‬
‫ܬܪ‪ .爯q‬ܘܙܒܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܥܣ‪r‬ܐ ‪ 爯qqrq‬ܐܘ ܕܥܣ‪r r‬ܢ̈‪ .爯q‬ܐܘ ܕ‪q‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ̣ܗܘ‪ .‬ܘ̇ܗܢ‪爯q‬‬
‫ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܘܕܐ‪ qq‬ܗܠ‪爯q‬܉ ܡ‪r̈qr‬ܒ‪ 爯‬ܬ‪ rqq‬ܓܢܣ‪̇ 焏‬ܗܘ ܕܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪q r‬ܡ‪熏q‬ܬܐ‪.‬‬ ‫‪15‬‬
‫‪q‬ܠ‪ 爯q煿‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܡ‪rq̈r熏‬ܐ ܘܡܢ̈‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܘ‪r̈熏q‬ܒܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܙ̈ܒܢ‪ 焏‬ܘܕ̈‪r‬ܢ‪q 焏q‬ܡ‪熏q‬ܬܐ‬
‫ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܡ‪熏r‬ܕܥ‪.爯q‬‬
‫̈‬ ‫̈‬
‫‪§ 12‬‬ ‫ܡ‪ 爯‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܬܪ‪ 爯q‬ܓܢܣ‪.爯q‬‬ ‫ܐ‪ rq‬ܬܘܒ ̈ܒܢ‪̈ r‬ܩܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ܉ ̈ܕܠ‪ rq‬ܐܢ‪̣ 爯q‬‬
‫̈‬
‫ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪q‬ܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܘܡ‪rqr‬ܘܬܐ ܘܓ‪熏‬ܢ‪q 焏‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܘܐܣ‪qq‬ܡ‪ .焏‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܓ‪rq‬‬
‫ܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܘܣ‪⟩ 焏q‬ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ⟨ ܘܠ‪q 焏‬ܡ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܡ‪熏r‬ܕܥ‪ .爯q‬ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕܐܦܠ‪焏‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬
‫̣ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܩܢ‪熏‬ܡ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܡ‪ 爯qqqr‬ܕܢ‪r‬ܩ‪q‬ܡ‪熏‬ܢ܇ ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܢ ܒ‪qq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪.焏‬‬
‫ܘܐܦܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪rq熏r‬ܐ ܕ‪q‬ܡ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܩܢ‪ .爯q‬ܕ̣ܗܢ‪ 爯q‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܘܕܐ‪ qq‬ܗܠ‪爯q‬܉ ܒ‪煟q‬‬
‫‪85v‬‬ ‫ܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܕܓ‪熏‬ܐ | ܡ‪ 爯qq̈rr‬ܘܡ‪̈rr‬ܡ‪煿‬ܢ ܦ‪熏‬ܐ‪ .爿qqq‬ܗܢ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܒ‪熟‬ܒ‪qq 爯‬ܠ‪焏‬‬
‫ܘܒ‪熟‬ܒ‪ 爯‬ܐ‪q‬ܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܩ‪ 爯qr‬ܠ‪.煿‬‬

‫‪§ 13‬‬ ‫ܡ‪qqqr‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܬܘܒ ̈ܒܢ‪̈ r‬ܩܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ܉ ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܢ̈ܦܠ‪ 爯‬ܬ‪̣ 煟q rqq‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܗܠ‪爯q‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬
‫⟩ܬܠ‪r‬ܐ⟨ ܓܢ̈ܣ‪ 焏‬ܕܐܬܐܡ‪r‬ܘ‪ .‬ܕ̣ܗܢ‪ 爯q‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܢܩ‪q‬ܦ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܩ̈ܢ‪ 爯q‬ܠ‪熏‬ܬ‬
‫̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ܉ ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪煟q 焏q犏‬ܐ ܡܢ‪ 爯q煿‬ܕܬܬܪܢ‪ 焏‬ܒܠܥ‪̇ 煟‬ܗܝ ܐ‪rq‬ܬܐ܉ ܐ‪爯q煿qrq‬‬
‫ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܗܠ‪爯q‬܉ ܒ‪熟‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪̇ 爯q‬ܗܘ ܕܡ‪r‬ܡ‪q煿‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܒ‪ 煿‬ܒ‪r‬ܐ ܘܐܒ‪焏‬܇ ܘܥ̣ܒ‪煟‬ܐ ܘܡ‪r‬ܐ‪.‬‬
‫ܘܥ‪焏‬ܦ‪ 焏‬ܘܦܠܓ‪ .焏‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܒ‪r‬ܐ ܡ‪r‬ܪܢ‪ 焏‬ܒܠܥ‪ 煟‬ܐܒ‪焏‬܇ ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܥ̣ܒ‪煟‬ܐ ܕܠ‪焏‬‬
‫ܡ‪r‬ܐ܇ ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܥ‪焏‬ܦ‪ 焏‬ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܦܠܓ‪ .焏‬ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ ܐܒ‪ 焏‬ܐܘ ܡ‪r‬ܐ ܐܘ ܥ‪焏‬ܦ‪焏‬‬ ‫‪30‬‬

‫ܡ‪q‬ܠ‪1 爯q煟‬‬ ‫‪; em. ex P.25v3 (cf. L.7ra22) 13‬ܕܡ‪熏‬ܕܥ‪ (vd. comm.) 9 焏‬ܕܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪ q‬ܘܪ‪8 qrq‬‬
‫‪; em. ex P.26r23 20 suppl.‬ܡ‪熏r‬ܕܥ‪; sǝyāmē suppl. ‖ suppl. ex P.26r17 17 爯‬ܘܬܠ‪ r‬ܐܡ‪焏‬‬
‫̈‬
‫‪ (vd. comm.) 26 suppl. ex P.26v14‬ܐ‪q‬ܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ ‪ 24‬ܒ‪qq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ex P.26v4 21 P.26v7: 焏‬‬
‫‪; em. ex L.8ra1–3/P.26v19‬ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܥ̣ܒ‪煟‬ܐ ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܐ܇ ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܥ‪焏‬ܦ‪ 焏‬ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܦܠܓ‪29–30 焏‬‬
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 103

In order that they will be more clear, obvious, and known to the reader § 10
we return to each of them by saying: substance is always a genus, because
there is no other genus separate from it, and that is why it is named the
most generic genus. ‘Horse in general’ is always a species (ʾādšā), because
there is no other species separate from it. And those in between [i.e. the
intermediates/subaltern genera], which are ‘animal’ and ‘animate body’, are
species and genera at the same time. On the one hand, they are species of
those that are before them, on the other hand, genera of those that are after
them. Therefore, this genus that is primary and main, because it contains
many genera and species, is a simple word that signifies a countless number
of simple objects by a simple concept of each and every one of them, and it
is named substance.

There are also other objects in the world, whose subsistence (qūyāmā) is in a § 11
substance (ʾūsīyaʾ), and which are said with measures and with numbers. In
the way we are wont to say: two cubits and three cubits, and again ⟨one⟩ span
or two, a period of ten months or of ten years or how many soever. These and
the like are reckoned to the genus that is called quantity. For all measures,
numbers, reckonings of times and years signify a certain quantity.

There are also other words, which do not pertain to [lit. are not of] these § 12
two genera, as for example sweetness and bitterness, and all the colours
and figures. For these ⟨are⟩ neither substance nor do they signify any quan-
tity, because these are neither able to constitute their own existence [as
substance does], except in another physical being, nor do they possess the
measure of quantity. These and the like are found in a single general genus
and are named poiótês, that is, people call it sometimes faculty (ḥaylā) and
sometimes quality (ʾaynūṯā).

We find again other words, which do not fall under any of the ⟨three⟩ § 13
genera that have been mentioned. These hold some entailment of each
other, and none of them is possible to be thought of without the other one
[i.e. its counterpart]. These are present in the way we name ‘son’ and ‘father’,
‘slave’ and ‘master’, ‘double’ and ‘half’. For neither ‘son’ is thought of without
‘father’, nor is ‘slave’ without ‘master’, nor ‘double’ without ‘half’. And neither
 ‫‪104‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫ܡ‪ 焏qqr‬ܕܢ‪r‬ܐܡ‪ r‬ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܒܠܥ‪ 煟‬ܒ‪r‬ܐ ܘܥ̣ܒ‪煟‬ܐ ܘܦܠܓ‪ .焏‬ܕ̣ܗܢ‪ 爯q‬ܗܠ‪爯q‬‬

‫̈‬
‫ܬܘܒ ܘܕܐ‪ qq‬ܗܠ‪q 爯q‬ܢ‪ 爯r‬ܘܐ‪ 爯q煿qrq‬ܒ‪ 煟q‬ܓܢܣ‪̇ 焏‬ܗܘ ܕܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ‪.‬‬

‫‪§ 14‬‬ ‫ܐ‪ rq‬ܬܘܒ ̈ܒܢ‪̈ r‬ܩܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ ܕܠ‪ rq‬ܐ̈ܢ‪ 爯q‬ܬ‪̣ 煟q rqq‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܓܢ̈ܣ‪焏‬‬
‫ܕܐܡ‪r‬ܢ‪ .爯‬ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܡ‪̈熏r‬ܕܥ‪ 爯‬ܐܬ‪r‬ܘܬܐ ܐܘ‪ rqq‬ܕܘ̈‪rqq‬ܐ ܐ‪qq‬‬
‫ܐܢ‪ r‬ܢ‪焏‬ܡ‪ .r‬ܕܣ‪熏‬ܩ‪ 爿qqr‬ܒ‪r‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܢ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ܉ ⟩ܐܘ⟨ ܦܠ‪熏q‬ܢ ܒ‪熏̣r‬ܩ‪.焏‬‬ ‫‪5‬‬
‫ܥ‪ 焏qrr 爟‬ܕܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ ܕܐ‪ qq‬ܗܠ‪ .爯q‬ܕ̣ܗܢ‪ 爯q‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܘܕܐ‪ qq‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܡ‪̈qr‬ܢ‪爯r‬܉‬
‫ܬ‪ 煟q rqq‬ܓܢܣ‪̇ 焏‬ܗܘ ܕܡ‪r‬ܩ‪r‬ܐ ܐ‪ .焏qq‬ܒܦ‪熏‬ܢ‪ q‬ܦ‪r‬ܓܡ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܕܐ‪焏qq‬܉‬
‫ܡ‪r‬ܩ̈‪q‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܗܠ‪q 爯q‬ܠ‪.爯q煿‬‬

‫‪§ 15‬‬ ‫ܡ‪ 爯‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܐܡ‪r‬ܢ‪.爯‬‬ ‫ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ ܐ‪ rq‬ܐܦ ̈ܒܢ‪̈ r‬ܩ ̈ܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ܉ ܠܒ‪̣ r‬‬
‫ܕܐܦ ̇ܗܢ‪̇ 爯q‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܙܒܢ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܡ‪熏r‬ܕܥ‪爯‬܉ ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܡܥ‪q煟‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܠܡ‪焏‬ܡ‪ .r‬ܐܬܡܠ‪q‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬
‫ܘ‪熏q‬ܡܢ‪ 焏‬ܘܩ‪煟‬ܡ ̈‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏q‬ܥܣ‪ 爯qr‬ܐܘ ܒ‪r‬ܪ ̈‪r‬ܢ‪q 焏q‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ̣ܗܘ‪ .‬ܕܐܦ ̇ܗܢ‪ 爯q‬ܗܠ‪爯q‬‬
‫ܡ‪̈qr‬ܒ‪ 爯r‬ܒ‪ 煟q‬ܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܕܓ‪熏‬ܐ ̇ܗܘ ܕܡ‪r‬ܩ‪r‬ܐ ܐܡ‪r‬ܝ‪ .‬ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕ‪ 煟q‬ܢ‪焏r‬ܠ‬
‫ܐܢ‪ r‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪̇ .焏‬ܗܝ ܕܐܡ‪r‬ܝ܉ ܡܦܢ‪q‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܦ‪r‬ܓܡ‪ .焏‬ܐ‪qq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܢ‪̣ qqrr‬ܗܘ ܐܡ‪r‬ܝ‬
‫ܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܕܐ‪ qq‬ܗܠ‪.爯q‬‬

‫‪§ 16‬‬ ‫ܬܘܒ‪ 爯q煟‬ܐ‪ rq‬ܐܦ ̈ܒܢ‪̈ r‬ܩܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ‪ .‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܡ‪熏̈r‬ܕܥ‪̇ 爯‬ܗܘ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܕܐ‪rq‬‬ ‫‪15‬‬
‫ܠ‪ 煿‬ܠܒ‪r‬ܢ‪ .焏r‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܡܥ‪q煟‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܠܡ‪焏‬ܡ‪ .r‬ܕܠܒ‪ rq‬ܐܘ ܣ‪ 爯q焏‬ܐܘ ܣ‪ 爟q‬ܥ‪熟‬ܩ‪r‬ܐ‪.‬‬
‫ܘ̇ܗܢ‪ 爯q‬ܗܠ‪q 爯q‬ܠ‪ 爯q煿‬ܡ‪̈qr‬ܒ‪ 爯r‬ܬ‪ rqq‬ܓܢܣ‪̇ 焏‬ܗܘ ܕܡ‪r‬ܩ‪r‬ܐ ܕܐ‪.rq‬‬

‫‪§ 17‬‬ ‫ܐ‪ rq‬ܬܘܒ ܘܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ ܐ‪q‬ܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܣ‪q‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܡ‪熏̈r‬ܕܥ‪爯‬܉ ܐ‪ qq‬ܡ‪焏‬‬
‫ܕܐܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪ .爯‬ܕ̇ܩ‪焏‬ܡ ܐܘ ‪ .焯qrq‬ܐܘ ܪܡ‪ .焏‬ܘ̣ܗܢ‪ 爯q‬ܗܠ‪q 爯q‬ܠ‪ 爯q煿‬ܡ‪̈qr‬ܒ‪ 爯r‬ܬ‪rqq‬‬
‫‪ 煟q‬ܓܢܣ‪̇ .焏‬ܗܘ ܕܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܣ‪.爟q‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬

‫‪§ 18‬‬ ‫ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ ܘ̈ܒܢ‪̈ r‬ܩܠ‪q 焏‬ܠ‪ 爯q煿‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܡ‪̈熏r‬ܕܥ‪ 爯‬ܡܥܒ‪煟‬ܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ܉‬
‫‪87r‬‬ ‫ܐ‪q‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܐܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܕ̇‪rq‬ܒ‪ .‬ܐܘ ̇ܡ‪ .焏q‬ܐܘ ̇ܡܩ‪ | r‬ܐܘ ̇ܡ‪ .爯qr‬ܘܡ‪̈qr‬ܢ‪爯r‬‬
‫ܥܒ‪ .煟‬ܡܥܒ‪煟‬ܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܓ‪rq‬‬ ‫ܘܡ‪̈qr‬ܒ‪ 爯r‬ܬ‪ 煟q rqq‬ܓܢܣ‪焏‬܉ ̇ܗܘ ܕܡ‪r‬ܩ‪r‬ܐ ̇‬
‫ܡ‪ 爯‬ܗܠ‪.爯q‬‬‫ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܐܡ‪r‬ܢ‪爯‬܉ ܕܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܡ‪熏r‬ܕܥ‪q 焏‬ܠ‪煟q‬ܐ ̣‬
‫‪§ 19‬‬ ‫ܘܬܘܒ ܐ‪̈ rq‬ܒܢ‪̈ r‬ܩܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ ܕܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪ 焏‬ܕܗܠ‪ .爯q‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܢ‪焏‬ܡ‪r‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬
‫ܕܡ‪rqr‬ܒ ܐܘ ̇ܒܠ‪ 牟‬ܐܘ ̇ܩ‪焏‬ܪ ܐܘ ̇‪焏q‬ܡ‪̈q .‬ܢ‪ 爯r‬ܠ‪ 煟q‬ܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܕܓ‪熏‬ܐ܉ ̇ܗܘ‬
‫ܕܡ‪r‬ܩ‪r‬ܐ ̇‪焏q‬ܫ‪.‬‬

‫‪; em. ex L.8ra6/P.26v20‬ܕܬܬܡ‪1 r‬‬ ‫‪ ‖ suppl. ex L.8ra31/P.27r8‬ܕܣ‪熏‬ܩ‪r‬ܛ ‪5‬‬

text and translation of sergius’ introduction 105

‘father’ nor ‘master’ nor ‘double’ can be said to exist without ‘son’, ‘slave’, and
‘half’. These and the like come together and exist in one genus, the toward
something [i.e. relatives].

There are other words, which are not to be found under any of these genera § 14
that we have mentioned, as for example those that signify locations, namely
places, as someone would say: “Socrates is at the theatre” ⟨or⟩ “Plato at the
marketplace”, with the rest of other such things. These and the like are
gathered under one genus that is called where [i.e. place], for in answer to
‘where’ all these are constituted.

In this way there are also other words, beside those we have mentioned, § 15
which in their turn signify a certain time, as we are wont to say: yesterday,
today and twenty years ago, or in how many years soever. These too are
contained in a single general genus, which is called when [i.e. time]. Because
when someone asks (a question) of the sort of ‘when’, we offer an answer in
such a way that ‘when’ turns out to be the genus of everything of this sort.

There are also other words, those that signify what a person has, as we are § 16
wont to say: he is dressed or shod or with a ring on. All these are contained
under the genus that is called having [i.e. state].

There are other (words) too which signify a certain posture, as we say: he is § 17
standing or he is sitting or he is lying. And all these are contained under one
genus, which is designated placed [i.e. position].

In this way again all the words which signify a certain activity, as we say: § 18
‘he writes’ or ‘he hits’ or ‘he cools’ or ‘he heats’. They are gathered and
contained under one genus, which is called doing [i.e. action]. For each of
these signifies the activity of something, as we have said.

Again, there are other words which are opposite to these, as we say: ‘is being § 19
written’, or ‘is being beaten’, or ‘grows cold’, or ‘grows hot’. They come together
into a single general genus, which is called being-affected [i.e. affection].
 ‫‪106‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫‪§ 20‬‬ ‫ܘ‪ 煟q‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܢ‪rq煿‬ܐ‪ rq‬ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕܘܪ‪ 焏r‬ܕܒܡܠ‪q‬ܠ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܠ‪煿‬ܠ‪ 爯q‬ܓ̈ܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܥܣ‪r‬ܐ‬
‫‪熏r‬ܕܥܢ‪爯‬܉ ܩ‪r‬ܒ‪q‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܠ‪ 爯‬ܡ‪ 爏qq‬ܕܠ‪熏‬ܬ ‪熏r‬ܘܕܥ‪ 焏‬ܕܦ‪rr熏‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܒܥܠܡ‪焏‬‬
‫ܐ‪ 爯q煿qrq‬ܢ‪焏‬ܡ‪ .r‬ܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪ 焏q‬ܐ‪qq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪ 爯q‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܢ‪̇ 爯‬ܗܘ ܕܠܥ‪爏‬‬
‫ܡܢ‪ 煿‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬܉ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܐܘܣ‪ .焏q‬ܠ‪̣ rqr‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܗܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܐ‪rq‬‬
‫ܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪̇ .焏‬ܗܘ ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ .焏‬ܘܬ‪ rqq‬ܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪爯q‬܉ ̇ܗܘ‬ ‫‪5‬‬
‫ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܢܦ‪r‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܘ̇ܗܘ ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܢܦ‪ .r‬ܘܬ‪̇ rqq‬ܗܘ ܢܦ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ܉ ܐ‪rq‬‬
‫ܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪熏qq 焏‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܬ‪熏qq rqq‬ܬܐ ܕ‪爯q‬܉ ܐܕ̈‪ 焏r‬ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ‪ .‬ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ‬
‫ܡ‪r‬ܦܠܓ‪ 爯q‬ܠܓܢ̈ܣ‪焏‬܇ ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܠܩܢ̈‪熏‬ܡ‪̇ 焏q煟qq̈q 焏‬ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕܒܡܢ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ‬
‫ܦ‪̣ 爯qrqr‬ܡ‪煟q̈ 爯‬ܕܐ܉ ܡ‪ 爯q煟‬ܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܐ‪ 焏qrq‬ܕܠ‪ rq‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪ rqr‬ܡܢ‪ .煿‬ܡ‪爏q‬‬
‫‪爯qr‬܉ ܐ‪ qq‬ܣ‪熏‬ܣ‪ 焏q‬ܕܓ‪熏‬ܐ܉ ܘܐ‪q qq‬ܠܒ‪ 焏‬ܕܓ‪熏‬ܐ‪.‬‬ ‫ܗܢ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܐܕܫ ܐܕ ̈‬ ‫‪10‬‬
‫ܓܢܣ‪ 煿‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕܗܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ‪熏qq‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܘܗܝ ܬܘܒ ‪熏qq‬ܬܐ܉ ܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪̇煿qrq‬‬
‫̣‬
‫ܕܣ‪熏‬ܣ‪ 焏q‬ܘܕ‪q‬ܠܒ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܐܡ‪r‬ܢ‪爯‬܉ ܘܕܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ ܕܐ‪ qq‬ܗܠ‪ .爯q‬ܐܕ‪焏r‬‬
‫ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܐ‪ 煿̇qrq‬ܕܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܢܦ‪r‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܘ̣ܗܘ ܬܘܒ ܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܢܦ‪r‬ܢ‪焏‬܉ ܓܢܣ‪焏‬‬
‫ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܕ‪熏qq‬ܬܐ ܘܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܕܐܘܣ‪ .焏q‬ܡ‪ 爯q煟‬ܐܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܒ‪q‬ܠ‪熟‬ܒ‪ 爯‬ܓܢܣ‪焏‬‬
‫ܐ‪ .煿̇qrq‬ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕܠ‪ rq‬ܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܠܥ‪ 爏‬ܡܢ̇‪ .煿‬ܘܒ‪煟‬ܓ‪熏‬ܢ ܓܢ‪ 爿‬ܓܢ̈ܣ‪爯q‬‬ ‫‪15‬‬
‫ܡ‪rr‬ܡ‪煿‬ܐ‪ .‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ ܐܦ ܣ‪熏‬ܣ‪ 焏q‬ܕܓ‪熏‬ܐ ܒ‪q‬ܠ‪熟‬ܒ‪ 爯‬ܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܗܘ‪ .‬ܡ‪爏q‬‬
‫ܕܠ‪ rq‬ܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܠܒ‪ r‬ܡܢ‪̇ .煿‬ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕܒܡ‪犏‬ܥ‪r‬ܐ ܕܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ‬
‫̈‬
‫‪ 焏r‬ܘܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ ̇ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ‪̇ 煟q‬ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ‪.‬‬ ‫‪熏qq‬ܬܐ ܘܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܢܦ‪r‬ܢ‪ :焏‬ܐܕ ̈‬
‫ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܕ̈‪ 焏r‬ܕ̇ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪煿q‬ܘܢ‪ .‬ܓ̈ܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕ̇ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕܒ‪r‬ܪܗܘܢ‪ .‬ܐ‪̇煿qrq‬‬
‫ܡ‪ 爯q煟‬ܐܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܓܢ‪ 爿‬ܓܢ̈ܣ‪ .爯q‬ܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܘܓܢܣ‪ .焏‬ܘܬܘܒ‬ ‫‪20‬‬
‫ܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܢܦ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܘܓܢܣ‪ .焏‬ܘ‪熏qq‬ܬܐ ܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܘܓܢܣ‪ .焏‬ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪焏r‬‬
‫ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕܓ‪熏‬ܐ ܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ܉ ܘܒ‪煟‬ܓ‪熏‬ܢ ܐܦ ܐܕܫ ܐܕ ̈‬
‫‪.爯qr‬‬

‫‪87v § 21‬‬ ‫ܘ‪ 煟q‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܡܠ‪q‬ܠ‪ | rq焏‬ܘܒ‪qq‬ܣ‪ 焏‬ܐܬܐܡ‪r‬ܘ‪ .‬ܘܡ‪熏‬ܣܦ‪q‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܩܢ‪熏‬ܢ‪rq焏‬‬
‫ܠܡܦܠܓ‪ 熏‬ܘܠܡ‪焏‬ܡ‪ .r‬ܕܡܢ‪ 爯q煿‬ܕܨ̈ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܒ‪r‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ ܡ‪熏̈r‬ܬܦ‪爯‬‬

‫‪; em. ex P.25r9‬ܐ‪] 煿̇qrq‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ‪11‬‬ ‫ܐܬܐܡ‪23 r‬‬

text and translation of sergius’ introduction 107

[Gradation of existing things]

Having thus clearly presented these ten genera [i.e. categories] for the study § 20
of logic, we henceforth approach the hallmark of the distinctions that [per-
tain] for things that exist in the world by saying: the primary genus, as we
have said before, above which there is no other one [i.e. no superordinate
genus], is substance. But beneath this there is another genus, the one that is
body, and beneath body the one that is animate body and the inanimate one.
Furthermore, beneath the animate one there is another genus: animal.6 And
beneath animal there are species, which are not further divided into genera,
but into particular individuals, those that are distinct from one another only
in number, since it is the last species beneath which there is no other one [i.e.
no subordinate species]. Because of this, it is designated the lowest species,7
such as ‘horse in general’ and ‘dog in general’. The genus of this is ‘animal’,
and again, as we have said, ‘animal’ is the genus of ‘horse’ and of ‘dog’, and
of others like these, but it is a species of ‘animate body’. And again, ‘animate
body’ is the genus of ‘animal’ and species of substance, since substance is
always a genus, because there is no other genus above it; hence it is named
the most generic genus [i.e. the highest or supreme genus]. In this way, ‘horse
in general’ is always a species too, because there is no other species separate
from it. And those in between [i.e. the intermediates] are animal and ani-
mate body: they are species and genera at the same time. On the one hand,
they are species of those that are before them, on the other hand, genera of
those that are after them. Therefore, substance is the most generic genus.
‘Body’ is species and genus, and also ‘animate body’ is species and genus,
and ‘animal’ is species and genus, but ‘man in general’ is only species, and
therefore also a lowest species.

[Homonyms, polyonyms, synonyms, and heteronyms]

These things having thus been logically and successively recounted, we go § 21

on now to make further divisions in a regular manner, by saying: some of

6 What is meant at many places in the text by ‘animal’ (‫ܬܐ‬熏qq ζῷον) is a ‘living being’, and
not only the animal genus, as Sergius specifies it in his On Genus, Species, and Individuality
(126vb6–8): ‫ܬܐ‬熏qq ‫ܐ‬r‫ܩ‬r‫ ܡ‬焏r‫ ܢܦ‬煿‫ ܒ‬rq‫ ܕܐ‬焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫‘ ܓ‬a body in which there is a soul
is called animal’.
7 Literally ‘the species of species’, that is, ‘the most specific species’.
 ‫‪108‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫ܘܡ‪r‬ܩ‪ 爯qr‬ܕ̈ܡ‪r rq‬ܡ̈‪煿‬ܐ‪ .‬ܐ‪qq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪q‬ܠܒ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪q‬ܒ‪ .焏r‬ܘ‪q‬ܠܒ‪ 焏‬ܕ̈ܡ‪ .焏q‬ܘ‪q‬ܠܒ‪焏‬‬

‫ܕܓܢܒ‪r‬ܐ‪ .‬ܘ‪q‬ܠܒ‪ 焏‬ܦ‪q‬ܠܣ‪熏‬ܦ‪ .焏‬ܘܡܢ‪ 爯q煿‬ܒ‪熏qr‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ ܡ‪熏̈r‬ܬܦ‪爯‬‬
‫ܘܡ‪̈rr‬ܡ‪煿‬ܢ ܕ̈ܡ‪ rq‬ܐܕ̈‪ .焏r‬ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪焏q‬ܦ‪ 焏‬ܘ‪熏r‬ܥ‪ 焏‬ܘ‪rq‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܘܡܢ‪爯q煿‬‬
‫ܒ‪r‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܘܒ‪熏qr‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪熏̈r‬ܬܦ‪ .爯‬ܘܐ‪̈ 爯q煿qrq‬ܒܢ‪ 煟q r‬ܐܕ‪ .焏r‬ܐ‪qq‬ܢ‪焏‬‬
‫ܕܐܠ‪q‬ܣܢ‪煟‬ܪܘܣ ܡܩ‪煟‬ܘܢ‪ 焏q‬ܘܐܠ‪q‬ܣܢ‪煟‬ܪܘܣ ܦ‪ .爿qr‬ܘܡܢ‪ 爯q煿‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܒ‪r‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܘܠ‪焏‬‬ ‫‪5‬‬
‫ܒ‪熏qr‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪熏̈r‬ܬܦ‪ .爯‬ܘܒ‪ 爏q‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ ܐ‪ .爯q煿qrq‬ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܩ‪q‬ܣ‪焏‬‬
‫ܘ‪焏q‬ܦ‪ 焏‬ܘܒ‪r‬ܢ‪.焏r‬‬

‫‪§ 22‬‬ ‫ܘ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܒ‪r‬ܪ ܕܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܐܬܦܠܓ‪ 熏‬ܘܐܬܬܣ‪q‬ܡ‪ :熏‬ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕܐܦܠ‪ 焏‬ܗܠ‪爯q‬‬
‫ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ ܢ‪̈煿‬ܘ‪̈q 爯q‬ܣ‪ 爯q‬ܘܡ‪̣ 爯qr̈q‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܐ‪q‬ܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܨ̇ܒ‪ 爯q‬ܕܢ‪r‬ܕܪ‪熏r‬ܢ ܒ̇‪煿‬‬
‫ܒܦ‪q‬ܠܣ‪熏‬ܦ‪熏‬ܬܐ܉ ܐܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܕܠ̇‪ 煿‬ܠܒ‪r‬ܬ ܩܠ‪ 焏‬ܗܕܐ ܕܐܘܣ‪ .焏q‬ܗܢ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܠ̇‪煿‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬
‫ܠ‪焏‬ܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܡ‪ 爟qr‬ܠ̇‪ 煿‬ܐܪܣ‪q熏q‬ܠ‪ 煟q 爿q‬ܐܡ‪ r‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܕܐܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܠ‪爟‬‬
‫ܐ‪ 爏q 煿̇qrq‬ܨܒ‪ 熏‬ܕܐ‪ rq‬ܠ̇‪ 煿‬ܩ‪q熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪̇rq‬ܗ܉ ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܣܢ‪q‬ܩ‪ 焏‬ܥ‪ 爏‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ‬
‫ܐ‪ 爯qrq‬ܕܒ‪ 煿‬ܬܬܩ‪ .爟q‬ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏r‬ܘܩ‪q‬ܣ‪ 焏‬ܘ‪焏q‬ܦ‪焏‬܇ ܘܗܠ‪爯q‬‬
‫ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ ܐ‪q‬ܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܩ̈ܢ‪ 爯q‬ܩ‪q熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪rq‬ܗ‪ .爯q‬ܘܬܘܒ ܠܓ‪ 焏r̈煟‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬‬
‫ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܩ‪q熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪rq‬ܗܘܢ ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܒ̇‪ 煿‬ܒ‪焏‬ܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܡ‪r‬ܩ‪q‬ܡ‪爯q‬܉ ܡ‪ 爟qr‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ‬ ‫‪15‬‬
‫̣ܗܘ ܐܪܣ‪q熏q‬ܠ‪ 爿q‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܕܓ‪ 焏r煟‬ܠ‪ 爟‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܒܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐ‪爯qrq‬‬
‫ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ܇ ܘܠ‪ 熏‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܡܢ‪r‬ܐ ܡܢ‪煿‬܇ ‪ 煟q‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪ 焏q犏‬ܕܢ‪煿‬ܘܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ‬
‫ܡ‪r‬ܘܡ ܒܠܥ‪̇ 煟‬ܗܘ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܒ‪.煿‬‬

‫‪§ 23‬‬ ‫ܬܗܘܐ ܕ‪q煟q 爯q‬ܥ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪ q‬ܐܦ ܗܕܐ܉ ܕ̇ܗܝ ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܒܡ‪煟‬ܡ܉ ܒ‪煟q‬ܥܣ‪r‬‬
‫̈ܙܢ‪ 爯q‬ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܐ‪ .‬ܐܡ‪ r‬ܐܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܒ‪熟‬ܒܢ‪ .焏‬ܐܘ ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܒ‪焏‬ܬܪܐ‪.‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬
‫̈‬ ‫̈‬
‫ܐܘ ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܒܡ‪焏‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܐܘ ܐ‪ qq‬ܡܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܒ̇‪煿‬ܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܐ‪ 爯q煿qrq‬ܡܢ‪熏‬ܬܗ‪.‬‬
‫ܐܘ ܐ‪q qq‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܒܡܢ̈‪熏‬ܬܗ‪ .‬ܐܘ ܐ‪ qq‬ܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܒܓܢܣ‪ .焏‬ܐܘ ܐ‪qq‬‬
‫̈‬
‫ܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܒ‪焏‬ܕ̈‪ .焏r‬ܐܘ ܐ‪ qq‬ܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܒ‪煿‬ܘܠ‪ .焏‬ܐܘ ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܘܒ‪r‬ܐ ܕܐ‪q‬ܠ‪爯q‬‬
‫ܕܡ‪r‬ܕܒ‪̣ 爯qr‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܬ‪ rqq‬ܐ‪煟q‬ܐ ܕܐܢ‪r‬܉ ܒ̇‪煿‬ܘ ̇ܡ‪ 爯‬ܕܡ‪煟‬ܒ‪ r‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ‪ .‬ܐܘ ܐ‪qq‬‬
‫ܕܒ‪熏r‬ܡܠ‪ .焏q‬ܐܘ ܐ‪ qq‬ܓ‪ 焏r̈煟‬ܒ‪焏‬ܘܣ‪ .焏q‬ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕ‪q‬ܒ‪ r‬ܠ‪q煟q 焏‬ܥ‪爯q‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬
‫ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܓܠ‪ rq焏q‬ܠ‪q焏‬ܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܩ‪爯qr‬܉ ܢ‪煿‬ܦ‪熏‬ܟ ܬܘܒ ܥܠ‪煿q‬ܘܢ ܘܢ‪焏‬ܡ‪ r‬ܬ‪rq熏q‬ܐ‬
‫̈‬
‫ܡ‪ 爯‬ܐ‪q‬ܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕ‪q煟q‬ܥ‪ | 爯‬ܠ‪q‬ܠܢ‪.r‬‬
‫‪86r‬‬ ‫ܕ‪q‬ܠ‪ 煟q 煟q‬ܡܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ܇ ̣‬

‫)‪ (vd. comm.‬ܦ‪ 5 爿qr‬ܘܡܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ ‪; sǝyāmē suppl. ex P.30r2 2‬ܕܡ‪1 rq‬‬ ‫‪; em.‬ܡ‪̇] 焏‬ܡ‪24 爯‬‬
‫‪q煟q; em. ex L.14va10/P.35r8‬ܥ‪ex L.14va6/P.35r6 25 爯‬‬
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 109

the objects share only a name and are called homonyms, as ‘dog of land’,
‘dog of water’ [i.e. otter], the ‘dog of Orion constellation’ [i.e. Sirius], and
‘philosopher dog’ [i.e. a Cynic]. Some of them share only the definition and
are named of the same species [i.e. polyonyms], as for example ‘stone’, ‘rock’,
and ‘flint’. Some of them share both the name and the definition and are of
one species [i.e. synonyms], as ‘Alexander the Macedonian’ and ‘Alexander
Paris’. And some of them share neither the name nor the definition, and they
are in every aspect different [i.e. heteronyms], as for example ‘log’, ‘stone’, and
‘man’.

[Aristotle’s definition of substance and accident, and eleven

ways of being in something]

After these things have been divided and set forth in this way, in order that § 22
even these other things shall not be hidden and concealed from those who
wish to be instructed in philosophy, we shall discuss the word ‘substance’, in
particular how Aristotle defines it when he says thus: substance is everything
that has self-subsistence and does not stand in need of anything else in
which it can subsist, as for example ‘man’, ‘log’, and ‘stone’, and other things
which have self-subsistence. Furthermore, Aristotle defines the accidents,
which do not have self-subsistence but subsist in the substance, as follows:
accident is what is in something else, but not as a part of it, since it is
impossible that it ever can exist without the thing in which it is.

Also this should be known to you: that something is said to be in something § 23

in eleven ways. I say: (1) as in time, or (2) as in space, or (3) as in a vessel, or
(4) as parts in what they are parts of, or (5) as a whole thing in its parts, or
(6) as species (pl.) in a genus, or (7) as a genus in species (pl.), or (8) as form
in matter, or (9) as the rule of those who are ruled by someone is in the one
who rules them, or (10) as in a purpose [i.e. goal], or (11) as accidents in a
substance. But since perhaps these things are not plainly known to readers,
we will again turn to them and present the evidence of each and every one
of them from things that are known to everyone.
 ‫‪110‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫‪§ 24‬‬ ‫ܒ‪熟‬ܒܢ‪ 焏‬ܗ‪ 爏qq‬ܐܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܕܗܘܐ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ܉ ܐ‪q‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܢ‪焏‬ܡ‪ r‬ܥ‪ 爏‬ܩ‪r‬ܒ‪ 焏‬ܕܐ‪q‬ܠ‪熏q‬ܢ‬
‫ܕܒ‪熟‬ܒܢ‪ 煿‬ܕܐܠ‪q‬ܣܢ‪煟‬ܪܘܣ ܦ‪ 爿qr‬ܗܘܐ‪ .‬ܐܘ ܕܢ‪焏‬ܡ‪ r‬ܥ‪ 爏‬ܨܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܬܐ‬
‫ܐ‪煟q‬ܐ ܕ̣ܗܝ܇ ܕܐܘ ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪r‬ܐ ܕܙܦܠ‪ 爯‬ܐܘ ܒ‪熏q‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܦܠ‪ 爯‬ܗܘܬ‪q .‬ܠ‪ 爯q煿‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܕܕܐ‪qq‬‬
‫ܗܠ‪ .爯q‬ܒ‪熟‬ܒܢ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܢ ܕ̈ܗܘܝ ܐܘ ܕܐ‪.爯q煿qrq‬‬

‫‪§ 25‬‬ ‫ܘܒ‪焏‬ܬܪܐ ܬܘܒ ܐܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܕܐ‪ 煿̇qrq‬ܨܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ܉ ܐ‪⟩ qq‬ܡ‪ ⟨焏‬ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ‪爏q‬‬ ‫‪5‬‬
‫‪ 煟q 煟q‬ܡܢ‪ 爯‬ܠܓ‪̣ 熏‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܣ‪ 焏q‬ܕܐܬܪܐ ܕܢܩ‪̣ 牯q‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܠܒ‪ r‬ܠܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ .爯‬ܐܘ ܐ‪qq‬‬
‫ܕܐܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܥ‪̈ 爏‬ܡ‪ 焏q‬ܐܘ ܥ‪q 爏‬ܡ‪r‬ܐ ܕܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ ܒܣ‪ 焏q‬ܓ‪ 焏q熏‬ܕܓ‪r‬ܒ‪焏‬‬
‫ܕ‪犏q‬ܒ‪ 焏‬ܐܘ ܕܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐ‪ 爯qrq‬ܕ̇‪q‬ܒ‪ r‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ‪.‬‬

‫‪§ 26‬‬ ‫ܘܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ ܘܐܦ ܒܡ‪焏‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܐܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܕܐ‪ 煿̇qrq‬ܨܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ܉ ܐ‪qq‬‬
‫̈ܡ‪ 焏q‬ܒܓ‪r‬ܒ‪ 焏‬ܐܘ ‪q‬ܡ‪r‬ܐ ܒ‪熟‬ܩ‪ .焏‬ܐܘ ܐ‪ qq‬ܣ‪ 爏q q‬ܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ‬ ‫‪10‬‬
‫ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܒܓ‪ 熏‬ܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܡ‪qr‬ܠ‪ 牯‬ܗ̣ܘ ܓ‪ rq‬ܗܢ‪ 焏‬ܙܢ‪̣ 焏‬ܡ‪̇ 爯‬ܗܘ‬
‫ܕܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪熏‬ܗܝ ܒ‪煿‬ܕܐ‪ .‬ܒ̇‪煿‬ܝ ܕܐܬܪܐ܉ ܬܪ‪ 爯q‬ܩ̈‪q‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ ܐ‪ rq‬ܠ‪ .煿‬ܗܢ‪熏‬‬
‫ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܐܘܪ‪ 焏q‬ܘܦ‪ .焏qr‬ܡ‪焏‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪̣ 爯q‬ܡ‪ 爏q 爯‬ܦ‪r‬ܘܣ ܬܠ‪r‬ܐ ܩ̈‪q‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬‬
‫ܠ‪ .煿‬ܗܢ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܐܘܪ‪ 焏q‬ܘܦ‪ 焏qr‬ܘܥ‪熏‬ܡܩ‪ .焏‬ܡ‪ 爯q煟‬ܐܬܪܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܣ‪煿q‬‬
‫ܕܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪̇ 焏‬ܗܘ ܕ̇‪q‬ܒ‪̣ r‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܠܓ‪ 熏‬ܠ̇‪煿‬ܘ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܕܣ‪ 爟q‬ܒ‪ .煿‬ܡ‪焏‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ‬ ‫‪15‬‬
‫̣ܗܘ ܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܩܢ‪熏‬ܡ‪ 煿‬ܕܩܢ‪ 焏‬ܬܪ‪̈ 爯q‬ܣ‪ 煟q .焏q‬ܓ‪ 焏q熏‬ܕ‪煟q‬ܪ ܠ̇‪煿‬ܘ ܡ‪焏‬‬
‫ܕܐ‪ rq‬ܒ‪煿‬܉ ܘܡ‪rr‬ܡ‪ 煿‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܐܡ‪r‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܐܬܪܗ܉ ܘ‪ 煟q‬ܒ‪̇ 焏qr‬ܗܘ ܕ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܠܒ‪r‬‬
‫ܕܡ‪熟qr‬ܐ ܠ‪q‬ܠܢ‪ .r‬ܐܢ‪ 爯q煟‬ܗܕܐ ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪煿̇qrq‬܉ ‪q煟q‬ܥ‪ 焏‬ܗܝ ܕܡ‪qr‬ܠ‪ 牯‬ܗ̣ܘ‬
‫̇ܗܘ ܙܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܢ‪煿‬ܘܐ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܒ‪焏‬ܬܪܐ ̣ܡ‪̇ 爯‬ܗܘ ܕܢ‪煿‬ܘܐ ܒܡ‪焏‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܒ̇‪煿‬ܝ ܕ̇ܗܘ‬
‫ܣ‪ 焏q‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܓ‪ 焏q熏‬ܕܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܐܡ‪r‬ܢ‪ .爯‬ܗܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪̣ 爯q‬ܗܘ ܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪焏‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬
‫ܩܢ‪熏‬ܡ‪ 煿‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ‪.‬‬

‫‪§ 27‬‬ ‫ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܦ ܐ‪̈ qq‬ܡܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܒ̇‪煿‬ܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܐ‪̈ 爯q煿qrq‬ܡܢ‪熏‬ܬܗ܇ ܐܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪爯‬‬
‫ܕܐ‪ 煿̇qrq‬ܨܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ܉ ܐ‪ qq‬ܐ̈‪ 焏q煟q‬ܘ‪r‬ܓܠ‪ 焏‬ܘ‪ 爏q‬ܗܕܡ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ̣ܗܘ‬
‫ܡܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܐ‪ 爯q煿qrq‬ܒܦܓ‪r‬ܐ‪.‬‬ ‫ܕܒܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ .焏‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܐ‪̈ qq‬‬

‫‪§ 28‬‬ ‫ܘ̣ܗܘ ܬܘܒ ‪q‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܦܓ‪r‬ܐ ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪ r‬ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܒ̈ܡܢ‪熏‬ܬܗ‪ .‬ܗܢ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܒ‪焏rqr‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬
‫ܘܒ‪rq‬ܣ‪ 焏‬ܘܒ‪ 焏q煟q̈焏‬ܘܒ‪r‬ܓܠ‪ 焏‬ܘܒ‪q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܗܕܡ̈‪熏‬ܗܝ ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ .焏qrr‬ܒ‪熟‬ܢ‪焏‬‬
‫ܡܢ‪熏‬ܬܗ‪.‬‬‫̇ܗܘ ܕܐܡ‪r‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܕܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪⟩ r‬ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ⟨ ‪q‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܒ ̈‬

‫‪§ 29‬‬ ‫ܘܐ‪ qq‬ܐܕ̈‪ 焏r‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܒܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܐ ܨܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܕܐ‪ 煿̇qrq‬ܒܡ‪煟‬ܡ܉‬
‫ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܢ‪熏q‬ܪ ܒ‪煿‬ܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܡ‪̈r‬ܦܠܓ‪ 爯‬ܡܢ‪ 煟q 煿‬ܡܢ‪ 煿‬ܕ‪ 煟q‬ܓܢܣ‪焏‬܇ ܘܢ‪焏‬ܡ‪r‬‬

‫‪; em. ex L.14va26/P.35r14‬ܗ̣ܘܐ ‪3‬‬ ‫‪; em. ex L.14va30/P.35r15‬ܐ‪4 爯q煿qrq‬‬ ‫‪5 suppl. ex‬‬
‫ܐܘ ܣ‪ (vd. comm.) 10 q‬ܕ‪犏q‬ܒ‪ 8 焏‬ܣ‪ 焏q‬ܕܐܐܪ ‪L.14va33/P.35r16 6 L.14va35/P.35r17:‬‬
‫‪); emend. 27 suppl. ex L.15ra30/P.35v17‬ܐܘ ܣ‪ (etiam P.35r21 f.; L.14vb13: 爏q q‬ܐ‪爏q qq‬‬
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 111

Thus, we say that something happens in time, in the way we would say § 24
concerning the war of Ilium, that it happened in the time of Alexander Paris.
Or, as we would say about anything else whatsoever, that it happened either
in the year of a certain (person) or on a certain day. For all suchlike things
are said to have happened in a given time or are (still) present.

Again, we say that an object is in space, as each and every one of us is within § 25
the limit of space, which from without surrounds our body. Or, as we say
about water or wine, that they are in the inner limit of a jar, of a pitcher, or
of something else that contains them.

Again, in the same way we say that a certain object is in a vessel too, as water § 26
in a jar or wine in a wineskin, or as the limit of any certain body, which is
inside another body. For this way [of being in space] is different from the
one preceding it in this respect: in that space has just two dimensions,8
namely length and breadth, but a vessel has, of course, three dimensions,
namely length, breadth, and depth. So then, space is the limit of a body,
which from the inside surrounds the thing that is put in it, but a vessel is
itself a body, which possesses two limits: one inner that encloses what is in
it and is named, as we have said, its space; and one outer, which from without
is perceptible to everyone. If so, it is obvious that the way of something being
in space is different from the one of being in a vessel, in that the former is an
inner limit of a body, as we have said, but the latter is itself a body.

But we also say that an object is present as parts in that of which its parts § 27
are parts, like hands and feet, and any other member whatsoever that is in a
body, for these are present as parts in a human body.

Moreover, the whole human body is said to be in its parts, namely in the § 28
head, in the stomach, in the hands, in the feet, and all the rest of its other
members, in the way we have said that a whole thing is said ⟨to be⟩ in its
parts.

And an object is said to be in something as species are in a genus. If we look § 29

into those things that are branched off from one and the same genus, we

8 For a lengthy discussion on space and its dimensions, see §68–73 and the commentary to
them.
 ‫‪112‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫ܕܒ‪ 煿‬ܒܓܢܣ‪ 爯q煿‬ܐ‪爯q煿qrq‬܇ ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܣ‪熏‬ܣ‪ 焏q‬ܘ‪q‬ܠܒ‪ 焏‬ܘܬܘܪܐ ܒܓܢܣ‪焏‬‬

‫ܕ‪熏qq‬ܬܐ ܐܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܕܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ܇ ܘܓܦ‪r‬ܐ ܬܘܒ ܘܙ‪rq‬ܐ ܘܐܪܙܐ ܒܓܢܣ‪焏‬‬
‫ܕܢ‪犏‬ܒ‪r‬ܐ‪.‬‬

‫‪§ 30‬‬ ‫ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܦ ⟩ܐ‪ ⟨qq‬ܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܒ‪焏‬ܕ̈‪ 焏r‬ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪r‬܉ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ‬
‫ܒܡ‪煟‬ܡ܇ ܐ‪ qq‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܢ‪焏‬ܡ‪ r‬ܐܢ‪ r‬ܕ‪熏qq‬ܬܐ ܒ‪焏‬ܕ‪ 焏r‬ܕ‪q‬ܠܒ‪ 焏‬ܘܕܣ‪熏‬ܣ‪焏q‬‬ ‫‪5‬‬
‫‪86v‬‬ ‫ܘܕ‪q‬ܠ‪熏̈qq 爯q煿‬ܬܐ | ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ ܐ‪煿̇qrq‬܇ ܐܘ ܢ‪犏‬ܒ‪r‬ܐ ܬܘܒ ܒ‪r‬ܬܐ‬
‫ܘܒ‪煟‬ܘܠܒ‪ 焏‬ܘܒ‪rq熟‬ܐ ܘܒ‪q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܐܕ ̈‬
‫‪ 焏r‬ܕܢ‪犏‬ܒ‪r‬ܐ‪.‬‬

‫‪§ 31‬‬ ‫ܘܐ‪ qq‬ܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܬܘܒ ܒ‪煿‬ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܐ ܨܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܕܐ‪ 煿̇qrq‬ܒܡ‪煟‬ܡ܉‬
‫ܐ‪ qq‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܢ‪焏‬ܡ‪ r‬ܐܢ‪ r‬ܠ‪ 爟‬ܕܕܡ‪熏‬ܬܗ ܕܐܢ‪煟‬ܪ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏q‬ܒܢ‪ 焏rq‬ܐ‪煿̇qrq‬܇ ܐܘ‬
‫ܐܣ‪qq‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪熏q‬ܪܣ‪ 焏q‬ܒܩ‪q‬ܣ‪ 焏‬ܐܘ ܒܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܕܐ‪ qq‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪.焏‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬

‫‪§ 32‬‬ ‫ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܦ ܕܘܒ‪r‬ܐ ܬܘܒ ܕܐ‪q‬ܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܡ‪r‬ܕܒ‪ 爯qr‬ܒ̇‪煿‬ܘ ܕܡ‪煟‬ܒ‪ r‬ܐܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪q 爯‬ܡ‪焏‬‬
‫ܙ̈ܒܢ‪ 爯q‬ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܒܡ‪煟‬ܡ‪ .‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܡܥ‪q煟‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܠܡ‪焏‬ܡ‪ r‬ܕܕܘܒ‪r‬ܐ ܕܒ‪rq‬ܐ‬
‫ܒ‪熏r‬ܠ‪q‬ܢ‪ 煿‬ܕܡ‪r‬ܐ ܒ‪rq‬ܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ܇ ܐܘ ܕܕܘܒ‪r‬ܐ ܕܡ‪q煟‬ܢ‪r‬ܐ ܒ̇‪煿‬ܘ ܕ‪r‬ܠ‪qq‬‬
‫ܥ‪ 爏‬ܡ‪q煟‬ܢ‪r‬ܐ ܣ‪.爟q‬‬

‫‪§ 33‬‬ ‫ܘܐ‪ qq‬ܕܒ‪熏r‬ܡܠ‪ 焏q‬ܬܘܒ ܐܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪爯‬܉ ܕܬܨܒ‪rq‬ܗ ܕܒ‪rq‬ܐ ܒ‪熏r‬ܡܠ‪̣ 煿q‬ܗܝ‪.‬‬ ‫‪15‬‬
‫ܘ‪rqrq‬ܐ ܕܐܠܦ‪ 焏‬ܒ‪熏r‬ܡܠ‪ .煿̇q‬ܘܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ ‪q‬ܠ‪ 爯q煿‬ܕܕܐ‪ qq‬ܗܠ‪.爯q‬‬

‫‪§ 34‬‬ ‫ܐ‪ qq‬ܓ‪ 焏r煟‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܒ‪焏‬ܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܐܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪爯‬܉ ܕܐ‪熏q rq‬ܪܘܬܐ ܒܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪.焏‬‬
‫ܗܢ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܒ‪q‬ܠܒ‪ .焏‬ܘܐܘ‪q‬ܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܒ‪焏q‬ܦ‪ .焏‬ܘ‪q‬ܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܒ‪煟‬ܒ‪ .焏r‬ܘܡ‪rqr‬ܘܬܐ‬
‫ܒܡ‪熏‬ܪܐ‪ .‬ܘܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ ‪q‬ܠ‪ 爯q煿‬ܕܕܐ‪ qq‬ܗܠ‪.爯q‬‬

‫‪§ 35‬‬ ‫ܘ‪ 煟q‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܘܠ‪ rq焏q‬ܘܒ‪熟‬ܕܩ‪ 焏‬ܐܬܬܣ‪q‬ܡ‪ 熏‬ܠܢ‪熏‬ܗܪܐ ܕ̇ܗܘ ܕ̇ܩ‪r‬ܐ܉‬ ‫‪20‬‬
‫ܥ‪煟‬ܠ‪ 焏q‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܕܡ‪ 爯qrq‬ܐܢ‪ 爯qr‬ܥ‪爏‬‬‫ܐܬ‪rq‬ܒ‪ 爯‬ܬܘܒ ܕܐܦ ܙ‪q̈q‬ܡ‪ 焏q‬ܘ ̈‬
‫ܬ‪熏q‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܓ‪̇ 焏r煟‬ܗܘ ܕ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܠܥ‪ 爏‬ܣܡܢ‪爯‬܇ ܢ‪熏rr‬ܡ ܠ‪ q‬ܥ‪ 爏‬ܡܦ‪ 犟‬ܒ‪r‬ܘ‪焏q‬‬
‫ܘ‪ 焏qrr‬ܕ‪q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ‪.‬‬

‫;)‪ (etiam L.15ra4‬ܕܐ‪; em. ex L.15rb1/P.35v20 2 爯q煿qrq‬ܕܒ‪ 煿‬ܒܓܢܣ‪] 焏‬ܕܒ‪ 煿‬ܒܓܢܣ‪1 爯q煿‬‬
‫‪; sǝyāmē del.‬ܒ‪焏‬ܕ ̈‬
‫‪; em. et suppl. ex L.15rb8 f./P.35v23 5 焏r‬ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܘܐܦ ‪em. ex P.35v22 4‬‬
‫ܡܠ‪熏q‬ܗܝ ]ܒ‪熏r‬ܡܠ‪̣ 煿q‬ܗܝ ‪; em. ex L.15rb33/P.36r12 15‬ܐܡ‪ex L.15rb12/P.35v25 11 爯qr‬‬ ‫ܒ‪̈ 熏r‬‬
‫ܐܬܬܣ‪); emend. 20 爟q‬ܒ‪熏r‬ܠܡ‪ 煿‬ܗܝ ‪(L.15va8/P.36r13:‬‬
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 113

would say that they are in their genus, as for example we say that ‘horse’,‘dog’,
and ‘ox’ are in the genus of animal; and also ‘vine’, ‘olive’, and ‘cedar’ are in
the genus of plant.

But also what is in something is said to be [so] ⟨as⟩ a genus in species, in the § 30
way someone would say that animal is in the species of ‘dog’, of ‘horse’, and
of all other animals; or plant is in ‘fig tree’, in ‘plane tree’, in ‘olive tree’, and in
all species of plant.

An object is said to be in something as form in matter, as someone would say § 31

that the shape of a statue is in bronze, or the figure of the chair is in wood,
or in something else like this.

Also the rule of those who are ruled is in the one who rules. We say occasion- § 32
ally that something is in something, as we are wont to say that the rule of a
household is in the power of the master of household, or that the rule of a
city is put in the one who is in command of the city.

And as in purpose we say that the decoration of a house is in its purpose, and § 33
the usefulness of a boat is in its purpose, and all other things like these.

We say that whiteness exists in a body as an accident is in a substance, such § 34

as in milk, and blackness in a stone, and sweetness in honey, and bitterness
in myrrh, and all other things like these.

[A dispute about Aristotle’s definition of accident and its

solution]

While these things were in this way properly and duly set forth to the eluci- § 35
dation of the reader, we were also considering some disputes and criticisms
that some persons bring up about the definition of accident that we have
presented above. We will outline for you the defense and the solution of
them.
 ‫‪114‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫‪§ 36‬‬ ‫ܐܡ‪ 爯qr‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܕܡܠ‪r‬ܐ ܡ‪qr‬ܡܢ‪rq‬ܗ ܕܓ‪焏r煟‬܉ ܠ‪ 熏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ ܠܓ‪ 焏r̈煟‬ܬ‪q‬ܡ ݀‬
‫‪r‬‬
‫‪r‬܉ ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܦ ܨ̈ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ܉ ܐ‪q‬ܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܐܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܘܠ‪熏‬‬ ‫ܘ‪q‬ܒ‪݀ r‬‬
‫̇‬ ‫̈‬
‫⟩̣ܡ‪ ⟨爯‬ܓ‪ 焏r煟‬ܐ‪ .爯q煿qrq‬ܐܢ̣‪煿‬ܘ ܓ‪ rq‬ܕܓ‪ 焏r煟‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܐ‪ qq‬ܡܠ‪r‬ܐ ܗܝ‬
‫ܡ‪ 爯‬ܠܥ‪̇ :爏‬ܗܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܒܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܘܠ‪ 熏‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܡܢ‪r‬ܗ‪:‬‬ ‫ܕܐܬܬܣ‪q‬ܡ ݀‬
‫‪̣ r‬‬
‫‪ 煟q‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪ 焏q犏‬ܕܢ‪煿‬ܘܐ ܩ‪q熏‬ܡ‪ 煿‬ܠܒ‪ r‬ܡܢ‪ :煿‬ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕܐܦ ܣ‪熏‬ܩ‪ 爿qqr‬ܘ‪爏q‬‬ ‫‪5‬‬
‫‪ 煟q 煟q‬ܡܢ‪ 爯‬ܒ‪焏‬ܬܪܐ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ‪ 煟q :‬ܠ‪ 熏‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܡܢ‪r‬ܐ ܐ‪̣ 爯qrq‬ܡ‪爯‬‬
‫ܐܬܪܐ‪ :‬ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ ‪ 煟q‬ܡܢ‪ 爯‬ܡ‪犏‬ܐ ܒܠܥ‪̣ 煟‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܐܬܪܐ ܠܡ‪煿‬ܘܐ܉ ܡ‪ 爯q煟‬ܐ‪qq‬‬
‫‪qq‬ܠ̇‪ 煿‬ܕܡܠ‪r‬ܐ ̇ܗܝ܉ ܐܦ‪q‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܓ‪ 焏r煟‬ܐ‪ .爯qrq‬ܘܐ‪ qq‬ܕ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܡ‪焏qqrr‬‬
‫ܕܐ‪煿̇qrq‬܉ ⟩ܐܘܣ‪̣ ⟨焏q‬ܗܝ ‪̣ 煟q‬ܗܝ ܐܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܘܓ‪焏r煟‬܉ ܐܘ‪ rqq‬ܕ̣ܗܘ ܩܢ‪熏‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܠ‪焏‬‬
‫ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܐܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪.焏r煟‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬

‫‪§ 37‬‬ ‫ܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܐ‪ rq‬ܠ‪焏‬ܢ‪ r‬ܠܡ‪焏‬ܡ‪ r‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܕܐܦ ܐܢ ‪q‬ܠ‪ 煟q 煟q‬ܡܢ‪爯‬‬
‫ܒ‪焏‬ܬܪܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ‪ 煟q‬ܠ‪ 熏‬ܡܢ‪r‬ܐ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐ‪̣ 爯qrq‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܐܬܪܐ ܕܐ‪ 爯qrq‬ܒ‪煿‬܉‬
‫ܐܠ‪̣ 焏‬ܗܘ ‪qq‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܡ‪犏‬ܐ ܕܢ‪r‬ܪܢ‪ 焏‬ܠܒ‪̣ r‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܐܬܪܐ‪ .‬ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕܠ‪ 熏‬ܡ‪r‬ܡܠ‪q‬ܢ‪煿‬‬
‫ܕ‪qq‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܐܬܪܐ܉ ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܡܩ‪̣ 牯‬ܗܘ ܢܩ‪ 牯q‬ܠ‪ 爯‬ܐ‪q qq‬ܠܠ‪ 焏‬ܠܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪.焏‬‬
‫‪89r‬‬ ‫̇ܗܘ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܡܩܒܠܢ‪ 煿‬ܕܓ‪焏r煟‬܉ ܡ‪r‬ܡܠ‪q‬ܢ‪ | 焏‬ܕ‪qq‬ܢ‪ 煿‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ‪.‬‬ ‫‪15‬‬
‫ܒܠܥ‪煟‬ܘܗܝ ܓ‪ rq‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪ 焏q犏‬ܕܢ‪r‬ܩ‪爟q‬܉ ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܐܡ‪r‬ܢ‪̣ 爯‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܠܥ‪ .爏‬ܐܢ‪ 爯q煟‬ܗܠ‪爯q‬‬
‫ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪爯q煿qrq‬܉ ܡ‪ 爯q煟‬ܠ‪q̇ 焏‬ܒ‪ r‬ܬ‪熏q‬ܡ‪ 煿‬ܕܓ‪̇ 焏r煟‬ܗܘ ܕܐܬܐܡ‪̣ r‬ܡ‪爯‬‬
‫ܠܥ‪ 爏‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐ‪爯qrq‬܇ ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܢ ܠ‪ 煿‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕܘܗܝ‪.‬‬

‫‪§ 38‬‬ ‫ܦ‪r‬ܦ‪熏‬ܪ‪熏q‬ܣ ܕ‪爯q‬܉ ܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ܡ‪ 爟qr‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܠܓ‪ 焏r煟‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܕܓ‪ 焏r煟‬ܠ‪ 爟‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ‬
‫̇ܗܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ̇ܗܘܐ ܒܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܘܡ‪r‬ܦ‪r‬ܫ ⟩ܡܢ‪ 煟q ⟨煿‬ܠ‪̇ 焏‬ܡ‪݁q‬ܒ‪ 爏‬ܠ‪ .煿‬ܒ‪r‬ܡ ܕ‪爯q‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬
‫ܐܦ ܥܠ‪熏‬ܗܝ ܕܬ‪熏q‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܗܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪qrq rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܒ‪熟‬ܥ‪熏‬ܪ‪ .‬ܕܥ ܓ‪ rq‬ܕܡܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ‬
‫ܕܓ‪ 焏r̈煟‬ܡ‪r‬ܦ‪̣ 爯qrr‬ܡ‪̇ 爯‬ܗܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܓ‪ 爯qr煟‬ܒ‪煿‬܉ ܘܡ‪qr‬ܒܠ‪ 爯q‬ܘܥ‪焏‬ܠ‪爯q‬‬
‫ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪q 焏‬ܠܦ‪煿q‬ܘܢ‪ .‬ܘܡܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܦ‪ 爯qrr‬ܡ‪r‬ܘܡ ̣ܡ‪̇ 爯‬ܗܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܓ‪爯qr煟‬‬
‫ܒ‪ .煿‬ܐܘ‪q‬ܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܓ‪ rq‬ܕܗܘ‪ 焏q‬ܒܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܐܢ‪ :r‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܡ‪r‬ܕܒ‪ r‬ܙܒܢ‪焏‬‬
‫ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܒ‪熟‬ܥ‪熏‬ܪ ܒ‪r‬ܡ‪̇ 焏r‬ܗܝ ܕܐ‪ 煿̇qrq‬ܓ‪焏r煟‬܉ ܗܕܐ ܡ‪r‬ܦ‪ 焏rr‬ܘ̇ܡ‪qr‬ܩ‪焏‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬
‫ܡ‪ 焏q‬ܘܒ‪q‬ܠܠ‪ 焏‬ܢ‪煿‬ܦ‪熏‬ܟ ܢ‪r‬ܕܒ‪ r‬ܙܒܢ‪ 焏‬ܣܓ‪焏q‬ܐ‪.‬‬ ‫ܡܢ‪煿‬܉ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܒܣ‪ 焏qq‬ܕ ̈‬

‫‪2–3 焏r‬‬ ‫‪; suppl. cum sǝyāmē ex L.16vb1/P.37v11f.‬ܘܠ‪ 熏‬ܓ‪] 焏r煟‬ܘܠ‪̣⟩ 熏‬ܡ‪ ⟨爯‬ܓ‪̈ 煟‬‬ ‫‪6‬‬
‫‪; em. ex‬ܐ‪qq qq‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܕܡܠ‪r‬ܐ ]ܐ‪qq qq‬ܠ̇‪ 煿‬ܕܡܠ‪r‬ܐ ‪ 煟q 7–8‬ܠ‪ 熏‬ܡܢ‪r‬ܐ ‪L.16vb13/P.37v16:‬‬
‫)‪L.16vb18/P.37v18 (vd. comm.‬‬ ‫)‪9 suppl. ex L.16vb18/P.37v18 (vd. comm.‬‬ ‫‪20 suppl. ex‬‬
‫;ܢ‪r‬ܒ‪] r‬ܢ‪r‬ܕܒ‪; em. ex L.30vb14/P.38v22 (vd. comm.) 26 r‬ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܙܥ‪熏‬ܪ ‪L.30vb9/P.38v22 21‬‬
‫‪em. ex L.30vb29/P.39r5‬‬
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 115

For they say that his defining description of accident has not only defined § 36
and included accidents, but other objects too, which pertain to substance
and not ⟨to⟩ accidents. Given that accident is in accord with the definition
that previously was set forth “what is in something but not as its part” (Cat.
1a24), as it is impossible that [an accident’s] subsistence can be separate
from [the thing in which it is]. And because also Socrates and each and
every one of us is in a certain space, although we are not as a part of space
and yet none of us can be apart from space, then the implication of that
definition is that also we are an accident. And as it seems to follow from this,
a ⟨substance⟩ is at the same time substance and accident, which would mean
that our essence is not substance but accident.

Concerning this one may say as follows: even if each and every one of us § 37
is in space, we are not any part of the space in which we are, yet it is
possible to think of our nature to be separate from space, because space
is not completive [i.e. is not forming an essential part] of our nature, but
rather it follows upon us like a shadow (follows) upon a body. However,
what is receptive of an accident is completive of its nature, for it [i.e. the
accident] cannot subsist without it, as we have said above. And if it is how
these matters stand, then the definition of accident that was given above
does not include anything else, except itself alone.

[Porphyry’s definition of accident and its controversy]

However, Porphyry in turn defines accident as follows: ‘accident is what § 38

occurs in something and is separated ⟨from it⟩ without destroying it’. Never-
theless, also concerning this definition there is a considerable controversy.
For be aware that some of the accidents are separated from what they occur
in, and they are destroyed, and others take their place. And some of them
are never separated from what they occur in. For the blackness that occurs
in someone’s body, when he spends a considerable time in the sun, which
is an accident, this (blackness) is separated and goes away from him, when
 ‫‪116‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫ܐܘ‪q‬ܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܓ‪ rq‬ܕ‪ 焏qr熏q‬ܐܘ ܕܢܥܒ‪焏‬܉ ‪ 煟q‬ܐܦ ̣ܗܝ ܓ‪ 焏r煟‬ܐ‪煿̇qrq‬܉‬

‫ܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܦ‪ 焏rr‬ܘܡ‪qr‬ܩ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܘܡ ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܡ‪ 煿qr‬ܕ‪焏qr熏q‬܇ ܐܘ ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܡܠܓ‪煿‬‬
‫ܕܢܥܒ‪焏‬܉ ܡ‪ qqr‬ܡ‪ 爯q煟‬ܐܢ‪ r‬ܕܢ‪焏‬ܡ‪ r‬ܕܬ‪熏q‬ܡ‪̇ 焏‬ܗܘ ܕ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܦ‪r‬ܦ‪熏‬ܪ‪熏q‬ܣ‬
‫ܐܬܬܣ‪ 爟q‬ܥ‪ 爏‬ܓ‪焏r煟‬܉ ܠ‪ 焏‬ܗ̣ܘܐ ܠ‪q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܓ‪q̇ 焏r̈煟‬ܒ‪r‬܇ ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܠ̇‪煿‬ܢ‪熏‬ܢ‬
‫ܡ‪̇ 爯‬ܗܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ̇ܗܘ‪ 爯q‬ܒ‪.煿‬‬
‫⟩ܓ‪ ⟨焏r̈煟‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ ܕܡ‪r‬ܦ‪ 爯qrr‬ܘܡ‪r‬ܪ‪q‬ܩ‪̣ 爯q‬‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫‪§ 39‬‬ ‫ܡ‪ 焏q犏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܠܡܦ‪ 犟‬ܒ‪r‬ܘ‪q 焏q‬ܠܦ‪熏‬ܗܝ ܕܬ‪熏q‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܕܓ‪̇ 焏r̈煟‬ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ‬
‫ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܪ‪q‬ܩ‪̣ 爯q‬ܡ‪̇ 爯‬ܗܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܓ‪ 爯qr煟‬ܒ‪ .煿‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܐܘ‪q‬ܡ‪熏‬ܬܗ ܕ‪焏qr熏q‬‬
‫ܘܕܢܥܒ‪ .焏‬ܘܐܦ‪ 爯‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪qr‬ܩ‪⟩ 爯q‬ܒ‪ ⟨煿‬ܒܣ‪熏‬ܥ‪r‬ܢ‪̣ 焏‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܓ‪r̈熏‬ܡ‪̇ 焏‬ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ‬
‫ܕܒ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ܉ ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܒܡܠ‪r‬ܐ ܘܒ‪r熏q‬ܒ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܦ‪ 爯qrr‬ܐܢ‪熏‬ܢ‬
‫ܡܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ‪ 煟q .‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܥܒ‪ 爯q煟‬ܒ‪煿‬ܘܢ ‪̇q‬ܒܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ‪ .‬ܡ‪ 焏q犏‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܕܢ‪r‬ܪܢ‪焏‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬
‫ܐܦ ‪ 焏qr熏q‬ܘܐܦ ܢܥܒ‪r熏q 焏‬ܐ܉ ‪ 煟q‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏qq‬ܐܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܕ‪煟q‬‬
‫ܡܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܒܡ‪煟‬ܡ‪ .‬ܘܒ‪煟‬ܓ‪熏‬ܢ ܐܦ ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܠ‪q‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܡܠ‪r‬ܐ ̇ܗܝ ܡ‪qr‬ܡܢ‪rq‬ܐ‬
‫ܡ‪ 爯‬ܠܥ‪.爏‬‬ ‫݀‬
‫ܕܐܬܐܡ‪r‬ܬ ̣‬
‫‪§ 40‬‬ ‫ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ ܐܦ ܠ‪熏‬ܩܒ‪̇ 爏‬ܗܝ ܕܐܡ‪rq‬ܐ ܒ‪ 煿‬ܒ‪熏qr‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܡ‪r‬ܦ‪r‬ܫ ܠ‪爟‬‬
‫ܓ‪̣ 焏r煟‬ܡ‪̇ 爯‬ܗܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܒ̣‪ 煟q 煿‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪݁q‬ܒ‪ 爏‬ܠ‪ .煿‬ܡ‪煿‬ܦ‪ q‬ܐܢ‪r‬‬ ‫‪15‬‬
‫ܘܐ̇ܡ‪ .r‬ܕܗܐ ܐ‪rr‬ܐ ܐܦ̣‪煿‬ܝ ܓ‪ 焏r煟‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐ‪ .煿̇qrq‬ܘܗܐ ܡ‪q‬ܒܠ‪焏‬‬
‫‪89v‬‬ ‫̣ܗܝ ܠܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪̇ 焏‬ܗܘ ܕܗܘ‪ 焏q‬ܒ‪ .煿‬ܘܩ‪熏̣qr‬ܬܐ ܬܘܒ ܕܗܘ‪ 焏q‬ܒܣܥ‪r‬ܐ܉ |‬
‫ܡ‪q‬ܒܠ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܠ̇‪煿‬ܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܗܘ‪ 焏q‬ܒ‪ .煿‬ܡ‪rr‬ܪ‪ 爯q‬ܬܘܒ ܘܐܦ ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪.焏‬‬
‫ܕܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܡ‪r‬ܡ‪̈ 爯q̈r‬ܡܢ‪ 焏‬ܒܩ‪rq‬ܪܐ‪ :‬ܐܘ ܡ‪rr‬ܦ‪̣ rqrq 爯q‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܡ‪焏‬‬
‫ܕܙܕܩ‪ :‬ܡ‪̈q‬ܒܠ‪ 爯‬ܠ̇‪ 煿‬ܠ‪焏‬ܪܡ‪熏‬ܢ‪ 焏q‬ܘܠܩ‪q‬ܢ‪r‬ܐ ‪rq熏r‬ܐ ܕܒ‪爯q煿‬܉ ‪ 煟q‬ܠ‪ 熏‬ܠ‪煿‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬
‫ܠܩ‪rq‬ܪܐ ܡ‪̈q‬ܒܠ‪爯‬܉ ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܐܦ ܐ‪rr‬ܐ ܠ‪ 焏‬ܗ̣ܘܐ ܠܦܓ‪r‬ܐ ̇ܡ‪q‬ܒܠ‪ :焏‬ܐܠ‪焏‬‬
‫ܠ‪焏‬ܪܡ‪熏‬ܢ‪rq熏r 焏q‬ܐ ܕܡ‪熏‬ܙܓ‪ 煟q .煿‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܢ‪qr‬ܒ‪̣ 爏‬ܗܘ ܗܢ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪熏‬ܙܓ‪ :焏‬ܠ‪焏‬‬
‫ܐܠ‪犏‬ܐ ܕܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ܦܓ‪r‬ܐ ܢ‪qr‬ܒ‪ 爏‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܥܡ‪̇ .煿‬ܡ‪ 爯q煟‬ܐܦܠ‪ 焏‬ܗܪ‪̇ 焏q‬ܡ‪݁q‬ܒ‪爏‬‬
‫ܓ‪ 焏r煟‬ܠ̇‪煿‬ܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ̇ܗܘܐ ܒ‪ .煿‬ܐܦ ܩ‪熏qr‬ܬܐ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܗ̣ܘܐ ܒܣܥ‪r‬ܐ‬
‫ܕܡ‪̇q‬ܒܠ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܐ‪煿̇qrq‬܉ ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܒ̇‪ 煿‬ܒܩ‪r‬ܩܦ‪r‬ܐ ‪qq‬ܢ̇‪ 煿‬ܓ‪ .焏r煟‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܕ̣ܡ‪爯‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬
‫ܗܪ‪ 焏q‬ܬܬ‪熟q‬ܐ܉ ܕܠ‪̇ 焏‬ܡ‪݁q‬ܒ‪ 爏‬ܓ‪ 焏r煟‬ܠ̇‪煿‬ܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܒ‪ .煿‬ܒ‪r‬ܡ ܕ‪爯q‬‬
‫‪ 爏q‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܒܥܠܡ‪焏‬܉ ܠܩ‪q熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪rq‬ܗ ܡ‪焏qr‬ܒ ܘ ̇‬
‫ܥ‪r‬ܩ ̣ܡ‪q 爯‬ܒܠ̣‪煿‬‬
‫̇‬
‫ܒ‪q‬ܠ‪熟‬ܒ‪ .爯‬ܐܢ̣‪煿‬ܘ ܗ‪ 爏qq‬ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪犏‬ܐ ‪̣ 煟q‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܓ‪ 焏r̈煟‬ܠܡ‪r‬ܩ‪q‬ܡ‪ 熏‬ܒܠܥ‪̣ 煟‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܗܘ‬
‫ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܒ‪煿‬܉ ‪q煟q‬ܥ‪ 焏‬ܗܝ ܕܠ‪ rq‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܓ‪ 焏r̈煟‬ܕܡ‪q‬ܒ‪̇ 爏‬ܗܘ ܡ‪焏‬‬
‫ܕ̇ܗܘܐ ܒ‪ .煿‬ܕܠܡ‪ 焏‬ܢܥܒ‪⟩ 煟‬ܠ‪ ⟨煿‬ܐܦ ‪熏q‬ܒܠ‪ 焏‬ܕܩܢ‪熏‬ܡ‪.煿‬‬ ‫‪30‬‬

‫‪; suppl. et sǝyāmē‬ܒܣ‪熏‬ܥ‪r‬ܢ‪⟩] 焏‬ܒ‪ ⟨煿‬ܒܣ‪熏‬ܥ‪r‬ܢ‪q 8 焏‬ܠܦ‪5 suppl. ex L.31ra10/P.39r12 6 熏‬‬

‫ܵ‬
‫‪熏̌ q熏r; em.‬ܬܐ ‪熏q熏r et‬ܬܐ ‪ (vd. comm.) 20 et 22‬ܘ̣̇ܩ‪熏̣qr‬ܬܐ ‪del. ex L.31ra26f./P.39r19 17‬‬
‫‪ex L.31rb29/34, (P.39v lac.) 30 suppl. ex L.31va26/P.39v7‬‬
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 117

he resumes spending a long time bathing in the water and in shade. But the
blackness of a Cushite [i.e. African] or of a raven, also it being an accident,
is never separated and goes away from the skin of the Cushite9 or from the
feather of the raven. One may therefore say that the definition that is set
forth by Porphyry about accident does not include all accidents, but merely
the ⟨accidents⟩ that are separated and go away from what they occur in.

Still, it is possible to defend this definition in this way: those accidents § 39

which do not go away from what they appear in, like the blackness of a
Cushite and of a raven, although they are not actually taken away from
those bodies in which they are, yet they are separated from them in speech
and in imagination, without inflicting upon them any destruction. For it is
possible to think also of a Cushite and a raven (as being) white, without
the substance of any of them being damaged in any way. Therefore, the
defining description that was given above is applicable also to them [i.e. to
inseparable accidents].

In this way, someone may also retort against what was said in the definition § 40
that separates accident from what it is in [i.e. its substrate] without destroy-
ing it, and say: indeed also fever is a certain accident, and yet it destroys the
body in which it occurs [i.e. its substrate]. Furthermore, the baldness that
occurs in the hair destroys what it occurs in. Also these (objections) are
solved in this way: just like when the strings on a cither are tightened or loos-
ened more than what is required, they destroy the balanced harmony and
melody that is in them, without destroying the cither itself. In the same way,
also the fever does not destroy the human body itself, but the balanced har-
mony of its temperament. When this (corporal) temperament is destroyed,
it is not necessary that the human body is also destroyed along with it. There-
fore, not even here does the accident destroy what it occurs in. Baldness
too does not exist in the hair that it destroys, but its nature appears in the
skull. It may be seen from this that an accident does not destroy what it
is in. Nonetheless, everything that is in the world strives after its own self-
subsistence and always avoids its own destruction. If, therefore, no single
accident can subsist without what it is in, it is obvious that there is no single
accident which destroys what it occurs in, lest it causes also the destruction
of itself.

9 For a similar example and the name Cushite, i.e. an Ethiopian or a black person, cf.
Jeremiah 13:23 in Hebrew language.
 118 chapter 7

§ 41 爯qr煟‫ ܕܓ‬焏r̈煟‫ ܓ‬爏q‫ܐ ܕܡ‬r‫ ܠܡܠ‬煿̇‫ ܠ‬爯‫ܢ‬q‫ܡ‬q‫ ܡܩ‬焏q‫ܪ‬煿‫ ܠ‬焏‫ܡ‬煟‫ ܥ‬煟q‫ܘ‬

爿q̈‫ ܕܐܘܣ‬爯q煿‫ ܕܡܢ‬.爯‫ܢ‬qr‫ ܐܡ‬煟q 爯‫ܢ‬q‫ܦܢ‬r‫ ܡ‬焏q‫ܬ̇ܗ ܕܐܘܣ‬熏‫܉ ܠ‬焏q‫ܘܣ‬焏‫ܒ‬
‫ܢ‬rrq‫ܐ܉ ܐܘ ܡ‬rqqr̈‫ ܦ‬爯q‫ ܘܗܠ‬.‫ܐ‬r‫ܒ‬qr‫ ܡ‬爯q煿‫ܐ܉ ܘܡܢ‬rqqr̈‫ ܦ‬爯q煿qrq‫ܐ‬
爯‫ܢ ̣ܡ‬rrq‫ ܕܡ‬爯q‫ܐ ܕ‬rqqr̈‫ ܦ‬.爯q煿‫ܢ ܡܢ‬rq犏‫ܐ ܐܘ ܒ‬r‫ܒ‬qr‫ ܡ‬爯q‫ ܗܠ‬爯‫̣ܡ‬
焏‫ ܗܘܠ‬爯‫ ̣ܡ‬焏‫ܢ‬qq‫ ܒ‬爯‫ܩ‬qqr‫ ܕ‬爯q‫ ܗܠ‬爯q煿‫ܠ‬q 爿q̈‫܉ ܐܘܣ‬爯q煿qrq‫ܐ ܐ‬r‫ܒ‬qr‫ܡ‬ 5
‫ܐ‬r‫ܒ‬qr‫ ܡ‬爯‫ܢ ̣ܡ‬rq犏‫ ܬܘܒ ܕܒ‬爯q‫ܐ ܕ‬rqqr̈‫⟨ ܦ‬爿q̈‫ ⟩ܐܘܣ‬.焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܪܓ‬r‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܒܠ‬q‫ܘ‬
rq‫ܘܢ ܓ‬煿‫ܒ‬q‫ ܪܘ‬.‫ܕܘܗܝ‬熏q‫ ܒܠ‬焏r‫ ܐܘ ܐܕ‬.煿̇q‫ܕ‬熏q‫ ܒܠ‬焏‫܉ ܗܘܠ‬爯q煿qrq‫ܐ‬
焏‫ ܓܢܣ‬爏qq‫ ܗ‬焏q‫ ܐܘܣ‬.煟‫ܠ‬熏‫ܐ ܡ‬r‫ܒ‬qr‫ ̇ܗܝ ܡ‬焏q‫ܘܣ‬焏‫܉ ܠ‬焏r‫ ܘܐܕ‬焏‫ܕܗܘܠ‬
爯q‫ܪ‬r‫ ܠ‬焏‫ܦܠܓ‬r‫ ܘܡ‬.煿̇‫ ܡܢ‬rqr‫ ܠ‬焏r‫ܒ‬q rq‫ܬܐ ܓ‬焏q‫ ܣ̈ܓ‬.煿̇qrq‫ܡ ܐ‬煟‫ܡ‬
焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫ ܘ̣ܗܘ ܬܘܒ ܓ‬.焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫ ܓ‬焏‫ ܘܠܠ‬焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫ ܠܓ‬.焏q‫̈ܡ‬煟‫ ܩ‬焏‫ܢ‬rr熏‫ܦ‬ 10
焏‫ܢ‬r‫ ܢܦ‬焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫ ܠܓ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬熏‫ ܗܢ‬.煿‫ ܡܢ‬rqr‫ ܕܠ‬焏‫ܢ‬rq‫ ܐ‬焏‫ܢ‬rr熏‫܉ ܠܦ‬焿‫ܦܠ‬r‫ܡ‬
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܡ‬煟‫ ܒ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬煿̇‫ ܒ‬.‫ܐ‬rr‫ ܪܓ‬爯‫ ̣ܡ‬熟q‫ܘ ܕܓܠ‬煿̇‫ ܘܠ‬焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܓ‬r‫ ܘܠܡ‬.r‫ ܢܦ‬焏‫ܠ‬煟‫ܘܠ‬
焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫ ܠܓ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬熏‫ ܗܢ‬.焏‫ܢ‬rq‫ ܐ‬焏‫ܢ‬rr熏‫ ܠܦ‬焿‫ܦܠ‬r‫ ܡ‬.焏‫ܢ‬r‫ ܢܦ‬焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫ܘܐܦ ܓ‬
88r | ‫⟨ ܘ̇ܗܘ ܬܘܒ‬焏‫ ܙܘܥ‬爯‫ܡ‬̣ 熟q‫ܘ ܕܓܠ‬煿̇‫ ܘܠ‬牟q‫ܬܙ‬r‫ܘ ܕܡ‬煿̇‫ ⟩ܘܠ‬.qq 焏‫ܘ ܕܠ‬煿̇‫ ܘܠ‬qq‫ܕ‬
rqr‫ܘܢ ܠ‬煿qrq‫ ܕܐ‬焏‫ܢ‬rq‫ ܐ‬焏‫ܢ‬rr熏‫ ܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ܠܦ‬焿‫ܦܠ‬r‫܉ ܡ‬牟q‫ܬܙ‬r‫ ܘܡ‬qq‫ܕ‬ 15
爯q‫ ܕ‬焏r‫ܢ‬r‫ ܒ‬.‫ܐ‬rq‫ ܘܠܒܥ‬焏r‫ܢ‬r‫ ܘܠܒ‬.焏‫ܠ‬q‫ ܡܠ‬焏‫ ܘܠܠ‬焏‫ܠ‬q‫ ܠܡܠ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬熏‫ ܗܢ‬.煿‫ܡܢ‬
‫ܢ‬熏q‫ ܠܦܠ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬熏‫ ܗܢ‬.焏‫ܢ‬qq 煟q‫ ܒ‬爯qrq‫ܒ‬q‫ ܕ‬焏rr‫ ܡܦ‬焏‫̈ܡ‬熏‫ܕ ܠܩܢ‬熏q‫ ܒܠ‬焿‫ܦܠ‬r‫ܡ‬
.‫ܐ‬煟q焏‫ܐ ܒ‬煟q焏‫ܢ ܕܒ‬熏‫ ܕ̇ܗܢ‬焏qrr‫ ܘܠ‬爿qqr‫ܩ‬熏‫ܘܠܣ‬

§ 42 焏‫ܡ‬煟‫ ܥ‬焏r‫ܢ‬r‫ ܒ‬爯‫ ̣ܡ‬熏‫ܡ‬q‫ ܕܐܬܬܣ‬焏‫ܢ‬rr熏‫ܘܢ ܦ‬煿‫ܠ‬q‫ܥ܉ ܕ‬煟‫ ܠܡ‬爏qq‫ܙܕܩ ܗ‬

‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܘܢ ܨ̈ܒ‬煿‫ ܡܢ‬煟q 煟q 爏q‫ ܕ‬爏q‫ ܡ‬.爯qr‫ܐܡ‬r‫ܐ ܡ‬熏‫܉ ܕܓ‬焏q‫ܘܣ‬焏‫ܠ‬ 20
焏‫ܡ‬熏̈‫ ܕܩܢ‬焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܪ‬熏‫ ܐܘ ܒܦ‬.‫ܕܐ‬煟q̈ 爯‫ ̣ܡ‬爯‫ܠܦ‬q̈r‫ܬܘܗܝ ܕܡ‬熏q‫ ܬ‬r‫̇ܒ‬q ‫ܬܐ‬焏q‫ܣ̈ܓ‬
爯qr‫ܐܡ‬r‫ ܡ‬rqrq ‫ܕܐ‬煟q̈ 爯‫ ̣ܡ‬爯qq‫ܢ ܕܥܠ‬熏‫ ̇ܗܢ‬焏‫ܢ‬rr熏‫ ܐܦ ܦ‬焏‫ ܐܠ‬.焏r̈‫ܕ‬焏‫ܐܘ ܒ‬
rqr‫ܢ ܕܠ‬熏‫ܘܢ ̇ܗܢ‬煿‫ܠ‬q‫ܘܢ ܠ‬煿‫ ܡܢ‬煟q 煟q‫ܠ‬q‫ ܕ‬爏q‫ ܡ‬.‫ܐ‬熏‫ܘܢ ܕܓ‬煿qrq‫ܕܐ‬
.煿‫ ܡܢ‬rqr‫ܢ ܕܠ‬熏‫ܘܢ ̇ܗܢ‬煿‫ܠ‬q‫ ܠ‬煿‫ܢ‬qq 爯‫ܡ‬ ̣ ‫ ܘ‬煿‫ܡ‬r 爯‫ܒ ̣ܡ‬煿̇q‫ ܘ‬.r‫̇ܒ‬q 煿‫ܡܢ‬
qq‫ ܐ‬焏r‫ܘܗܝ ܘܐܕ‬rq‫ ܐ‬焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܪ‬熏‫ ܦ‬焏r‫ܢ‬r‫ ܒ‬.焏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܗ‬qq‫ ܕܐ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܐܡ‬ 25
‫ܐ܉‬r‫ܩ‬r‫ܐ ܡ‬熏‫ ܕܓ‬焏r‫ܢ‬r‫ ܒ‬爏qq‫ ܗ‬焏‫ ܗܢ‬.焏qq ‫ ̇ܗܘ‬焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫܉ ܕܓ‬爯‫ܢ‬r‫ܕܐܡ‬

6 add., (cf. L.33va24f./P.42r11) 14 suppl. ex L.32ra1–3/P.40r4f. 18 r‫ܩ‬熏‫( ܘܠܣ‬vd.

comm.) 22 焏r‫ܕ‬焏‫ ;ܒ‬sǝyāmē suppl. ex L.32ra26, (cf. 120.3/B.88r20) ‖ 爯qq‫ ]ܕܥܠ‬爯q‫ܠ‬焏‫ ;ܕܥ‬em.
ex L.32ra27/P.40r14 (vd. comm.)
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 119

[Simple and compound substances and their differences, (cf.

“Porphyry’s tree”)]

Since up to now we have been discussing accidents that occur in a substance, § 41

let us return to [the discussion of] substance by saying: some substances are
simple and some are compound. And the simple ones are either superior to
the compound ones or inferior to them. The simple ones that are superior
to the compound ones are all those substances which by nature are distant
from matter and perceivable destruction. And the simple ⟨substances⟩ that
are inferior to the compound ones are matter by itself or form by itself. For
the composition of matter and form brings forth the compound substance.
Substance is, therefore, a certain genus. For it contains many things beneath
itself. And it is divided into two primary differences: the corporeal and the
incorporeal. Body too is divided into other differences beneath itself, namely
into animate body and into the inanimate one, and into sentient and into the
one that is destitute of sensation [i.e. non-sentient]. Similarly, animate body
is also divided into other differences, namely into living body and into the
lifeless one; and ⟨into the moving one and into the one destitute of motion⟩.
The living and moving one is also divided into other differences, which are
below it, namely into rational and non-rational, and into human and into
beast. But human being is only divided into separate individuals, who are
contained in one nature, for example into ‘Plato’, into ‘Socrates’, and into the
rest of particular (men).

[On the differences between objects]

One ought to know that all differences that have been put forward from § 42
human being to substance are said in general [i.e. are generalizations],
because each and every one of them contains many objects beneath itself
that are different from one another, either by the difference of individuals
or by species. However, also those differences that are higher in relation to
one another are all the more said to be general, since each and every one of
them contains all those that are below it, and it gives its name and its nature
to each item beneath it [in the tree/hierarchy]. I mean the following: ‘man’
is a difference and a species of the living body, as we have said; hence this is
 ‫‪120‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕ‪̇q‬ܒ‪q r‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ̇ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܩܢ̈‪熏‬ܡ‪ 焏q煟qq̈q 焏‬ܕ‪̣ 煟q 煟q‬ܡ‪̈ 爯‬ܒܢ‪q‬ܢ‪焏q煟qq̈q .焏r‬‬
‫ܕ‪̣ 爯q‬ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܩܢ̈‪熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪rr‬ܡ‪爯q煿‬܉ ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕܠ‪ rq‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪q‬ܒ‪ rq‬ܠ‪rqr‬‬
‫ܡܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ܉ ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܦܠܓ‪ 爯q‬ܠܦ‪rr熏‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪焏‬ܕ̈‪ .焏r‬ܘ̣ܗܘ ܬܘܒ‬
‫ܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏qq 焏‬ܕܓ‪熏‬ܐ ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪r‬܉ ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕ‪̇q‬ܒ‪ r‬ܠܒ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏r‬ܕܓ‪熏‬ܐ ܘܠܒܥ‪rq‬ܐ‬
‫ܕܦ‪̣ 爯qrqr‬ܡ‪煟q̈ 爯‬ܕܐ‪ .‬ܠ‪ 熏‬ܒܡܢ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ܉ ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܘܐܦ ܒ‪焏‬ܕ‪ .焏r‬ܘ‪煿̇q‬ܒ ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ‬ ‫‪5‬‬
‫̣ܡ‪熏r 爯‬ܡ‪煿‬ܗ ܘ̣ܡ‪qq 爯‬ܢ‪ .煿‬ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕܐܦ ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏r‬ܘܒܥ‪rq‬ܐ ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪ 爯qr‬ܕ‪爯qqq‬‬
‫ܒܢܣ‪q‬ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܕ‪熏q‬ܢ‪ 煿q‬ܕ̇ܗܘ܉ ܘܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ ܢܦ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪ r‬ܐܦ ̣ܗܘ‬
‫ܕܓ‪熏‬ܐ‪̇q .‬ܒ‪ r‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ܬ‪熏q‬ܬܘܗܝ ܠ̇‪煿‬ܘ ‪ 焏qq‬ܘܠ‪q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܦ‪rr熏‬ܢ‪熏‬ܗܝ‪.‬‬
‫ܘܢܣܒ‪ 爯q‬ܐܦ ̣ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ̣ܡ‪熏q 爯‬ܢ‪ .煿q‬ܡ‪r‬ܩ‪r‬ܐ ܓ‪ rq‬ܢܦ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܐܦ ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪焏r‬‬
‫ܐܦ ‪熏qq‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܒ̇‪ 煿‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܒ‪煟‬ܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܐܦ ܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܐܦ ܐܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܕܓ‪熏‬ܐ‬ ‫‪10‬‬
‫‪88v‬‬ ‫ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ‪ | .‬ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕ‪q‬ܒ‪q 爯qr‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܦ‪rr熏‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܠ‪ rqr‬ܡܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ܉ ܘ‪煿q‬ܒ‪爯q‬‬
‫ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ̣ܡ‪熏q 爯‬ܢ‪煿q‬ܘܢ‪ .‬ܡ‪r‬ܩ‪r‬ܐ ܓ‪ rq‬ܐܘܣ‪焏q‬܉ ܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܘܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪焏‬‬
‫ܢܦ‪r‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܘ‪熏qq‬ܬܐ ܘܒ‪r‬ܢ‪ .焏r‬ܘ‪q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ̇ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܦ‪rr熏‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ‬
‫ܒ‪焏‬ܘܣ‪焏q‬܉ ܘܩܢ̈‪熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ ‪̇ 焏q煟qq̈q‬ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕܠ‪rqr‬܇ ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܦܠܓ‪ 爯q‬ܠܡ‪煟‬ܡ‬
‫ܐ‪.爯qrq‬‬ ‫‪15‬‬

‫‪§ 43‬‬ ‫ܒܦܣ‪̈q‬ܩ‪r‬ܐ ܓ‪ rq‬ܠܡ‪焏‬ܡ‪r‬܉ ‪q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܦ‪rr熏‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܬ̈‪ 焏qrq‬ܢܣܒ‪熏r 爯q‬ܡ̈‪煿‬ܐ‬

‫ܕ̇ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕܠܥ‪ 爏‬ܡܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ‪̇ .‬ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܥܠ̈‪焏q‬܉ ܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪ 爯q‬ܒ‪熏r‬ܡ‪煿‬ܐ ܕ̇ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ‬
‫ܬ̈‪ 爏q .焏qrq‬ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏r‬ܓ‪ 焏qq rq‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܘܢܦ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܘܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܘܐܘܣ‪.焏q‬‬
‫ܠ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪ 爏q 爯q‬ܕ‪ qq‬ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏r‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ܉ ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܒܥ‪rq‬ܐ‪ .‬ܘܠ‪ 爏q 熏‬ܕܢܦ‪qq r‬܉‬
‫ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܢ‪̈犏‬ܒ‪r‬ܐ‪ .‬ܘܠ‪ 熏‬ܬܘܒ ‪ 爏q‬ܕܐܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܗܘ ܕܢܦ‪ r‬ܗ̣ܘ‪ .‬ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪̈焏q‬ܦ‪焏‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬
‫̈‬
‫ܠ‪ 爟‬ܘܩ‪q‬ܣ‪ .焏‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܓ‪̇ rq‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܐܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ܉ ܕܢܦ‪ r‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܩ‪.爯qr‬‬
‫ܗ‪熏q‬ܬ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܐܦ ‪ 爏q‬ܕ‪ qq‬ܡ‪r‬ܩ‪r‬ܐ ܢܦ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܘܐܘܣ‪ .焏q‬ܘ‪ 爏q‬ܕܢܦ‪ r‬ܗ̣ܘ ܬܘܒ‬
‫ܡ‪rr‬ܡ‪ 煿‬ܐܘܣ‪ .焏q‬ܠ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪ 爏q 爯q‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܐܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܗܘ ̣ܡ‪ 爏q 爯‬ܦ‪r‬ܘܣ ܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪焏‬‬
‫‪ r‬ܠ̇‪̇ 煿‬ܗܝ‬
‫ܗܘ܇ ܐܘ ܢܦ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܐܘ ‪熏qq‬ܬܐ ܐܘ ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪ .焏r‬ܡ‪ 爯q煟‬ܐܬ‪݀ q熟q‬‬
‫ܕܐܡ‪ 爯qr‬ܗܘ‪ 爯q‬ܢ‪rq煿‬ܐ‪rq‬܇ ܕ‪q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܓ̈ܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܕܥܠ‪̣ 爯qq‬ܡ‪煟q̈ 爯‬ܕܐ ‪煿q‬ܒ‪̣ 爯q‬ܡ‪爯‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬
‫‪熏r‬ܡ̈‪煿q煿‬ܘܢ ܘ̣ܡ‪qq 爯‬ܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܠ‪q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܐܕ̈‪ 焏r‬ܬ̈‪焏qrq‬܇ ܥ‪煟‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܠܩܢ̈‪熏‬ܡ‪焏‬‬
‫‪ 焏q煟qq̈q‬ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ ܡ‪r‬ܦܠܓ‪̇ .爯q‬ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܬ̈‪焏qrq‬܉ ܠ‪ 焏‬ܠ̇‪煿‬ܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ‬
‫ܠܥ‪ 爏‬ܡܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܒ‪rr‬ܥ‪r‬ܗ܉ ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܠ̇‪煿‬ܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܬܘܒ ܕܡܥܠ‪ rqrq 爯q‬ܘܪ‪qq‬ܩ‪爯q‬‬
‫ܡܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ܇ ‪煿q‬ܒ‪ 爯q‬ܡ‪r‬ܘܡ ‪熏r‬ܡ‪煿‬ܗܘܢ ܐܘ ‪qq‬ܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ‪.‬‬

‫‪; em. ex L.32va4/P.40v10‬ܘܡ‪11 爏q‬‬ ‫‪; em. ex L.32vb13/P.41r5‬ܕܥ‪焏‬ܠ‪] 爯q‬ܕܥܠ‪25 爯qq‬‬ ‫‪25–26‬‬
‫‪煿q; del. et sǝyāmē suppl. ex L.32vb15‬ܒ‪̣ 爯q‬ܡ‪̣] 爯‬ܡ‪熏r [爯‬ܡ‪煿q煿‬ܘܢ‬
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 121

called ‘man in general’, because it contains all those particular individuals of

entire mankind. And these particulars are named ‘individuals’, since there
is nothing else, which is contained below them, and they are not divided by
further differences, or into [further] species. And again, ‘living body’ is said
in general, since it contains man in general and animal, which are distinct
from one another not only in number but also in species, and it assigns them
of its title and of its nature, since both man and animal are said to be living
things because they receive that appellation from it [i.e. from the genus of
‘living things’]. Furthermore, ‘animate body’ is also said in general, for it also
contains below itself the living [genus] and all its differences. And they too
receive of its appellation, for both ‘man’ and ‘animal’ are called animate.
Similarly, both ‘body’ and ‘substance’ exist in general, because they contain
all the differences below them, and they assign to them their appellation.
For ‘body’, ‘animate body’, ‘animal’, and ‘man’ are called substance, and (so
also) all the other differences that are in substance, and even the particular
individuals below, which are not divided into something else.

To recount in brief: all the lower differences receive the titles of those that § 43
are above them, but the upper ones are not designated by the title of the
lower ones. For each man is living, animate, body, and substance, but not
everything that is living is man, as for example beast, and not everything
that is animate is living, as for example plants; and again, not everything
that is substance is animate, as for example stones and logs. For these are
substance, but they are not called animate. Likewise, also everything that is
living is called animate and substance, and again, everything that is animate
is named substance, but not everything that is substance is by any means
body, animate, animal, or man. Therefore, what we were saying has appeared
clearly: all genera that are higher in relation to one another assign their titles
and their nature to all the lower species, down to particular individuals that
are not further divided. But the lower ones do not ever assign their title or
their nature to those that are immediately above them or to those that are
further above and remote from them.
 ‫‪122‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫‪§ 44‬‬ ‫ܐܘܣ̈‪ 爿q‬ܗ‪ 爏qq‬ܩ‪̈煟‬ܡ‪rq‬ܐ ܐ‪爯q煿qrq‬܉ ‪q‬ܠ‪ 爯q煿‬ܨ̈ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ‪rq煟qq̈q‬ܐ ܕܐ‪rq‬‬
‫ܠ‪ 爯q煿‬ܩ‪q熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪rq‬ܗ‪ .爯q‬ܐܘܣ̈‪ 爿q‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕܬܪܬ‪ 爯q‬ܡ‪̈rr‬ܡ‪煿‬ܢ܉ ‪q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ‬
‫ܐܕ̈‪ 爯q煿qr‬ܕܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܘܓܢ̈ܣ‪ .爯q煿q‬ܒܥ‪r‬ܐ ܗܝ ܓ‪ rq‬ܐܦ ܗܪ‪ 焏q‬ܪܒ‪r‬ܐ܉‬
‫ܕܒ‪q焏‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܙܢ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܦܠܓ‪ 焏‬ܐܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܠ̇‪煿‬ܝ ܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪rq‬ܐ ܘܠ̇‪煿‬ܝ ܕܬܪܬ‪ .爯q‬ܘܙܕ̇ܩ‬
‫ܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪ rq‬ܕ‪q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ̈ܙܢ‪ 焏q‬ܕܡ‪ 焏qqr‬ܕܢ‪煿‬ܘܐ ܒ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܦ‪熏‬ܠܓ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ̣ܗܘ‬ ‫‪5‬‬
‫‪90r‬‬ ‫ܢܣ‪爟q‬܉ ܘܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܢܥܒ‪ 煟‬ܠ̇‪ | 煿‬ܡܦܩܢ‪ 焏‬ܠܡܠ‪r‬ܐ ܐ‪qq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܙܕܩ‪.‬‬

‫‪§ 45‬‬ ‫‪ 爏q‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܓ‪ rq‬ܕܡ‪r‬ܦܠ‪焿‬܉ ܐܘ ܐ‪ qq‬ܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪焏‬ܕ̈‪焏r‬܉ ܐܘ ܐ‪ qq‬ܒ‪r‬ܬ‬

‫ܩܠ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪̈犏‬ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܕ̈ܡ‪ .爯q‬ܐܘ ⟩ܐ‪ ⟨qq‬ܠܡܢ̈‪熏‬ܬܐ ܕܕ̈ܡ‪ 爯q‬ܐܘ ܠܡܢ̈‪熏‬ܬܐ ܕܠ‪焏‬‬
‫ܕ̈ܡ‪⟩ 爯q‬ܡ‪r‬ܦܠ‪ .⟨焿‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪焏‬ܕ̈‪焏r‬܉ ܐ‪熏qq qq‬ܬܐ ܠܒ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏r‬ܘܠ‪q‬ܠ‪爯q煿‬‬
‫‪熏̈qq‬ܬܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ‪ .‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܒ‪r‬ܬ ܩܠ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܠ‪̈犏‬ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܕ̈ܡ‪爯q‬܉ ܠ‪q‬ܠܒ‪焏‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬
‫ܕ‪q‬ܒ‪ 焏r‬ܘܠ̇‪煿‬ܘ ܕ̈ܡ‪ 焏q‬ܘܠ̇‪煿‬ܘ ܕܓܢܒ‪r‬ܐ ܘܠ̇‪煿‬ܘ ܕܨ‪ .rq‬ܘܠܡܢ̈‪熏‬ܬܐ ܕܕ̈ܡ‪ 爯q‬ܠ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ‬
‫ܣ‪̣ rq‬ܡ‪̇ 爯‬ܗܝ ܕܪܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܘܕܙܥ‪熏‬ܪܘܬܐ܉ ܐ‪ qq‬ܓ‪r‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܘܩ‪q‬ܣ‪ 焏‬ܘܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ‬
‫ܕܐ‪ qq‬ܗܠ‪ .爯q‬ܘܠ‪煿‬ܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܕ̈ܡ‪爯q‬܉ ܐ‪r qq‬ܓܠ‪ 焏‬ܘܐ̈‪ 焏q煟q‬ܘܪ‪ 焏rq‬ܘܕܐ‪qq‬‬
‫ܗܠ‪.爯q‬‬

‫‪§ 46‬‬ ‫ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܗ‪ 爏qq‬ܕܒ‪̣ 煟q‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܬܠ‪r‬ܐ ̈ܙܢ‪ 焏q‬ܡ‪r‬ܦܠܓ‪ 爏q 焏‬ܨܒ‪ 熏‬ܐ‪煟q‬ܐ‬ ‫‪15‬‬
‫ܕܡܩܒܠ‪ 焏‬ܦ‪熏‬ܠܓ‪ :焏‬ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪ 焏q犏‬ܕܢ‪ qqrr‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܕܡ‪r‬ܦܠ‪ :焿‬ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܠ‪犏‬ܐ‬
‫ܕܬ‪ 煟q rqq‬ܡܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܢ݁ܦ‪爏‬܉ ܢܩܦ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪ 爏qq‬ܕܢܒܥ‪ 焏‬ܕܒ‪q焏‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܙܢ‪ 焏‬ܡܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ‬
‫̇ܗܘܐ ܦ‪熏‬ܠܓ‪ 焏‬ܕܐܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܠܩ‪̈ 煟‬‬
‫ܡ‪rq‬ܐ ܘܠ‪煟‬ܬ‪r‬ܬ‪.爯q‬‬

‫‪§ 47‬‬ ‫ܐܡ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܗ‪ .爏qq‬ܕܐ‪ qq‬ܕܠܡܢ̈‪熏‬ܬܐ ܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܬܦܠܓ ݀‬

‫‪r‬܉ ܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܕ̈ܡ‪爯q‬܉‬
‫ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܕ̈ܡ‪ 爯q‬ܠ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ‪ .‬ܘܐܢ‪ 爯q煟‬ܠ‪焏‬܉ ܐܠ‪犏‬ܐ ܗܘܬ ܕܐܘܣ‪焏q‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬
‫ܐ‪rq‬ܬܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܐ‪ rq‬ܗܘܬ ܕܡ‪r‬ܦܠܓ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪煿‬ܠ‪ 爯q‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܠܡܢ̈‪熏‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܘܙܕܩ‬
‫ܗܘܐ ܕܐܦ ܥ‪ 爏‬ܗܕܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܡܠܦܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܩ‪煟‬ܡ ܗܠ‪ .爯q‬ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܦܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪qq‬‬
‫‪ 焏r‬ܡ‪r‬ܦܠܓ‪ 焏‬ܬܢ‪ 爯‬ܐܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܠܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪rq‬ܐ ܘܠ̇‪煿‬ܝ ܕܬ‪r‬ܬ‪.爯q‬‬ ‫ܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪焏‬ܕ ̈‬
‫ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕܒ‪焏‬ܕ̈‪ 焏r‬ܕܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ ܡܢ‪ 煟q 煿‬ܡܢ‪ 煿‬ܕܓܢܣ‪焏‬܉ ܠ‪ rq‬ܣ‪ q‬ܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪焏q‬‬
‫ܘܐ‪ .焏qrq‬ܐܠ‪̣ 焏‬ܡ‪ 爏q 爯‬ܐ‪ 焏qq‬ܕ̇ܨܒ‪ 焏‬ܐܢ‪ r‬ܕܢ‪rr‬ܐ ܒܦ‪熏‬ܠܓ‪煿‬ܘܢ܉ ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܬܡ‪爯‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬
‫̇‬
‫ܥܒ‪ 煟‬ܠ‪ 煟q .煿‬ܢܩܦ‪q 爯q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܐܕ̈‪ 焏r‬ܕܠ‪r熏q 焏‬ܒ‪ 焏‬ܕܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪ 焏q‬ܘܐ‪ .焏qrq‬ܡ‪爯q煟‬‬
‫ܐܢ̣‪煿‬ܘ ܕܡܢ̇‪ 煿‬ܕܐܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܐ‪ 煿̇qrq‬ܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪rq‬ܐ ܘܡܢ̇‪ 煿‬ܕܬܪܬ‪爯q‬܉ ‪q煟q‬ܥ‪ 焏‬ܗܝ‬
‫ܕܐܦܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܦ‪熏‬ܠܓ‪ 焏‬ܕܐܕ̈‪ 焏r‬ܐܬܬܣ‪ 爟q‬ܬܢ‪ 爯‬ܦ‪熏‬ܠܓ̇‪ .煿‬ܐܦܠ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ‬
‫ܐ‪ qq‬ܒ‪r‬ܬ ܩܠ‪qqr 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܐ ܕܡ‪r‬ܦܠܓ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪̈犏‬ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܕ̇ܡ‪qq 焏‬ܢ‪爯q煿‬‬
‫‪90v‬‬ ‫ܠ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ܇ ܡ‪犏‬ܐ ܐܢ‪ r‬ܕܢ‪焏‬ܡ‪ | r‬ܕܗܘܐ ܬܢ‪ 爯‬ܦ‪熏‬ܠܓ̇‪ 煿‬ܕܐܘܣ‪焏q‬܉ ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕܠ‪熏‬‬ ‫‪30‬‬

‫ܕܨ‪ (vd. comm.) 8 add. 9 add. 11 rq‬ܕܡ‪r‬ܦܠ‪; em. ex L.34va5/P.43r11 7 焿‬ܕ‪2 爯q煿qrq‬‬
‫ܕܩ‪̈ 煟‬‬
‫ܡ‪; em. ex L.35ra20/P.43v17 26 L.35rb2–3: 焏q‬ܐ‪ rq‬ܗ̣ܘܐ ]ܐ‪ rq‬ܗܘܬ ‪(vd. comm.) 21‬‬
‫‪; em. ex L.35rb4/P.43v25‬ܕܡܢ‪, (etiam P.43v24–25 sine sǝyāmē) 27 煿‬ܘܐ‪焏qrq‬‬
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 123

[The dispute on the division of substance]

Now, primary substances are all particular objects that have self-subsistence, § 44
and all their species and genera are named secondary substances. Also here
the dispute is huge: in what way is substance divided into the primary and
the secondary one? It is proper that we first set forth all the ways in which
any division whatsoever possibly may come about, and afterwards we shall
make a conclusion for the discussion as it is required.

For everything that is divided is ⟨divided⟩ either (1) as a genus into species, or § 45
(2) as a word into dissimilar objects [i.e. homonyms], or (3) ⟨as⟩ into similar
parts or into dissimilar parts. (It is divided) as a genus into species: as animal
into man and into all other animals. As a word into dissimilar objects: into
the dog of land, into the dog of water, into the (dog) of Orion constellation,
and into the depicted one. And into similar parts to each other, apart from
that of largeness and smallness [i.e. size]: as bone and log and other suchlike
things; and into the dissimilar (parts): as feet, hands and head, and the like.

As every object that admits of division, is divided in one of these three ways, § 46
and it is impossible to find anything that is divided, which does not neces-
sarily fall under one of them, it is accordingly suitable that we investigate,
in what way of these (three), the division of substance into primary and sec-
ondary comes about.

I say thus, that it [i.e. substance] has not been divided as into parts, neither § 47
as those that are similar nor as those that are dissimilar to one another;
otherwise it would be necessary that there was another substance that could
be divided into such things as into parts. And there should have been a
teaching also concerning this latter one before the former ones.10 But nor
is substance here divided into a primary and a secondary one as a genus
into species, because amongst the species that pertain to the same genus
there is no prior and posterior, except from wherever a person wishes to
begin with [any] division of them, from there he makes him one, as all the
species proceed without any notion of prior and posterior (being present).
Therefore, if some substance is primary and some secondary, it is obvious
that its division is not herein established as a division of species. Again, nor
as a single word that is divided into objects, the nature of each of which is

10 If there were any substance that could be divided as into similar or dissimilar parts,
there should be a tradition of exegesis concerning that one too and its divisions.
 ‫‪124‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ ܒ‪r‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ̈ܡ‪ 爯q‬ܐܘܣ̈‪ 爿q‬ܠ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ܉ ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܦ ܬ‪熏q‬ܡ‪ 爯q煿‬ܘ‪qq‬ܢ‪爯q煿‬‬

‫ܗܘ‪̣ 煟q 熏q‬ܗܘ ܒ‪ 爏q‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ‪ .‬ܡ‪ 爯q煟‬ܐܢ̣‪煿‬ܘ ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܠܡܢ̈‪熏‬ܬܐ‪ :‬ܘܠ‪焏‬‬
‫ܬܘܒ ܐ‪ qq‬ܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪焏‬ܕ̈‪ :焏r‬ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܒ‪r‬ܬ ܩܠ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪̈犏‬ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܡ‪q̈r‬ܠܦ‪r‬ܐ‬
‫ܐܬܦܠܓ‪ r‬ܐܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܠܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪rq‬ܐ ܘܠ‪煟‬ܬܪܬ‪爯q‬܉ ܡ‪ 焏q熟qr‬ܕ‪ 焯q‬ܣܓ‪ q‬ܐ‪煿̇qrq‬‬
‫ܒܥ‪r‬ܐ ܕܠ‪.焏qrr 焏‬‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫‪§ 48‬‬ ‫ܐܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܗ‪ 爏qq‬ܕܠ‪ 熏‬ܦ‪熏‬ܠܓ̇‪ 煿‬ܕܐܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܥ̣ܒ‪ 煟‬ܐܪܣ‪q熏q‬ܠ‪ 爿q‬ܒ‪煿‬ܕܐ ܕܐ̇ܡ‪.r‬‬
‫ܕܡܢ̇‪ 煿‬ܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪rq‬ܐ ܐ‪ 煿̇qrq‬ܘܡܢ̇‪ 煿‬ܕܬܪܬ‪爯q‬܉ ܐܠ‪qq 焏‬ܣ‪ 焏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ ܣ‪ 爟‬ܒ̇‪煿‬‬
‫ܕܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܘܕܬܪ‪q‬ܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܘܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪̣⟩ 焏‬ܗܘ⟨ ‪qq‬ܣ‪ 焏‬ܕܡܢ‪q‬ܢ‪焏‬܉ ܘܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪̣ 焏‬ܗܘ‬
‫̇‬
‫ܦ‪熏‬ܠܓ‪ 焏‬ܕܢܣܒ‪ 焏‬ܨܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܕܓ‪熏‬ܐ܇ ܘܡܦ‪r‬ܫ ܠ̇‪ 煿‬ܢܩܦ‪ rq焏‬ܠ‪rq煟qq̈q‬ܐ‪.‬‬

‫‪§ 49‬‬ ‫ܘ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܒ‪r‬ܪ ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܗ̣ܘ‪煟q rq‬ܥ݁‪ r‬ܐܦ ܗܕܐ܉ ܕܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܩ‪ 焯qr‬ܗ̣ܘ ܠ‪焏‬ܘܣ‪焏q‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬
‫̇ܗܝ ܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪rq‬ܐ ‪̣ rqrq‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܓܢܣ‪ .焏‬ܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪ rq‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܐܢ̣‪煿‬ܘ ܕܢ‪rr‬ܐܠ ܐܢ‪ r‬ܕܡ̣ܢ‪熏‬‬
‫ܣ‪熏‬ܩ‪爿qqr‬܉ ܡ‪qq‬ܢ‪ rq焏‬ܐ̇ܡ‪ r‬ܕܒ‪r‬ܢ‪ .焏r‬ܐܢ‪ 爯q煟‬ܐܦ ܡ̣ܢ‪ 熏‬ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏r‬ܢ‪rr‬ܐܠ܉‬
‫ܗ‪ 爯q煟q‬ܡܦܢ‪ 焏‬ܦ‪r‬ܓܡ‪焏‬܉ ܕ‪ 焏qq‬ܡܠ‪q‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪熏q‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܒ‪熏r‬ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܗ‪̇ 爏qq‬ܗܘ‬
‫ܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪焏q‬܉ ܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܢ̣ܣ‪ 焯‬ܘ‪熏r‬ܕܥ ܥ‪ 爏‬ܣ‪熏‬ܩ‪ 爿qqr‬ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܐܘܣ‪焏q‬‬
‫ܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪rq‬ܐ‪ .‬ܒ̇‪煿‬ܘ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪焏‬܉ ܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܢ̣ܣ‪̇ .焯‬ܡ‪q煟q 爯q煟‬ܥ‪ 焏‬ܗܝ܉‬ ‫‪15‬‬
‫ܕܩ‪qr‬ܒ‪ 爯q‬ܐܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܐܕ̈‪ 焏r‬ܠ‪焏‬ܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪rq‬ܐ ‪̣ rqrq‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܓ̈ܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܘܡ‪rq‬ܪ‪爯q‬‬
‫ܡܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ‪ .‬ܒ̇‪煿‬ܝ ܕܓ̈ܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܣܢ‪q‬ܩ‪ 爯q‬ܥ‪ 爏‬ܐܕ̈‪ 焏r‬ܕܢ‪r‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܘܢ ܥܠ‪煿q‬ܘܢ܉ ܐܕ̈‪焏r‬‬
‫ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܣܢ‪q‬ܩ‪ 爯q‬ܥ‪ 爏‬ܓ̈ܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܕܢ‪r‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܘܢ ܥܠ‪煿q‬ܘܢ܉ ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܕܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ ܢ‪q‬ܒ‪熏r‬ܢ‬
‫ܐܢ‪熏‬ܢ‪.‬‬

‫‪§ 50‬‬ ‫ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕܐܦܠ‪ 焏‬ܗܕܐ ܗܦ‪rq‬ܐ ܢܥܒ‪ 煿̇qr‬ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܢܣ‪q‬ܡ‪ 煿̇q‬ܒܡ‪焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܢ‬ ‫‪20‬‬
‫ܕܠ‪熏‬ܬܟ܉ ܐ‪qq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܐܦܠ‪ 焏‬ܗܕܐ ܬܗܘܐ ‪q‬ܥ‪ 焏q‬ܠܩ‪r‬ܘ‪ .焏q‬ܐ‪̇ rq‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܐܢ̈‪爯qr‬‬
‫ܕܡ‪煿‬ܦ‪ 爯qq‬ܘܐܡ‪爯qr‬܉ ܕܐܢ̣‪煿‬ܘ ̇ܡ‪ 爯‬ܕܐܘܣ̈‪ 爿q‬ܩ‪̈煟‬ܡ‪rq‬ܐ ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ ܩܢ̈‪熏‬ܡ‪焏‬‬
‫‪ .焏q煟qq̈q‬ܘܐܘܣ̈‪ 爿q‬ܕܬܪܬ‪ 爯q‬ܐܕ̈‪ 焏r‬ܘܓ̈ܢܣ‪焏‬܉ ܥ‪ 爏‬ܡܢ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܦ ܓ‪焏r̈煟‬‬
‫ܡ‪rr‬ܡ‪ 爯q煿‬ܐܘܣ̈‪ 爿q‬ܕܬܠ‪ .r‬ܡ‪rr‬ܪ‪ 焏q‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܒܥ‪r‬ܐ ܗܕܐ ܕܐܬܐܡ‪݀ r‬‬
‫ܬ‬
‫ܒ‪r‬ܪ‪̈ 爯q‬ܙܢ‪.焏q‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬

‫̈‬
‫‪ 8 suppl. ex L.35va3/P.44r12 9‬ܐܪܣ‪; sǝyāmē del. ex L.35rb23/P.44r5 6 熏q‬ܓܢܣ‪3 焏‬‬
‫;ܢ‪焏r‬ܠ ‪ et‬ܕܢ‪焏r‬ܠ ‪ 11 et 12‬ܗ̣ܘ̣‪煟ܵq rq‬ܥ݁‪ (etiam L.35va5/P.44r13); emend. 10 vid. r‬ܕܢ̇ܣ‪焯‬‬
‫‪em. ex L.36vb4/P.45v5 et L.36vb8/P.45v6‬‬ ‫)‪ (vd. comm.‬ܕ‪ 焏qq‬ܡܠ‪q‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ‪13‬‬ ‫‪16‬‬
‫‪; del. ex‬ܡܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ ]ܕܓ̈ܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܐܕ̈‪ .[焏r‬ܒ̇‪煿‬ܝ ‪; sǝyāmē suppl. ex L.36vb20/P.45v12 17‬ܓܢܣ‪焏‬‬
‫‪L.36vb22/P.45v13‬‬
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 125

dissimilar to the others, can anyone say that the division of substance has
come about here, since substances are similar one to another not only by
a name, but also their definition and their nature is the same in every way.
Hence, if substance has not been divided into a primary and secondary one
as into parts, nor as a genus into species, and nor as a word into different
objects, (then) the dispute seems very much to be without a solution.

We say therefore that Aristotle did not make a division of substance in saying § 48
this: “some of it is primary and some of it secondary” (cf. Cat. 2a11–19), but
merely he put the order of priority and posteriority into it, and another
⟨being⟩ the order of number, and another being the division that a general
object receives and differentiates it accordingly into particulars.

[The priority of secondary substances over primary substances]

After these things, you should know also this: species is closer to primary § 49
substance than is genus (Cat. 2b7f.). For firstly, if someone is asked “what
is Socrates?”, he appropriately says ‘man’. And if he is also asked “what is
man?”, then he offers the answer: ‘living, rational, mortal’. Thus, through the
first question he received a species and signified Socrates as being a primary
substance. And through the other (question) he received a certain genus.
Therefore, it is obvious that species are closer to primary substance than are
genera, and are superior to them, in that the genera stand in need of species
to be predicated of them, but species do not stand in need of genera to be
predicated of them, but only to contain them.

In order that we neither pass over the following objection nor (fail to) put § 50
it in our treatise for you, nor that it leads to confusion within the reader
[we report]: there are some people who retort and say that if particular indi-
viduals are truly primary substances, and species and genera are secondary
substances, why are accidents not in turn named tertiary substances? How-
ever, the said problem is solved in two ways.
 ‫‪126‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫‪§ 51‬‬ ‫ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܕ‪̣ 煟q 爯q‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܬܪ‪̈ 爯q‬ܙܢ‪ 焏q‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܕܐܕ̈‪ 焏r‬ܘܓ̈ܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪爯qr‬‬
‫ܡ‪rq‬ܐ‪ .‬ܕ̇ܗܢ‪ 爯q‬ܐ‪rqrqr 爯q煿qrq‬ܐ ܘ‪rq̈rq‬ܬܐ‪.‬‬‫‪qq‬ܢ‪ rq焏‬ܥ‪ 爏‬ܐܘܣ̈‪ 爿q‬ܩ‪̈ 煟‬‬
‫̈‬
‫ܘܡܒ‪q‬ܠ‪熏r 爯q‬ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܕܥܠ‪爯q煿q‬܇ ܒ‪ 煟q‬ܕܡ‪熏r‬ܕܥ‪ 爯q‬ܠ‪ .爯q煿‬ܓ‪ 焏r煟‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܠ‪焏‬‬
‫‪91r‬‬ ‫ܡ‪r‬ܘܡ ܥܒ‪ 爯q煟‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕܕܐ‪ qq‬ܗ‪ | .爯q‬ܣ‪熏‬ܩ‪ 爿qqr‬ܘܦܠ‪熏q‬ܢ‬
‫ܘܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܐ‪ qq‬ܗܠ‪ .爯q‬ܩܢ̈‪熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ ‪焏q煟qq̈q‬܉ ܘܐܘܣ̈‪ 爿q‬ܩ‪̈煟‬ܡ‪rq‬ܐ‬ ‫‪5‬‬
‫ܡ‪rr‬ܡ‪ .爯q煿‬ܐܢ ܗ‪ 爏qq‬ܢ‪rr‬ܐܠ ܐܢ‪ r‬ܕܡܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܣ‪熏‬ܩ‪ .爿qqr‬ܒ‪rr‬ܥ‪r‬ܗ‬
‫ܡܦܢ‪ 焏‬ܦ‪r‬ܓܡ‪焏‬܉ ܕܒ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏r‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܘ‪ 焏qq‬ܬܘܒ ܘܢܦ‪r‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܡ‪ 爯q煟‬ܒ‪煟q‬‬
‫ܐܕ̈‪ 焏r‬ܘܓ̈ܢܣ‪̇ 焏‬ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ ܐܘܣ̈‪ 爿q‬ܕܬ‪r‬ܬ‪爯q‬܉ ܐܩ‪熏r 爟q‬ܐܠ‪焏‬‬
‫ܕܥ‪ 爏‬ܐܘܣ̈‪ 爿q‬ܩ‪̈煟‬ܡ‪rq‬ܐ܉ ܘܒ‪煿q煟q̈焏‬ܘܢ ‪熏r‬ܕܥ ܐܢ‪ .爯q‬ܐܢ‪ 爯q煟‬ܢ‪焏‬ܡ‪ r‬ܠ‪熏‬ܬ‬
‫̇ܗܘ ܕܡ‪焏r‬ܠ ܠ‪ .煿‬ܕܡ̣ܢ‪ 熏‬ܣ‪熏‬ܩ‪ 爿qqr‬ܐܘ ܦܠ‪熏q‬ܢ‪ .‬ܕ‪熏q‬ܪܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܐܘ‬ ‫‪10‬‬
‫ܐܘ‪q‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܐܘ ܩ‪ 焏qr‬ܐܘ ܐܪ‪ .焏qq‬ܐܘ ‪煟q‬ܐ ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܓ‪r煟‬ܢ‪ rq焏‬ܢܩ‪̈q‬ܦ‪爯‬‬
‫ܘܠ‪qq 熏‬ܢ‪q煟q .rq焏‬ܥ‪ 焏‬ܗܝ ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪熏r‬ܕܥ ܕܡܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܐ‪rr‬ܐܠ‬
‫ܥܠ‪熏‬ܗܝ‪ .‬ܕܐ‪ qq‬ܕ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܗܪ‪ 焏q‬ܬܬ‪熟q‬ܐ܉ ܕܐܕ̈‪ 焏r‬ܘܓ̈ܢܣ‪qq 焏‬ܢ‪ rq焏‬ܡ‪熏r‬ܕܥ‪爯q‬‬
‫ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܠܩܢ̈‪熏‬ܡ‪ 焏q煟qq̈q 焏‬ܕܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ ܐܘܣ̈‪ 爿q‬ܩ‪̈煟‬ܡ‪rq‬ܐ܉ ܓ‪ 焏r̈煟‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܠ‪焏‬‬
‫ܡ‪r‬ܘܡ ܥܒ‪ 爯q煟‬ܠ̇‪ 煿‬ܠ‪煿‬ܕܐ‪ .‬ܡ‪r 爯q煟‬ܦ‪ rq‬ܡ‪r‬ܬܣ‪q‬ܡ‪ 爯q‬ܐܕ̈‪ 焏r‬ܘܓ̈ܢܣ‪焏‬‬ ‫‪15‬‬
‫ܐܘܣ̈‪ 爿q‬ܕܬ‪r‬ܬ‪ .爯q‬ܠܓ‪ 焏r̈煟‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܠ‪̣ 焏‬ܩ‪r‬ܐ ܐܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܐܘܣ̈‪爿q‬܉ ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪q‬ܢ‪爯q‬‬
‫ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܐܡ‪r‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܕܢ‪熏r‬ܕܥ‪熏‬ܢ ܠ‪ 煟q 爯‬ܡ‪焏r‬ܠ‪q‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܥ‪ 爏‬ܐܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪rq‬ܐ܇ ̇ܗܝ‬
‫̈‬
‫‪ 焏r‬ܘܓܢܣ‪.焏‬‬ ‫ܕ‪ 焏qqqr‬ܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܐܕ ̈‬

‫‪§ 52‬‬ ‫ܙܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ 煿̇qrr‬ܬܘܒ ܕܒܥ‪r‬ܐ ܗܕܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ܉ ܕܐ‪ qq‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪.焏‬‬
‫ܩܢ̈‪熏‬ܡ‪̇ 焏‬ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ‪ 焏q煟qq̈q‬ܐܘܣ̈‪rqrqr 爿q‬ܐ ܘܩ‪̈煟‬ܡ‪rq‬ܐ ܐܬܩ‪熏qr‬܉ ܡ‪爏q‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬
‫ܕ̣ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܣ‪q‬ܡ‪ 爯q‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܐ̇ܡ‪ r‬ܠ‪焏‬ܕ̈‪ 焏r‬ܘܠܓ̈ܢܣ‪焏‬܉ ܘܢܩ‪q‬ܦ‪ 爯q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ̣ܡ‪爯‬‬
‫‪ 爏q‬ܦ‪r‬ܘܣ‪ .‬ܒ̇‪煿‬ܝ ܕܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܩܢ‪熏‬ܡ‪ 焏q煟qqq 焏‬ܐ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ̣ܗܘ܉ ܢܩ‪牯q‬‬
‫ܠ‪̣ 煿‬ܡ‪ 爏q 爯‬ܦ‪r‬ܘܣ ܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܘܓܢܣ‪ .焏‬ܐܢ̣‪煿‬ܘ ܓ‪ rq‬ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪焏‬‬
‫ܕܦܠ‪熏q‬ܢ ܐܘ ܐܪܣ‪q熏q‬ܠ‪ .爿q‬ܐ‪q煟q‬ܥ‪ 焏‬ܗܝ ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܐܦ ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏r‬ܘ‪焏qq‬‬
‫ܘܢܦ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ ܐܕ̈‪ 焏r‬ܘܓ̈ܢܣ‪ .焏‬ܡ‪ 爯q煟‬ܣ‪q‬ܡ‪ 爯q‬ܐܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܩܢ̈‪熏‬ܡ‪焏‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬
‫‪ 焏q煟qq̈q‬ܠ‪焏‬ܕ̈‪ 焏r‬ܘܠܓ̈ܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܕܢ‪煟qr‬ܥ‪熏‬ܢ ܒ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܘܢ‪r‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܘܢ ܥܠ‪煿q‬ܘܢ‪ .‬ܘܐܦ‬
‫̣ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܐܕ̈‪ 焏r‬ܘܓ̈ܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܕܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ ܐܘܣ̈‪ 爿q‬ܕܬ‪r‬ܬ‪爯q‬܉ ܣ‪q‬ܡ‪ 爯q‬ܠܓ‪焏r̈煟‬‬
‫ܕܢ‪r‬ܩ‪q‬ܡ‪熏‬ܢ ܒ‪煿‬ܘܢ‪ .‬ܓ‪ 焏r̈煟‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪ 爯q熟qr‬ܕܣ‪q‬ܡ‪ 爯q‬ܠܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪焏‬‬
‫ܕܢ‪r‬ܩ‪ 爟q‬ܒ‪煿‬ܘܢ‪ .‬ܐܘ ܕܢ‪煟qr‬ܥ ܒ‪煿‬ܘܢ‪ .‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܕ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܗܪ‪ 焏q‬ܗ‪ 爏qq‬ܬܬ‪煟q‬ܥ܉‬
‫‪91v‬‬ ‫ܕܐܢ ܩܢ̈‪熏‬ܡ‪ | 焏q煟qq̈q 焏‬ܐܬܩ‪ 熏qr‬ܐܘܣ̈‪ 爿q‬ܩ‪̈煟‬ܡ‪rq‬ܐ ܘ‪rqrqr‬ܐ‪ .‬ܡ‪爏q‬‬ ‫‪30‬‬
‫ܕܣ‪q‬ܡ‪ 爯q‬ܠ‪焏‬ܕ̈‪ 焏r‬ܘܠܓ̈ܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܕܢ‪r‬ܩ‪q‬ܡ‪熏‬ܢ ܒ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܗܠ‪ :爯q‬ܘ̇ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܬܘܒ ܐܕ̈‪焏r‬‬
‫ܘܓ̈ܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܩ‪ 爯qr‬ܐܘܣ̈‪ 爿q‬ܕܬ‪r‬ܬ‪ .爯q‬ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪qq 爯qr‬ܢ‪ rq焏‬ܥ‪爏‬‬
‫ܐܘܣ̈‪ 爿q‬ܩ‪̈煟‬ܡ‪rq‬ܐ‪ .‬ܘܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕܣ‪q‬ܡ‪ 爯q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܠܓ‪ 焏r̈煟‬ܕܢ‪r‬ܩ‪q‬ܡ‪熏‬ܢ ܒ‪煿‬ܘܢ‬

‫)ܢ‪rr‬ܐܠ ܐܢ‪ r‬ܕܡܢ‪; em. ex L.37rb6, (P.46r8: 熏‬ܢ‪焏r‬ܠ ܐܢ‪ r‬ܡܢ‪6 焏‬‬ ‫!‪ sic‬ܣܘܩ‪10 rq‬‬
‫‪̇; em. ex L.37rb27f./P.46r18‬ܗܘ ̇ܡ‪̇] 爯‬ܗܘ ܡ‪12 焏‬‬ ‫‪; em. ex‬ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪ ‖ 焏qq 焏r‬ܐܪܣ‪24 熏q‬‬
‫‪L.37va28/P.46v8‬‬ ‫‪ sic!; em. ex L.37va34/P.46v10‬ܘܢ‪焏‬ܬܡ‪r‬ܘܢ ‪26‬‬ ‫‪ (etiam‬ܡ‪r‬ܩ‪32 爯qr‬‬
‫‪P.46v18); em. ex L.37vb15‬‬
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 127

One of these two ways is as follows: species and genera are naturally predi- § 51
cated of primary substances, as they are supreme and proper, and (hereby)
they invalidate the question about them by signifying them [i.e. the pri-
mary substances], but accidents never do so. I also say as follows: Socrates
and Plato and others like them are particular individuals, and are named
primary substances. If, therefore, someone is asked “what is Socrates?”, he
immediately offers the answer: “he is man, and also living and animate”.
Therefore, through species and genera, which are secondary substances, he
raised a question about primary substances and by means of those he signi-
fied them. And if he would say to the one who asks him “what is Socrates or
Plato?”, that “he is white or black, bald or long(-haired?)”;11 or any of these
things that are attended by accident and not by nature, (then) it is obvious
that he does not signify what he was asked about. As it appears from this:
species and genera signify by nature particular individuals, which are pri-
mary substances, but accidents never do this. Therefore, species and genera
are correctly denoted secondary substances, but he [i.e. Aristotle] did not
call accidents substances, because they are not constituted to signify for us,
as we have said, when we ask about primary substance, which is found in
species and genera.

The other way of solving this problem is as follows: particular individuals § 52

were called supreme and primary substances, because they underlie [lit. are
established for], as he says, species and genera, and they certainly follow
upon them, in that when there is any particular individual whatsoever, a
species and a genus certainly follows upon it. For if there is for example
Plato or Aristotle, it is obvious that there is also man, living, and animate,
which are species and genera. Therefore, particular individuals underlie the
species and genera by means of which they are recognized and predicated of
them. Also species and genera, which are secondary substances, underlie the
accidents which subsist in them. However, accidents do not seem to underlie
any other thing in which they subsist or through which they are recognized.
As it will hence be known: particular individuals were called primary and
supreme substances, because they underlie species and genera in which
they subsist; and again, species and genera are called secondary substances,
since they are by nature predicated of primary substances and because
they underlie the accidents which subsist in them and are recognized; but

11 See Anon. Syr. Cat. 焏‫ܨܬܢ‬熏‫ ܩ‬κομήτης cincinnatus Cat. 13a36 (cf. Br.LS. p. 656). Porphyry
has in the related section (In Cat. 92.11) τρίπηχυς ‘three cubits long’.
 ‫‪128‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫ܘܢ‪煟qr‬ܥ‪熏‬ܢ‪ .‬ܓ‪ 焏r̈煟‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܣ‪q‬ܡ‪ 爯q‬ܠܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐ‪ 爯qrq‬ܕܢ‪r‬ܩ‪ 爟q‬ܒ‪煿‬ܘܢ‪ .‬ܐܠ‪焏‬‬

‫̣ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܒ‪q‬ܠ‪熟‬ܒ‪ 爯‬ܣܢ‪q‬ܩ‪ 爯q‬ܥ‪ 爏‬ܐܘܣ̈‪ 爿q‬ܕܢ‪r‬ܩ‪q‬ܡ‪熏‬ܢ ܒ‪r .爯q煿‬ܦ‪ rq‬ܡ‪爯q煟‬‬
‫ܐܬܩ‪ 熏qr‬ܐܕ̈‪ 焏r‬ܘܓ̈ܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܐܘܣ̈‪ 爿q‬ܕܬܪܬ‪ 爯q‬ܒ‪r‬ܪ ܩ‪̈煟‬ܡ‪rq‬ܐ܇ ܓ‪ 焏r̈煟‬ܕ‪爯q‬‬
‫ܐܬܬܣ‪q‬ܡ‪ 熏‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܐܘܣ̈‪ 爿q‬ܕܬܠ‪r‬܉ ܐܦܠ‪ 焏‬ܣ‪ q‬ܒ‪qq‬ܣ‪ 焏‬ܕܐܘܣ̈‪爿q‬‬
‫ܐܬܡܢ‪.熏q‬‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫‪§ 53‬‬ ‫ܘ‪ 煟q‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪煟‬ܘܪ‪ 焏r‬ܐܬܬܣ‪q‬ܡ‪ :熏‬ܡ‪r‬ܦܢ‪q‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܡ‪ 爏qq‬ܠܡ‪焏‬ܡ‪r‬‬
‫ܘܠܡ‪熏q熏q‬܉ ܐܦ ̈ܙܢ‪ 焏q‬ܕ‪q‬ܠ̇‪ 煿‬ܕܕ‪q‬ܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ‪q‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ‪ .‬ܡ‪qqqr‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܓ‪rq‬‬
‫ܒ‪̈rq‬ܒ‪ 焏‬ܩ‪̈煟‬ܡ‪ 焏q‬ܠ‪ 爟‬ܕܦ‪q‬ܠܣ‪熏‬ܦ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܡܠ‪q‬ܠ‪r‬ܐ ܕܡ‪ 爯q熏q‬ܠ‪爯‬܉ ܕܐܪܒܥ‪焏‬‬
‫ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ ‪q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ̈ܙܢ‪ 焏q‬ܕܕ‪q‬ܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܕ‪ 煟q‬ܡܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܒܠ‪熏̣q‬ܕ ܩܢ‪ 焏‬ܠ̇‪煿‬‬
‫ܠ‪rqrq‬ܘܬܐ܉ ̇ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕ‪焏qrr‬܉ ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܒ‪q焏r‬ܠ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܡ‪ 爯qqrqr‬ܒ‪煿‬ܘܢ‪.‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬

‫‪§ 54‬‬ ‫ܙܢ‪ 焏‬ܗ‪ 爏qq‬ܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪ 焏q‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ܉ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ qqqr‬ܠ‪q‬ܠ‪ 煟q 煿‬ܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕܘܗܝ‪.‬‬
‫‪ 煟q‬ܠ‪ 熏‬ܒ‪q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܩܢ̈‪熏‬ܡ‪ 焏q煟qq̈q 焏‬ܕ‪q‬ܒ‪ 爯qrq‬ܒ‪ 煿‬ܡ‪熟qr‬ܐ ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ‬
‫ܡܥܒ‪煟‬ܢ‪ .rq焏‬ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪熏q‬ܠ̈ܦܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܐܣ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܘܕܦ‪q‬ܠܣ‪熏‬ܦ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܘܕܡ‪rq‬ܘܬܐ‬
‫ܘܕ‪ 焏qrr‬ܕܐܘܡ̈ܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ‪ .‬ܗܕܐ ܓ‪ rq‬ܠ‪焏‬ܕ‪ 焏r‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ ܕܒ‪r‬ܢ‪焏r‬‬
‫‪焏qqqr‬܉ ܘܐܦ ܠ‪ 熏‬ܠ‪熏‬ܬ ‪q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ̈ܒܢ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏r‬ܐ‪煿̇qrq‬܇ ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪熏‬ܬ ̇ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ‬ ‫‪15‬‬
‫ܕܡ‪r‬ܕܪ‪ 爯qr‬ܒ‪煿‬ܘܢ‪ .‬ܘ̣ܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܕ‪q‬ܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܕܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܐܢ‪ 焏qr‬ܐ‪ 煿̇qrq‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕܘܗܝ‪.‬‬
‫ܘܠ‪ 焏qqqr 焏‬ܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪.焏‬‬

‫‪§ 55‬‬ ‫ܬܘܒ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܙܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܬܪ‪ 爯q‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ܉ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ qqqr‬ܠ‪熏‬ܬ ‪q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܩܢ̈‪熏‬ܡ‪焏‬‬
‫ܕܒ‪焏‬ܕ‪焏r‬܉ ‪ 煟q‬ܠ‪ 熏‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ‪煿q‬ܘܢ ܐ‪ 煿̇qrq‬ܗܕܐ‪ :‬ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܦ ܠ‪焏‬ܕ̈‪焏r‬‬
‫ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪焏‬܇ ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏r‬ܕܬܪܬ‪r 爯q‬ܓܠ‪熏‬ܗܝ܇ ܐܦ ܗܕܐ ܓ‪rq‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬
‫ܠ‪q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ̈ܒܢ‪q‬ܢ‪ .焏qqqr 焏r‬ܘܒ‪煟‬ܓ‪熏‬ܢ ܕ‪q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܐ ܕܐ‪煿̇qrq‬܉ ܒ̇‪煿‬ܝ‬
‫‪92r‬‬
‫̈‬
‫ܕܠ‪q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ | ‪ 焯q 煟q .焏qqqr‬ܦ‪rqr‬ܐ ܣܓ‪焏q‬ܬܐ ܐ‪ rq‬ܕܬܪܬ‪r 爯q‬ܓܠ‪.爯q煿q‬‬

‫‪§ 56‬‬ ‫ܘܬܘܒ ܙܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܬܠ‪r‬ܐ ܕܕ‪q‬ܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ܉ ̇ܗܘ ܕ‪ qqqr‬ܠ‪q‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܐܕ‪.焏r‬‬
‫ܘܠܩܢ̈‪熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ ܕܒ‪ 煿‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ܉ ܠ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܒ‪q‬ܠ‪熟‬ܒ‪ 爯‬ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܒ‪熟‬ܒ‪爯‬܇ ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܢ̈‪煿‬ܘ‪爯q‬‬
‫‪r熏q‬ܬܐ ܒ‪熟‬ܒ‪ 爯‬ܣ‪q‬ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܐܦ ܗܕܐ ܓ‪ rq‬ܠ‪焏‬ܕ‪ 焏r‬ܕ̈ܒܢ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏r‬ܘܠ‪q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ‬ ‫‪25‬‬
‫̈ܒܢ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏qqqr 焏r‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ‪ .‬ܠ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܒ‪ 爏q‬ܥ‪煟‬ܢ܉ ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܒ‪熟‬ܒ‪ 爯‬ܣ‪q‬ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ‪.‬‬

‫)‪ (vd. comm.‬ܠ‪q‬ܠ‪11 煟q 煿‬‬ ‫]ܕܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܐܢ‪; emend., (vd. comm.) ‖ 焏qr‬ܕܡ‪r‬ܬܕܪ‪16 爯qr‬‬
‫ܕܬ‪r‬ܬ‪; (L.39va3/P.48v14f.: 爯q‬ܕܬܪܬ‪r 爯q‬ܓܠ‪; em. ex L.39rb19/P.48v7 22 q‬ܕܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܐܢ‪焏qr‬‬
‫)‪r‬ܓܠ‪爯q煿q‬‬
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 129

accidents do not underlie any other thing that can subsist in them. Instead,
they always stand in need of the substances in which they subsist. It is there-
fore accurate that species and genera are called secondary substances, after
the primary ones, but accidents were neither denoted as tertiary substances,
nor were they at all reckoned to the class of substances.

[The four manners of a distinctive property]

Having thus set forth these things for study, we return henceforth to mention § 53
and show how many manners of a (distinctive) property there are. We find in
ancient books of logical philosophy, which show us, that all the manners of
property are four. Only one of them relates to reality, and the rest are treated
as by metaphor.

Thus, the first manner is what is found in the entirety of one species alone, § 54
while it does not seem to actually be in all the particular individuals that are
contained in it, as for example the sciences of medicine, of philosophy, and
of geometry, and of the rest of other arts. For this (property) is found in the
species of man only and it is not present even in all men, but only in those
who are instructed in them. So, this is a property of human species only and
is not found in any other species.

The second manner is what is found in all the individuals that are in a § 55
species, while it is not present only in them, but in other species too, as for
example man is two-footed. For also this is found in all men, and therefore
is said to be proper to them, in that it is found in all of them, even though
there are many birds that are two-footed.

The third manner of property is that which is found in the entire species § 56
and only in the individuals in it, not always but at some time, as for example
turning grey at the time of old age. For also this is found in the species of
men and in all men only, however not all the time but at the time of old age.
 ‫‪130‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫‪§ 57‬‬ ‫ܙܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕܐܪܒܥ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܒ‪rr‬ܪܐ ܕ‪q‬ܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ‪rqrq‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܘ‪q‬ܠ‪ 爯q煿‬ܗܠ‪爯q‬‬
‫ܩܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪煟qq‬ܐ܉ ̇ܗܘ ܕ‪ qqqr‬ܠ‪ 煟q‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ ܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܘܠ‪熏‬ܬ ‪q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܩܢ̈‪熏‬ܡ‪焏‬‬
‫ܕܒ‪煿‬܇ ܘܠ‪ 熏‬ܒ‪熟‬ܒ‪ 爯‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܒ‪q‬ܠ‪熟‬ܒ‪爯‬܇ ‪ 煟q‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܢܩ‪ 牯q‬ܠ‪焏‬ܕ‪ 焏r‬ܐܘ‬
‫ܠܩܢ‪熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܠܒ‪̣ r‬ܡ‪̇ 爯‬ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪ r‬ܥܠ‪煿q‬ܘܢ܇ ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܐ‪煿̇qrq‬‬
‫ܓ‪熏q熏q‬ܬܗ ܕܒ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏r‬ܘܨܗܘܠ‪熏‬ܬܗ ܕܣ‪熏‬ܣ‪ 焏q‬ܘܢܒ‪熏q熏‬ܬܗ ܕ‪q‬ܠܒ‪焏‬‬ ‫‪5‬‬
‫ܘܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ ܕܐ‪ qq‬ܗܠ‪爯q‬܇ ܐ‪q‬ܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܠ‪ 煟q‬ܐܕ‪̣ 焏r‬ܗܘ ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ ‪爯qq̈qr‬܇ ܘܠ‪q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ‬
‫ܩܢ̈‪熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܒ‪焏‬ܕ‪̇ 焏r‬ܗܘ܇ ܘܠ‪ 熏‬ܒ‪熟‬ܒ‪ 爯‬ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܒ‪q‬ܠ‪熟‬ܒ‪ .爯‬ܘܐܦ‪ 爯‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪qq‬‬
‫ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏r‬ܒ‪ 煿‬ܒܣ‪熏‬ܥ‪r‬ܢ‪焏‬܉ ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪ 焏q熏q‬ܡ‪r‬ܩ‪r‬ܐ‪ .‬ܒ̇‪煿‬ܝ ܕܩܢ‪ 焏‬ܒ‪qq 煿‬ܠ̇‪煿‬‬
‫ܕܗܕܐ܉ ܘ‪ 爏q‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܝ ܕ̇ܨܒ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪qr‬ܠ‪ 牯‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܠ‪qq‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܗܢ‪ 焏‬ܠܡܥܒ‪煟‬ܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ‪.‬‬
‫ܙܢ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܗܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪焏qrq‬܉ ܒ‪煟‬ܡ‪熏‬ܬ ܬ‪熏q‬ܡ‪̇ 焏‬ܡ‪煿‬ܦ‪ q‬ܒ‪q‬ܠ‪熟‬ܒ‪ 爯‬ܐܣ‪qq‬ܡ‪焏‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬
‫ܕܡܠ‪r‬ܐ ܠ‪熏‬ܬ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܕܐ‪ 煿̇qrq‬ܕ‪q‬ܠ‪熏q‬ܬܗ‪ 爏q .‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܕܒ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏r‬ܗܘ ܓ‪焏q熏q‬‬
‫ܗܘ‪ .‬ܘ‪ 爏q‬ܐ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܓ‪ 焏q熏q‬ܗܘ ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏r‬ܗܘ‪̇ .‬ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܬܠ‪r‬ܐ ̈ܙܢ‪ 焏q‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪焏‬‬
‫ܕܕ‪q‬ܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ܉ ܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪煿‬ܦ‪ 爯qq‬ܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܢܦ‪煿r‬ܘܢ‪ .‬ܘܒ‪煟‬ܓ‪熏‬ܢ ‪q焏r‬ܠ‪ rq焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪.爯qr‬‬

‫‪§ 58‬‬ ‫̇ܗܘ ܓ‪ rq‬ܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪ 焏q‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܕ‪ 煟q‬ܐܕ‪ .焏r‬ܘܠ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪q‬ܠ‪ .煿‬ܐ‪熏̈q qq‬ܠܦܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪qq‬ܢ‪焏‬‬
‫ܐܢ‪ .焏qr‬ܘܗܢ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪̇ 焏‬ܡ‪煿‬ܦ‪ 爏q .q‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܕ̇ܡܩܒ‪ 爏‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܠ‪熏̈q‬ܠܦܢ‪ 焏‬ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪焏r‬‬ ‫‪15‬‬
‫ܗܘ‪ .‬ܠ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪ 爏q 爯q‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܒ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏r‬ܗܘ ܢ̇ܣ‪ 焯‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܠ‪熏̈q‬ܠܦܢ‪ .焏‬ܣ̈ܓ‪焏q‬ܐ ܓ‪̣ rq‬ܡ‪爯‬‬
‫̈ܒܢ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏r‬ܠ‪q 焏‬ܠܦ‪ 爯q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ‪.‬‬

‫‪§ 59‬‬ ‫ܘ̇ܗܘ ܬܘܒ ܕܬܪ‪ 爯q‬ܕ‪q‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ‪ .‬ܘܠ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪q‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕܘܗܝ܇ ܐ‪qq‬‬
‫ܕܢ‪r‬ܩ‪r‬ܐ ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏r‬ܕܬܪܬ‪r 爯q‬ܓܠ‪熏‬ܗܝ‪ 爏q .‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܕܒ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏r‬ܗܘ܉ ܕܬܪܬ‪r 爯q‬ܓܠ‪熏‬ܗܝ‬
‫‪92v‬‬ ‫ܢ‪rr‬ܡ‪ | .煿‬ܠ‪ 熏‬ܓ‪ 爏q rq‬ܕܐ‪ rq‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܬܪܬ‪r 爯q‬ܓܠ‪ 焏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏r‬ܗܘ‪.‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬

‫‪§ 60‬‬ ‫ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܐܦ ̇ܗܘ ܙܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܬܠ‪r‬ܐ ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܕ‪ 煟q‬ܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܘܕ‪q‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܘܒ‪熟‬ܒ‪爏q .爯‬‬
‫ܡ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܕܩܢ‪r熏q 焏‬ܬܐ ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏r‬ܗܘ‪ .‬ܠ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪ 爏q 爯q‬ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪̇ 焏r‬ܗܘܐ ܩܢ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪爯q煿‬‬
‫ܠ‪r熏q‬ܬܐ ̣ܡ‪煟q 爯‬ܘ‪ .‬ܡ‪ 爯q煟‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܐܡ‪r‬ܢ‪爯‬܉ ܘܠ‪̣ 煟q 焏‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܬܠ‪r‬ܐ ̈ܙܢ‪焏q‬‬
‫ܡ‪煿‬ܦ‪ q‬ܠ‪熏‬ܬ ‪rq‬ܗ‪ .‬ܘܒ‪煟‬ܓ‪熏‬ܢ ̇ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ‪q̈焏r‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܢ‪熏‬ܢ‪̇ .‬ܗܘ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ ‪rqrr‬ܐ‪.‬‬

‫‪§ 61‬‬ ‫ܢܩ‪q‬ܦ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܠ‪焏‬ܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܕ‪q‬ܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ܉ ̇ܗܝ ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܬܗܘܐ ܒܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐܠ‪爏q 焏‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬
‫ܡ‪ 爯‬ܬ‪熏q‬ܡ̇‪ 煿‬ܠ‪ 爏q‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܐ ܥܠ‪熏‬ܗܝ‪.‬‬ ‫ܒ̇‪ .煿‬ܘ̇ܗܝ ܕܬܬܠ ̣ܡ‪r 爯‬ܡ̇‪ 煿‬ܘ ̣‬
‫ܘ̇ܗܝ ܬܘܒ ܕܬܗܘܐ ܡ‪熏r‬ܕܥ‪ 焏‬ܗܢ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ‪煟q‬ܥ‪ .rq焏‬ܘ̇ܗܝ ܬܘܒ ܕܡ‪煟‬ܡ‬
‫ܕܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪ rq‬ܠ̇‪煿‬܇ ܘܐܦ ̇ܗܝ ܕܠ‪ rq‬ܒ̇‪rqrq 煿‬ܘܬܐ ܘܒ‪rq犏‬ܘܬܐ‪ .‬ܘ̇ܗܝ ܕ‪煟q‬‬
‫‪煟q‬ܐ ܗܝ ܬܗܘܐ ܡܩܒܠܢ‪rq‬ܐ ܕܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܕܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪.焏‬‬

‫)‪ sic! (vd. comm.‬ܘܨܗܠ‪5 熏‬‬

text and translation of sergius’ introduction 131

But the fourth manner is truly a real property and at once it embraces them § 57
all: that which is found in one species alone and in all the individuals in
it, and not at some time only but always, not being attached to another
species or individual, apart from those it is predicated of, just as for example
man’s ability to laugh and horse’s ability to neigh, and dog’s ability to bark,
and others like these, which are found in one (specific) species only and
in all the individuals in that species, and not at some time but always. For
even if man does not actually laugh, yet he is called ‘able to laugh’ in that
he possesses the potentiality of this, and whenever he wishes he turns this
potentiality into actuality. For this last manner (of property), in the same way
as a definition, always reciprocates its form of expression into that of which
it is the property. For everyone who is man is able to laugh, and everyone
who is able to laugh is man. However, the three other manners of property
do not reciprocate with themselves, since they are metaphorically said.

For the first (manner of property) belongs to a single species and not to its § 58
entirety, as the sciences of human nature, and this does not reciprocate.
For everything that receives sciences is man, but not every man receives
sciences, for many men do not learn them.

The second belongs to the entire species and is not (restricted) to itself alone, § 59
as we call man two-footed. For everyone who is man we name two-footed,
but not everything that has two feet is man.

In this way is also the third manner, which belongs to a single species and § 60
to its entirety and at some time. For everything that turns grey is man, but
it is not the case that every man will turn grey. Therefore, as we have said,
none of these three manners reciprocates with itself, since the former ones
are metaphorical, and only the latter one [i.e. the fourth] is real.

Following upon substance as property is, that which is not in something but § 61
all is in it, that which assigns of its name and of its definition to everything
that is predicated of it, that which is signifying this something explicitly, that
which has nothing opposite to it, also, that in which there is no more or less,
and that which is unique of being receptive of opposites.
 ‫‪132‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫‪§ 62‬‬ ‫ܘ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܒ‪r‬ܪ ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܡ‪熏‬ܣܦ‪q‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܠܡܣ‪ 爟‬ܐܦ ܗܪ‪ 焏q‬ܒܥ‪r‬ܐ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܕܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܐ‬
‫ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܡܢ̈‪熏‬ܬܐ ܕܐܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܘܓ‪ .焏r̈煟‬ܐܢ̣‪煿‬ܘ ܠ‪ 爟‬ܕܓ‪ 焏r̈煟‬ܒ‪焏‬ܘܣ‪焏q‬‬
‫ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ܉ ܘܡܢ̈‪熏‬ܬܐ ܬܘܒ ܕܐܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܒ̇‪ 煿‬ܒ‪焏‬ܘܣ‪焏q‬܉ ܡ‪ 爯q煟‬ܐܦ‬
‫ܡܢ̈‪熏‬ܬ̇ܗ ܕܐܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܓ‪̈ 煟‬‬
‫‪ 焏r‬ܐ‪.爯q煿qrq‬‬

‫‪§ 63‬‬ ‫ܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܐܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪ .爯‬ܕ̇ܗܝ ܕܢ‪煿‬ܘܐ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܒܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܒ‪煟q‬ܥܣ‪̈ r‬ܙܢ‪ 焏q‬ܐ‪qq‬ܢ‪焏‬‬ ‫‪5‬‬
‫ܕܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪q熏q 爯q‬ܢ‪̣ 爯‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܠܥ‪ .爏‬ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܐ ܕ‪ 煟q‬ܡܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܐ‪qq‬‬
‫ܡܢ̈‪熏‬ܬܐ ܕܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܒ‪q‬ܠ‪ .煿‬ܘܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ ܐ‪ qq‬ܓ‪ 焏r̈煟‬ܒ‪焏‬ܘܣ‪焏q‬܉ ܡ‪爯q煟‬‬
‫ܐܦ‪ 爯‬ܐ‪ 爯q煿qrq‬ܡܢ̈‪熏‬ܬ̇ܗ ܕܐܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܒ̇‪ 煿‬ܒ‪焏‬ܘܣ‪ :焏q‬ܘܓ‪ 焏r̈煟‬ܬܘܒ ܒ̇‪煿‬‬
‫ܒ‪焏‬ܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܩܢ‪ 爯q‬ܩ‪q熏‬ܡ‪焏‬܉ ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܗܘ ܙܢ‪̇ 焏‬ܗܘ ܕܡܢ̈‪熏‬ܬܐ܉ ܘܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪焏‬‬
‫̇ܗܘ ܕܓ‪ .焏r̈煟‬ܡܢ̈‪熏‬ܬܐ ܓ‪rq‬܉ ܐ‪̇ qq‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܕܒ‪ 爯q煿‬ܘܡܢ‪ 爯q煿‬ܡ‪r‬ܩ‪qq 爟q‬ܢ̇‪煿‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬
‫ܕܐܘܣ‪ .焏q‬ܕܐ‪ 爯q煿qrq‬ܒ̇‪ .煿‬ܓ‪ 焏r̈煟‬ܕ‪爯q‬܉ ܠ‪ 熏‬ܐ‪̇ qq‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܕܡ‪̈r‬ܡܠ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܐܢ‪熏‬ܢ‬
‫ܕܐܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܕܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ ܒ̇‪ .煿‬ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܕܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪ 焏‬ܕܗܕܐ‪ .‬ܕܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܡ‪rr‬ܡܠ‪爯q‬‬
‫‪93r‬‬ ‫ܘܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܩ‪q熏‬ܡ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܒ‪焏‬ܘܣ‪̇ .焏q‬ܡ‪ 爯q煟‬ܐܦ‪ 爯‬ܐ‪ | 爯q煿qrq‬ܡܢ̈‪熏‬ܬܐ ܘܓ‪焏r̈煟‬‬
‫‪ 焏r‬ܒ‪焏‬ܘܣ‪.焏q‬‬‫ܒ‪焏‬ܘܣ‪焏q‬܉ ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪ 熏‬ܒ‪ 煟q‬ܙܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪ 爯q煿qrq‬ܡܢ̈‪熏‬ܬܐ ܘܓ‪̈ 煟‬‬

‫‪§ 64‬‬ ‫ܕܥ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܘܐܦ ܗܕܐ‪ .‬ܕ̣ܗܝ ܐܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܐ ̇ܗܝ ܕܐ‪ 煿̇qrq‬ܒܡܢ̈‪熏‬ܬ̇ܗ܉‬ ‫‪15‬‬
‫̈‬ ‫̈‬
‫ܐ‪̇q‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܕܡܢ‪ 爯q煿‬ܡ‪qr‬ܒ‪ .焏‬ܘܡܢ‪熏‬ܬ̇ܗ ܒ̇‪煿‬܇ ܐ‪̇ qq‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܕܠ̇‪q 煿‬ܢ̈‪ 爯r‬ܡܢ‪熏‬ܬ̇ܗ‪.‬‬
‫ܕܐ‪ 煿̇qrq‬ܕ‪̣ 爯q‬ܗܝ ܐܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܒܓ‪焏r煟‬܉ ܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܐ܇ ܐ‪qq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܐܦ‬
‫̈‬
‫ܓ‪ 焏r̈煟‬ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪ 爯qr‬ܠ‪ 爟‬ܕܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ ܒ̇‪ .煿‬ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕܠ‪̣ 熏‬ܗܝ ܡܩ‪q‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܒ‪煿‬ܘܢ܉‬
‫̣ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܒ̇‪ 煿‬ܡܩ‪q‬ܡ‪ .爯q‬ܘܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܣܦ̈ܩ‪ 爯‬ܕ‪r‬ܥ‪r‬ܐ‪.‬‬

‫‪§ 65‬‬ ‫ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕܐܦ ܡܠ‪r‬ܗܘܢ ܕܥ‪ 爏‬ܗܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܕܦ‪q‬ܠܣ̈‪熏‬ܦ‪ 焏‬ܢ‪熏‬ܕܥ‪ q‬ܐܦ ܗܪ‪焏q‬܉‬ ‫‪20‬‬
‫ܒ‪rqrq‬ܐ ܪ‪r‬ܡ‪q‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܠ‪̣ q‬ܡ‪̇ 爯‬ܗܘ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܕܐ‪qqr‬ܢ‪ .爯‬ܐܡ‪ 爯qr‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܕ‪rr‬ܐܣ‪r‬ܐ‬
‫ܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪rq‬ܐ ܕܓ‪r̈熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪ 煿̇qrq‬ܗܘܠ‪焏‬܉ ܘ̣ܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܐ‪ 煿̇qrq‬ܕܠ‪爏qq 焏‬‬
‫ܘܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܣ‪qq 爟qq‬ܢ‪ .rq焏‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܠ‪ 爟‬ܡ‪ qqr‬ܕܢ‪煿‬ܘܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ‪qq‬ܢ̇‪煿‬‬
‫̈‬
‫ܡ‪熏‬ܢ ܘܕ‪ 爏q‬ܐܣ‪qq‬ܡ‪ 爯q‬ܕܬ̇ܒ‪ 牟‬ܣ‪熏‬ܢܩܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܥܒ‪熏‬ܕܘܬܐ‪.‬‬ ‫ܡܩܒܠܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ 爏q‬ܕ ̈‬

‫)‪; del., (cf. L.17rb10f.‬ܐܦ ܗܪ‪] 焏q‬ܐܦ[ ܒܥ‪r‬ܐ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ‪1‬‬

‫̈‬
‫ܘܡܢ‪熏‬ܬ̇ܗ ‪3 L.17rb19/P.56v12:‬‬
‫ܬܘܒ ܕܐܘܣ‪焏q‬‬ ‫)ܐ‪; em. ex L.17va10, (P.52r4: 爯q煿qrq‬ܘܐ‪11 爯q煿qrq‬‬ ‫ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ ‪12‬‬
‫‪ 22‬ܕܥ‪ 爯q煟‬ܘܐܦ‪煿‬ܕܐ ‪ 15‬ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ ‪(etiam L.17va13/P.52r5); emend. 13 et 14 possis‬‬
‫‪; sǝyāmē suppl. ex P.55v20‬ܕܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪焏‬‬
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 133

[The dispute about the parts of substance, accidents, and being

in something]

After this, we proceed to set forth here also a certain dispute that is said § 62
about the parts of substance and the accidents: whether accidents are in
substance and whether the parts of substance are in substance, so that also
the parts of substance are accidents?

Concerning these (questions) we say that something is in something in § 63

eleven ways, as we previously have shown above. It is said that one of them
is as parts of something in its whole [i.e. no. 4], and another as accidents in
a (particular) substance [i.e. no. 11]. Therefore, even if the parts of substance
are in substance and accidents also have subsistence in substance, yet one
is the manner of parts and another is that of accidents.12 For parts are those,
in which and of which the nature of the substance they are present in is
constituted, but accidents are not completive of the substance in which they
are, but on the contrary, they are completed (by it) and their subsistence
is in the (particular) substance. Therefore, even if parts and accidents are
in substance, yet parts and accidents are in substance not in one (and the
same) way.

You should also know this: substance is said to be that which exists in its § 64
parts, because it is compounded of them and its parts (are) in it, since its
parts accumulate it, but substance is not said to be in accidents, in the way
accidents are said to be in it, because it does not subsist in them, but they
subsist in it. So much for that for the moment.

[Natural philosophers’ view of matter and the four elements]

In order to make here known to you also the argument of philosophers about § 65
matter, we will in brief outline for you of what we have found. They say that
the primary foundation [i.e. substrate] of the bodies is matter, and that it
is by nature without quality (ḥaylā) and without figure, whereby its nature
seems to be receptive of any shape and any figure that is a requirement
of its manufacture, since it seems to be found without shape and figure.

12 That is, the way of parts being in substance is different from that of accidents being so.
 ‫‪134‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫‪ 煟q‬ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܕܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܘܐܣ‪qq‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܬ‪ qqrr‬ܐ‪̣ 煿̇qrq‬ܗܝ܉ ܘ̣ܗܝ ܠ‪ 爟‬ܗܕܐ‬

‫ܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪ rq‬ܡ‪ 焏qr‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܡܩܒܠ‪焏‬܉ ܠ‪焏‬ܘܪ‪ 焏q‬ܘܠܦ‪ 焏qr‬ܘܠܥ‪熏‬ܡܩ‪ .焏‬ܐ‪qq‬‬
‫ܬ ܠ‪焏‬ܘܪ‪ 焏q‬ܘܠܦ‪ 焏qr‬ܘܠܥ‪熏‬ܡܩ‪焏‬܉ ܘܗܘܘ ܒ̇‪煿‬‬ ‫ܕܬܐܪܒ‪ .‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕܪܕ ݀‬
‫ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܬܠ‪r‬ܐ ܩ‪̈q‬ܡ‪ .爯q‬ܗ‪ 爯q煟q‬ܡ‪r‬ܡ‪ 爯q煿‬ܠ̇‪qq 煿‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܬܪ‪ 爯q‬ܕܓ‪r̈熏‬ܡ‪ .焏‬ܘ̣ܡ‪爯‬‬
‫̈‬
‫ܒ‪r‬ܪ ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪爟‬܉ ܡ‪r‬ܪܢ‪ 焏q‬ܠ‪ 爟‬ܕܡܩܒܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܣ‪qq‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܘ̈ܙܢ‪ 焏q‬ܘ‪q̈q‬ܠ‪.焏‬‬ ‫‪5‬‬
‫ܘܥܒ‪煟‬ܐ ܓ‪r̈熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܩ‪̈煟‬ܡ‪ 焏q‬ܐ‪r‬ܒܥ‪̇ .焏‬ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕܒܥ‪煟q‬ܐ ܡ‪rr‬ܡ‪ 爯q煿‬ܡܢ‪爯‬‬
‫ܐܣ‪q̈熏q‬ܣ‪ .焏‬ܕܡܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܕܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܡ‪r‬ܪ‪q‬ܒ‪q 爯q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܓ‪r̈熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܬܢ‪爯‬܇ ̇ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ‬
‫ܕܒܡ‪熏‬ܠ‪煟‬ܐ ܘܒ‪熏q‬ܒܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ‪ 煟q .‬ܠ‪ 爟‬ܬܩ݁ܒ‪̣ 爏‬ܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܗܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܕܩܢ ݀‬
‫‪r‬‬
‫ܪܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ‪q‬ܒ‪熏rq‬ܬܐ ܘ‪q‬ܡ‪q‬ܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ܉ ܢ‪熏‬ܪܐ ܗܘ‪ 煟q .焏q‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܬܩܒ‪ 爏‬ܩ‪rqr‬ܘܬܐ‬
‫ܘܪ‪qq‬ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ܉ ̈ܡ‪ 焏q‬ܡܩ‪q‬ܡ‪ .焏‬ܐܢ‪q 爯q煟‬ܒ‪熏rq‬ܬܐ ܘܩ‪rqr‬ܘܬܐ ܬܣ‪焯‬܉ ̇ܗܝ ܕ‪爯q‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬
‫‪93v‬‬ ‫ܐܪܥ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪qq‬ܢ‪ | .焏‬ܘܐܢ ܘ‪q‬ܡ‪q‬ܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܘܪ‪qq‬ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܬܗܘܐ ܒ̇‪煿‬܉ ܐܐܪ‬
‫ܥܒ‪煟‬ܐ‪ .‬ܘܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܥܠ‪ 煿̇q‬ܕܗܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܢܣ‪ 熏q‬ܠܡ‪焏‬ܡ‪̇ r‬ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕܒ̇‪ 煿‬ܒܦ‪q‬ܠܣ‪熏‬ܦ‪熏‬ܬܐ‬ ‫̇‬
‫‪qq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ ܐܬܕܪ‪.熏r‬‬

‫‪§ 66‬‬ ‫ܡ‪q 爏q‬ܡ‪熏q‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܐܦ ܠ̇‪ 煿‬ܬܘܒ ܠ‪q‬ܡ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܕܐܘܣ‪ 焏q‬ܡܦܠܓ‪爯q‬‬
‫̈‬
‫ܒ‪焏‬ܘܡܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܡܠ‪q‬ܠ‪r‬ܐ ܘܐܡ‪爯qr‬܉ ܕܡܢ̇‪ 煿‬ܕ‪q‬ܡ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܡܦ‪ 爯rr‬ܡܢ‪熏‬ܬ̇ܗ‪.‬‬ ‫‪15‬‬
‫ܘܡ‪q̈r‬ܡ‪̣ 爯‬ܡ‪煟q̈ 爯‬ܕܐ‪ .‬ܕܐ‪ 爯q煿qrq‬ܡܢ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܡܠ‪r‬ܐ‪ .‬ܘܡܢ̇‪ 煿‬ܐ̈‪煟qq‬ܢ ܘܠ‪焏‬‬
‫ܦܣ‪̈q‬ܩ‪̣ 爯‬ܡ‪煟q̈ 爯‬ܕܐ‪ .‬ܣ‪熏‬ܪ‪熏qqqr .焏q‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ .焏‬ܐܬܪܐ‪ .‬ܙܒܢ‪ .焏‬ܘܬܘܒ‬
‫ܡܦܠܓ‪ 爯q‬ܠ̇‪ 煿‬ܠ‪q‬ܡ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܡܢ̇‪ 煿‬ܐ‪ rq‬ܣ‪q‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܠܡܢ̈‪熏‬ܬ̇ܗ ܘܩ̈‪q‬ܡ‪爯‬‬
‫ܒ‪煟‬ܘ̈‪rqq‬ܗ‪ .爯q‬ܕܐ‪ 爯q煿qrq‬ܣ‪熏‬ܪ‪熏qqqr .焏q‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ .焏‬ܐܬܪܐ‪ .‬ܘܡܢ̇‪煿‬‬
‫̈‬
‫ܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪rrq‬ܢ ܡܢ‪熏‬ܬ̇ܗ‪ .‬ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪ 爯qrrr‬ܒ‪煟q焏‬ܐ ܒ‪煟q焏‬ܐ‪ .‬ܗܢ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܙܒܢ‪.焏‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬
‫̈‬
‫ܡܠ‪r‬ܐ‪ .‬ܡܢ‪q‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕܠ‪ 煟q 熏‬ܗ̣ܘ ܙܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܡܠ‪r‬ܐ ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܣܓ‪焏q‬ܐ‪.‬‬
‫‪煿‬ܐ ܣܓ‪焏q‬ܐ‪.‬‬
‫̈‬ ‫ܐ‪ rq‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܡܠ‪r‬ܐ ܗܕܐ ܕܡܡܠܠ‪ 焏‬ܕܡ‪r‬ܪ‪q‬ܒ‪̣ 焏‬ܡ‪r 爯‬ܡ ̈‬
‫ܘܐ‪ rq‬ܡܠ‪r‬ܐ ̇ܗܝ ܕܒܓ‪ 熏‬ܬܪܥ‪rq‬ܢ ܡ‪r‬ܪܥ‪q‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܒ‪rr‬ܩ‪ 煿‬ܕܡ‪煟‬ܥ‪ :爯‬ܕܒ‪̇煿‬‬
‫ܘܡ‪q‬ܠ‪r‬ܢ ܡ‪r‬ܩ‪qr‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܘܐ‪̈ 爯qrq‬ܡܠ‪q‬ܠ‪ .焏‬ܘܐ‪ rq‬ܬܘܒ ܡܠ‪r‬ܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܬܐ‬
‫ܐܘܡܢ‪rq‬ܐ‪̇ .‬ܗܝ ܕܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪ 焏r‬ܘܡ‪qr‬ܒܥ‪ 焏‬ܒܓ‪ 熏‬ܪܥ‪q‬ܢ‪ 煿‬ܕܐܘܡܢ‪ .焏‬ܕܒ̇‪煿‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬
‫̇‬
‫ܒ‪q‬ܠ‪熟‬ܒ‪ 爯‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܒ‪熏q‬ܪܐ ̇ܡ‪犏‬ܕ ܘܢܣ‪ 焯‬ܡܢ̇‪ 煿‬ܕܘܡ‪ 焏q‬ܕܐܘܡܢ‪熏‬ܬܗ‪.‬‬
‫ܘܒܦ‪q‬ܡ̇‪̇ 煿‬ܣܥ‪ 爏q r‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܡ‪r‬ܥܒ‪ 煟‬ܡܢ‪ .煿‬ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܗ‪ 爏qq‬ܕܬܠ‪r‬ܐ‬
‫ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܐܕ̈‪ 焏r‬ܓ‪熏‬ܢ̈‪ 焏q‬ܕܡܠ‪r‬ܐ܉ ܙܕܩ ܠܡ‪煟‬ܥ܉ ܕܗܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪焏qrq‬‬
‫ܘ̇ܗܘ ܡ‪犏‬ܥ‪焏q‬܉ ܠ‪̣ 熏‬ܡ‪q 爯‬ܡ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ‪ .‬ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕܒܢܦ‪ 焏r‬ܠ‪焏‬‬
‫ܓ‪qr‬ܡ‪r‬ܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܩܒܥ‪ 焏‬ܕܣ‪熏‬ܬܬܗܘܢ‪̇ .‬ܗܘ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪ 焏q‬ܕܡ‪̣ 焯qr‬ܡ‪爯‬‬ ‫‪30‬‬
‫ܡܡܠܠ‪ 焏‬ܕܒ‪r‬ܡ̈‪煿‬ܐ ܐܘ ܒܦ‪r‬ܓ̈ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܐܪ‪ 爯qqq‬ܐܘ ‪̣ :爯qrq‬ܗܘ̣‪̣ 煟q 熏q‬ܡ‪̈ 爯‬ܙܢ‪煿̇q‬‬
‫ܕ‪q‬ܡ‪熏q‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܘܗܕܐ ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪熏r q‬ܕܥܢ‪ .爯‬ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕܠ‪ 煟q 焏‬ܒ‪̣ 煟q‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܬܪ‪爯q‬‬
‫̈‬
‫ܕ‪q‬ܡ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ‪; em. ex P.51r7 15 vid.‬ܒ‪ 3 煿‬ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܕܡ‪ 熏‬ܘܐܣ‪1 possis 爟qq‬‬ ‫;ܒ‪煟‬ܘ‪19 爯q煿qrqq‬‬
‫)‪ (vd. comm.‬ܒ‪rr‬ܩ‪ 煿‬ܕܡ‪煟‬ܥ‪emend. (vd. comm.) 23 爯‬‬
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 135

Consequently, it first receives a certain extension toward length, breadth,

and depth, in order to grow [i.e. to obtain volume], and when it has attained
to length, breadth, and depth, and these three dimensions have occurred in
it, then they [i.e. the philosophers] name it the second nature of the bod-
ies [i.e. second substrate]. And afterwards, it is considered to receive figures,
qualities (zənayyā) and faculties (ḥaylē), and it makes up four primary bod-
ies, those which by us in common usage are named elements. All bodies
that are here (in this world) are compounded of these (four elements), those
(bodies) that undergo generation and destruction. When this matter, which
has acquired magnitude, receives dryness and heat, it becomes fire, when it
receives cold and moisture, it produces water, but if it obtains dryness and
cold, it forms earth, and if heat and moisture occur in it, it builds air. In this
way, those who were trained in natural philosophy have tried to speak about
matter.

[On quantity: whether language is a quantity]

On quantity. They [i.e. the philosophers] divide also the quantity of sub- § 66
stance in the art of logic and say: some of the parts of quantity are discrete
and delimited from one another, which are number (and) language. And
some of (its parts) are continuous and are not cut off from one another,
(being) line, surface, body, place, (and) time. Moreover, they divide quantity
in this way: some of it has position to its parts and they succeed one another,
which are line, surface, body, (and) place. And some of its parts do not
endure, but are gradually dissolved, namely time, language, (and) number;
because the sort (zənā) of language is not one only but many. There is the lan-
guage of speech, which is compounded of many words, and there is the lan-
guage that we in our reason consider in the silence of our intellect, through
which we on our account are called (rational) and are rational. And there is
another technical language, which is gathered and imprinted into the mind
of the artisan, at which he always gazes as at a model, and obtains from it the
image of his work of art, and by comparison to it he makes everything that is
done by him. Thus, since the general kinds (ʾādšē) of language are three, one
must know that the last one and the middle one do not pertain to quantity,
since the construction of their base is in an incorporeal self. But the first one,
which is compounded of a speech with nouns or with syllables that are long
or short, is one of the forms of quantity. In this way, we have reported this
for you in order that, when you fix your mind on any of these two kinds (of
 136 chapter 7

煟q .q‫ܟ ܠ‬rr‫ܘܕܐ ܬ‬煟‫܇ ܠ‬q‫ܬܐ ܬܨܕ ܗܘܢ‬熏q‫ܡ‬q 爯‫ܘܢ ̣ܡ‬煿qrq‫ ܐ‬焏‫ ܕܠ‬焏q‫̈ܙܢ‬
94r ̣ ‫ܐ‬r‫ ܡܠ‬煿̇qrq‫ ܐ‬焏‫ ܕܠ‬r‫ ܐܢ‬r‫ܡܣܒ‬
| .‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܡ‬q 爯‫ܡ‬

§ 67 爯q‫ܡ‬q̈‫ܐ ܩ‬r‫ ܕܬܠ‬rq‫ ܕܐ‬焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫ ܓ‬爏q‫ ܠ‬焏‫ ܡܢ‬爏q‫ ܕܐܦ ̇ܗܝ ܕܡ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬爏q‫ܡ‬
煿̇rq‫ܘܗܝ ܪ‬rq‫ ܕܐ‬焏q‫ܪ‬熏‫ ܘܠܣ‬.‫ܕ‬熏q‫ ܒܠ‬爯q‫ ܬܪ‬爯q‫ܬܐ ܕ‬熏qqqr‫ ܠ‬.煿‫ ܠ‬爯q煿‫ܡ‬r‫ܡ‬
‫ܬܐ‬煟‫ܩ‬熏‫܉ ܢ‬焏‫ܥ‬rr‫ ܢ‬q‫ ܠ‬爯q‫ ܗܠ‬爏q‫ ܘܡ‬.爏q‫ܐ ܬܘܒ ܕܩܠ‬rq‫ ܐ‬.煟q ‫ܬܐ‬熏qqqr‫ܕ‬ 5
‫܉‬焏‫ܢܣܒ‬r‫ܡ ̇ܡ‬煟‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫ ܗ̣ܘܐ ܒܓ‬焏‫ ܘܠ‬:焏q‫ܪܢ‬r‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܒ‬r熏q‫ ̇ܗܝ ܕܒ‬爟‫ܠ‬
焏‫ܠܓ‬熏‫ ܦ‬焏‫ܐ ܘܕܠ‬r‫ ܡܢ‬焏‫ܕܐ܉ ܕܠ‬煿‫ ܠ‬煿̇‫ ܘܠ‬.‫ܐ‬rq‫ ܡ‬煿̇‫ ܠ‬爯q煿‫ܡ‬r‫ܢ ܡ‬熏q‫ܡ‬q‫ܣ‬
.‫ܡ‬熏r‫ ܓ‬爏q‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܡ‬qr‫ ܓ‬焏‫ܡ ܠ‬煟‫ ܡ‬焏rq‫܆ ܪ‬r‫ܡ‬焏‫ ܢ‬r‫ ܕܐܢ‬qq‫ ܘܐ‬.煿̇‫ ܠ‬爯q‫ܡ‬q‫ܣ‬
‫ܬܐ‬熏qq‫ ܐܪ‬焯‫ܐ ܘܬܣ‬r‫ܒ‬rq̈‫ ܡ‬熏‫ ܬܪܕܐ ܒܓ‬爟‫ ܠ‬煟q‫܉ ܕ‬爯qr‫ܕܐ ܐܡ‬煿‫ܥܠ‬
‫ܬܐ‬熏qq‫ܘܗܝ ܐܪ‬rq‫ ܕܐ‬.‫ܐ‬煿‫ܡ‬rr‫ ܡ‬焏q‫ܪ‬熏‫ ܣ‬爯q煟q‫܉ ܗ‬焏qr‫ ܦ‬焏‫ܡ ܕܠ‬煟‫ܡ‬ 10
焏‫ܢ‬rq‫ ܐ‬焏qr‫ ܬܘܒ ܡ‬焯‫ ܢ̇ܣ‬焏‫ ܗܢ‬焏q‫ܪ‬熏‫ ̣ܗܘ ܣ‬爯q煟‫ ܐܢ‬.焏qr‫ ܦ‬焏‫ܕܠ‬
.‫ܕ‬熏q‫ ܒܠ‬焏qr‫ ܘܦ‬焏q‫ ܐܘܪ‬煿̇qrq‫ ܕܐ‬.焏‫ܡ‬q‫ܩ‬r‫ܬܐ ܡ‬熏qqqr 爯q煟q‫܉ ܗ‬煿qr‫ܠܦ‬
‫܉‬焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܪܓ‬r‫⟨ ܕܬܗܘܐ ܡ‬qq‫ܚ ܗܕܐ ⟩ܐ‬r‫ ܬܬܡ‬焏‫ܡܩ‬熏‫ ܐܦ ܠܥ‬爯q煟‫ܐܢ‬
焏qr‫ ܘܠܦ‬焏q‫ܘܪ‬焏‫ ܠ‬.焏q̈r‫ܐ ܡ‬r‫ ܬܠ‬焏‫܇ ܕܩܢ‬焏‫ܡ‬q‫ ܡܩ‬焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫ ܓ‬爯q煟q‫ܗ‬
爯q‫ܡ‬q̈‫ܐ ܩ‬r‫ ܕ̣ܗܘ܉ ܕܬܠ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܐ‬焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫ ܓ‬爏q‫ ܠ‬焏‫ ܗܢ‬爏q‫ ܘܡ‬.焏‫ܡܩ‬熏‫ܘܠܥ‬ 15
煿rq‫ ܪ‬煿̇qrq‫ܬܐ ܐ‬煟‫ܩ‬熏‫ ܕܢ‬:‫ ܗܝ‬焏q‫ ܓܠ‬爏qq‫ ܗ‬爯q‫ ܗܠ‬爯‫ ܘ̣ܡ‬.煿‫ ܠ‬爯q煿‫ܡ‬r‫ܡ‬
‫ܬܐ‬熏qqqr‫ ܘ‬.‫ܬܐ‬熏qqqr‫ܘܗܝ ܕ‬rq‫ ܐ‬焏rq‫܉ ܪ‬焏q‫ܪ‬熏‫ ܣ‬爯q‫ ̣ܗܘ ܕ‬.焏q‫ܪ‬熏‫ܕܣ‬
爯‫ܐ ̣ܡ‬rr‫ ܬ‬煟q ‫ܘܢ‬煿‫ ܡܢ‬煟q 爏q‫ ܘ‬.‫ܡ‬熏r‫ ܓ‬爏q‫ ܕ‬焏q‫ܪ‬熏r‫ ܘ‬焏rq‫ܬܘܒ܉ ܪ‬
‫ܬܐ‬煟‫ܩ‬熏‫ܢ ܢ‬熏‫ܓ‬煟‫ ܘܒ‬.‫ܗ‬r‫ܒ‬q 爯‫ ̣ܡ‬rq‫ܣ‬q 焏qr‫ ܡ‬煟q ‫܉‬爏‫ ܠܥ‬焏‫ ܘܬܦܢ‬焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫ܓ‬
‫ܡ‬煟‫ܐ ܡ‬r‫ ܡܢ‬焏‫ ܐܦ ܠ‬焏‫ ܗܢ‬爏q‫ ܘܡ‬.r‫ ܠܓܡ‬焏qqrr‫ ܡ‬焏qr‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܕܠ‬ 20
焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫ ܓ‬rq‫ ܐܢܓ‬.‫ܡ‬熏r‫ ܓ‬焏‫ ܕܠ‬焏q‫ܡ‬煟‫ܡ ܩ‬煟‫ ܡ‬焏rq‫ ܪ‬煿̇qrq‫ ܐ‬焏‫ ܐܠ‬.焏q‫̇ܩܢ‬
.焏q‫ܕ ܩܢ‬熏q‫ ܒܠ‬爯q‫܉ ܬܪ‬煿q‫ܪ‬熏r 煿̇qrq‫ܬܐ ܕܐ‬熏qqqr ‫܉‬煿‫ ܠ‬rq‫ ܐ‬焏‫ܡ‬q̈‫ܐ ܩ‬r‫ܬܠ‬
.‫ ܗܕܐ‬爯‫ܡ‬ ̣ rq‫ܣ‬q 焏qr‫ ܡ‬煟q ‫ܬܐ܉‬熏qqqr‫ ܕ‬煿̇rq‫ܘܗܝ ܪ‬rq‫ ܬܘܒ ܕܐ‬焏q‫ܪ‬熏‫ܘܣ‬
爏q‫ ܡ‬爯q煟‫ ܡ‬.‫ܬܐ‬熏qq‫ܕ ̇ܗܘ ܕܐܪ‬熏q‫ ܒܠ‬焏qr‫ ܡ‬煟q 焏‫ ܩܢ‬qqrr‫ ܕܢ‬qq‫ܐ‬
煟q 煿‫ ܡܢ‬rq‫ܣ‬q ‫ܘܐ‬煿‫ ܕܢ‬:‫ܢ‬熏q‫ܡ‬q‫ ܠܣ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬熏‫ ܗܢ‬:焏q‫ܪ‬熏‫ ܕܣ‬煿rqr‫ ܠ‬煿‫ܕܙܕܩ ܠ‬ 25
94v 焏q‫ ܗܘ܉ ܓܠ‬焏qr‫ ܡ‬焏‫ ܘܐܢ ܕܠ‬.qqrr‫ ܡ‬焏qr‫ ܡ‬焏‫ ܗܝ ܕܕܠ‬焏‫ܥ‬q煟q | ‫܉‬焏qr‫ܡ‬
.‫ܘܗܝ‬rq‫ܬܐ ܐ‬熏q‫ܡ‬q 爯‫ܡ‬ ̣ 焏‫ܕܐ ܐܦܠ‬煿‫ܠ‬q‫ ܘܡ‬.焏‫ܬܐ ܩܢ‬熏‫ ܪܒ‬焏‫ܗܝ ܕܐܦܠ‬
rq‫܉ ܠ‬焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫ܬܐ ܘܓ‬熏qqqr‫ ܘ‬焏q‫ܪ‬熏‫ ܣ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬熏‫ ܗܢ‬.煿̇‫ܐ ܕܡܢ‬r‫ ܬܠ‬爯q‫ܢ ܕ‬熏‫̇ܗܢ‬
.‫ܘܢ‬煿qrq‫ܬܐ ܐ‬熏q‫ܡ‬q 爯‫ܡ‬ ̣ 熏‫ ܕܠ‬.r‫ ܠܓܡ‬焏‫ܢ‬qrq ‫ܘܢ‬煿q‫ܥܠ‬

3–4 煿̇‫ ܠ‬爯q煿‫ܡ‬r‫ ܡ‬爯q‫ܡ‬q‫ܐ ܩ‬r‫ ;ܕܬܠ‬sǝyāmē suppl. et emend., possis ‫ܗܝ‬熏‫ܡ‬q̈‫ܐ ܩ‬r‫ ܕܬܠ‬7
‫ܐ‬rܹq̣̇‫ ̣̇ܡ‬8 et 18 ‫ܡ‬熏r‫ ]ܓ‬爟r熏‫ ;ܓ‬emend. (vd. comm.) 10 ‫ܘ‬rq‫ ܕܐ‬13 suppl. ex L.20ra10
/P.59r23 15 爯q‫ܡ‬q̈‫ܐ ܩ‬r‫ ;ܕܬܠ‬possis ‫ܗܝ‬熏‫ܡ‬q̈‫ܐ ܩ‬r‫( ܕܬܠ‬vd. comm.) 19 爏‫[ ܠܥ‬爯‫ ]ܡ‬焏‫;ܘܬܦܢ‬
̈
del. ex L.20ra26/P.59v2 20 ‫ܐ‬r‫ܬܐ ]ܡܢ‬熏‫ ;ܡܢ‬em. ex L.20ra31/P.59v4 28 煿‫( ܕܡܢ‬etiam
L.20rb16/P.59v15); emend.
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 137

language), which do not pertain to quantity, you will not end up in (a state
of) disturbance, imagining that language does not pertain to quantity.

[Whether a mark is a quantity]

Also concerning why they name every existing body three-dimensional, and § 67
surface only two(-dimensional), and line, which is the starting point (rēšā) of
a surface, one(-dimensional). Bring forward what is less! We will (now) tell
you about these things. The surveyors name the dot, which is considered
by imagination and is not obtained in any body, a mark. They denote this
(dot) without part and without division, as someone would say: a certain
incorporeal starting point of every single body. Because of this, they say:
when you travel in thoughts and obtain a certain length without breadth,
then it is named a line, which is a length without breadth. If this line obtains
another dimension to its breadth, then it constitutes a surface, which is
only length and breadth. If it is extended also to depth ⟨so that⟩ it becomes
perceptible, then it constitutes a body, which has three extensions: length,
breadth, and depth. Because of this, they name any body whatsoever three-
dimensional. Hence, it is obvious from this that a dot is the starting point
of a line, and a line is the starting point of a surface, and a surface is the
starting point and beginning of every single body. And when you strip off
any of them [i.e. the extensions] from a body and you return upwards, there
will be one extension less than its antecedent, and finally a dot without
extension is found altogether. Because of this, it does not have any part
too, but is a certain incorporeal initial principle (rēšā). For if a body has
three dimensions, and surface, which is its beginning, has only two, and
furthermore a line, which is the starting point of surface, is one extension
less than this, so that it seems to possess only one extension, that of length—
since now the starting point of a line, that is a mark, needs to be one
extension less than it [i.e. the line]—it is clear that it is found without
extension. And if it [i.e. the mark] is without extension, it is obvious that
it has no magnitude, and therefore it does not pertain to quantity. But those
three that pertain to it, that is line, surface, and body, concerning them there
is no controversy at all that they do not pertain to quantity.
 ‫‪138‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫‪§ 68‬‬ ‫ܘܡ‪ 爯‬ܒ‪r‬ܪ ܗܠ‪r 爯q‬ܦ‪rq‬ܐ ܕܐܦ ܥ‪ 爏‬ܐܬܪܐ ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܒ‪rqrq‬ܐ ܢ‪rr‬ܥ‪焏‬‬
‫ܘܢ‪熏q‬ܐ ܠ‪q‬܉ ܕܐܢ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܐܘ ܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ‪⟩ .‬ܘܐ‪qq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ⟨ ܘܕܡܢ‪焏‬‬
‫ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ‪ .‬ܘܢ‪熏q‬ܐ ܠ‪ q‬ܬܘܒ ܕܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ̣ܡ‪q 爯‬ܡ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܗܘ‪ .‬ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܗ‪爏qq‬‬
‫ܐܦ ‪qq‬ܢ‪ 煿‬ܕܐܬܪܐ܉ ܡ‪熏‬ܕ‪̣ 焏q‬ܗܝ ܐܦ ܬܪܥ‪rq‬ܐ ܕܓ‪熏‬ܐ‪q .‬ܠܢ‪ r‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܡܣܒ‪r‬‬
‫ܕ‪ 爏q‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܡ‪r‬ܪܓ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܐܘ ܡ‪煟qr‬ܥܢ‪焏‬܉ ܒ‪煟‬ܘ‪rq‬ܐ ܘܒ‪焏‬ܬܪܐ‬ ‫‪5‬‬
‫ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ‪ .‬ܘܐܦ ܥ‪ 爏‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪̈qr‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪爯q‬܉ ܠ̇‪ 煟q 煿‬ܠ̇‪ 煿‬ܠܡܣܒ‪r‬ܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ‬
‫ܩܢ‪̣ 爯q‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܕܘܡ‪ 焏q‬ܕܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܡ‪q熟qr‬ܢ̈‪rq‬ܐ‪ .‬ܒ̇‪煿‬ܝ ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪煟‬ܪܫ ܗܘܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܠܡ‪煟‬ܪ‪熏q‬܇‬
‫ܕ‪ 爏q‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܕܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪熏r‬ܡ ܗ̣ܘ ܒ‪ 爏q‬ܕܘ‪ 焏q‬ܗܘ܉ ܐܠ‪̣ 焏‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܡ‪r‬ܬܙ‪q‬ܥܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ‬
‫ܘܬܪܒ‪rq‬ܐ ܘܒ‪犏‬ܪܐ ܕܓ‪̈r熏‬ܡ‪焏‬܉ ܡ‪r‬ܕܪ‪ 焏q‬ܕܐ‪ rq‬ܐܬܪܐ‪ .‬ܐ‪qq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪rq‬‬
‫ܡ‪r‬ܬܙ‪ 牟q‬ܗ̣ܘܐ ⟩ܡ‪煟‬ܡ⟨ ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܕܘ‪ 焏q‬ܠ‪煟‬ܘ‪焏q‬܉ ܘܐ‪qq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܪ̇ܒ‪ 焏‬ܗ̣ܘܐ ܐܘ‬ ‫‪10‬‬
‫̇ܒ‪犏‬ܪ܉ ܐܠ‪ 熏‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪ rq‬ܗ̣ܘܐ ‪qq‬ܢ‪ 煿‬ܕܐܬܪܐ ܕܒ‪ 煿‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܗ̈ܘ‪熏r .爯q‬ܢ‪ 焏q‬ܓ‪rq‬‬
‫ܕ̇ܗܘܐ ܒ‪ 煟q‬ܙܘܥ‪̣ 焏‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܕܘ‪ 焏q‬ܠ‪煟‬ܘ‪̇ 焏q‬ܡܣ‪煿‬ܕ ܓܠ‪ rq焏q‬ܥ‪̇ 爏‬ܗܘ ܡ‪焏‬‬
‫ܕܡ‪r‬ܬܙ‪牟q‬܉ ܕܒ‪焏‬ܬܪܐ ̇ܗܘܐ ‪熏r‬ܢ‪ .煿q‬ܐܦ ̣ܡ‪̇ 爯‬ܗܝ ܕܡ‪qr‬ܩ‪ 爯q‬ܓ‪̈r熏‬ܡ‪焏‬‬
‫̈‬
‫ܡ‪ 爯‬ܕܘ‪rqq‬ܗܘܢ ܘ‪煿q‬ܒ‪ 爯q‬ܐܬܪܐ ܠ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ܉ ܓܠ‪ 焏q‬ܗܝ ܕܐ‪ rq‬ܐܬܪܐ‪.‬‬ ‫ܒ‪熟‬ܒ‪̣ 爯‬‬
‫̈‬ ‫̇‬
‫ܗܐ ܓ‪q熟q rq‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܕܐ‪ 焏qq‬ܕܐ‪ rq‬ܗ̣ܘܐ ܡ‪ 焏q‬ܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪rq‬܉ ܐܐܪ ܡ‪煟q qqrr‬‬ ‫‪15‬‬
‫ܢ‪qr‬ܩ‪熏‬ܢ‪ .‬ܘܐ‪ 焏qq‬ܬܘܒ ܕܐ‪ rq‬ܗ̣ܘܐ ܐܐܪ ‪ 煟q‬ܢ‪r‬ܢܣ‪熏q‬ܢ ̈ܡ‪焏q‬܉ ܡ‪r‬ܢ‪焏‬‬
‫ܘ‪煿̇q‬ܒ ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܐܬܪܐ‪ .‬ܐܢ ܗ‪ 爏qq‬ܢ‪qr‬ܩ‪熏‬ܢ ܓ‪̈r熏‬ܡ‪̣ 焏‬ܡ‪⟩ 爯‬ܩ‪煟‬ܡ⟨ ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ‪煟q :‬‬
‫̇ܗܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ ܗܘܘ ܒ‪ 煿‬ܗܘ‪̣ 煟q 熏q‬ܗܘ܉ ‪q煟q‬ܥ‪ 焏‬ܗܝ ܕܐ‪ rq‬ܩ‪q熏‬ܡ‪煿‬‬
‫ܕܐܬܪܐ‪ .‬ܘܓܠ‪⟩ 焏q‬ܗܝ⟨ ܬܘܒ ܠ‪q‬ܠܢ‪ r‬ܕܐܦܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܥ‪ 爟‬ܓ‪̈r熏‬ܡ‪ .焏‬ܐܠ‪焏‬‬
‫‪̣ 煟q‬ܗܘ ܩ̇‪焏‬ܡ ܒ‪煟‬ܘ‪rq‬ܗ܉ ܡ‪r‬ܢ‪ 爯q‬ܓ‪̈r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܘ‪煿q‬ܒ‪ 爯q‬ܐܬܪܐ ܠ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ‪ .‬ܘ̣ܡ‪爯‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬
‫ܣ̈ܓ‪焏q‬ܬܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ ܐ‪ rq‬ܗ̣ܘܐ ܕܢ‪熏q‬ܐ ܕܐ‪ rq‬ܐܬܪܐ‪ .‬ܐܠ‪̣ 煟q 焏‬ܡ‪爯‬‬
‫‪ r‬ܡܢ‪ 爯‬ܕܐ‪rq‬‬ ‫ܐܪ‪熏qq‬ܬ ̈ܡܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪煿‬ܡ‪q‬ܢ‪爯‬܉ ܒ‪ 煟q‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܙܥ‪rqr熏‬ܐ ܐܬ‪݀ q熏q‬‬
‫‪95r‬‬ ‫ܐܬܪܐ‪| .‬‬

‫‪§ 69‬‬ ‫ܡ‪煟qr‬ܥ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܐܦ ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܗܕܐ ܕ‪qq‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܪܒ‪ 焏‬ܩܢ‪ 焏‬ܐܬܪܐ‪ .‬ܐܢ ܓ‪ rq‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܢ‪焏‬‬
‫ܥ‪ 爟‬ܓ‪̈r熏‬ܡ‪焏‬܆ ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪ rq‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܝ ܕܐܦ ܡ‪qr‬ܒܠ‪ 爯q‬ܒ‪ 煿‬ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪qr‬ܒ‪爏‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬
‫ܡܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ‪ .‬ܘܒ‪q‬ܠ‪熟‬ܒ‪̇q 爯‬ܒ‪ r‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪qr‬ܒ‪ r‬ܡܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ‪q煟q .‬ܥ‪ 焏‬ܗܝ ܕܐܦ‬
‫ܡ‪rq‬ܪ ‪qq‬ܢ‪̣ 煿‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܕ‪q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ‪ .‬ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕܕܡܥܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܐ‪ 煿̇qrq‬ܕܢ‪݁q‬ܒ‪熏‬ܫ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܘܠ‪焏‬‬
‫ܡ‪q 爯‬ܒܠ‪ 焏‬ܕܐ‪q‬ܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܡ‪݁qr‬ܒܠ‪ 爯q‬ܒ‪.煿‬‬
‫ܢ‪qr‬ܒ‪r‬܇ ܘܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܢ‪̣ rq‬‬

‫ܕܐܦܥ‪1 爏‬‬ ‫)‪ ‖ suppl. ex L.20vb34 f./P.60v8 et B.95v13 (§71‬ܕܐܢ ܐ‪rq‬ܘ ‪2‬‬ ‫;ܡ‪熏‬ܕܐ ‪4‬‬
‫)‪em. ex L.21ra8 (vd. comm.‬‬ ‫ܡ‪煟‬ܥ‪煿‬ܘܢ ‪; L.21ra20/P.60v18:‬ܗܘܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ ‪7‬‬ ‫ܒ‪ 爏q‬ܕܘ‪8 焏q‬‬
‫‪; em. ex‬ܐ‪ 10 suppl. ex L.21ra27/P.60v21 15 焏qq‬ܒ‪ 爏q‬ܕܘܟ ܗܘ ‪; L.21ra22/P.60v19:‬ܗܘ‬
‫;ܩܢ‪熏‬ܡ‪] 煿‬ܩ‪q熏‬ܡ‪ (vd. comm.) ‖ suppl. ex L.21rb14/P.61r8 18 煿‬ܘ‪煿̇q‬ܒ ‪L.21rb6/P.61r4 17‬‬
‫‪em. ex L.21rb18/P.61r10‬‬ ‫‪; em. ex‬ܡ‪] 爯‬ܥ‪19 suppl. ex L.21rb19, (etiam P.61r8 om.) ‖ 爟‬‬
‫‪; em. ex L.21rb27 /P.61r13 27–28‬ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ]ܕܐ‪L.21rb20/P.61r10 et line 24 f./B.95r2 21 rq‬‬
‫‪; em. ex L.21va25–27/P.61v5–7‬ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕܡܥܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ … ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܢ‪rq‬‬
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 139

[Whether there is space and whether it is a quantity]

After this, it is appropriate that we present also space in brief, and show § 68
you whether it exists or does not exist, ⟨and how it is⟩, what it is, and
moreover to show whether it also pertains to quantity. Now, that there
is a natural being of space does even the common sense affirm. For all
men assume that everything that is perceptible and intelligible is in some
place or space. And also concerning the incorporeals they hold the same
assumption on the analogy of the perceptible things, in that their mind is
not trained to comprehend that everything that is incorporeal is everywhere.
However, from the motion, the increase and the diminution of bodies it is
comprehended that there is space. For how would ⟨something⟩ move from
one place to another or how would it increase or diminish, if there was not
a natural being of space in which these things could occur? For the change
that happens by a movement from one place to another indicates clearly
that the change of what is moving happens in space. Also from the fact that
bodies sometimes depart from their places and leave room for each other
[i.e. successive replacement], it is obvious that space exists. For we see where
there was water at first, air is found when it goes away. And where there
was air, when water flows, air departs and leaves room for water. If therefore
bodies depart ⟨before⟩ each other [i.e. replace one another], as what they
were in remains the same, it is obvious that there is a subsistence of space.
Moreover, it ⟨is⟩ obvious for everyone that (space) does not depart along
with the bodies, but as it remains in its location, bodies depart and leave
room for each other. From many other things we could show that there is
space, but since we desist from verbosity, through these few things it has
been shown by us that space exists.

Also, from this it is known that space possesses a great power. For if it does § 69
not depart along with the bodies, but exists even when they sometimes are
destroyed in it and is not destroyed by them; and it always contains them
and is not contained by them. It is obvious that even its nature is superior to
theirs, because it is a superiority to contain something and not be contained,
and not to be affected by the destruction of those that are destroyed in it.
 ‫‪140‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫‪§ 70‬‬ ‫ܬܘܒ‪ 爯q煟‬ܡ‪r‬ܥܩܒ‪ 焏‬ܕܐܢ̣‪煿‬ܘ ܕܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܗܘ ܐܘ ܠ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܗܘ‪ .‬ܘܕܠ‪焏‬‬
‫ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܓܠ‪ 焏q‬ܗܝ ̣ܡ‪̇ 爯‬ܗܝ ܕܡܩܒܠܢ‪ 焏‬ܗܘ ܕܓ‪̈r熏‬ܡ‪ .焏‬ܐܠ‪熏‬‬
‫ܓ‪ rq‬ܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܗ̣ܘܐ ܘܡܩ݁ܒ‪ 爏‬ܗ̣ܘܐ ܒ‪ 煿‬ܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪焏‬܉‬
‫ܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܒܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪ qqrr‬ܗܘܐ‪̇ .‬ܗܝ ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪ 焏q犏‬ܕܬܗܘܐ‪ .‬ܐܠ‪熏‬‬
‫ܡ‪ 焏qqr‬ܗ̣ܘܬ ܓ‪ rq‬ܕܢ‪煿‬ܘܐ ܡ‪r‬ܘܡ ܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܒܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪焏‬܉ ܡ‪ 焏q犏‬ܗ̣ܘܬ‬ ‫‪5‬‬
‫ܕܐܦ ܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܪܒ‪ 焏‬ܒܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܙܥ‪熏‬ܪܐ ܢ‪煿‬ܘܐ‪ 煟q .‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܐܠ‪ 犏‬ܒ‪煿‬܇‬
‫ܐܢܓ‪ rq‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ̇‪ 煟q‬ܒ‪ 煿‬ܕܘ‪rq‬ܐ‪q煟q .‬ܥ‪ 焏‬ܗܝ ܕܐܦܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪熟‬ܕܪܒ ܒ‪ 煿‬ܣ‪.q‬‬
‫ܠ‪煿‬ܕܐ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܢܩ̣‪q‬ܦ‪ 焏‬ܕܐܦ ‪q‬ܠ‪r 煿‬ܡ‪ 焏q‬ܒܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܙܥ‪熏‬ܪܐ ܢ‪qr‬ܒ‪ r‬ܗ̣ܘܐ‪.‬‬
‫ܘܐܦ ‪rr‬ܩ‪r‬ܐ ‪煟q‬ܐ ܙܥ‪熏‬ܪܬܐ ܬܐ‪熏q‬ܕ ܗ̣ܘܬ ‪q‬ܠ‪q 煿‬ܡ‪ .焏‬ܡ‪ 爯q煟‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪焏q犏‬‬
‫ܕܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܢ‪煿‬ܘܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܐܬܪܐ‪ .‬ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܦܠ‪ 焏‬ܕܢܣ‪q‬ܡ‪熏q‬ܗܝ ܐܢ‪ r‬ܠ‪焏‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬
‫ܓ‪qr‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪ .焏q犏‬ܒ̇‪煿‬ܝ ܕ‪ 爏q‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܕܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪熏r‬ܡ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ܉ ܠ‪ rq‬ܒ‪⟩ 煿‬ܠ‪⟨焏‬‬
‫ܡ‪ 焏qr‬ܘܠ‪熏q 焏‬ܪܐ ܘܐܦܠ‪熏qqqr 焏‬ܬܐ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ‪ .‬ܐܬܪܐ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܡ‪r‬ܡ‪r‬ܚ‬
‫ܘܡ‪r‬ܦ‪r‬ܐ ܥ‪ 爟‬ܓ‪̈r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܒ‪ 煿‬ܘܗ‪q‬ܢ‪̇q 焏‬ܒ‪ r‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ‪ .‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܕ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܗܠ‪爯q‬‬
‫ܬܬ‪煟q‬ܥ ܕܠ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܐܬܪܐ ܠ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪qr‬ܡ‪ .焏‬ܐܦܠ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܠܡ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪ 焏q犏‬ܣ‪q‬܇‬
‫ܕܓ‪̈r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܒܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܕܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪熏r‬ܡ ܗ̣ܘ ܡ‪qr‬ܒ‪̇ .爯qr‬ܗܘ ܓ‪ rq‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪̇q‬ܒ‪ r‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ܉‬ ‫‪15‬‬
‫ܠܦ‪熏‬ܬ ܡ‪rq熏r‬ܗܘܢ ܐܠ‪犏‬ܐ ܕܢ‪煿‬ܘܐ ܡ‪ qqr‬ܘܡܒ‪r‬ܝ‪̣ .‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܗ‪ 爏qq‬ܐܦ‬
‫ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܐܬܪܐ ܠܓܡ‪ r‬ܡܣ‪r‬ܒ‪ r‬ܐܢ‪.r‬‬

‫‪§ 71‬‬ ‫ܘܒ‪煟‬ܓ‪熏‬ܢ ܐܦ ܙ‪q‬ܢ‪熏‬ܢ ̇ܗܘ ܩ‪焏qq‬ܘܣ ܐ̇ܡ‪ .r‬ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪ rq‬ܐܬܪܐ ܘܡ‪焯qr‬‬
‫‪95v‬‬ ‫ܡܠ‪r‬ܐ ܕܐ‪ qq‬ܗܕܐ‪q | .‬ܠܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܠ‪ 爟‬ܒ‪煟‬ܘ‪ 焏q‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ‪ .‬ܘܐܢ ܡ‪ 爯q煟‬ܐ‪rq‬‬
‫ܐܬܪܐ‪ :‬ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܒ‪煟‬ܘ‪ 焏q‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ‪ .‬ܘܡ‪ qqrr‬ܠ‪煿‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬
‫ܐܬܪܐ ܒ‪焏‬ܬܪܐ܉ ܘ̇ܗܘ ܬܘܒ ܒ‪rq焏‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܘܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܒ‪rq焏‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܘܗܕܐ ܕܠ‪焏‬‬
‫ܣ‪ .q‬ܡ‪ 爯q煟‬ܠ‪ 爟‬ܠܓܡ‪ r‬ܠ‪ rq‬ܐܬܪܐ‪ .‬ܙܕܩ ܗ̣ܘܐ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܢ‪r‬ܒ‪爯q‬܉ ܕܠ‪爏q 熏‬‬
‫ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܒ‪焏‬ܬܪܐ ܗܘ ܐ‪qq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ̣ܗܘ ܐ̣ܡ‪ .r‬ܣ̈ܓ‪焏q‬ܬܐ ܓ‪ rq‬ܘ‪rqrq‬ܐ‪ rq‬ܐ‪q‬ܠ‪爯q‬‬
‫ܕܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪熏r‬ܡ ܐ̈ܢ‪爯q‬܉ ܠ‪ rq‬ܠ‪ 爯q煿‬ܐܬܪܐ ܘܠ‪ rq‬ܐ̈ܢ‪ 爯q‬ܒ‪煟‬ܘ‪ .焏q‬ܘ̇ܗܢ‪ 爯q‬ܬܘܒ‬
‫ܕܐ‪ 爯q煿qrq‬ܒ‪煟‬ܘ݁‪焏q‬܉ ܠ‪ 熏‬ܒ‪ 煟q‬ܙܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪ 爯q煿qrq‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܕ‪q‬ܠ‪ 爯q煿‬ܒ‪焏‬ܬܪܐ‬ ‫‪25‬‬
‫ܢ‪ .爯q̈qrr‬ܩ‪煟‬ܡܢ‪ 爯‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܕܒ‪煟q‬ܥܣ‪̈ r‬ܙܢ‪ 焏q‬ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪̇ r‬ܗܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ‬
‫ܡ‪ 爯‬ܬܡ‪ 爯‬ܡ‪ 焏q熟qr‬ܓܠ‪rq焏q‬܉ ܕܠ‪ 爏q 熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܒ‪煟‬ܘ‪ 焏q‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ‪.‬‬ ‫ܒܡ‪煟‬ܡ‪ .‬ܘ ̣‬
‫ܒ‪焏‬ܬܪܐ ܗܘ ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܐܣܒ‪ r‬ܙ‪q‬ܢ‪熏‬ܢ‪ .‬ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܥ‪̇ 爏‬ܗܝ ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܐܬܪܐ‬
‫ܘܐ‪qq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ܉ ܣܦ̈ܩ‪ 爯‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܐܬܐܡ‪r‬ܘ‪.‬‬

‫‪§ 72‬‬ ‫ܡ‪q 爯‬ܡ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܗ‪ 焏r‬ܐܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪.爯‬‬ ‫ܕܡܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܘܕ ̣‬ ‫‪30‬‬
‫ܒܦܣ‪̈q‬ܩ‪r‬ܐ ܗ‪ 爏qq‬ܠܡ‪焏‬ܡ‪ .r‬ܐܬܪܐ ܣ‪ 焏q‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܘ‪熏qqqr‬ܬܐ ܕܡ‪煟‬ܡ‬
‫ܕ‪̇q‬ܒ‪ r‬ܠ̇‪煿‬ܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܡ‪qr‬ܒ‪ r‬ܡܢ‪ .煿‬ܘ‪ 爏q‬ܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܐ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ̣ܗܘ܉ ܐ‪rq‬‬
‫ܠ‪ 煿‬ܣ‪ 焏q‬ܘ‪熏qqqr‬ܬܐ ܕܐ‪ 煿̇qrq‬ܥܒ‪r‬ܗ ܒ‪ .焏qr‬ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܢ ̣ܗܘ ܕ‪q‬ܡ‪q‬ܡ‪焏‬‬

‫ܒ‪ r‬ܗ̣ܘܐ ‪6 scriptor exp.‬‬ ‫ܙܥ‪熏‬ܪܐ ‪ܸ post‬ܢ‪ܸ qr‬‬ ‫)‪q (vd. comm.‬ܠ‪r 煿‬ܡ‪ … 焏q‬ܗ̣ܘܐ ‪8‬‬ ‫‪11‬‬
‫)‪ (vd. comm.‬ܒ‪煟‬ܘ‪ 焏q‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ‪ (vd. comm.) 20‬ܙ‪q‬ܢ‪熏‬ܢ ‪suppl. ex L.22vb13/P.62v8 18‬‬
‫‪ (vd. comm.) 33‬ܕ‪̇q‬ܒ‪ r‬ܠ̇‪煿‬ܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܡ‪qr‬ܒ‪ r‬ܡܢ‪ (vd. comm.) 32 煿‬ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘ ܒܡ‪煟‬ܡ ‪26–27‬‬
‫)ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܥܒ‪r‬ܗ ܒ‪; em. ex L.22vb18 f., (P.63r17: 焏qr‬ܕܐ‪ 煿̇qrq‬ܥܒ‪ 煿̇qr‬ܒ‪焏qr‬‬
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 141

Furthermore, there is an inquiry whether it [i.e. space] is a body or is not § 70

a body. That it is not a body is obvious from the fact that it is receptive of
bodies. For if it were a body and were receiving another body in it, (then) a
body would be found in another body, which is impossible to occur. For if it
ever were possible that a body occurred in another body, it would be possible
that also a large body were in a small body without being compressed in it.
For if (a body) does not occupy place in (another body), it is also obvious
that it is not compacted in it at all. On this it follows that the whole heaven
would be contained in a small body, and also a small eddy would contain a
whole sea. Therefore, it is impossible that space would be body, but nor can
anyone denote it to be incorporeal, in that everything that is incorporeal
has ⟨neither⟩ extension, nor measure, nor any surface. Space, however, is
extended and expanded along with the bodies in it, and in this way it
contains them. As it is known from this, space is not incorporeal, for it is
not possible at all to imagine that bodies are contained in something that is
incorporeal. For what contains them needs in accordance with their size to
be extended and empty. Hence, some people think that there is no space at
all.

Therefore, also Zeno of Citium [of Elea!] says that there is no space, and § 71
formulates the argument as follows: everything is in some place, and if
therefore there is space—since also that thing would be in a certain place—
(then) a space would be found in (another) space, and again that one in
another, and another in another, and so on without end. Therefore, there
is (clearly) no space at all. He should, however, have understood that not
everything is in space in the way he has said. For many things, and especially
those that are incorporeal, do not have space and are not in a place. And
again, those that are in a place are so not in one single way, so that all of
them would be found in space. For we have already presented that what is
in something is said to be so in eleven ways, and thence it clearly appears
that not everything that is in a place is in space, as Zeno thought. However,
what has been said may suffice concerning that there is space and how it is.

But what it is, and that it pertains to quantity we will say now. To recount § 72
in brief: space is a limit and a surface of something that contains what
is contained by it. And every single body whatsoever has a limit and a
surface which is its extreme. However, if it is solid it has one surface, which
 ‫‪142‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ܉ ‪煟q‬ܐ ‪熏qqqr‬ܬܐ ܐ‪ rq‬ܠ‪煿‬܉ ̇ܗܝ ܕ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܠܒ‪煟q r‬ܪܐ ܠ‪ .煿‬ܐܢ‪爯q煟‬‬

‫‪q‬ܠ‪q‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܗܘ ܐܘ ܩܒ‪q‬ܒ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ܉ ܬܪܬ‪熏q̈qqr 爯q‬ܬܐ ܩܢ‪ .焏‬ܗܢ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪爯q‬‬
‫‪煟q‬ܐ ݁ܒ‪rqr‬ܐ ܘ‪煟q‬ܐ ݁ܓ‪rq熏‬ܐ‪ .‬ܐܢ‪ 爯q煟‬ܢ‪煿‬ܘܐ ‪q‬ܒ‪ rq‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܒ‪q‬ܠܠ‪煿‬܉ ܗ‪爯q煟q‬‬
‫‪熏qqqr‬ܬܗ ̇ܗܝ ܒ‪rqr‬ܐ ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܐܐܪ ‪rq煟q‬ܐ‪ .‬ܘܒ‪煟‬ܓ‪熏‬ܢ ܣ‪ 焏q‬ܕܐܐܪ ̇ܗܘ‬
‫ܕܢܩ‪ 牯q‬ܠ̇‪ 煿‬ܠ‪熏qqqr‬ܬܐ ܗܕܐ ܒ‪rqr‬ܐ܉ ̣ܗܘ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܐܬܪܗ ܕܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪焏‬‬ ‫‪5‬‬
‫̇ܗܘ܉ ‪熏qqqr‬ܬܐ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕ‪q‬ܠ‪̇ 煿‬ܗܝ ܓ‪rq熏‬ܐ ܕܢܩ‪q‬ܦ‪ 焏‬ܠ̇‪煿‬ܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪q‬ܒ‪rq‬‬
‫⟩ܒ‪q‬ܠܠ‪煿‬܉ ܐܬܪܐ ܐ‪ 煿̇qrq‬ܕ‪q‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܕ̇ܗܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪q‬ܒ‪ ⟨rq‬ܒ‪煿‬܉ ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕ̣ܗܝ ܢܩ‪q‬ܦ‪焏‬‬
‫ܠܣ‪熏̈q‬ܗܝ ܘ‪rq煟q‬ܐ ܠ‪̣ 煿‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܠܒ‪r‬܉ ܐܬܪܐ ܗ‪ 爏qq‬ܣ‪ 焏q‬ܓ‪ 焏q熏‬ܕܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪焏‬‬
‫ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ܇ ܕܢܩ‪ 牯q‬ܠܣ‪ 煿q‬ܒ‪ 焏qr‬ܕ̇ܗܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪q‬ܒ‪ rq‬ܒ‪ .煿‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪焏‬‬
‫ܓ‪ rq‬ܡ‪焏q熟qr‬܉ ܕܠ‪ 熏‬ܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܐܬܪܐ‪ .‬ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܣ‪ 煿q‬ܓ‪焏q熏‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬
‫‪96r‬‬ ‫ܕܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ .焏‬ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ | ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪熏r‬ܡ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ܉ ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕܩܢ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪焏qr‬‬
‫ܕܠ‪焏‬ܘܪ݁‪ 焏q‬ܘܠܦ‪ .焏qr‬ܠܦ‪熏‬ܬ ܪܒ‪熏‬ܬܗ ܕܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪̇ 焏‬ܗܘ ܕ‪q‬ܒ‪ rq‬ܒ‪ :煿‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪焏‬‬
‫ܗ‪ 爏qq‬ܐܬܪܐ ܕ̈ܡ‪焏q‬܉ ܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪ r‬ܩ‪煟‬ܣ‪̇ 焏‬ܗܘ ܕܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ ܒ‪煿‬܉ ܡ‪爏q‬‬
‫ܕܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܗܘ‪ .‬ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܣ‪ 煿q‬ܓ‪ 焏q熏‬ܕܩ‪煟‬ܣ‪̇ 焏‬ܗܘ ܕܢܩ‪ 牯q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܠ̈ܡ‪ 焏q‬ܕܒ‪煿‬܉‬
‫ܗܘ‪ 熏q‬ܐܬܪܗܘܢ‪ .‬ܘܐܣܦ‪rq‬ܐ ܬܘܒ ܕܡ‪熏‬ܙܠ‪r‬ܐ܉ ܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܕ̣ܗܝ ܗ̣ܝ ܐܬܪܗ‬ ‫‪15‬‬
‫ܕܐܐܪ܇ ܐܠ‪熏qqqr 焏‬ܬܐ ̇ܗܝ ܓ‪rq熏‬ܐ ܕܢܩ‪q‬ܦ‪ 焏‬ܠܣ‪熏̈q‬ܗܝ ܒ‪ 焏qr‬ܕܐܐܪ܉ ̣ܗܝ‬
‫ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܐ ܕܐ‪ 煿̇qrq‬ܐܬܪܗ‪ .‬ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ ̣ܗܘ ܐܐܪ ܕܐ‪ 爯qrq‬ܒ‪ 煿‬ܐܬܪܗܘܢ‬
‫ܕ̈‪qq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܒ‪rr‬ܪܐ܉ ܐܦ‪ 爯‬ܡܣ‪r‬ܒ‪ r‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܣ‪熏̈q‬ܗܝ ̇ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ‬
‫ܕܢܩ‪q‬ܦ‪̣ 爯q‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܠܒ‪ r‬ܠ‪̣ 煟q 爏q‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܓ‪̈r熏‬ܡ‪焏‬܉ ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ ܐܬ‪r‬ܘܬܐ ܕ‪̣ 煟q 爏q‬ܡ‪爯‬‬
‫̈‪qq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪q‬ܒ‪ rq‬ܠܓ‪ 熏‬ܡܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ‪ .‬ܐܬܪܐ ܗ‪ 爏qq‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܒܦܣܩ‪ 焏‬ܠܡ‪焏‬ܡ‪ r‬ܗܢ‪焏‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬
‫ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ‪ .‬ܗܢ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܣ‪⟩ 焏q‬ܓ‪ ⟨焏q熏‬ܕ̇ܗܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪煟q‬ܪ ܠ̇‪煿‬ܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪q‬ܒ‪ rq‬ܒ‪.煿‬‬

‫‪§ 73‬‬ ‫ܥ‪ 爯‬ܠ‪q‬ܠܢ‪ r‬ܐ‪ 煿̇qrq‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܡܣ‪r‬ܒ‪r‬ܐ ܠ‪q‬܉ ܐܦ ܕ̣ܡ‪爯‬‬ ‫ܡ‪ 爯‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕ̈ܓܠ‪ 爯q‬ܘ‪̈ q煟q‬‬
‫̣‬
‫‪q‬ܡ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܐܬܪܐ‪ .‬ܐܢ̣‪煿‬ܘ ܓ‪ rq‬ܕ̇‪煟q‬ܪ ܠ‪ 爏q‬ܓ‪r̈熏‬ܡ‪ :爯q‬ܘܠ‪ rq‬ܡ‪r‬ܘܡ‬
‫ܠܡ‪r‬ܢ‪qq 焏‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܪܓ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܠ‪ 熏‬ܒ‪焏‬ܬܪܐ ܗܘ܉ ‪q煟q‬ܥ‪ 焏‬ܗܝ ܕܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܡ‪r‬ܚ‬
‫ܐܬܪܐ ܠܦ‪熏‬ܬ ܪܒ‪熏‬ܬܗ ܕ‪ 爏q‬ܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ̣ܗܘ‪ .‬ܘܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ ܡ‪r‬ܩܦ‪爿‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬
‫ܠܦ‪熏‬ܬ ܙܥ‪熏‬ܪܘܬܐ ܕܨ̈ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܕܒ‪ .煿‬ܡ‪ 爯q煟‬ܐܢ ܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪̣ 焏‬ܡ‪q 爯‬ܡ‪熏q‬ܬܐ‬
‫ܗܘ܉ ܓܠ‪ 焏q‬ܗܝ ܕܐܦ ܐܬܪܐ ܡܢ̇‪ 煿‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ‪ .‬ܘܐܢ̣‪煿‬ܘ ܕܣ‪熏‬ܪ‪ 焏q‬ܕ‪爯q‬‬
‫ܡ‪ 焏qr‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ ܕܐܪ‪熏qq‬ܬܐ ܩܢ‪ .焏‬ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܡ‪̣ 煿qr‬ܡ‪q 爯‬ܡ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܗܘ‪焯q .‬‬
‫ܣܓ‪rqrq q‬ܐ‪ rq‬ܡ‪熟qr‬ܐ ܐܬܪܐ ܕܩܢ‪ 焏‬ܬܪ‪ 爯q‬ܡ‪⟩ 爯qq̈r‬ܗܢ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܠ‪焏‬ܘܪ‪焏q‬‬
‫ܘܠܦ‪ ⟨焏qr‬ܕ̣ܡ‪q 爯‬ܡ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ‪ .‬ܐܢ‪ 爯q煟‬ܐܢ‪ r‬ܢ‪焏‬ܡ‪ r‬ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܡ‪r‬ܚ‬ ‫‪30‬‬
‫ܐܬܪܐ ܠܦ‪熏‬ܬ ‪q‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܩ‪q熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܓ‪̈r熏‬ܡ‪焏‬܉ ܗܢ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܐܠ‪ 犏‬ܕܢ‪焏‬ܡ‪r‬܉ ܕܠ‪熏‬‬
‫‪q‬ܠ‪ 爯q煿‬ܡܢ̈‪熏‬ܬܗܘܢ ܕܓ‪̈r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܒ‪焏‬ܬܪܐ ܐ‪̇ .爯q煿qrq‬ܗܝ ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪焏qqr‬‬
‫ܕܬܗܘܐ‪ .‬ܐܢܓ‪ rq‬ܡ‪ 焏q犏‬ܗܘܬ ܕܢ‪̈煿‬ܘ‪ 爯q‬ܡܢ̈‪熏‬ܬܐ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܓ‪̈r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܠ‪焏‬‬

‫ܐܢ‪ 爯q煟‬ܢ‪煿‬ܘܐ ‪̇q‬ܒ‪ r‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ‪; del. ex L.22vb26/P.63r20 3–4‬ܬܪܬ‪熏q̈qqr 爯q‬ܬܐ ]ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ[ ܩܢ‪2 焏‬‬
‫‪; em. ex L.22vb28–32/P.63r21–23‬ܒ‪q‬ܠܠ‪煿‬܉ ̇ܗܝ ‪熏qqqr‬ܬܐ ݁ܒ‪rqr‬ܐ ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܐܐܪ ‪rq煟q‬ܐ‬ ‫‪7‬‬
‫‪suppl. ex L.23ra3–5(conj.)/P.63v4‬‬
‫̈‬
‫‪; em. ex L.23ra6/P.63v5‬ܠܣ‪熏q‬ܗܘܝ ‪8‬‬ ‫ܕܒܦܣܩ‪20 焏‬‬
‫)‪(vd. comm.‬‬ ‫‪21 suppl. ex L.23rb13/P.64r2‬‬ ‫ܡ‪29–30 爯‬‬ ‫‪; em. et suppl. ex‬ܡ‪ … 爯qqqr‬ܕ ̣‬
‫‪L.23va2f./P.64r14‬‬
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 143

surrounds it from without. But if it is concave or convex it has two surfaces,

namely one outer and one inner. If something happens to be contained in
its hollow, then its outer surface is surrounded by air, and thus, the limit of
the air that is adjoined to this outer surface, is the space of that body. But
its inner surface that is adjoined to what is contained ⟨in its hollow, is the
space of what is contained⟩ in it, because it is adjoined to its limits and is
surrounding it from without. Hence, space is an inner limit of a certain body
that is adjoined to the outer limit of what is contained in it. For in this way it
appears that space is not a body, but the inner limit of a body, nevertheless it
is not incorporeal, because it possesses the extension of length and breadth
in accordance with the size of the body that is contained in it. In this way,
therefore, the space of water is not said to be the jar in which it is, because
(the jar) is a body, but the inner limit of the jar that is adjoined to the water
in it, that is its [i.e. water’s] space. And again, we do not say that a celestial
sphere is the space of air, but the inner surface which is adjoined to the outer
limits of air, that one is said to be its space. And neither the air in which
we are is really the space of physical things, although it is assumed so, but
those limits that from without are adjoined to each and every one of the
bodies are the spaces of each and every one of the physical things, which is
contained inside them. Thus, to say in short, space is this: the ⟨inner⟩ limit
of what surrounds what is contained in it.

And it is from these things that are apparent and known to everyone, as it § 73
seems to me, that space too pertains to quantity. For if it surrounds every
single body and it is impossible to ever think of a perceptible physical item
which is not in space, (then) it is obvious that space in this way is extended in
accordance with the greatness of every body whatsoever, and also in this way
it is contracted in accordance with the smallness of objects in it. Therefore,
if a body pertains to quantity, it is obvious that also space pertains to it. Now,
if a line, having only the extension of length, on account of its extension
pertains to quantity, (then) space, by having two extensions, ⟨namely length
and breadth⟩, to a much greater extent seems to pertain to quantity. But
if someone would say that space is not extended in accordance with the
whole constitution of bodies, this (person) would be obliged to say that not
all the parts of bodies are in space, which is impossible to occur. For if it
were possible that some parts of bodies could occur without space, also
the whole (body) would be able to occur without space. And it makes it
 ‫‪144‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫‪96v‬‬ ‫ܐܬܪܐ܉ ܘܐܦ ‪q‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܡ‪ qqr‬ܗܘܐ ܕܢ‪煿‬ܘܐ ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܬܪܐ‪ | .‬ܘܐܢܢܩ‪ 焏‬ܥܒ‪煟‬ܐ‬
‫ܠ‪ 煿‬ܠ̇‪煿‬ܘ ܕܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ̇ܡ‪r‬܉ ܕܐܦ ܣܦ‪q‬ܩ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܢܥ‪ 爏‬ܒ‪qq‬ܢ‪ 爯q煿‬ܕܨ̈ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ‪.‬‬
‫ܘܢܣ‪ 爟q‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܕܣܦ‪̣ 犟‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܓ‪̈r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܘܠ‪ rq‬ܒ‪qq̈ 煿‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܣ‪ .q‬ܗܕܐ ܕܒܥ‪熏‬ܩ̈ܒ‪焏‬‬
‫ܣ̈ܓ‪焏q‬ܐ ܐܬ‪ rq熏q‬ܡܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܕܦ‪q‬ܠܣ̈‪熏‬ܦ‪ 焏‬ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪ 焏qqr‬ܠܡ‪煿‬ܘܐ‪ .‬ܐܦܠ‪焏‬‬
‫ܓ‪̇ rq‬ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕܡܥܠ‪ 爯q‬ܐܬܪܐ ⟩ܣܦ‪q‬ܩ‪ ⟨焏‬ܘܣܦ‪q‬ܩ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܣ‪q‬ܡ‪ 爯q‬ܒܒ‪rqr‬ܐ܇‬ ‫‪5‬‬
‫‪qq‬ܢ‪ rq焏‬ܐܡ‪ 爯qr‬ܕܐ‪煿̇qrq‬܇ ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܕܗܘ‪ 焏q‬ܠܒ‪̣ r‬ܡ‪qq 爯‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܘܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܡ‪爏q‬‬
‫ܐܬܪܐ ܣܦܩ‪ rq焏‬ܗܪ‪ 焏q‬ܣܡܢ‪.爯‬‬

‫‪§ 74‬‬ ‫ܬܘܒ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܠܓܢܣ‪̇ 焏‬ܗܘ ܕܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܡܦܠܓ‪ 爯q‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܒ‪焏‬ܘܡܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܡܠ‪q‬ܠ‪r‬ܐ‬
‫̇ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕܐܬܕܪ‪ 熏r‬ܒ‪qq‬ܢ̈‪rq‬ܐ‪ .‬ܘܐܡ‪ 爯qr‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܕܡܢ‪ 煿‬ܕܗܢ‪ 焏‬ܓܢܣ‪焏‬܉‬
‫ܒ‪r‬ܡ̈‪煿‬ܐ ܕܕܡ‪ 爯q‬ܡ‪r‬ܢܣ‪⟩ .焯‬ܘܡܢ‪ 煿‬ܒ‪熏̈q‬ܢ‪ 焏q‬ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܕܡ‪ .爯q‬ܒ‪r‬ܡ̈‪煿‬ܐ ܗ‪爏qq‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬
‫ܕܕܡ‪ 爯q‬ܡ‪r‬ܢܣ‪焯‬܉⟨ ܐ‪ qq‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܐܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܕ̇ܗܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܕܡ‪ 焏‬ܠ̇‪煿‬ܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܕܡ‪焏‬‬
‫ܠ‪ 煿‬ܕܡ‪ .焏‬ܘ‪ 爏q‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪熏r‬ܐ ܥ‪̇ 爟‬ܗܘ ܕ‪熏r‬ܐ ܠ‪熏r 煿‬ܐ‪ .‬ܘܪ‪q‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܪ‪q‬ܡ‪煿‬‬
‫ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܪ‪q‬ܡ‪ .焏‬ܘܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ ܕܕܐ‪ qq‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܡ‪r‬ܢ̈ܣܒ‪̣ 爯‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܗܢ‪焏‬‬
‫ܕܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ‪ .‬ܒ‪煿‬ܘܢ ‪ 煟q‬ܒ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܒ‪r‬ܡ̈‪煿‬ܐ ܕܕ̇ܡ‪ 爯q‬ܠ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ‪ .‬ܒ‪熏̈q‬ܢ‪ 焏q‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕܠ‪焏‬‬
‫̈‬
‫ܡ‪ 爯‬ܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܗܢ‪ 焏‬ܒ̈‪熟‬ܢ‪ 焏q‬ܣܓ‪焏q‬ܐ‪.‬‬
‫̈‬ ‫̈‬ ‫̇‬
‫ܕܡ‪⟩ 爯q‬ܠ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ⟨ ܡ‪r‬ܢܣܒ‪ 爯‬ܨܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ̣‬ ‫‪15‬‬
‫ܐ̇ܡ‪ r‬ܐܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕܐ‪ qq‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪ rq‬ܒ‪熟‬ܢ‪̇ 焏‬ܗܘ ܕ‪̇q‬ܒ‪ r‬ܘܡ‪qr‬ܒ‪ .r‬ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪焏‬‬
‫ܕܥ‪焏‬ܦ‪ 焏‬ܘܦܠ݁ܓ‪ .焏‬ܦܠܓ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܕܥ‪焏‬ܦ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܦܠܓ‪焏‬܉ ܘܐܥܦ‪焏‬‬
‫ܬܘܒ ܕܦܠܓ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܐܥܦ‪ .焏‬ܘܒ‪熟‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ ̇ܗܘ ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܕ̇ܗܘ ⟩ܡ‪⟨焏‬‬
‫ܕ‪r‬ܠ‪ qq‬ܘܕ̇ܗܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܡ‪r‬ܥܒ‪ .煟‬ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܡ‪r‬ܐ ܠ‪ 爟‬ܘܥ̣ܒ‪煟‬ܐ‪ .‬ܡ‪r‬ܐ ܓ‪rq‬‬
‫ܕܥ̣ܒ‪煟‬ܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܡ‪r‬ܐ܉ ܘܥ̣ܒ‪煟‬ܐ ܬܘܒ ܕܡ‪r‬ܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܥ̣ܒ‪煟‬ܐ‪ .‬ܘܐ‪qq‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬
‫̇ܗܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ̇ܦ‪r‬ܫ ܘܡ‪r‬ܦ‪r‬ܫ‪ .‬ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ 爏q‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܕܡ‪r‬ܪܓ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܗܘ܇ ܒ‪r‬ܓ‪rr‬ܐ‬
‫ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܡ‪r‬ܪܓ‪r‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܘܐ‪̇ qq‬ܗܘ ܬܘܒ ⟩ܡ‪ ⟨焏‬ܕܡ‪ 爯qqr‬ܠ‪熏q‬ܠܦܢ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ܉‬
‫ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܣ‪熏q‬ܠ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܒܣ‪q熏‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ̇ܗܘܐ ܣ‪熏q‬ܠ‪r‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܐܘ ‪煟q‬ܘܥ‪r‬ܢ‪焏‬‬
‫ܒ‪煟q‬ܥ‪r‬ܐ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ‪煟q‬ܘܥ‪r‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܘܐ‪̇ qq‬ܗܘ ܬܘܒ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ‬
‫ܥܠ‪r‬ܐ ܘ̇ܗܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܡܢ‪ .煿‬ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܐܒ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܒ‪r‬ܐ ܘܒ‪r‬ܐ ܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܐܒ‪.焏‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬
‫ܥܒ‪ 煟‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܘ̇‪焏q‬ܫ ܡܢ‪ .煿‬ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ̇ܗܘ ܕ̇ܡ‪ 焏q‬ܠ̇‪煿‬ܘ‬ ‫ܘܐ‪̇ qq‬ܗܘ ܬܘܒ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ ̇‬
‫‪97r‬‬ ‫ܡ‪̇ 爯‬ܗܘ ܕ̇ܡ‪̇ 焏q‬ܒܠ‪ .牟‬ܘܐ‪ qq‬ܣ‪q‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ |‬ ‫̇‬
‫ܕ̇ܒܠ‪ 牟‬ܡ‪ .焏q‬ܘ̇ܗܘ ܕ̇ܒܠ‪̣ 牟‬‬
‫̇‬ ‫̇‬
‫ܕܒ‪焏‬ܬܪܐ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ‪ .‬ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܗܘ ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ̣ܡ‪q 爯‬ܡ‪q‬ܢ‪焏‬܉ ܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܗܘ ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ‬
‫̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܣܡܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪熟qr‬ܐ܇ ܘ̇ܗܘ ܕ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܣܡܠ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪熏‬ܬ ̇ܗܘ ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ̣ܡ‪q 爯‬ܡ‪q‬ܢ‪焏‬‬

‫‪ 10–11 suppl. ex L.42ra6f./P.77v22f.‬ܒ‪焏‬ܘܡ‪ 5 suppl. ex L.23va37/P.64v7 8 爯‬ܘܐܦ‪q‬ܠ‪1 煿‬‬

‫‪; del. ex L.42ra9 f./P.78r1 15 suppl. ex P.78r6, (etiam L.42ra20‬ܕܕܡ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪] 煿‬ܠ‪ [煿‬ܕܡ‪11–12 焏‬‬
‫ܐ‪rq‬ܘ ‪̇ (vd. comm.) 18 suppl. ex L.42ra32/P.78r11 20‬ܗܘ ܕ‪̇q‬ܒ‪ … r‬ܘܦܠ݁ܓ‪om.) 16–17 焏‬‬
‫‪ 22‬ܠ‪r‬ܓ‪rr‬ܐ ‪; L.42ra39/P.78r16:‬ܒ‪r‬ܓ‪rr‬ܐ ‪) 21‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘ ‪(sine line abbr., cf. B.101v24/§97:‬‬
‫‪suppl. ex L.42ra41/P.78r17‬‬
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 145

necessary for the one who says something like that, that he also introduces
a certain void into the nature of objects and that he presents something that
is empty of bodies and in which there are absolutely no physical items. This
has through many investigations of the philosophers been demonstrated to
be impossible to occur. For those who introduce ⟨empty⟩ space and insert
void into created things do not say that it [i.e. void] exists by nature, but that
it occurs out of nature. And we have sufficiently set forth here these (words)
concerning space.

[On relatives]

Again, those who have been trained in physics divide the category (gensā) § 74
of relatives in the art of logic and say as follows: some of this category is con-
ceived by similar names [i.e. homonymously], ⟨and some of it is conceived
by dissimilar appellations [i.e. heteronymously]. It is conceived by similar
names⟩, as when we say “what is similar is similar to that which is similar
to it”, and “equal is everything that is equal to that which is equal to it”, and
“the friend of his friend is a friend”, and the like are derived from this cate-
gory of relatives, by those names that are similar to one another. And objects
are conceived as being from this category by appellations that are dissimilar
⟨to each other⟩ in many ways. I say like this: at first, in the way of containing
and being contained, as for example double and half. For the half of a certain
double is a half, and also the double of a half is a double. In another way, the
one who rules and the one who is subject, as for example master and slave. A
master is a master of a slave and a slave is a slave of a master. And as the one
who discerns and is discerned, as for example everything that is perceptible
is perceptible in perception. Again, as that which refers to a certain learning,
as for example an intelligent person becomes intelligent in a certain intel-
ligence, or a knower is knower in some certain knowledge. Furthermore, as
what is a cause and that which is (caused) by it, as for example father in rela-
tion to son, and son in relation to father. Moreover, as the one who is doing
something and the one who is affected by it, as for example the one who
smites is smiting the one who is beaten and the beaten one is beaten by the
one who smites. And again, as a position in a certain location, as for example
the one who is to the right is seen in relation to the one who is to the left, and
the one to the left is perceived in relation to the one who is to the right. For all
 ‫‪146‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫ܡ‪煟qr‬ܥ‪ .‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܓ‪q rq‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܙ̈ܢ‪ 焏q‬ܕܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܗܢ‪焏‬܉ ܡ‪qr‬ܠܦ‪ 爯q‬ܒ‪熏̈q‬ܢ‪焏q‬‬

‫̣ܡ‪煟q̈ 爯‬ܕܐ‪ .‬ܘܠ‪̣ 熏‬ܗܘ ⟩‪̣ 煟q‬ܗܘ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ⟨ ‪r 煟q‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܡ‪熏r‬ܕܥ ܬܪܬ‪爯q煿q‬‬
‫ܨ̈ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ܇ ̇ܗܢ‪ 爯q‬ܕܐ‪ 爯q煿qrq‬ܬܪܬ‪ 爯q煿q‬ܒ‪qq焏‬ܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܠ‪熏‬ܬ ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ‪̇ .‬ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕ‪爯q‬‬
‫̈ܙܢ‪ 焏q‬ܩ‪̈煟‬ܡ‪焏q‬܉ ܒ‪r 煟q‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܕ̇ܡ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪q‬ܒ‪r‬ܗ ܒ‪ 爏q‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܩ‪q熏‬ܡ‪煿‬ܘܢ܉‬
‫̈‬
‫ܐ‪qq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܐܡ‪r‬ܢ‪ .爯‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܦ‪熏‬ܠܓ‪ 焏‬ܕܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܗܢ‪ 焏‬ܣܦܩ‪.爯‬‬ ‫‪5‬‬

‫‪§ 75‬‬ ‫ܢ‪焏‬ܡ‪ r‬ܬܘܒ ܐܦ ܒܥ‪r‬ܐ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܕܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܐ܉ ܥ‪ 爏‬ܡܠ‪r‬ܗ ܕܐܪܣ‪q熏q‬ܠ‪爿q‬‬

‫ܕܡ‪ 爏q‬ܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܗܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ‪ .‬ܐ̇ܡ‪ r‬ܓ‪̇ rq‬ܗܘ ܦ‪q‬ܠܣ‪熏‬ܦ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪q‬ܠ‪爯q煿‬‬
‫ܨ̈ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܕܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܢ ܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐ‪煟qq‬ܐ ܐ‪爯q煿qrq‬܉ ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܩ‪q煟‬ܡ‪煟q 焏‬ܐ‬
‫ܡܢ‪ 爯q煿‬ܠ‪q‬ܒ‪r‬ܬ̇ܗ‪ .‬ܘܬܘܒ ܐ̇ܡ‪ r‬ܕܢܩ‪̈q‬ܦ‪ 爯‬ܠ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ܉ ܘܐܢ ܬܬܒ‪煟q 爏q‬ܐ‬
‫ܡܢ‪爯q煿‬܉ ܒ‪q‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܠ̇‪ 煿‬ܥܡ̇‪ 煿‬ܐܦ ⟩̇ܗܝ⟨ ܐ‪rq‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܠ‪熏‬ܩܒ‪ 爏‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܐ‪rq‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬
‫ܠܡ‪焏‬ܡ‪r‬܉ ܕܡܢ‪ 焏‬ܗ‪ .爏qq‬ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕܐܒ‪ 焏‬ܘܒ‪r‬ܐ ܒܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܗܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ‬
‫ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ‪ .‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܩ‪ 爟q煟‬ܐܒ‪ 焏‬ܠܒ‪r‬ܗ ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ ܡ‪r‬ܐ ܠܥܒ‪煟‬ܗ‪ .‬ܐܘ ܥܒ‪煟‬ܐ‬
‫ܡ‪ 爯‬ܗܠ‪ :爯q‬ܐܠ‪犏‬ܐ ‪ qq‬ܕܢܒ‪ 爏q‬ܐܦ ̇ܗܘ ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪.焏‬‬
‫ܠܡ‪r‬ܗ‪ .‬ܘܐܢ ܢܒ‪̣ 煟q 爏q‬‬
‫‪§ 76‬‬ ‫ܘܬܘܒ ܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܐ‪ rq‬ܠܡ‪焏‬ܡ‪ r‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܕ‪ 爏q‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܕܩ‪ 爟q煟‬ܠ‪q‬ܒ‪r‬ܗ܉ ܐܘ‬
‫ܒ‪熟‬ܒܢ‪ 焏‬ܐܘ ܒ‪qq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܩ‪ 爟q煟‬ܠ‪ .煿‬ܒ‪熟‬ܒܢ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܩ‪ 爟q煟‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܠܡ‪煟‬ܡ܉ ܡ‪焏‬‬ ‫‪15‬‬
‫ܕܦ‪ 犟qr‬ܡ‪ 焏qr‬ܕ̇ܗܘܐ ܒ‪ 煿‬ܢ‪熏‬ܓ‪r‬ܐ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܙܒܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ̇ܗܘܐ ܒ‪̇ 煿‬ܗܘ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ‬
‫ܕܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪ r‬ܠ‪熏‬ܬܗ‪ .‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܡܥ‪q煟‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܠܡ‪焏‬ܡ‪ .r‬ܕܩ‪r‬ܒ‪ 焏‬ܕ̈ܡ‪ 焏q煟‬ܩ‪煟‬ܡ ̇ܗܘ‬
‫̈‬
‫ܕܦ‪q‬ܠ‪q‬ܦ‪q‬ܣ‪熏‬ܢ‪ 焏q‬ܗܘܐ‪ .‬ܘܐܦ ܦ‪rq‬ܓ‪熏‬ܪܘܣ ܩ‪̣ 爟q煟‬ܗܘ ܠܦܠ‪熏q‬ܢ ܐܬܢ‪.焏q‬‬

‫‪§ 77‬‬ ‫ܒ‪qq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܩ‪ 爟q煟‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܠܡ‪煟‬ܡ܉ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܡܒ‪ 爏q‬ܥܡ‪ 煿‬ܠ̇‪煿‬ܘ ܡ‪焏‬‬
‫‪97v‬‬ ‫ܕܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪ r‬ܠ‪熏‬ܬܗ ‪̣ 煟q‬ܗܘ ܠ‪ | 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܒ‪ 爏q‬ܥ‪̇ 爟‬ܗܘ‪ .‬ܘ̇ܗܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ 煟q‬ܢ‪qqrr‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬
‫̇ܗܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪ r‬ܠ‪熏‬ܬܗ܇ ̇ܡܥ‪⟩ 爏‬ܠ‪ ⟨煿‬ܥܡ‪ 煿‬ܐܠ‪犏‬ܐ‪ 煟q .rq‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܢ‪qqrr‬‬
‫̣ܗܘ܇ ܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܠ‪犏‬ܐ ܕܢ‪煿‬ܘܐ ܢܩ‪ 牯q‬ܠ‪̇ 煿‬ܗܘ‪ .‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܥ‪熏qq 爏‬ܬܐ‬
‫ܘܣ‪熏‬ܣ‪ .焏q‬ܐܢ ܓ‪ rq‬ܬܒ‪熏qq 爏q‬ܬܐ ܓܠ‪ 焏q‬ܗܝ܉ ܕܒ‪ 爏q‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܐܦ ܣ‪熏‬ܣ‪焏q‬‬
‫ܡ‪ 爯‬ܐܢܢܩ̣‪ .q‬ܐܢ‪ 爯q煟‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܢ‪煿‬ܘܐ ܐ‪ rq‬ܣ‪熏‬ܣ‪焏q‬܉ ܠ‪ 焏‬ܒ‪q‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܥܡ‪熏qq 煿‬ܬܐ‪.‬‬ ‫̣‬
‫ܐ‪ rq‬ܓ‪熏̈qq rq‬ܬܐ ܣ̈ܓ‪焏q‬ܬܐ ܐ‪q‬ܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܠ‪̈ 焏‬ܗܘܝ ‪ .焏rqr‬ܡ‪熏qq 爯q煟‬ܬܐ‬ ‫‪25‬‬
‫ܩ‪q煟‬ܡ‪qq 焏‬ܢ‪ rq焏‬ܠܣ‪熏‬ܣ‪ .焏q‬ܙܕ̇ܩ ܓ‪ rq‬ܕܢ‪煿‬ܘܐ ܩܢ‪熏‬ܡ̇‪ 煿‬ܘܗ‪熏̈qq 爯q煟q‬ܬܐ‬
‫ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܒ‪煟q焏‬ܐ ܒ‪煟q焏‬ܐ‪ .‬ܘܒ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏r‬ܬܘܒ ‪ 煟q‬ܢ‪qqrr‬܉ ܥ‪焏‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܠ̇‪ 煿‬ܥܡ‪ 煿‬ܐܦ‬

‫‪; em.‬ܕܠ‪熏‬ܬ ‪; sǝyāmē suppl. ex L.42rb23/P.78v6 2 suppl. ex L.42rb24f./P.78v7 3‬ܒ‪熏q‬ܢ‪1 焏q‬‬

‫‪; em. ex L.43rb15/P.81v9 (cf. B.97r19/§75) 10‬ܕܐܢ ‪ 9‬ܕܐܪܣ‪ex L.42rb28/P.78v8 6 熏q‬‬
‫‪) 18‬ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܩ‪; del. ex L.43rb23f., (P.81v13: 爟q煟‬ܠ‪] 焏‬ܡ‪ [爯q煟‬ܩ‪suppl. ex L.43rb17/P.81v10 12 爟q煟‬‬
‫‪ (etiam P.82v3); em. ex L.43v32–33 21‬ܩ‪ 爟q煟‬ܗ̣ܘܐ ]ܩ‪̣ 爟q煟‬ܗܘ ‖ )‪ (vd. comm.‬ܕܦ‪q‬ܠ‪q‬ܦ‪q‬ܣ̈‪熏‬ܢ‪焏q‬‬
‫‪suppl. ex L.44ra4/P.82v8‬‬
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 147

the manners of this category are different from one another in appellations,
and it is not one ⟨and the same⟩ name which signifies two objects that are
two in relation to each other. However, the subsistence of the first modes
exists in a single name that is similar to its counterpart in every aspect, as
we have said. This may suffice regarding the division of this category.

[Simultaneity of relatives and priority of things]

We will also mention a certain question that is brought up about Aristotle’s § 75

account regarding this category of relatives. For the philosopher says that all
objects that are called relatives are simultaneous, and none of them is prior
to its counterpart. Furthermore, he says that they are concomitant with each
other, and if one of them is removed the other one is removed with it too.
However, against this one can say: why so? (Well), because father and son
are in this category of relatives, (and) neither a father is prior to his son, nor
a master to his slave, nor a slave to his master. And if we remove any of these,
it is indeed necessary that we also remove the other one.

With regard to these things one can say as follows: everything that is prior § 76
to another thing is prior to it, either in time or by nature. For in time, a
thing is prior to another thing, when the period in which some duration
occurs is more distant from the time in which what is said in relation to it
occurs. As we are wont to say that the war of Medes happened before that of
Peloponnesians. Also Pythagoras is prior to Plato the Athenian.

A thing is prior to another thing by nature: that which removes along with § 77
itself that which is said in relation to it, while the former is not removed along
with the latter. And when that which is said in relation to it is present, it
necessarily introduces ⟨it⟩ [i.e. the prior thing] along with itself, while when
the latter is present, it is not necessary that the former follows upon it.13 I
say this, as in the case of ‘animal’ and ‘horse’. For if ‘animal’ is removed, it is
obvious that also ‘horse’ by necessity is removed, but if there would not be
‘horse’, ‘animal’ would not be removed with it. For there are many animals
which are not horses. Therefore, ‘animal’ is by nature prior to ‘horse’, for its
essence needs to be there and then the particular animals. And when ‘man’

13 The prior thing “co-removes” the posterior thing, but is not “co-removed” by it, whereas
the prior thing is “co-introduced” by the posterior thing, but it does not “co-introduce”
it.
 ‫‪148‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫ܡܠ‪q‬ܠ‪熏‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܠ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܐܢ ܐ‪ rq‬ܡܠ‪q‬ܠ‪熏‬ܬܐ܇ ܐܠ‪犏‬ܐ ܕܢ‪煿‬ܘܐ ܐ‪ rq‬ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪焏r‬‬

‫̣ܡ‪ 爏q 爯‬ܦ‪r‬ܘܣ‪ .‬ܡ‪ 焏qqr‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܕܢ‪煿‬ܘܘܢ ̈ܡܠ‪q‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ̈ܡܠ‪焏q焏‬‬
‫̈‬
‫ܘ‪焏r‬ܕܐ‪.‬‬

‫‪§ 78‬‬ ‫ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܗ‪ 爏qq‬ܕܒ‪煿‬ܠ‪ 爯q‬ܬܪ‪̈ 爯q‬ܙܢ‪ 焏q‬ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪ 爏q r‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܕܩ‪ .爟q煟‬ܗܢ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪爯q‬‬
‫ܒ‪熟‬ܒܢ‪ 焏‬ܘܒ‪qq‬ܢ‪焏‬܉ ܡ‪q熏q‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܩ‪̈q煟‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܨ̈ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ̇ܗܢ‪ 爯q‬ܕܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܢ ܠ‪熏‬ܬ‬ ‫‪5‬‬
‫ܡ‪煟‬ܡ܉ ܠ‪ 焏‬ܒ‪熟‬ܒܢ‪ 焏‬ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܒ‪qq‬ܢ‪焏‬܇ ̇ܗܘ ܕܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܢ ܒ‪ 煿‬ܠ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ‪ .‬ܐܠ‪焏‬‬
‫ܐ‪煟qq‬ܐ ܐ‪ 爯q煿qrq‬ܒ‪ 爏q‬ܙܒ‪爯‬܉ ܘܢܩ‪̈q‬ܦ‪ 爯‬ܐ̈ܢ‪ 爯q‬ܠ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ‪ .‬ܐܦ‪ 爯‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܩ‪爟q煟‬‬
‫ܒ‪熟‬ܒܢ‪̇ 焏‬ܗܘ ܕ̇ܡ‪熏‬ܠ‪ 煟‬ܠ̇‪煿‬ܘ ܕܡ‪q̣r‬ܠ‪ 煟‬ܡܢ‪煿‬܉ ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܗܘܐ ܐ‪q̇ qq‬ܠ‪熏‬ܕܐ܉ ܘܠ‪焏‬‬
‫ܬܘܒ ܐ‪ qq‬ܐܒ‪ 焏‬ܩ‪ 爟q煟‬ܠܒ‪r‬ܗ ܘܠ‪q‬ܠ‪煟‬ܗ܉ ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪qqr 焏r‬ܡ‪.rq焏‬‬
‫ܡ‪ 爯‬ܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܗܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ‪.‬‬ ‫ܒ‪煿‬ܕܐ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕܐ‪ qq‬ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪焏r‬܉ ܠ‪̣ 熏‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬
‫ܐܠ‪̣ 焏‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܐܘܣ‪ .焏q‬ܘܬܘܒ ⟩ܠ‪ ⟨焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܐ ܩ‪ 爟q煟‬ܠܥܒ‪煟‬ܗ ܐܘ ܥܒ‪煟‬ܐ ܠܡ‪r‬ܗ‪ .‬ܠ‪焏‬‬
‫ܗ̣ܘܐ ܒ̇‪煿‬ܝ ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܡ‪r‬ܐ ܘܥܒ‪煟‬ܐ‪ .‬ܕܒ̇‪ 煿‬ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪ 爯qr‬ܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ‪ .‬ܒ‪煿‬ܕܐ‬
‫ܓ‪ rq‬ܐ‪煟qq‬ܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܩ‪q熏‬ܡ‪煿‬ܘܢ‪ .‬ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܢ ̣ܗܘ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕܩ‪ 爟q煟‬ܒ‪熟‬ܒܢ‪煟q 焏‬‬
‫ܡܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܠ‪q‬ܒ‪r‬ܗ܉ ܒ̇‪煿‬ܝ ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏r‬ܩ‪ .爟q煟‬ܘܠ‪ 熏‬ܒ̇‪煿‬ܝ ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ̣ܡ‪爯‬‬
‫ܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܕܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ‪.‬‬ ‫‪15‬‬

‫‪98r § 79‬‬ ‫ܐܦܠ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܒ‪qq‬ܢ‪ | 焏‬ܩ‪̈q煟‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܨ̈ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܕܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܢ ܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܠ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ܉‬
‫ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕܬܪܬ‪ 爯q煿q‬ܢܩ‪̈q‬ܦ‪煟q 爯‬ܐ ܠ‪煟q‬ܐ‪ .‬ܘܐܢ ܬܬܒ‪煟q 爏q‬ܐ ܡܢ‪爯q煿‬܉ ܥܡ̇‪煿‬‬
‫ܡ‪r‬ܒ‪q‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܦ ‪q‬ܒ‪r‬ܬ̇ܗ‪ .‬ܐܢ̣‪煿‬ܘ ܓ‪ rq‬ܕܠ‪ rq‬ܒ‪r‬ܐ܉ ܐܦܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܒ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ‬
‫ܐܒ‪̣ 焏‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܐܢܢܩ‪ .q‬ܐܦ‪ 爯‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪ .焏r‬ܘܐܢ ܠ‪ rq‬ܬܘܒ ܐܒ‪焏‬܉ ܐܦܠ‪焏‬‬
‫⟩ܒ‪r‬ܐ⟨ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܒ‪r‬ܐ ܘܐܦ‪ 爯‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪ .焏r‬ܘܢܩ‪̈q‬ܦ‪ 爯‬ܐ̈ܢ‪ 爯q‬ܬܪܬ‪爯q煿q‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬
‫‪煟q‬ܐ ܠ‪煟q‬ܐ‪ .‬ܘܓܠ‪ 焏q‬ܗܝ ܡ‪ 爏qq‬ܕܗܠ‪q 爯q‬ܠ‪ 爯q煿‬ܘܕܐ‪ qq‬ܗܠ‪爯q‬܉ ܕܐ‪爯q煿qrq‬‬
‫̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܗܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ‪ .‬ܐ‪煟qq‬ܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܒ‪ 煿‬ܩ‪q熏‬ܡ‪爯q煿‬܉ ܘܢܩ‪̈q‬ܦ‪爯‬‬
‫ܒ‪ 爏q‬ܙܒ‪ 爯‬ܠ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ ܘܡܩ̈‪q‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܬܘܒ ܘ̈ܡܒ‪q‬ܠ‪ 爯‬ܠ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ܉ ܘ‪r‬ܦ‪ rq‬ܦܣ‪ 犟‬ܥܠ‪爯q煿q‬‬
‫ܐܪܣ‪q熏q‬ܠ‪.爿q‬‬

‫‪§ 80‬‬ ‫ܘ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܒ‪r‬ܪ ܗܠ‪爯q‬܉ ܘܐܦ ܗܕܐ ܬܘܒ ܐܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܠ‪熏‬ܬܟ‪ .‬ܕܐܢ‪̣ 爯qr‬ܡ‪爯‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬
‫ܐܣ‪̣焏q‬ܘ̈‪q‬ܩ̇‪ 熏‬ܠܓ̈‪熏‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܘܠ‪q‬ܥ̈‪熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܘܠ‪焏‬ܣ̈‪qq‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܘܠ‪̈煟‬ܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ‪ :‬ܗܠ‪爯q‬‬
‫ܕܒܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܩ‪q熏‬ܡ‪煿‬ܘܢ܆ ܘ‪qq‬ܣ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪̈qr‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܩܢ‪爯q‬‬
‫ܒ‪qq‬ܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ܉ ܠ‪ 焏‬ܨܒ‪ 熏‬ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪r̈熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܢ‪焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܘܢ ܐܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܠ‪煿‬ܠ‪爯q‬܉ ܐܠ‪焏‬‬
‫ܓ‪r̈熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ ܐܦ ܗܠ‪ .爯q‬ܒ‪r‬ܡ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܡ‪qr‬ܣܣ‪̣ 爯q‬ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܒ‪煿‬ܕܐ‬

‫ܡ‪ 爯‬ܡ‪r‬ܗ ]ܠܡ‪r‬ܗ ‖ )‪11 add., (etiam deest L.44rb16/P.83r9‬‬‫‪̣ ; em. ex L.44rb18/P.83r10‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬
‫ܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ ‪ 26‬ܐܪܣ‪suppl. ex P.83v9 24 熏q‬‬ ‫‪; emend.‬ܘܐܣ̈‪qq‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܘܕ ̈‬
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 149

is present, also ‘rationality’ enters along with him, but it is not (the case that)
if there is ‘rationality’, it is at any rate necessary that there is ‘man’, for it
is possible that there are other rational beings, as for example angels and
demons.

Since thus, in these two manners everything is said to be prior, namely in § 78

time and by nature, we will show that those objects that are called relatives
are not prior—neither in time nor by nature—by which they are said in
relation to each other, but they are always simultaneous and concomitant
with each other. For even if the one that begets is prior in time to the one
who is begotten by him, yet not as begetter (is he prior), nor as ‘father’ is
he prior to his son and to his child, but merely as ‘man’. However, in this
as ‘man’ he does not pertain to the category of relatives but to substance.
Again, a master is ⟨not⟩ prior to his slave, or a slave to his master, not in being
master and slave, in which they are called relatives. For in this respect their
subsistence is simultaneous. Even if one of them is prior to the other in time,
he is prior in being ‘man’ and not in being of the category of relatives.

Neither are objects that are called relatives prior to each other by nature, § 79
because both of them are concomitant with each other, and if one of them
is removed, also its counterpart is removed along with it. For if there is no
‘son’, a father is necessarily not a father, even if he is ‘man’. And if there is
no ‘father’, ⟨son⟩ is not a son, even if he is ‘man’. These two are concomitant
with each other. It is therefore obvious that the subsistence of all these and
the like, which pertain to this category of relatives, is simultaneous within
it and they are always concomitant with each other and they introduce and
remove each other. Thus, Aristotle has settled these things properly.

[On quality: the view of Stoics on qualities and their divisions]

After these things we also inform you this: some of the Stoics concerning § 80
colours, tastes, figures, and shapes—those (entities) whose subsistence is in
a body and possess a certain classification of incorporeals by their nature—
they did not want to call them incorporeal, but that they too are bodies.
However, they are contradicted in saying this, for a colour is not a body,
 ‫‪150‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫ܕܐܡ‪ .爯qr‬ܓ‪熏‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܗܘ‪ .‬ܘܐܢ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܠ‪焏‬܉ ܡ‪r‬ܘܡ ܠ‪̇ 焏‬ܡ‪qr‬ܠ‪牯‬‬
‫ܗ̣ܘܐ ܓ‪熏‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪qq‬ܢ‪ 煿‬ܠ‪̣ 煟q‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܓ‪r̈熏‬ܡ‪ .焏‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ ܘܐܦܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܣ‪qq‬ܡ‪焏‬‬
‫ܐܘ ܕܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܗܘ‪ .‬ܘܐܢ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܠ‪焏‬܉ ܡ‪r‬ܘܡ ܠ‪ 焏‬ܩ‪焏‬ܪܘܬܐ ܘܠ‪焏‬‬
‫ܢ‪ 焏rq‬ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪̣ 焏‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܕܐ‪ qq‬ܗܠ‪爯q‬܇ ̇ܡܩܒ‪ 爏‬ܗ̣ܘܐ‬
‫ܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܕ‪ 爏q‬ܓܢ‪爿‬܇ ܐ‪ qq‬ܕ̇ܨܒ‪ 焏‬ܐܢ‪ r‬ܢ‪q‬ܒ‪熏‬ܥ ܒ‪煿‬ܘܢ‪.‬‬ ‫ܐܣ̈‪qq‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܘܕ ̈‬ ‫‪5‬‬
‫̈‬
‫ܓܠ‪ 焏q‬ܗܝ ܡ‪⟩ 爯q煟‬ܡ‪ ⟨爏q‬ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܢ‪熏‬ܪܟ ܥ‪ 爏‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕ‪q煟q‬ܥ‪ 爯‬ܠ‪q‬ܠܢ‪r‬܉ ܕܗܠ‪q 爯q‬ܠ‪爯q煿‬‬
‫ܕܓ‪ 爯r̈煟‬ܒܓ‪r̈熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܘܡ‪qr‬ܩ‪ 爯‬ܘܡ‪̈qr‬ܒܠ‪ 爯‬ܡܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ‪ 煟q :‬ܩ‪qq 爟q‬ܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ ̣ܗܘ ‪煟q‬‬
‫̣ܗܘ܉ ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ ܐ‪ 爯q煿qrq‬ܠܒ‪̣ r‬ܡ‪qq 爯‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܕܓ‪r̈熏‬ܡ‪̣ .焏‬ܗܢ‪ 爯q‬ܗ‪爏qq‬‬
‫‪98v‬‬ ‫ܡ‪r‬ܐ ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ | ܩ‪q熏‬ܡ‪ 爯q煿‬ܒܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪.焏‬‬ ‫ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܐ̃ܘ ܐ‪熏q‬ܢ ܠ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪̈ qr‬‬
‫ܗܢ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܒܓ‪r̈熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܐܘ ܒ̈‪qq‬ܢ‪̈ 焏‬ܡܠ‪q‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪q‬ܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܓ‪ 爯r̈煟‬ܒ‪熟‬ܒ‪ 爯‬ܘܡ‪qr‬ܩ‪ 爯‬ܬܘܒ‬ ‫‪10‬‬
‫ܒ‪熟‬ܒ‪ 爯‬ܘܡ‪݁q̈r‬ܒܠ‪ .爯‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܡ‪̈rr‬ܡ‪煿‬ܢ ̣ܡ‪熏̈q 爯‬ܢ‪ 焏q‬ܦ‪q .爿qqqq熏‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܕ‪̈ 爯q‬ܙܢ‪焏q‬‬
‫̈‬
‫̇ܩ‪qr‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܠ‪ .爯q煿‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪q̈q 爯q‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܘ ܡ‪熏‬ܙܓ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܡ‪ 爯q煿‬ܠ‪.爯q煿‬‬

‫‪§ 81‬‬ ‫ܠ‪ 煿‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܠܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܗܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܙܢ‪ 焏‬ܡܦܠܓ‪ 爯q‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܠܡܣ‪r‬ܬܘܬܐ ܘܠܠ‪焏‬‬
‫ܡܣ‪r‬ܬܘܬܐ‪ .‬ܠܡ‪r‬ܡ‪q犏‬ܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܘܠܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܡ‪q犏‬ܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܠ̈‪熟‬ܢ‪焏r熏̈rq 焏q‬‬
‫ܘܡ̈‪rq‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܠ‪焏‬ܣ̈‪qq‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܘܠ‪̈ 煟‬‬
‫ܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ‪.‬‬ ‫‪15‬‬

‫‪§ 82‬‬ ‫̈ܙܢ‪ 焏q‬ܕ‪ 焏r熏̈rq 爯q‬ܘܡ̈‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܦܠܓ‪ 爯q‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܐܘ ܒ‪q‬ܠ‪ 煟q 煿‬ܐܕ‪焏r‬‬
‫ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ܉ ܐ‪熏q qq‬ܪܘܬܐ ܠ‪q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܩ‪̈熏‬ܩܢ̇‪熏‬܉ ܐܘ ܠ‪ 熏‬ܒ‪q‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܐܕ‪焏r‬‬
‫ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ܉ ܐ‪熏q qq‬ܪܘܬܐ ܒܒ‪r‬ܢ‪ .焏r‬ܐܘ ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܡ‪熏‬ܠ‪煟‬ܐ ܢܩ‪q‬ܦ‪爯q‬܇ ܐ‪qq‬‬
‫ܐܘ‪q‬ܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܠ‪ .焏qr熏q‬ܐܘ ܠ‪rq‬ܬܐ ܓ‪爯qr煟‬܇ ܐ‪熏r qq‬ܢ‪ q‬ܓ‪熏‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ̣ܡ‪爯‬‬
‫‪熏q‬ܪܗܢ‪.焏‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬

‫‪§ 83‬‬ ‫ܬܘܒ ܡܣ‪r‬ܬܘܬܐ ܡ‪r‬ܩ‪焏qr‬܉ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ̇ܓ‪煟‬ܫ ܒܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܘܡ‪r‬ܥܠ‪ 爏‬ܒ‪煿‬‬
‫ܣܓ‪rq焏q‬܇ ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܢ‪r‬ܦ‪r‬ܫ ⟩ܡܢ‪ ⟨煿‬ܬܘܒ ܠܓܡ‪ .r‬ܐܘ ‪ 焯q‬ܣܓ‪q‬‬
‫ܥܣܩ‪ rq焏‬ܢ‪ 犟qr‬ܡܢ‪ .煿‬ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܡܣ‪r‬ܬܘܬܐ ܠ‪ 爟‬ܡ‪rr‬ܡ‪煿‬ܐ܉ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪煟q‬‬
‫ܢܓ‪煟‬ܫ ܒܡ‪煟‬ܡ܇ ܠ‪ 焏‬ܢ‪rr‬ܪܪ ܒ‪ 煿‬ܓ‪煿r煟‬܇ ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ ܡ‪ 焏q犏‬ܠܡ‪qr‬ܩ‪熏‬ܬܗ‬
‫ܡܢ‪煿‬܇ ܐܦ ܒܥܠ‪r‬ܐ ܐ‪煟q‬ܐ ܕ̣ܗܝ ܕܣܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪ 焏q‬ܠ‪.煿‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬

‫‪§ 84‬‬ ‫ܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕܬܪ‪ 爯q‬ܕܙܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ܉ ܡ‪r‬ܡ‪q犏‬ܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܡ‪q犏‬ܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ܇‬
‫ܐ‪ qq‬ܐܢ‪ r‬ܕܡ‪犏‬ܐ ܠܡ‪煿‬ܘܐ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ܇ ܐܘ ܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪犏‬ܐ ܠܡ‪煿‬ܘܐ‪.‬‬

‫‪§ 85‬‬ ‫ܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕܬܠ‪r‬ܐ ܕ‪q‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܕܓܢܣ‪ 焏‬ܗܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܙܢ‪焏‬܉ ܘܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ܒ̈‪熟‬ܢ‪ 焏q‬ܡ‪r‬ܩ‪.爟q‬‬
‫̇ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕܡ‪r‬ܩ‪ 焏r熏̈rq 爯qr‬ܘܡ̈‪rq‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܡ‪rr‬ܡ‪̇ 爯q煿‬ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕ̇ܗܘ‪爯q‬‬

‫̈‬
‫ܡ‪ 爯‬ܓ‪熏‬ܢ‪1–2 焏‬‬ ‫̇‬
‫‪ sic!; emend. (vd. comm.) 5‬ܡ‪r‬ܘܡ ܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪qr‬ܠ‪ 牯‬ܗ̣ܘܐ ܓ‪熏‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪qq‬ܢ‪̣ 煟q 煿‬‬
‫‪; sǝyāmē suppl. ex L.47va31/P.88v16‬ܘܕܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ‬ ‫‪6 suppl. ex L.47va34/P.88v18‬‬ ‫‪11 vid.‬‬
‫‪; sǝyāmē suppl.‬ܩ‪熏‬ܩܢ̇‪; emend. 17 熏‬ܓܢܣ‪] 焏‬ܐܕ‪; cf. cap. 8 n. 68 16 et 17 焏r‬ܦ‪qq熏‬ܢ‪爿q‬‬
‫̈‬
‫ܐܦܒܥܠ‪r‬ܐ ‪; emend. 22 suppl. ex L.48ra10/P.89r15 25‬ܢܩ‪q‬ܦ‪18 爯‬‬
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 151

otherwise the colour of the nature of (that body) would never alter any
of the bodies. In the same way, neither a figure nor a shape is a body,
otherwise wax or bronze, or anything else like these, would never receive
figures or shapes of all kinds, that someone may wish to imprint in them.
It is therefore obvious—⟨in order⟩ not to treat these things that are known
to everyone—that all the things that appear in bodies, and go away and
are destroyed from them, while the constitution of their nature remains the
same, are of different sort, separate from the bodies. Thus, O our brother
(Philotheos), these incorporeals whose subsistence is in something else,
namely in bodies or in rational beings, and those that sometimes appear and
again sometimes go away and are destroyed, these are named by the Greeks
poiótêtes (qualities), but we call them zənayyā (manners), and others name
them ḥaylē (powers, i.e. faculties) or muzzāḡē (temperaments).

They divide this genus of quality (zənā) in this way: into stability and insta- § 81
bility; into capacity and incapacity; into affected and affective qualities; and
into figures and shapes.

The affected and affective qualities are divided like this: they are either in § 82
the entirety of one species, as whiteness in all swans, or they are not in the
entire species, as paleness in man. They are either accompanied from birth,
as blackness for the Cushite, or they appear after the birth [i.e. acquired later
in life], as the departure of colour by sickness.

Again, stability is called what appears in something and becomes so greatly § 83

integrated into it, so that it cannot be separated ⟨from it⟩ at all, or will go away
from it with very great difficulty. Hence, instability is named that which,
when it appears in something, its appearing does not become steady in it,
but it is again possible to take it away from it, by any reason whatsoever it
might be contrary to it.

The second kind (ʾādšā) of quality is capacity and incapacity, as someone § 84

who is capable of becoming something or is incapable of becoming (that).

The third kind of this category of quality (zənā) is also subsisting in qualities § 85
(zənayyā), which are called affected and affective. So are these named which
 152 chapter 7

爯qr煟‫ ܕܓ‬rq‫ ̇ܗܝ ܓ‬爏q‫ ܡ‬.爯qr‫ܓ‬r‫ܡ ܒ‬煟‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܠܦ‬q̈熏r 爯q煟‫܇ ܘܥܒ‬焏‫ܡ‬r̈熏‫ܒܓ‬

99r 爯q煿‫ܡ‬r‫ ܡ‬焏r熏̈rq ‫ܘܢ܉‬煿‫ܠ‬qq | 爯q‫ ܩ̈ܢ‬爯q‫̈ܘ‬煿‫ ܕܢ‬爯q煿‫ ܠ‬爯q煟‫ܬܐ ܘܥܒ‬熏‫̈ܒ‬犏‫ ܒ‬爯q煿‫ܒ‬
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫̈ܒ‬犏‫ ܠ‬爯q煿‫ ܠ‬爯qr‫ܓ‬r ‫ܢ‬熏‫ܒ‬r‫ܩ‬r‫ ܢ‬煟q‫ ܕ‬爯q‫ܝ ܕ‬煿̇‫ ܒ‬.爯q‫ ܗܠ‬焏q‫ܢ‬熟̈‫ܘܢ ܠ‬煿‫ܠ‬
爏q‫ ⟩ܡ‬.‫ܘܢ‬煿‫ ܠ‬爯qr‫ ܩ‬焏‫ܢ‬rq̈‫܉ ܡ‬爯q煿‫ ܒ‬爯qr‫ܓ‬r‫ ܡ‬煟q 焏‫ܠܦ‬q̈熏r 爯q煿‫ܢ ܡܢ‬熏‫ܘܢܩܒܠ‬
.‫ܐ‬rr‫ ܕܪܓ‬焏‫ܠܦ‬q̈熏r ‫ܘܢ‬煿‫ ܒ‬爯q煟‫ܝ ܕܥܒ‬煿̇‫ ܕ̣ܗܘ⟨܉ ܒ‬焏‫ܢ‬qq‫ܘܢ ܐ‬煿‫ ܠ‬爯qrq‫ܕܡ‬ 5
爯‫ܡ‬q‫̈ܡ‬q‫ܐ ܕ‬rq‫ܢ‬rq‫ ܐ‬爯q煿‫ܠ‬q‫ ܘ‬焏r‫ܪܐ ܘܕܒ‬熏‫ ܢ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܗ‬qq‫ ܕܐ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܐܡ‬
焏q‫ܬܐ܉ ̈ܙܢ‬熏q‫ܠ‬q‫ܬܐ ܘ‬熏‫ܡ‬q‫ܡ‬q 爯q煿‫ܢ‬qq‫ ܒ‬r ݀ r煟‫ܝ ܕܓ‬煿̇‫܉ ܒ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܗ‬爯q‫ܠ‬q̈‫ܐܘ ܕ‬
爯‫ܡ‬熏‫ܢ ܐܘ ܠܦ‬r‫ ܠܦܓ‬爯‫ܒ‬r‫ܩ‬r‫ ܕܡ‬煟q‫ ܕ‬爯q‫ܝ ܕ‬煿̇‫ ܒ‬.焏r熏̈rq 爯q‫ܢ ܕܩ̈ܢ‬r‫ܐܡ‬r‫ܡ‬
焏‫ܢ‬rq̈‫ ܡ‬焏q‫ܕܐ ̈ܙܢ‬煿‫ܬܐ܉ ܒ‬熏q‫ܠ‬q‫ܬܐ ܘܕ‬熏‫ܡ‬q‫ܡ‬q‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܠܦ‬q熏r ‫ܢ‬rr‫ܓ‬r‫ܢ ܒ‬煟‫ܥ̈ܒ‬
.‫ܗܘܢ‬rr‫ܓ‬r‫ܡ ܒ‬煟‫ܐ ܡ‬rrq 爯‫ ܠ‬爯q煟‫ ܕܥܒ‬爏q‫ ܡ‬.爯q煿q‫ܠ‬q̈q 爯qr‫ܩ‬r‫ܡ‬ 10

§ 86 ‫ܢ‬熏‫ ̈ܡܢ‬牟‫ܪܒ‬焏‫܉ ܠ‬焏‫ܢ‬rq̈‫ ܘܡ‬焏r熏̈rq ‫ܢ‬熏‫ ̇ܗܢ‬焏‫ܠ‬q̈q‫ܐ ܕ‬r‫ ܕܬܠ‬爏qq‫ ܗ‬焏r‫ܐܕ‬

‫ܪܘܬܐ‬熏q‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܢ‬熟q‫ܫ܉ ܐ‬煟‫ܬܐ ̇ܓ‬熏‫ ܕܨ̈ܒ‬焏r‫ ܐܕ‬煟q 煿‫ܠ‬q‫ ܠ‬rq‫ ܓ‬煿‫܉ ܡܢ‬焿‫ܦܠ‬r‫ܡ‬
qqqr 焏r‫ ܐܕ‬煟q 煿‫ܠ‬q‫ ܒ‬熏‫ ܠ‬煿‫ ܘܡܢ‬.‫ܣ‬熏‫ܩܢ‬熏‫ ܘܠܩ‬焏q煟q‫ܣܦ‬焏‫ ܘܠ‬焏‫ܠܓ‬r‫ܠ‬
焏r‫ܢ‬q‫ ܘܒ̈ܒܢ‬焏rqr‫ܬܐ ܒ‬熏‫ܡ‬q‫ܪܘܬܐ ܐܘ ܐܘ‬熏q qq‫ܬܗ܇ ܐ‬熏‫ ܒ̈ܡܢ‬焏‫ܐܠ‬
‫ܫ‬煟‫ܘܬܐ ܓ‬煟q‫ܠ‬q 爯‫ ̣ܡ‬rq焏‫ܢ‬qq ‫ ܬܘܒ‬煿‫ ܘܡܢ‬.‫ܐ‬rq‫ܢ‬rq‫ܡ ܐ‬煟‫ܬܐ ܡ‬熏̈qq‫ܘܒ‬ 15
̈
.焏qr熏‫ܠ‬q‫ܬܐ ܕܐ‬熏‫ܡܩ‬熏‫ ܘܣ‬焏qr熏q‫ܬܐ ܕ‬熏‫ܡ‬q‫ ܐܘ‬qq‫ ܐ‬.‫ܬܐ‬熏‫̈ܒ‬犏‫ ܒ‬爯q煿‫ܒ‬
爯‫ܬܐ ܕ̣ܡ‬熏‫ܡܩ‬熏‫ ܣ‬qq‫ܪܐ܉ ܐ‬rr‫ ܕܢ‬犟qr‫ܫ ܘܦ‬煟‫ܬܐ ̇ܓ‬rq‫ ܠ‬煿‫ܘܡܢ‬
焏‫ܡ‬r̈熏‫ܐ ܘܒܓ‬r‫ ܒܦܓ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬熏‫ ܠ‬.‫ܐ‬r‫ܠ‬q‫ ܕ‬爯‫ ܕ̣ܡ‬焏‫ܢ‬熏‫ ܓ‬q‫ܢ‬熏r‫݁ܬܐ܇ ܘ‬犏‫ܡ‬q‫ܬ‬
rq‫ ܓ‬焏‫ܢ‬熟q‫ ܐ‬.焏r‫ ܐܦ ܒܢܦ‬焏‫ ܐܠ‬.‫ܕ‬熏̣q‫ ܒܠ‬爯q‫ ܗܠ‬焏q‫ ̈ܙܢ‬爯qr煟‫ ܓ‬焏‫ܢ‬rq‫ܐ‬
‫ܝ ܕܐܦ‬r‫ ܐܡ‬rq‫ ܐ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܗ‬.焏qr熏q‫ ܒ‬焏q‫ܘܬܐ ܗܘ‬煟q‫ܠ‬q 爯‫ܬܐ ̣ܡ‬熏‫ܡ‬q‫ܕܐܘ‬ 20
焏r‫ ܒܢܦ‬煿̇‫܇ ̇ܗܘܐ ܒ‬焏‫ ܗܢ‬qq‫ ܕܐ‬焏‫ܢ‬rq‫ܡ ܐ‬煟‫ ܐܘ ܡ‬焏q‫ܢ‬r ‫ܐ ܐܘ‬r‫ܡ‬q
‫ܐ‬r‫ܠ‬q‫ ܕ‬爯‫ ܕ̣ܡ‬焏‫ܢ‬熏‫ ܓ‬q‫ܢ‬熏r‫ ܬܘܒ ܕ‬焏‫ܢ‬熟q‫ ܘܐ‬.焏r‫ܢ‬r‫ ܕܒ‬焏q‫ܡ‬煟‫ܗ ܩ‬煟‫ܠ‬熏‫ ܡ‬爯‫̣ܡ‬
‫ܡ‬煟‫ ܡ‬焏rq 爯‫ ܐܦ ̣ܡ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܗ‬.‫݁ܬܐ‬犏‫ܡ‬q‫ ܬ‬爯‫ܬܐ ܕ̣ܡ‬熏‫ܡܩ‬熏‫ ܘܣ‬.焏q‫ܬܐ ܗܘ‬rq‫ܠ‬
.‫ ܕ̣ܗܘ‬爯qq‫ ܐ‬焏‫ܠܦ‬qr‫ܐ ܐܘ ܕܡ‬rq‫ܢ‬r ‫ܐ ܐܘ‬r݁q‫ܢ‬r‫ܡ‬q ‫ܬܐ‬rq‫ ܠ‬焏r‫ ܢܦ‬焏q‫ܗܘ‬

99v § 87 .焏‫ ܕܙܢ‬焏‫ ܗܢ‬焏‫ ܓܢܣ‬爯‫ܡ‬

̣ | 焏‫ ܕܐܪܒܥ‬焏‫ܢ‬rq‫ ܐ‬焏r‫ ܐܕ‬rq‫ ܐ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬爯q‫ܪ ܗܠ‬r‫ܒ‬ 25
‫ܡ‬煟‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܡ‬熏q‫ ܬ‬爏‫ ܥ‬犟q‫ܬܐ܉ ܕܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ܣܢ‬熏‫ ܘܕ̈ܡ‬焏‫ܡ‬qq̈‫ ܐܣ‬r‫̇ܒ‬q‫̇ܗܘ ܕ‬
爯q‫ ܕ‬熏‫ ܠ‬.焏‫ܡ‬qq‫ ܐܦ ܐܣ‬煿‫ ܠ‬rq‫ܬܐ܉ ܐ‬熏̣‫ ܕܡ‬焏‫ܡ ܕܩܢ‬煟‫ܠܡ‬q‫ ܕ‬.焏‫ ܗܢ‬qq‫ܕܐ‬

1 et 5 焏‫ܠܦ‬q熏r; sǝyāmē suppl. ex L.49va9 et L.49va23, (etiam P.91r17 et P.91r25 sine) 2

爯q煿q‫ܠ‬q̈q; em. ex L.49va13/P.91r20 (vd. comm.) 4 爯q煿‫ ]ܡܢ‬煿‫ ;ܡܢ‬em. ex L.49va17/P.91r23
4–5 suppl. ex L.49va20f./P.91r24f. 7 ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܡ‬q‫ܡ‬q‫ܬܐ ܘ‬熏q‫ܠ‬q; em. ex L.49va28f./P.91v1 8
爯q‫ ܕܩ̤ܢ‬爯qr‫ܐܡ‬r‫ ;ܡ‬emend., (L.49va9/P.91v2: 爯q‫ܢ ܕܩܢ‬r‫ܐܡ‬r‫)ܡ‬ 9 ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܠ‬q‫ ;ܘ‬emend.,
(L.49va34: ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܠ‬q‫ )ܐܘ ܕ‬10 爯q煿q‫ܠ‬qq; sǝyāmē suppl. ex L.49va35, (P.91v5: 爯q煿‫ܠ‬qq) ‖ 爯‫]ܠ‬
煿‫ ;ܠ‬em. ex L.49va37/P.91v5 11 焏‫ܢ‬rq̈‫ ܘܡ‬焏r熏̈rq] 焏‫ܢ‬r̈q‫ ܘܡ‬焏‫ܢ‬r̈q‫ ;ܡ‬em. ex L.49vb2–
4/P.91v7 14 焏r‫ܢ‬q‫ ;ܘ̈ܒܢ‬em. ex L.49vb14/P.91v12 16 焏qr熏q‫ ;ܕ‬sǝyāmē suppl. ex P.91v15,
(etiam L.49vb19 sine) ‖ 焏qr熏‫ܠ‬q‫ ]ܕܐ‬熏‫ܘܠ‬r‫ ;ܕܐ‬em. ex P.91v16, (L.49vb20: 焏q‫ܠ‬r‫)ܕܐܘ‬ 18
‫ܐ‬r‫ ;ܒܦܓ‬sǝyāmē suppl. ex L.49vb26/P.91v19 24 ‫ܬܐ‬rq‫ ;ܒ‬em. ex L.50ra2/P.92r2 26
焏‫ܡ‬熏qr‫ܩܥܠ‬q‫ܘܣܢ‬煿̣‫ ܕܐܦ‬27 煿̇‫ ܠ‬rq‫ ;ܐ‬em. ex L.50ra21/P.92r11
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 153

occur in bodies and bring about some changes in our senses. Since, on the
one hand, they occur in objects and make them to possess their faculty
(ḥaylā), they name these qualities affected. While, on the other hand, when
our senses approach the objects and receive from them changes by sensing
them, they call them affective, ⟨because they affect them [i.e. the senses]
in some way⟩, in that they produce in them changes of sensation. I say as
follows: fire and honey, and all other things which accordingly are hot or
sweet, since sweetness or hotness has appeared in their nature, are said to
possess affected qualities, but insofar as they approach our human body
or our mouth, they bring about a change of hotness and sweetness in our
sensation, their faculties are called affective qualities, because they cause us
a certain feeling (ḥeštā) by the sensation of them.

Thus, the third kind of the affected and affective qualities (ḥaylē) is divided § 86
into four parts, of which (1) one occurs in the entirety of one species of
objects, as for example whiteness in snow, in lead, and in swan, and of which
(2) one is not found in the entirety of one species, but in parts of it, like
whiteness or blackness in horses and in men and in some other animals;
and again of which (3) one appears in objects by nature from birth, like the
blackness of Cushites and the redness of Illyrians. And of which (4) one
appears after the birth [i.e. later in life] and is easy to lose, like redness
in consequence of shame and departure of colour in consequence of fear.
However, not only in (animate) bodies and other (inanimate) bodies do
these qualities appear, but also in the soul. As for example blackness in
the Cushite occurs from birth, likewise sometimes also wrath or insanity or
something else like this occurs in the soul of a man from his first birth. And
again, as for example the departure of colour in consequence of fear and
redness in consequence of shame occurs after the birth, in this way a soul
in consequence of any certain affection (ḥaššā) becomes wrathful or insane
after the birth, or that it changes in any other way.

After these, there is another fourth kind of this category of quality, which § 87
contains figures and shapes. Also this (kind) is in need of a certain definition
like this: everything that possesses a shape has also a figure [i.e. form], but
 ‫‪154‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫ܒ‪q‬ܠܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܕ‪ qqqr‬ܒ‪ 煿‬ܐܣ‪qq‬ܡ‪焏‬܉ ܢܩ‪q‬ܦ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܐܦ ܕܡ̣‪熏‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܘܒ‪煟‬ܓ‪熏‬ܢ‬

‫ܣ̈ܓ‪ 爯q焏q‬ܐܣ̈‪qq‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܕ ̈‬
‫ܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ܉ ܒ̇‪煿‬ܝ ܕܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܠ‪ 熏‬ܒ‪q‬ܠܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐ‪.爯q煿qrq‬‬ ‫̣‬ ‫̈‬
‫ܐܣ‪qq‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܒ‪ 爏q‬ܨ̈ܒ‪熏‬ܢ ‪ .爯qqqqr‬ܐܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܗ‪ 爏qq‬ܒܦܣ‪q‬ܩ‪r‬ܐ ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪.焏‬‬
‫̈‬ ‫̈‬
‫ܕ‪q‬ܠܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܕܕܢܦ‪ r‬ܗ̣ܘ ܘܡ‪r‬ܬܙ‪ 牟q‬ܙܘܥ‪ 焏‬ܨܒ‪q‬ܢ‪焏q‬܉ ܥ‪̇ 爟‬ܗܝ ܕܩܢ‪ 焏‬ܐܣ‪qq‬ܡ‪焏‬܉‬
‫ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪ r‬ܕܐ‪ rq‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܐܦ ܕܡ̣‪熏‬ܬܐ‪ 爏q .‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܕܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܢܦ‪ r‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ‬ ‫‪5‬‬
‫ܩ‪q熏‬ܡ‪ :煿‬ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܡ‪焏‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܢ‪ 焏rq‬ܘܕܩ‪q‬ܣ‪ 焏‬ܘܕ‪ 焏qrr‬ܕܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ܉ ܥ‪ 爏‬ܗܠ‪爯q‬‬
‫ܐܣ‪qq‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪ 煟q .r‬ܪ‪qq‬ܩ‪̣ 爯q‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܐ‪qq‬ܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܕܕܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܡ‪爯q煟‬‬
‫ܥ‪q 爏‬ܠ‪ 爯q煿‬ܢܦ‪r‬ܢ̈‪rq‬ܐ܉ ܕܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܘܐܣ‪qq‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪ .r‬ܥ‪ 爏‬ܐ‪q‬ܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕ‪爯q‬‬
‫ܕܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܢܦ‪ r‬ܐ‪爯q煿qrq‬܉ ܐܣ‪qq‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪.r‬‬

‫‪§ 88‬‬ ‫ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ ܓܢܣ‪̇ 焏‬ܗܘ ܕܕܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܡ‪r‬ܦܠ‪ 焿‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܕܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ‬ ‫‪10‬‬
‫ܐ‪煿̇qrq‬܉ ܐܘ ܐ‪̇ qq‬ܗܢ‪ 爯q‬ܕܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ܉ ܐܘ ܐ‪̇ qq‬ܗܢ‪ 爯q‬ܕܣܩ‪̈熏‬ܒܠ‪爯q‬܉‬
‫ܐܘ ܐ‪qq qq‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܘܓܠ‪熟q‬ܘܬܐ܉ ܐܘ ܐ‪ qq‬ܪܘ‪q‬ܒ‪ 焏‬ܕܐ‪ 爯q‬ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܒܡܠ‪r‬ܐ‪.‬‬
‫ܡܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪煿̇qrq‬܉ ܐ‪̇ qq‬ܗܝ ܕܣ‪熏‬ܩ‪ 爿qqr‬ܪ̇ܗܛ‪.‬‬ ‫ܘܬܘܒ ܕܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܡܢ̇‪ 煿‬ܒ ̈‬
‫ܣ‪熏‬ܩ‪ 爿qqr‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܪ̇ܗܛ‪ .‬ܘܡܢ̇‪ 煿‬ܒ‪ 爯q煿‬ܒ‪̈犏‬ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܐ‪煿̇qrq‬܉ ܐܘ ܒ‪熏r‬ܬܦ‪熏‬ܬܐ‬
‫ܕܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܐܘ ܡܢ̇‪ 煿‬ܘܠ̇‪ 煿‬ܐ‪煿̇qrq‬܉ ܐܘ ܡ‪q̈rr‬ܠܦ‪ 爯‬ܠ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ‪ .‬ܗܠ‪爯q‬‬ ‫‪15‬‬
‫ܕܣܩ‪̈熏‬ܒܠ‪ .爯q‬ܐܘ ܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪q̈rr‬ܠܦ‪̇ .爯‬ܗܢ‪ 爯q‬ܕܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ܉ ‪qq‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܘܓܠ‪熟q‬ܘܬܐ‪.‬‬

‫‪§ 89‬‬ ‫ܐܕ̈‪ 焏r‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕ‪熏r‬ܓܢ‪ 焏q‬ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ ‪rr‬ܐ‪ .‬ܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪̇ 焏q‬ܗܘ ܕܒ‪煿‬ܘ‪ 焏q‬ܘܒ‪熏q‬ܒܠ‪焏‬‬
‫ܡ‪熟qr‬ܐ܉ ܘܕܬܪ‪̇ 爯q‬ܗܘ ܕܒ‪r‬ܪܒ‪rq‬ܐ ܘܒܒ‪rq犏‬ܘܬܐ ܡ‪r‬ܩ‪ .爟q‬ܕ̣ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܗܠ‪爯q‬‬
‫ܡ‪ 爯‬ܥܦܦ‪ 爯q煿‬ܕܨ̈ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܕܓ‪ 爯qr煟‬ܒ‪爯q煿‬܉ ܘܗܘ‪ 爯q‬ܐܪܒܥ‪.焏‬‬
‫ܬܪ‪ 爯q‬ܡ‪r‬ܥܦܦ‪̣ 爯q‬‬
‫̇‬ ‫̇‬ ‫̇‬
‫ܕ‪q‬ܡ‪ 焏r‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܗܘ ܕܥܒ‪q熏r 煟‬ܠܦ‪ .焏‬ܕ‪rr‬ܐ ܗܘ ܕܡ‪熟qr‬ܐ ܒ‪熟‬ܘܥ‪焏‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬
‫ܡ‪ 爯‬ܕܘ‪ 焏q‬ܠ‪煟‬ܘ‪.焏q‬‬
‫ܕ ̣‬
‫‪100r § 90‬‬ ‫ܬܘܒ ܡ‪熏‬ܣܦ‪q‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܘܐܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪ .爯‬ܕܡܢ̇‪ 煿‬ܕܕܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ܉ | ܐ‪qq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܐܡ‪rq‬ܐ‬
‫̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܠܥ‪ 爏‬ܒܦ‪熏‬ܠܓ̇‪煿‬܉ ܒ̈ܡܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪ .焏qqrr‬ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܢ‪焏‬ܡ‪ r‬ܐܢ‪ r‬ܕܣ‪熏‬ܩ‪爿qqr‬‬
‫ܪܗܛ܇ ܣ‪熏‬ܩ‪ 爿qqr‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܪܗܛ‪ .‬ܥ‪ 焏qrr 爟‬ܕܕܐ‪ qq‬ܗܠ‪ .爯q‬ܘܡ‪ qqrr‬ܐܕ‪焏r‬‬
‫̇ܗܘ ܕܡ‪r‬ܩ‪ 爟q‬ܒ‪r‬ܘ‪q‬ܒ‪ 焏‬ܕܡܠ‪r‬ܐ‪ :‬ܘܡܢ̇‪ 煿‬ܒ‪ 爯q煿‬ܒ‪̈犏‬ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܡ‪r‬ܩ‪q‬ܡ‪.焏‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬
‫ܘ̣ܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܕܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܕܓ‪ 焏r煟‬ܒ‪̈犏‬ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܡܢ̇‪ 煿‬ܒ‪熏r‬ܬܦ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ‬
‫ܡ‪煟qr‬ܥ‪焏‬܉ ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪q‬ܡ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܘܣܡܠ‪ 焏‬ܘܠܥ‪ 爏‬ܘܠ‪ rqr‬ܘ‪ 焏qrr‬ܕܕܐ‪qq‬‬

‫̈‬
‫)‪; emend. (vd. comm.‬ܥ‪ 爟‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ ܐܣ‪qq‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪6–7 爯qr‬‬ ‫ܕܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ ‪8‬‬
‫)ܕܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܕܐܣ‪qq‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪; em. ex L.50rb4 f., (P.92r20–21: r‬ܕܐܣ‪qq‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܐ‬
‫)‪; emend., (cf. L.55vb17‬ܕܐܢ ]ܕܐ‪12 爯q‬‬ ‫ܡ‪煟q̈ 爯‬ܕܐ ]ܠ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ ‪15‬‬ ‫;ܘܒ‪rq犏‬ܘܬܐ ‪̣ ; emend. 18‬‬
‫‪em. ex L.54ra20/P.100r16‬‬ ‫̈‬
‫‪, vd. Manna‬ܥܦܦ‪; em. ex L.54ra22, (P.100r17: 爯q煿q‬ܥܦܦ‪19 爯q煿q‬‬
‫ܘ‪ (etiam L.55vb33); em. ex P.103r9 27 rr‬ܘܡܢ‪ 25 煿‬ܣ‪熏‬ܩ‪r‬ܛ ‪p. 555) 24‬‬
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 155

shape is not attached to everything in which figure is found. Therefore, fig-

ures are more numerous than shapes, in that the latter are not in everything,
while figures are found in all objects. Thus, we say in brief as follows: every-
thing that is animate and is moving in a voluntary motion, as it possesses
a figure, is said to have also a shape. Everything whose subsistence is inan-
imate, as for example a vessel of bronze, or of timber, or of the rest of such
things, only figure is predicated of these, as they are distant from the affinity
of shape. Thus, of all animate things both shape and figure is predicated, but
of those that are inanimate only figure is predicated.

[On opposites]

In this way, the category of opposition is divided as follows: opposition § 88

is either as relatives, or as those that are contraries, or as faculty (ḥaylā)
and privation, or as the construction of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ in a statement [i.e.
affirmation and negation]. Some opposition is in words, as “Socrates runs”,
“Socrates does not run”, and some is in objects, either in participation of
something else or in its own right. They either change into each other, (as)
those of contraries, or they do not change, (as) those of relatives, (and)
faculty and privation.

And the modes (ʾādšē) of change are six. The first one is seen in generation § 89
and in destruction. And the second one is constituted in increase and in
decrease. These two are doubled by the double number of the objects in
which they appear and become four. And the fifth one is that which makes
alteration, the sixth one is seen in the movement from one place to another
[i.e. locomotion].

We proceed and say that some opposition, as said above in connection with § 90
its division, is found in words, as for example someone says: “Socrates runs”,
“Socrates does not run”, with the rest of such things, and the form (ʾādšā) that
is constituted in the construction of a statement is found in this way. And
some of it is constituted in objects. Some of this opposition that appears
in objects is recognized by certain participation, as for example right and
 ‫‪156‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫ܗܠ‪ .爯q‬ܘ̇ܗܘܐ ܓܢܣ‪̇ 焏‬ܗܘ ܕܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ‪ .‬ܘܡܢ̇‪ 煿‬ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪qq‬ܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܕܥ‪ 爟‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ‬
‫ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪煿̇qrq‬܉ ܕܐܦ ̣ܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܬܘܒ ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪熏r‬ܬܦ‪ 焏‬ܥ‪ 爟‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪.焏‬‬
‫ܐܘ ܡ‪qr‬ܠܦ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪ 爯q煿‬ܠ‪̈犏‬ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܕܐ‪ 煿̇qrq‬ܒ‪ 爯q煿‬ܠ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ‪ .‬ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪熏q‬ܪܘܬܐ‬
‫ܘܐܘ‪q‬ܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܘܩ‪rqr‬ܘܬܐ ܘ‪q‬ܡ‪q‬ܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܘ‪ 焏qrr‬ܕܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ ܕܐ‪ qq‬ܗܠ‪.爯q‬‬
‫ܘ̇ܗܘܐ ܡܢ̇‪ 煿‬ܐܕ‪̇ 焏r‬ܗܘ ܕܣܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܐܘ ܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪qr‬ܠܦ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪ 爯q煿‬ܠ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ܇‬ ‫‪5‬‬
‫ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪熟q‬ܬܐ ܥ‪熏‬ܕ ܘܣܡ‪熏q‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܕ‪煟q‬ܐ ܡܢ‪ 爯q煿‬ܡ‪qrr‬ܠܦ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪q‬ܒ‪r‬ܬ̇ܗ‪̇ .‬ܗܝ‬
‫ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܐ‪rq‬ܬܐ ܠ‪ 焏‬ܗܦ‪焏q‬܇ ܘܥܒ‪煟‬ܐ ܐܕ‪̇ 焏r‬ܗܘ ܕ‪qq‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܘܕܓܠ‪熟q‬ܘܬܐ‪.‬‬

‫‪§ 91‬‬ ‫ܢ‪焏‬ܡ‪ r‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܐܦ ‪熏r‬ܘܕܥ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪q‬ܠ‪̣ 煟q 煟q‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܐܕ̈‪ 煿̇qr‬ܕܕܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ܇‬
‫ܡܦ‪ rq焏rr‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܒܦܣ‪̈q‬ܩ‪r‬ܐ‪ .‬ܗܢ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪qq 爯q‬ܠ‪̇ 焏‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܘܓܠ‪熟q‬ܘܬܐ‬
‫ܕܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ ܕܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪ 焏‬ܕ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ ܡ‪r‬ܡ‪ 爯q煿‬ܦ‪q‬ܠܣ̈‪熏‬ܦ‪焏‬܉ ܠ̇‪煿‬ܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܐ‪ rq‬ܠ‪煿‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬
‫ܒ‪ 爯‬ܡܥܒ‪煟‬ܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ܇ ܘܠ̇‪煿‬ܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪煿‬܇ ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ 焏q熟q‬ܘܣܡ‪熏q‬ܬܐ‪.‬‬
‫‪ 焏q熟q‬ܓ‪qq rq‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܗܘ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ‪qq‬ܢ‪ 焏q‬ܕܡܥܒ‪ 煟‬ܒ‪ .爯‬ܣܡ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܕ‪爯q‬܉ ܓܠ‪熟q‬ܘܬܗ‬
‫ܘ‪q‬ܒܠ‪ 煿‬ܕܗܢ‪qq 焏‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪ .煿̇qrq‬ܓܠ‪熟q‬ܘܬܐ ܕ‪爯q‬܉ ܙܕܩ ܠܡܣ‪ 焯‬ܒ‪q‬ܠ‪熟‬ܒ‪ 爯‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܗ̣ܘܐ‬
‫ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܐܬ‪焏q‬܇ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܓܠ‪ 熟q‬ܐܢ‪̣ r‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐܦܠ‪熏‬ܣ‪ .‬ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܓܠ‪̣ 熟q‬ܡ‪爯‬‬
‫̇ܗܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܙ̇ܕܩ ܗ̣ܘܐ ܕܢ‪煿‬ܘܐ ܩܢ‪ .焏‬ܒ‪熟‬ܒܢ‪ 焏‬ܘܒܡܢ‪r‬ܐ ̇ܗܝ ܕ‪ 焏qrq‬ܠ‪ .煿‬ܡ‪爯q煟‬‬ ‫‪15‬‬
‫ܬܠ‪ r‬ܨ̈ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܙܕܩ ܕܢ‪r‬ܥ̈ܩܒ‪ 爯‬ܥ‪ 爏‬ܓܠ‪熟q‬ܘܬܐ‪ .‬ܗܢ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪ .爯q‬ܕܐܢ ܡ‪ 爯q‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ‬
‫‪100v‬‬ ‫ܕܢܩܒܠ‪ 煿‬ܠ‪qq‬ܠ‪̇ 焏‬ܗܘ ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܕܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪ .煿‬ܘܐܢ ܒ‪熟‬ܒܢ‪̇ 焏‬ܗܘ ܕܡ‪ 爯q‬ܕܢܩܒܠ‪| .煿‬‬
‫ܒ‪ 煿‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܓܠ‪ 熟q‬ܡܢ‪ .煿‬ܘܐܢ ܬܘܒ ܒ‪煿‬ܕܡ‪̇ 焏‬ܗܘ ܕܡ‪ 爯q‬ܕܢ‪煿‬ܘܐ‬
‫ܒ‪qq 煿‬ܠ‪焏‬܇ ܠ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܒ‪.煿‬‬

‫‪§ 92‬‬ ‫ܬܘܒ‪ 爯q煟‬ܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܕܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ܇ ̇ܗܘ ܕܒ‪r‬ܘ‪q‬ܒ‪ 焏‬ܕܡܡܠܠ‪焏‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬
‫ܡ‪熟qr‬ܐ‪ .‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܕܢܣ‪ 焯‬ܬ‪r‬ܬ‪ 爯q‬ܨ̈ܒ‪熏‬ܢ ܘܢ‪焏‬ܡ‪煟q r‬ܐ ܥ‪q 爏‬ܒ‪r‬ܬ̇ܗ‬
‫ܕܐ‪ 煿̇qrq‬ܠ̇‪ 煿‬ܐܘ ܕܠ‪⟩ 煿̇qrq‬ܠ̇‪⟨煿‬܉ ܗ‪̈ 爯q煟q‬ܡܠ‪ 焏‬ܕܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪ 焏‬ܕ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ ܐܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪爯‬܉‬
‫ܐ‪qq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܐܢ‪ r‬ܢ‪焏‬ܡ‪ r‬ܥ‪ 爏‬ܦܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܪ̇ܗܛ ܐܘ ̇ܩ‪r‬ܐ ܐܘ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪q‬ܢ‪焏‬‬
‫ܕ̣ܗܘ‪ .‬ܘܬܘܒ ܢ‪焏‬ܡ‪ r‬ܥܠ‪熏‬ܗܝ ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܪ̇ܗܛ ܘܠ‪̇ 焏‬ܩ‪r‬ܐ‪ .‬ܗ‪̈ 爯q煟q‬ܡܠ‪ 焏‬ܕܕܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪焏‬‬
‫ܡ‪ 爯‬ܗܠ‪.爯q‬‬
‫ܡ‪qrr‬ܒ‪̣ 爯‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬

‫‪§ 93‬‬ ‫ܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪q‬ܠ̇‪ 煿‬ܕܕܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ܉ ̇ܗܘ ܕܡ‪r‬ܢܣ‪̣ 焯‬ܡ‪爯‬‬
‫ܓܢܣ‪̇ 焏‬ܗܘ ܕܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ܉ ܐ‪q qq‬ܡ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܘܣܡܠ‪焏‬܇ ܘܐ‪ qq‬ܠܥ‪ 爏‬ܘܠ‪rqr‬܇‬
‫ܘܐ‪ qq‬ܦܠܓ‪ 焏‬ܘܐܥܦ‪焏‬܇ ܘܐܒ‪ 焏‬ܘܒ‪r‬ܐ܇ ܘܡ‪r‬ܐ ܘܥ̣ܒ‪煟‬ܐ‪ .‬ܘ‪q‬ܠ‪爯q煿‬‬
‫ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ ܕܕܐ‪ qq‬ܗܠ‪ .爯q‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܕܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪ 焏‬ܕ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܢ‬
‫ܡ‪ 爯‬ܓܢܣ‪̇ 焏‬ܗܘ ܕܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܩ‪q熏‬ܡ‪.爯q煿‬‬
‫ܕܐ‪爯q煿qrq‬܉ ‪̣ 煟q‬‬ ‫‪30‬‬

‫‪] vid.‬ܗܢ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪; em. ex L.56ra16/P.103r19 9 爯q‬ܡܢ‪ 5 煿‬ܘ‪; emend. 4 rr‬ܐܕ‪] 焏r‬ܓܢܣ‪1 焏‬‬
‫;ܕܠ‪煿̇qrq‬܉ ̇ܗܢ‪] 爯q‬ܕܠ‪⟩ 煿̇qrq‬ܠ̇‪⟨煿‬܉ ܗ‪ (etiam L.56ra37); em. ex P.103v7 22 爯q煟q‬ܕܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ̇‪̄ 11 煿‬ܘ‬
‫‪; em. ex L.56vb29/P.104v12‬ܘܐ‪ qq‬ܕܠܥ‪) 27 爏‬ܕܠ‪ rq‬ܠ̇‪煿‬܉ ܗ‪emend., (P.104r21: 爯q煟q‬‬
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 157

left, up and down, and the rest of such things, and becomes the category
of relatives. And some of it is without relation to something else. Even this
which does not participate with (something) else: either it turns the objects
in which it is into the other one, as for example whiteness and blackness,
cold and heat, and the rest of other things like these, and make up the species
of contrariety, or it does not turn them into the other, as for example sight,
indeed, and blindness, of which one changes into the other, but the other
one does not revert, and this forms the species of faculty and privation.

We will also tell the headmark of each and every one of the kinds of oppo- § 91
sition separately in brief. The philosophers name that which has a certain
actuality in us and its opposite ‘faculty and privation’, which are opposites,
as for example sight and blindness. For sight is a certain physiological fac-
ulty that acts within us, but blindness is the privation and destruction of this
faculty. However, privation should not always be understood just like that,
when someone is simply deprived of something, but when he is deprived of
what he should be possessing at the time and in the part which is suitable
to him. Therefore, three matters need to be investigated about privation,
namely whether something is capable of receiving the faculty which is its
opposite; and whether at the time in which it is capable of receiving it, (that)
it is present in it when it is deprived of it; and again, whether faculty is in the
member of the body in which it is capable of being, (but) is not there.

Another kind of opposition is that which is seen in the construct of speech. § 92

For when we take two matters and we say one against another, that it
bears on it, or that it does bear on ⟨it⟩, then we express mutually opposite
words, as someone would say about Plato, that “he runs” or “he reads”, or
something else whatsoever, and again, he says about him that “he does not
run” and “he does not read”, then opposite words are construed from these
(combinations).

Another kind of opposition is that which is derived from the category of § 93

relatives, as right and left, as up and down, and as half and double, father
and son, master and slave, and all the others like these. For these are said
to be opposite to each other, as their subsistence pertains to the category of
relatives.
 ‫‪158‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫‪§ 94‬‬ ‫̇ܗܘ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܕܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܕܡ‪r‬ܩ‪r‬ܐ ܣܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ܉ ܒ‪q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ‬

‫‪q̈q‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܘܓ̈‪熏‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܡ‪qrr‬ܠܦ‪ 爯q‬ܠ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܩ‪q熏‬ܡ‪ .煿‬ܕ̇ܗܢ‪ 爯q‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܨ̈ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ‬
‫ܕܣܩ‪̈熏‬ܒܠ‪ 爯q‬ܠ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ‪ :‬ܐܘ ܡ‪犏‬ܥ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ̈ܩܢ‪ 爯q‬ܠ‪熏‬ܬ ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ܉ ܐܘ ܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬‬
‫ܠ‪ 爯q煿‬ܒܡ‪犏‬ܥ‪r‬ܗ‪ 爯q‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪⟩ 焏‬ܕ‪ 牟q煟q‬ܣ‪̇ .q‬ܗܢ‪ 爯q‬ܗ‪ 爏qq‬ܣܩ‪̈熏‬ܒܠ‪rq‬ܐ‬
‫ܕܠ‪ rq‬ܒܡ‪犏‬ܥ‪r‬ܗ‪ 爯q‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪⟨焏‬܉ ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܡܢ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏q熏r 焏‬ܘܐܦ‪熟‬ܓ‪焏‬‬ ‫‪5‬‬
‫ܐ‪ .爯q煿qrq‬ܠ‪ rq‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܡ‪犏‬ܥ‪ r‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܡܢ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܠ‪ 焏q熏r 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ‬
‫ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܦ‪熟‬ܓ‪ .焏‬ܘܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ ܕܢ‪熏‬ܗܪܐ ܘ‪̇ .焏q熏rq‬ܗܢ‪ 爯q‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܨ̈ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ‬
‫ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ ܕܣܩ‪̈熏‬ܒܠ‪⟩ 爯q‬ܠ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ⟨܉ ܕܐ‪ rq‬ܒܡ‪犏‬ܥ‪r‬ܗ‪ 爯q‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ‬
‫ܐ‪爯q煿qrq‬܉ ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪熏q‬ܪܘܬܐ ܘܐܘ‪q‬ܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܡ‪犏‬ܥ‪ r‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܐ‪rq‬‬
‫ܓ‪熏‬ܢ‪̇ 焏‬ܗܘ ܒ‪̇煿‬ܘܪܐ ܘܣ‪熏‬ܡܩ‪ 焏‬ܘ‪熏q‬ܪܩ‪ 焏‬ܘܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܣ̈ܓ‪焏q‬ܐ‪ .‬ܘܡ‪犏‬ܥ‪r‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬
‫ܡ‪rq‬ܪܘܬܐ ܬܘܒ ܘܒ‪熏rq‬ܬܐ ܘ‪煟q‬ܥ‪r‬ܐ ܘܠ‪煟q 焏‬ܥ‪r‬ܐ܉ ܐ‪q̈q rq‬ܣ‪焏‬‬
‫ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܣ‪q‬ܡ‪ 爯q‬ܒܡ‪犏‬ܥ‪r‬ܐ ‪rqrq‬ܐ‪rq‬܉ ܐܘ ܩ‪qr‬ܒ‪ 爯q‬ܩܠ‪ 爏q‬ܠ‪̣ 煟q‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܓ̈ܒ‪焏‬‬
‫‪̣ rqrq‬ܡ‪q 爯‬ܒ‪r‬ܗ‪ .‬ܘܒ‪煟‬ܓ‪熏‬ܢ ܐ‪ rq‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܝ ܕܡ‪qqqr‬ܢ‪r 爯‬ܡ̈‪煿‬ܐ ܕܣ‪q‬ܡ‪爯q‬‬
‫‪101r‬‬ ‫ܠ̇‪ 煿‬ܠ‪煿‬ܕܐ ܡ‪犏‬ܥ‪熏q‬ܬܐ | ܕܒܣܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ܉ ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܐܡ‪r‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܥ‪ 爏‬ܓ̈‪熏‬ܢ‪焏‬‬
‫̇ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕܒܡ‪犏‬ܥ‪r‬ܐ‪ .‬ܘܐ‪ rq‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܝ ܕܠ‪ rq‬ܥܠ‪熏q 煿̇q‬ܢ‪焏q‬܉ ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܒܡܠ‪r‬ܐ‬ ‫‪15‬‬
‫ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ ܡ‪r‬ܦ‪焏rr‬܉ ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܐܡ‪r‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܗ‪ 焏r‬ܥ‪ 爏‬ܕ‪r‬ܓ‪̇ 焏‬ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕܒܡ‪犏‬ܥ‪r‬ܐ‬
‫ܕܡ‪rq‬ܪܘܬܐ ܘܕܒ‪熏rq‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܗ‪ 爏qq‬ܥ‪ 爏‬ܩ‪q熏‬ܡ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܕܐ‪r‬ܒܥ‪ 焏‬ܐܕ̈‪煿̇qr‬‬
‫̈‬
‫ܕܕܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܣܦܩ‪.爯‬‬

‫‪§ 95‬‬ ‫ܡ‪r‬ܦ‪r‬ܫ ܗ‪⟩ 爏qq‬ܐܕ‪̇ ⟨焏r‬ܗܘ ܕ‪qq‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܘܕܓܠ‪熟q‬ܘܬܐ‪̣ .‬ܡ‪̇ 爯‬ܗܘ ܕܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ܉‬
‫ܒ̇‪煿‬ܝ ܕܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪ 爯qr‬ܕ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ‪ .‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪ 焏q熟q rq‬ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪ r‬ܕܣܡ‪熏q‬ܬܐ܉‬ ‫‪20‬‬
‫ܘܐܦܠ‪ 焏‬ܣܡ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܬܘܒ ܕ‪ .焏q熟q‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ܉ ܣ‪熏‬ܓ‪焏‬ܗ‪ 爯q‬ܕ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ‬
‫ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܢ܉ ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܣܡܠ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪熏‬ܬ ‪q‬ܡ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܘ‪ .焏qrr‬ܘ̣ܡ‪̇ 爯‬ܗܝ ܬܘܒ ܕ‪qq‬ܠ‪焏‬‬
‫ܘܕܓܠ‪熟q‬ܘܬܐ܉ ܒ‪ 煟q‬ܗܕܡ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪q‬ܢ‪ 爯q‬ܠܡ‪煿‬ܘܐ‪ .‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ‪ .‬ܠ‪焏‬‬
‫ܒ‪煟q‬ܐ ܨܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܐ‪ 爯q煿qrq‬ܬ‪r‬ܬ‪ .爯q煿q‬ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܒܣ‪熏‬ܓ‪焏‬ܐ ܒ‪煟q‬ܐ‬
‫ܡܢ‪r‬ܐ ̇ܓ‪̈ 煟‬‬
‫‪.爯 r‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬

‫‪§ 96‬‬ ‫̣ܡ‪̇ 爯‬ܗܢ‪ 爯q‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕܐ‪ 爯q煿qrq‬ܣܩ‪̈熏‬ܒܠ‪rq‬ܐ ܠ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ‪ .‬ܦ‪ 焏rqr‬ܕܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ‬
‫ܕ‪qq‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܘܕܓܠ‪熟q‬ܘܬܐ܉ ܒ̇‪煿‬ܝ ܕܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܣܩ‪̈熏‬ܒܠ‪ 爯q‬ܠ̈‪煟q‬ܕܐ܉ ܒ‪q‬ܠ‪熟‬ܒ‪ 爯‬ܡ‪q̈rr‬ܠܦ‪爯‬‬
‫‪煟q‬ܐ ܠ‪煟q‬ܐ܉ ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪熏q‬ܪܘܬܐ ܠ‪焏‬ܘ‪q‬ܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ܇ ܘܐܘ‪q‬ܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܠ‪熏q‬ܪܘܬܐ‪.‬‬

‫ܣܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪1 vid. 焏‬‬ ‫ܗܠ‪ post 爯q‬ܣܩ‪̈熏‬ܒܠ‪rq‬ܐ ‪2 scriptor exp.‬‬ ‫–‪4–5 suppl. ex L.57ra11‬‬
‫‪15/P.105r1–3‬‬ ‫)‪8 suppl. ex L.57ra36, (etiam P.105r13 om.‬‬ ‫‪; em.‬ܕܐܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪14 爯‬‬
‫‪ex L.57rb19/P.105r22‬‬ ‫‪ 煿̇qr‬ܕܡ‪rq‬ܪܘܬܐ ‪17–18‬‬ ‫‪ sic!; em. ex‬ܩ‪q熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܐܪܒܥ‪ 焏‬ܐܕ ̈‬
‫‪; em. ex L.57va29/P.105v23‬ܡ‪q̈r‬ܠܦ‪L.57rb30f./P.105v4f. 19 suppl. ex L.57rb37/P.105v8 27 爯‬‬
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 159

The subsistence of another kind of opposition, which is called contrariety, § 94

is in all the qualities (ḥaylē) and colours that change into each other. These
entities, which are contrary to each other, either possess a certain interme-
diate position to each other or they do not have anything else in the middle
of them ⟨at all that is known. Now, those contraries in the middle of which
there is nothing else⟩, are as for example the even and the odd number. For
there is no other number in between these that is not even or odd, and
as for example (there is no intermediate of) light and darkness. But those
other entities that are contrary ⟨to each other⟩, (and) in the middle of which
there are others things (are), as for example whiteness and blackness. For in
between these there is bright, red, and yellowish colour, and many others.
Also, between virtue and evil, and between knowledge and ignorance, there
are other degrees that are properly put in the middle, whether they are lit-
tle closer to one of the ends than their counterparts. Thus, we occasionally
find names that are invented for this intermediacy of contrariety, as we men-
tioned with regard to the colours in the middle, and occasionally there is no
appellation for it, but it is kept separate only by definition, as we have just
said about those levels that are in between virtue and evil. Now, this may
suffice concerning the constitution of the four kinds of opposition.

[On the distinctions of opposition]

In this way, ⟨the species⟩ of faculty and privation is distinguished from that of § 95
relatives, in that the former ones are not said to be of each other [i.e. belong
to each other]. For sight is not said to be of blindness, neither blindness of
sight. But with relatives, most of them are said to be of each other, as for
example left in relation to right, and so on. Also, in that faculty and privation
are capable of occurring in one (and the same) part of a body, but both
relatives do not exist in one object and they do not even appear in one (and
the same) part generally.

The opposition of faculty and privation is distinct from the things that are § 96
contrary to each other, in that those that are contrary to each other do always
change into each other, as for example whiteness into blackness, and black-
 ‫‪160‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫ܘ‪q‬ܡ‪q‬ܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܠܩ‪rqr‬ܘܬܐ܇ ܘܩ‪rqr‬ܘܬܐ ܠ‪q‬ܡ‪q‬ܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܥ‪qq 爏‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪爯q‬‬

‫ܘܓܠ‪熟q‬ܘܬܐ܉ ܠ‪ 熏‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪q熟q̇ 焏‬ܢ‪爯‬܉ ܐܠ‪qq 焏‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪qrr‬ܠ‪ 牯‬ܒ‪熟‬ܒ‪ 爯‬ܠܓܠ‪熟q‬ܘܬܐ‪.‬‬
‫ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ 焏q熟q‬ܠܣܡ‪熏q‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܓܠ‪熟q‬ܘܬܐ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܘܡ ܡ‪qrr‬ܠܦ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪qq‬ܠ‪.焏‬‬
‫ܣܡ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܓ‪ rq‬ܠ‪ 焏q熟q‬ܠ‪̇ 焏‬ܗܦ‪ 焏q‬ܡ‪qrr‬ܠܦ‪ .焏‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܬܪܥ‪rq‬ܐ ‪qq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ‪.‬‬
‫ܦ‪ 焏rqr‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܐܦ ܒ‪煿‬ܕܐ ܕܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܕܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܣܩ‪̈熏‬ܒܠ‪̣ 爯q‬ܡ‪̇ 爯‬ܗܝ ܕ‪qq‬ܠ‪焏‬‬ ‫‪5‬‬
‫ܘܓܠ‪熟q‬ܘܬܐ‪ .‬ܣ‪熏‬ܓ‪焏‬ܗ‪ 爯q‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܕܣܩ‪̈熏‬ܒܠ‪rq‬ܐ ܐ‪ rq‬ܒܡ‪犏‬ܥ‪r‬ܗ‪ 爯q‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ‬
‫ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܐܡ‪r‬ܢ‪̣ 爯‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܠܥ‪ .爏‬ܡ‪犏‬ܥ‪qq r‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܠܓܠ‪熟q‬ܘܬܐ܉ ܠ‪ rq‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪焏‬‬
‫‪101v‬‬ ‫ܣ‪ q‬ܕܡ‪熟qr‬ܐ ⟩ܒ‪q‬ܢ‪r‬ܗܘܢ⟨‪ .‬ܦ‪ 爯rqr‬ܕ‪̇ 爯q‬ܗܢ‪̣ 爯q‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܗܠ‪ | 爯q‬ܐܦ ܒ‪煿‬ܕܐ‪ .‬ܕ̇ܗܢ‪爯q‬‬
‫ܣܩ‪̈熏‬ܒܠ‪rq‬ܐ ܣ‪熏‬ܓ‪焏‬ܗ‪爯q‬܉ ܐܠ‪犏‬ܐ ܕܬܗܘܐ ‪煟q 焏qqqr‬ܐ ܡܢ‪ 爯q煿‬ܒ̇‪煿‬ܘ‬
‫ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܓ‪ 焏r煟‬ܒ‪ .煿‬ܘܐܢ ܬܪ‪ 犟q‬ܡܢ‪煿‬܉ ܡ‪݁qr‬ܒ‪ 爏‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܒ‪rr‬ܥ‪r‬ܗ‪ .‬ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪焏‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬
‫ܕ‪q‬ܡ‪q‬ܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܒܢ‪熏‬ܪܐ܇ ܘܩ‪rqr‬ܘܬܐ ܒ‪r‬ܠܓ‪ .焏‬ܓܠ‪熟q‬ܘܬܐ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܘ‪qq‬ܠ‪焏‬܉ ܠ‪焏‬‬
‫ܗ̣ܘܐ ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ‪ .‬ܐܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܕܒ‪q‬ܠ‪熟‬ܒ‪ 爯‬ܒ‪ 煟q 煿‬ܒ‪ 煿‬ܒ‪ 煟q‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ‬
‫ܓ‪.爯qr煟‬‬
‫̇‬

‫‪§ 97‬‬ ‫̣ܡ‪̇ 爯‬ܗܢ‪ 爯q‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕܐ‪ 爯q煿qrq‬ܒ‪煟‬ܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܕܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ܉ ܦ‪ 爯rqr‬ܗܠ‪爯q‬‬
‫ܕܣܩ‪̈熏‬ܒܠ‪爯q‬܉ ܒ̇‪煿‬ܝ ܕܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܢ‪ 煟q .‬ܬܗܘܐ ܐ‪煟q 煿̇qrq‬ܐ‬ ‫‪15‬‬
‫ܡܢ‪爯q煿‬܉ ܐܠ‪犏‬ܐ ܕܬ‪ qqrr‬ܐܦ ̇ܗܝ ܐ‪rq‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܘܐܢ ܬܬ݁ܒ‪煟q 爏q‬ܐ ܡܢ‪爯q煿‬܉‬
‫ܡܒ‪q‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܥܡ̇‪ 煿‬ܐܦ ܠ̇‪煿‬ܝ ܐ‪rq‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܐܢܓ‪ rq‬ܐ‪ rq‬ܐܒ‪焏‬܉ ܐܠ‪犏‬ܐ ܕܢ‪煿‬ܘܐ‬
‫ܐ‪ rq‬ܒ‪r‬ܐ‪ .‬ܘܐܢ ܠ‪ rq‬ܒ‪r‬ܐ܉ ܐܢܢܩ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪ 煿̇qrq‬ܕܢ‪r‬ܒ‪ 爏q‬ܥܡ‪ 煿‬ܐܦ ܐܒ‪.焏‬‬
‫ܘܥ‪q 爏‬ܠ‪ 爯q煿‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ ܕܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ܉ ̣ܗܝ ‪̣ 煟q‬ܗܝ ܗܕܐ ܡ‪ .焏q熟qr‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕ‪爯q‬‬
‫ܕܣܩ‪̈熏‬ܒܠ‪爯q‬܉ ܠ‪ 焏‬ܗ̣ܘܐ ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪ .爯q煿qrq‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܐܢ ܬܗܘܐ ‪煟q‬ܐ ܡܢ‪爯q煿‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬
‫ܡܥܠ‪ 焏‬ܥܡ̇‪ 煿‬ܐܠ‪犏‬ܐ‪q rq‬ܒ‪r‬ܬ̇ܗ‪ .‬ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܢ ܬܬܒ‪ 爏q‬ܡܒ‪q‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܠ̇‪̣ 煿‬ܡ‪爯‬‬
‫‪ 爏q‬ܦ‪r‬ܘܣ ܠ̇‪煿‬ܝ ܕܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ̇‪ .煿‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪ rq‬ܐܢ ܐ‪熏q rq‬ܪܘܬܐ ܒܡ‪煟‬ܡ܇ ܐܠ‪犏‬ܐ‬
‫ܕܬܗܘܐ ܐ‪ rq‬ܐܘ‪q‬ܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ ܐܢ ܬܬܒ‪ 爏q‬ܩ‪rqr‬ܘܬܐ܇ ܡܒ‪q‬ܠ‪焏‬‬
‫ܥܡ̇‪̣ 煿‬ܡ‪ 爏q 爯‬ܦ‪r‬ܘܣ ܠ‪q‬ܡ‪q‬ܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܐܠ‪q 焏‬ܒ‪ r‬ܐܦ ܡܩ‪q‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܠ̇‪ .煿‬ܦ‪爯rqr‬‬
‫̈‬
‫ܡ‪q‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܕܢܓ‪.爯r煟‬‬ ‫ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܐܦ ܒ‪煿‬ܕܐ‪ .‬ܕ̇ܗܢ‪ 爯q‬ܒ‪ 煟q‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܒ‪熟‬ܒܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܘܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪̈ 焏‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬
‫ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܢ܉ ܠ‪ 熏‬ܒ‪ 煟q‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܩ‪q熏‬ܡ‪爯q煿‬܉‬
‫ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܒ‪rr‬ܬ‪ 爯q‬ܨ̈ܒ‪熏‬ܢ ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܐܡ‪r‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܙ̈ܒܢ‪ 爯q‬ܣ̈ܓ‪焏q‬ܢ܉ ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܗ‪ 爏qq‬ܬܠ‪r‬ܐ‬
‫‪ 煿̇qr‬ܕܕܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܗܢ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪̇ 爯q‬ܗܘ ܕ‪qq‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܘܓܠ‪熟q‬ܘܬܐ‪ :‬ܘ̇ܗܘ ܕܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܡ‪煟‬ܡ‪.‬‬
‫ܐܕ ̈‬
‫̈‬ ‫ܘ̇ܗܘ ܕܣܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ܉ ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܦ‪̣ 爯qrr‬‬
‫ܡ‪煟q 爯‬ܕܐ‪.‬‬

‫‪102r § 98‬‬ ‫̇ܗܘ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܐ‪rq‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܪܒ‪q‬ܥ‪ 焏q‬ܕ‪q‬ܠ̇‪ | 煿‬ܕܕܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܕܡ‪r‬ܩ‪ 爟q‬ܐ‪qq‬‬ ‫‪30‬‬
‫ܕܐܡ‪r‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܒ‪r‬ܘ‪q‬ܒ‪ 焏‬ܕܡܠ‪r‬ܐ܉ ܡ‪r‬ܦ‪r‬ܫ ܐܦ̣‪煿‬ܘ ܒܦܣ‪̈q‬ܩ‪r‬ܐ ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܬܠ‪煿qr‬ܘܢ‬
‫ܗܠ‪ .爯q‬ܒ̇‪煿‬ܝ ܕܗܢ‪ 焏‬ܒܡܠ‪r‬ܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ‪̇ .‬ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܬܠ‪r‬ܐ ܠ‪焏‬‬

‫‪; em. ex L.57va37/P.106r3 3‬ܡ‪qr‬ܠ‪; del. ex L.57va36/P.106r3 ‖ 牯‬ܠ‪ 熏‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪] 焏‬ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪q熟q̇ [焏‬ܢ‪2 爯‬‬
‫ܕܡ‪熟qr‬ܐ‪ sic!; emend. 8 .‬ܕܣܩ̈‪熏‬ܠ‪rq‬ܐ ‪; em. ex L.57vb4/P.106r5 6‬ܡ‪qr‬ܠܦ‪] 焏‬ܡ‪qrr‬ܠܦ‪焏‬‬
‫ܕܡ‪熟qr‬ܐ ܒ‪q‬ܢ‪r‬ܗܘܢ‪; suppl. et em. ex P.106r17f., (L.57vb28–30: .‬ܦ‪ 爯qrqr‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܗܠ‪̣ 爯q‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܗܠ‪爯q‬‬
‫)ܦ‪ 爯rqr‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܐܦ ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܗܠ‪爯q‬‬ ‫‪ (etiam L.58ra5/P.106r23); emend.‬ܐ‪12 爯q煿qrq‬‬ ‫‪17‬‬
‫ܐ‪rq‬ܘ ‪; em. ex L.58ra35/P.106v15 26‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ‪ (vd. comm.) 22‬ܡܒ‪q‬ܠ‪ 焏‬ܥܡ̇‪煿‬‬
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 161

ness into whiteness, and heat into cold, and cold into heat. However, con-
cerning faculty and privation we do not see this, except faculty sometimes
changes into privation, as for example sight into blindness, but privation
never changes into faculty, for blindness does not counterchange into sight,
according to the natural opinion. Also in this respect is the opposition of
those that are contraries distinct from that of faculty and privation: for in
the middle of most contraries there are other (states), as we have said above,
but in the middle of faculty and privation there is nothing else at all to be
seen ⟨in between them⟩. The former are distinct from the latter also in this
respect: concerning most of the contraries, it is necessary that one of them
is found in what it appears, and if it goes away from that one, it is destroyed
directly, as for example heat in fire, and cold in snow [i.e. the substantial
qualities]. But privation and faculty are not like this. For we say that they
always appear in one and the same thing.

The contraries are distinct from those things that have the opposition of § 97
relatives, in that when one of the (two) things called relatives is present, it is
necessary that also the other one is found [i.e. the entailment of existence];
and if one of them is removed, it removes with it also the other one. For if
there is ‘father’, it is necessary that there is ‘son’, and if there is no ‘son’, it is
necessary that also ‘father’ is removed with it. And concerning all the other
relatives the same is observed. But those that are contraries are not like this.
For it is not (the case that) if one of them exists, it necessarily introduces
along with it its counterpart, and it is not (the case that) if it is removed,
it at any rate removes its opposite. For it is not (the case that) if there is
whiteness in something, it is necessary that there is blackness. Again, it is not
(the case that) if cold is removed, it at any rate removes with it heat, unless
it perchance also upholds that one. They are distinct also in this respect:
they [i.e. contraries] are capable of appearing in one (and the same) thing
at different points, but the subsistence of those called relatives is not in one
thing, but in two objects, as we have said many times. Consequently, these
three kinds of opposition, namely that of faculty and privation, and that
of relatives, and that of contrariety, are in this way distinguished from one
another.

However, the other fourth kind of opposition, which is constituted, as we § 98

have said, in the construction of a statement is also briefly distinguished
from the (previous) three, in that this one is only in a statement. However,
 ‫‪162‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫ܗ̣ܘܐ ܒܡܠ‪r‬ܐ‪ .‬ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܒ‪ 爯q煿‬ܒ‪̈犏‬ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܐ‪煿qrq‬ܘܢ‪ .‬ܐܢܓ‪ rq‬ܐܢ‪ r‬ܢ‪焏‬ܡ‪:r‬‬

‫ܕܣ‪熏‬ܩ‪rq̇ 爿qqr‬ܒ‪ .‬ܣ‪熏‬ܩ‪ 爿qqr‬ܠ‪rq̇ 焏‬ܒ܉ ܗܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܐ̇ܡ‪r‬‬
‫ܕܐ‪ 煿̇qrq‬ܒܡܠ‪r‬ܐ‪ .‬ܐܢ‪熟q 爯q煟‬ܬܐ ܐܘ ܣܡ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܐܘ ‪q‬ܡ‪q‬ܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܐܘ‬
‫ܩ‪rqr‬ܘܬܐ ܐܘ ‪q‬ܡ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܘܣܡܠ‪ 焏‬ܢ‪焏‬ܡ‪ r‬ܐܢ‪r‬܉ ܨ̈ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܩܢ‪熏‬ܡ‪ 爯q煿‬ܐ̇ܡ‪.r‬‬
‫ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܗ̣ܘܐ ܪܘ‪q‬ܒ‪ 焏‬ܕܡܠ‪r‬ܐ‪ .‬ܡ‪ 爯q煟‬ܦ‪̇ rqr‬ܗܘ ܐܕ‪ 焏r‬ܕܕܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ̣ܡ‪爯‬‬ ‫‪5‬‬
‫ܗܠ‪爯q‬܉ ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܐܦ ܐܡ‪r‬ܢ‪ .爯‬ܒ̇‪煿‬ܝ ܕ̇ܗܘ ܒ̈ܡܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܘܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܒܣ‪熏‬ܥ‪r‬ܢ‪焏‬‬
‫ܩܢ‪熏‬ܡ‪煿‬ܘܢ‪ .‬ܐܢ‪ 爯q煟‬ܐܢ‪ r‬ܢ‪焏‬ܡ‪ .r‬ܕܐܦ ܗܪ‪̇ 焏q‬ܗܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܡ‪煟qr‬ܥ ̣ܡ‪爯‬‬
‫ܪܘ‪q‬ܒ‪ 焏‬ܕܡܠ‪r‬ܐ‪ .‬ܗܢ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܣ‪熏‬ܩ‪rq̇ 爿qqr‬ܒ܇ ܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ܨܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ‬
‫ܘܠ‪ 熏‬ܒ‪r‬ܬ ܩܠ‪ 焏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪熏r‬ܕܥ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ܉ ܐܦ ܠ‪熏‬ܬ ܗܢ‪ 焏‬ܐܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪爯‬܉‬
‫ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܗ̣ܘܐ ‪q‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ‪r‬ܘ‪q‬ܒ‪ 焏‬ܕܡܠ‪r‬ܐ ܨ̈ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܡ‪熏r‬ܕܥ‪爯q‬܉ ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕ‪q‬ܡ‪焏‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬
‫ܙ̈ܒܢ‪ 爯q‬ܥ‪ 爏‬ܐ‪q‬ܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪ 爯q煿qrq‬ܡ‪r‬ܪ‪q‬ܒ‪ 焏‬ܡܠ‪r‬ܐ‪ .‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܐܢ ܐܢ‪r‬‬
‫ܢ‪焏‬ܡ‪ :r‬ܣ‪熏‬ܩ‪̇ 爿qqr‬ܦ‪r‬ܚ܇ ܐܘ ‪ 爏q‬ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪rq̇ 焏r‬ܒ܇ ܠ‪ 焏‬ܓ‪̇ rq‬ܗܝ ܐ‪煿̇qrq‬‬
‫ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܗܕܐ‪ .‬ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪ rq‬ܣ‪ 爏q q‬ܒ‪r‬ܢ‪r‬܉ ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ ܐܢ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ‬
‫ܡ‪ 爯‬ܢ‪熏‬ܓ‪r‬ܐ‪.‬‬
‫̇‬
‫‪rq‬ܒ܇ ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܐܦܠ‪ 焏‬ܣ‪熏‬ܩ‪ ̇ 爿qqr‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ‪ .‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܦ‪̣ rqq‬‬
‫ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ ܐܠ‪ 熏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ⟩ܗ̣ܘܐ⟨ ܦ‪r‬ܚ ܗ̣ܘܐ‪ .‬ܦ‪ rqr‬ܗ̣ܘ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܗܢ‪ 焏‬ܐܕ‪焏r‬‬ ‫‪15‬‬
‫ܕܕܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܕܒ‪r‬ܘ‪q‬ܒ‪̇ 焏‬ܗܘܐ ܕܡܠ‪r‬ܐ‪̣ .‬ܡ‪̇ 爯‬ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܬܠ‪r‬ܐ ܕܐܡ‪爯qrq‬܉‬
‫ܐܦ ܒ‪煿‬ܕܐ܉ ܕܗܢ‪ 焏‬ܒ‪q‬ܠ‪熟‬ܒ‪ 爯‬ܐܘ ‪rr‬ܪܐ ܐܘ ܕܓܠ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܡ‪熏r‬ܕܥ‪̇ .‬ܗܢ‪熏‬ܢ ܕ‪爯q‬‬
‫ܘܠ‪ 煟q 焏‬ܡܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܡ‪熏r‬ܕܥ ܥ‪̣ 煟q 爏‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܗܠ‪ .爯q‬ܘܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܥ‪ 爏‬ܦ‪rr熏‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܐܕ̈‪焏r‬‬
‫‪102v‬‬
‫̈‬
‫ܕܕܠܩ‪熏‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܬܐ ܣܦܩ‪| .爯‬‬

‫‪§ 99‬‬ ‫ܢ‪焏‬ܡ‪ r‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕܐܦ ܡܢ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪熏r‬ܕܥ‪ 焏‬ܒ‪r‬ܬ ܩܠ‪ 焏‬ܗܕܐ ܕܩ‪q煟‬ܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܡ‪r‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܐ‬ ‫‪20‬‬
‫ܗ‪ 爏qq‬ܩ‪q煟‬ܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܒ‪q‬ܡ‪̈ 焏r‬ܙܢ‪ .焏q‬ܗܢ‪ 熏‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܒ‪熟‬ܒܢ‪ .焏‬ܘܒ‪qq‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܘܒܣ‪煟‬ܪܐ‪.‬‬
‫ܘܒ‪qq‬ܣ‪ 焏‬ܕܪܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ‪ .‬ܘܒ̇‪煿‬ܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪熏r 煟q‬ܐ ܥ‪ 爟‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܢܩ‪ 牯q‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܩܢ‪熏‬ܡ‪.煿‬‬
‫ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕܐܦ ‪̣ 煟q 爏q‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܐܕ̈‪⟩ 焏r‬ܗܠ‪ ⟨爯q‬ܢ‪煟qr‬ܥ ܓܠ‪ rq焏q‬ܒܡܠ‪r‬ܐ܉‬
‫ܐܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܥܠ‪煿q‬ܘܢ ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪̣ 煟q .焏‬ܡ‪̇ 爯‬ܗܘ ܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪ 焏q‬ܡ‪qrr‬ܢ‪ .爯‬ܕܒ‪熟‬ܒܢ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪焏q熟qr‬‬
‫ܩ‪q煟‬ܡ‪熏‬ܬܗ‪.‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬

‫‪§ 100‬‬ ‫ܐܡ‪qr‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܗ‪ 爏qq‬ܕܩ‪ 爟q煟‬ܒ‪熟‬ܒܢ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܠܡ‪煟‬ܡ܉ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܩ‪ rqr‬ܘܥ‪犟qr‬‬
‫̣ܡ‪q 爯‬ܒ‪r‬ܗ‪ .‬ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܩ‪熏rqr‬ܬܐ ܡ‪r‬ܩ‪ 焏qr‬ܩ‪q煟‬ܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܕܨ̈ܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܐ‪q‬ܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܕܢܦ‪r‬‬
‫ܐ̈ܢ‪ .爯q‬ܘܥ‪qr‬ܩ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܩ‪q煟‬ܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܕܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܘܕܐ‪q‬ܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܢܦ‪ r‬ܐ‪爯q煿qrq‬‬

‫ܣ‪熏‬ܩ‪r‬ܛ ‪2 alterum‬‬ ‫ܣ‪熏‬ܩ‪r‬ܛ ‪8‬‬ ‫ܕܣ‪熏‬ܩ ‪12‬‬ ‫ܡ‪] 爏q‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܦ‪ ‖ rqq‬ܕܣ‪熏‬ܩ‪14 r‬‬
‫‪ (etiam P.107v6); em. ex L.58va32 15 suppl. ex L.58va34/P.107v7 23 suppl. ex‬ܕܦ‪rq̮q‬‬
‫ܡܢ‪q‬ܒ‪r‬ܗ ‪; em. ex L.59ra18/P.108r9 27‬ܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪rq‬ܗ ]ܩ‪q煟‬ܡ‪熏‬ܬܗ ‪L.59ra13/P.108r7 25‬‬
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 163

those three are not in a statement but in objects. For if someone says:
“Socrates writes”, “Socrates does not write”, this one expresses an opposition
that is in a statement. But if someone says: sight or blindness, heat or
cold, or right and left, he states that their essences are objects and not
the construction of a statement. Therefore, the latter kind of opposition is
distinct from the former (three), as we also have said, in that the latter is in
words, whereas the essence of the former ones is in concrete objects. But
if someone would assert that what is announced here by the construction
of a statement, namely “Socrates writes”, that this is also (an expression for)
an object and not only a word that does not signify anything, also to him
we say that not all the constructions of a statement signify objects. Because
occasionally a statement is construed regarding things that are not actual. As
if someone says: “Socrates flies” or “every man writes”, for neither the former
nor the latter is actual, because by no means does every man exist, and even
if he were existing he would not be writing. In the way that neither Socrates
is present (anymore), as he has passed away long ago, and not even if he
⟨were⟩ present would he fly. This kind of opposition that comes about in the
construction of a statement is distinct from those three mentioned also in
this respect: this one always signifies either truth or falsity, but none of those
(three) signifies any of these. This may suffice concerning the distinctions of
the kinds of opposition.

[Priority and posteriority]

We will also tell what this word priority signifies. Now, priority is said in five § 99
ways, namely in time, and by nature, and in sequence, and in the order of
greatness, and in that which, being equal to something, (that) one’s being is
attendant on it. In order that also each and every one of ⟨these⟩ kinds will
be recognized clearly in the discourse, we discuss them as follows, starting
with the first one, whose priority is observed in time.

Now, we say that something is prior to another thing in time, which is older § 100
or more ancient than its counterpart. However, agedness is called priority
of objects that are animate, and ancientness is called priority of those that
 164 chapter 7

‫ܘܐ‬煿‫ ܕ̣ܗܘ܉ ܘܢ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܐ‬焏‫ܒܢ‬熟‫ܡ ܒ‬煟‫ ܕܡ‬焏q‫ܘܐ ܗܘ‬煿‫ ܕܢ‬爏qq‫ ܗ‬焏‫ ܡ‬.焏qr‫ܩ‬r‫ܡ‬
焏‫ܒܢ‬熟‫܇ ܒ‬焏‫ܢ‬煿‫ ܠ‬爟q煟‫ ̇ܗܘ ܕܩ‬r‫ܐܡ‬r‫ ܡ‬爯q煟q‫ܪܗ܉ ܗ‬r‫ ܕܒ‬焏‫ܒܢ‬熟‫ ܒ‬焏‫ܢ‬rq‫ܡ ܐ‬煟‫ܡ‬
.焏‫ ܙܒܢ‬爯‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܢܣܒ‬r‫ܬܐ ܡ‬熏‫ܡ‬q煟‫̇ܗܘ ܕܩ‬

§ 101 ‫ܘܗܝ܇‬rq‫ܘܐ ܐ‬煿‫ ܢ‬煟q‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܡ܉ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‬煟‫ ܠܡ‬爟q煟‫ܡ ܕܩ‬煟‫ ܡ‬r‫ܐܡ‬r‫ ܡ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬rq焏‫ܢ‬qq
‫ܘܐ‬煿‫ ܢ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬煟q ‫܇‬煿‫ ܠ‬爟q煟‫ ܕܩ‬r‫ܐܡ‬r‫ ܕܡ‬焏‫ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‬煿‫ܠ ܥܡ‬熏‫ܐ ܕܢܥ‬犏‫ ܐܠ‬焏‫ܠ‬ 5
rq‫ ܐܢܓ‬.焏q‫ܣ‬熏‫ܬܐ ܘܣ‬熏qq‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܢ‬熟q‫ ܐ‬.‫ ̇ܗܘ‬qqrr‫ ܕܢ‬q‫܉ ܐܢܢܩ‬焏‫ܘܗܝ ܗܢ‬rq‫ܐ‬
‫ ܐܦ‬rq‫ܘܐ ܐ‬煿‫ܘܣ ܕܢ‬r‫ ܦ‬爏q 爯‫ܐ ̣ܡ‬犏‫ ܐܠ‬焏‫ܬܐ܉ ܠ‬熏qq rq‫ܬܗܘܐ ܐ‬
‫ ܬܗܘܐ‬焏‫ ܕܠ‬焏‫ܪܣ‬熏‫ ܦ‬rq‫܉ ܠ‬焏q‫ܣ‬熏‫ ܣ‬rq‫ܘܐ⟨ ܐ‬煿‫ ⟩ܢ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬煟q .焏q‫ܣ‬熏‫ܣ‬
‫ ܕܬܗܘܐ‬rq‫ ܙܕܩ ܓ‬.rq焏‫ܢ‬qq 焏‫ܡ‬q煟‫ܬܐ ܩ‬熏qq 爯q煟‫ ܡ‬.‫ܬܐ‬熏qq ‫⟨ ܐܦ‬rq‫⟩ܐ‬
‫ܬܐ‬熏̈qq‫ ܕ‬焏qrr‫ ܘܠ‬焏‫ܠܒ‬q‫ ܘܠ‬焏q‫ܣ‬熏‫ ܠܣ‬焿‫ ܬܬܦܠ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܬܐ⟨܉ ܘܗ‬熏qq⟩ 煿̇qrq‫ܐ‬ 10
.‫ܐ‬rq‫ܢ‬rq‫ܐ‬

§ 102 rq‫ܡ‬煟‫ ܩ‬爟q‫ܬܣ‬r‫ ܕܢ‬焏‫ܡ܉ ܡ‬煟‫ܡ ܠܡ‬煟‫ ܡ‬爟q煟‫ ܕܩ‬r‫ܐܡ‬r‫ܪܐ ܬܘܒ ܡ‬煟‫ܒܣ‬
103r ‫̇ܡ‬焏‫ ܕ̇ܗܘ ܕܩ‬焏‫ܢ‬熟q‫ | ܐ‬.焏‫ܒܢ‬熟‫ ܒ‬煿‫ ܒ‬煟q 煿‫ܡ ܒ‬煟‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܢ‬rq‫ܕܪ ܐ‬r‫ܪܗ ܢܣ‬r‫ܘܒ‬
‫ܐ‬rq‫ܥ‬r‫ܐ܉ ܐܘ ܕܬ‬r‫ܡ‬焏‫ܢ ܕܡ‬熏q‫ܐܘܡ‬r‫ ܦ‬qq‫ܡ܉ ܘܐ‬煟‫ܐ ܡ‬熏‫ ܕܓ‬焏rqr‫ܒ‬
̈ q煟‫ܢ ܕܩ‬r‫ܐܡ‬r‫ܪܐ ܡ‬煟‫ ܒܣ‬爯q‫ ܗܠ‬qq‫ ܘܕܐ‬rq‫ ܓ‬爯q‫ܐ ܕܗܝ܉ ܗܠ‬煟q‫ܐ‬
.爯 ‫ܡ‬ 15
̣
§ 103 焏q‫ ܕ̈ܡܠ‬焏‫ܢ‬熟q‫ ܐ‬.‫ܢ‬r‫ܩ‬q‫ ܘܡ‬爯qrqr‫ ܕ‬爯q‫ܠ‬q‫ ܐ‬爯‫̈ܡ‬q煟‫ܬܐ ܩ‬熏‫ܒ‬r‫ ܘܒ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܣ‬qq‫ܒ‬
.爯q‫ ܗܠ‬qq‫ܐ ܕܐ‬rq‫ܢ‬rq‫ ܘܐ‬焏‫ܢ‬熏qr‫ܘܐ‬

§ 104 爟q̇‫ ܠ‬.‫ܐ‬煟q‫ ܠܥ‬牟q煟q 焏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܗ‬qq‫ ܕܐ‬熏‫ܬܐ܉ ܠ‬熏‫ܡ‬q煟‫ ܕܩ‬焏qrq‫ܡ‬q ‫ ̇ܗܘ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܙܢ‬
rq‫ ܓ‬爯‫ ܐܦ‬.‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܠ‬q‫ ܕ‬rq‫ܐ‬rqrq 煿̇qrq‫ܐ ܕ̣ܗܝ ܕܐ‬煟q‫ܬܐ ܐ‬熏q‫ܠ‬q‫ ܕ‬爏q‫⟨ ܠ‬爯q‫⟩ܕ‬
‫ܪܗ‬r‫ ܘܒ‬煿‫ ܠ‬焏‫ܦ‬q‫ ܢܩ‬焏‫܉ ܐܠ‬煿‫ ܒ‬煿̇qrq‫ ܕܐ‬焏‫ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‬爟‫ܬܐ ܥ‬熏q‫ܠ‬q‫ ܕ‬焏q熏r 20
.煿̇qrq‫ܐ ܕܐ‬r‫ܐܡ‬r‫ܡ‬

§ 105 ‫ܥ‬煟‫ܬܐ܉ ܙܕܩ ܠܡ‬熏‫ܡ‬q煟‫ ܕܩ‬爯‫ ܠ‬熏q熏q‫ ܐܬ‬爯q‫ ܗܠ‬焏q‫ ̈ܙܢ‬焏r‫ܡ‬q‫ ܕ‬爏qq‫ ܗ‬爏q‫ܡ‬
煟q 爏q rq‫ ܓ‬爏‫ܩܒ‬熏‫ ܠ‬.‫ܘܢ‬煿qrq‫ ܐ‬焏r‫ܡ‬q ‫ܬܐ‬熏qrq‫ ܕܐ‬煿̇qr̈‫ܕܐܦ ܐܕ‬
.‫ܬܐ‬熏qrq‫ ܕܐ‬焏r̈ ‫ ܐܦ ܐܕ‬rq‫ ܗܝ ܕܐ‬焏‫ܥ‬煟q‫ܬܐ܉ ܐ‬熏‫ܡ‬q煟‫ ܕܩ‬煿̇qr̈‫ ܐܕ‬爯‫̣ܡ‬
̇煿‫ܬܐ⟨܉ ܘܡܢ‬熏qrq‫ܐ ⟩ܐ‬r‫ܐܡ‬r‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܒܢ‬熟‫ ܬܘܒ ܒ‬煿̇‫ܢ ܐܦ ܡܢ‬熏‫ܓ‬煟‫ܘܒ‬ 25
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܦ‬q‫ ܒܢܩ‬煿̇‫ ܘܡܢ‬.‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܒ‬r‫ ܘܒ‬焏‫ܣ‬qq‫ ܒ‬煿̇‫ ܘܡܢ‬.‫ܪܐ‬煟‫ ܒܣ‬煿̇‫ ܘܡܢ‬.rq焏‫ܢ‬qq
.‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܠ‬q‫ܕܕ‬

8 suppl. ex L.59rb13/P.108v2 9 suppl. ex L.59rb15/P.108v3 10 suppl. ex P.108v4, (etiam

L.59rb18f. om.) 14 ‫ܐ‬r‫ܥ‬qr‫ ܕܬ‬sic!; em. ex P.108v10, (L.59rb30: ‫ܐ‬rq‫ܥ‬r‫)ܬ‬ 19 suppl.
ex L.59va4/P.108v16 20 煿̇‫ ;ܒ‬em. ex L.59va9/P.108v18 22 scriptor exp. ‫ ̣ܗܝ‬焏‫ܥ‬q煟q
焏r̈‫ ܐܕ‬rq‫ ܐܦ ܐ‬rq‫ ܕܐ‬ante ‫ܙܕܩ‬, (etiam L.59va32/P.109r4 om.) 25 suppl. ex P.109r8,
(L.59vb4: ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܢ‬rq‫)ܐ‬ 25–26 煿̇‫ ܘܡܢ‬.‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܒ‬r‫ ܘܒ‬焏‫ܣ‬qq‫ ܒ‬煿̇‫ ܘܡܢ‬.rq焏‫ܢ‬qq 煿̇‫ܘܡܢ‬
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܦ‬q‫ ܒܢܩ‬煿̇‫ ܘܡܢ‬.‫ܪܐ‬煟‫ ;ܒܣ‬em. ex L.59vb5 f./P.109r8 f.
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 165

are inanimate. When therefore the being of a thing comes about in any time
whatsoever and another thing comes about in the time after that, then the
former is called prior to the latter, at the point when priority is conceived
from time.

A thing is by nature said to be prior to another thing: that which when it § 101
exists, it is not necessary that what it is said to be prior to, comes along with
it, but when this latter exists, it is necessary that the former is found, as for
example animal and horse. For if there is ‘animal’, it is by no means necessary
that there is also ‘horse’, but when ⟨there⟩ is ‘horse’, there is no way that there
⟨is⟩ not ‘animal’ too. Hence, animal is by nature prior, for it is required that
there is ⟨‘animal’⟩, and then to be divided into horse, into dog, and into the
rest of the other animals.

Again, in sequence one thing is said to be prior to another thing, when it is § 102
placed at first and after it another thing is arranged at the same time, as for
example that which stands at any general beginning, and like a preface of a
treatise or of any narration whatsoever. For these and the like are said to be
prior in sequence.

In order and in greatness are those prior who are leading and venerable, as § 103
for example kings and rulers, and others like these.

The fifth kind (zənā) of priority is not known like this in common usage, § 104
⟨but⟩ it embraces every property whatsoever, which is truly a property. For
although a property is equal with that in which it is, yet it is attendant on it
and is said to be after it.

As we now have presented these five ways of priority, it is required to know § 105
that also the kinds of posteriority are five. For it is obvious that against each
and every one of the kinds of priority there is also a kind of posteriority. Thus,
of these one is called ⟨posteriority⟩ in time, and one by nature, and one in
sequence, and one in order and in greatness, and one in the adherence of a
property.
 ‫‪166‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫‪§ 106‬‬ ‫ܬܘܒ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܐܦ ܥ‪ 爏‬ܡ‪r‬ܬܙ‪q‬ܥܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ܉ ̇ܣܦ‪ 犟‬ܠ‪ q‬ܗ‪ 焏r‬ܠܡ‪r‬ܡ‪ 牟‬ܘܠ‪爯‬‬
‫ܠܡ‪焏‬ܡ‪ r‬ܠ‪熏‬ܬܟ‪ .‬ܕ‪熏r 爏q‬ܓܢ‪ 焏q‬ܐ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕ̣ܗܘ܉ ܙܘܥ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ‬
‫ܡ‪ 爯‬ܠܥ‪ 爏‬ܥ‪熏r 爏‬ܓܢ‪:焏q‬‬
‫ܘܡ‪r‬ܬܙ‪q‬ܥܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܡ‪rr‬ܡ‪ .煿‬ܡ‪ 爯q煟‬ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕܐܡ‪r‬ܢ‪̣ 爯‬‬
‫ܕܡܢ‪ 煿‬ܒ‪焏‬ܘܣ‪̇ 焏q‬ܗܘܐ ܘܡ‪r‬ܩ‪r‬ܐ ܗܘ‪ 焏q‬ܘ‪q‬ܒܠ‪焏‬܉ ܡܢ‪ 煿‬ܒ‪q‬ܡ‪熏q‬ܬܐ‬
‫̇ܓ‪煟‬ܫ܉ ܘܡ‪rr‬ܡ‪ 煿‬ܬܪܒ‪rq‬ܐ ܘܒ‪rq犏‬ܘܬܐ܉ ܡܢ‪ 煿‬ܒ‪熟‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܩ‪ 爟q‬ܘܡ‪r‬ܩ‪r‬ܐ‬ ‫‪5‬‬
‫‪q熏r‬ܠܦ‪ .焏‬ܘܙܘܥ‪ 焏‬ܕ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܕܘ‪ 焏q‬ܠ‪煟‬ܘ‪̇ :焏q‬ܙܕܩ ܠ‪ 爯‬ܕܐܦ ܥ‪ 爏‬ܡ‪r‬ܬܙ‪q‬ܥܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ܉‬
‫ܠ‪ 煟q 爯q煿‬ܠ‪ 爯q煿‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܕܐܬܐܡ‪r‬ܘ ܥ‪熏r 爏‬ܓܢ‪ 焏q‬ܠܡܣ‪.焯‬‬

‫‪103v § 107‬‬ ‫ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪ 爏q‬ܕܥ‪q 爏‬ܠ‪煿‬ܘܢ ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܐܕ‪熏̈r‬ܗܝ | ܕ‪熏r‬ܓܢ‪ 焏q‬ܐܡ‪r‬ܢ‪̣ 爯‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܠܥ‪爏‬‬
‫ܣܦܩ‪ .rq焏‬ܘܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ ܥ‪⟩ 爏‬ܗܢ‪ 煟q ⟨焏‬ܕܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ ܙܘܥ‪ 焏‬ܕ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܕܘ‪ 焏q‬ܠ‪煟‬ܘ‪焏q‬‬
‫ܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܠܦܢ‪ :爯‬ܐ‪q‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܙܕܩ ܥܠ‪熏‬ܗܝ ܕܗܢ‪ 焏‬ܢ‪焏‬ܡ‪ r‬ܗ‪ 煟q 焏r‬ܡܦܠܓ‪q‬ܢ‪ 爯‬ܠ‪煿‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬
‫ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ 爏q .焏‬ܙܘܥ‪ 焏‬ܕ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܕܘ‪ 焏q‬ܠ‪煟‬ܘ‪̇ 焏q‬ܗܘܐ܉ ܡܢ‪ 煿‬ܒ‪熏q‬ܕܪܐ ܡ‪rqr‬ܟ܉‬
‫ܘܡܢ‪ 煿‬ܬܪ‪犏q‬ܐ‪ rq‬ܡ‪r‬ܬܙ‪ .牟q‬ܐܠ‪ 焏‬ܐܦ ̇ܗܘ ܕ̇ܗܘܐ ܒ‪熏q‬ܕܪܐ܉ ܡܢ‪ 煿‬ܠ‪q‬ܠ‪煿‬‬
‫ܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ̇ܗܘܐ ܒ‪ 煿‬ܡ‪̣ 牟q熟‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܐܬܪܐ ܠ‪焏‬ܬܪܐ܉ ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܓ‪q‬ܓܠ‪焏‬‬
‫ܕܥܓܠ‪r‬ܐ ‪ 煟q‬ܡ‪r‬ܬܙ‪q‬ܥ‪ 焏‬ܒ‪熏q‬ܕܪܐ ܡ‪q‬ܠܦ‪ 焏‬ܕܘ‪rq‬ܐ‪ .‬ܘܡܢ‪ 煿‬ܥ‪ 爏‬ܕܘ‪rq‬ܗ‬
‫ܥܒ‪ ⟨煟‬ܕܢ‪̈r‬ܢ‪̣ 爯q‬ܡ‪爯‬‬
‫ܡ‪ 牟q熟‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܠܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕ̇ܗܘܐ ܒ‪ 煟q .煿‬ܡܢ̈‪熏‬ܬܗ ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ ⟩ ̇‬ ‫‪15‬‬
‫ܕܘ‪ 焏q‬ܠ‪煟‬ܘ‪焏q‬܇ ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܓ‪r熏‬ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܡ‪熏‬ܙܠ‪r‬ܐ ܕ‪q 煟q‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܒ‪焏‬ܬܪܗ ܐ‪rq‬ܘܗܝ‬
‫ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ̇‪r‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܠ‪煟‬ܘ‪rq‬ܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܬܐ܉ ܡܢ̈‪熏‬ܬܗ ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ ̈ܡ‪q‬ܠܦ‪ 爯‬ܐܬܪܐ ܒ‪煿‬‬
‫ܒ‪熏q‬ܕܪܐ܇ ‪ 煟q‬ܕܢ̈‪ 爯q‬ܘ‪ 煟q‬ܗܘ̈‪ 爯q‬ܠܥ‪̣ 爏‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܪ‪ 爯rq‬ܘ‪ 煟q‬ܥ‪r‬ܒ‪ .爯‬ܘܪ‪ 焏qq‬ܬܘܒ ܒ̇‪煿‬‬
‫ܒ‪煟‬ܡ‪熏‬ܬܐ܉ ܥ‪ 煟q 爏‬ܣ‪r‬ܢ‪̇ 焏‬ܩ‪ 焏qq‬ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܢ‪̣ 焏q‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܐܬܪܐ ܠ‪焏‬ܬܪܐ܇ ‪煟q‬‬
‫ܡܢ̈‪熏‬ܬ̇ܗ ܒ‪q‬ܠ‪熟‬ܒ‪ 爯‬ܐ‪煟q̈q‬ܢ ܕܘ‪rq‬ܐ ܐ‪rq‬ܬܐ ܘܐ‪rq‬ܬܐ ܒ‪ 煿‬ܒ‪熏q‬ܕܪܐ‪ .‬ܙܘܥ‪焏‬‬ ‫‪20‬‬
‫ܕ‪̇ 爯q‬ܗܘ ܕ̇ܗܘܐ ܬܪ‪犏q‬ܐ‪rq‬܉ ܘܐܦ̣‪煿‬ܘ ܬܘܒ ܡ‪r‬ܦܠ‪ 焿‬ܠ‪rr‬ܐ ̈ܙܢ‪ .焏q‬ܐܘ ܓ‪rq‬‬
‫ܠܥ‪ 爏‬ܡ‪ 牟q熟‬ܠ‪ 煿‬ܠ̇‪煿‬ܘ ܡ‪ 焏‬ܕܡ‪r‬ܬܙ‪ 牟q‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܢ‪熏‬ܪܐ܉ ܐܘ ܠ‪ rqr‬ܡ‪牟q熟‬‬
‫ܠ‪ 煿‬ܐ‪̈ qq‬ܡ‪焏q‬܉ ܐܘ ܠ‪̣ 煟q‬ܡ‪ 爯‬ܣ‪rq‬ܐ܇ ܐ‪熟q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܕܠ‪q‬ܡ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܐܘ ܠܣܡܠ‪ .焏‬ܐܘ‬
‫ܐ‪ qq‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܕܡ‪熟‬ܕܢ‪̣ 犟‬ܡ‪qq 爯‬ܠ‪焏‬܉ ܐܘ ܠܩ‪熏‬ܕܡ‪ 焏‬ܐܘ ܠܒܣ‪r‬ܪܐ ܡ‪r‬ܬܙ‪ .牟q‬ܐܘ‬
‫ܐ‪̇ qq‬ܗܘ ܕܡ‪煿‬ܠ‪⟩ q‬ܠܩ‪熏‬ܕܡ‪ .⟨煿‬ܐܘ ܐ‪ qq‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܕܡ‪r‬ܕܒ‪ r‬ܠܒܣ‪r‬ܪܗ‪.‬‬ ‫‪25‬‬

‫‪ (etiam L.60rb1); em. ex‬ܒ‪熟‬ܒܢ‪] 焏‬ܒ‪熟‬ܢ‪; em. ex L.60ra36/P.109v9 ‖ 焏‬ܪܒ‪熏‬ܬܐ ]ܬܪܒ‪rq‬ܐ ‪5‬‬
‫)‪P.109v10 (cf. P.102v6‬‬ ‫‪9 suppl. ex L.60rb12/P.109v14‬‬ ‫‪ post‬ܒܓ‪q‬ܓܠ‪14 scriptor exp. 焏‬‬
‫‪; em. ex‬ܘܡܢ̇‪ (cf. L.60rb29/P.109v20) ‖ 煿‬ܡ‪q‬ܠܦ‪ supra 焏‬ܒ‪熏q‬ܕܪܐ ‪ et scripsit‬ܡ‪r‬ܬܙ‪q‬ܥ‪焏‬‬
‫‪; em. ex L.60rb39/P.109v23‬ܒ‪焏‬ܬܪܐ ‪L.60rb30/P.109v21 15 suppl. ex L.60rb34/P.109v22 16‬‬
‫‪; em. ex L.60va2/P.109v24‬ܡ‪q̈r‬ܠܦ‪17 爯‬‬ ‫̣̇ܩ‪19 焏qܵq‬‬ ‫‪; em. ex L.60va22, P lac.‬ܘܠܣܡܠ‪23 焏‬‬
‫)‪; em. ex L.60va24 25 add., (deest etiam L.60va26, P lac.‬ܠܩ‪煟‬ܡ‪] 焏‬ܠܩ‪熏‬ܕܡ‪24 焏‬‬
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 167

[On motion]

Once again on motion. It is now sufficient for you to hear and for us to tell § 106
you that every change whatsoever is a movement and is named motion.
Since we above have already spoken about change—that some of it occurs
in substance and is called generation and destruction; some of it appears in
quantity and is named increase and decrease; some of it subsists in quality
and is called alteration; and (lastly) movement from one place to another—
it is required of us to derive also regarding motion the same things that were
said about change.

But since we have sufficiently spoken above about all the modes of change, § 107
and we did not teach only about ⟨this⟩ one that is movement from one place
to another [i.e. locomotion], we will now discuss this one, as it is suited to it,
by dividing it as follows: every movement that comes about from one place
to another, some of it rolls in rotation and some of it moves straight ahead.
But also the one that take place in rotation, some of it causes the whole body
in which it occurs to move from a space to another, as for example the wheel
of a wagon when it moves in rotation (the whole wagon) changes place; and
some of it causes the body in which it occurs to move on its spot, while it
⟨makes⟩ only its parts to depart from one place to another, as for example a
celestial body, as the whole of it is in its space [i.e. its sphere] and does not
depart to another place, (while) only its parts change space in rotation, when
they rise and when they occur above our head and when they set. Again, in
the same way a mill is spinning about an axis and it does not depart from
a space to another, while its parts are always occupying a different place in
the rotation. The movement that occurs straight ahead, in turn is divided
into six kinds. For either it causes what is moving to move upwards as fire, or
it causes it to move downwards as water, or towards one of the directions as
for example to the right or to the left, or as something that is driven away by
a force, it moves either forwards or backwards, either as the one who walks
⟨forwards⟩, or as something that is dragged backwards.
 ‫‪168‬‬ ‫‪chapter 7‬‬

‫‪§ 108‬‬ ‫ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܗ‪ 爏qq‬ܐ̃ܘ ܦ‪q‬ܠ‪r‬ܐܘܣ ܐ‪ qq‬ܕܐ‪ 爯qrr‬ܒ‪煟q̈焏‬ܝ ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܥ‪熏‬ܕܪܢ‪ 煿‬ܕܡ‪r‬ܢ‬
‫ܪ‪r‬ܡ‪ r‬ܠ‪q‬܉ ܥ‪ 爏‬ܦ‪熏‬ܠ̈ܓ‪ 煿̇q‬ܘ‪q̈q‬ܣ‪ 煿̇q‬ܘ̈ܙܢ‪ 煿̇q‬ܕܦ‪q‬ܠܣ‪熏‬ܦ‪熏‬ܬܐ ‪qq‬ܢ‪rq‬ܐ‬
‫ܘܕܐܘܡܢ‪熏‬ܬܐ ܡܠ‪q‬ܠ‪r‬ܐ‪ .‬ܐܢ̣‪煿‬ܘ ܕ‪ 爯q‬ܕܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ‪q‬ܣ‪rq‬ܢ‪r .‬ܦ‪rq‬ܘ ܕܢ‪r‬ܬܪܨ‬
‫‪104r‬‬ ‫ܒ‪熏q‬ܒ‪ 焏‬ܘܢ‪rr‬ܡܠ‪ 焏‬ܒ‪qr‬ܡ‪r‬ܐ ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܪܘ‪q‬ܢ‪ 焏‬ܘܥ‪煟‬ܠ‪焏q‬܇ | ‪̣ rqrq‬ܡ‪̇ 爯‬ܗܝ ܕܠ‪熏‬ܬ‬
‫ܥ‪煟‬ܠ‪ 煿̇q‬ܕܡܠ‪r‬ܐ ܢ‪r‬ܗܛ܇ ܘܠ‪犏‬ܘ‪rqq‬ܐ ܕܐܡ‪熏‬ܪ̇ܗ ܢܣ‪r‬ܪܗܒ‪̇ .‬ܙܕܩ ܠ‪ 爯‬ܓ‪rq‬‬ ‫‪5‬‬
‫ܕܢ‪r‬ܒ‪ 爯q‬ܕ‪q‬ܠ‪q 爯‬ܣ‪rq‬ܝ ̣ܡ‪熏r 爯‬ܡܠ‪ 焏q‬ܕ‪qq‬ܡ‪r‬ܐ ܐ‪ .爯qrq‬ܘܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕ ܕ‪ 煟q 爯q‬ܗ̣ܘ‬
‫ܡ‪r‬ܡܠ‪ 焏q‬ܒܠ‪熏q‬ܕܘܗܝ܇ ܕ̣ܡ‪̇ 爏q 爯‬ܘܠ‪ 焏‬ܕܢ‪rr‬ܒ‪ .q‬ܕܠ‪ 爏q‬ܐ‪ qq‬ܕ̇ܨܒ‪ 焏‬ܘܐ‪qq‬‬
‫ܕ̇ܒܥ‪ 焏‬ܡܦܠ‪ 焿‬ܘ‪煿̇q‬ܒ ̣ܡ‪熏r 爯‬ܡܠ‪ 焏q‬ܕ‪qq‬ܡ‪r‬ܗ‪ .‬ܕ‪ 煟q‬ܒ‪ 煟q‬ܡ‪熏‬ܗܒ‪r‬ܐ ܕܡܢ‪煿‬‬
‫ܥ‪qq 爏‬ܡ‪r‬ܗ ܡ‪rr‬ܥ‪爯q‬܉ ܙܕܩ‪r rq焏‬ܡܥ‪ 煟q 煟q 爏q 爯q‬ܡܢ‪煿‬ܘܢ܇ ܕܡܢ‪ 焏‬ܐ‪rq‬‬
‫ܠ‪ q‬ܕܠ‪ 焏‬ܢܣܒ݁‪ .r‬ܘܐܢ ܢܣܒ݁‪r‬܉ ܥ‪ 爏‬ܡܢ‪ 焏‬ܡ‪rr‬ܒ‪煿‬ܪ ܐܢ‪r‬܇ ܐ‪̇ qq‬ܗܘ ܕܠ‪焏‬‬ ‫‪10‬‬
‫ܢܣܒ݁‪.r‬‬

‫܀ ‪r‬ܠ‪ 爟‬ܣ‪r‬ܓ‪ 爿q‬܀‬

‫‪§ 109‬‬ ‫‪ṙ 煟q‬ܠ‪ 爟‬ܐܢ‪ 焏‬ܠܡܠ‪r‬ܗ ܕܣ‪r‬ܓ‪ 爿q‬ܐܪ‪rqqq‬ܘܣ܆ ܥ‪ 爏‬ܠ‪q‬ܣ̈‪ 爿q‬ܗܠ‪ 爯q‬ܐ‪rqrq‬ܐ‬
‫ܕܒ‪ 爯q煿‬ܐܣ‪ qqr‬ܡ‪焏‬ܡ‪r‬ܗ܉ ̇ܣ‪焏‬ܡ ܐܢ‪ 焏‬ܗܪ‪ 焏q‬ܠ‪煟q‬ܐ ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܡ‪r‬ܓܢ‪rq‬ܗ‬
‫ܕܢ‪rq煿‬ܐ ܪܒ‪ 焏‬ܕܬܒ‪ .爏q‬ܕܬܐܕܘܪܘܣ ̇ܗܘ ܢܒܥ‪ 焏‬ܕ‪ .焏q̈q‬ܒܦ‪r熏‬ܩ‪ 焏‬ܕܒ‪rqr‬ܐ‪.‬‬ ‫‪15‬‬
‫ܣ‪̣ 爟‬ܗܘ ܒ‪焏‬ܓ‪r‬ܬܗ ܗ‪q‬ܢ‪ .焏‬ܡܢ‪ 焏‬ܬܘܒ ⟩ܒ‪rqr‬ܐ⟨‪ .‬ܒ‪rqr‬ܐ ̇ܡ‪̣ 爯‬ܗܝ ̣ܡ‪ 爯‬ܢܦ‪煿̇r‬‬
‫ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܠ‪ rq‬ܠ̇‪煿‬܇ ܐ̇ܡ‪ r‬ܢ‪rq煿‬ܐ ܪܒ‪ .焏‬ܐܠ‪ 爏q 焏‬ܡ‪煟‬ܡ ܕܐ‪ rq‬ܠ̇‪ 煿‬ܠ‪rq‬ܬܐ‬
‫ܡ‪̇ 爯‬ܗܘ ܕ̣ܗܘ ‪煿q‬ܒ ܠ̇‪ 煿‬ܒ‪qq‬ܒ‪熏‬ܬܗ ܕܬܗܘܐ‪.‬‬
‫ܩܢ‪r‬ܗ܇ ̣‬
‫܀ ‪r‬ܠ‪ 爟‬ܬܐܕܘܪܘܣ ܀‬

‫‪; emend.‬ܘܠ‪犏‬ܘ‪rq熏q‬ܐ ‪5‬‬ ‫‪16 add.‬‬

text and translation of sergius’ introduction 169

[The epilogue]

I have now described these things to you, O Philotheos, as it has been § 108
imparted in my hands [i.e. to me] by the aid of our Lord, concerning the
divisions, the orders, and the forms (zənayyā) of natural philosophy and of
the art of logic. But if these things lack something, it is appropriate that we
are corrected in love and completed in friendship without complaint and
criticism, rather than that we rush at the blame of the discourse and hasten
towards the insult of its speaker. It is proper for us to realize that we all have a
lack of perfection of wisdom, and one is only perfect in himself alone, whom
it becomes to be praised by all, (and) who to all, as he wants and as he wishes,
distributes and gives from the perfection of his wisdom, as they through the
gift from him talk about his wisdom. Each and every one among them shall
duly listen: “what do you have that you have not received, and if you have
received (it), why do you boast, as if you have not received (it).” (1 Cor. 4:7)

End of Sergius

When I finish the treatise of Sergius the chief physician about the final words § 109
(λέξεις) in which his treatise has ended, I present here one of the pearls of
the illustrious teacher of the world, of Theodore, the fount of life, in the
interpretation of the creation he wrote in his letter as follows: what is now
⟨the creation⟩? Creation is what by itself did not have anything, says the
illustrious teacher, but everything that it has, it has obtained afterwards from
the one who has granted it to come into being in his grace.

End of Theodore
170 chapter 7

7.1 Textual Notes

Comments to the Syriac text (by page and line number)

98.14/B.84r36 has 爯q煿q‫ܠ‬q‫ܕ‬. This is perhaps an analogous formation with
masculine plural suffixes: 爯q煿q̈‫ܠ‬q‫*ܕ‬, as e.g., 爯q煿q̈‫ܒ‬rq ‘their books’.

98.20/B.84v7 has 煿̇‫ ܕܒ‬.‫̇ܗ‬rqܵ‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܡ‬q熏‫ ܩ‬煿̇‫ ܠ‬rq‫‘ ܕܐ‬which [i.e. the object!] has
self-subsistence, through which’. Also P.20v7 has the same, and L.5rb33 has
煿‫ ܕܒ‬.‫̇ܗ‬rq‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܡ‬q‫ ܩ‬煿̇‫ ܠ‬rq‫ܕܐ‬. However, the dot above the ‫ ܗ‬in ‫̇ܗ‬rq‫ ܕ‬is
not the feminine marker, but rather the so called 焏q̈‫ܐ ܥܠ‬熟‫̈ܩ‬熏‫‘ ܢ‬high points’
(‫)܇‬, which erroneously also has caused 煿‫( ܠ‬and 煿‫ ܕܒ‬for B and P) to receive
the feminine marker. Also some other instances in the mss provide scope
for such confusion (see L.7rb28; L.14vb34; L.48va17/P.89r18; L.48va18/P.89r19;
P.20v9; P.29r3; P.103v20). Thus, the antecedent here is 焏r‫‘ ܐܕ‬species/form’
and not ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫‘ ܨܒ‬object’ or 焏q‫ܘ‬r‫‘ ܒ‬creator’.

98.20/B.84v8 has ‫ ܘܐܬ̤ܬ‬r ̤ ‫ܒܥ‬q‫ܐܬ‬, that is to say, with the East Syriac
markers for verbs inflected in 3 fem.sing.perf. In the text edited here, I have
changed it to ‫ܬ‬݀ ‫ ܘܐܬ‬r ݀ ‫ܒܥ‬q‫ܐܬ‬, the more standard way of marking this
function in Syriac. This change has been made many times, and will not be
noted further.

100.8/B.84v21 has ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ ܨ̈ܒ‬爯q‫ ܕܗܠ‬焏q‫ ܗܘ‬爏‫ܥ‬, while L.5va32f./P.20v21f. has

‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ ܕܨ̈ܒ‬爯q‫ܬܗ‬熏‫ܢ‬q̈‫ ܡ‬爏‫‘ ܥ‬about the possibilities of the objects’.

102.8/B.85r16 At a similar passage P.25r23 has rq‫ ܘܪ‬爟q煟‫ܕ̣̇ܩ‬.

102.24/B.85v2 We would expect ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܢ‬q‫ ܐ‬here as at B.85r5, but also George,

Bishop of the Arabs, uses this form for ‘quality’ at many places in his transla-
tion of the Categories, cf. also B.98v4. For more on this, see the commentary
to §12.

108.5/B.87v8 The occurrences of 爿qr‫ ܦ‬in L and P are:

B.87v8 = L.10va1 焏q‫ܣ‬r‫‘ ܦ‬Persian’. P.30v3 爿q‫ܪ‬焏‫‘ ܦ‬Paris’.

Charts in L and P L.11r 爿q‫ܪ‬焏‫‘ ܦ‬Paris’. P.31v 焏q‫ܣ‬r‫‘ ܦ‬Persian’.
B.86r2 = L.14va22 爿q‫ܪ‬焏‫‘ ܦ‬Paris’. P.35r12 爿q‫ܪ‬焏‫‘ ܦ‬Paris’.

For more on this, see the comm. to §21.

text and translation of sergius’ introduction 171

110.8/B.86r8 For 焏‫ܒ‬犏q‫ ܕ‬the parallel passage of the texts of L.14vb5/P.35r19

has 焏‫ܦ‬犏q‫( ܕ‬same meaning, < Akkadian ḫaṣbu). However, also in Sergius’
translation of On the Cosmos (Lat. De Mundo) we have the form 焏‫ܒ‬犏q for
the Greek πίθος (cf. De Mundo 145.11: 焏‫ܒ‬犏q‫ܘ‬, see also McCollum 2009: 139
and 234; as well as the Syriac version of Geoponica 16.10: 焏‫ܒ‬犏q‫ܒ‬, 17.3: ‫ܐ‬r‫ܡ‬q
焏‫̈ܒ‬犏q‫ܕܒ‬, 18.30: 焏‫̈ܒ‬犏q, and 46.11: 焏‫ܒ‬犏q‫ ܕ‬rr‫)ܒ‬. Note also the related 焏‫ܒ‬熟q
and 焏‫ܣܦ‬q; cf. Nöldeke, zdmg 40 (1886: 730) and Schwally, zdmg 52 (1898:
140).

114.7f./B.86v26 Although our ms has ‫ܐ‬r‫ ܕܡܠ‬焏‫ܠ‬qq qq‫ܐ‬, we prefer the

reading of L.16vb18/P.37v18, which seems to be Sergius’ usual construction;
cf. L.19va17f./P.68v16f.: 焏‫ ܗܢ‬焏‫ܠܓ‬熏‫ ܕܦ‬煿‫ܠ‬qq qq‫ ܐ‬and L.44vb16 f./P.83v21f.:
‫ ̇ܗܘ‬焏‫ܡ‬熏q‫ ܕܬ‬煿‫ܠ‬qq qq‫ܐ‬.

114.9/B.86v27–29 This last passage (焏r煟‫ ܓ‬焏‫ … ܐܠ‬爯‫ ܕܡ‬qq‫ )ܘܐ‬is a lit-
tle different in L.16vb18/P.37v18: 焏q‫ ܗܝ ܕܐܦ ܐܘܣ‬焏‫ܥ‬q煟q‫ ܕ‬爏q‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܐܠ‬
焏q‫ ̣ܗܝ ܐܘܣ‬煟q ‫ ̣ܗܝ‬焏q‫ ܐܘܣ‬煿̇‫ ܠ‬焏qqrr‫܉ ܡ‬爯‫ ܡܢ‬煟q 煟q 爏q ‫ܘܗܝ‬rq‫ܐ‬
‫ܘܐ‬煿‫ ܠܡ‬焏q犏‫ ܡ‬焏‫ ̇ܗܝ ܕܠ‬.焏r煟‫‘ ܘܓ‬but since it is obvious that each and
every one of us is also substance, it appears that substance at the same time
is both substance and accident, what is impossible to be’.

114.21/B.89r7 has ‫ܪ‬熏‫ ܙܥ‬焏‫ܕܠ‬, while L.30vb14/P.38v24 has ‫ܪ‬熏‫ܥ‬熟‫ ܒ‬焏‫ܕܠ‬, which
is Sergius’ usual form, cf. 114.25/B.89r12; L.14ra32/P.34v17; L.43rb3,6/P.81v4,5;
L.44vb16/P.83v21; and L.57vb25/P.106r15 (cf. also TS.1144). The form 焏‫ܕܠ‬
‫ܪ‬熏‫ܥ‬熟‫ ܒ‬occurs also in Sergius’ On the Influence of the Moon (煿‫ܩ‬/105.18).
ܵ
116.17/B.89r33 Here the ms has the vocalization ‫ܬܐ‬熏̣qr‫ܘ̣̇ܩ‬, which was repro-
duced by Hoffmann (H.208a21), but most dictionaries have the vocalization
ܵ ܵ
‫ܬܐ‬熏̣qr‫ ܩ‬for thisܵ word, except Manna (1900: 353) who has both forms, sug-
gesting that ‫ ݂ܬܐ‬熏̣qr‫ ̣̇ܩ‬is an East Syriac form, although in the edited East
ܵ ܵ
Syriac Bible the form ‫ ݂ܬܐ‬熏̣qr‫ ܩ‬is given (Lev. 13:42–43). Hebrew has ‫ ָק ַרַחת‬and
ܵ
therefore this variant vocalization ‫ ݂ܬܐ‬熏̣qr‫ ̣̇ܩ‬may reflect the Hebrew form as
in Lev. 13:42,43,55.

118.18/B.88r4 Here L.32va14/P.40r9 has 爿q煟q‫ܒ‬q‫ܠܩ‬焏‫ ܘܠ‬Ἀλκιβιάδης Alcibiades

(cf. David In Isag. 65.24f.). On a couple of other places (L.37rb1/P.46r6 =
B91r1 and L.37rb20/P.46r15 = B.91r7) he has exchanged Alcibiades for Plato
and not Socrates; but at B.91v24 = L.37va26 he has exchanged Aristotle
for Aristophanes (Ἀριστοφάνης 爿q‫ܦܢ‬熏q‫ܣ‬q‫ܐܪ‬, where P.46v7 seems to have
Stephanos Στέφανος ‫ܘܣ‬焏‫ܦܢ‬熏qq‫ܣ‬q‫)ܐ‬.
172 chapter 7

118.22/B.88r10 and 120.25/B.88v19 has 爯q‫ܠ‬焏‫ܕܥ‬, but at both instances

L.32ra27/P.40r14 and L.32vb13/P.41r5 have 爯qq‫( ܕܥܠ‬see also TS.2889 f.), with
the meaning ‘higher’, ‘upper’, ‘superior’ (i.e. the differences that are higher
than one another, cf. Arist. Cat. 1b23; also P.41r26). Another alternative would
be 爯q‫ ܕܡܥܠ‬as at B.88v23, but L.32vb23/P.41r10 also has this (see TS.2883f.)
rather than 爯q‫ ܕܡܥܠ‬or 爯qq‫ܕܥܠ‬.

122.7/B.90r1 At a similar passage L.34va20f./P.43r17f. has here ‫ ܐܘ‬焿‫ܦܠ‬r‫ܕܡ‬

焿‫ܦܠ‬r‫ܬܗ ܡ‬熏̈‫ ܕܠܡܢ‬qq‫ܐ‬.

122.11/B.90r7 Here we could envisage that rq‫ ܨ‬referred to the ‘dog star’ Sir-
ius. In fact, Thesaurus Syriacus (col. 3384) cites rq‫ ܕܨ‬焏‫ܠܒ‬q ‘Sirius Con-
stellatio’, but it cites also (col. 646) 焏‫ܠܒ‬q ‫ܡ‬煟‫ ܕܩ‬焏qq犏‫ܣ ̇ܗܘ ܢ‬熏qrq‫ܣ‬
‫ܐ‬r‫ܕܓܢܒ‬, and see especially TS.1742 and TS.3386. In the Syriac version
of Geoponica (7.17,18), just 焏‫ܠܒ‬q is given for the star Sirius (cf. Sokoloff
2009: 622). However, in his Commentary Sergius has the additional exam-
ples (L.10ra29f./P.30r8f.) 牯q‫ ܘ̇ܗܘ ܕܓܠ‬rq‫‘ ܘ̇ܗܘ ܬܘܒ ܕܨ‬and also the depicted
and engraved one’ and (L.34vb32f./P.43v8f.) 牯q‫ܘ ܕܓܠ‬煿̇‫ ܬܘܒ ܘܠ‬rq‫ܘ ܕܨ‬煿̇‫ܘܠ‬
after separately having stated that (L.10ra23–26/P.30r6f.) 焏‫ܒ‬q熏q rq‫ܘܐ‬
‫ܐ‬r‫ܪ ܓܢܒ‬r‫ ܒ‬犟‫ ̇ܗܘ ܕ̇ܣܠ‬.焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܐ ܗ‬r‫ܩ‬r‫‘ ܕܡ‬there is a star which is called
like this [i.e. dog], that which rises after Orion [constellation]’, that is Sir-
ius. These instances show clearly that ‘depicted’ dog is meant here. And in
this sense, it occurs indeed in the Categories 1a3 where τὸ γεγραμμένον ‘the
depicted (man)’ is rendered by the anonymous translator by rq‫( ̇ܗܘ ܕܨ‬96.7,
ed. King).

124.13/B.90v15 = L.36vb9f./P.45v7 has 焏‫ܢ‬r‫ ܘܢܦ‬焏‫ܠ‬q‫ ܘܡܠ‬焏qq‫‘ ܕ‬living, ratio-

nal, and animate’, and at B.91r4,r24 = L.37rb11,va28/P.46r10f.,v8 焏qq‫ ܘ‬焏r‫ܢ‬r‫ܒ‬
焏‫ܢ‬r‫‘ ܬܘܒ ܘܢܦ‬human, living, and animate too’ as the defining attributes or
account of an individual person. But P.37r19,20 and L.38va30f./P.47v20 have
the three found in our text: ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܠ‬q‫ ܡܠ‬焏qq ‘living, rational, and mor-
tal’.

128.11/B.91v18 has 煟q 煿‫ܠ‬q‫ ܠ‬as well as L.39rb1, but P.48r26 煟q‫ܠ‬q‫( ܠ‬cf.
B.99r14, B.92r9, P.49r7, P.49v18 and P.49r25). And at 128.14 f./B.91v22 =
L.39rb11f./P.48v4f. has 焏qqqr 焏r‫ܢ‬q̈‫ ܕܒܢ‬煿‫ܠ‬q ‫ܕ‬熏q‫ ܒܠ‬焏r‫ܕ‬焏‫‘ ܠ‬found only
in the whole species of men’, which is apparently wrong.

128.16/B.91v24 has 爯qr‫ܬܕܪ‬r‫ܕܡ‬, the ettafʿal pass.ptc., but the conjugations

afʿel and ettafʿal of this verb are not attested in Syriac dictionaries. For a sim-
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 173

ilar phrase, see Barhebraeus: 爯‫ ܘܗܪܬܡ‬焏qr‫ ܕܒ‬焏‫ܠܦܢ‬熏q‫ ܗܘܘ ܒ‬爯qr‫ܕܪ‬r‫ܡ‬

‘apprirent … la science des païens’, in Le Candélabre des Sanctuaires de
Grégoire Aboulfaradj dit Barhebraeus, par Ján Bakoš (1930: 524 f.; cf. ad
loc. TS.955: scientiis ediscendis operam navabant). L.39rb16 f./P.48v6f. has
爯q‫ ܗܠ‬qq‫ ܕܐ‬焏‫ܠܦܢ‬熏q̈‫ ܠ‬爯q‫ܒ‬r‫ܩ‬r‫‘ ܕܡ‬who approach to such sciences’. How-
ever, at B.93v3, B.96v9, B.97v13, the ethpaʿʿal conjugation is used.

130.5/B.92r12 has 熏‫ܘܨܗܠ‬, but since its unabbreviated form is ‫ܬܐ‬熏̣‫ܨܗܘܠ‬, as

̇
the parallel passage of L.39vb2 has 焏‫ܠܒ‬q‫ ܕ‬焏q‫ ܘܢܒ‬焏q‫ܣ‬熏‫ܬܗ ܕܣ‬熏‫ܘܨܗܘܠ‬,
we would expect the abbreviation ‫ܘܨܗܘܠ‬. The ms form is probably a con-
tamination of 焏‫ ܨܗܠ‬and ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ ܨܗܘܠ‬both with the same meaning, where
P.48v28 actually has 焏‫ܠܒ‬q‫ ܕ‬焏q‫ ܘܢܒ‬焏q‫ܣ‬熏‫ ܕܣ‬煿‫ܘܨܗܠ‬.

134.19/B.93v10 has 爯q煿qrqq‫ܘ‬煟‫ܒ‬, but cf. 138.14/B.94v21, and also Peshitta

2Chron. 35:10 & Judges 5:20. Indeed, also the ms of Concerning the Divi-
sion of Substance (bl Add 14658), in the related passage at fol. 171va18, has
爯q‫ܗ‬rqq̈‫ܘ‬煟‫ܒ‬.

134.23/B.93v16 Here, P.58v14f. has ‫ܐ‬rq‫ܢ‬q‫ܪܥ‬r‫ܐ ̇ܗܝ ܡ‬r‫ ܡܠ‬rq‫ܘܐ‬

焏‫ܥ‬煟‫ ܡ‬熏‫ ܒܓ‬rq焏q‫ܠ‬r ‫ܐ‬煿‫ ܘܢܒ‬:‫ܐ‬rq‫ ܬܪܥ‬熏‫ ܒܓ‬煿̇qrq‫‘ ܕܐ‬and there is the
discursive language, which is in the reason and emerges silently in the intel-
lect’.

136.8/B.94r7 has here and in the next instance 136.18/B.94r22 爟r熏‫ܓ‬, but has
then ‫ܡ‬熏r‫ ܓ‬throughout the text. For the common form of the absolute state
of this kind of noun, see Aydin 2013: 94, §20b. P.59r21 has ‫ܡ‬熏r‫ܓ‬.

136.15/B.94r2. For the 爯q‫ܡ‬q̈‫ܐ ܩ‬r‫ ܕܬܠ‬of the Berlin ms, L.20ra16/P.59r29
have ‫ܗܝ‬熏‫ܡ‬q̈‫ܐ ܩ‬r‫‘ ܕܬܠ‬three-dimensional’ here, which would suggest
that the form of our text should perhaps be emended to the same.
Note the analogy to ‫ܗܝ‬熏‫ܓܠ‬r 爯q‫‘ ܕܬܪܬ‬two-footed’. We have also 爯q‫ܕܬܪܬ‬
‫ܗܝ‬熏‫ܓܠ‬r for δίπους ‘two-footed’ at Eis.12.15, 19.18/Eis.Syr.i.28.7, 43.10, whereas
Eis.Syr.ii has 焏‫ܓܠ‬r ‫ܬ‬熏‫ܢ‬q‫( ̇ܗܝ ܕܬܪ‬τό τε δίπουν); but also for τὸ τετράπουν,
Eis.18.20/Eis.Syr.i.41.10 has ‫ܗܝ‬熏‫ܓܠ‬r 爯q‫ܬ‬r‫( ܕܬ‬sic! error in edition?), whereas
Eis.Syr.ii has 焏‫ܓܠ‬r ‫ܬ‬熏q‫ܥ‬q‫ܪܒ‬, (cf. H.216b5). See also 焏‫ܓܠ‬r r‫ܒܥ‬r‫ ܐ‬for τὸ
τετράπουν ‘four-footed’, Eis.14.16/Eis.Syr.i 32.17. Eis.Syr.ii has both r‫ܒܥ‬r‫ܐ‬
焏‫ܓܠ‬r here for τέσσαρας πόδας and 焏‫ܓܠ‬r ‫ܬ‬熏q‫ܥ‬q‫ ܪܒ‬for τὸ τετράπουν (see
also H.208b18) and at Eis.18.20. For ὁ δίπους at Eis.19.8 (= Eis.Syr.i.42) Eis.Syr.ii
has 焏‫ܓܠ‬r q‫ܢ‬qr‫ܬ‬. Cf. also section 5.4 point (m) here.
174 chapter 7

138.4/B.94v8–10 Here, L.21ra6–12 has: ‫ ܕܐܬܪܐ܉‬煿‫ܢ‬qq 爏qq‫ܘܗܝ ܗ‬rq‫ܕܐ‬

‫ܘܢ‬煿‫ܠ‬q .rq焏‫ܢ‬qq r‫ܠܢ‬q‫ ܒ‬r‫ܡ‬焏q 焏‫ܥ‬q‫ܐ ܕܙܪ‬熏‫ܐ ܕܓ‬rq‫ ܐܦ ܬܪܥ‬焏q‫ܕ‬熏‫ܡ‬
… ‫ܡ‬煟‫ ܡ‬爏q‫ ܕ‬爯qr‫ ܡܣܒ‬焏r‫ܢ‬q‫ ̈ܒܢ‬rq‫‘ ܓ‬that there is a natural being of space
does even the common sense affirm, which is indeed by nature implanted
in everyone. For all men assume that everything …’. Also P.60v12–14 seems
to have the reading of L, but it lacks some of the words in the sentence and
appears to be fragmentary. The ‫ܕܐ‬熏‫ ܡ‬of B is an active participle masc.sing.
afʿel of √ ‫ܝ‬煟q and not the expected fem.sing.

138.17/B.94v25 For some reason the ms has ‫ܒ‬煿̇q‫ ܘ‬with the abbreviation line,
where L.21rb12/P.61r6 correctly do not have it.

140.8/B.95r17–18 The 焏q‫ܡ‬r is treated as a masculine noun here, but in

L.22rb2–4/P.62v3f. it is treated as feminine (‫ ܗܘܬ‬r‫ܒ‬q‫ … ܬܬ‬焏q‫ܡ‬r 煿̇‫ܠ‬q).
However, this noun appears in both genders.

140.18/B.95r30 Also here the ms has the abbreviation line above the name
‫ܢ‬熏‫ܢ‬q‫‘ ܙ‬Zeno’ for some unknown reason.

140.20/B.95v2 ‫ܘܗܝ‬rq‫ܡ ܐ‬煟‫ ܡ‬焏q‫ܘ‬煟‫ܒ‬. P.62v22 lacks some words here, while
L.22va7f. has additional ones: .‫ܘܗܝ‬rq‫ܡ ܐ‬煟‫ ܡ‬爏q 爯‫ܡ ܡ‬煟‫ ܕܐܦ ܡ‬爏q‫ܡ‬
‫ܘܗܝ‬rq‫ ܐ‬焏q‫ܘ‬煟‫‘ ܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ܒ‬since it [i.e. space] too is a thing among every-
thing, also it is somewhere’.

140.26f./B.95v10f. has ‫ܡ‬煟‫ܘܗܝ ܒܡ‬rq‫ ܕܐ‬焏‫ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‬and P.63r9 has 焏‫̇ܗܘ ܡ‬
‫ܡ‬煟‫ ܒܡ‬焏‫ܪܢ‬r‫‘ ܕܡ‬that which is considered in something’, while L.22va36 has
焏q‫ܘ‬煟‫ ܒ‬焏‫ܪܢ‬r‫ ܕܡ‬焏‫‘ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‬that which is considered in a place’.

140.32/B.95v16f. Both L.22vb13/P.63r14f. have here ‫ܬ‬熏‫ ̇ܗܝ ܕܠ‬r‫ܒ‬q̇‫ܡ ܕ‬煟‫ ܡ‬爏q‫ܕ‬
煿‫ ܡܢ‬r‫ܒ‬qr‫ ܕܡ‬焏‫̇ܗܘ ܡ‬.

142.20/B.96r13 Both L.23rb11/P.64r1 have ‫ܐ‬r‫ܩ‬q̈‫ ܕܒܦܣ‬here, but the form

焏‫ ܕܒܦܣܩ‬occurs also in P.87r6.

144.16f./B.96v17 f. 焏‫ ܘܦܠ݁ܓ‬焏‫ܦ‬焏‫ ܕܥ‬焏‫ܢ‬熟q‫ ܐ‬.r‫ܒ‬qr‫ ܘܡ‬r‫̇ܒ‬q‫̇ܗܘ ܕ‬, while

L.42ra24–26/P.78r8–9 has 焏‫ ܕܦܠܓ‬焏‫ܢ‬熟q‫܇ ܐ‬r‫ܒ‬qr‫ܡ ܘܡ‬煟‫ ܡ‬r‫̇ܒ‬q‫)̇ܗܘ( ܕ‬
焏‫\ܒܥܦ‬焏‫ܥܦ‬焏‫ܒ‬.
text and translation of sergius’ introduction 175
̈ ̈
146.18/B.97r26 The spelling of 焏q‫ܢ‬熏‫ܣ‬q‫ܦ‬q‫ܠ‬q‫ ܕܦ‬is at L.43vb31 焏q‫ܢܣ‬熏‫ ܕܦܠܦ‬and
̈
P.82v3 焏q‫ܣ‬q‫ܢ‬熏‫ܦ‬熏‫ܠ‬熏‫ ܕܦ‬for the Greek Πελοποννησίων ‘of the Peloponnesians’,
̈ ̈
and L.48va9 焏q‫ܣ‬q‫ܢ‬熏‫ܦ‬焏‫ܠ‬焏‫ ܦ‬and P.90r2 焏q‫ܣ‬q‫ܢ‬熏‫ܦ‬熏‫ܠ‬熏‫ܦ‬.
̇ ̇

150.1f./B.98r18f. Here, L.47va21–23 has: 焏‫ܢ‬熏‫ ܗܘܐ ܓ‬牯‫ܠ‬q‫ ̇ܡ‬焏‫ܘܡ ܠ‬r‫ܡ‬

焏‫ܡ‬r̈熏‫ ܓ‬爯‫ ܡ‬煟q 煿‫ܢ‬qq‫ ܕ‬and P.88v12–13: ‫ ܗ̣ܘܐ‬牯‫ܠ‬qrr‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܘܡ ܠ‬r‫ܡ‬
焏‫ܡ‬r̈熏‫ ܓ‬爯‫ ̣ܡ‬煟q‫ ܠ‬煿‫ܢ‬qq‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܢ‬熏‫ܓ‬.
̈
152.2/B.98v29 At the end of folio 98 the scribe has erased 爯q煿‫ܠ‬qq ‫ ܐܦ‬爯q‫ܩܢ‬,
and then at the beginning of folio 99 (B.99r1) changed it to the plural form
爯q煿q‫ܠ‬q̈q, but both L.49va13/P.91r20 have ‫ܘܢ‬煿‫ܠ‬qq.

154.6f./B.99v11 Here, L.50ra38-rb1 has: ‫ܕ‬熏q‫ ܒܠ‬焏‫ܡ‬qq‫ ܐܣ‬爯q‫ ܗܠ‬爟‫ܥ‬

r‫ܐܡ‬r‫ ܡ‬and P.92r20–21: r‫ܐܡ‬r‫ܕ ܡ‬熏q‫ ܒܠ‬焏‫ܡ‬qq̈‫ ܐܣ‬爯q‫ ܗܠ‬爏‫ܥ‬.

160.17/B.101v11 Here, P.106v6 has 煿̇‫ ܥܡ‬煿̇‫ ܠ‬焏‫ܠ‬q‫ܡܒ‬, while L.58ra17 has
煿̇‫ ܥܡ‬煿̇‫ ܠ‬焏‫ܠ‬q‫ܒ‬r‫ܡ‬.
 chapter 8

Commentary1

§1–2 The preface. For some common rhetorical topoi in Sergius’ extant pref-
aces, see the discussion in the introduction (at 2.2).

§3 The division of philosophy. Here in Sergius, we find the general division

of philosophy into the two main categories, namely into theory and practice,
which in turn are divided respectively. A tripartite division of philosophy into
physics, ethics, and logic was carried out already by the Stoics, although a
first type of classification of the parts of philosophy came about in a Platonic
setting, as a result of a reflection on the scientific method and a need to
introduce a classification of the sciences and their parts. In that environment,
the parts of philosophy and science in general were closely connected, no
clear boundary existing between them. Later, in the Metaphysics (1025b19–
1026a33), Aristotle gave a distinct division of the theoretical and practical
sciences, as being opposed to each other, where the former refer to objects
that do not depend on us, whereas the latter refer to objects that depend
on us. This bipartite division into physics and ethics (with logic as ancillary
discipline) was adopted by the Neoplatonists. According to Hadot (1979: 213,
cf. 219–221), in the Alexandrian commentary tradition of the Categories this
discussion is conducted mainly in connection to the classification and the topic
of Aristotelian writings. Aristotle’s works are usually divided into theoretical
(θεωρητικά), practical (πρακτικά) and logical/instrumental (λογικά/ὀργανικά)
ones, as the relevant passages of Ammonius (4.28–5.8), Philoponus (3.16–21
and 4.23–27), Olympiodorus (7.28–8.3), Elias (115.14–20), and Simplicius (4.22–
28) illustrate. The practical writings are said to be ethical, economic, and
political. To quote Philoponus concerning this (3.18 f.): τῶν δὲ πρακτικῶν τὰ μὲν
ἠθικὰ τὰ δὲ οἰκονομικὰ τὰ δὲ πολιτικά “Of the practical works, some are ethical,
others economic, and others political.”2 And also Elias (115.19f.): τὰ δὲ πρακτικὰ
[διαιρεῖται] εἰς ἠθικὰ οἰκονομικὰ πολιτικά ‘the practical (works) [are divided] into

1 All translations enclosed within single quotation marks (‘x’) are mine, while those given
with double quotation marks (“x”) are taken from existing translations and their translators
are stated the first time a certain work is quoted and also given in the list of literature in
connection with the quoted work.
2 The quotations from Philoponus’ commentary on the Categories (up to 83.4) are taken from
the English translation by Riin Sirkel, Martin Tweedale, and John Harris (2014).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2016 | doi: 10.1163/9789004325142_009

commentary 177

ethical, economic, and political ones’. The political practice underlies Sergius’
‘government of a people’, the economic one underlies his ‘government of a
house’, and the ethical one his ‘government of the individual person’.
Nevertheless, Sergius is right when he states that any occupation with phi-
losophy begins with its division. If we examine the various expositions on Por-
phyry’s Eisagoge, which was considered to be an introductory work to logic
or even to all philosophy, we find that a more general division of the parts of
philosophy was already executed in these texts. But due to the fact that some
of these works are extant only in Syriac this picture has not emerged clearly
before, and therefore in the following I will describe this division at some
length.
We can start by looking at the Greek commentary of Ammonius (In Isag.
11.16–16.20), the famous teacher of philosophy at the Alexandrian school.
Among other things, he says (11.21–23): εἰκότως οὖν ἡ φιλοσοφία εἰς δύο διαιρεῖ-
ται, εἴς τε θεωρητικὸν καὶ πρακτικόν. πάλιν τὸ θεωρητικὸν διαιρεῖται εἰς θεολογικὸν
μαθηματικὸν καὶ φυσιολογικόν ‘reasonably, then, philosophy is divided into two
parts, into a theoretical and a practical one. Again, the theoretical is divided
into theological, mathematical, and physical’, and he continues (15.2): διαιρεῖ-
ται τοίνυν τὸ πρακτικὸν εἴς τε τὸ ἠθικὸν καὶ οἰκονομικὸν καὶ πολιτικόν ‘the practical
is divided into ethical, economic, and political philosophy’, (see also David In
Isag. 65.11–14, 5.6–8 and Elias In Isag. 26.6f., 29.4, 31.27–29). All the three parts
of practical philosophy are subdivided by Ammonius (In Isag. 15.10–17) into two
further units, a passage which is closely paralleled in Sergius. The practical gov-
ernments needs to have a legislative (νομοθετικός) instance, which Sergius calls
焏‫ܣ‬熏̈‫ ܢܡ‬爟q‫‘ ܣ‬legislation’, and a judicial (δικαστικός) instance, as when Sergius
̈
says that a legislator needs to be ‫ܗܝ‬熏‫ܣ‬熏‫ܝ ܢܡ‬r‫ ܕܥܒ‬焏‫ܥ‬熏‫ ܘܬܒ‬焏‫ܢ‬q̇‫ ܕ‬qq‫ܐ‬
‘like a judge and a punisher of those who break his laws’ (cf. Westerink 1990:
344f. and 347). Likewise, in those Syriac fragments, which Baumstark pro-
posed to be from Philoponus’ lost Greek commentary on Porphyry’s Eisagoge,
we find this more general division of philosophy in similar terms to those
of Ammonius and Sergius. Although, this ascription to Philoponus has not
been widely accepted, it remains an important witness to this division, where
the Syriac version has (Syr. In Isag. 13.30–14.1):3 ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܦ‬熏‫ܠܣ‬q‫ ܕܦ‬.爯‫ܢ‬q 爯‫ܢ‬qr‫ܘܐܡ‬
爯‫ܪܘܬܐ ̇ܡ‬熏‫ ܘܣܥ‬.‫ܪܘܬܐ‬熏‫ ܘܣܥ‬焏q‫ ܬܐܘܪ‬.焏q‫ܐ ܩܢ‬rq̈q‫ܒ‬r ‫ܬܐ‬熏̈‫ ܡܢ‬爯q‫ܬܪ‬
‫ܐ‬煟̈q‫ܬ ܥ‬熏‫ܦ‬q犏q‫ܐ ܘܠ‬r‫ܬ ̈ܒ‬熏‫ܦ‬q犏q‫ܐ ܘܠ‬r‫ܢ‬q煟‫ܬ ܡ‬熏‫ܦ‬q犏q‫ ܠ‬焏‫ܦܠܓ‬r‫‘ ܡ‬and we
say that philosophy possesses two splendid parts: theory and practice. And

3 Full citation: Philop. Syr. In Isag. 13.30–14.1/焿q .٣٠ ‫ ـ‬煟q .١ in the edition and p. 179.16–19 in the
Greek and German translation by Baumstark (1900).
178 chapter 8

practice is divided into the care of a city, the care of households and the care
of customs’. The wording of this division of practice into the care (ἐπιμέλεια
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܦ‬q犏q) of a city, of the households, and of the customs corresponds closely
to Sergius’ tripartite division of the governments or administrations (προστασία
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬r‫ܒ‬煟‫)ܡ‬. Sergius gives only a description of the parts of practice without
providing any designations of them. This division of government into three
parts is the common one in ancient philosophy,4 which are generally known
as politics, economics, and ethics (see Hein 1985: 226–237). Further, Philo-
ponus says that theory (14.3):5 ‫ܬ‬熏‫ܬܐ ܘܠܡܡܠܠ‬熏‫ܢ‬qq ‫ܬ‬熏‫ ܠܡܡܠܠ‬焏‫ܦܠܓ‬r‫ܡ‬
焏‫ܠܦܢ‬熏̈q‫ܘܬܐ ܘܠ‬煿‫‘ ܐܠ‬is divided into the science of natural things [φυσιολο-
γία ‘physics’], into the science of divine things [θεολογία ‘theology’], and into
mathematical sciences [μαθήματα ‘mathematics’]’, which were considered as
the three main fields of knowledge in Antiquity. Finally, the μαθήματα/焏‫ܠܦܢ‬熏q
̈
‘mathematics’,6 for which Boethius coined the Latin term quadrivium7 and
which were so known during the Middle Ages and Renaissance, are given
by Philoponus and Sergius as being 焏qrq‫ܘܡ‬焏‫= ܓ‬8 γεωμετρία ‘geometry’
(Sergius: ‫ܘܬܐ‬rq‫)ܡ‬, 焏q‫ܡ‬熏‫ܘܢ‬rq‫ = ܐܣ‬ἀστρονομία ‘astronomy’, 焏‫ܩ‬qq‫ܡ‬rq‫ܐܪ‬
= ἀριθμητική ‘arithmetic’ (Sergius: ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫)ܡܢ‬, and ‫ܘܬܐ‬r‫ܩ‬q‫ܣ‬熏‫ ܡ‬or q‫ܩ‬q‫ܣ‬熏‫= ܡ‬
μουσική ‘music’.9 In his Discourse on the Spiritual Life, Sergius has the same divi-
sion of these four disciplines, but has replaced Greek 焏q‫ܡ‬熏‫ܘܢ‬rq‫ = ܐܣ‬ἀστρο-
νομία ‘astronomy’ with the Syriac word ‫ܬܐ‬熏q煟‫ܠ‬q ‘chaldeism’, thus: ‫ܘܬܐ‬rq‫ܡ‬
‫ܘܬܐ‬r‫ܩ‬q‫ܣ‬熏‫ܬܐ ܘܡ‬熏q煟‫ܠ‬q‫ܬܐ ܘ‬熏q‫ܘܡܢ‬.10 Almost the same division of philos-

4 For an illustrative example see the Middle Platonist philosopher Alcinous (probably 2nd
century ad), who in chapter three of his Handbook of Platonism (Ἐπιτομὴ τῶν Πλάτωνος
δογμάτων, ed. Whittaker 1990), and English translation Dillon (1993: 5f. and 59 n. 3),
gives a congruent division of the parts of philosophy. For the Greek terms ἐπιμέλεια and
προστασία, see Dillon (ibid., p. 60).
5 Philop. (Syr. In Isag. 14.3/煟q .٣, tr. 179.21 f.).
6
̈
Jacob/Severus bar Shakko (Ruska 1896: 7.1): 焏‫ܠܦܢ‬熏q rqq‫ܢ ܐܘ‬熏‫ܩ‬qq‫ܬܡ‬焏‫ ܡ‬爏‫‘ ܥ‬on
mathematikon that is yūlpānē’, cf. also Wright (1872, vol. 3, p. 1166 on ms bl Add. 21454,
text 2d).
7 In his De arithmetica i.i. For a chart of this elaborated division system of philosophy, see
Magee (2010: 797 f.). See also the diagrams by Gutas (1983: 261); and Hein (1985: 182–225).
8 Equals sign (=) is used for Greek loan words. No sign is used between the Syriac equiva-
lences of Greek words.
9 Philop. (Syr. In Isag. 14.10–22/煟q .١٠-٢٢, tr. 179.21f., cf. also 13.7f./焿q .٧-٨). Paul the Persian
has in his Treatise on the Logic of Aristotle (5.11 f.) ‫ܪܘܬܐ‬rq‫‘( ܩ‬the art of cither-playing’) for
‘music’, and like Sergius, he has ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ ܡܢ‬for ‘arithmetic’, ‫ܘܬܐ‬rq‫ ܡ‬for ‘geometry’, and
焏q‫ܡ‬熏‫ܘܢ‬rq‫ ܐܣ‬for ‘astronomy’.
10
̈
Sherwood (1961: 124, lxxxi.4). And Sergius has 焏q煟‫ܠ‬q ‘Chaldeans’ for astronomers (ibid.,
commentary 179

ophy into theory (i.e. natural sciences, metaphysical inquiry, and mathemat-
ical sciences: geometry, astronomy, arithmetic, and music) and practice (i.e.
politics, economics, and ethics, subdivided into legislation and jurisdiction) is
found in the Syriac material transmitted by Jacob/Severus bar Shakko, which
Baumstark believed to go back to Stephanus of Alexandria’s commentary on
Porphyry’s Eisagoge.11 Similar divisions are also found in manuals that are con-
cerned with the parts of philosophy and other philosophical matters, a method
called dihairesis or diairesis (διαίρεσις ‘division’). Such an example is the unpub-
lished Syriac dihairesis-text, attributed to Bar Zoʿbi (12th/13th cent.). According
to Daiber (1985: 78–80), this Syriac text contains materials from many different
Greek sources, among them mostly from Ammonius’ commentary on Aristo-
tle’s Categories. He assumes that this kind of compilations, which must have
been used as textbooks in classroom, existed in Greek and were probably (in
translation) available to later writers such as Bar Zoʿbi. In many sections, the
wording of Bar Zoʿbi’s text is different from that of Sergius, but in a few instances
echoes of passages from Sergius’ text is clearly discernible (see ms. Syr. Berlin
92, Sachau 306, fol. 120v–124r). Also in the prolegomena of Ibn al-Ṭayyib’s com-
mentary on Porphyry’s Eisagoge (11.9–19 and 25.18–20, ed. Gyekye, tr. Dunlop
1957: 80 and 92), a comparable division of the parts of philosophy is present,
but only in passing.
Such a concise division is also found in Sergius’ Concerning the Division
of Substance, where he has (171rb1–14): 焏q‫ܐܘܪ‬r‫ ܠ‬焏‫ܦܠܓ‬r‫ܬܐ ܡ‬熏‫ܠܣܦ‬q‫ܦ‬
‫ܐ‬r‫ܥ‬煟q‫ ܐ‬.焏‫ܠ̈ܦܢ‬熏q‫ܐ ܘܠ‬r‫ܥ‬煟q焏‫ ܠ‬焏‫ܦܠܓ‬r‫ ܡ‬焏q‫ ܬܐܘܪ‬.‫ܪܘܬܐ‬熏‫ܘܠܣܥ‬
焏‫ܠ̈ܦܢ‬熏q .‫ܐ‬rq‫ܢ‬qq̈‫ܐ ܕ‬r‫ܥ‬煟q焏‫ܐ ܘܠ‬rq煿̈‫ܐ ܕܐܠ‬r‫ܥ‬煟q焏‫ ܠ‬焏‫ܦܠܓ‬r‫ܡ‬
‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܘܬܐ ܘܠܡܢ‬rq‫ ܘܠܡ‬焏q‫ܡ‬熏‫ܢ‬rq‫ܣ‬焏‫ ܘܠ‬12‫ܘܬܐ‬r‫ܩ‬q‫ܣ‬熏‫ ܠܡ‬爯q‫ܦܠܓ‬r‫ ܡ‬爯q‫ܕ‬
‫ܗ‬rq‫ܒ‬煟‫ ܘܠ‬焏‫ ܥܡ‬煿‫ܠ‬q‫ܬܐ ܕ‬熏‫ܢ‬r‫ܒ‬煟‫ ܠܡ‬焏‫ܦܠܓ‬r‫ ܡ‬爯q‫ܪܘܬܐ ܕ‬熏‫ ܣܥ‬.焏qrr‫ܘܠ‬
.煿‫ܡ‬熏‫ܩܢ‬煟‫ ܘܠ‬r‫‘ ܕܐܢ‬Philosophy is divided into theory and practice. Theory
is divided into knowledge and mathematics. Knowledge is divided into the
knowledge of divine things and into the knowledge of physical things. The
mathematics are divided into music, astronomy, geometry, arithmetic, and into
the rest. Practice is divided into the government of the entire people, of some-
one’s household, and of the individual person’.
On the basis of a similar division of philosophy by Paul the Persian (mid-6th
century) in his Treatise on the Logic of Aristotle at 4.26–5.16, Dimitri Gutas (1983,

p. 142, cvii.2 and p. 143, cix.1). For the background of this meaning, cf. the book of Daniel
2:2 passim.
11 See esp. the proposed text of Steph. Syr. (In Isag. 15 f./煿q, 22/焯q, and 25/煿q, tr. pp. 192f.,
199, and 202). Cf. also Hugonnard-Roche (2004: 153 and 156f.).
12 The manuscript has (171rb9) ‫ܘܬܐ‬r‫ܠܡܣܩ‬.
180 chapter 8

esp. p. 257) connects him with the Alexandrian commentators David and Elias
and the classification of the sciences in their Introductions (or Prolegomena)
to philosophy. In this way, Paul is deemed to be the transmitter of this Alexan-
drian division of the parts of philosophy to Arabic writers, more specifically to
the Persian thinker Miskawayh (d. 1030), who wrote in Arabic, and Al-Farabi
(d. 950). Paul was active at the court of king Khusrau i Anuširwān (also Chos-
roes i Anushirwan, reign. 531–579), and to whom he addressed his treatise. Yet,
two points need to be made here. On the one hand, this division of philosophy
is already fully formulated by Ammonius and his students, and not chiefly by
David and Elias. On the other hand, Paul’s direct connection to the Alexandrian
tradition is presupposed, and the intermediate individual between many such
philosophical matters is more likely Sergius of Reshaina, at least as the one who
introduced them into the Syriac milieu. In fact, some wordings in Paul’s treatise
can probably be traced to Sergius’ text. A couple of passages in Paul’s treatise
have close parallels in Sergius’ text, not only in terms of contents, but also the
wording and Syriac vocabulary is almost the same, which indicates that Paul
was perhaps partly depending on Sergius when he composed his introduction
to Aristotle’s logic. Note the close correspondence between Sergius’ definition
of substance by specifying its properties (at §61) and that of Paul (at 9.17–23).
Compare also Sergius 106.13–16 (§20) with Paul 7.5–7, and 150.13–15 (§ 81) with
10.3–6. Moreover, Paul’s language displays some features typical of a somewhat
later stage of Syriac philosophical terminology; (given that this peculiarity is
not due to the possibility that his treatise was written in Persian and later trans-
lated into Syriac).

§4 Simple things, and the aim of Aristotle’s Categories. As already mentioned

and noted by Hugonnard-Roche (2004: 152), Sergius’ short treatise should not
be deemed to be a mere commentary on the Categories, but a general intro-
duction to philosophy. In fact, nowhere in the text is it mentioned by Sergius
as being such a commentary. Therefore, when he at this place discusses sim-
ple things in the world he does not connect the presentation to the aim/goal
(σκοπός 焏rq‫ )ܢ‬of Aristotle’s Categories, as he does in his commentary proper
on Categories, addressed to Theodore (L.4rb7–7rb18/P.18v23–23r8), which is in
line with the procedure of the other Neoplatonist commentators on the Cate-
gories.13

13 On the aim of the Categories, see Ammon. (8.20–13.2), Philop. (8.27–12.11), Olymp. (18.14–
22.2), Elias (129.4–132.4), and Simpl. (9.4–16.30). Cf. also Hugonnard-Roche (2004: 157) and
Chase (2003: 160 n. 120).
commentary 181

There seem to have been three main opinions among the ancient philoso-
phers about the aim of the Categories. Some held that the treatise deals with
̈
words (φωναί 焏‫ ̈ܩܠ‬r‫)ܒܢ‬, others claimed it to be about objects/realities (πρά-
γματα ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫)ܨ̈ܒ‬, and again others asserted it to be about notions/concepts
(νοήματα 焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܥ‬r). On this point we can just give the following short quotation
from Philoponus (8.27–29): τινὲς οὖν περὶ τοῦ σκοποῦ τῶν Κατηγοριῶν διηνέχθη-
σαν, καὶ οἱ μὲν εἰρήκασι περὶ φωνῶν μόνων εἶναι τὸν σκοπὸν οἱ δὲ περὶ πραγμάτων
μόνων οἱ δὲ περὶ νοημάτων μόνων “Certain people, then, have quarrelled over
the aim of Categories. Some have said that the aim concerns only expressions,
others that it concerns only things, and still others that it concerns only con-
cepts.”14 As Hugonnard-Roche (2004: 157) states, the arguments of the differ-
ent factions were centred on what τὰ λεγόμενα/‫ܢ‬r‫ܐܡ‬r‫ ܕܡ‬爯q‫‘ ܗܠ‬things said’,
mentioned in Cat. 1a16, bear upon. The point of the first view is grammatical, of
the second view is ontological, and of the third view is psychological, as Olym-
piodorus expresses it (21.4–6): φωνὰς μὲν οὖν ᾗ φωναὶ σκοπεῖν γραμματικῆς ἔργον,
νοήματα δὲ ᾗ νοήματα τῆς περὶ ψυχῆς πραγματείας, πράγματα δὲ ᾗ πράγματα τῆς
πρώτης φιλοσοφίας ‘it is the function of grammar to examine words qua words,
concepts as such belong to the study of mind, objects as such belong to first
philosophy’, (see also Philop. 12.5–9).
From Sergius’ Commentary and some other Alexandrian commentators, we
can conclude that these three varying views were reconciled in a formula
expressing that the Categories is about words that signify objects through
mediating concepts. Sergius, Philoponus, Olympiodorus (19.36ff.), and Elias
(130.14ff.) mention only Iamblichus by name in connection with this solution,
but Simplicius reports several other commentators from earlier periods who
were holding this position (Simpl. 9.31–10.23, 13.15–18, cf. n. 171 of Chase ad loc.,
and also Dillon 1997: 68f.). It is appropriate here to give the very close par-
allel passages concerning this topic from Sergius and Philoponus (9.12–15): οἱ
δὲ ἀκριβέστερον λέγοντες, ὧν εἷς ἐστιν ὁ Ἰάμβλιχος, φασὶν ὡς οὔτε περὶ νοημάτων
μόνων ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος οὔτε περὶ φωνῶν μόνων οὔτε περὶ πραγμάτων μόνων, ἀλλ’
ἔστιν ὁ σκοπὸς τῶν Κατηγοριῶν περὶ φωνῶν σημαινουσῶν πράγματα διὰ μέσων νοη-
μάτων “Now, those who speak more accurately, one of whom is Iamblichus,
say the discussion is neither about concepts alone nor expressions alone nor
things alone, but rather the aim of Categories concerns expressions that signify
things through mediating concepts.” And Sergius (L.7ra8–24/P.22v9–15): 焏‫ܐܠ‬

14 The French translation of Laramée (2000: 77): “Donc les avis sur le but des Catégories
ont divergé. Et selon certains, le but ne concernait que des mots; selon d’autres, que des
choses; selon d’autres, que des notions.”
182 chapter 8

‫ܘܗܝ ܘܐܦ‬rq‫ܘܢ ܐ‬煿‫ ܕܡܢ‬:焏‫ ܗܢ‬焏‫ܒ‬rq‫ ܕ‬煿rq‫ ܢ‬爏‫ܘ ܥ‬r‫ ܐܣܒ‬rq‫ܐ‬犏q‫ܢ ܕܬܪ‬熏‫̇ܗܢ‬
‫ܕ‬熏q‫ ܒܠ‬焏‫ ̈ܩܠ‬r‫ ̈ܒܢ‬爏‫ ܥ‬焏‫ ܘܠ‬.‫ܐ‬rqqr̈‫ܕ ܦ‬熏q‫ܬܐ ܒܠ‬熏‫ ܨ̈ܒ‬爏‫ ܥ‬焏‫ ܠ‬.爿qq‫ܡܒܠ‬q
煿̇rq‫ܘܗܝ ܢ‬rq‫ܘ ܕܐ‬r‫ܕ ܐܡ‬熏q‫ ܒܠ‬焏qqr̈‫ ܦ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܥ‬r 爏‫ ܬܘܒ ܥ‬焏‫ ܘܠ‬.‫ܐ‬rqqr̈‫ܦ‬
.‫ܐ‬rqqr̈‫ ܦ‬焏‫ ̈ܩܠ‬r‫ ̈ܒܢ‬爏‫ ܥ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬熏‫ ܗܢ‬.煟qq‫ܘܢ ܐ‬煿‫ܠ‬q 爏‫ ܥ‬焏‫ ܐܠ‬.‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܒܢ‬rq‫ܕܡ‬
.焏qqr̈‫ ܦ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܥ‬r 煟q‫ܐ܇ ܒ‬rqqr̈‫ܬܐ ܦ‬熏‫ ܨ̈ܒ‬爯‫ܕܥ‬熏r̈‫‘ ܕܡ‬but those who have accu-
rately proclaimed about the aim of this book, among them Iamblichus, main-
tain that the aim of the writing is neither about simple objects alone, nor about
simple words alone, nor again about simple concepts alone, but rather about
all of them at once, that is about simple words that signify simple objects
through simple concepts’ (cf. the transl. of Watt 2014a: 39 and the comm. at
pp. 50ff.). The last sentence of Sergius has a more similar wording later on in
Philoponus (12.9–11): σκοπὸς οὖν τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει εἰπεῖν περὶ ἁπλῶν φωνῶν σημαι-
νουσῶν ἁπλᾶ πράγματα διὰ μέσων ἁπλῶν νοημάτων “Therefore, Aristotle’s aim
is to talk about simple expressions that signify simple things through simple
mediating concepts” (again at 12.31–33), and is also present in Olympiodorus
(21.18–20). Thus, it seems that most of the Neoplatonist commentators, among
them Sergius, have sided with this harmonizing standpoint, which declares the
subject matter of the Categories to be ‘about simple words that signify simple
objects through mediating simple concepts’, as Sergius, Philoponus, and Olym-
piodorus express it.15 Sergius formulates this notion in his Introduction only in
connection with the description of substance (ʾūsīyaʾ), at § 10.
A final comment can be made about a possible connection between the Ara-
maic or Syriac 焏‫ܬ ܩܠ‬r‫ ܒ‬and the technical meaning of ‘word’ that the Greek
φωνή ‘sound’ has evolved. The sense ‘word’ for the syntagm 焏‫ܬ ܩܠ‬r‫ ܒ‬is attested
already in the early Syriac literature, in addition to its primary sense ‘voice’,
‘sound’.16 Urmson writes17 that “(phônê) reflects the view introduced to the
Neoplatonists by Porphyry that Aristotle’s account of ambiguity in the Cate-
gories concerns not things, but words insofar as they signify things.” However,
the Greek term φωνή (pl. φωναί) does not appear in the text of the Eisagoge
itself, except in the heading at Eis. 13.9: Περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῶν πέντε φωνῶν
‘On the common features of the five words’, which might have been added
to it by later editors,18 but it is used with this sense in his commentary on

15 For variations on this formula, see Ammon. (10.7–9), Philop. (10.6–8, 12.9–11), Olymp. (21.9–
24), Elias (131.6–14), and Simpl. (10.17–19, 13.12–21), cf. also Porph. (58.5–7 and 58.15–20).
16 At TS.596 see the quoted instances for meaning “2) vox, verbum”, plus the additional
ܶ ܳ ܳ
references for the plural 焏‫ ̈ܩܠ‬r‫“ ̈ܒܢ‬verba” at TS.3620, and Sokoloff (2009: 194): “2. word”.
17 Urmson (1992: 47 n. 62) to Simpl. In Phys. (553.12).
18 The treatise itself was sometimes called by later commentators Πέντε φωνῶν ‘The five
words’ (Lat. Quinque Voces), among them Proba: 焏‫ ̈ܩܠ‬r‫ ̈ܒܢ‬r‫ܡ‬ ̈ q 爯q‫‘ ܗܠ‬these five words’
commentary 183

the Categories.19 The term in this title is rendered in the two Syriac transla-
tions of Porphyry’s Eisagoge by 焏‫ ̈ܩܠ‬r‫‘ ̈ܒܢ‬words’ (Eis. 13.9/Eis.Syr.i 347.16 and
Eis.Syr.ii). In this sense, the expression appears also in Proba’s commentary
on On Interpretation, (82.1,2, ed. Hoffmann 1867 with the entry at H.205b1 f.).
Though the meaning ‘word’ for φωνή can be seen as a natural extension of its
basic meaning, yet the evolution of this meaning may also be due to Porphyry
and Iamblichus and their Aramean background, especially since its techni-
cal sense as ‘word’ is primarily found in this philosophical context.20 That the
denotation of Aramaic 焏‫ܬ ܩܠ‬r‫ ܒ‬for ‘word’ is the source of the Greek φωνή may
be proposed considering the prominent role both Porphyry21 and Iamblichus22
played with regard to Neo-Platonic philosophy and particularly to the com-
mentary tradition of Aristotle’s Categories.23 Since Porphyry was less exposed to
Latin, a less probable explanation for how the evolution of this meaning have

(Proba In Isag. 4.8/‫ ܕ‬.٨, tr. 148.8). The five words that the Eisagoge treats are: genera,
species, differences, properties, and accidents. On the tradition of the title, see Barnes
(2003: xii–xiii).
19 Porph. (56.35, 58.5,8 passim), in the translation of Strange (1992: 32 and n. 16) for a
discussion of this meaning.
20 See Liddell-Scott-Jones (lsj, 1968: 1967f.), and Sophocles (1900: 1156) for the absence of
the meaning of ‘word’ for φωνή, but later in a Christian context it was used in the sense of
“word, opp. ἔργον” (‘deed’), Lampe (1961–1968: 1503 f.).
21 Porphyry was born c. 234 in Tyre (modern Ṣūr, Lebanon), or in Batanaea (modern Syria).
Porphyry’s original Aramaic/Semitic name was mlkʾ/mlkw (or ‫ מלכו‬mlkw and Μάλχος
as this name appears in bilingual inscriptions from Syria, Yon 2012: inscriptions no. 518
pp. 388f., no. 520 p. 390, no. 529 pp. 394 f. passim), which was the name of his father
too, see Porph. Vita Plotini (17.6–10), and cf. Bidez (1913: 5f.). The name mlkw means
‘king’, Stark (1971: 95). He is known as a Phoenician, but this designation is solely geo-
graphical, because, as Bidez indicates, at the time of Porphyry the Phoenicians had since
long assimilated to Arameans, (Bidez 1913: 6 n. 1: “Notons ici qu’à l’époque de Porphyre,
le phénicien s’était depuis longtemps assimilé partout à l’araméen.”). See also Brock
(2011).
22 Iamblichus was born in Chalcis ad Belum/Qenneshrin in Syria and his original Aramaic
name was ya-mliku (or ‫ ימלכו‬ymlkw and Ἰάμβλιχος as this name is given in bilingual
inscriptions from Syria, Yon 2012: inscriptions nos. 405 and 405 p. 317, also no. 128 p. 141 and
no. 441 p. 339). Ymlkw is probably the causative form of a verb (√mlk) meaning ‘n.n. shall
cause to rule’, Stark (1971: 91). For Iamblichus’ contribution to logic, see Dillon (1987: 904–
907 and 1997). A collection of his extant fragments on the Categories is found in Dalsgaard
Larsen (1972: 9–72). See also David In Isag. (92.2–6).
23 See for instance Simplicius for his high estimation of Porphyry and Iamblichus and the
importance of their commentaries on the Categories (Simpl. 2.5–3.17, tr. Chase, pp. 17–19,
and also p. 7).
184 chapter 8

taken place is that it happened under the influence from the Latin term vox
(pl. voces), also with the primary sense ‘voice’, but since early times, already in
Cicero and before, it meant ‘word’ too (Lewis & Short, A Latin Dictionary, 1879:
2015).

§4 ‘Socrates’ or ‘Plato’, or some other person among men. The fact that Sergius
like other commentators gives proper names to serve as examples of simple
words is intentional. On the one hand, they intend to point out that the Cat-
egories is about three phenomena, that is about concrete objects (πράγματα)
that can be perceived and give birth to notions (νοήματα) or concepts (ἔννοιαι),
and of which names or words (φωναί) are coined, and that all these three
phenomena can be realized only in a human being, as Philoponus puts it
(12.7–9): οἷον τοῦ Σωκράτους ἔστιν ὄνομα ἡ Σωκράτης φωνή, τὸ δὲ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸς
ὁ Σωκράτης, ἡ δὲ ἔννοια, ἣν ἔχομεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἡ περὶ τοῦ Σωκράτους γνῶσις
“For example, the expression ‘Socrates’ is the name of Socrates, and the thing
is Socrates himself, and the concept we have in the soul is the cognition
about Socrates.” On the other hand, they intend to stress that perceptible
objects have a real and independent existence that is anterior to the percep-
tion and the designation of them, and that they are not only in the mind of
man, (see Ammon. 9.24–10.1, Philop. 11.34–12.9, and cf. Hugonnard-Roche 2004:
157).

§5 Words do not by nature exist in the world. The view that names do not
exist naturally, but “by convention” is Aristotelian. In On Interpretation, Aris-
totle writes (16a26–28): τὸ δὲ κατὰ συνθήκην, ὅτι φύσει τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐδέν ἐστιν,
ἀλλ’ ὅταν γένηται σύμβολον “I say ‘by convention’ because no name is a name
naturally but only when it has become a symbol”,24 (cf. also Simpl. 13.26 and
n. 175 of Chase ad loc.). As Hugonnard-Roche (2004: 158) states, such a stance
anticipates potential criticism and explains the divergent prevalence of signif-
icant names/words in different languages. In contrast to names, the concrete
entities and their perception are considered to be natural and the same to all
men under the same circumstances.25 The question concerned here, is whether
names are naturally existing (φύσει rq焏‫ܢ‬qq, called ‘naturalism’) or conven-
tionally current (θέσει, called ‘conventionalism’). Sergius’ argument that since

24 All translations from Aristotle’s On Interpretation are by J.L. Ackrill (1963), unless otherwise
stated.
25 According to Hugonnard-Roche (2004: 158) this account, though not explicitly expressed,
might also be intending to make a distinction between the two disciplines of logic and
grammar.
commentary 185

names are not the same for all people this should be taken as proof that they
are not natural is found in Ammonius (In De Int. 19.1ff.), which goes back at
least to his teacher Proclus, (Sorabji 2004b: 213–219). Cf. also Stephanus, In De
Int. (9.7–10.13).

§6 The different kinds of statements. The discussion on the “parts of speech”

goes far back into Antiquity and becomes a pervasive theme in the commen-
taries of the Neoplatonists. Its origin is found in the Stoic theory about λεκτὰ
αὐτοτελῆ ‘complete sayables’ and is related to Aristotle’s σχήματα λέξεως ‘figures
of speech’, though he did not make a systematic treatment of them. Never-
theless, in Late Antiquity the Aristotelian commentators took up this topic,
especially in the introductory sections of their commentaries on some of the
books of Organon.26 According to Schenkeveld (1984), who has made a thor-
ough overview of the Greek tradition, “The same five kinds are always men-
tioned, ἀποφαντικός, εὐκτικός, προστακτικός, ἐρωτηματικός and κλητικός, some-
times very briefly, at other times a theoretical foundation of this number is
given” (p. 295), and he concludes that in the philosophical tradition “neither
Ammonius nor anyone else connects this system with the theory of grammat-
ical moods” (p. 297).27 Nonetheless, at about the same time the grammarian
Dionysius Thrax describes five types of expression for the Greek verb, though
not exactly the given five, which he called ἐγκλίσεις, translated as ‫ܐ‬rqr‫ ܩ‬by
Joseph Huzaya28 (sixth century, on whom see Van Rompay 2011).
The five kinds of statements are called by Ammonius εἴδη λόγου ‘the species
of sentence/statement’29 which received a close rendering by Sergius in Syr-

26 Schenkeveld (1984: 291 ff.). On pp. 294 f., he gives a list of the passages in the text of
late ancient to late Byzantine Greek commentators, where these kinds of sentences are
discussed.
27 For a survey of the discussion whether such expressions are ‘verbal moods’, ‘sentence
types’, or ‘kinds of speech’, see van der Auwera & Zamorano Aguilar (2016).
28 Dionysius Thrax (ιγ´/13.5f., ed. Lallot): ἐγκλίσεις μὲν οὖν εἰσι πέντε, ὁριστική, προστακτική,
εὐκτική, ὑποτακτική, ἀπαρέμφατος .‫ܕܐ‬熏‫ ܦܩ‬.焏‫ܡܢ‬qr‫ ܡ‬.爯q煿q̈rq‫ ܐ‬r‫ܡ‬q 爏qq‫ܐ ܗ‬rqr‫ܩ‬
‫ܐ‬r‫ܡ‬焏‫ ܡ‬爯‫ܬܐ ܡ‬熏‫ܢ‬r‫ܡ‬r‫ ܡ‬.焏‫ ܡܩܒܠܢ‬.焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܠ‬犏‫( ܡ‬Appendix, 59–60/q‫ܣ–ܢ‬, see also
pp. 249f., ed. Merx 1889). The Greek of Dionysius in the English translation of Alan
Kemp (1987: 180): “There are five moods—defining, imperative, optative, subjunctive, and
infinitive.” For the Syriac grammatical tradition, see also Farina (2013: 148ff. on the “moods
of speech”).
29 In the English translation of Blank (1996: 12) of Ammonius’ In De Int. 2.10–20: “kinds
of sentence”, and they have the order: κλητικός, προστακτικός, ἐρωτηματικός, εὐκτικός,
and ἀποφαντικός. In Blank’s version: Vocative, Imperative, Interrogative, Optative, and
Assertoric; see also Blank’s note 7 and 14 ad loc. However, in Ammonius’ commentary
186 chapter 8

iac ‫ܐ‬r‫ ܕܡܠ‬焏r ̈ ‫‘ ܐܕ‬the species of sentence/statement’.30 This terminology

was also used by Paul the Persian (10.24–26, ed. Land),31 while Proba called
them ‫ܐ‬r‫ܡ‬焏‫ ܕܡ‬焏r ̈ ‫‘ ܐܕ‬the species of sentence/discourse’,32 Athanasius of
Balad has 焏q‫ܡܠ‬ ̈ r‫ܐ ܡ‬r‫ܡ‬焏‫‘ ܡ‬the complete sentences/discourses’,33 and in
an anonymous letter on accents they are called ‫ܐ‬r‫ ܕܡܠ‬焏rq̈‫ ܢ‬焏r‫ܡ‬q ‘the five
signs of sentence’.34
In the Syriac grammatical tradition the name of all five species of sentence or
speech were later adopted to designate accents,35 probably with the intention
to mark sentences that were expressing any of these types of statements.36 As it
appears from our text, Sergius reduced their number to four against the five of
Ammonius and most other commentators, but in accordance with some com-
mentators from the Arabic tradition.37 Also in the Vatican Syriac ms 158, studied
by Hugonnard-Roche (2004: 119), concerning the various divisions made by Por-
phyry, one of the two divisions has four kinds of sentences, where vocative is
excluded.
In the Syriac logical and grammatical tradition the four/five species of state-
ment were rendered by the terms and with order given below.

on Eisagoge we have μέρη λόγου ‘parts of speech’ and πυσματικός for interrogative, with
another order as this quotation shows: (In Isag. 43.4–5): τοῦ δὲ λόγου πολλά εἰσι μέρη,
ἀποφαντικὸν εὐκτικὸν κλητικὸν προστακτικὸν πυσματικόν. But the fact that only Ammonius’
commentary to On Interpretation is believed to have been written by his own hand and
the rest of his works recorded by his pupils on the basis of his seminars, may explain this
difference of ordering of words, if the ordering was considered to be important in any
way.
30 In an almost literal quotation the same order and examples are given also in Sergius’
Commentary, (see L.7rb25–7va14/P.23r10–23).
31 But in the Syriac translation from Persian of his Elucidation of Peri Hermeneias by Severus
Sebokht (d. 666/7) we have ‫ܐ‬r‫ܡ‬焏‫ ܕܡ‬焏r ̈ ‫( ܐܕ‬52.11, ed. Hugonnard-Roche 2013).
32 In De Int. 66.3–4, ed. Hoffmann 1873, and also pp. 115f.
33 In his translation of an anonymous Greek introduction to Aristotelian syllogistic, (732.7,
ed. Furlani). Cf. the Stoic expression λεκτὰ αὐτοτελῆ ‘complete sayables’.
34 Ed. Phillips (1869), Appendix i, pp. 68 and 75, where he has the translation “five signs of
discourse”.
35 King (2013a: 109 ff.).
36 Revell (1974: 22–26 and 29).
37 Revell (1974: 20 f.), who gives a survey of the Hebrew, Arabic, and Syriac tradition, mentions
the grammarian Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā Thaʿlab (d. 908) with the claim of four categories.
According to Diogenes Laertius, book 9 (53–54, ed. Dorandi 2013), also Protagoras had
four sentences, but as Professor Jaap Mansfeld points out (personal communication), this
is certainly a later interpretation.
commentary 187

First, we present the Syriac equivalents to Ammonius’ terms: κλητικός

焏q‫ܘ‬r‫‘ ܩ‬vocative’, προστακτικός ‫ܕܐ‬熏‫‘ ܦܩ‬imperative’, ἐρωτηματικός/πυσματικός
焏‫ܠܢ‬焏r‫‘ ܡ‬interrogative’, εὐκτικός 38焏‫ܣܢ‬q‫\ܡܦ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܠ‬犏‫‘ ܡ‬precative’, and ἀπο-
φαντικός 焏‫ܩ‬熏‫‘ ܦܣ‬declarative’. Their internal order is as follows:

Sergius: ‫ܕܐ‬熏‫ ܦܩ‬/ 焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܠ‬犏‫ ܡ‬/ 焏‫ܠܢ‬焏r‫ ܡ‬/ 39焏‫ܩ‬熏‫ܦܣ‬.

Paul (10.26–11.1):40 焏‫ܠܢ‬焏r‫ ܡ‬/ ‫ܕܐ‬熏‫ ܦܩ‬/ 焏‫ܣܢ‬q‫ ܡܦ‬/ 焏q‫ܘ‬r‫ ܩ‬/ 焏‫ܩ‬熏‫ܦܣ‬.
Proba (66.4f.): 焏‫ܠܢ‬焏r‫ ܡ‬/ 焏q‫ܘ‬r‫ ܩ‬/ 焏‫ܣܢ‬q‫ ܡܦ‬/ ‫ܕܐ‬熏‫ ܦܩ‬/ 焏‫ܩ‬熏‫ܦܣ‬.
Athanasius (732.7–9): 焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܠ‬犏‫ ܡ‬/ 焏‫ܠܢ‬焏r‫ ܡ‬/ 焏q‫ܘ‬r‫ ܩ‬/ ‫ܕܐ‬熏‫ ܦܩ‬/
焏‫ܩ‬熏‫ܦܣ‬.
Anonymous:41 焏‫ܠܢ‬焏r‫ ܡ‬/ 焏q‫ܘ‬r‫ ܩ‬/ 焏‫ܣܢ‬q‫ ܡܦ‬/ ‫ܕܐ‬熏‫ ܦܩ‬/ 焏‫ܩ‬熏‫ܦܣ‬.

The order of none of these Syriac lists is in agreement with those two of
Ammonius, but Proba and the anonymous grammarian have the same terms
and internal order.
Following up Sergius’ four species of statement, it is valuable to quote Al-
Farabi’s description of the five kinds of sentences and to give his account of the
discussion about vocative, concerning which there seems to have been a dis-
pute whether it should be considered as a complete sentence. In his commen-
taries on Aristotle’s On Interpretation (17a2–3), Al-Farabi has: “At this point, sen-
tences must be divided into their primary species, namely, imperative, request,

38 King (2013a: 110 n. 47). According to a later tradition: if God was the addressee of the
request 焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܠ‬犏‫ ܡ‬was used, but if it was a created being 焏‫ܣܢ‬q‫ ܡܦ‬was used, see the
quotation in Hoffmann (1873: 16) and cf. Revell (1974: 25f.). This information is repeated
also by Bar Bahlul in his lexicon, who even presents the five ‘species’ (焏r ̈ ‫ )ܐܕ‬of speech
(col. 1098: ‫ܐ‬r‫ )ܡܠ‬as these: ‫ܕܐ‬熏‫ ܦܩ‬/ 焏‫ܠܢ‬焏r‫ ܡ‬/ 焏‫ܣܢ‬q‫\ܡܦ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܠ‬犏‫ ܡ‬/ 焏q‫ܘ‬r‫ ܩ‬and
焏‫ܩ‬熏‫ܦܣ‬.
39 In the Commentary (L.7va3/P.23r17), Sergius has the same order but calls the last species
just 犟‫̇ܗܘ ܕܦܣ‬, which could be taken as an indication that the Introduction was written
later.
40 In his treatise Elucidation of Peri Hermeneias (‫ܣ‬焏q‫ܢ‬煿‫ܐܪܡ‬煿q‫ܪ‬煿‫ ܕܦ‬焏‫ܒ‬rq‫ܗܪܐ ܕ‬熏‫ܢ‬,
ed. Hugonnard-Roche 2013), Paul gives a list of ten species of statement (52.11f.): ‫ܐ‬r‫ܥܣ‬
.焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܕܡ‬r‫ ܡ‬.焏‫ܩ‬熏‫ ܦܣ‬.焏‫ܣܢ‬q‫ ܡܦ‬.‫ܕܐ‬熏‫ ܦܩ‬.焏‫ܠܢ‬焏r‫ ܡ‬.焏q‫ܘ‬r‫ ܩ‬:‫ܐ‬r‫ܡ‬焏‫ ܕܡ‬焏r ̈ ‫ܢ ܐܕ‬熏‫ܐܢ‬
焏‫ܢ‬qr‫ܦ‬r‫ ܡ‬.焏‫ܡ‬熏q‫ ܣ‬.焏‫ܡܢ‬q‫ܬܣ‬r‫ ܡ‬.[‫؟‬焏‫ܡܢ‬q] 焏q‫ܡ‬q “Les espèces du discours sont dix:
vocatif, interrogatif, impératif, déprécatif, déclaratif, exclamatif, juratif [ yīmānā?], institu-
tif, hypothétique, dubitatif.” Yet, also he says that they can be reduced to five species, since
dubitative can be assigned to interrogative, and exclamative, jurative/promissive, insti-
tutive, and hypothetic can be assigned to declarative. For a discussion, see Hugonnard-
Roche (2011: 213ff.).
41 Phillips (1869, Appendix i, p. 68).
188 chapter 8

entreaty, vocative, and statement,”42 and then continues “Regarding the voca-
tive, it is a matter of dispute whether it is a sentence or a single word.”43
In this connection, Zimmermann gives the following quotation from the
scholium to the manuscript of an Arabic version of On Interpretation in Paris,
Bibliothèque nationale, ar. 2346,44 which he names School Note (pp. cli and clii):

School Note: «According to Allīnūs, there are ⟨only⟩ four kinds of sen-
tences: entreaty, request (or: question [as-sāʾil]), imperative, and state-
ment. He says that the vocative is not a kind, but a part, of sentences
because it can be employed in connexion with all other kinds. That it is
not a sentence he shows as follows. Every sentence is composed of a noun
and a verb [kalima]. A vocative however is not composed of a noun and a
verb. It is therefore not a sentence.»45

A definite identification of “Allinus” has yet not been made,46 but according
to some information he composed, among others, a commentary on Aristo-
tle’s Categories. Sergius does not make any comment about his own list of four
species/kinds of sentences and his exclusion of the vocative from it. Neverthe-
less, he might have held similar ideas about the function of the vocative, namely
that it does not constitute a sentence, in contrast with the other four species,
but rather that it is just a single word and thereby part of a sentence.

§6 Only declaratory sentences signify truth or falsity. The background for this
comment on declaratory sentence (λόγος ἀποφαντικός) can be found in the
discussion at On Interpretation (16a33–17a7), as Aristotle expresses it (7a2–3):
ἀποφαντικὸς δὲ οὐ πᾶς, ἀλλ’ ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι ὑπάρχει “not every sen-
tence is a statement-making sentence, but only those in which there is truth
or falsity”, which Sergius and Ammonius verify (In Isag. 43.10–12): μόνος δὲ ὁ

42 Zimmermann (1981: 43). The Arabic words are: amr, ṭalab, taḍarruʿ, nidāʾ, jāzim (ibid.,
p. 43 n. 4). Also in his short treatise to On Interpretation, Al-Farabi has these five kinds, but
with another order, which would indicate that the order does not necessarily mean much.
There he has: “The genera of complete phrases are, according to many of the ancients, five
in number, namely, statement, imperative, entreaty, request, and vocative” (ibid., p. 226).
43 Zimmermann (1981: 44), cf. also Hugonnard-Roche (2004: 158f.).
44 On this manuscript and the comments written on its margin, Hugonnard-Roche (1993:
19–28).
45 Zimmermann (1981: 254 n. 5 to p. 10).
46 For references to Allinus, see Rosenthal (1972: 337–349), and Zimmermann (1981: xcvi–
xcviii).
commentary 189

ἀποφαντικὸς λόγος περιέχει τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος· οἱ γὰρ ἄλλοι οὔτε ἀληθεύ-
ουσιν οὔτε ψεύδονται ‘only the declaratory sentence contains truth and falsity,
for other kinds express neither truth nor falsity’. And it is this kind of sen-
tence that Aristotle and his commentators consider meaningful to be studied
within the scope of logic. Also Paul the Persian upholds that (Elucidation of Peri
Hermeneias 52.26): rq‫ܕ ܐ‬熏q‫ ܒܠ‬焏‫ܩ‬熏‫ܬܐ ܒܦܣ‬熏‫ܪܐ ܘܕܓܠ‬rr ‘truth and falsity
exist only in a declaratory (sentence)’; and the same idea is expressed also in
his Treatise on the Logic of Aristotle at 11.16–18, (see also Hugonnard-Roche 2004:
159; and cf. Porph. 57.4).

§7 The account of universals. In the same way as Aristotle himself uses the
Greek word εἶδος for both ‘species’ and ‘form’, so also do the Neoplatonist com-
mentators. Plato uses εἶδος ‘form’ and ἰδέα ‘idea/form’ in a technical sense for
the real essence of the entities, which have an independent existence and must
be perceived by reason, whereas for Aristotle εἶδος ‘form’ is always attached to
matter (ὕλη), without any independent existence. Likewise, Sergius employs
the borrowed Syriac counterpart of εἶδος, namely 焏r‫‘ ܐܕ‬species’, in the tech-
nical meaning it has in Plato and Aristotle, and in such contexts usually trans-
lated into ‘form’ in English. By his presentation of the Neo-Platonic notion
of the genera and forms, and whether they have an independent existence
or exist solely in our notion, Sergius touches upon the question of univer-
sals (τὰ καθόλου47) and the huge dispute that emerged concerning them.48
Porphyry had mentioned the problem in Eisagoge (1.9–16), but regarded it
best to not deal with it in an introductory or logical work. However, while
reading the Eisagoge the ensuing Neoplatonist philosophers (among them
Ammonius, In Isag. 43.23–45.15,49 see also Ammon. 41.5–11) paid attention
to Porphyry’s statement on them and brought up the problem for discus-
sion. As Hugonnard-Roche (2004: 159) notes, the three states of universals
are not explicitly mentioned in the works of Plato, but they seem to have
appeared at the time of Middle Platonism. Later in his commentary on the
Eisagoge, Ammonius (In Isag. 41.10–42.26, and 68.25–69.5) gave the following
threefold distinction to the universals, corresponding to Sergius’ tripartite divi-
sion:

47 Ammon. (41.4) and Elias In Isag. (48.16,30).

48 For a good overview, see Hoffmann (1992, esp. p. 242), Benakis (1982), Libera (1996, esp.
pp. 34ff. and 103–105), and Libera (2014).
49 See also Fortier (2012: 21–33).
190 chapter 8

1) The first stage is when the εἴδη (焏r ̈ ‫‘ )ܐܕ‬forms’ are ἐν τῷ δημιουργῷ50 ‘with
the demiurge’ (Sergius: 焏q‫ܘ‬r‫ܬ ܒ‬熏‫‘ ܠ‬with the creator’) and these are the
Platonic ἰδέαι ‘forms’ yet being πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν51 ‘prior to the many’ (Latin:
universalia ante res), and they are said to have an independent exis-
tence.52
2) Next stage is when the εἴδη (焏r ̈ ‫‘ )ܐܕ‬forms’ occur ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ53 (焏‫ܘܠ‬煿‫‘ )ܒ‬in
the matter’, that is to say, they are now τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ ἔνυλα εἴδη54 ‘the physical
̈
and material forms’ (焏q‫ܢ‬qq‫ ܘ‬焏q‫)̈ܗܘܠܢ‬, since they have been actualized in
a physical form, have been perceptible, and become ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς55 ‘in the
many’ (Latin: universalia in rebus), and are inseparable from the corporeal
bodies in which they are (ἀχώριστα τῆς ὕλης56).
3) The last stage is when the εἴδη (焏r ̈ ‫‘ )ܐܕ‬forms’ are ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ57
(‫ܐ‬rq‫ܪܥ‬r‫‘ )ܒ‬in the thought’, and have become notional (ἐννοηματικά58
焏q‫ܢ‬q‫ܥ‬r) after having been observed and perceived by a sentient being and
therefore are ὑστερογενής59 ‘later in origin’ (Sergius: 焏qrq‫‘ ܐ‬last’) as being
ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς60 ‘posterior to the many’ (Latin: universalia post res), and are
grasped in our mind/memory.61

Worth noting is that the creator (焏q‫ܘ‬r‫ )ܒ‬and maker (‫ܕܐ‬熏‫ )ܥܒ‬of Sergius
should perhaps be understood in a Christian sense (Hugonnard-Roche 2004:

50 Ammon. In Isag. (41.23, 42.6).

51 Ammon. In Isag. (41.18, 42.7,16).
52 On this, see Ammon. In Isag. (44.3).
53 Elias In Isag. (48.28), and David In Isag. (113.17, 114.22), whereas Ammonius has (In Isag.
42.9f.): ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς εἶναι καὶ ἀχώριστα τῆς ὕλης ‘being in the many and inseparable from
matter’.
54 Ammon. In Isag. (11.28). The word ἔνυλος is only once used by Aristotle (On the Soul
403a25), but is also present in Iamblichus, De mysteriis v. 8.6, vii. 2.7.
55 Ammon. In Isag. (41.18 f., 42.9,20).
56 Ammon. In Isag. (11.27, 12.11 f.), cf. also Ammon. (33.24–25).
57 Ammon. In Isag. (41.17,19, 42.12).
58 Ammon. In Isag. (69.1 f., 69.4 f.).
59 Ammon. In Isag. (41.20, 42.13, 69.1).
60 Ammon. In Isag. (41.19), and he has at (42.13): ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἢ μετὰ τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ
ὑστερογενές.
61 The Platonic division of the universals into these three states of being is also presented in
the dialogue of Jacob/Severus bar Shakko, which is said to reproduce the interpretation
of Stephanus of Alexandria (Steph. Syr. In Isag.29.31–30.13/qq .٣١ ‫ ܠ ـ‬.١٦). There, ‫ܡ‬煟‫ܩ‬
‫ܐ‬焏q‫ ܣ̈ܓ‬is given for πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ‫ܐ‬焏q‫ ܒܣ̈ܓ‬for ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς, and ‫ܐ‬焏q‫ܪ ܣ̈ܓ‬r‫ܒ‬
for ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς.
commentary 191

160), though it is possible to think that it is just the Platonic demiurge, since
Sergius does not present his own views, but reports the standpoint of the
Platonists. But because Sergius after all chooses here to present the view of the
Platonists about general concepts and a Christian parallel to them can be found
in Pseudo-Dionysius, he was perhaps attracted by this doctrine, even if he says
in his Commentary that the Peripatetics do not believe in this teaching.62 In
this context, Ammonius’ (In Isag. 41.13–42.1263) metaphor of a portrait being
engraved on the bezel of a ring, then imprinted on many different pieces of
wax, and finally being conceived in the mind of man, has its parallel in Sergius’
Commentary (P.21r14–21v23, Watt 2014a: 37ff.).64

§9 The ten categories. From now on, Sergius leaves behind the view of the
Platonists and approaches one of the chief aims of his exposition, that is to
present the ten categories of Aristotle and to discuss them. By first discussing
the self-subsistent Platonic forms, Sergius probably intended to contrast them
against the Aristotelian categories of the perceptible world, which encompass
̈
all physically existing things. Sergius describes the categories (焏‫ = ܓܢܣ‬γενεά)
as underlying every existent being and containing or comprising them. At
this first instance, he presents each of the ten categories as a supreme or
̈
highest genus (爯q‫ ܓܢܣ‬爿‫ ܓܢ‬γένος γενικώτατον ‘most generic genus’, summa
genera), but later on he acknowledges, like most other Neoplatonists, four main
categories, as more clearly stated in his Commentary (L.47rb31–36/P.89r8–10):
̈
.焏q‫ ܐܘܣ‬qq‫ܘܗܝ܉ ܐ‬rq‫ ܐ‬爯q‫ ܓܢܣ‬爿‫[ ܓܢ‬焏‫ ܕܙܢ‬焏‫ ܕܐܦ ̣ܗܘ ]ܓܢܣ‬爏q‫ܡ‬
‫ܡ‬煟‫ܬ ܡ‬熏‫ ܕܠ‬焏‫ܢ‬rq‫ ܐ‬焏‫ ̇ܗܘ ܓܢܣ‬qq‫ ܘܐ‬.‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܡ‬q qq‫‘ ܘܐ‬because also the
[category of quality] is a supreme genus, like substance, like quantity, and like
the further category of relatives’, (cf. also P.97r7–v3, and L.42ra14f./P.78v21).
That Sergius thinks substance, quantity, quality, and relatives are the four main
categories is also indicated by the fact that they are given first here in Sergius’
list of the ten categories. However, only substance is self-subsistent,65 whereas

62 As proposed by John W. Watt (personal communication).

63 See also Elias In Isag. (48.15–30).
64 Cf. also Hoffmann (1992: 241) and Hugonnard-Roche (2004: 160 and 2006: 103–110).
65 Sergius uses the substantive form ‫ܗ‬rq‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܡ‬q熏‫‘ ܩ‬self-subsistence’, (corresponding to
Greek αὐθυπόστασις), rather than the adjective αὐθυπόστατος ‘self-subsistent’ of Ammonius
(33.12, 35.15, but esp. the related section at In Isag. 70.8–13). In an anonymous commen-
tary on the Eisagoge, the closer masculine form ‫ܗ‬rq‫ ܠ‬爟q‫ ܡܩ‬and the feminine r‫ܡ‬q‫ܡܩ‬
‫̇ܗ‬rq‫ ܠ‬both ‘self-subsistent’ are given (at 46.17–19/熏‫ ܡ‬.١٧ ‫ ـ‬١٩ passim in Aristoteles bei
den Syrern, ed. Baumstark). Also in Sergius’ A Natural Demonstration (178r29f.), we find:
192 chapter 8

the other three main categories (i.e. quantity, quality, and relatives) do not
have their own existence, but come about by participation or in relation to
substance. And the remaining six are brought forth through the combina-
tion of substance with these three, (P.97v3–98r10; Ammon. 92.6–12 and Philop.
63.15–24). For that reason, the four main or extensive categories are treated
more exhaustively than the other six. Throughout his text, Sergius keeps to
the terms he has chosen for the ten categories, except for ‘quality’ concern-
ing which he cannot make up his mind, but the use of it fluctuates and he
tries out different alternatives, (see below §12). For a discussion on the gen-
era that lie between a specific species and a general genus, that is “the sub-
ordinate genera” (ὑπάλληλα γένη), see the exposition of Porphyry at 83.18–
34.

§10 The aim of the Categories. In his account of substance, Sergius articulates
the adopted formula saying that the goal of the Categories itself is about simple
words that signify simple objects through mediating simple concepts, (see
above §4 and pp. 70ff., and Hugonnard-Roche 2004: 160). That this account
does not appear elsewhere in his text depends on the envisaged character of
his treatise, which is not, as we have said, a commentary on the Categories, but
a primary introduction to the philosophy of Aristotle. As such an introduction it
covers naturally the contents of the Categories, where Aristotle’s ten categories
are presented in first place.

§12 Different words for quality. Although Sergius is supposed to have been
the first writer in Syriac dealing with philosophical topics, he mentions here
and at another instance (§80) the different terms that were in use for the
Greek 爿qqq‫ܐ‬熏‫ = ܦ‬ποιότης ‘quality’.66 This indetermination of Sergius and
his use of varying terms for this category is also present in the parallel pas-
sages of his Commentary, where in a related phrase he writes (P.26v9–11): ‫̇ܗܘ‬

‫ܗ‬rq‫ ܠ‬爟q‫ܡ ܕܡܩ‬煟‫܉ ܡ‬焏q‫ ܕܐܘܣ‬焏‫ܡ‬熏q‫‘ ܬ‬the definition of substance: something self-
subsistent’. Jacob of Edessa has both forms in his Encheiridion (‫ܗ‬rq‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܡ‬q熏‫ ܩ‬at 227.24,
228.17,19, 233.2 and ‫ܗ‬rq‫ ܠ‬爟q‫ ܡܩ‬at 229.13, 231.23, 232.1, 233.8,11,17 passim).
66 Interestingly, also Cicero gives the example of Latin qualitas, which he coined for Greek
ποιότης, when he writes (Academicorum i, 7, 25): “Qualitates igitur appellavi, quas ποιότη-
τας Graeci vocant, quod ipsum apud Graecos non est vulgi verbum, sed philosophorum,
atque id in multis.” / “So I used the term ‘qualities’ for what the Greeks call poiotêtes—
itself not an ordinary word in Greek, but a philosophical term, like many others.” (Trans.
Brittain 2006: 97). I thank Professor Christian Høgel, (University of Southern Denmark),
for this reference.
commentary 193

煿‫ ܠ‬爯‫ܢ‬qr‫ ̇ܩ‬焏‫ܙܓ‬熏‫ ܡ‬爯‫ܒ‬熟‫ ܘܒ‬焏‫ܠ‬qq 爯‫ܒ‬熟‫ ܒ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬爯‫ܢ‬q .‫ܣ‬熏q‫ܐ‬熏‫ܗ ܦ‬煿‫ܡ‬r‫‘ ܕ‬the (cat-
egory) which he named poiótês, but we call it sometimes ḥaylā and some-
times muzzāḡā.’ At the beginning of book six of his Commentary, dealing
with quality itself, he indicates that some works had already been translated
from Greek into Syriac, as he writes (L.46vb8/P.86v9): 爯‫ ܡ‬熏‫ܩ‬r‫ ܕܦ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬爯q‫ܠ‬q‫ܐ‬
rq焏q‫ܢ‬rq‫ ܐ‬焏qqr熏‫ ܕܣ‬焏‫ܬ ܩܠ‬r‫ ܠܒ‬焏q‫ܢ‬熏q 焏‫ܢ‬r‫ ܠ‬爯‫ܡ ܡ‬煟‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܒ‬rq̈ 爯q‫ܡ‬煟‫ܩ‬
爯qr‫ ̇ܩ‬焏‫ܠ‬qq 爯‫ܒ‬熟‫ ܒ‬煟q .焏‫ ܗܢ‬焏‫ ܕܓܢܣ‬67煿q‫ܢ‬熏q‫ ܒ‬煿‫ ܒ‬熏qrq‫ ܐܬ‬rq焏‫ܠܦ‬qr‫ܘܡ‬
.煿‫ ܠ‬爯q煿‫ܡ‬r‫ ܡ‬焏‫ ܙܢ‬爯‫ܒ‬熟‫ ܘܒ‬煿‫‘ ܠ‬those who before us have translated some books
from the Greek language to the expression of the Syrians have differently and
variously made use of the designation of this genus/category, as they call it
sometimes ḥaylā and they sometimes name it zənā.’ And in a literal passage
with some addition to B.98v3–5 (§80) we have (L.47vb12–22/P.88v26–89r3):
爯‫ܬ ܡ‬r‫ ܕܐܡ‬qq‫ ܐ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬爯‫ܢ‬q 68.爿qqqq熏‫ܐ ܦ‬煟q‫ ܒܥ‬焏q‫ܢ‬熏̈q 爯‫ܢ ̣ܡ‬煿‫̈ܡ‬rr‫ ܡ‬爯q‫̇ܗܢ‬
爯q煿‫ܡ‬r‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܙ̈ܓ‬熏‫ ܘܡ‬焏‫ܠ‬q̈q ‫܉‬焏qqr熏‫ ܣ‬爯‫ ܡ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܢ‬rq‫ ܐ‬.爯q煿‫ ܠ‬爯‫ܢ‬qr‫ ̇ܩ‬焏q̈‫܉ ܙܢ‬爏‫ܠܥ‬
.焏‫ ܙܢ‬焏‫ ܐܢ‬煿‫ܡ‬r‫܉ ܡ‬爯q煿‫ܠ‬q 爯q‫ܠ‬煿‫ ܠ‬爯q煿‫ ܠ‬r‫ܒ‬q̇‫ ̇ܗܘ ܕ‬爏qq‫ ܗ‬焏‫ ܠܓܢܣ‬.爯q煿‫‘ ܠ‬these
(qualities) are in ordinary usage named by the Greeks poiótêtes, but we, as I
have said above, call them zənayyā, and others among the Syrians name them
ḥaylē and muzzāḡē. However, the genus which contains all these things I name
zənā.’ Also in his On Genus, Species, and Individuality, Sergius says that ‘we call
(this) zənā’ (128vb17: 焏‫ ܙܢ‬爯‫ܢ‬qr‫)̇ܩ‬. These passages of Sergius about different Syr-
iac words used for quality are paraphrased by Dionysios bar Ṣalibi (d. 1171) in
his commentary on the Categories (see Wright 1901, vol. ii, p. 1011, the quota-
tion from Cambridge ms Gg. 2.14, fol. 123b). For a discussion on this passage
and the subsequent use of these different words for ‘quality’, see King (2011c:
234f.).
From our text and these quotations from the Commentary, we obtain five
different words used by Sergius for the Greek ποιός (Arist. Cat. 1b26) and ποιότης
(Arist. Cat. 8b25), all standing for ‘quality’. They are as follows:
‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܢ‬q‫ܐ‬, an abstract formation from the interrogative 焏‫ܢ‬q‫‘ ܐ‬which?’, ‘of
what sort?’, and it appears only here in the list of the ten categories. Aristotle
has ποιός ‘of what sort?’ in his list of all ten categories (Cat. 1b26), but for Sergius
this form of the word most likely corresponds to ποιότης ‘quality’ as the general
category.69

67 For the rest of the quotation we have lacuna in the London ms (L.46vbf.).
68 B.98v4 seems to have 爿q‫ܢ‬qq熏‫ܦ‬, while the spelling of L.47vb14 is ‫ܣ‬熏qq‫ܐ‬熏̥‫ ܦ‬and that of
P.88v27 ‫ܣ‬焏q焏q熏‫ܦ‬.
69 For an explanation of the difference between ποιός and ποιότης, see Philop. (133.23–30,
139.31–140.6).
194 chapter 8

‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬q‫ܐ‬, a shorter abstract formation of the same interrogative, which is

also used by George, Bishop of the Arabs, for ποιότης (G.28.14,15, 30.23 passim),70
who has 焏‫ܢ‬q‫‘ ܐ‬which?’ (G.10.27, 11.2) and 焏q‫ܢ‬q‫ ܐ‬for ποιός (G.31.17).71
焏‫ܙܓ‬熏‫ܡ‬, meaning ‘mixture’ (see also P.25v16), and usually employed as
the equivalent of Greek κρᾶσις for the temperament of body, as in the case in
Sergius’ text at §40 with this sense.
焏‫ܠ‬qq, basically meaning ‘power’ and usually used as equivalent of Greek
δύναμις.
焏‫ܙܢ‬, generally signifying ‘sort/kind’ and ‘manner’, (see L.34va25 /P.42v16,
L.18vb6/P.69v15, and L.26va5/P.70v14), and the most approximate Greek equiva-
lent of which would be τρόπος. The anonymous translator of the Categories uses
the abstract formation ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ ܙܢ‬for ποιότης (Cat. 8b25–26/A.134.12–14), a form
not found in Sergius.
It seems that Sergius at first uses ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܢ‬q‫ ܐ‬and ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܐ‬as literal equiva-
lences of Greek ποιότης, but later on he is more inclined to use primarily 焏‫ ܙܢ‬for
the category of ‘quality’, as indicated by the end of our last quotation (煿‫ܡ‬r‫ܡ‬
焏‫ ܙܢ‬焏‫‘ ܐܢ‬I name zənā’). We would expect that he consistently employed an
abstract formation for the category of ‘quality’ and 焏‫ܙܢ‬, 焏‫ܠ‬qq, and 焏‫ܙܓ‬熏‫ܡ‬
for the individual qualifications or properties in a body. Such a notion is sug-
gested by the interpolation at the beginning of Categories’ chapter five (8b25: on
quality) of the anonymous Syriac translation, where we have (A.134.12f.): rqr‫ܦ‬
‫ܪܘܬܐ‬熏q qq‫ ܐ‬.焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܥ‬ ̈ ‫ ܒ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬焏‫ ܙܢ‬焏‫ܥ‬煟qr‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܥ‬r‫ܬܐ ܒ‬熏‫ ܙܢ‬.焏‫ ܙܢ‬爯‫ܬܐ ܡ‬熏‫ܙܢ‬
.‫ܪܐ‬熏q‫“ ܘ‬Quality differs from qualification. Quality is known by the mind, but
qualification by the senses [lit. by the eyes]. For example, [respectively] ‘white-
ness’ and ‘white’” (tr. King 2010b: 135).72

§20 Gradation of existing things. After having introduced and briefly described
the ten categories, Sergius makes a gradation of the entities that are significant
for determining the subjects and predicates in the propositions that will be uti-
lized and how they relate to one another (Hugonnard-Roche 2004: 160 f.). This
classification and gradation is based on Porphyry’s Eisagoge 4.21–25 and is usu-

70 The form ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܐ‬occurs also in the translation of Cyril of Alexandria’s commentary on
Luke (406.1: ‫ܬܗ‬熏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܐ‬爯‫ ܡ‬焏q‫)ܡ̣ܠ‬, to which a gloss is written in the margin of the ms(s):
焏qr‫ܩ‬r‫ ܡ‬爿qq‫ܐ‬熏‫ ܦ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬rq焏‫ܢ‬熏q .焏‫ܕܥ‬熏r‫ܐ ܡ‬r‫ܥܡ‬q 焏q‫ܬܐ ܗܪ‬熏‫ܢ‬q‫‘ ܐ‬ʾaynūṯā here
signifies a taste, and in Greek it is called poiótês’, (cf. King 2011c: 234 n. 35 and TS.159).
71 See also King (2010b: 321): “Greek-Syriac Glossary”.
72 See also King’s discussion to this gloss at pp. 220f. and the similar passage at Ammon.
80.20–26 which he has located, and also his comment on p. 226 to Cat. 9a28 for the
inconsistent usage of the anonymous translator.
commentary 195

ally known as “Porphyry’s tree” by modern commentators, an expression which,

however, lacks historical attestation, and the only early mention of a similar
“tree” is in fact found in Sergius’ short treatise On Genus, Species, and Individu-
ality, (bl Add 14658, fol. 127vb5–128ra19, see Barnes 2003: 109 n. 53). Sergius gives
a more complete account of the levels of “Porphyry’s tree” later when dealing
with the differentiae of substance (§41).

§21 Homonyms, polyonyms, synonyms, and heteronyms. The fact that Aristo-
tle commences the Categories (1a1–15) with a specification of homonyms, syn-
onyms, and paronyms—seemingly pure linguistic observations—made some
commentators argue that the goal of the entire treatise is about terms and not
realities (cf. Simpl. 18.27–19.8). To Aristotle’s threefold division of things some
commentators, like Ammonius, Philoponus, and Simplicius, added a presen-
tation of the two additional classes of polyonyms and heteronyms. The reason
why Aristotle himself had omitted these two kinds is explained by Porphyry
(61.2–3) as being irrelevant to the aim of the Categories.73 Other commentators
omitted paronyms, and described the remaining four (Hugonnard-Roche 2004:
161), probably since the paronyms did not fit into the classification of four ways
by which things could be connected to one another and also that paronyms
were conceived to be apparently more linguistic than the other four classes.74
Sergius’ omission of paronyms75 is the more understandable considering the
far more derivative and productive function of endings in Greek than in Syr-
iac. However, it is significant to establish that Sergius’ word-formation generally
has a focus on meaning, rather than being a literal rendering of the underlying
Greek word, while the latter method was applied by many subsequent Syriac
translators and commentators. The four classes that Sergius presents are:
‫ܐ‬煿̈‫ܡ‬r rq‫ ܕ̈ܡ‬ὁμώνυμα ‘homonyms’: objects that share, or have in com-
mon (‫ܬܦ ܒ‬熏r κοινωνεῖν), only the name (焏‫ܡ‬r ὄνομα), but differ in defini-
tion (焏‫ܡ‬熏q‫ ܬ‬ὁρισμός) or account (‫ܐ‬r‫ ܡܠ‬λόγος). Sergius gives examples of
different things that have the name “dog” in common, viz. the land-dog, the

73 According to the report of Simplicius (23.12–19) the Neoplatonist Syrianus (d. 437) con-
sidered them to be linguistic terms and therefore being more appropriate to a treatise on
rhetoric than to one on realities.
74 For the description of these classes, see also Porph. (60.21–33), Ammon. (15.16–16.6),
Philop. (14.11–16), Olymp. (26.13–22, 27.10–20), Simpl. (22.22–23.12), and Anon. (1.8–17).
75 The Anonymous translator of the Categories (96.16), Jacob of Edessa (253.17), as well
as Severus Sebokht (50.3,13) in his translation of Paul the Persian’s Elucidation of Peri
Hermeneias, have 焏‫ܡ‬r 爯‫ ܡ‬for ‘paronym’ (lit. ‘from name’), while George, Bishop of the
Arabs, has (9.11) 焏‫ܡ‬r ‫ܝ‬rq犏‫ܒ‬, (cf. King 2010b: 170).
196 chapter 8

water-dog, the star-dog, and the philosopher-dog, which were used also by the
Greek commentators, as Chase says: “the dog had been a frequent example in
school-discussions of homonymy since the time of the early Empire” (Chase
2002: 116 n. 291).76 In the Syriac translation of Porphyry’s Eisagoge, we find (13.13)
焏‫ܡ‬r ‫ܬ‬熏q‫ܡ‬煟‫ܒ‬, an adverbialized substantive form of the same root, for ὁμω-
νύμως ‘homonymously’ (Eis. 6.8), while the revision of Athanasius of Balad has
rq‫ܐ‬煿‫ܡ‬r ‫ܬ‬熏q熏r‫ ܒ‬and all three Syriac translators of the Categories (cf. King
2010b: 320) and Bar ʿEbroyo (47.13) have: 焏‫ܡ‬r qq̈熏r (A.96.6, J.253.3, and G.9.2)
for ὁμώνυμα of Cat. 1a1. Paul the Persian (50.2,4) has 焏‫ܡ‬r ‫ܬ‬熏q熏r ‘homonymy’
(substantive) and 焏‫ܡ‬r qq̈熏r ‘homonyms/homonymous’ (substantive/adjec-
tive). At any rate, in the Concerning the Division of Substance (bl Add 14658, at
170ra34), we find 焏‫ܡ‬r ‫ܬ‬熏q熏r for ‘homonymy’.
焏r̈‫ ܐܕ‬rq‫ ܕ̈ܡ‬is brought forward to correspond to Greek πολυώνυμα ‘poly-
onyms’: objects that share the account, but have a variety of names. How-
ever, this compound term should be considered as a closer equivalent to ὁμο-
ειδῆ ‘belong to/be of the same species’ than πολυώνυμα.77 It is the idea which
he expresses in his Commentary (L.10rb7f./P.30r14 f.): 煿‫ ܡܢ‬煟q 煿‫ ܕܡܢ‬爏q‫ܡ‬
爯q‫ ܗܠ‬爯q煿qrq‫ ܐ‬焏r‫‘ ܕܐܕ‬because these belong to the same species’. Things
belonging to the same species, but having various names are exemplified by
Sergius with three words for stones, while most Greek commentators adduce
several words for sword, Ammon. (16.6): ἄορ ξίφος μάχαιρα “sword, scimitar,
and sabre”; Philop. (15.2): ἄορ ξίφος σπάθη; Simpl. (38.26): ἄορ ξίφος μάχαιρα
φάσγανον, and Anon. (4.4–5): ἄορ, ξίφος, σπάθη, φάσγανον· σίδηρος γὰρ ἀμφί-
στομος ταῦτα πάντα each one meaning ‘a two-edged iron’, that is ‘a sword’ (cf.
Chase 2002: 123 n. 402). All these five Greek terms for sword are present in the
Tekhnē Grammatikē of Dionysius Thrax, but there they exemplify synonymous
words (ιβʹ/12.72f. no. 7). Bar ʿEbroyo has a similar passage with the very same
examples as Sergius (47.15–48.2): ‫ܕܥ‬熏r‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܥ‬熏‫ ܣ‬煟q 焏‫ܡ‬r ‫ ܗܘ‬煟q 熏‫ ܠ‬煟q
̈
.爯qr‫ܩ‬r‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܡ‬r ‫ܝ‬焏q‫ ܘܣܓ‬爯q‫ܕܥ‬熏r‫ܡ ܡ‬煟‫ ܡ‬煟q‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܢ‬rq‫ ܘ‬焏‫ܦ‬焏q‫ ܘ‬焏‫ܥ‬熏r qq‫ܐ‬
‘when the name [that] signifies a single object is not one, as for rock, stone, and
flint, which [all] signify a single thing, they call [those words] polyonyms’.78
̈
Thus, he employs the closer rendering 焏‫ܡ‬r ‫ܝ‬焏q‫ ܣܓ‬for πολυώνυμα, which is
similar to Severus Sebokht’s rendering of Paul’s terminology (50.3,9): ‫ܘܬ‬焏q‫ܣܓ‬

76 For an overview of the ancient discussion on homonyms, see esp. Anton (1969), but also
Anton (1968), Narcy (1981: 42 ff.), and Bäck (2008: 49–53).
77 Against Hugonnard-Roche (2004: 161) and King (2011c: 232).
78 Janssens’ French translation (1937: 145): “Lorsque le terme n’est pas un, il représente—soit
un seul objet, comme rocher, pierre et roc qui représentent une seule chose et sont appelés
polyonymes.”
commentary 197

‫ܐ‬煿̈‫ܡ‬r ‘polyonymy’ and ‫ܐ‬煿̈‫ܡ‬r 焏q‫‘ ܣܓ‬polyonyms’, and being exemplified

with different names for sword (焏‫ܒ‬rq ‫ܐ‬r‫ ܣܦܣ‬焏‫ܦ‬q‫)ܣ‬.
焏r‫ ܐܕ‬煟q r‫ ̈ܒܢ‬is used to correspond to συνώνυμα ‘synonyms’: objects that
share both the name and the account. Again, the meaning is closer to Greek
μονοειδῆ ‘of one species’ than συνώνυμα. If we pay regard to Sergius’ selection of
the expression ‘of one species’,79 it is not remarkable that he provides the exam-
ple of Alexander the Macedonian and Alexander Paris80 for synonyms. First of
all, Paris81 was also called Alexander and it was not uncommon to use these
two names in connection with the discussion at hand. Philoponus (16.22–24:
Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Πάρις καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Μακεδών), Elias (139.29–33), and Simpli-
cius (31.22–25, cf. also 36.8–11) give these two names, however, as example of
homonyms by chance and not by intention, and not of synonyms. Already Por-
phyry had written (65.21–25): ἅ ὡς ἔτυχεν καὶ ἀνεπιστάτως διάφορα πράγματα
τῆς αὐτῆς ἔτυχε προσηγορίας, ὥσπερ Ἀλέξανδρός τε ὁ Πριάμου καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ
Φιλίππου ὁ Μακεδόνων βασιλεύσας. ταῦτα γὰρ κατὰ τύχην ὁμώνυμα εἶναι λέγεται
“Different things that have the same designation purely by chance and uninten-
tionally: for example Alexander the son of Priam and Alexander the son of King
Philip of Macedon. These are called homonyms.”82 Also in Tekhnē Grammatikē
of Dionysius Thrax, we find the names Alexander and Paris, but not for syn-
onyms or homonyms, except for dionymous words (ιβʹ/12.76–78 no. 9). Else, in
the discussion on homonymous and synonymous words most Greek commen-
tators utilize the example of Ajax (Αἴας) or the two Ajaxes (Αἴαντε),83 which are
said to be homonymous and synonymous at the same time. They are homony-
mous by having the same name, but synonymous in having the same definition:

79 In his Concerning the Division of Substance at 171va34f., Sergius has 焏‫ ܓܢܣ‬煟q r‫‘ ̈ܒܢ‬of one
genus’, but this might be an error.
80 We should accept the reading of the ms here, and not read “Alexandre de Perse”, as
Hugonnard-Roche (2004: 156, 161, and 162 n. 1) does. Even though L.10va1 has indeed
焏q‫ܣ‬r‫‘ ܦ‬Persian’ here, yet on the chart at L.11r it has 爿q‫ܪ‬焏‫‘ ܦ‬Paris’ as well as in the text
at L.14va22 (= B.86r2) 爿q‫ܪ‬焏‫ܦ‬, while P.30v3 has instead here in the text 爿q‫ܪ‬焏‫ܦ‬, but on
the chart at P.31v has 焏q‫ܣ‬r‫‘ ܦ‬Persian’, and again at P.35r12 ‫ܪܣ‬焏‫ܦ‬. Also in his Concerning
the Division of Substance at 171vb1 f., Sergius gives ‫ܪܘܣ‬煟‫ܣܢ‬q‫ ܘܐܠ‬焏q‫ܘܢ‬煟‫ܪܣ ܡܩ‬煟‫ܣܢ‬q‫ܐܠ‬
爿q‫ܪ‬焏‫‘ ܦ‬Alexander the Macedonian and Alexander Paris’. Sergius seems to be aware of
Alexander Paris as being a main figure from the Trojan War, see §24 here. See also King
(2011c: 231 and 234 n. 33).
81 Paris, son of Priam, is the individual who by carrying off Helen from Sparta brought on
war with Troy (Iliad 24.28 ff.).
82 All quotations from Porphyry’s commentary on the Categories are taken from Steven
K. Strange’s English translations (1992), unless otherwise stated.
83 For these two characters, see Homer’s Iliad 13.694–711 passim.
198 chapter 8

mortal, rational, and animal, namely that of being ‘man’.84 Also in Tekhnē Gram-
matikē, the name Ajax is used for homonymous words.
Simplicius mentions that (35.10f.) τετραχῶς τὸ αὐτὸ ὁμώνυμόν τε καὶ συνώνυ-
μον λέγεται “the same thing can be called ‘homonymous’ and ‘synonymous’ in
four different senses”,85 of which one is (Simpl. 35.15–18): ποτὲ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ πρὸς
τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα διαφόροις ἑαυτοῦ ὀνόμασιν ὁμώνυμόν τε εὑρίσκεται καὶ συνώνυμον,
ὡς Σωκράτης ὁ φιλόσοφος πρὸς Σωκράτην τὸν Θεαιτήτου συγγυμναστὴν ὁμώνυμος
μὲν καθὸ Σωκράτης, συνώνυμος δὲ καθὸ ἄνθρωπος “Sometimes, the same thing
is found to be both homonymous and synonymous with regard to the same
reality, by virtue of its different names. For instance, the philosopher Socrates,
qua Socrates, is homonymous to Socrates the school-mate of Theaetetus, but
the two are synonymous qua men”, (see also Simpl. 30.16–31.21, 33.27–34.7 and
35.10–36.7).
In Sergius’ Commentary, we find a passage reminiscent of the one just quoted
from Simplicius. Although Sergius does not provide the notation 煟q r‫̈ܒܢ‬
焏r‫‘ ܐܕ‬of one species’ for synonyms there, yet for things that have both name
and definition in common (i.e. synonyms) he offers what follows, before sup-
plying the example of the two Alexanders, (L.10rb33–10va7/P.30r14–30v1–5):
r‫ ܐܢ‬r‫ܡ‬焏‫ ܕܢ‬焏‫ ܡ‬qq‫ ܐ‬.爯q煿qrq‫ ܐ‬焏r‫ ܕܐܕ‬煿‫ ܡܢ‬煟q 煿‫ ܡܢ‬爯q‫ܘܐܦ ܗܠ‬
焏‫ܡ‬r‫ ܒ‬rq‫ ܓ‬爯q‫ ܗܠ‬86.爿q‫ܪ‬焏‫ܪܘܣ ܦ‬煟‫ܣܢ‬q‫ ܘܐܠ‬焏q‫ܘܢ‬煟‫ܪܘܣ ܡܩ‬煟‫ܣܢ‬q‫ܐܠ‬
煿‫ܘܕܥ‬熏r ‫ܘܗܝ‬rq‫ ܬܘܒ܇ ̇ܗܘ ܕܐ‬焏‫ܡ‬熏qr‫ܐ ܘܒ‬煟qq‫ܕܐ ܐ‬煟q̈ 爟‫ ܥ‬爯q‫ܬܦ‬熏r‫ܡ‬
.焏r‫ ܐܢ‬r‫ ܕܒ‬焏q‫ܢ‬qq ‘also these pertain to the same species,87 as when some-
one says Alexander the Macedonian and Alexander Paris. For these have at
the same time both the name and the definition in common, that which is
the natural mark of man’. Thus, Sergius’ two Alexanders (and Simplicius’ two
Socrateses), through belonging to the species of man with the common defini-
tion ‘mortal, rational, and animal’, are synonymous, and they are homonymous
by having the same name, that of Alexander. Therefore, Sergius’ expression
焏r‫ ܐܕ‬煟q r‫‘ ̈ܒܢ‬of one species’ for this kind of commonality must be consid-
ered to be a deliberate choice, as well as his use of the example of two different
Alexanders.

84 See Porph. (64.7–21), Dexip. (18.25–33, 20.24–21.10), Ammon. (15.29–16.4, 19.17–20.12, 22.12–
19), Philop. (19.11–20), Olymp. (35.15–36.7), Elias (51.11–22, 135.22–136.6), Simpl. (29.2–12),
and Anon. (3.3–14).
85 All quotations from Simplicius’s commentary on the Categories are taken from the avail-
abe translation of Michael Chase (for 1.1–75.22), Frans A.J. de Haas (for 75.23–120.24), Barrie
Fleet (for 120.25–294.9), and Richard Gaskin (295.1–438.36), unless otherwise stated.
86 L.10va1 has 焏q‫ܣ‬r‫‘ ܦ‬Persian’.
87 As also do polyonyms, see above.
commentary 199

In the translation of Porphyry’s Eisagoge, we have 焏‫ܢ‬qq ‫ܬ‬熏q‫ܡ‬煟‫( ܒ‬13.13,16,

35.9, 36.5) for συνωνύμως ‘synonymously’ (Eis. 6.8f.,9, 15.20, 16.6), with the same
abstract form of the first element as for ὁμωνύμως, while Athanasius of Balad has
rq‫ܐ‬煿‫ܡ‬r 爟‫ ܥ‬and the Syriac translators of the Categories (cf. King 2010b: 322)
have: 焏‫ܡ‬r q‫ܦ‬q‫( ܢ̈ܩ‬A.96.12), 焏‫ܡ‬r 爟‫( ܥ‬J.253.10), and 焏‫ܡ‬r q‫ܙܠ‬r‫( ܡܥ‬G.9.7)
for συνώνυμα (Cat. 1a6), and as well as Paul/Severus (50.2,7) and Bar ʿEbroyo
(47.10) having 焏‫ܡ‬r 爟‫ܥ‬.
‫ܐ‬rq‫ܢ‬rq‫( ܐ‬ʾ)ḥǝrānāyāṯā ‘different (things)’ is used by Sergius where the
Greek commentators have ἑτερώνυμα ‘heteronyms’: objects that share neither
a common name nor an account. Again, Sergius’s word is rather equivalent
to ἕτερα ‘of another kind’, ‘different’ than ἑτερώνυμα. Examples given for het-
eronyms are ‘fire’ and ‘gold’ by Porphyry (60.30–31, cf. also 69.10–13), ‘horse’ and
‘man’ by Ammonius (15.27) and Philoponus (14.23), while the anonymous Greek
commentator (1.14) has two of Sergius’ examples, namely ‘stone’ and ‘man’.
The reason why Sergius does not coin an equivalent term for ἑτερώνυμα, but
uses instead one for ἕτερα is to be found in the view expressed by the Greek
commentators that heteronymous things (τὰ ἑτερώνυμα) are required to be
in one and the same substrate (ὑποκείμενον), as “ascent and descent” (ἀνάβα-
σις καὶ κατάβασις) are in a ladder (κλῖμαξ),88 while totally unlike (ἄλλος) and
separate things, like ‘man’, ‘log’, and ‘stone’ are more correctly called ‘differ-
ent’ (ἕτερα) than ‘heteronyms’ (ἑτερώνυμα).89 Therefore, also in his Commentary
(L.10rb21/P.30r21), Sergius has ‫ܐ‬rq‫ܢ‬rq‫ܐ ܘܐ‬r‫ܠܦ‬q̈r‫‘ ܡ‬various and different’,
rather than any close representation like 焏‫ܡ‬r ‫ܬ‬熏q‫ܢ‬rq‫‘ ܐ‬heteronymy’ and
焏‫ܡ‬r qq‫ܢ‬rq‫‘ ܐ‬heteronyms’ as construed by Severus Sebokht in his translation
of Paul (50.3,11). The latter is found in Bar ʿEbroyo (48.4) too, (cf. also King 2011:
232f.). However, in his Concerning the Division of Substance Sergius gives (bl
Add 14658, at 170ra35) 焏‫ܡ‬r ‫ܬ‬熏‫ܠܦ‬qr‫ ܡ‬for ‘heteronymy’, which is a progress
in his terminology.
With his various expressions Sergius simply tries to render the underlying
meaning of these classes instead of producing some kind of calque. As a student
of the Alexandrian school, Sergius was in the midst of the discussion concern-

88 Chase (2002: 114 n. 261): “The example of the ladder as common substrate of ascent and
descent is found already in Clement of Alexandria’s Stromata (8,8,24,3,1f.), which probably
means it was current school doctrine by the early second century bc [sic!].” Sergius himself
uses this example in another context in his paraphrase of Alexander’s On the Principles of
the Universe 141.17–22; cf. King (2010a: 164 f.).
89 See Ammon. (16.24–17.3), Philop. (14.15–23, 15.4–10), Olymp. (26.22–23.10), Simpl. (22.30–
33), and Anon. (1.11–15).
200 chapter 8

ing this terminology and what these words were thought to designate, but at
the same time he operates in another sphere and does not put on himself the
burden of tradition and that of transfering the whole vocabulary. Therefore,
he can express the essence of the Greek terms, without feeling obliged to coin
exact counterparts in Syriac. Furthermore, by avoiding introducing the terms
synonym and heteronym he also escapes reporting the entire discussion about
them.

§22 The definition of substance and accident. The exact wording of the defi-
nitions here of substance and accident is not present in Aristotle’s text, but
they are rather to be considered as being expressions for his doctrine regard-
ing the two of them, or more correctly, the commentators’ interpretation and
laying out of Aristotle’s teaching (cf. Cat. 1a24 f., 8a13–28, Phys. 185a31 f.). On
the whole, Sergius is very restrictive with exact or literal quotations. A very
similar definition of substance is found in the Preparation (Προπαρασκευή, ed.
Diekamp) of the monk Theodore of Raithu (lived at some time in the 6th–7th
centuries).90 In chapter 11 of this work, entitled ‘On substance and nature’, he
gives (201.12–16): οὐκοῦν οὕτως ὁρισάμενοι τὴν οὐσίαν εἴπωμεν· οὐσία ἐστὶ πρώτως
τε καὶ κυρίως πᾶν, ὅτι αὐθυπόστατον ὑπάρχει, τουτέστιν ὃ καθ’ ἑαυτό ἐστι καὶ οὐ
δι’ ἄλλο οὐδὲ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, τουτέστιν ὃ μὴ χρῄζει ἄλλου τινὸς ἔξωθεν αὐτοῦ
εἰς τὸ ὑπάρχειν ‘let us define substance thus: substance is primarily and strictly
everything that is self-subsistent, namely, that which exists by itself and does
not have its being through something else or in something else, namely, that
which does not need anything outside itself to exist’. Theodore later repeats
some of this definition (ibid. 202.1–8) and offers the examples λίθος ‘stone’ and
φυτόν ‘tree (or plant)’ for material things (ὑλικά), which is also found in Sergius.
Any direct connection between Sergius and this Theodore cannot be presup-
posed, but we may assume that the different entities of this definition were
prevalent among the Neoplatonists (see esp. Olymp. 56.4–8).91 Also a passage
in Simplicius’ commentary reflects the same view (44.12–16): τὰ γὰρ ὄντα διαι-
ρεῖται διχῶς, εἴς τε τὰ καθ’ ἑαυτὰ εἶναι δυνάμενα καὶ μηδενὸς ἑτέρου δεόμενα πρὸς
ὑπόστασιν, ἅπερ καὶ οὐσία καλοῦνται διὰ τὸ ἐξαρκεῖν ἑαυτοῖς πρὸς τὸ εἶναι, καὶ εἰς
τὰ ἐν ἑτέροις ὑφεστῶτα, ἅπερ καὶ συμβεβηκότα λέγεται διὰ τὸ ἐν ἑτέροις συμβε-
βηκέναι “for beings are divided into two: 1. Those which are capable of being

90 On Theodore of Raithu and his Praeparatio or Liber De Incarnatione, see Chase (forthcom-
ing), where this definition of substance is quoted as well.
91 For this definition, Chase himself refers to, inter alia, Ammon. (33.12ff.), Philop. (46.1, 49.19,
and 53.10), and Olymp. (43.13 ff.).
commentary 201

per se, and need nothing else in order to subsist. These are also called sub-
stance, since they are sufficient unto themselves with regard to being. 2. Those
which subsist within other things. These are also called accidents, since they
occur within other things.” Furthermore, as an alternative definition, Philo-
ponus states that (29.7–9): [τὸ συμβεβηκὸς] αὐτὸ γὰρ καθ’ αὑτὸ ὑποστῆναι οὐ
δύναται, δέεται δὲ ἄλλου πρὸς ὕπαρξιν, τοῦτ’ ἔστιν οὐσίας [an accident] “is not
capable of existing in virtue of itself, but needs something else for its existence,
namely a substance”. The definition of substance states that a substance is every
independent individual object that is self-subsistent (αὐθυπόστατον ὑπάρχει, cf.
‫ܗ‬rq‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܡ‬q熏‫ ܩ‬煿‫ ܠ‬rq‫ )ܐ‬and self-sufficient, whereas accident is defined by
opposite attributes, that of being dependent on other objects to occur and sub-
sist within.92

§23 Something being in something in eleven ways. The different meanings of

being in something are presented by Aristotle in his Physics (210a14–25)93
and not in his Categories. Chase (2002: 128 n. 468) states that “The Physics
commentators enumerate Aristotle’s ‘eight or nine’ meanings of ‘in something’,
while remarking that the exegetes of the Cat. enumerate eleven meanings.” The
commentators tried therefore to give different explanations to the different
numbers of this state of things (Chase 2002: 128–129 nn. 468, 470, 481, and 482).
A description of eleven ways of being in something is present in almost all
late ancient commentaries on the Categories, though the eleven ways (or even
twelve, cf. Simpl. 46.22) are not exactly the same in all commentators.94
Below are the eleven senses of being in something in the order they appear
in Sergius95 and their equivalences supplied from Ammonius (26.33–27.2), who
has the same order except for nos. 8 and 9. They are:

1) Being in time (焏‫ܒܢ‬熟‫ ܒ‬ἐν χρόνῳ).

2) Being in place/space (‫ܬܪܐ‬焏‫ ܒ‬ἐν τόπῳ).
3) Being in a vessel (焏‫ܢ‬焏‫ ܒܡ‬ἐν ἀγγείῳ).

92 Cf. also Cat. 2b5 f.; Porph. (88.5 f., 89.16 f., 90.12 f.) and Philop. (163.10f.).
93 See Philop. In Phys. (526.25–527.3 n. 81 ad loc. and also n. 77, and 529.13–18) and Simpl. In
Phys. (553.1–16).
94 See Plotinus Enneads (6.1.14.19–24) and Porph. (77.22–78.5), who enumerate only nine
manners; Ammon. (26.32–27.8, 29.5–17), Philop. (32.7–26), Olymp. (47.3–21), Elias (149.16–
34), Simpl. (46.5–14), J.Damasc. Dialec. (λθ/39.2–13); Anon. (6.12–17), cf. Huby (1981: 402 and
404 n. 10).
95 For the parallel passage in his Commentary, see L.14rb24–15va17/P.35r1–36r16.
202 chapter 8

4) Being as parts in what they are parts of (焏‫ܘ ܡ‬煿̇‫ܬܐ ܒ‬熏‫ ܡܢ‬qq‫ܐ‬
̈
‫ܬܗ‬熏̈‫ ܡܢ‬爯q煿qrq‫ ܕܐ‬or 96焏‫ܠ‬熏q‫ܬܐ ܒ‬熏̈‫ ܡܢ‬qq‫‘ ܐ‬as parts in the whole’
ὡς μέρος ἐν ὅλῳ “as a part in the whole”,97 but also Elias 149.20: ὡς μέρη ἐν
ὅλῳ ‘as parts in the whole’98).
̈
5) Being as a whole thing in its parts (‫ܬܗ‬熏‫ܡ ܒܡܢ‬煟‫ ܡ‬煿‫ܠ‬q qq‫ ܐ‬or qq‫ܐ‬
̈
99‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ ܒܡܢ‬焏‫ܠ‬熏q ‘as a whole in the parts’ ὡς ὅλον ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν “as a
whole in its parts”).
6) Being as (many) species in a genus (焏‫ ܒܓܢܣ‬焏r ̈ ‫ ܐܕ‬qq‫ ܐ‬ὡς εἶδος ἐν γένει
“as a species in a genus”).
7) Being as a genus in (many) species (焏r ̈ ‫ܕ‬焏‫ ܒ‬焏‫ ܓܢܣ‬qq‫ ܐ‬ὡς γένος ἐν εἴδει
“as a genus in a species”, but also Plotinus Enn. 6.1.14.23: γένος ἐν εἴδεσι ‘a
genus in species’, and Olymp. 47.10: ὡς γένος ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσιν ‘as a genus in
species’, pl.).
8) Being as form in matter (焏‫ܘܠ‬煿‫ ܒ‬焏r‫ ܐܕ‬qq‫ ܐ‬ὡς εἶδος ἐν ὕλῃ).
9) Being as the rule of those who are ruled by someone is in the one who rules
them (‫ܘ‬煿̇‫܉ ܒ‬r‫ܐ ܕܐܢ‬煟q‫ ܐ‬rqq‫ ܬ‬爯‫ܡ‬ ̣ 爯qr‫ܕܒ‬r‫ ܕܡ‬爯q‫ܠ‬q‫ܐ ܕܐ‬r‫ ܕܘܒ‬qq‫ܐ‬
̇
‫ܘܢ‬煿‫ ܠ‬r‫ܒ‬煟‫ ܕܡ‬爯‫ ܡ‬or in Division of Substance 171rb26 he has ‫ܐ‬r‫ ܕܘܒ‬qq‫ܐ‬
焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܒ‬煟‫‘ ܒܡ‬as ruling in the ruler’ ὡς τὰ τῶν ἀρχομένων ἐν τῷ ἄρχοντι “as the
⟨affairs⟩ of the ruled in ⟨the power or control of⟩ the ruler”).
10) Being as in a purpose/goal (焏q‫ܡܠ‬熏r‫ ܕܒ‬qq‫ ܐ‬ὡς ἐν τέλει).
11) Being as accidents in a substance (焏q‫ܘܣ‬焏‫ ܒ‬焏r ̈ 煟‫ ܓ‬qq‫ ܐ‬ὡς ἐν ὑποκει-
μένῳ οἷον τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν οὐσίᾳ “as in a subject, for example, an accident
in a substance”).

The Greek commentators have ‘species’ at nos. (6) and (7) in the singular,100 and
indeed, the plural of Sergius appears to provide a better description of them,
but both Philoponus (32.14–17) and Elias (149.19–28) provide an argument why
they do not have no. 7 in the plural, which would indicate that there was at least
a discussion concerning in which number species should be given.

96 This is found in Sergius’ Concerning the Division of Substance at 171rb21, where he again
enumerates all the eleven ways of being in something (at 171rb17–28).
97 All quotations from Ammonius’ commentary on the Categories are taken from the trans-
lation of S. Marc Cohen & Gareth B. Matthews, unless otherwise stated.
98 And the explanation of Elias (149.21–22): καὶ ὅλως τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἑνικῶς λέγεται, τὰ δὲ μέρη
πληθυντικῶς, ἐπειδὴ μία μὲν ἡ ὁλότης, πολλὰ δὲ τὰ μέρη.
99 In Sergius’ Concerning the Division of Substance at 171rb22.
100 Except Olympiodorus, who at loc. cit. at no. 7 has species in the plural.
commentary 203

§24–34 Examples of the various ways of being in something. The examples

given by Sergius of the eleven different ways of being in something are mostly
the same as those of the Greek commentators. For being in time, the Trojan
or Ilian War as happening at a certain time is given, see Ammonius (29.6): ὁ
Τρωικὸς πόλεμος; and Philoponus (32.18): ἐν τῷδε τῷ χρόνῳ γεγονέναι τὰ Ἰλιακά.
(§25–26) For being in a place, Porphyry (77.22f.), Ammonius (29.7), Philo-
ponus (32.19), and Elias (149.17) give Socrates as being in the Lyceum, which is
a kind of example that Sergius avoids. For being in a vessel, cf. Porph. (77.24):
ὡς ἐν τῷ ἐκπόματι τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀμφορεῖ ὁ οἶνος “as water is in a cup or wine
in a jar”, Ammon. (29.8): οἶνον ἐν τῷ κεράμῳ “wine in a pitcher”, Simpl. (46.7): ὡς
οἶνος ἐν τῷ ἀμφορεῖ “as wine is ‘in’ the amphora”, and John of Damascus (Dialec.
λθ/39.5f.): ὡς οἶνος ἐν κρατῆρι “as wine is in a jar”.101 The reason why Sergius is
more cautious about presenting an example of a location for being in place is
that he takes into consideration the fact that ‫ ܐܬܪܐ‬τόπος, when viewed in this
philosophical context, involves more than just a location, but rather it signifies
‘space’, as his discussion concerning space indicates (§ 68–73). Also Ammonius,
Philoponus (32.20–22), Olympiodorus (47.8–10), and Elias (149.18 f.) are keen on
distinguishing a container from space by using a common argument, as Ammo-
nius says (29.8–10): διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ἐν τόπῳ τοῦ ἐν ἀγγείῳ, διότι τὸ μὲν ἀγγεῖον τόπος
ἐστὶ μεταφορητός, ὁ δὲ τόπος ἀγγεῖον ἀμεταφόρητον “in a place differs from in a
container in that the container is a movable place, whereas a place is an immov-
able container.”
(§27–28) Sergius intentionally uses the word ‫ܐ‬r‫‘ ܦܓ‬human body’ against
the more general word 焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫ ܓ‬σῶμα for ‘body’, in the way that Porphyry also
does by writing (77.25f.): ἡ χεὶρ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου σώματι “as a hand is in
the whole human body.” See also the example of John of Damascus, who has
(Dialec. λθ/39.6f.): ὡς Σωκράτης ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις μέλεσι κεφαλῇ τε καὶ χερσὶ καὶ
ποσί “as Socrates in his own members, in his head, hands, and feet.”
(§29) By using the examples of ‘horse’, ‘dog’, and ‘ox’ for various species in
the genus of animal the Christian Sergius avoids the somewhat problematic
view expressed by Aristotle, giving (Phys. 210a18) ὡς ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν ζῴῳ “as man
in animal”, which was used by both pagan philosophers and Christian thinkers
like Philoponus (32.13) and John of Damascus (Dialec. λθ/39.2 f.) in the Greek
tradition. See for instance Porphyry (77.27f.): ὡς ἐν τῷ γένει τὸ εἶδος καθάπερ
ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ ὁ ἄνθρωπος “as the species is in the genus, as man is in animal”, and
Ammonius (29.12f.): ὡς εἶδος ἐν γένει ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ “as a species in a

101 All quotations from John of Damascus’s Dialectica or Philosophical Chapters are taken
from the translation of Frederic H. Chase, unless otherwise stated.
204 chapter 8

genus, for example man in animal”, while Olympiodorus gives (47.10–13) ‘man’
alongside ‘horse’ (ἵππος) and ‘ox’ (βοῦς).
The tendency to adjust non-Christian thinking present in the pagan philoso-
pher’s text is also found in the Syriac translation of Porphyry’s Eisagoge. For
example, it has (23.12, 26.17) 焏q焏‫‘ ܡܠ‬angel’ for θεός ‘god’ at Eis. 10.13 and
11.24,102 and in several troublesome contexts it has avoided the term ‘ani-
mal’ or any specific animal in connection to ‘man’ (26.4 f.,13/Eis. 11.14,26 f., and
34.4,7/Eis. 15.4f.,6). Nonetheless, the statement that ‘animal is said about man,
horse …’ is kept at 32.16/Eis. 14.15f. Likewise, in his text Sergius evades the stan-
dard account of man being ‘mortal rational animal’ (see textual note 124.13/
B.90v15) and other examples which connect man to animal, as at 146.22f. where
the Greek commentaries have ‘animal and man’, but he has ‘animal and horse’.
However, he has at least once retained a formulation that indicates that ‘ani-
mal (is divided) into man’ (122.9). Yet, it seems that Sergius considers it to be
slightly controversial, in the setting in which he operates, to express what the
Christian Greek commentators record naturally. His anticipation of censure in
his prefaces indicates the same caution and fear.
The examples of form being in matter current in Sergius’ commentary are
also present in the Greek commentaries. Again, to present the comparable
passages of Porphyry (29.34f.): ὡς ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ τὸ εἶδος καθάπερ ἐν τῷ χαλκῷ ἡ μορφὴ
τοῦ ἀνδριάντος κἀν τῷ σιδήρῳ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς μαχαίρας “in the way that form is in the
matter, as the shape [μορφή] of the statue is in the bronze, the shape [σχῆμα]
of the knife is in the iron”, (cf. also Porph. Eis. 11.13f.), of Philoponus (32.22): ὡς
τὸ τοῦ ἀνδριάντος εἶδος ἐν τῷ χαλκῷ “as the form of the statue in the bronze”; and
same at Elias (149.28f.): ὡς τὸ εἶδος τοῦ ἀνδριάντος ἐν τῷ χαλκῷ.
The way of describing the power over or control of some people as being ‘in’
the ruler appears in all the above-mentioned commentaries, probably without
any further implication or any specific allusion, (see Chase 2002: 128 f., n. 477–
478).
The meaning of 焏q‫ܡܠ‬熏r for τέλος ‘end’, ‘goal’, ‘purpose’, and ‘completion’ is
not specified in the lexicons. Although, a more literal translation like ‘comple-
tion’ would better illustrate the Syriac calque on the Greek τέλος, yet with regard
to Sergius’ and some Greek commentators’ examples its rendering as ‘purpose’
seems most justified here. See also Olympiodorus (47.18) and Elias (149.31), who
have ὡς ἐν τελικῷ ‘in the final cause’, and John of Damascus (Dialec. λθ/39.10–
12): ἐν τῷ τελικῷ αἰτίῳ ὡς ἡ κλίνη ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀναπαύσει· διὰ τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν

102 Also some Greek scribes changed ‘gods’ to ‘angels’ at these instances in their mss, see
Barnes (2003: 198 n. 117).
commentary 205

γὰρ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γίνεται κλίνη “as in the final cause, as the bed is in man’s rest,
because it is for the purpose of man’s resting that the bed is made.” Porphyry
(29.31f.) includes ‘to be happy’ (εὐδαιμονεῖν) as being ‘in’ the goal of man, while
Ammonius (29.16f.) illustrates the goal of medicine to be ‘in health’ (τὴν ἰατρι-
κὴν ἐν τῇ ὑγείᾳ), and cf. also Philop. 32.24f.
There seems to have been some disagreement concerning which of the
eleven ways of being in something represents Aristotle’s ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ‘in a
subject/substrate’ at Cat. 1a23–25. Is it τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ ‘the form in the matter’
of Physics 210a21, or any other way of being in something? Porphyry (77.33–36,
78.6–9) seems to think it is the former, whereas Ammonius, Philoponus, and
Elias present them separately. Sergius does not mention the substrate here, but
makes use of, among others, Ammonius’ example of “in a substance”, namely
(29.17): ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὡς τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν οὐσίᾳ “as in a subject, for example
an accident in substance.” The same phase is present also in Elias (149.32 f., and
see 150.7–11 for a discussion on this class). However, Olympiodorus seems to
have the closest parallel to Sergius’ text here (47.20 f.): λέγεται πάλιν ἔν τινι ὡς
συμβεβηκὸς ἐν οὐσίᾳ, ὡς τὸ λευκὸν ἐν τῷ Σωκράτει ‘again, one says ‘in something’
as an accident in substance, as whitness (is) in Socrates’, as also the example
of John of Damascus (Dialec. λθ/39.12): ὡς λευκὸν ἐν σώματι “as whiteness is in a
body.”

§36 Defining description. ‫ܐ‬rq‫ܡܢ‬qr‫ܐ ܡ‬r‫ ܡܠ‬ὁριστικὸς λόγος (or λόγος ὁρι-
στικός) present already in Aristotle (Phys. 186.23f.; On the Soul 413a14; Metaph.
1043b31), which may be translated as ‘defining/definitional /definitory descrip-
tion/account/formula’. The first Syriac translation of Porphyry’s Eisagoge em-
ploys once ‫ܐ‬rq‫ܡܢ‬qr‫ܐ ܡ‬r‫ܡܠ‬, however, for λόγος alone (Eis. 9.15/Eis.Syr.i
21.12), but in the immediately following occurrence and at some other instances
焏‫ܡ‬熏q‫ ܬ‬is given for it (Eis. 9.16,20/Eis.Syr.i 21.14, 22.42, and Eis. 7.11/Eis.Syr.i
14.2). This is a closer equivalent of Greek ὅρος and ὁρισμός ‘definition’ than of
λόγος, usually rendered by ‫ܐ‬r‫ ܡܠ‬in Syriac texts, as also Athanasius of Balad
has it in his translation/revision of the Eisagoge. This might indicate that the
Greek copy of the Eisagoge at hand for the first translator had λόγος ὁριστικός at
9.15. Indeed, in his commentary to the Categories Porphyry uses this expres-
sion several times, (60.19,21, 63.7, 64.3,4,9,24f., 65.9,10). In connection to the
discussion on the various meanings of λόγος (64.28–65.11) he writes, inter alia,
that (65.1–4): λόγος δέ ἐστι καὶ κατ’ ἄλλο σημαινόμενον ὁ ὅρος, οὗτος δὲ ὁ λόγος ὁ
ὁριστικός· τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο λέγεται λόγος τῆς οὐσίας, ἡ γὰρ προσθήκη τῆς οὐσίας δια-
στέλλει αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων σημαινομένων τοῦ λόγου “Yet another signification
of logos is the definition, that is, the definitional account. The general term for
this is ‘the account of the essence’: the supplement of the ‘of the essence’ serves
206 chapter 8

to distinguish it from the other meanings of logos.” He claims that a defining

description is equivalent to λόγος τῆς οὐσίας “the definition of being/substance”
of Cat. 1a7.103 Thus, Porphyry specifies that a defining description describes
something essential of that which is being defined, in addition to its name,
as also his example of ‘a drachma’ and ‘a golden drachma’ illustrates (65.4–
7).
Usually, the essential part stated in the defining description consists of the
difference of something set against something else, which is not included in
the name and in an occasionally too extensive definition. The name ‘animal’
denotes both ‘man’ and all other animate substances, as also the description
‘animate sentient substance’ (Porph. 63.11–14), whereas the defining descrip-
tion ‘mortal rational animal’ (63.14) denotes only ‘man’. Therefore, he states that
(63.7f.): δεῖ δὲ τὸν ὁριστικὸν λόγον σύζυγον εἶναι τῷ ὀνόματι καὶ ἐξηγητικὸν τοῦ πρά-
γματος, καθὸ τῷδε κέχρηται τῷ ὀνόματι “a definitional account must correspond
to the name and give an explanation of the thing only insofar as the name is
used of it.” The name ‘man’ corresponds to the description ‘mortal rational ani-
mal’ and they are reciprocable or convertible, whereas the name ‘animal’ and
the description ‘animate sentient substance’ are not reciprocable.
Note that the emphasis of Syriac 焏‫ܠ‬q‫‘ ܡܠ‬rational’ (lit. ‘talkative’, ‘articulate’),
in like manner as Greek λογικός, lies on man’s ability to speak. Looked at in
this way, the ability to speak can either be conceived as a result of reason
or to be a prerequisite of it. In his Concerning the Division of Substance, he
writes (168vb20): ‫ܐ‬r‫ ܡܠ‬焏‫ܬܐ ܕܠ‬熏qq̈ 爯‫ ܡ‬煿rr‫ ܘܦ‬焏‫ܠ‬q‫ܝ ܐܦ ܡܠ‬煿qr‫‘ ܘܩ‬and
he called it [i.e. man] also speaking/rational and separated it from animals
without word/speech/reason’.

§36–37 The aporia concerning whether individuals might be accidents. The

dispute that Sergius puts forth here is also present in Porphyry, it reads (79.12–
15): ἀλλ᾽εἰ τὰ συμβεβηκότα ἔν τινι μὴ ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχοντα ἀδύνατονχωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ
ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν, πῶς ὁ Σωκράτης ἐν τόπῳ ὢν καὶ μὴ ὡςμέρος ὑπάρχων τοῦ τόπου καὶ
μηδέποτε δυνάμενος χωρὶς τόπου εἶναι οὐκἂν εἴη συμβεβηκός “But if accidents,
which are not in their subjects as parts, cannot exist separately from what they
are in, how is it that Socrates, who is in a place, but not as a part of that place,
and cannot exist apart from some place, is not an accident?”. This problem and
proposals for its solution were set out by some other commentators too.104

103 See Porphyry (68.15–18); cf. also Arist. Metaph. (1031a12, 1043b24–32) and Barnes (2003:
339f.).
104 See for instance Dexip. (22.26–28), Ammon. (27.15–30), Philop. (33.6–33), and Simpl.
commentary 207

Sergius holds this argument in common with Ammonius and Philoponus,

that since place/space does not complete our essence,105 it does not form
an essential part of our body, while a body that is substrate for an accident
completes it, since an accident “cannot subsist without it” (Philop. 33.19f.: ἄνευ
γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἂν συσταίη, Sergius 114.16 爟q‫ܩ‬r‫ ܕܢ‬焏q犏‫ ܡ‬焏‫ ܠ‬rq‫ܘܗܝ ܓ‬煟‫)ܒܠܥ‬, but
when an accident is separated from its substrate it is destroyed. Sergius brings
forward the argument that ‘our nature is possible to be thought of separate
from space’, whereas Ammonius says that a body is able to change location
in the place without taking damage. And all three offer the example of place
(Ammon. 27.26) ὡς παρακολούθημα, ὥσπερ τῷ ἐν φωτὶ βαδίζοντι ἡ σκιὰ παρέπεται
“as attending [to a body] in the way that a shadow goes along with someone
walking in the light”, (and see Philop. 33.17f.). Further, Philoponus maintains
that it is (33.20,30) οὐδὲ/οὐκ ἀνάγκη πᾶν σῶμα ἐν τόπῳ εἶναι “it is not even
necessary for each body to be in a place” / “it is not necessary for every bodily
thing to be in a place”.

§38–39 Porphyry’s definition of accident. The exact wording of Porphyry’s def-

inition of accident, provided here by Sergius, is not present in his extant works.
Brock (1989: 42f.) assumed that this passage was a translation of Eis. 12.24 f.:
Συμβεβηκὸς δέ ἐστιν ὃ γίνεται καὶ ἀπογίνεται χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου φθορᾶς
“Accidents are items which come and go without the destruction of their sub-
jects”,106 and that the discrepancy between Sergius’ formulation and the first
Syriac translation of it could be taken as an indication that Sergius was not the
translator. But as I have suggested in the introduction (2.1.4) and in compliance
with Sergius’ usual style, I would say that he is not giving a literal translation
of a passage from Porphyry, but rather sums up the inward sense from Por-
phyry’s discussion on accidents and the exposition of it done by Ammonius.
Another alternative is that he quotes Porphyry’s larger, now lost, commentary
on the Categories known as Ad Gedalium or To Gedaleios.107 Porphyry’s defini-

(49.31–50.15). According to Moraux (1973: 152 f.) this puzzle (aporia) might have been
raised by Lucius [Annaeus Cornutus] (first century ad), cf. Chase (2002: 132 n. 525), while
Simplicius (50.2–9) tells us that Boethos of Sidon (first century bc) already tried to solve
this difficulty.
105 Both Ammonius and Philoponus have οὐσία ‘substance’ here, while Sergius has 焏‫ܢ‬qq
‘nature’.
106 All quotations from Porphyry’s Eisagoge are taken from the latest English translation by
Jonathan Barnes (2003), unless otherwise stated.
107 But such a definition is neither found in Andrew Smith’s (1993: 34–59) collection of
testimonies and extant fragments of this commentary on the Categories.
208 chapter 8

tion of accident (Eis. 12.24–13.8) is quoted and discussed in other expositions

too.108 Evidently, Ammonius lectured on Porphyry’s Eisagoge and the defini-
tion of accident found there is also quoted by Ammonius. Sergius’ paraphrase
of this definition is close to the wording of Porphyry, but not a literal transla-
tion of it. Sergius bases his account of this formula probably on the reading of
Eisagoge in the classroom and its exposition by Ammonius. Therefore, Brock’s
argument does not leave out the possibility that Sergius is the translator of the
first Syriac Eisagoge version.
The two different kinds of accidents described here are those that are separa-
ble and inseparable (Eis. 12.25f.: τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ χωριστόν ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ ἀχώριστον,
Sergius 106.1f.: 爯qrr‫ܦ‬r‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܘܢ ܠ‬煿‫ … ܘܡܢ‬爯qrr‫ܦ‬r‫ ܡ‬焏r ̈ 煟‫ܘܢ ܕܓ‬煿‫)ܡܢ‬.109
Sergius’ example of the blackness of the Cushites/Ethiopians and ravens as
being an inseparable accident is also present at Eisagoge (12.26–13.1), while the
problem formulated here (Sergius 116.3–5: 爯q‫ ܕ̇ܗܘ‬焏‫ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‬爯‫ܡ‬ ̣ … 爯q煟‫ ܡ‬qqr‫ܡ‬
煿‫ )ܒ‬has its parallel in Ammonius and some other commentators.110 We give
Elias’ formulation of it (In Isag. 92.1f.): οὐκέτι πᾶν συμβεβηκὸς αὕτη ἡ ὑπογραφὴ
περιέλαβεν, ἀλλὰ μόνον τὸ χωριστόν ‘that description does not cover every acci-
dent, but only the separable one’. Then, we have the solution presented by
Sergius saying that although some accidents in reality do not go away from
their substrate, but we can yet imagine them as doing so—though this solu-
tion is actually also given already by Porphyry111—yet it has a closer wording in
Ammonius (In Isag. 111.11–15): εἴπομεν δὲ ἤδη ὅτι εἰ καὶ μὴ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ἀπογίνε-
ται, ἀλλ’ οὖν τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ ὁ κόραξ καὶ ὁ Αἰθίοψ λευκός (…) ἐπινοήσαντες δὲ τὸν κόρακα
μὴ εἶναι μέλανα ἢ τὸν Αἰθίοπα οὐ φθείρομεν αὐτοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν ὡς κόρακος ἢ ἀνθρώπου
‘we have already said that even if it actually does not go away, yet in thought (we
can conceive) the raven and Ethiopian being white (…), if we conceive of the
raven or Ethiopian as not being black, we will not have destroyed its substance
as raven or man’, (cf. also David In Isag. 207.21–36).

108 See especially Ammon. In Isag. (110.7–114.7), but also Philop. Syr. In Isag. (31.23–32.2/
焏‫ ܠ‬.٢٣‫ـ‬焯‫ܠ‬.٢, tr. 208.26–43), Elias In Isag. (91.2–93.8), David In Isag. (204.26–207.36), Anon.
Syr. In Isag. (56.21–57.16/熏‫ ܢ‬.٢١‫ـ‬熟‫ ܢ‬.١٦, tr. 248.44–250.3), and J.Damasc. Dialec. (ιγ/13.2–11).
109 The first Syriac translation of the Eisagoge has (29.4): 焏‫ ܠ‬煿‫܉ ܘܡܢ‬焏‫ܢ‬r‫ ܡ‬rq‫ ܓ‬煿‫ܡܢ‬
焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܡ‬, which is also found in Sergius’ A Natural Demonstration (178v12f.).
110 See Ammon. In Isag. (111.7–9), David In Isag. (205.14–16), and Anon.Syr. In Isag. (57.3–
12/熟‫ ܢ‬.٣‫ـ‬١٢, tr. 249.26–42).
111 Eis. 13.1–3: δύναται δὲ ἐπινοηθῆναι καὶ κόραξ λευκὸς καὶ Αἰθίοψ ἀποβαλὼν τὴν χροιὰν χωρὶς
φθορᾶς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου “it is possible to think of a white raven and an Ethiopian losing his
skin-color without the destruction of the subjects.”
commentary 209

§40 The next objection has also a very close parallel in Ammonius (In Isag.
111.18–21): ἀπορεῖται δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, πῶς λέγεται γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀπογίνεσθαι χωρὶς τῆς
τοῦ ὑποκειμένου φθορᾶς· ὁ γὰρ πυρετὸς γινόμενος φθείρει τὸν ἄνθρωπον ‘also this
problem is raised: how can he say ‘comes into being and falls away without
the destruction of its subjects’? [Eis. 12.24f.]. For when fever occurs, it destroys
man’. Sergius says that according to this objection fever would destroy the
‘body’ (焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫)ܓ‬, while Ammonius gives ‘man’ (ἄνθρωπος), but then speci-
fies it as ‘body’ (σῶμα). Their subsequent solution to this problem is presented
slightly differently, but with common examples and conclusions. Both have
the example which runs as follows: when the strings (χορδαὶ 焏‫ܡܢ‬ ̈ ) of a musi-
cal instrument are tightly stretched (ἐπιτείνεσθαι ‫ܚ‬r‫ )ܐܬܡ‬or are loosened
(ἀνίεσθαι q‫)ܐܬܪܦ‬, the harmony (ἁρμονία = 焏q‫ܢ‬熏‫ )ܐܪܡ‬and symmetry (συμμε-
τρία) of the musical tune is destroyed, but not the instrument (i.e. substrate)
itself. So also the lack of balance between heat and coldness in a body does
not destroy the essence of the animate body itself, but the temperament (κρᾶ-
σις 焏‫ܙܓ‬熏‫ )ܡ‬or good temperament (εὐκρασία) in it.112 A similar summing-up
saying that none of the accidents (or not any ‘quality’) fights against its own
substrate, in which it has its subsistence, is also present in Ammonius113 and
David (In Isag. 206.16–29). Present in Ammonius also is the example of bald-
ness (φαλάκρα ‫ܬܐ‬熏qr‫ )ܩ‬in the hair (θρίξ ‫ܐ‬r‫)ܣܥ‬, that it does not destroy the
hair as such, but appears in the skull (κεφαλή ‫ܐ‬r‫ܩܦ‬r‫)ܩ‬.114 Sergius’ description
of these two examples is more closely presented by Elias (In Isag. 92.20–23): ἡ
φαλάκρωσις οὐ τὴν κεφαλὴν φθείρει τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀλλὰ τὴν τρίχωσιν, καὶ ἡ ἁρμο-
νία οὐ τὰς χορδὰς φθείρει τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀντικείμενον, φημὶ τὴν ἀναρμοστίαν
‘the baldness does not destroy the skull, (which is) the substrate, but the growth
of hair, and harmony does not destroy the strings, (which is) the substrate, but
the contrary state (occurs), I mean disharmony/discord’, (see also David In Isag.
206.29–34).

112 Ammon. In Isag. (113.21–22): ὡς τὴν συμμετρίαν τῆς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου κράσεως φθεῖραι ‘as to
destroy the symmetry of the temperament of the substrate’.
113 Ammon. In Isag. (112.6–8): οὐδεμία δὲ ποιότης μάχεται τῷ ἰδίῳ ὑποκειμένῳ ἢ φθείρει τὸ ἐν ᾧ τὴν
ὑπόστασιν ἔχει· φθείρουσα γὰρ τὸ ὑποκείμενον καὶ ἑαυτὴν συμφθείρει ‘no quality fights against
its own substrate or destroys that in which it subsists. For if the substrate is destroyed it,
too, will be destroyed along with it’.
114 Ammon. In Isag. (113.26–28): ἀποροῦσι δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς φαλάκρας· φασὶ γὰρ φθείρειν τὸ
ὑποκείμενον, τὰς τρίχας. ἰστέον τοίνυν, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπόκεινται τῇ φαλάκρᾳ αἱ τρίχες ἀλλ’ ἡ κεφαλή,
καὶ αὕτη οὐ φθείρεται ‘they raise an objection also about baldness. For they say that the
substrate destroys the hair. Now, one must know that the hair is not the underlying subject
of baldness, but the skull, and it is not destroyed’.
210 chapter 8

The conclusion of this discussion is that an accident/quality, which is sepa-

rated from a body/substrate, does not destroy the nature of its substrate. Thus,
in this section Sergius leans closely on Ammonius’ exposition of the Eisagoge
and not only Porphyry’s treatise itself.

§41 Simple and compound substances. For a description of simple and com-
pound substances in Aristotle’s own writings, see Metaph. 1029a1–7 and
1042a26–31, (cf. Dexip. 41.8–12). In Sergius’ presentation we have the sole matter
and form as simple substances, while the composition (συναμφότερος 焏‫ܒ‬q‫)ܪܘ‬
of both of them constitutes compound substance (σύνθετος οὐσία 焏q‫ܐܘܣ‬
‫ܐ‬r‫ܒ‬qr‫)ܡ‬. That the parts of substance, that is matter and form, are by them-
selves substances was stated by Aristotle (Cat. 3a29–32). This passage has a very
close parallel in Ammonius (35.18–36.2) and Philoponus (49.23–50.1), with the
exception of Ammonius’ pagan example of “substance of gods” as being simple
substance superior to the composite one, (Ammon. 35.18–22): τῆς δὲ οὐσίας ἡ
μέν ἐστιν ἁπλῆ ἡ δὲ σύνθετος, καὶ τῆς ἁπλῆς ἡ μὲν κρείττων τῆς συνθέτου ἡ δὲ χεί-
ρων. ἔστι δὲ σύνθετος μὲν οὐσία ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἁπλῆ δὲ καὶ κρείττων τῆς
συνθέτου ἡ τῶν θείων οὐσία, ἁπλῆ δὲ καὶ χείρων τῆς συνθέτου ἡ ὕλη ἡ πρώτη καὶ
τὸ εἶδος “Some substance is simple, some composite. Some simple substance is
better than composite, some is inferior. Man and things of that sort are compos-
ite substances. The substance of the gods is simple substance that is better than
the composite. Simple substance that is inferior to the composite is prime mat-
ter and form.” For the related passages at some other commentators, see Porph.
(88.13–22), Simpl. (74.18–19, followed by lacuna), and Anon. (11.33–37).
In Sergius’ description of the categories of existence a vertical perspective
can be discerned. Generally, he uses the prepositions 爯‫ ܡ‬rqr‫‘ ܠ‬below’ and
爯‫ ܡ‬爏‫‘ ܠܥ‬above’ in order to describe their mutual relation. In the translation
of the Eisagoge the same tendency can be observed. Where Porphyry has terms
like πρὸ ‘before’ and μετά ‘after’ occasionally indicating a more horizontal point
of view regarding their distribution, the Syriac translation has sometimes ren-
dered them by these prepositions, as can be seen from the following instances:
The πρό at Eis. 5.6,5.58,7.17 is faithfully rendered by ‫ܡ‬煟‫( ܩ‬Eis.Syr.i 11.6,12.16,
16.18), but at Eis. 5.11,5.13,5.16 it is given by 爏‫( ܠܥ‬Eis.Syr.i 11.14,11.17, 12.3).115 In the
same way, even if μετά in this section usually is rendered by ‫ܪ‬r‫ܒ‬, we find also
that at least once (Eis. 5.14 = Eis.Syr.i 11.18) rqr‫ ܠ‬is offered.
Sergius’ explanation of substance as a supreme genus containing many
things with their connected differences is a more complete survey of the so

115 At Eis. 5.7 for πρό even rqr‫ ܠ‬is given (Eis.Syr.i 11.8).
commentary 211

called Porphyry’s tree already touched upon, (see § 20). For a drawing of such
a tree, see Barnes (2003: 110) and also Mansfeld (1992: 98 and 78–109). The
following depiction can be drawn based on Sergius’ description:

It is remarkable that Sergius provides non-living beneath animate body, after

the difference of being sentient and non-sentient, and not before. His Commen-
tary also has this sequence, (see L.31vb20–32ra15/P.39v21–40r10).116 A slightly
different classification of substance is found in Sergius’ Concerning the Division
of Substance (at 169rb16–31).

§42 Higher than each other. The reciprocal expression ‫ܕܐ‬煟q̈ 爯‫ܡ‬ ̣ 爯qq‫“ ܕܥܠ‬that
are higher one than another” is problematic. We would expect that this view
was expressing that something is higher than something else, instead of the
mutual relation (ἄλληλα ‫ܕܐ‬煟q̈ 爯‫‘ ܡ‬each other’). However, Porphyry also uses
a prefixed form of the same pronoun, only to convey the opposite perspective:
ὑπάλληλα ‘under each other’ (81.30, 83.35, 93.19 passim; cf. Arist. Cat. 1b21).

116 For the “tree”, see also Porph. (83.25–84.9), Philop. Syr. (In Isag. 28.10–29.8/qq .١٠‫ ـ‬qq .٧,
tr. 205.9–206.2), J.Damasc. Dialec. (ιʹ/10.140–159 and μζʹ/47.1–23).
212 chapter 8

§42 Gives its name and its nature to each item beneath it. The higher genera
contain all those beneath them and are predicated of them, whereas the lower
are not predicated of the higher, since the more general genera do not include
the differences of the more specific genera and species (cf. Cat. 1b22–24, Porph.
72.7f., 80.16–23, and Philop. 62.15). A similar passage to that of Sergius is found
in John of Damascus (Dialec. ιʹ/10.160–161): τὸ εἶδος τεμνόμενον μεταδίδωσι τοῖς
ὑποκάτω αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦ ὅρου “when the species is divided, it
communicates both its name and its definition to those inferior to itself.”117 See
also Porph. (84.10–86.4).

§44–45 The question about the division of substance, and the three manners
of division. The problem of how substance is divided into primary and sec-
ondary substances is more explicitly formulated in Sergius’ text than we find it
in Ammonius commentary, though the latter’s discussion implies such a ques-
tion and its solution. The account of the various ways in which division can be
carried out is present in Ammonius’ text (37.22–38.22) in connection with Aris-
totle’s mention of secondary substances (Cat. 2a14), but also in his commentary
on the Eisagoge (6.3f.). Ammonius, Philoponus (53.18–55.2), and Simplicius
(61.19–27) give three main modes of division, which according to Ammonius
(38.1f.) are: (1) γένος εἰς εἴδη ‘a genus into species’, (2) ὅλον εἰς μέρη ‘a whole into
parts’, and (3) φωνὴ ὁμώνυμος εἰς διάφορα σημαινόμενα ‘a homonymous word118
into different senses’. These were the three essential divisions in Antiquity,119
while some commentators provide a list of six or even eight modes of divi-
sion, including those referring to both substance and accident.120 Nevertheless,

117 Richter (1982: 105): “Schließlich teilt die Art, wenn sie gegliedert wird, den Individuen
unter ihr die Bezeichnung und die Bestimmung mit.”
118 Sergius has ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫‘ ܨܒ‬object’ here in order to emphasize a more ontological view.
119 As Chase (2002: 142 n. 663) writes: “Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism 2,214ff.) and
Alcinous (Didaskalikos 5, 156,34–157,10 Hermann), agree that there are three principal
types of diairesis: that of names into their meanings; that of a whole into its parts; and
that of a genus into its species. Cf. Clement of Alexandria Stromata viii.19,1–8. As a fourth
type, Sextus mentions the division of a species into particulars; while Alcinous adds two
more: that of subjects into accidents and of accidents into subjects. The classification of
types of division appears to be of Stoic origin.” See also Stephanus, In De Int. (4.11–36). For
the history of the division tradition, see Mansfeld (1992: 326–331, Appendix ii: Diaeresis),
with the literature cited there; and the introduction of Magee to his edition and translation
of Boethius, De divisione liber, (1998: xxiv–lvii).
120 As John of Damascus writes (Dialec. ϛʹ/6.46–49): πᾶν γὰρ διαιρούμενον ἢ καθ’ αὑτὸ διαιρεῖται
ἤγουν κατ’ οὐσίαν ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός “Thus, everything that is divided is divided either
according to itself, namely, according to substance, or according to accident.” Such a
commentary 213

these commentators state that only three of them are essential.121 Elias (In Isag.
67.23–69.18) gives six manners of division, while David (In Isag. 65.14–68.2) and
John of Damascus (Dialec. ϛʹ/6.45–143) give eight.122
Characteristically, this section of Sergius’ treatise is concise and compact,
while the parallel passage in his Commentary on the Categories (L.34v20 ff./
P.43r17ff.) is more detailed. To illustrate the connection between Sergius and
Ammonius it will help here to give the parallel passage from Ammonius’ com-
mentary on Eisagoge (In Isag. 81.17–82.1): πάντα τὰ διαιρούμενα ἢ ὡς γένη εἰς εἴδη
διαιρεῖται, (…) ἢ ὡς ὅλον εἰς μέρη, καὶ τοῦτο διττόν, ἢ γὰρ εἰς ὁμοιομερῆ διαιρεῖται ἢ
εἰς ἀνομοιομερῆ (…), ἢ ὡς ὁμώνυμος φωνὴ εἰς διάφορα σημαινόμενα, ὡς ὅταν εἴπω-
μεν, τοῦ κυνὸς ὁ μέν ἐστι χερσαῖος ὁ δὲ θαλάττιος ὁ δὲ ἀστρῷος ‘everything divided
is divided either as genera into species, (…) or as a whole into parts, and this is
done twofold: for either into similar parts or into dissimilar parts,123 (…) or as
homonymous words into different senses, as we already have said, terrestrial,
aquatic, and starry may refer to dog’. Thus, Sergius uses just ‘word’124 for Ammo-
nius’ ὁμώνυμος φωνή ‘homonymous words’, although his examples of different
things signified by the word ‘dog’ above at §20 were those given for homonyms.
But the division into parts like each other (ὁμοιομερῆ 爯q‫ܡ‬ ̈ ‫ܬܐ ܕܕ‬熏̈‫ )ܡܢ‬and not
̈ ̈
like each other (ἀνομοιομερῆ 爯q‫ ܕܡ‬焏‫ܬܐ ܕܠ‬熏‫ )ܡܢ‬is the same, and it is present
in several commentators.
Ammonius, Philoponus, and Sergius rule out the possibility that substance
is divided according to any of these three modes of division, by using slightly
different arguments in dismissing each of the three alternatives. Then, they
conclude that Aristotle gives an ordering and not a division of substance, as

distinction and a more elaborate division is also found in the dialogue of Jacob/Severus
bar Shakko, in the part claiming to reproduce the teaching of Stephanus of Alexandria
(Steph. Syr. In Isag. 18.18–20.9/qq .١٨ ‫ ـ‬qq .٩). For the three primary divisions and three
secondary ones, see also Boethius, De divisione liber 6.17–26 and the commentary of Magge
pp. 67ff.
121 As David In Isag. (66.24 f.) writes: οὐκ εἰσὶ κυρίως τρόποι διαιρετικοὶ ὀκτὼ ἀλλὰ τρεῖς ‘strictly
speaking the divisive modes are not eight but three’.
122 In addition to these six divisions, David presents two more: an accident into accidents
and the ‘deriving from one thing ⟨and⟩ relating to one thing’ (ἀφ’ ἑνὸς πρὸς ἕν or ἀφ’ ἑνὸς
καὶ πρὸς ἕν, for his clarification of these two, see In Isag. 66.11–23); see Hein (1985: 131–142).
123 For these terms, see Aristotle’s History of Animals (486a5–9), and the explanation of them
by Chase (2002: 142 f. nn. 666 and 667).
124 Also in his Commentary, Sergius has (L.34va24–26/P.43r19): ‫ܐ‬r‫ܡ‬qqr 焏‫ܬ ܩܠ‬r‫ ܒ‬qq‫ܐ‬
‫ܐ‬r‫ܠܦ‬q̈r‫ܬܐ ܡ‬熏‫̈ܒ‬犏‫‘ ܠ‬as a simple word into different entities’, while in his Concerning the
Division of Substance, where he as well gives the modes of division, has (171rb30f.) qq‫ܐ‬
爯q‫ ܕ̈ܡ‬焏‫ܬܐ ܕܠ‬熏‫̈ܒ‬犏‫ ܠ‬焏‫ ̈ܩܠ‬r‫‘ ̈ܒܢ‬as words into dissimilar objects’.
214 chapter 8

Ammonius expresses it (38.21f.): φαμὲν οὖν ὅτι τάξιν παραδίδωσιν αὐτῆς, οὐκέτι
δὲ καὶ διαίρεσιν “Thus we say that he gives an ordering [τάξις = 焏‫ܣ‬qq] of
substance, but not a division.” For different solution(s) to this problem, see also
Dexippus (46.30–47.13) and Simplicius (88.6–29).
Lastly, Sergius’ argument that ‘amongst the species that pertain to the same
genus there is no prior and posterior’ has its parallel at least in Elias, who has (In
Isag. 68.19f.): ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους διαιρεθέντων εἰδῶν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ πρότερον
καὶ ὕστερον ‘for amongst the species branched off from a genus there is no prior
and posterior’. This would indicate that the statement has a previous history in
the commentary tradition.

§49 Species are closer to primary substance than genera, and are superior to
them (cf. Porph. 92.36–93.24). The notion that Sergius sets out here reflects
the most severe difference in the ontological views of Plato and Aristotle. As
is known, the original and most general forms/ideas were considered by Plato
to be principal and superior, whereas Aristotle held the opposite standpoint,
saying that the most specific and concrete substances are primary and thereby
superior, since these are nearest to us and we can perceive them and predi-
cate the more general genera of them. Steven K. Strange makes an attempt to
clarify how the Categories could become so popular among the Platonists con-
sidering this fundamental disagreement.125 He states: “What is fundamentally
anti-Platonist about Categories §5 is its argument that less universal substance
is ontologically prior to more universal substance, and that particular sub-
stance is primary”, (Strange 1992: 4). This obvious difference of opinion was
the most significant challenge for the Neoplatonist philosopher to deal with
and to somehow find a way to explain in order to harmonize the thought of
Plato and that of Aristotle with each other. Therefore, to define the goal of the
Categories became an important approach to finding an explanation of this
question. A solution that tries to show that the Categories is “not inconsistent
with orthodox Platonism” (op. cit., p. 5) was offered by Porphyry (90.12–91.27),
who declared that the Categories is not a metaphysical work, but rather a logi-
cal work. He adopted “an earlier Peripatetic line of interpretation that sees the
Categories as principally about terms or linguistic items, which Porphyry calls
‘predicates’” (op. cit., p. 7). And though Aristotle in the Categories (2b7 f., 14a29–
35, 14b11–13) and Metaphysics (1019a1–4) asserts that the particular substances

125 Strange does so in his important study from 1987, of which a different version was attached
as introduction to his translation of Porphyry’s commentary on Aristotle’s Categories
(1992), from which I cite here. See also the study of Striker (2011).
commentary 215

are prior, in the Posterior Analytics (71b33–72a5) he “states that universals are
prior in the order of nature” (Strange 1992: 11 and n. 30 ad loc.). The explana-
tory model of Porphyry was adopted by most subsequent commentators, and
it says that the particular substances are primary with respect to perception,
but they are secondary by nature (see Philop. 50.2 ff., 53.7–13). Porphyry writes
(91.23–25): ὥστε ὡς πρὸς τὰς σημαντικὰς λέξεις πρῶται οὐσίαι αἱ ἄτομοι αἰσθηταί, ὡς
δὲ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν πρῶται αἱ νοηταί “Thus with respect to significant expressions
sensible individuals are primary substances, but as regards nature, intelligible
substances are primary.” There are descriptions of the notion that species are
nearer to primary substance and are superior to genus also by other commen-
tators.126
For Sergius’ part, this is not a big issue, since he should be viewed more
as a Peripatetic than a Platonist (see pp. 34f. and 48 f. above). As a conse-
quence, there are not many traces of any discussion about this question in his
Introduction, although the debate is reproduced in his Commentary proper on
the Categories (L.35va19–36vb30/P.44r14–45v16), where he, inter alia, declares
(L.35va19–26/P.44r18–21): ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫܉ ܕܨ̈ܒ‬r‫ܡ‬焏‫ ܕܢ‬r‫ ܐܢ‬qqr‫ ܡ‬爯q‫ ܗܕܐ ܕ‬爏‫ܘܐܦ ܥ‬
爯q‫ܠ‬q‫ ܘܐ‬.爯q煿qrq‫ܐ ܐ‬rqrq‫ ܐ‬爯‫ ܠ‬焏‫ܢ‬qq‫ܐ ܠ‬rq‫̈ܡ‬煟‫ ܩ‬爯q煿qrq‫ ܕܐ‬爯q‫ܠ‬q‫ܐ‬
.爯q煿qrq‫ܐ ܐ‬rq‫ܡ‬ ̈ 煟‫ ܩ‬爯‫ܐ ܠ‬rqrq‫ ܐ‬焏‫ܢ‬qq‫ ܠ‬爯q煿qrq‫‘ ܕܐ‬and also concerning this
someone might say: those things which are primary to nature are secondary
to us, and those which are secondary to nature are primary to us’, (see how-
ever also Sergius’ discussion at §77). As expected, the contents of this section
in Sergius’ Commentary concur with the accounts of Ammonius (36.2–21) and
Philoponus (50.1–51.21), while the shorter exposition relates more closely to
Porphyry (92.6–16). For the presentation of this problem and a discussion on
it, see also Dexippus (44.32–45.11) and Simplicius (82.1–35).
The adverb rq焏‫ܢ‬qq‫( ܡ‬mǝḥayyǝnāʾīṯ) ‘appropriately’ at § 49 (B.90v13) is
indistinctly written in our manuscript, but it is also present in the correspond-
ing passage at L.36vb6/P.45v5. It is otherwise not attested in Syriac dictio-
naries, but again it seems to appear three times in Sergius’ On the Influence
of the Moon (at 煟‫ܩܒ‬/124.6,11,14), where its editor Sachau has twice wrongly
emended it to rq焏qq‫‘ ܡܢ‬pleasingly’ (√nwḥ). Sachau bases his emendation on
the second occurrence of the adverb at 124.11, where the manuscript, accord-
ing to him, reads the emended rq焏qq‫ܡܢ‬, although our reading fits better
in that context. Also its more common adjectival form 焏‫ܢ‬qq̣̇‫‘ ܡ‬related/con-

126 See Ammon. (41.19–24), Philop. (59.5–17, 76.2–77.24), Olymp. (64.13–35); Elias (168.5–
169.2), and Simpl. (88.32–90.6). On the subject of Porphyry’s reinterpretation of the ontol-
ogy of the Categories, see also Evangeliou (1988, esp. pp. 22, 60–66, and 164–169).
216 chapter 8

nected’ (passive participle form paʿʿel of the secondary root 爯qq/ḥyn) occurs at
P.50r18 (lacuna in L) and in Sergius’ A Natural Demonstration (bl Add 12155,
fol. 178ra47). The related passages for the adverb rq焏‫ܢ‬qq‫ ܡ‬in Porphyry (92.9)
and Ammonius (41.26) has the Greek οἰκείως ‘appropriately/properly’, while
Philoponus (59.22) uses at first the adverb ὑγιῶς ‘soundly’, which is immediately
(59.23) followed by the comparative form οἰκειότερον, the form that Aristotle
also has in the lines expounded here (Cat. 2b8–10). As usual, Sergius has cho-
sen to construe a semantic equivalence for οἰκείως (from οἶκος ‘house’), instead
of the etymological one adopted by later translators. Sergius’ term was proba-
bly more easily understood by an uninitiated reader than the calque rq‫ܐ‬rq‫ܒ‬
would have been. In the first Syriac translation of Porphyry’s Eisagoge (11.12),
οἰκείως is rendered by an adjective plus infinitive (25.15): ‫ܥ‬r‫ܐ ܠܡܦ‬犏q‫ܬܪ‬
‘it is accurate to reply’, while in the revision of Athanasius of Balad we find
the etymologically equivalent adverb rq‫ܐ‬rq‫( ܒ‬from ‫ܐ‬rq‫‘ ܒ‬house’). The first
Syriac translation of the Categories, on the other hand, has rq焏‫ܠܢ‬q‫‘ ܕ‬particu-
larly’ (Cat. 2b33/A.104.16) or even its substantive form ‫ܐ‬rq‫ܠ‬q‫‘ ܕ‬particularity’
(Cat. 6b37,39/A.124.15,18), and rq焏‫ܢ‬r‫‘ ܡ‬properly’ (Cat. 7a4,31/A.124.21,126.18)
for οἰκείως, whereas the translations of Jacob of Edessa (259.4 passim) and
George, Bishop of the Arabs (13.11 passim) give rq‫ܐ‬rq‫ ܒ‬throughout. The
adverb rq焏‫ܢ‬r‫( ܡ‬from ‫ܐ‬r‫‘ ܡ‬lord’) in the anonymous translation of the Cat-
egories corresponds rather to Greek κυρίως ‘properly/strictly (speaking)’ (from
κύριος ‘lord’), which in Sergius’ text is rendered by rq‫ܐ‬rqrq (see also the last
section of comm. §53–60 and Brock 1989: 49). The term rq焏‫ܢ‬r‫ ܡ‬occurs also
in Paul the Persian’s Treatise on the Logic of Aristotle at 9.7 and 10.26.127

§50–51 Why are accidents not in turn named tertiary substances? The dispute
concerning why accidents are not also called tertiary substances is expressed
with reference to Cat. 2b29f., where Aristotle says: Εἰκότως δὲ μετὰ τὰς πρώτας
οὐσίας μόνα τῶν ἄλλων τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ γένη δεύτεραι οὐσίαι λέγονται “It is reasonable
that, after the primary substances, their species and genera should be the only
other things called secondary substances.” Relating to this question, Ammo-
nius declares that (43.16f.): Νῦν τὴν αἰτίαν λέγει δι’ ἣν τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἴδη δευτέρας
οὐσίας ἐκάλεσε, τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα οὐκέτι τρίτας οὐσίας εἶπε “Now he states the
reason why he has called genera and species secondary substances, but not said
that accidents are tertiary substances”, and then he presents the two main argu-

127 See also its occurrences in Paul’s Elucidation of Peri Hermeneias 48.26 and 64.33, and
the comment of Hugonnard-Roche (2013: 102f.). For the adjective 焏q‫ܢ‬r‫‘ ܡ‬dominical’, see
Brock (2010: 114 f.).
commentary 217

ments why accidents are not named tertiary substances (43.17–44.4), which has
its parallel in Philoponus (61.20–30) too. Ammonius specifies the first argument
as deriving ἀπὸ τῆς ἀποδόσεως τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ ‘from giving a definition’ (cf. Arist.
Top. 108b9,19f.), while Philoponus has ἐκ τῆς σχέσεως ‘by relation’, and both call
the second manner ἐκ τῆς ἀναλογίας ‘by analogy’. Sergius does not describe the
two manners by name, but he offers the same examples. His conclusion dif-
fers from that of Ammonius and is closer to that of Philoponus, by the fact that
they focus on the argument that species and genera signify primary substance,
while accidents do not do so, which is actually Porphyry’s argument (92.6–16).
Ammonius, on the other hand, emphasizes the setting out of a definition and
its inference. The second argument is found also in Porphyry (92.7–35), saying
that species and genera are substrates for all other things, whereas accidents
do not underlie anything else. For a mention of this aporia, see also Simplicius
(90.7–12).

§52 Sergius’ terminology for ὑποκείμενον ‘subject’. The expression here (at
126.21–128.1) that Sergius employs to convey the meaning of ὑποκεῖσθαι ‘under-
lie’, ‘to be subject/substrate for’ (Arist. Cat. 2b15f., 33) is ‫ ܠ‬爯q‫ܡ‬q‫ܣ‬, the plural of
爟q‫ܣ‬. This Syriac word is a passive participle of the verb 爟‫( ܣ‬root 爟q‫ܣ‬/sym),
which in the passive is an etymological equivalent of the Greek verb κεῖσθαι
‘to lie’, and its active form corresponds to the transitive τιθέναι ‘to put/place’.
In his two commentaries, Sergius does not utilize any form of this verbal root
to designate the substantive ὑποκείμενον ‘subject’, but in his A Natural Demon-
stration (bl Add 12155) we find twice 爟q‫‘ ̇ܗܘ ܕܣ‬what is placed’. Once, when
he refers to Porphyry’s definition of accident at Eis. 12.24 f. Sergius has there
(178ra31–33): ‫ ܕ̇ܗܘ‬煿‫ܒܠ‬熏q 爯‫ ܡ‬rq‫܇ ܣ‬爏q‫ܡ ܕ̇ܗܘܐ ܘ̇ܒ‬煟‫܉ ܡ‬焏r煟‫ ܕܓ‬焏‫ܡ‬熏q‫ܬ‬
爟q‫‘ ܕܣ‬the definition of accident: something that occurs and disappears with-
out the destruction of the substrate’.128 And a second time at 178rb28. The
expression 爟q‫( ̇ܗܘ ܕܣ‬equivalent to Greek τὸ κείμενον), and the related ‫ܡ‬煟‫ܡ‬
爟q‫‘ ܕܣ‬something placed’ (equivalent to κείμενον τι), come to function as the
technical term for ‘subject’ by later commentators and translators, (see King
2010b: 176f.). Despite the fact that Sergius most likely coined 爟q‫ ̇ܗܘ ܕܣ‬for ὑπο-
κείμενον, he prefers to use inflected forms of 煿‫ܘܗܝ ܒ‬rq‫ ܕܐ‬焏‫‘ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‬that in
which it is’ and 煿‫ ܕ̇ܗܘܐ ܒ‬焏‫‘ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‬that in which it occurs’, to serve for the
meaning of ‘subject’. The fact that these phrases appear also in the first Syr-
iac version of Porphyry’s Eisagoge, further strengthens the connection between

128 Also in the first Syriac translation of Porphyry’s Eisagoge, there is once (46.14f./Eis. 21.13)
爟q‫ ܕܣ‬焏‫‘ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‬that which is placed’ for τὸ ὑποκείμενον ‘subject’.
218 chapter 8

this translation and Sergius. In this translation, it has the following forms:
煿‫ ܕ̇ܗܘܐ ܒ‬焏‫( ܕ̇ܗܘ ܡ‬Eis. 12.24f./Eis.Syr.i 29.3), 煿‫ܘܗܝ ܒ‬rq‫ ܕܐ‬焏‫( ܕ̇ܗܘ ܡ‬Eis.
13.3/Eis.Syr.i 29.9; Athanasius of Balad has at both these instances 爟q‫)ܕ̇ܗܘ ܕܣ‬,
煿‫ܘܗܝ ܒ‬rq‫ ܕܐ‬焏‫ܘ ܡ‬煿̇‫( ܒ‬Eis. 20:20f./Eis.Syr.i 45.8 f.; Athanasius of Balad:
爟q‫ ܕܣ‬焏‫ܘ ܡ‬煿̇‫)ܠ‬, and once also just 焏‫ܢ‬rq‫ܡ ܐ‬煟‫‘ ܒܡ‬in something else’ (Eis.
13.5/Eis.Syr.i 29.14f.; Athanasius of Balad: 爟q‫ܘ ܕܣ‬煿̇‫)ܒ‬, and ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫‘ ܨ̈ܒ‬objects’
̈ q‫ ܕܣ‬爯q‫)ܗܠ‬.
(Eis. 20.3/Eis.Syr.i 43.17; Athanasius of Balad: 爯‫ܡ‬
Sergius’ usages answers well to Aristotle’s specification of being ‘in a subject’
at Cat. 1a24f., where he writes: ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ λέγω ὃ ἔν τινι μὴ ὡς μέρος
ὑπάρχον ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν “By ‘in a subject’ I mean what is in
something, not as a part, and cannot exist separately from what it is in”, and to
the explanation of Porphyry at 77.18: ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἔφη ἐκεῖνο εἶναι τὸ ἔν τινι ὄν “by
‘in a subject’ he means what exists in something.”

§53–60 The four modes of a (distinctive) property. This description of the four
specific features that constitute a property (Greek τὸ ἴδιον, for which some-
times the Latin proprium is used in translation), that is to say, what is peculiar
and distinctive of a certain substance, is given by Porphyry at Eisagoge (12.12–
22) and also discussed in his question-answer commentary on the Categories
(93.26–94.28), where he gives only three types of property. As the translators
Cohen and Matthews explain, Aristotle himself in the Topics (102a18–30) uses
the term ἴδιον “in a semi-technical way to indicate a non-accidental charac-
teristic that is distinctive, but not part of the essence, of the subject” (1991: 55
n. 71). In other words, that is what is defined as οὐσιώδης ‘essential’ and ἐπουσι-
ώδης ‘non-essential’ to something by the Neoplatonists in their interpretation
of especially the above given relevant passage of Porphyry’s Eisagoge.129 The
four peculiarities or peculiar characteristics according to Porphyry, Ammonius,
Stephanus, and Sergius are:

1) What is accidentally or potentially found in one species alone, though actu-

ally not in all the individuals of that species, as only some individuals of the
human species alone concern themselves with the sciences and fine arts; Eis.
(12.13f.): ὃ μόνῳ τινὶ εἴδει συμβέβηκεν, εἰ καὶ μὴ παντί, ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ἰατρεύειν ἢ
τὸ γεωμετρεῖν “what is an accident of a certain species alone, even if not of it

129 Cf. Ammon. In Isag. (109.1–3), David In Isag. (200.17–23), Elias In Isag. (89.5–11). These
four properties are also specified by Stephanus of Alexandria (Steph. Syr. In Isag. 30.32–
31.23/‫ ܠ‬.٣٢ ‫ ܠـܐ ـ‬.٢٣, tr. 207.35–208.25 apud Jacob/Severus bar Shakko), and will be given
below.
commentary 219

all (as doctoring or doing geometry of man)”, and Ammon. In Isag. (109.13–
15): πρῶτον ὃ μόνῳ τινὶ συμβέβηκεν, οὐ παντὶ δέ, ὡς τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ἰατρεύειν τὸ
φιλοσοφεῖν τὸ ἀστρονομεῖν τὸ γεωμετρεῖν ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων ‘first as what only
happens to belong to a subject but not in every subject of a species, as prac-
tising medicine or philosophy or astronomy or geometry, etc. may belong
to man’. Steph. Syr. In Isag. (31.1f.): .煿‫ܠ‬q‫ ܠ‬熏‫ ܠ‬焏‫܇ ܐܠ‬焏r‫ ܐܕ‬煟q‫ ܕܠ‬焏‫̇ܗܘ ܡ‬
rq‫ ܐܘ ܕܢܡ‬焏‫ܣ‬焏‫ ̇ܗܝ ܕܢ‬焏r‫ܢ‬r‫ ܕܠܒ‬焏‫ܢ‬熟q‫‘ ܐ‬what (belongs) to one species,
but not to all of it, as it (belongs) to man to practise medicine and geometry’.
2) What is accidentally or potentially found in all the individuals of a species,
but not only in that species, as all individuals of man and some other animals
are two-footed; (Eis. 12.14f.): ὃ παντὶ συμβέβηκεν τῷ εἴδει, εἰ καὶ μὴ μόνῳ, ὡς τῷ
ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ εἶναι δίποδι “what is an accident of all the species, even if not of it
alone (as being biped of man)”, and Ammon. In Isag. (109.15–17): δεύτερον δὲ
ὃ παντὶ μέν, οὐ μόνῳ δέ, ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ εἶναι δίποδι· παντὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπῳ ὑπάρχει,
οὐ μόνῳ δέ· καὶ γὰρ καὶ πετεινοῖς ὑπάρχει τὸ δίποσιν εἶναι ‘second, what belongs
to every instance, though not only to it, such as being two-footed belongs to
man. It belongs to every man, but not only to man, for it also belongs to birds
to be two-footed’. Steph. Syr. In Isag. (31.2f.): 熏‫܇ ܘܠ‬焏r‫ ܐܕ‬煿‫ܠ‬q‫ ܕܠ‬焏‫̇ܗܘ ܡ‬
焏r‫ܢ‬r‫ ܠܒ‬焏‫ܓܠ‬r ‫ܬ‬熏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܬܪ‬qq‫ ܐ‬.‫ܕܘܗܝ‬熏q‫ ܒܠ‬煿‫‘ ܠ‬what (belongs) to a whole
species, but not to it alone, as bipedality/two-footedness to man’.
3) What is accidentally or potentially found in one species alone and in all
the individuals of it, however not always but sometimes, as a human being
turning grey at some point of life; Eis. (12.16f.): ὃ μόνῳ καὶ παντὶ καὶ ποτέ, ὡς
ἀνθρώπῳ παντὶ τὸ ἐν γήρᾳ πολιοῦσθαι “what holds of it alone and of all of it
and at some time (as going grey in old age of man)”, and Ammon. In Isag.
(109.17f.): τρίτον δὲ ὃ καὶ μόνῳ καὶ παντί, οὐκ ἀεὶ δὲ ἀλλὰ ποτέ, ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ἐν
γήρᾳ πολιοῦσθαι ‘third, what belongs to a subject both exclusively and wholly,
although not always but only sometimes, as having grey hair in old age
belongs to man’. Steph. Syr. In Isag. (31.3f.): 熏‫ ܠ‬焏‫܇ ܐܠ‬焏r‫ ܐܕ‬煿‫ܠ‬q‫ ܕܠ‬焏‫̇ܗܘ ܡ‬
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܒ‬q‫ ܣ‬爯‫ܒ‬熟‫ܪܘܬܐ ܒ‬熏q qq‫ ܐ‬.爯‫ܒ‬熟‫ܠ‬q‫‘ ܒ‬what (belongs) to a whole species,
but not always, as grey in the time of old age’.
4) What essentially as a potentiality is found in one species alone (no. 1), in all
of its individuals (no. 2), and always (no. 3), as all the individuals of human
species alone can laugh whenever they like; Eis. (12.17f.): ἐφ’ οὗ συνδεδράμηκεν
τὸ μόνῳ καὶ παντὶ καὶ ἀεί, ὡς τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ γελαστικόν “where ‘alone and all
and always’ coincide (as laughing of man)”, and Ammon. In Isag. (109.19–21):
τέταρτον δὲ ἐφ’ οὗ συνδεδράμηκε καὶ τὸ μόνῳ καὶ παντὶ καὶ ἀεί, οἷον τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ
τὸ γελαστικὸν καὶ τῷ ἵππῳ τὸ χρεμετιστικὸν καὶ κυνὶ τὸ ὑλακτικόν ‘fourth, in
which ‘alone’, ‘all’ and ‘always’ coincide, as for example laughing of man,
neighing of horse, and barking of dog’, (cf. Elias In Isag. 36.17f.). Steph. Syr.
220 chapter 8

In Isag. (31.4f.): ‫ܕܘܗܝ‬熏q‫ ܒܠ‬煿‫ ̇ܗܝ ܕܠ‬.爯q煿‫ܠ‬q 130爯q‫ܗ‬r ‫ܐ‬煟qq‫ ܐ‬煿‫ ܕܠ‬焏‫̇ܗܘ ܡ‬
焏q‫ܣ‬熏‫ܬܐ ܠܣ‬熏‫ ܘܨܗܘܠ‬焏r‫ܢ‬r‫ܬܐ ܠܒ‬熏q熏q‫ ܓ‬qq‫ ܐ‬.爯‫ܒ‬熟‫ܠ‬q‫ ܘܒ‬煿‫ܠ‬q‫‘ ܘܠ‬that
in which they all coincide, that of ‘it alone’, ‘all of it’, and ‘always’, as laughing
of man and neighing of horse’.

Only the last one is said to be a property ‘in the strict sense’ (Eis. 12.20/Eis.Syr.i
28.16: κυρίως rq‫ܐ‬rqrq), in completing the insufficiency of the other three and
actualizing and realizing the potentiality of them, and also in being reciproca-
ble, that is ‘man’ can be deduced from ‘laughter’, and ‘laughter’ can be deduced
from ‘man’ (cf. among others Elias In Isag. 36.25–30 and Steph. Syr. In Isag.
31.12–15). For the discussion on the modes of property, see especially Ammon.
In Isag. (108.20–110.6, to which Sergius’ rendering is closely related), and also
Ammon. (44.5–25), where he only defines the last mode, which is said to be a
property in the strictest sense.131
Sergius uses the abstract noun ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܠ‬q‫ ܕ‬to represent the Greek τὸ ἴδιον,
which is also the usual form used in the first translation of the Eisagoge (see
̈
Eis. 1.5,12.13/Eis.Syr.i 1.6,28.2 passim), even in plural ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܠ‬q‫ ܕ‬for τὰ ἴδια (Eis.
2.19/Eis.Syr.i 4.14). But in this translation, we find also the form ‫ܐ‬rq‫ܠ‬q‫( ܕ‬Eis.
12.5/Eis.Syr.i 27.6, and Eis. 12.17/Eis.Syr.i 28.9f.: τέταρτον δέ ⟨ἴδιον⟩ 爯q‫ܐ ܕ‬rq‫ܠ‬q‫ܕ‬
‫ܐ‬rq‫ܥ‬q‫ )ܪܒ‬and its plural ‫ܐ‬rq̈‫ܠ‬q‫( ܕ‬Eis. 16.10/Eis.Syr.i 36.11). Unexpectedly, this
latter form is elsewhere used for the abstract Greek form ἰδιότης (Eis. 20.7/
Eis.Syr.i 44.5: αἱ κοινότητες καὶ αἱ ἰδιότητες τῆς διαφορᾶς ‫ܐ‬rq̈‫ܠ‬q‫ܐ ܘܕ‬rq̈‫ܢ‬熏‫ܓ‬
焏‫ܢ‬rr熏‫‘ ܕܦ‬the general and proper features of differences’, and Eis. 7.23,25,
22.11/Eis.Syr.i 17.10,11, 48.9) in this translation. The non-abstract form ‫ܐ‬rq‫ܠ‬q‫ܕ‬
(pl. ‫ܐ‬rq̈‫ܠ‬q‫ )ܕ‬became the prevalent form for τὸ ἴδιον in later times (see King
2010b: 318). Athanasius of Balad uses it for ἰδιότης as well (at Eis. 7.23).
In accordance with his customary method, Sergius employs a semantic
equivalent for κύριος/κυρίως (see also the end of comm. § 49). He uses an
adjective (‫ܬܐ‬rqrq ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܠ‬q‫‘ ܕ‬a real property’), and the (anonymous) Syriac
translation of Eisagoge (Eis. 12.20/Eis.Syr.i 28.16) has the above given adverbial
form of this word. Also Steph. Syr. In Isag. (31.12) has ‫ܬܐ‬rqrq ‫ܐ‬rq‫ܠ‬q‫‘ ܕ‬a real
property’. In contrast, Athanasius of Balad in his revision has an etymological
equivalent: rq焏‫ܢ‬r‫‘ ܡ‬like a lord’, which is also found in the translators of
the Categories (5a38, 5b8: A.116.15,25, J.267.22, 268.9, G.19.16,25, cf. King 2010b:

130 Baumstark’s edition has 爯qq‫ܗ‬r ‫ܐ‬煟qq‫( ܐ‬corresponds to Greek συντρέχειν).

131 See also Philop. (63.12–64.6), where he closely relates to Ammonius’ exposition of the
Categories; but also David In Isag. (200.9–203.15), Elias In Isag. (89.2–90.28), Simpl. (90.10–
17 passim and De Haas’ n. 83 p. 72 ad loc.), Anon.Syr. In Isag. (55.1–56.20/煿‫ ܢ‬.١ ‫ ـ‬熏‫ ܢ‬.٢٠, tr.
247.11–248.43), and J.Damasc. Dialec. (ιδʹ/14.1–22).
commentary 221

319). The opposite of κυρίως rq‫ܐ‬rqrq, used by Sergius as an equivalent to

μεταφορικῶς132 ‘metaphorically’, ‘fictitiously’, is rq焏‫ܠ‬q焏r (cf. Porph. 58.37 f.,
and this adverb at L.39ra33/P.48r23).133 In all the three Syriac translations of
the Categories, rq‫ܐ‬rqrq is used to convey the sense of ἀκριβῶς ‘exactly’,
‘precisely’ (Cat. 8b12: A.132.27, J.279.8, and G.28.1). See also the information
provided by King (2010b: 202, comm. to 5a38).

§61 The properties of substance. In his Commentary, Sergius states, like the
Greek commentators, that an adequate definition of substance cannot be pro-
vided, since it is the highest genus, above which there is no other genus to which
it can be referred, (L.38ra33–b1/P.47r17–19): 煟‫ ܠܡܥܒ‬焏q犏‫ ܡ‬焏‫ ܗܝ ܕܠ‬焏‫ܥ‬q煟q
爿‫ ܓܢ‬焏‫ܕ ܐܠ‬熏q‫ ܒܠ‬焏‫ ܓܢܣ‬熏‫ ܠ‬煿̇qrq‫܇ ܕܐ‬焏q‫ ܐܘܣ‬爏‫ ܥ‬rq‫ܐ‬犏q‫ ܬܪ‬焏‫ܡ‬熏q‫ܬ‬
爯q‫‘ ܓܢ̈ܣ‬it is known that it is impossible to accurately give a definition of sub-
stance, which is not only a genus, but a most generic genus’. Later on, he says
that (L.38vb12–18/P.47v28–48r3): 焏‫ܡ‬熏q‫ ܬ‬煟‫ ܠܡܥܒ‬爯‫ܢ‬q犏‫ܐܠ‬r‫ܝ ܕܡ‬r‫ ܐܡ‬爏q
‫ܐ܉‬rq‫ܡܢ‬qr‫ܐ ܡ‬r‫ ܡܠ‬爯‫ܢ‬q‫ܒܩ‬r 爯‫ܢ‬q‫܉ ܗܘ‬r‫ ܗܕܐ ܠܡܣܥ‬爯‫ܢ‬qqqr‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܡ ܘܠ‬煟‫ܕܡ‬
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܬܐ ܕܨܒ‬熏q‫ܠ‬q‫ܬ ܕ‬熏‫ ܠ‬爯‫ܢ‬q‫‘ ܘܐܬ‬whenever we are obliged to give a defini-
tion of something, but are unable to do that, we should leave aside the defining
description and approach the property of (that) object’.134 Therefore, Sergius
started this passage by enumerating and describing what a distinctive prop-
erty is. Having done that, he applies those criteria to specify substance through
its properties, since, as noted, any proper definition of it cannot be given.
The presented properties of substance are: (1) that which is not in anything,
but rather everything is in it, (2) that which gives its name and definition to
everything predicated of it, (3) that which signifies a definite something, (4)
that which has no opposite, (5) that which cannot be more or less, and (6) that
which is unique of being receptive of opposites.
For a related definition of substance, see also Jacob of Edessa’s Encheiridion
(231.22–232.6, ed. Furlani).

132 Or much less probably the καταχρηστικῶς ‘by a misuse (of language)’ of David In Isag.
(202.19).
133 See also L.18rb10–21/P.69v16–22: rq‫ܐ‬rqrq‫ ܘ‬rq‫ܡ‬煟‫ܬܐ ܩ‬熏‫ ܕܨ̈ܒ‬爯q煿‫ ܕܡܢ‬爏qq‫ ܗ‬爯‫ܢ‬qr‫ܐܡ‬
‫ ̇ܗܘ‬爯q煿‫ܘܗܝ ܠ‬rq‫ ܐ‬rq焏‫ܢ‬r煟‫ ܘܓ‬rq焏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܬܪ‬爯q煿‫ܢ܇ ܘܡܢ‬r‫ܐܡ‬r‫ ܕܡ‬焏‫ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‬爯q煿qrq‫ܐ‬
rq焏‫ܠ‬q焏r‫ ܘ‬rq‫ܐ‬rqrr ‫܉‬焏q̈‫ ܙܢ‬爯qr‫ ܬ‬爯q‫ܠ‬煿‫ ܠ‬焏qq‫ܪ‬熏‫ ܣ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܢ‬r‫ ܒܠ‬.爯q煿q‫ ܥܠ‬r‫ܐܡ‬r‫ ܕܡ‬焏‫ܡ‬
‫ܢ‬熏‫ ܐܢ‬煿‫ܡ‬r‫ܗܝ[ ܕܢ‬熏qr‫ ]ܕܢܩ‬爯‫ܢ‬q煟‫‘ ܡܥ‬thus, we say that some objects are primarily and
strictly what they are said to be, and others have secondarily and accidently what is said
of them. In the Syriac language we are wont to name these two kinds truly and falsely’.
However, the translation of it by ‘metaphorically’ fits better in this context.
134 See also L.38rb14-va13/P.47r25–v14, P.54v18–21, and L.51ra10–16/P.93v8–11.
222 chapter 8

§62–64 Whether accidents and parts of substance are in substance, so that also
the parts of substance are accidents? As noted above, Aristotle had insisted that
the parts of substance are themselves substances (Cat. 3a29–32). A problem
like the one formulated by Sergius is already found in Porph. (94.17–19). Here,
Porphyry and the ensuing commentators try to clarify the difference between
being in something (or ‘in a subject’ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι) as accidents from being
in something (or ‘in a whole’ τὰ μέρη ἔν τινι/ἐν ὅλῳ) as parts, which constitute
a difference (διαφορά) in their subject. The way Sergius puts it is closer to
Ammonius (46.22–25): ἠπόρησε γὰρ ἄν τις λέγων ‘ἐπειδὴ τὰ μέρη τῶν οὐσιῶν ἔν
τινι (ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ θεωροῦνται χεῖρες καὶ σκέλη), καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα δὲ ἔν τινι
ὁμοίως, ⟨ὡς⟩ εἰ τύχοι ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ θεωρεῖται λευκότης θερμότης· τὰ μέρη ἄρα τῶν
οὐσιῶν συμβεβηκότα, ὅπερ ἄτοπον’. “One might have objected as follows: ‘Since
the parts of substances are in something (for hands and legs are observed in a
man) and similarly accidents are also in something, as whiteness or heat may
perhaps be observed in a man, the parts of substances are therefore accidents
— which is absurd.’” This passage has its parallel in Philop. (68.14–16) too.
Ammonius and Philoponus say that the solution to this problem is antic-
ipated by Aristotle, who had defined accidents as in something not as parts
(Cat. 1a24f.: ὃ ἔν τινι μὴ ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχον ‘what is present in something not as
a part’), whereas parts are themselves substances and are necessary for their
whole, since (Ammon. 46.28): αὗται τὸ ὑποκείμενον συνιστᾶσιν “they constitute
the subject”, or as Porphyry expresses it (94.22–24): τὰ δὲ μέρη τῶν οὐσιῶν ἐν τοῖς
ὅλοις ὄντα οὐκ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ ὡς οὐσίαι καὶ οὐχ ὡς συμβεβηκότα “but
the parts of substances are not in a subject. They are in substances as wholes,
but as substances and not as accidents.” Thus, as Sergius establishes it, a part
is completive (焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܡܠ‬r‫ ܡ‬συμπληρωτικός) of its whole, whereas an accident is
completed (q‫ܡܠ‬rr‫ ܐ‬συμπληροῦσθαι) by its substrate, (cf. also Simpl. 97.5–11).

§65 Natural philosophers’ view of matter and the four elements. The exposition
on matter presented by Sergius is not found in the Categories, but it is rather
treated by Aristotle especially in Phys. (192a25–34), and Metaph. (1028b33–
1029b10 passim, cf. index loc., Bonitz 1870: 784ff.). This topic is just slightly
touched upon by Porphyry in the Eisagoge (11.12–17) and in his commentary
on the Categories he makes a brief mention of it. Ammonius on his part offers
some notes about it in his commentary on the relevant passages of the Eis-
agoge (Ammon. In Isag. 106.11–107.21). Already in an earlier instance of this
work he had written that (In Isag. 36.23f.): τὰ γὰρ στοιχεῖα ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους
σύγκειται ‘the elements are compounded of matter and form’. In his survey he
writes, inter alia, that (In Isag. 106.15f.): πᾶσι μὲν οὖν τοῖς φυσικοῖς πράγμασίν
ἐστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὃ καλοῦσι κυρίως ὕλην, τὴν ἀκαλλῆ καὶ ἀνείδεον ‘the sub-
commentary 223

strate for all physical objects, which is properly called matter, is that which is
unshapely and formless’, and which is the standard definition of matter that
is shared by Stoics, Platonists, and Peripatetics. Then, he mentions the mat-
ter of those objects that change into one another (εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβάλλουσι, cf.
Arist. On the Heavens 306b19–23). And later on, he gives examples similar to
those of Sergius regarding what the supply of different combinations of ele-
ments brings forth. He lays down that (In Isag. 107.6–8): δῆλον ὅτι δεξαμένη αὐτὴ
[i.e. ὕλη] ψυχρότητα καὶ ὑγρότητα γίνεται ὕδωρ, θερμότητα δὲ καὶ ξηρότητα γίνεται
πῦρ, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὁμοίως ‘it is clear that when it [i.e. matter] has received cold-
ness and wetness it becomes water, but (when it receives) heat and dryness
it becomes fire, and other things similarly’. Otherwise, his and Sergius’ discus-
sions focus on different aspects. However, in his Commentary on the Categories,
while evaluating the order of “quantity” among the ten categories, Ammonius
makes some statements about matter, which in many respects are reminiscent
of Sergius’ description. These lines are worth quoting here (Ammon. 54.4–9):
ἡ γὰρ πρώτη ὕλη ἀνείδεος οὖσα καὶ ἀσώματος πρότερον τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις δέχε-
ται καὶ γίνεται τριχῇ διαστατὸν τὸ καλούμενον δεύτερον ὑποκείμενον, εἴθ’ οὕτως τὰς
ποιότητας καὶ γίνεται σύνθετον ποσόν, ⟨οἷον⟩ τὸ τριχῇ διαστατὸν θερμότητα μὲν δεξά-
μενον καὶ ξηρότητα γίνεται πῦρ, ψυχρότητα δὲ καὶ ὑγρότητα γίνεται ὕδωρ, καὶ τἆλλα
ὁμοίως “Prime matter, which is formless and incorporeal, first receives the three
dimensions and becomes a three-dimensional object called the second sub-
ject, and next ⟨receives⟩ its qualities and becomes a quantified compound. For
example, when the three-dimensional ⟨subject⟩ receives heat and dryness, it
becomes fire; when it receives coldness and wetness, it becomes water, and the
rest similarly.” And this section is even more closely matched in Philoponus,
who writes (83.14–18): ἡ γὰρ πρώτη ὕλη, ὡς πολλάκις εἴρηται, ἀσώματος οὖσα καὶ
ἀνείδεος καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος πρότερον ἐξογκωθεῖσα τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις δέχεται καὶ
γίνεται τριχῇ διαστατόν, ὅ φησιν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης δεύτερον ὑποκείμενον, εἶθ’ οὕτως
δέχεται τὰς ποιότητας καὶ ποιεῖ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ‘for the prime matter, as we have said
many times,135 being first incorporeal, formless, and figureless, expands and
receives the three dimensions and becomes the three-dimensional subject that
Aristotle calls the second substrate. Then it receives the qualities and produces
the elements’. At somewhat greater length the question of matter is discussed

135 Philop. (65.10–13): τὴν πρώτην ὕλην φασὶν οἱ φιλόσοφοι ἀσώματον εἶναι τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ ἀσχημά-
τιστόν τε καὶ ἀμεγέθη καὶ πάσης ποιότητος κεχωρισμένην· ὅτι γὰρ ἀνείδεός ἐστι, δείκνυται σαφῶς
τῷ πάντων τῶν φυσικῶν εἰδῶν αὐτὴν εἶναι δεκτικήν “The philosophers say that prime matter
is incorporeal and by its very definition utterly formless, without size, and separated from
all qualities. That it is without form is clearly shown by the fact that it is receptive of all
physical forms.” (Cf. Arist. Metaph. 1029a30 f.).
224 chapter 8

by Philoponus at 65.8–66.5. Thus, Ammonius, Philoponus, and Sergius agree

with Aristotle that the ultimate matter is a substrate (Metaph. 1029a2–7), which
is incorporeal (ἀσώματος),136 formless (ἀνείδεος 137‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ ܕܡ‬焏‫)ܕܠ‬, and figureless
(ἀσχημάτιστος 爟qq‫ ܐܣ‬焏‫)ܕܠ‬,138 but when it has attained its three dimensions,
this qualityless (ἄποιος 爏qq 焏‫ )ܕܠ‬body becomes a second substrate (Sergius:
焏‫ܡ‬r̈熏‫ ܕܓ‬爯q‫ ܕܬܪ‬焏‫ܢ‬qq),139 which is receptive (δεκτικός 焏‫ )ܡܩܒܠܢ‬of qualities
(ποιότητες 焏q̈‫)ܙܢ‬, figures (σχήματα 焏‫ܡ‬q̈q‫)ܐܣ‬, and faculties (δυνάμεις 焏‫ܠ‬q̈q,
cf. Metaph. 1029a13). And the different combinations of the qualities in matter
̈
make up the four elements (στοιχεῖα = 焏‫ܣ‬q熏q‫)ܐܣ‬. The four combinations
are also given by Philoponus (65.22–25): τούτῳ οὖν κατά τι μὲν μέρος προσγενο-
μένη ἡ θερμὴ καὶ ξηρὰ ποιότης ἐποίησε τὸ πῦρ, κατά τι δὲ ἡ ψυχρὰ καὶ ὑγρὰ ἐποίησε
τὸ ὕδωρ, κατά τι δὲ πάλιν ἡ ξηρὰ καὶ ψυχρὰ ἐποίησε τὴν γῆν, κατά τι δὲ ἡ θερμὴ
καὶ ὑγρὰ ἐποίησε τὸν ἀέρα “So adding the quality hot and dry to one part of this
[qualityless body] made fire, and adding the quality cold and wet to another
made water, and again the quality dry and cold to another part made earth,
and the quality hot and wet to another part made air.”140
Since Sergius has composed his Introduction not only with the intention
of expounding the Categories, but rather to present a general introduction
to philosophy, he considered it appropriate to include also the most basic
views of the natural philosophers on topics like matter and space, even though
not in connection with the discussion on the order of ‘quality’, as the other
commentators do, with the exception of Philoponus’ separate overview.

§66 On quantity (‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܡ‬q πόσος Cat. 4b20–6a35). After having presented

the first main category, namely substance, and some questions and disputes
connected to its description and definition, Sergius goes on to the next main

136 Ammonius and Philoponus have this, but not Sergius.

137 The word ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ ܕܡ‬is usually used by Sergius for μορφή ‘shape’ and not for εἶδος ‘form’, for
which 焏r‫ ܐܕ‬is used; for σχῆμα ‘figure’ the loan word 焏‫ܡ‬qq‫ ܐܣ‬is used. Note however
that Zacharias of Mytilene uses the terms ἄμορφος, ἀνείδεος, and ἀσχημάτιστος to describe
matter (Ammonius, ll. 877 f., ed. Colonna). Cf. also the words used in next footnote.
138 Arist. On the Heavens (306b17): ἀειδὲς καὶ ἄμορφον δεῖ τὸ ὑποκείμενον εἶναι ‘the substrate
must be formless and shapeless’ (cf. also Arist. Phys. 191a10).
139 Philop. (65.17–19): αὕτη οὖν ἐξογκωθεῖσα κατὰ τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις ποιεῖ τὸ δεύτερον ὑποκείμε-
νον κατὰ Ἀριστοτέλην, τοῦτ’ ἔστι τὸ ἄποιον σῶμα “Once it has been swelled up with the three
dimensions it makes, according to Aristotle, the second subject, i.e. the qualityless body.”
(Cf. also Philop. In Phys. 579.4 f.).
140 For some treatment of this theme, see also Olymp. (82.17–23), Elias (154.34–155.8, 159.29f.,
185.19f.), and Simpl. (46.14–48.33).
commentary 225

category, which is quantity. Ammonius and most of his pupils agreed on this
order, where substance is introduced first, next quantity, then quality, and
finally relatives (Ammon. 54.3–15 and Philop. 83.7–84.4). But a dispute about in
which order quality and quantity should come had been going on since at least
first century bc.141 The order established by the Neoplatonists had an onto-
logical basis, since they postulated substance as the primary category under-
lying everything else. Then comes the formless and qualityless matter, which
becomes a quantity when it extends to three dimensions. Next, this quantified
matter142 receives forms and qualities. Finally, the qualified composites stand
in various relations to one another, making up relative things of various kinds.
Quantity is divided by Aristotle (Cat. 4b20–6a35) and his commentators
into several parts. Firstly, some of its parts are said to be discrete (διωρισμέ-
̈
νος, Sergius: ‫ܕܐ‬煟q̈ 爯‫ܡ‬ ̣ 爯‫ܡ‬q̈r‫ܬ̇ܗ ܘܡ‬熏‫ ܡܢ‬爯rr‫ܬܐ ܡܦ‬熏q‫ܡ‬q‫ ܕ‬煿̇‫‘ ܕܡܢ‬some
of the parts of quantity are discrete and delimited from one another’) and
some continuous (συνεχής, Sergius: ‫ܕܐ‬煟q̈ 爯‫ܡ‬ ̣ 爯‫̈ܩ‬q‫ ܦܣ‬焏‫ܢ ܘܠ‬煟qq̈‫ ܐ‬煿̇‫‘ ܘܡܢ‬and
some of (its parts) are continuous and are not cut off from one another’). Dis-
crete parts of quantity being two: number (ἀριθμός 焏‫ܢ‬q‫ )ܡܢ‬and speech (λόγος
‫ܐ‬r‫ ;)ܡܠ‬and continuous parts being five: line (γραμμή 焏q‫ܪ‬熏‫)ܣ‬, surface (ἐπι-
φάνεια ‫ܬܐ‬熏qqqr), body (σῶμα 焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫)ܓ‬, place (τόπος ‫)ܐܬܪܐ‬, and time
(χρόνος 焏‫)ܙܒܢ‬. Of these, some parts (Cat. 4b21, 5a15) θέσιν ἐχόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα
“have position in relation to one another”, as line, surface, body, and place; and
some are composed of parts that do not have any position, as time, speech, and
number. See Porphyry (100.29–105.10), Ammonius (54.16–55.3), and Philoponus
(84.5–9).

§66 The varieties of speech (‫ܐ‬r‫ ܡܠ‬λόγος). Two of the three kinds of lan-
guage/speech (cf. Cat. 4b32–37), which are mentioned here by Sergius are also
given by Porphyry (101.25–31), who dismisses ὁ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ, ὃς καὶ σιωπών-
των ἡμῶν ἐγγίνεται “the speech which occurs in thought, and which goes on
within us even when we are silent”, (see Strange’s n. 237 ad loc.). This kind of
speech is not a quantity, except the intended kind of speech is “that we utter”
(ὃν φθεγγόμεθα) and is “composed of nouns and verbs and the other so-called
parts of speech” (ἐξ ὀνομάτων σύγκειται καὶ ῥημάτων καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν, ἃ λέγεται
εἶναι τοῦ λόγου μέρη). These two varieties of speech are named by Greek com-
mentators προφορικὸς λόγος ‘expressed/external speech’ and ἐνδιάθετος λόγος

141 See Strange (1992: 94 n. 227) to Porph. (100.11).

142 Philop. In Phys. (516.25): ἡ ὕλη ποσωθεῖσα ‘the quantified matter’, (520.20f.): ἥτις ἐστὶ τὸ τριχῇ
διαστατόν ‘which is what is three-dimensional’.
226 chapter 8

‘conceptual/internal speech’, which are in fact Stoic expressions that became

common coin in later pagan, Jewish, and Christian writers, see Hülser (1987:
582–591, fs. 528–535) and Pohlenz (1939: 79–86).143 But Sergius has an addi-
tional third kind of speech which he calls ‫ܐ‬rq‫ܐ ܐܘܡܢ‬r‫( ܡܠ‬i.e. τεχνικὸς
λόγος ‘technical speech’), and this variety of speech is not described in any of
the commentaries belonging to the Neoplatonists, save for one mention of a
τεχνικὸν λόγον by Philoponus (169.19) in another context. Sergius’ source of this
variety of speech will therefore remain unknown for us so far.
However, in the elementary philosophical handbook called Aristotelian Divi-
sions (Διαίρεσις),144 preserved in three manuscripts and partially also in Dio-
genes Laertius iii 80–109, five kinds of speech are given.145 In the version of
Codex Marcianus 257 we have (11.2–6): διαιρεῖται ὁ λόγος εἰς πέντε· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτοῦ
ὁ μὲν ῥητορικός, ὁ δὲ πολιτικός, ὁ δὲ διαλεκτικός, ὁ δὲ τεχνικός, ὁ δὲ ἰδιωτικός ‘speech
is divided into five (parts): there is rhetorical, political, dialectical, technical,
and informal speech’, and the technical is specified as (11.13–16): τεχνικὸς δὲ, ὃν
λέγουσιν οἱ τεχνῖται ὑπὲρ τῶν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἑκάστου [τῶν] αὐτῶν ‘and the techni-
cal, which the artificers name that which relates to each of their arts’, (cf. Diog.
Laer. iii 86.10–87.14). But this division is performed in the scope of rhetoric, and
not that of philosophy. Sergius’ description of this variety of speech is rather
reminiscent of the last stage of a universal form (see comm. to § 7), when it
has become notional (ἐννοηματικός). Furthermore, this point reveals Sergius’
Aristotelian view concerning the relation of words and the things they repre-
sent. Both seem to allege that the relation of words to the things they represent
emerges in man by convention (On Inter. 16a26–28, see comm. to § 5) and is not,
as Plato appears to assume (in the dialogue Cratylus, see Sorabji 2004b: 213–
226), by nature and innate in every man. Sergius and most Peripatetics mean
that words are not naturally significative of things, but that in every language
meanings are attached to words in connection to how a certain convention
designates them. Then, through the perception, an accumulation of abstracted
forms of the entities in correlation to their significant words is imprinted in
the mind of a person and these together make up his language. Also in one of
Bar Bahlul’s explanations of ‫ܐ‬r‫ ܡܠ‬such an understanding of Sergius’ inter-
pretation is hinted at (col. 1097): ‫ܐ‬r‫ܒ‬qrq‫ ܒ‬焏q‫ܠܒ‬r‫ ܘܡ‬焏r‫ ܒܢܦ‬煿̇qrq‫ܘܐ‬

143 Cf. Porph. (64.28–30), Ammon. (57.22–24), Philop. (89.31–90.7), Olymp. (80.33–37, 87.7f.),
and Elias (191.14–17). I thank Professor Jaap Mansfeld for the remark on their Stoic origin
and the references to the relevant literature (personal communication).
144 For this text, see Pepe (2013: 235–240) and Brock (2014: 98ff.) for Syriac remnants of it.
145 The text of Codex Marcianus 257 along with the version of Diogenes Laertius were edited
by Mutschmann in 1906.
commentary 227

焏‫ ܕܐܘܡܢ‬煿‫ܢ‬q‫ܥ‬r‫ ܒ‬焏‫ܩܒܥ‬r‫ ܘܡ‬焏‫ܢ‬r‫ ܒܠ‬焏‫ܡܠܠ‬r‫‘ ܘܡ‬and it (meltha ‘speech’)

is in the soul, and it is kept in script, and it is spoken by the tongue, and it is
impressed in the mind of the artificer’.
The first variety of speech is said to be a quantity, since it is composed of
nouns (lit. ‘names’) or 爯qrq ‫ ܐܘ‬爯qqq‫ ܕܐܪ‬焏‫ܡ‬ ̈ ‫ܓ‬r‫‘ ܒܦ‬of syllables that are long
or short’. The Syriac term 焏‫ܓܡ‬r‫ ܦ‬usually means ‘word’, ‘sentence’, ‘phrase’
etc. But here, it should most probably be understood as equal to the Greek συλ-
λαβή ‘syllable’ of Aristotle (Cat. 4b32–35) and the commentators. In the parallel
passage under discussion, Porphyry (101.32) has αἱ δὲ συλλαβαὶ ἢ μακραί εἰσιν ἢ
βραχεῖαι “Syllables are either long or short”.146 Some Syriac writers adopted the
Greek συλλαβή = 焏‫ܠܒ‬熏‫ ܣ‬in this meaning, while it seems that the native words
焏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܗܓ‬and 焏‫ܩܠ‬r also meant ‘syllable’ inter alia.

§67 Whether a mark (σημεῖον) is a quantity. It is important to establish Sergius’

sources for this inquiry into the issue of a mark and whether it is a quantity or
not. Some discussion of body, its parts, the single dimensions and their relation
to a mark and each other is also found in the commentary of Porphyry on the
Categories. His aim is somehow different. He (103.4–17) treats the difference
between a limit (πέρας) and a part (μέρος), which has its source in Aristotle’s
Physics (231a21–b6). Porphyry states that (103.6f.) ἐκ μὲν μερῶν συνίσταται τὸ
ὅλον, ἐκ δὲ περάτων οὐκ ἂν συσταίη “a whole is composed of its parts, but it cannot
be composed of limits.” Then he declares that a line has a point as its limit,147
a surface has a line as its limit, and a body has a surface as its limit, but they
are not parts of that which a whole is composed of. Though this topic is not
discussed in his Eisagoge, a very similar overview to that of Sergius is found
in Ammonius’ commentary (In Isag. 7.14–31). His presentation is, in the first
place, not for the purpose of evaluating whether a mark, (σημεῖον = ‫ܢ‬熏q‫ܡ‬q‫ܣ‬,
for which Sergius uses also the Syriac ‫ܬܐ‬煟‫ܩ‬熏‫‘ ܢ‬point’, cf. Philoponus’ στιγμή),
is a quantity or not, but in connection with the description of the philosophi-
cal activity within the art of geometry. He writes that (In Isag. 7.15): ὁ γεωμέτρης
τὸ σημεῖον ἀμερὲς λαμβάνει ‘the geometer takes the mark without parts’, which
refers to Euclid’s first definition (ὅρος), the opening line of his Elementa: Σημεῖόν
ἐστιν, οὗ μέρος οὐθέν ‘A point is that which has no part’, (cf. also Philop. 34.31–
34, Olymp. 86.19–27). Later on, Ammonius presents the different levels of a

146 Cf. also Philop. (88.11–16), Olymp. (87.33–34, 90.19–22), and Elias (191.30–192.3).
147 See also Philoponus who in his commentary on Posterior Analytics gives the same descrip-
tion for στιγμή ‘spot/point’, as Sergius and others give for σημεῖον, (Philop. In Anal. Post.
391.7f.): ἡ στιγμὴ πέρας τῆς γραμμῆς καὶ ἔστιν ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος ‘the point is the limit of
the line and it is partless and indivisible’, (cf. Arist. Top. 108b31f.).
228 chapter 8

body (σῶμα 焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫ )ܓ‬or magnitude (μέγεθος ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ )ܪܒ‬by recording (In Isag.
7.18–23): τὸ γὰρ σῶμα τρεῖς ἔχον διαστάσεις περατοῦται ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιφανείας, ἥτις
ἔχει δύο διαστάσεις, μῆκος καὶ πλάτος (βάθος γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει ᾧ λείπεται τοῦ σώμα-
τος), ἡ δὲ ἐπιφάνεια δύο ἔχουσα διαστάσεις περατοῦται ὑπὸ τῆς γραμμῆς, ἥτις μίαν
ἔχει διάστασιν τὸ μῆκος μόνον, ἡ δὲ γραμμὴ περατοῦται ὑπὸ τοῦ σημείου, ὃ δῆλον
ὅτι οὐχ ἕξει οὐδεμίαν διάστασιν, ἀλλ’ ἔσται ἀμερές ‘the body having three dimen-
sions (διαστάσεις 焏‫ܡ‬ ̈ q‫ )ܩ‬is limited by surface (ἐπιφάνεια ‫ܬܐ‬熏qqqr), which
has two dimensions, length (μῆκος ‫ܬܐ‬熏qq‫ )ܐܪ‬and breadth (πλάτος 焏qr‫)ܦ‬,
(for that which is left of the body has no depth {βάθος 焏‫ܡܩ‬熏‫)}ܥ‬, and the
surface having two dimensions is limited by a line (γραμμή 焏q‫ܪ‬熏‫)ܣ‬, which
has one dimension, that of length, and the line is limited by the mark, which
obviously has no dimension, but rather is without parts’, (cf. also David In Isag.
25.32–26.12). In his commentary on the Categories (33.22–27), Ammonius only
mentions the problem of a mark, when noting that some people say that not
everything can be classified among any of the ten categories, and puts forward
the question (33.23f.): τὸ γοῦν σημεῖον καὶ τὴν στέρησιν ὑπὸ ποίαν κατηγορίαν ἀνά-
ξομεν “Under what category should we subsume a point or a privation?”, and
immediately concludes that (33.24–34.2): ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης διαλέγεται περὶ πραγμά-
των τῇ τε αἰσθήσει γνωρίμων καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς, τὸ δέ γε σημεῖον αὐτὸ μέν τι πρᾶγμα
ὑφεστηκὸς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀρχὴ δέ ἐστιν ὅλως πραγμάτων “Aristotle is here discussing
things known by perception, and to ‘the many’.148 But a point is not an indepen-
dently existing thing; it is a principle (ἀρχή 焏rq‫ )ܪ‬of things in general.”149 Also
Philoponus (46.14) and Olympiodorus (22.3–8) inform us that some people
examine the question of to which category a mark (σημεῖον) should be assigned.
In addition to a mark, Simplicius (84.13–66.15) mentions several other things
that some philosophers wonder why they are excluded from the discussion or
why their category is not specified, particularly those who consider Aristotle’s
Categories to be deficient in its treatment of reality. The discussion on mark
(and a parallel one on μονάς ‘monad’) goes back, at least, to the time of Alexan-
der of Aphrodisias, (Simpl. 65.13–66.12). Simplicius also establishes that a mark
is not a quantity, since it is neither continuous nor discrete. Thus, Sergius’ expo-
sition and demonstration that a mark is not a quantity—since it is a certain
incorporeal principle (ἀρχὴ ἀσώματος 焏‫ܡ‬qr‫ ܓ‬焏‫ܡ ܠ‬煟‫ ܡ‬焏rq‫ )ܪ‬which is with-

148 See discussion at § 7 point 3 on the universals.

149 Porphyry (65.31 f.): ἀρχὴν ἀριθμῶν καλέσω τὴν μονάδα, ἀρχὴν δὲ γραμμῆς τὴν στιγμήν “I call
both the monad the source of number, the point the source of the line”, and Philop. (86.1f.):
τὸ γὰρ σημεῖον ῥυϊσκόμενον ποιεῖ τὴν γραμμήν· ἀρχὴ γάρ ἐστι τῆς γραμμῆς ‘for when the mark
is moulded it makes the line, for it is the source of the line’.
commentary 229

out parts (ἀμερής ‫ܐ‬r‫ ܡܢ‬焏‫)ܕܠ‬, and lacks extension (διάστημα 焏qr‫)ܡ‬150 and
magnitude (μέγεθος ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫—)ܪܒ‬may have derived from these speculations.

§68–74 Whether there is space and whether it is a quantity. The notion that
space (τόπος ‘place’, ‘space’) is a quantity was established by Aristotle (Cat.
4b25), where it is classified as a continuous quantity (Cat. 5a9–14): πρὸς γὰρ
ἕνα κοινὸν ὅρον αὐτοῦ τὰ μόρια συνάπτει “since its parts join together at one
common boundary.” Sergius tends to see a difference between the spot of
location (‫ܐ‬rq‫‘ ܕܘ‬place’) and space in itself (‫‘ ܐܬܪܐ‬land’, ‘space’), while
Greek writers use τόπος for both meanings, although Aristotle, Philoponus, and
Simplicius sometimes employ the additional χώρα ‘space’,151 a word used chiefly
by Plato (Timaeus 52b4, 52d3).
In the first part of this section, Sergius deals with the assumed real being of
space and in the second part he determines whether it pertains to the category
of quantity, as Aristotle had upheld. By treating the question concerning the
being of space at such length Sergius goes, to some extent, against the com-
mon procedure of Aristotle and the Greek commentators. It is in the Physics
(book iv, chapter 1–5: 208a27–213a11)152 that Aristotle analyses the concepts
of τόπος and not in the Categories, except for defining it as a quantity there.
Therefore, the Greek commentators in their commentaries on the Categories
discuss τόπος in connection with this aspect, though also Ammonius (58.15–26)
and Philoponus (87.7–20) in the parallel passage provide a brief definition of it,
after having stated that the question about its being is treated in the Physics,
(see also Porph. 141.15f.). Simplicius too has some shorter passages on space
in his commentary on the Categories, (see 125.17–32, 133.35–134.11, 134.33–135.7,
147.30–150.12).
In his Commentary as well (L.20va25–23vb6/P.60r11–64v10), Sergius has an
almost literal version of the same exposition on space with some further infor-
mation, but also a quite lengthy discussion on time (χρόνος 焏‫ܙܒܢ‬, L.23vb6–
25vb10/P.64v10–67v4), which is likewise analyzed by Aristotle in the Physics

150 As Simplicius states (65.28 f.): τὸ σημεῖον διαστημάτων ἀρχὴ ὂν οὐκ ἂν εἴη διάστημα “the point,
which is the principle of extensions, would not be an extension.”
151 Arist. Phys. (209b15), Philop. In Phys. (502.11f., 515.31 f., 516.3), and Simpl. In Phys. (523.7,
531.16, 540.33, 608.4); cf. Syriac ‫ܐܬܪܐ‬.
152 For a good study on Aristotle’s theory of space in these chapters, see Morison (2002)
and Mendell’s (2005) review article, and for a comparison with Aristotle’s account in
the Categories, see Mendell (1987). See also the research carried out within the project
“Place, Space and Motion” (Research group d-ii-2, Topoi 1: http://www.topoi.org/group/d
-ii-2-topoi-1/projects/).
230 chapter 8

(iv.10–14: 217b29–224a17), after the account on space and void (τὸ κενόν, iv.6–
9: 213a11–217b28). In that text, Sergius notes that demonstrations of what and
how space and time are can be found in Aristotle’s book on ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܢ‬qq ‘nature’,
‘physics’, as also Ammonius had done (58.6). In a significant passage he writes
that he will present the view of Aristotle on space and time as they are greatly
and sublimely given in that work, but he continues immediately by saying
(L.20vb6–15/P.60r19–24) .爯‫ ܠ‬牯q‫ܠ‬q‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܠ ܡ‬熏q rq焏‫ܘܢ ܣܦܩ‬煿q‫ ܥܠ‬爯‫ܢ‬q 爯qr‫ܐܡ‬
爯‫ ܘܡ‬.焏‫ܢ‬rq‫ ܐ‬焏‫ܦ‬熏‫ܠܣ‬q̈‫ ܦ‬爯‫ ܐܦ ܡ‬焏‫ ܐܠ‬.‫ܕ‬熏q‫ ܒܠ‬焏‫ܐ ܗܢ‬r‫ ܕܓܒ‬煿‫ ܗ̣ܘܐ ܡܢ‬焏‫ܠ‬
‫ܬܐ‬rqrr 爏‫ ܥ‬rq‫ܐ‬rqrq 熏‫ ܕܥܩܒ‬爯q‫ܠ‬q‫܇ ܐ‬焏‫ܢ‬qq‫ܣ‬rq 爯‫ܠ‬q‫ ܕ‬爯‫ ܕܗܘܘ ܠ‬焏‫ܒܢ‬rq̈‫ܡ‬
‘we will say about them [i.e. space and time] sufficiently whatever we have
learned, not only from this man [i.e. Aristotle], but also from other philoso-
phers and from Christian writers that have appeared for us, who have properly
inquired into the truth’. No Christian philosopher is mentioned by name, but
Sergius might be referring inter alia to John Philoponus, whose literary activ-
ity started from about 510. Only two lengthy commentaries on the Physics are
extant in Greek from the Neo-Platonic Alexandrian School, and both are by two
of Ammonius’ students. One of them was composed by Philoponus in 517153
and though incomplete it covers 908 pages in Vitelli’s edition. The other is by
Simplicius covering 1366 pages in Diels’ edition. Their commentaries to Aristo-
tle’s Physics 5.1–4 on space are to be found at Philop. In Phys. (496.1–557.7 and
585.5–606.24) and Simpl. In Phys. (519.1–600.38).154
In conformity with the Greek commentators on the Categories, in his Com-
mentary Sergius is aware that it is an improper context for a long discussion
on the nature of space (‫ ܕܐܬܪܐ‬煿‫ܢ‬qq), which he says is much disputed, and
therefore, states that he will keep the inquiry about its nature brief and instead
clarify its relation to quantity. He writes (L.20vb32–21ra6):155 r‫ܡ‬焏‫ ܠܡ‬爯‫ܢ‬qrq‫ܡ‬
焏r‫ ܗ‬爯‫ܒ‬rr ‫ܘܗܝ‬rq‫ ܐ‬煿‫ܢ‬qq 爏‫ ܗܘܐ ܥ‬焏‫ ܕܠ‬爏q‫ ܡ‬.‫ ܕ̇ܙܕܩ‬焏‫ ܡ‬qq‫ܗܝ ܐ‬熏‫ܥܠ‬
‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܡ‬q 爟‫ܬܗ ܕܥ‬熏‫ܢ‬qq 爏‫ ܥ‬焏‫ ܐܠ‬.爯‫ܢ‬r‫ ܕܐܡ‬qq‫‘ ܐ‬we keep it brief in speak-
ing about it [i.e. space] as it is appropriate, because our book is not about its
nature, as we just said, but about its relation to quantity’. In the same way as in

153 By year 517 he had already written his supposed In Isagogen, (of which only presupposed
fragments are extant in Syriac, ed. Baumstark 1900: 156–223, syr. 焯q ‫ ـ‬熏‫)ܠ‬, and In Catego-
rias.
154 Both have special excursus too (usually called ‘Corollary’, Corollarium de loco), which
constitute digressions (παρέκβασις) from the main text (Philop. In Phys. 557.8–585.4 and
Simpl. In Phys. 601.1–645.19), where they offer certain views of their own concerning space
and raise some criticism about Aristotle’s concept of it, especially Philoponus argues here
for space being a three-dimensional extension.
155 At this passage the Paris ms is defective and omits some words (cf. P.60v9–12).
commentary 231

his prefaces, Sergius anticipates potential criticism that his discussion on space
may attract (or has attracted in oral teaching?) and therefore he defends him-
self against such criticism by writing (L.21rb30–21va11/P.61r15–23): 焏‫ܥ ܐܢ‬煟q̇
熏‫ ܘܠ‬焏q‫ܢ‬熏̣‫ ܓ‬爏q‫ܢ ܕܡ‬熏‫ ̇ܗܢ‬爯‫܇ ܡ‬爯‫ܒ‬熟‫ ܒ‬r‫ ܐܢ‬爯‫ܠ ܠ‬煟‫ܥ‬ ̇ 爯q‫ ܗܠ‬爏q‫ ܕܐܦ ܡ‬rq‫ܓ‬
̇ ̈
‫ ܗܘ‬qq‫܉ ܐ‬r‫ܒ‬q 爯‫ ܠ‬爯qr‫ ܘܪ‬.焏‫ܢ‬rq‫ܬܐ ܕܐ‬熏‫ܒܢ‬rq‫ ܒܡ‬爯q‫ ܦܓܥ‬焏‫ܬܪܢ‬熏q 爏q‫ܡ‬
焏‫ܦܩ‬熏‫ ܕܢ‬爯‫ܢ‬q‫ܠ‬qq‫ܬ‬煟‫ ܒ‬爯‫ܢ‬q 焏‫ ܐܠ‬.爯q‫ܢ ܗܠ‬r‫ܐܡ‬r‫ܐ ܡ‬r‫ܬܐ ܕܡܠ‬熏‫ܦ‬q‫ ܢܩ‬爯‫ ܡ‬r‫ܕܠܒ‬
‫܉‬爯q‫ ܗܠ‬qq‫ ܕܕܐ‬焏‫ ̈ܡܠ‬爯‫ ܡ‬爯qr‫ ܕܩ‬爯q‫ܠ‬q‫ܐ ܕܐ‬rq‫ܥ‬rr‫ܪ ̇ܗܘܐ ܠ‬熏‫ܥ‬熟‫ ܒ‬焏‫ ܕܠ‬焏r‫ܘܕܘܪ‬
̈ q‫ܡ‬qr ‫ܢ‬熏‫ ̇ܗܢ‬爏‫ ܥ‬焏q‫ ܕܘ‬焏q‫ܘ‬煟‫ ܒ‬爯‫ܢ‬qr‫ܡܒܣ‬
爯‫ ܡ‬r‫ ܠܒ‬爏q‫ ܩܠ‬爯‫ܢ‬q‫ ܘܢܦܩ‬.焏q‫ܠ‬煟‫ܥ‬
爯‫ܢ‬qr‫ܐ ܗܕܐ ܣܥ‬rq‫ܠ‬熏‫ ܒ‬焏‫ ܕܠ‬熏‫ ܠ‬煟q ‫܉‬爯rq‫‘ ܢ‬for I know that also for these things
some people reproach us sometimes, some of those who for the sake of retort
and not for the sake benefit come across the writings of others. And they pick
on us doubtless, as though these things are said unrelated to the discussion.
But as we are confident that not a little instruction and exercise comes about
in the minds of those who read words like these, we here and there thrust at
those who love to criticise and we go slightly beyond our aim, although we do
this not without right’ (cf. pp. 33–36). For all that, Sergius presents a relatively
long exposition of space and time, than the Greek commentators do in their
texts on the Categories.
At first, we shall highlight the arguments that Sergius puts forward for the
being of space, and then its relation to quantity. Four main questions are
examined by Sergius concerning space: (1) whether it exists at all, (2) how it
is (e.g. corporeal or incorporeal), (3) what it is (i.e. its definition),156 and (4)
whether it is a quantity (cf. also Simpl. In Phys. 535.4–5). That four kinds of
inquiries should be carried out concerning certain matters was introduced by
Aristotle (Posterior Analytics 89b24f.) and was evidently current among his
Alexandrian commentators already in Sergius’ time, (see esp. Altmann & Stern
1958: 13–23 and Hein 1985: 57–62). In the Commentary (L.21va29–22ra14/P.61v8–
62r13), Sergius refutes, in an unexpectedly ironic way, Plato’s alleged notion
that place is matter and form.157 He concludes his disproof of Plato’s deduction
by stating that (L.22ra2–10/P.62r7–11): ‫ ܘܐܦ‬焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܘܢ ܡ‬煿‫ ܥܡ‬焏‫ ܠ‬爯q‫ܐܬܪܐ ܕ‬
焏‫ ܗܘܠ‬焏‫ܘܗܝ ܘܠ‬rq‫ ܐ‬焏r‫ ܐܕ‬焏‫ܢ ܠ‬熏‫ܓ‬煟‫ ܘܒ‬.‫ܘܗܝ‬rq‫ܘܢ ܐ‬煿‫ܐ ܡܢ‬r‫ ܡܢ‬焏‫ܠ‬
焏‫ܡ‬r̈熏‫ ܓ‬爯‫ ܡ‬r‫ ܠܒ‬焏‫ܢ‬rq‫ ܗܘ ܐ‬焏‫ܡ‬q熏‫ ܩ‬焏‫ ܐܠ‬.‫ܡ‬煟‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫ ܬܘܒ ܓ‬焏‫ܘܠ‬
‘space does not move along with them [i.e. bodies], and it is not part of them,

156 Arist. Phys. (208a28 f.): εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή, καὶ πῶς ἔστι, καὶ τί ἐστιν ‘whether it is or not, also how
it is, and what it is’.
157 See Plato’s Timaeus (52a–d) and cf. Sorabji (2004a: 259–262). In contrast to some Greek
commentators, Sergius adopts Aristotle’s arguments against Plato and does not try to
neutralize them, see Philop. In Phys. (516.1–26, and the nn. 58–60 ad locum of its translators
Algra and van Ophuijsen, whose translation I quote in this section).
232 chapter 8

and therefore it is neither form nor matter, nor is it a certain body, but it is
rather a different subsistence separate from bodies’.158 The last argument is also
ascribed to Aristotle by Philoponus in dismissing Plato’s claim, writing (In Phys.
517.1–3): ἡ ὕλη, φησί, καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἀχώριστά ἐστι τοῦ πράγματος οὗπερ ἐστὶν ὕλη
καὶ εἶδος, ὁ τόπος χωρίζεται τῶν πραγμάτων ὧν λέγεται εἶναι τόπος, ὁ τόπος ἄρα
οὔτε εἶδός ἐστιν οὔτε ὕλη “Both matter and form, he says [i.e. Aristotle], cannot
be separated from the thing of which they are the matter and form. Place is
separate from the things of which it is said to be the place”, (cf. also ibid. 541.2–
4, 547.1f.).
Sergius’ first argument for the existence of space is derived from common
sense (‫ܐ‬熏‫ܐ ܕܓ‬rq‫ ܬܪܥ‬ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς ὑπολήψεως or κατὰ κοινὴν ἔννοιαν159),
which asserts that everything perceptible is somewhere; Arist. Phys. (208a29):
τά τε γὰρ ὄντα πάντες ὑπολαμβάνουσιν εἶναί που “because all suppose that things
which exist are somewhere”, (and cf. Philop. In Phys. 496.11: ἐν τόπῳ εἶναι ‘are in
a place’). At the same time, Sergius says that everything incorporeal is ‘every-
where’ (‫ ܕܘܟ‬爏q‫ ܒ‬πανταχοῦ), whereas Aristotle talks about non-existents, and
not the incorporeal things, when he writes that (Phys. 208a30): τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὂν
οὐδαμοῦ εἶναι ‘for what does not exist is nowhere’, (cf. also Philop. In Phys.
496.9–18). The second argument is based on the observation of perceptible
objects and the change of place that they undergo. On the one hand, we have
motion in respect of place (‫ܬܪܐ‬焏‫ ܕܒ‬焏q‫ܢ‬熏r κίνησις κατὰ τόπον), which is
called locomotion (焏q‫ܘ‬煟‫ ܠ‬焏q‫ ܕܘ‬爯‫ ܡ‬焏‫ ܙܘܥ‬φορά),160 on the other hand, the
motion in respect of quantity (κίνησις κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν, Phys. 226a29–32), which
is manifested through increase and decrease (‫ܐ‬rq‫ ܬܪܒ‬αὔξησις and ‫ܪܐ‬犏‫ ܒ‬or
‫ܘܬܐ‬rq犏‫ ܒ‬μείωσις), that is the change of size by the growing and shrinking
of the objects within space. And these two forms of change are perceived to
occur in some space, which indicate its existence.161 The motion in respect of
place is successive replacement (Sergius 138.13f.: ‫ܗܘܢ‬rqq‫ ܕܘ‬爯‫ܡ‬
̈
̣ … 爯q‫ܩ‬qr‫ܡ‬
‫ܕܐ‬煟q̈‫ ܐܬܪܐ ܠ‬爯q‫ܒ‬煿q‫)ܘ‬, which Aristotle terms ἀντιμετάστασις (Phys. 208b2),

158 For the ascription of such a notion to Plato, see Arist. Phys. (209b11–17), and discussions in
Philop. In Phys. (515.24–518.25) and Simpl. In Phys. (523.6–22, 539.6–14, and 544.17–546.21).
159 Simplicius has here (In Phys. 521.7,8): ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς ὑπολήψεως “derived from/based on
common sense”, and Philoponus κατὰ κοινὴν ἔννοιαν “according to the common concep-
tion”, In Phys. (539.18, n. 109 ad loc., 540.1,3, 541.9).
160 Phys. (208a31–32, 226a32–b1), Philop. In Phys. (541.25f.), and Simpl. In Phys. (524.7–9).
See also Ammon. In Isag. (113.12): ἡ κατὰ τόπον μεταβολή, ἣν καλοῦσι φοράν ‘the change in
respect of place, which they call locomotion’.
161 See Arist. Phys. (212b7), cf. Philop. In Phys. (501.24, 541.14–29, n. 120 ad loc. of Algra & van
Ophuijsen, and 544.2–7) and Simpl. In Phys. (522.11–12, 567.13–15, 580.8f.).
commentary 233

sometimes translated ‘mutual/reciprocal replacement’, that is the exchange of

place objects carry out. Sergius’ examples for successive replacement are found
already in Arist. Phys. 228b2–8.162 In addition, Sergius argues that space within
which objects replace one another does not move along with these objects
(Philop. In Phys. 518.5f., 522.21), but remains the same where it is,163 even when
the objects that it contains are destroyed inside it.164 Consequently, space has
a great power165 and it is distinct in its nature as compared to objects (Simpl. In
Phys. 527.6–8) and ‘prior in nature’, (Simpl. In Phys. 527.34: πρῶτόν ἐστι τῇ φύσει,
cf. Phys. 208b34f.).
The second question concerns what sort of thing space is. Sergius refutes the
argument that space is a body, since one of the common conceptions regarding
space says that it is receptive of bodies (焏‫ ܡܩܒܠܢ‬δεκτικός, Philop. In Phys.
512.7f.).166 Therefore, if space were a body it would imply that a body contained
or pervaded another body, and that even the smallest body would be able to
contain the largest one, which he asserts to be impossible. This implication
is attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias (see his De mixtione 218.10–220.23,
ed. Todd) by Simplicius (In Phys. 530.14–24, cf. also Philop. In Phys. 505.22–
506.14). This exposition is explained by Sorabji (n. 26 on p. 23 in Urmson 1992):
“The argument is that if you put a cup of sea water into a cup full of wine,
there’ll be no spillage, if body can permeate [χωρεῖν] body, so you do it again
as many times as you like, until you have put the sea into a cup full of wine,
or the universe into a grain.” So, space cannot be a three-dimensional entity
containing other bodies, though some interpreters supposed that Aristotle held
this idea when he writes (Phys. 209a4–7): διαστήματαμὲν οὖν ἔχει τρία, μῆκος καὶ
πλάτος καὶ βάθος, οἷς ὁρίζεται σῶμα πᾶν “Now it has three dimensions, length,
breadth, depth, the dimensions by which all body is bounded.” Nevertheless,

162 And also in Philop. In Phys. (498.20–25) and Simpl. In Phys. (524.3–7).
163 Cf. Philop. In Phys. (497.31–498.1, 498.26–29, 547.8 f.), and Simpl. In Phys. (577.12f., 581.26–
582.4, 583.20–27).
164 Cf. Philop. In Phys. (518.19 f.) and Simpl. In Phys. (550.27–30).
165 See Arist. Phys. (208b11,34 f.) and cf. Simpl. In Phys. (524.16). The power/faculty mentioned
here by Aristotle is discussed by Philoponus in connection with a certain principle or
cause (508.29–509.14, cf. 499.10 and n. 14 ad loc.), namely whether place is an active force
or not. For Sergius any such power is not an active efficient power, but he relates it to
place’s ability to remain unaffected and resist the destruction of the perceptible objects
that it contains, which is understood to be the power and superiority of place.
166 Simpl. In Phys. (587.16): ὑποδεκτικός. Simplicius In Phys. (565.8–566.18) ascribes six as-
sumptions regarding place from common conceptions that Aristotle had set out (Phys.
210b32–211a6), while Philoponus specifies first four (In Phys. 539.22–541.9) and then five
(586.27–32) of them. The first one is that place contains what is in it.
234 chapter 8

Sorabji explains that this statement is not endorsed by Aristotle, “but is used to
show that the conventional view raises a puzzle.”167 Both Philoponus (In Phys.
504.27–505.22) and Simplicius are aware of this approach. In his Corollary on
Place, Simplicius states (In Phys. 601.19–20): τῶν δὲ διαστατὸν λεγόντων οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ
δύο διεστὼς ὡς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τε καὶ ὁ Περίπατος ἅπας, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τρία “Of those
who said that it is extended, some said that it is two-dimensional, like Aristotle
and all the Peripatetics, some that it is three-dimensional.” Among those who
think that space is three-dimensional we find Porphyry168 and Philoponus,169
while Sergius should be placed among the Peripatetics who espouse the view
of a two-dimensional space (Sergius §26 and § 73),170 which is not a body.
However, he does not want to view space as totally incorporeal either, since it
encompasses bodies by expanding or contracting in compliance with their size.
Therefore, it is said to be of a different nature171 compared to bodies, (焏‫ܡ‬q熏‫ܩ‬
焏‫ܡ‬r̈熏‫ ܓ‬爯‫ ܡ‬r‫ ܠܒ‬焏‫ܢ‬rq‫‘ ̇ܗܘ ܐ‬a different subsistence separate from bodies’, as
already quoted). That space contains objects of different sizes does not mean
that it grows or shrinks in itself, but rather that it adapts to or fits onto the
objects it contains.172 One of the common conceptions regarding space is that
it is neither greater nor smaller than the thing it contains.173 Philoponus writes
(In Phys. 587.25f.): οὔτε μείζων ἂν εἴη οὔτε ἐλάττων ὁ τόπος, ἀλλ’ ἴσος “place is
neither larger nor smaller, but equal in size” to what it contains, (see also op.
cit. 565.14).

167 Sorabji n. 1 on p. 1 to J.O. Urmson’s translation (1992), which we quote here. See also the
notes by Urmson himself: nos. 22, 94, 106, 111, and 134. See also Simplicius In Phys. (531.10,
600.21f.) and cf. Sorabji (2004b: 226 ff.).
168 Porph. (103.22f.): τὸ δὲ σῶμα ᾗ σῶμα τριχῇ διαστατόν· καὶ ὁ τόπος ἄρα, ᾗ σώματός ἐστι τόπος,
τριχῇ ἂν εἴη διαστατός “Body qua body is three-dimensional, and space, qua being the place
of body, will also be three-dimensional.”
169 Philop. In Phys. (567.30–32): διάστημά τί ἐστι τριχῇ διαστατὸν ἕτερον τῶν σωμάτων τῶν ἐμπι-
πτόντων εἰς αὐτὸν ἀσώματον ὂν τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ “it is a certain extension in three dimensions,
different from the bodies that come to be in it, bodiless in its own definition.” Philoponus
concept of space as a three-dimensional extension is upheld to be one of his innovative
ideas. Cf. also Golitsis (2008: 180–187) and Sedley (1987).
170 If Sergius is not only presenting Aristotle’s teaching on space.
171 Also Philoponus (In Phys. 498.27f.) says that space “is different from what it receives”
(ἕτερόν ἐστι παρ’ ἃ δέχεται), and also ibid. (506.25 f., 547.9–11). For space not being body or
incorporeal, see ibid. (505.11–15, 506.12–15) and Simpl. In Phys. (529.3f., 596.22–27, 600.19–
22).
172 See Philop. In Phys. (597.20–598.3 and n. 215 ad loc. of Algra & van Ophuijsen).
173 Arist. Phys. (211a2), Philop. In Phys. (540.16–22), and Simpl. In Phys. (565.14–16).
commentary 235

Zeno of Eleas (not of Citium174) aporia which argued for the nonexistence of
space is put forward by Aristotle himself (Phys. 209a23–26) and the passage is
presented also by Philoponus (In Phys. 513.4–19) and Simplicius (In Phys. 534.5–
14). Zeno’s argument that if there were space it would be in another space ad
infinitum (q‫ ܣ‬焏‫ ܕܠ‬εἰς/ἐπ’ ἄπειρον) required some solution. Sergius raises two
counterarguments against Zeno’s aporia. The first being that not everything has
place,175 particularly not incorporeal things, though he has already indicated
that space is not entirely incorporeal. A second argument is that the modes
of being in something are many,176 which means that not everything must be
in space. Nevertheless, he does not clarify further the resolution of the puzzle.
Aristotle’s own solution (Phys. 210a25–b31) as it is repeated also by the com-
mentators amounts to the conclusion that “a thing cannot be in itself primarily”
(Phys. 210b22: ἀδύνατον ἐν αὑτῷ τι εἶναι πρώτως), but only in something else (ἐν
ἄλλῳ εἶναι). So, place cannot be in itself. Therefore, as Simplicius states (In Phys.
555.22f.): δείξας ὅτι πρώτως μὲν καὶ καθ’ αὑτὸ ἀδύνατόν τι αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἶναι, κατ’
ἄλλο δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος δυνατόν “He [i.e. Aristotle] has shown that primarily and
as such it is impossible for a thing to be in itself, but in respect of something
else and as a part possible.”177
Before demonstrating that space should be put under the category of quan-
tity, Sergius clarifies the difference between the imperceptible immovable
space and a movable bodily container. An aspect that Aristotle had also paid
attention to (Phys. 212a7–30), which was discussed by Philoponus (In Phys.
586.8–24, 589.28–590.20) and Simplicius (In Phys. 582.27–584.28). The defini-
tion that he finally gives of spaces concurs well with Aristotle’s definition (Phys.
212a20–21): ὥστε τὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος πέρας ἀκίνητον πρῶτον, τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ὁ τόπος
“so place is that which is the immediate immovable limit of the container”,
and Sergius having (142.8f.): ‫ܡ‬煟‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫ ܕܓ‬焏q熏‫ ܓ‬焏q‫ ܣ‬爏qq‫ܐܬܪܐ ܗ‬
.煿‫ ܒ‬rq‫ܒ‬q‫ ܕ‬焏‫ ܕ̇ܗܘ ܡ‬焏qr‫ ܒ‬煿q‫ ܠܣ‬牯q‫ܘܗܝ܇ ܕܢܩ‬rq‫‘ ܐ‬space is an inner limit of
a certain body that is adjoined to the outer limit of what is contained in it’. Thus,

174 Sergius is mistaking here by speaking of the Stoic Zeno of Citium (Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεύς c. 334–
c. 262) instead of Zeno of Elea (Ζήνων ὁ Ἐλεάτης c. 490–c. 430). Tarán (1981: 731–732)
observes some deficient scholarly habits by Ammonius and his school and says that such
“mistakes are due to careless scholarship” conducted by them. I am indebted to Professor
Jaap Mansfeld (personal communication) for drawing my attention to this mistake and
for the reference to Tarán.
175 Cf. also Arist. Phys. (212b28 f.), Philop. In Phys. (526.23 f.), and Simpl. In Phys. (551.15f.).
176 Philop. In Phys. (513.4–19, 538.19–539.2) and Simpl. In Phys. (551.4–553.16).
177 See also Simpl. In Phys. (553.31–33, 562.5–19) and Philop. In Phys. (527.14f., 531.1–5, 535.30–
357.3, 538.19–539.2).
236 chapter 8

according to Sergius space is a receptive two-dimensional container of unique

constitution (i.e. neither corporeal nor incorporeal), which is immovable and
indestructible and which from without surrounds and contains every corporeal
entity in its entirety by adjusting itself to its exact size. Therefore, it is defined
as an inner limit (焏q熏‫ ܓ‬焏q‫ ܣ‬ἐντὸς πέρας)178 that surrounds and adjoins to
(‫ ܠ‬牯q‫ ܢܩ‬ἅπτεσθαι)179 the outer limit (焏qr‫ ܒ‬焏q‫ ܣ‬ἐκτὸς πέρας) of every single
body it contains. The definition that Ammonius gives is (58.16 f.): τόπος δέ ἐστιν,
ὡς ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἀκροάσει λέγεται, πέρας τοῦ περιέχοντος, καθὸ περιέχει τὸ περιεχό-
μενον “Place, as is said in the Physics lectures, is the limit of a container in so far
as it contains what it contains”, (cf. Philop. 33.20–31, 87.7f., and In Phys. 585.12 f.).
Philoponus illuminates the way space contains an emplaced thing with the
‘hollow/concave surface’ (κοίλη ἐπιφάνεια) of a physical container, which is in
immediate contact with the outer or ‘convex surface’ (κυρτὴ ἐπιφάνεια) of the
emplaced thing. Sergius’ explanation is the same and he states that the outer
limit or surface of an object is its extreme edge (焏qr‫ܗ ܒ‬r‫ ܥܒ‬ἔσχατος), which
is in contact with the inner edge of space.
On the basis of what has been adduced, Sergius confirms that space certainly
belongs to the category of quantity, since it is a continuous two-dimensional
container which surrounds all the parts of a body. Also Ammonius (58.24–26)
and Philoponus (87.18–20, 91.21–25)180 dismiss the thought that any part of a
body can appear outside of space. And Sergius rejects in agreement with Aris-
totle the thought that there is empty space or total void (τὸ κενόν ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܩ‬q‫)ܣܦ‬.
With this he concludes his treatment of the second main category and passes
on to the next category in order, being that of relatives.

§74 On relatives (‫ܡ‬煟‫ܬ ܡ‬熏‫ ܕܠ‬τὰ πρός τι Cat. 6a36–8b24). The next main cat-
egory in order to be dealt with is the one commonly translated ‘relatives’ in
English. The Greek expression πρός τι means literally ‘to/toward something’,
which by Sergius and the subsequent Syriac writers received the close ren-
dering ‫ܡ‬煟‫ܬ ܡ‬熏‫ܠ‬, with the same meaning. The commentators discussed why
Aristotle treated this category in the plural (see Cat. 60a36 f.) and the reason for
its title181 (Ammon. 66.6 and Philop. 102.14f.: τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ἐπιγραφῆς ‘the reason

178 Philop. In Phys. (549.31, 551,25, 552.7,16).

179 Philop. In Phys. (564.18,25, 592.19,24, 604.13).
180 Philoponus also In Phys. (512.4 f.): τὸ γὰρ ἐν τόπῳ ὂν καθ’ ὅλον ἑαυτὸ ἐν τόπῳ ὀφείλει εἶναι,
ὥσπερ ὁ ἐν τῷ κεράμῳ οἶνος “For what is in place must be in place in its entirety, just as the
wine in a vessel.”
181 Though Aristotle indeed treats the “relatives” in the plural, the text of the Categories does
not actually have any title for the individual categories; rather, it is the commentators
commentary 237

for the title’). Ammonius puts the following question about why this technical
expression is translated in the plural and not in the singular, and gives also his
explanation (66.14–16): διὰ τί δὲ Περὶ τῶν πρός τι ἐπιγέγραπται, καὶ οὐχὶ περὶ τοῦ
πρός τι ἑνικῶς; λέγομεν ὅτι ἐπειδὴ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἓν πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ εἶναι τῶν
πρός τι, ἀλλὰ πάντως ἐν δυσὶ θεωρεῖται τὰ πρός τι “Why did he use the title ‘On
relatives’, and not ‘On relative’, in the singular? We answer that it is because a
single thing cannot be a relative just by itself; rather, relatives are always con-
sidered in pairs.”182 We need to bear in mind also this point, that “Relatives, for
Aristotle, are not relations, but things related” (Sorabji 2004b: 79).
Sergius sets about his exposition by presenting the division of the relatives,
which has parallel sections in the Greek commentaries too. Some kind of divi-
sion of relatives was made by Aristotle at Metaph. (1020b26–1021b11), and an
elaborated version of this division was presented by Iamblichus, whom Sim-
plicius quotes (161.16–29). Sergius himself states that some relatives are con-
ceived ‘by similar names’ and some ‘by dissimilar appellations’, which corre-
sponds with Ammonius’ (67.16f.) and Philoponus’ (105.1 f.) division of relatives
into those said homonymously (καθ’ ὁμωνυμίαν 183爯q‫ܐ ܕܕܡ‬煿 ̈ ‫ܡ‬r‫ )ܒ‬and those
said heteronymously (καθ’ ἑτερωνυμίαν 184爯q‫ ܕܡ‬焏‫ ܕܠ‬焏q̈‫ܢ‬熏q‫)ܒ‬.185 Relatives are
expressed homonymously when we say ‘what is similar is similar to that which
is similar to it’ (τὸ ὅμοιον ὁμοίῳ ὅμοιον 煿‫ ܠ‬焏‫ ܕܕܡ‬焏‫ܘ ܡ‬煿̇‫ ܠ‬焏‫ ܕܕܡ‬焏‫̇ܗܘ ܡ‬
焏‫)ܕܡ‬. The texts of Ammonius and Philoponus lack Sergius’ other examples
for this group of relatives. However, in a related discussion Olympiodorus gives
(99.24): τὸ ἴσον ἴσῳ ἐστὶν ἴσον186 ‘equal is equal to equal’ for the kind called ταὐ-
τότης ‘identical condition’, while Elias (202.33f.) for the same class provides
Sergius’ last example, that of οἷον φίλος φίλου φίλος ‘such as friend is friend of

who have Περὶ τῶν πρός τι ‘On the relatives’, see Porph. (111.6), Ammon. (66.4), and Philop.
(102.10).
182 Cf. Philop. (102.29–30) who gives the same reason. See also Porph. (111.22–27) and Elias
(200.35–201.1–3, 205.32–206.23).
183 Earlier he uses ‫ܐ‬煿 ̈ ‫ܡ‬r rq‫‘ ܕ̈ܡ‬of similar names’ for ὁμώνυμα ‘homonyms’ (§21).
184 Whereas he earlier refrains from coining a word for ἑτερώνυμα ‘heteronyms’, and instead
uses ‫ܐ‬rq‫ܢ‬rq‫ ܐ‬for ἕτερα ‘(are) different’ (§ 21).
185 Also John of Damascus seems to have a division of relatives into same/similar names and
different names, which is reminiscent of Sergius, when he writes that (Dialec. ναʹ/51.12f.):
τῶν δὲ πρός τι τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὀνόματι ὀνομάζονται, ὡς φίλος φίλου φίλος, ἐχθρὸς ἐχθροῦ
ἐχθρός, τὰ δὲ ἑτέρῳ ὀνόματι, ὡς πατὴρ υἱοῦ πατήρ, διδάσκαλος μαθητοῦ διδάσκαλος “Some
relatives are called by the same name, as a friend is a friend of a friend and as an enemy is
an enemy of an enemy [cf. Elias 202.34]. Others are called by different names, as a father
is a father of a son and as a teacher is a teacher of a pupil.”
186 This appears as a quotation in Olympiodorus’ text.
238 chapter 8

a friend’.187 That this example is found both in Sergius and Elias indicates that
it goes back to Ammonius, though not recorded in his ἀπὸ φωνῆς commentary.
These sorts of examples in Sergius may well be used to reconstruct Ammonius’
lost or elsewhere undocumented teaching by a judicious comparison with the
texts of later Greek commentators.
Heteronymously expressed relatives can be said in many ways. We give here
their division as it appears in Sergius, with the corresponding passages from
Ammonius (67.17–26) and Philoponus (105.3–11).

1) One mode of division is that ‘of containing and being contained …’ (‫̇ܗܘ‬
… r‫ܒ‬qr‫ ܘܡ‬r‫̇ܒ‬q‫ ܕ‬τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὸ περιέχον καὶ περιεχόμενον ὡς τὸ διπλάσιον
ἡμίσεος διπλάσιον ‘some relate container and contained, as double is double
of half’, my tr.).
2) Another mode is ‘that of ruler and subject …’ (焏‫ ܘܕ̇ܗܘ ܡ‬qq‫ܠ‬r‫⟨ ܕ‬焏‫ܕ̇ܗܘ ⟩ܡ‬
… 煟‫ܥܒ‬r‫ ܕܡ‬τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἄρχον καὶ ἀρχόμενον ὡς ὁ δεσπότης δούλου δεσπότης
“some relate ruler and ruled, as a master is master of a slave”).
3) The third mode is ‘that of discerning and being discerned …’ (焏‫̇ܗܘ ܡ‬
̇
… ‫ܫ‬r‫ܦ‬r‫ܫ ܘܡ‬r‫ ܕܦ‬τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ κρῖνον καὶ κρινόμενον ὡς τὸ αἰσθητὸν αἰσθήσει
αἰσθητόν “some relate judger and judged, as what is perceived is perceived by
perception”).
4) The fourth mode is ‘that which they ascribe to a certain learning …’ (‫̇ܗܘ‬
… ‫ܡ‬煟‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܠܦܢ‬熏q‫ ܠ‬爯qqr‫⟨ ܕܡ‬焏‫)ܬܘܒ ⟩ܡ‬, which is not clearly stated by
Sergius,188 while Ammonius and Philoponus have τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ μετέχον καὶ
μετεχόμενον ὡς ὁ ἐπιστήμων τῷ μετέχειν ἐπιστήμης λέγεται ἐπιστήμων “some
relate participant and what is participated in, as a knower is said to be
knower by participation in knowledge.” Nonetheless, it is more likely that
the verb ‫ܚ ܠ‬r‫ ܡ‬is intended to convey the sense of Greek ἀναφέρειν ‘refer’,
‘ascribe’, since this division is designated by some commentators as ἀναφορά
‘reference’, (Elias 203.12f. and Olymp. 99.34: πρὸς τὸ γένος ἀναφοράν).
5) The fifth mode is ‘as what is a cause and that which is (caused) by it …’, i.e.
the efficient cause, (… 煿‫ ܕܡܢ‬焏‫ܐ ܘ̇ܗܘ ܡ‬r‫ܘܗܝ ܥܠ‬rq‫ ܕܐ‬焏‫̇ܗܘ ܬܘܒ ܡ‬
τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ αἰτιατὸν ὡς ὁ πατὴρ υἱοῦ πατήρ “some relate cause and
effect, as a father is a father of a child”).
6) The sixth mode is ‘as the one who is doing something and the one who is
̇
affected by it …’ (… 煿‫ܫ ܡܢ‬焏q̇‫ܡ ܘ‬煟‫ ܡ‬煟‫ ܕܥܒ‬焏‫ ̇ܗܘ ܬܘܒ ܡ‬τὰ δὲ κατὰ

187 In Simplicius’ quotation of Iamblichus we find (161.19): [ἡ διαίρεσις τοῦ πρός τι εἰς] τὰ κατ’
ἰσότητα, ὧν ἐστιν τὸ ἴσον, τὸ ὅμοιον τὸ ταὐτόν [the division of relatives is made into] “those
based on equality, which includes the equal, the like and the same.”
188 The Commentary has the same brief account here.
commentary 239

τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ πάσχον ὡς ὁ τύπτων τυπτόμενον τύπτει “some relate agent and
patient, as a striker strikes what is struck”).
7) And the seventh and last mode is ‘as a position in a certain place …’ (焏‫ܡ‬q‫ܣ‬
‫ܡ‬煟‫ܬܪܐ ܡ‬焏‫ ܬܘܒ ܕܒ‬τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐν τόπῳ διαφορὰν ὡς ἀριστερὸς δεξιοῦ
ἀριστερὸς καὶ δεξιὸς ἀριστεροῦ δεξιός “some are related by difference in place,
as left is left of right, and right is right of left”). So, for this last one Sergius
has ‘position (焏‫ܡ‬q‫ ܣ‬θέσις) in place’ against the διαφορά ‘difference’ of
Ammonius and Philoponus. However, Olympiodorus (99.23,32f.) and Elias
(203.8) have θέσις for one of these divisions of relatives, cf. Porph. (112.31 f.).

Some of the modes that Sergius mentions are also present in Porphyry, but his
exposition is very different in being linguistic rather than logical/metaphysical
and taking into consideration whether various relations are expressed with
grammatical case or not.189 Obviously, Sergius’ account rests on Ammonius’
division and not that of Porphyry, even if such a different arrangement by
Sergius would be understandable, considering that Syriac lacks the inflection
of noun with grammatical case. Besides, Sergius and Ammonius refer to objects
(‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ ܨ̈ܒ‬πράγματα) and not solely words (cf. comm. to § 49).190

§75–79 The problem of the simultaneity of relatives. The question in dispute

(‫ܐ‬r‫ ܒܥ‬ἀπορία ‘a problem that requires a solution’, cf. A.130.16, King 2010b:
217f.) put forward by Sergius is the claim that relatives are simultaneous,
namely that their specific affiliation as relatives comes about and ceases at
the same time, and therefore they are dependent upon or concomitant with
each other (παρακολουθοῦντες ‫ܕܐ‬煟q̈‫ ܠ‬爯‫ܦ‬q̈‫)ܢܩ‬. Aristotle makes this proposition
at Cat. 7b15–8a12, and this idea was debated by his commentators. Porphyry
(117.35–118.16, 119.4–121.19) clarifies that those simultaneous are the (118.5): τὰ
συνεισάγοντά τε ἄλληλα καὶ συναναιροῦντα “Things that introduce each other and
eliminate each other”, which is in fact the argument of Aristotle taken over by
his commentators, among them Sergius. However, Aristotle says that ‘in most
cases’ (ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν πλείστων) relatives seem to be simultaneous, whereas Por-
phyry (119.4–6, and cf. 120.26–121.3) asserts that ‘in reality’ (κατ’ ἀλήθειαν) all

189 Porph. (112.2–4): τινὰ μὲν ἑτέρων λέγεται κατὰ πτῶσιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἄμφω, τινὰ δὲ καθ’ ἑτέραν καὶ
ἑτέραν, τινὰ δὲ οὐ κατὰ πτῶσιν “other relatives are construed with different grammatical
cases, while others are not construed with a grammatical case at all”, see esp. op. cit. 111.32–
112.21.
190 For the division of relatives, see also Olymp. (99.21–38, who has a different setup and
designations), Elias (202.11–215.17, close to that of Olymp.), Simpl. (161.12–163.5), J.Damasc.
Dialec. (ναʹ/51.15–23), and Anon. (30.17–27).
240 chapter 8

relatives are simultaneous, though some people get the impression that Aris-
totle does not maintain this standpoint judging from his subsequent account.
Also Sergius contends that as relatives all relative things are simultaneous,
both in time (焏‫ܒܢ‬熟‫ ܒ‬χρόνῳ) and by nature (焏‫ܢ‬qq‫ ܒ‬φύσει), although indepen-
dently they can be prior or posterior to each other either in time or/and by
nature.
In this connection most commentators, among them Sergius, discuss the
question about the ways things can be said to be prior (爟q煟‫ ܩ‬and 焏q‫ܡ‬煟‫ ܩ‬πρό-
τερος) and posterior (焏qrq‫ ܐ‬ὕστερος) to each other, although this matter is
treated by Aristotle in greater detail later on in the Categories (14a26–b23), a
fact noted by Porphyry (118.18–119.3). In this section, Porphyry analyses only
priority by nature and states that (119.1f.): τὸ μὲν γὰρ συναναιροῦν καὶ μὴ συναναι-
ρούμενον πρότερον “what eliminates something along with itself but is not itself
eliminated by it is prior.” However, Ammonius (74.11–25), Philoponus (117.15–
118.29), and Sergius discuss priority both in time and by nature (τὸ μὲν χρόνῳ
τὸ δὲ φύσει), in proving that all relatives are simultaneous. As an example of
priority in time all three give the war of the Medes as being prior the war
of the Peloponnesians.191 The definition Sergius gives for natural priority is
also to be found in Ammonius and Philoponus. Both these have an almost
verbatim definition, and we choose here to quote Philoponus (118.2–4): τῇ δὲ
φύσει πρότερον τὸ συναναιροῦν μὲν μὴ συναναιρούμενον δὲ καὶ τὸ συνεισφερόμε-
νον μὲν μὴ συνεισφέρον δέ, ὡς ἐπὶ ζῴου καὶ ἀνθρώπου ἔχει ‘that which eliminates
something but is not eliminated is prior in nature, and that which is implied
but does not imply, as in the case of animal and man’, (cf. Ammon. 74.19–
21). This means that if animal is taken away also man will be removed, but
not the opposite, that is to say, the genus of animal can exist even without
the species of man, since there are many other species in the genus of ani-
mal. And if man is posited, also animal will by necessity be deduced from it,
but animal does not necessarily introduce man. It is noteworthy that Sergius
gives the example of animal and horse and not that of animal and man, and
also that he presents angels and demons for beings endowed with rationality.
These cases are clearly motivated by his Christian approach (see comm. § 24–
34).
Ammonius (76.10–17) and Philoponus (122.25–30) declare that the proof for
showing that relatives are simultaneous is determined by the way we look at
them. If we think of them as independent entities they may be simultaneous or
not, but if we look at them as bound to each other in a certain kind of relation, as

191 The Persian War 499–449 bc and the Peloponnesian War 431–404 bc.
commentary 241

that of a father and a son, then they are inevitably simultaneous. Thus, Sergius’
solution is the same as the one found in their texts.192

§80–87 On quality (焏‫ ܙܢ‬ποιότης Cat. 8b25–11a38). Hence, Sergius arrives at

the fourth and last main category that is the aim of his exposition, without
marking this transition clearly. He begins this section with an overview of
the position of the Stoics on different qualities (cf. also Dillon 1997: 72ff. on
the nature of qualities). According to Sergius, the Stoics regarded qualities
like colours, tastes, forms, and shapes to be themselves bodies and not just
something incorporeal in the bodies. In accordance with the Platonic and
Peripatetic position he dismisses this view. A similar, but not quite identical,
account is found in the commentary of Simplicius, among his approximate
contemporaries. He writes (217.32): οἱ δὲ Στωικοὶ τῶν μὲν σωμάτων σωματικάς,
τῶν δὲ ἀσωμάτων ἀσωμάτους εἶναι λέγουσιν τὰς ποιότητας “The Stoics say that the
qualities of bodies are corporeal, and those of the bodiless are incorporeal.”193
And later on he states that (271.20–23): ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ἡ τῶν Στωικῶν δόξα λεγόντων
σώματα εἶναι καὶ τὰ σχήματα, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ποιά, συμφωνεῖ τῇ Ἀριστοτέλους
δόξῃ περὶ σχημάτων, διότι τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἐν ποσότητι θεωρεῖται, ἡ δὲ ποιότης ἑτέρα
τοῦ ποσοῦ ὑπάρχει “The Stoic view, by which they declare that even figures—
like other qualified things—are bodily, does not agree with Aristotle’s opinion
about figures because body is viewed as quantity, while quality is something
other than quantity.” Further, from the Greek tradition we have a treatise
called On the Incorporeity of Qualities, which is erroneously attributed to Galen.
As its title indicates, it argues for the incorporeal being of qualities. A work
with the same title is ascribed by Ephrem the Syrian (d. 373) to Albinus, who
is presumably the author of the already cited The Handbook of Platonism.
The eleventh chapter of this work provides five arguments for qualities being
incorporeal, intended to reject contrary claims.194
In the Syriac tradition, Ephrem the Syrian, in his Treatise Against Bardaisan’s
Domnus (ed./tr. Mitchell), provides a discussion concerning incorporeals,
where he, inter alia, gives the following report (7.32–45): rq‫ܢ ܓ‬熏q‫ ܦܠ‬rq‫ܕܒ‬

192 For the problem of simultaneity of relatives and its solution, see also Olymp. (108.6–109.19),
Elias (213.16–215.17), Simpl. (189.18–196.33), J.Damasc. Dialec. (ναʹ/51.26–37), and Anon.
(35.14–36.34).
193 In n. 296 ad loc. on p. 174, Fleet writes that “Stoic bodiless entities are void, place, time and
sayables (lekta).” For some other aspects of Stoic theory of qualities, see Simpl. (212.12–
213.7, 214.24–215.18, 222.30–23.11).
194 For a translation of and discussion on chapter 11, its relation to the Pseudo-Galenic work
on incorporeal qualities, and Ephrem’s attribution of it, see Dillon (1993: 19f. and 111–114).
242 chapter 8

焏‫̈ܩ‬q熏q‫ ܣ‬.焏‫ܡ‬熏‫ ܘܒܩܢ‬焏‫ܢ‬qq‫ܘܢ ܒ‬煿qrq‫ ܐ‬焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫ ܓ‬焏‫ ܘܠ‬焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫ ܕܓ‬爯qr‫ܐܡ‬

焏‫ܡ‬r̈熏‫ ܓ‬焏‫ ܠ‬.‫ ܗܘ‬焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫ ܓ‬焏‫ܡ‬熏‫ ܘܒܩܢ‬焏‫ܢ‬qq‫ܘܗܝ ܒ‬rq‫ܠ ܕܐ‬熏q‫ ܕ‬爯qr‫ ܐܡ‬爯q‫ܕ‬
焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܥ‬r‫ ܒ‬r‫ܪܓ‬r‫ ܡ‬煟q ‫ܘܗܝ‬rq‫ ܠ‬焏‫ܢ‬qq‫ܡ ܕܒ‬煟‫ ܠܡ‬爯qr‫ ܩ‬爯q‫“ ܕ‬For the Platonists say
that corporeal and incorporeal things exist in nature and substance, whereas
the Stoics say that all that exists in nature and substance is corporeal, but that
which does not exist in nature, though it is perceived by the mind, they call
incorporeal.”195 This chapter of Ephrem is discussed by Possekel (1999: 155 ff.),
making some comparison with the Pseudo-Galenic treatise On the Incorpore-
ity of Qualities. As Possekel also notes (p. 162 n. 47), the writer of the latter text
attributes the view that all qualities are bodies to the Stoics, (cf. 464.1–3, ed.
Kühn). And in his refusal of this notion the anonymous writer asks why the Sto-
ics do not apply the definition of body, i.e. ‘what is three-dimensional together
with resistance’ (τὸ τριχῇ διαστατὸν μετ’ ἀντιτυπίας), also to ‘colour, flavour, taste
and the remaining accidental attributes’ (χρόαν καὶ χυλὸν καὶ χυμὸν καὶ τῶν λοι-
πῶν συμβεβηκότων), which they claim to be bodies, (see 483.13–16, ed. Kühn).
Sergius’ arguments for the incorporeity of qualities amount to the idea that a
quality like colour, which is able to appear in all kinds of bodies, cannot itself
be a body and alter them. Also, if figures and shapes were bodies, it would not
be feasible to form some corporeal objects like wax and bronze in all sorts of
ways.
The fourfold division of the category of quality is Aristotle’s own. For three
of the four kinds of qualities Aristotle uses the term γένος ‘genus’ (Cat. 9a14,28,
10a11) and just once εἶδος ‘species’ (Cat. 8b27). Ammonius wonders why Aris-
totle does so and gives the explanation (84.17f.): γένος εἶπεν ἀντὶ τοῦ εἴδους, ἵνα
δείξῃ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν εἰδικώτατον εἶδος, ἀλλὰ γένος μὲν ὑπάλληλον “He says ‘genus’ in
place of ‘species’ to show that it [i.e. quality] is not an infima species but rather
a subordinate genus.” Further, Ammonius notices (86.2, 87.22f.) these instances
at which Aristotle has γένος. This explains also Sergius’ usage of 焏‫‘ ܓܢܣ‬genus’
instead of just 焏r‫‘ ܐܕ‬species’. I have chosen to interpret and translate his gensā
as ‘category’ here.
Aristotle’s first kind of quality is (Cat. 8b27) ἕξις ‘state’ and διάθεσις ‘condi-
tion’, and these two terms are used by his Greek commentators too.196 Sergius’

195 The information given in Sergius’ Commentary (L.47.6–16/P.88v6–10) that Bardaisan (154–
222) also sides with the Stoics on the corporeal nature of qualities (cf. Furlani 1937), might
have been taken from Ephrem, provided that the works of Bardaisan were not available
to Sergius. For a discussion on the possible links between Bardaisan and Sergius based on
the collection of texts in the Syriac British Library Additional 14658 manuscript, see King
(2011a, esp. pp. 204–212).
196 For the division of quality into four kinds, see also Porph. (128.34–133.19), Ammon. (81.4–
commentary 243

corresponding words ‫ܬܘܬܐ‬r‫‘ ܡܣ‬stability’ and ‫ܬܘܬܐ‬r‫ ܡܣ‬焏‫‘ ܠ‬instability’

convey rather their sense as used in this context than the terms themselves. The
difference between these qualities is said to be that state is that which is more
stable (μονιμώτερος) or longer lasting (πολυχρονιώτερος) and hard to lose (δυσ-
απόβλητος), since it has permeated (χωρεῖν ‫ ܒ‬爏‫)ܐܬܥܠ‬197 its substrate, while
condition is that which is less stable or shorter lasting (ὀλιγοχρονιώτερος) and
easy to lose (εὐαπόβλητος), (cf. also Philop. 135.20–24). The anonymous Syriac
translator of the Categories has Sergius’ term ‫ܬܘܬܐ‬r‫ ܡܣ‬for ἕξις when it has
the technical meaning ‘state’, and for διάθεσις he has 焏‫ܡ‬q‫‘ ܣ‬position/setting’,
while the two other translators Jacob and George have the etymologically more
close ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫‘ ܩܢ‬possession’ (Anon. and Jacob has also Greek 爿q‫ܣ‬q‫)ܐ‬, and for
διάθεσις both of them use the Greek loan word 爿q‫ܬܣ‬焏q‫ ܕ‬or 爿q‫ܣ‬rq‫ܕ‬, (King
2010b: 208f. and 224).
Aristotle’s second kind of quality is (Cat. 9a16) δύναμις ‘power/capacity’
and ἀδυναμία ‘powerlessness/incapacity’; they are rendered by Sergius by
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬q犏‫ܡ‬r‫ ܡ‬and ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬q犏‫ܡ‬r‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܠ‬, while the Syriac translators of the Cat-
egories have: Anonymous 焏‫ܠ‬qq ‘power’ and ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܠ‬qq‫‘ ܡ‬weakness’, and both
Jacob and George 焏‫ܠ‬qq ‘power’ and ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬r‫ܠ‬qq 焏‫‘ ܠ‬powerlessness’.
The third kind of quality is (Cat. 9a28f.) παθητικὴ ποιότης ‘affective qual-
̈
ity’ and πάθος ‘passion’, while Sergius has 焏‫ܢ‬rq̈‫ ܘܡ‬焏r熏rq 焏q̈‫‘ ܙܢ‬affected and
affective qualities’, that is to say, the noun 焏q̈‫‘ ܙܢ‬qualities’ has two attributes and
they have a reversed order in Sergius’ text, against its position in the Categories
and the Greek commentaries.198 Here, the anonymous Syriac translator surpris-
ingly uses the noun 焏rq ‘passion’ for παθητικός (i.e. for παθητικαὶ ποιότητες hav-
ing 焏rq̈ 焏q‫ ̈ܙܢ‬and 焏q‫ ̈ܙܢ‬焏rq̈), while Jacob and George have adopted Sergius’
adjective 焏‫ܢ‬rq‫ܡ‬. All three of them have 焏rq ‘passion’ for πάθος, where the
anonymous translator has once also (9a29) Sergius’ 焏r熏rq ‘affected’, (cf. King
2010b: 226). Only once does Sergius employ 焏rq ‘passion/affection’ in his text
(at §86).
The fourth sort of quality (Cat. 10a11f.) is σχῆμα ‘figure’ and μορφή ‘shape’,
for which Sergius has 焏‫ܡ‬qq‫ <( ܐܣ‬σχῆμα) and ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܕܡ‬. Throughout his text,
as also the three translators do, he has the loan word 焏‫ܡ‬qq‫ ܐܣ‬for σχῆμα,

88.4), Philop. (134.8–151.22), Olymp. (115.15–126.22), Elias (221.37–232.27), Simpl. (228.15–

262.31), J.Damasc. Dialec. (νβʹ/52.12–68), and Anon. (41.6–49.4).
197 Ammon. (82.29): διὰ βάθους κεχώρηκε τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ‘has gone deep inside the substrate’,
cf. Philop. (136.24).
198 This reversed order is found also in John of Damascus (52.21: πάθος καὶ παθητικὴ ποιότης)
and the anonymous Greek paraphrase on the Categories (41.8: πάθος καὶ παθητικὴν ποιό-
τητα).
244 chapter 8

‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ ܕܡ‬for μορφή, and 焏r‫ ܐܕ‬for εἶδος ‘species/form’, which is considered to
be a loan word too.
We have already described the difference between state and condition, as it
is defined by Sergius and other commentators. The second sort of quality is just
briefly explained by Sergius. What the commentators seem to mean is whether
a person has the physical propensity or aptitude for becoming something or
not. Ammonius writes (81.12f.): τὴν μὲν δύναμιν ἐπιτηδειότητα τὴν δὲ ἀδυναμίαν
ἀνεπιτηδειότητα καλοῦμεν “We call capacity fitness and incapacity unfitness.”
Earlier, Sergius gave just a brief division of ‘affected and affective qualities’
and now returns to it in its proper order for a more detailed exposition. The
idea expressed in this section is not easy to grasp, because of the double impli-
cation in the Greek word παθητικός ‘affective’: one active sense as being produc-
tive of affection and one passive sense as the result or effect of being affected.
Likewise, also the account of Ammonius is more complex and includes some
further divisions of this kind of quality.199 ‘Affected qualities’ are the changes of
sensation that come about in our senses in contact with the objects that pos-
sess their faculty (‫ܘܢ‬煿‫ܠ‬qq). ‘Affective qualities’ are understood in two ways, as
already noted, either as the effects of the ‘affections’ or as producer of an affec-
tion (焏rq) in our sense, which is called an ‘alteration’ (焏‫ܠܦ‬q熏r ἀλλοίωσις).
Ammonius formulates it like this (86.13–16): ἤτοι γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτὰ πεπονθέναι
καὶ διὰ πάθους πεποιῶσθαι παθητικὴν ἔχειν ποιότητα λέγεται ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ τὴν αἴσθη-
σιν ἡμῶν πάσχειν κατὰ τὴν τούτων ἀντίληψιν “Things are said to have an affective
quality either from having been affected themselves, i.e. because produced by
an affection, or from the fact that our senses are affected in the perception of
them.” While Simplicius lays it down as follows (228.27 f.): ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ πάθος ἐμποι-
εῖν τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτὰς ἀπὸ πάθους ἐγγίνεσθαι “either the result of
causing an affection in the percipient, or the result of qualities coming to be
present as a result of an affection”, and continues that (228.30f.): παθητικαὶ δέ,
ὅτι πάθος ἐμποιοῦσιν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ πάθους ἐγγίνονται “they are affec-
tive because they produce an affection in the senses or come to be as a result of
an affection.” The examples of heat (‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܡ‬q‫ܡ‬q θερμότης) of fire (‫ܪܐ‬熏‫ ܢ‬πῦρ)
and sweetness (‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܠ‬q γλυκύτης) of honey (焏r‫ ܕܒ‬μέλι) are present in some
Greek commentaries too.
This division of affective qualities and affections into four attributes belongs
to Ammonius (86.2–12). Some of this quality:

199 See the translators Cohen and Matthews’ outline of Ammonius’ division of quality, (1991:
108 n. 136; cf. also p. 105 n. 133).
commentary 245

1) ‘occurs in the entirety of one species of objects’, (‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ ܕܨ̈ܒ‬焏r‫ ܐܕ‬煟q 煿‫ܠ‬q‫ܠ‬
‫ܫ‬煟‫ ̇ܓ‬παντὶ τῷ εἴδει πάρεστι (…) ὡς ἡ ἐν τῇ χιόνι λευκότης “is present in the
entire species (…), like whiteness in snow”). Sergius’ examples for whiteness
in lead (焏q煟q‫ ܐܣܦ‬ψιμύθιον) and in swan (‫ܣ‬熏‫ܩܢ‬熏‫ < ܩ‬κύκνος) appear in
other contexts in the Greek commentaries.
2) or ‘is not found in the entirety of one species, but in parts of it’ (熏‫ ܠ‬煿‫ܡܢ‬
‫ܬܗ‬熏‫ ܒ̈ܡܢ‬焏‫ ܐܠ‬qqqr 焏r‫ ܐܕ‬煟q 煿‫ܠ‬q‫ ܒ‬οὐ παντὶ [πάρεστι] μὲν ἀλλὰ τισί,
φυσικῶς μέντοι καὶ ἐκ γενετῆς, (…) ὡς τοῖς Αἰθίοψιν ἡ μελανία “⟨it is present⟩
not in all but some ⟨members of the species⟩, although naturally and from
birth (…), like blackness in Ethiopians”). The same examples that Sergius
utilizes are not for this group, but for the next.
3) either it ‘appears in objects by nature from birth’ (爯‫ܡ‬ ̣ rq焏‫ܢ‬qq ‫ ܬܘܒ‬煿‫ܡܢ‬
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫̈ܒ‬犏‫ ܒ‬爯q煿‫ܫ ܒ‬煟‫ܘܬܐ ܓ‬煟q‫ܠ‬q οὐ φύσει [πάρεστι] μὲν ἀλλ’ ἐπίκτητον καὶ
δυσαπόβλητον (…) ὡς ἡ ὑπὸ μακρᾶς νόσου ἢ ἰκτερικοῦ νοσήματος ὠχρίασις “⟨it
is present⟩ not by nature but is acquired and hard to lose (…), like pallor
⟨that results⟩ from a long illness or from jaundice”). Here, the classifications
of Ammonius and Sergius differs. The former says “not by nature”, whereas
the latter says “by nature”, and this is also the reason for the overlapping of
their examples.200 His example of 焏qr熏‫ܠ‬q‫ܬܐ ܕܐ‬熏‫ܡܩ‬熏‫‘ ܣ‬the redness of
Illyrians’ (< Ἰλλυριοί),201 probably referring to Celts, is not found in any Greek
commentary.
̇
4) or ‘appears after the birth and is easy to lose’ (犟qr‫ܫ ܘܦ‬煟‫ܬܐ ܓ‬rq‫ ܠ‬煿‫ܡܢ‬
‫ܪܐ‬rr‫ ܕܢ‬ἐπίκτητον καὶ εὐαπόβλητον ὡς ἡ ἐρυθρότης, ὡς ἄν τις ἢ δι’ αἰδῶ ἐρυθρι-
άσῃ ἢ διὰ δέος ὠχριάσῃ “it is acquired and easy to lose, like redness ⟨or pallor⟩,
as when someone turns red with shame and pale with fear”). Both have the
same examples.202

200 The reading of Berlin manuscript here is supported by that of London and Paris. Also
the fact that Sergius gives the example of ‘the blackness of Cushites and the redness of
Illyrians’ indicates that we may not assume the loss of a negation in the Syriac text.
201 This ethnonym is attested only one other time in Syriac literature, that is at 45.12 in Incerti
auctoris Chronicon Pseudo-Dionysianum vulgo dictum i, (Textus, csco 91, Scriptores syri,
43), ed. J.-B. Chabot (1927); cf. TS.152.
202 Cf. also Philop. (147.9–148.7), who has a different classification of the affective quality. If
something (1) is present in the entire species, it is either (a) completive of it (like heat
of fire) or (b) it is not completive of it (like blackness of raven). If something (2) is not
present in the entire species, it is either (a) long lasting (like paleness from birth) or (b)
short lasting, and this is either hard to lose (like paleness from long sickness) or easy to
lose (like redness from shame).
246 chapter 8

Sergius’ statement that these qualities are present not only in bodies, but
also in the soul (焏r‫ ܢܦ‬ψυχή) is found in Ammonius (86.12) too. However,
Ammonius does not provide any further description, while Philoponus (148.8–
149.10) does so and is even more detailed than Sergius by giving some other
examples, in addition to those of persons who might be inclined to anger
(ὀργίλος) or be mad (μανικός).203
The fourth kind of the category of quality concerns figure (焏‫ܡ‬qq‫< ܐܣ‬
σχῆμα) and shape (‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ ܕܡ‬μορφή), to which Sergius’ account has a close par-
allel in Ammonius (87.22–88.4) and Philoponus (151.13–22). Prior to this place,
Ammonius had already announced that (81.24f.): εἰδέναι δεῖ ὅτι τὸ μὲν σχῆμα ἐπὶ
τῶν ἀψύχων λέγεται, ἡ δὲ μορφὴ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων “One should note that ‘figure’ is
applied to inanimate objects, and ‘shape’ to animate.”204 And later he clarifies
that (83.26–28): τὸ μὲν σχῆμα ἐν τῇ φαντασίᾳ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ θεωρεῖται, ἡ δὲ μορφὴ
ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς πράγμασιν “figure is manifested in our own mental represen-
tation, whereas shape is in physical things”, which are living.205 Furthermore,
Ammonius and Philoponus, along with Sergius, state that figure is more gen-
eral (καθολικώτερος), because everything that has shape has also figure, but not
everything that has figure also has shape, since shape is applied only to ani-
mate things and far from everything is animate. If we take this description into
account, ‘figure’ should be understood as abstracted “form” in our mind of all
physical things.

§88–94 On opposition (‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ܕܠܩ‬, ἀντικείμενα ‘opposites’ Cat. 11b17–

14a35). In addition to the ten categories, of which four were conceived to be
comprehensive, Aristotle treats some questions related to them, or mentioned
in the discussion about them, in the later part of the Categories. In chapter ten
he gives an exposition on different ways that things can be opposite to each
other viewed in relation to some of the categories. He begins with laying down
the four ways in which things can be opposite, (Cat. 11b17–19): λέγεται δὲ ἕτε-
ρον ἑτέρῳ ἀντικεῖσθαι τετραχῶς, ἢ ὡς τὰ πρός τι, ἢ ὡς τὰ ἐναντία, ἢ ὡς στέρησις καὶ
ἕξις, ἢ ὡς κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις “Things are said to be opposed to one another
in four ways: as relatives or as contraries or as privation and possession or as
affirmation and negation.”206

203 For the mental affections, see also Cat. (9b33–10a10) and Porph. (131.12–35).
204 Simplicius (261.34–262.11) raises some objections to this distinction.
205 Cf. also Philop. (137.20–32), who says that figure in inanimate objects is φανταστός ‘imag-
ined’. Also Elias states that (232.21f.): τὸ μὲν σχῆμα ἐπὶ τῶν κατ’ ἐπίνοιαν λέγεται, ἡ δὲ μορφὴ
ἐπὶ τῶν φυσικῶν ‘figure is said concerning notional things, while shape concerning physical
things’.
206 For these four different modes of opposition, see Porph. (108.10–12), Ammon. (93.8–102.21),
commentary 247

A distinction must be made here between ‘opposite things’ (爯q‫̈ܒܠ‬熏‫ ܕܠܩ‬爯q‫̇ܗܢ‬

τὰ ἀντικείμενα) or ‘opposition’ (‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ ܕܠܩ‬ἀντίθεσις) and ‘contrary things’
(爯q‫̈ܒܠ‬熏‫ ܕܣܩ‬爯q‫ ̇ܗܢ‬τὰ ἐναντία) or ‘contrariety’ (‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ ܣܩ‬ἐναντιότης). Sergius
marks this distinction by using various forms of 焏‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ ܕܠܩ‬and 焏q‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ܣܩ‬
respectively, and Jacob of Edessa and George, Bishop of the Arabs do likewise,
while the anonymous translator of the Categories uses ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ ܕܠܩ‬for both
these states of contrasts.207 In the first Syriac translation of Porphyry’s Eisagoge
both forms occur, but they are mixed-up and used inconsistently. This transla-
tion has only once 焏q‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ܣܩ‬, and at this instance it is used for ἀντικείμενος
‘opposite’ and not ἐναντίος ‘contrary’, as is Sergius’ usual approach.208 At Eis.
11.3/Eis.Syr.i 24.16f. it has: 爯q‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ ܕܣܩ‬焏‫ܢ‬rr熏‫ܘܢ ܦ‬煿‫ܠ‬q for πάσας τὰς [διαφοράς]
ἀντικειμένας “all the opposite differences”, but then it immediately gives 爯q‫ܗܢ‬
焏‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ ܕܕܠܩ‬twice for τὰ ἀντικείμενα (11.4,6/24.17,25.4). In the revision of Athana-
sius of Balad we find ‫ܐ‬rq‫̈ܒܠ‬熏‫ ܕܣܩ‬at 11.3,4 and its adverbial form rq焏‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ܣܩ‬
at 11.6. At the same time, the anonymous translator renders (20.5 f./44.2–4):
καὶ ἀμιγεῖς μὲν αἱ ἐναντίαι διαφοραί, μιγείη δ’ ἂν τὰ ἐναντία συμβεβηκότα209 ‫ܝ‬煿̇‫ܘܒ‬
焏‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ ܕܕܠܩ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬焏r̈煟‫ ܓ‬.‫ܕܐ‬煟q̈‫ ܒ‬爯qq‫ܠ‬qr‫ ܡ‬焏‫ ܠ‬210⟨焏‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ ⟩ܕܕܠܩ‬焏‫ܢ‬rr熏‫ܬܘܒ ܕܦ‬
‫ܢ‬熏q‫ܒ‬qr‫ ܗܝ ܕܢ‬焏q犏‫ܡ‬, while Athanasius’ revision has: 爯‫ ̇ܡ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܠ‬q̈r‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܘܠ‬
爯qq‫ܠ‬qr‫ ܡ‬焏q‫̈ܒܠ‬熏‫ܢ ܣܩ‬熏‫ ̇ܗܢ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬焏r̈煟‫ ܓ‬.焏q‫̈ܒܠ‬熏‫ܢ ܣܩ‬熏‫ ̇ܗܢ‬焏‫ܠܦ‬q̈熏r. Thus, the
anonymous translation of Eisagoge uses 焏q‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ ܣܩ‬once for ἀντικείμενος, but
then uses 焏‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ ܕܠܩ‬for both terms (see King 2010b: 70), while Athanasius has
different forms of 焏q‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ ܣܩ‬at all these instances. This may of course be taken
as a proof against the suggestion that Sergius is its translator, but the instances
are few and the confusion there may depend on the textual transmission of
this translation, if not reflecting an initial tendency in Sergius. Obviously, in
the early period of Syriac translations there was great confusion in the usage

Philop. (167.19–191.14), Olymp. (133.4–143.24), Elias (241.15–251.4), Simpl. (378.1–418.18),

J.Damasc. Dialec. (νηʹ/58.1–46), and Anon. (36.28–34).
207 King (2010b: 149) translates this by ‘contrariety’, though ‘opposition’ is to be preferred.
208 Note however that Sergius also uses 焏‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ ܕܠܩ‬for ἐναντίος in his translation of On the
Cosmos (at 147.8/396a33 f., 147.11,16,19,30/396b2,7,11,24, 148.7/396b32, 152.11/398b26, and
145.1/395b2: 焏‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ ܕܠܩ‬焏‫ ܒܓܒ‬爯‫ܡ‬ ̣ ἐξ ἐναντίας) and once 焏‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ ܕܠܩ‬for ἀντίπαλος (141.25/
394a22). The only time he has a form of ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ ܣܩ‬here, it is used to convey the
meaning of a verb prefixed with ἀντι- (i.e. ἀντιπεριιστάναι at 149.17/397b6). This means
that Sergius in an early stage had not made his mind how to render these two terms and
therefore he may still be the translator of the first Syriac version of Eisagoge, especially if
it belongs to his early production.
209 Barnes’ trans.: “Contrary differences do not mix whereas contrary accidents will mix.”
210 This word is lacking (in Brock’s edition?) and therefore uncertain.
248 chapter 8

of these two words, if we also take into account the rendering of both concepts
with 焏‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ ܕܠܩ‬by the anonymous translator of the Categories. However, the
distinction of Sergius between forms of 焏‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ ܕܠܩ‬for ἀντικείμενος ‘opposite’ and
焏q‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ ܣܩ‬for ἐναντίος ‘contrary’ was adopted by later translators, such as Jacob
and George.211 An exception, which may also explain why some of this confu-
sion has arisen, can be obtained from the fact that Syriac already had the fixed
expression ‫ ܕܗܕܐ‬焏‫ܒܠ‬熏‫‘ ܕܠܩ‬on the contrary’ as a functional equivalent to τοὐ-
ναντίον (lsj.555: ii.1c). It is how this Greek adverb is rendered by the anonymous
translator of Eisagoge (6.20/15.2) and in this sense it occurs also in the present
text of Sergius (§63). This use of 焏‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ ܕܠܩ‬for an expression construed with
ἐναντίος might therefore, to some extent, have had a compulsive effect.
Some explanations of the conceptual difference between ‘opposition’ (ἀντί-
θεσις) and ‘contrariety’ (ἐναντιότης) are provided by Aristotle’s commentators.
Ammonius (93.20–94.29) and Philoponus (168.25–30, 183.18–32) state that con-
traries are more violently opposed and “they destroy one another” (ἀναιρεῖ
ἄλληλα).212 This applies also the opposite relation of privation and possession,
with the significant difference that contraries “change into one another” (εἰς
ἄλληλα μεταβάλλει), whereas opposition as privation and possession “do not
change into one another” (οὐ μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα). For example contrary
colours can change into one another, as well as it being possible for one and
the same object to become hot and cold at different points,213 whereas a person
that has become blind or bald cannot recover his sight (ἀναβλέπειν) or grow hair
(φύειν) again, according to their distinction. In his adaptation of Alexander’s
On the Principles of the Universe, Sergius writes also (135.11f.): 焏‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ ܕܕܠܩ‬爯q‫ܠ‬q‫ܐ‬
214爯‫ܡ‬q‫̈ܩ‬r‫ܡ ܢ‬煟‫ ܡ‬煟q‫ ܒ‬焏‫ܒܢ‬熟‫ ܒ‬煿‫ ܒ‬煟q 煿‫ ܕܒ‬焏q犏‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܕܐ܉ ܠ‬煟q̈‫ ܕ‬爯q‫ܐܢ‬ ̈ ‘those
which are opposite to one another cannot subsist at the same time in one thing’.
The usage of another word in Sergius’ text differs from that of the translators
of Categories. It is the term 焏‫ܠ‬qq for ἕξις, in the pair στέρησις καὶ ἕξις “privation
and possession”. When ἕξις was used together with διάθεσις ‘condition’ in the
sense of ‘state’, Sergius employed ‫ܬܘܬܐ‬r‫‘ ܡܣ‬stability’ (§ 81) for it, but here
he uses 焏‫ܠ‬qq, which semantically is equivalent to δύναμις ‘power’. He has
already used 焏‫ܠ‬qq to mean ‘quality’ in some instances, in addition to its basic

211 For a description of these two words in the three Syriac translations of the Categories, see
King’s comments to Cat. 3b24 (p. 190), 4a11 (pp. 191f.), and 11b16 (pp. 236f.). See also the
discussion in Hugonnard-Roche (2004: 32 f., 46) and the entries in TS.3472f. and TS.3476f.
212 Philop. (75.2): τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία φθείρουσιν ἄλληλα “for contraries destroy each other”.
213 Philop. (190.4f.): ἅμα γὰρ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ μέρει ἀδύνατον συστῆναι τὰ ἐναντία ‘for contraries
cannot exist in the same part at the same time’.
214 In Fiori’s edition 爯q‫ܡ‬q‫̈ܩ‬r‫ܢ‬.
commentary 249

sense ‘power’. On the other hand, in order to convey the idea of ‘capacity’ for
Aristotle’s δύναμις ‘power’ (at Cat.9a16 as opposed to ἀδυναμία ‘powerlessness’)
he has ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬q犏‫ܡ‬r‫ܡ‬. The sense of ‘possession’ for ἕξις here is rendered by the
anonymous translator of Categories by ‫ܘܬܐ‬rq‫‘ ܐ‬existence’ i.e. ‘having’, while
Jacob and George have ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫‘ ܩܢ‬possession’ (see King 2010b: 208 f.). However,
Sergius’ use of 焏‫ܠ‬qq for ἕξις, comprehended as ‘a faculty of body’, suits well
Aristotle’s intention in this context to judge from the example he offers of
‘sight’, (see also Arist. Topics 106b21–28). Once again, he chooses to convey the
meaning for the Greek word instead of translating literally or transposing it.
A very close parallel to Sergius’ division of the four kinds of opposites and
some features connected with them is also to be found in Ammonius’ (93.17–
94.3) and Philoponus’ (168.18–29) commentaries. They delimit opposite things
to be either ‘in statements’ (焏‫ܡܠ‬ ̈ ‫ ܒ‬ἐν λόγοις) or ‘in objects’ (‫ܬܐ‬熏‫̈ܒ‬犏‫ ܒ‬ἐν
πράγμασι). Opposites in objects are conceived either in relation to something
else (焏‫ܢ‬rq‫ܡ ܐ‬煟‫ܬܐ ܕܡ‬熏‫ܬܦ‬熏r‫ ܒ‬ἐν σχέσει τινὶ, Philop. 168.20) or on their own
(煿̇‫ ܘܠ‬煿̇‫ ܡܢ‬καθ’ αὑτὰ, Philop.: ἄσχετα ‘unrelated’). Those opposites in objects
that are on their own and do not have a relation either change into one another
(‫ܕܐ‬煟q̈‫ ܠ‬爯‫ܠܦ‬q̈rr‫ ܡ‬μεταβάλλει εἰς ἄλληλα), as contraries, or they do not change,
as privation and possession.
Next, Sergius describes the six forms of ‘change’ (焏q‫ܓܢ‬熏r μεταβολή), which
is principally used synonymously with ‘motion’ (‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܥܢ‬q‫ܬܙ‬r‫ ܡ‬κίνησις, cf.
Cat. 15a13f.). These two words seem virtually interchangeable also in Aristo-
tle and his commentators (cf. Ammon. 105.10). Sergius’ brief specification of
motion here, rather than in connection with chapter 14 of the Categories, is
intended to illuminate the aforementioned change of contrary things. We shall
return to these six motions or changes in their proper context later on.
In the next passage, Sergius repeats some of what he has briefly mentioned
two sections earlier in order to provide a more complete account. Some oppo-
sition was said to be in statements and Sergius’ example for ‘Socrates runs’ /
‘Socrates does not run’ can be compared with Ammonius’ (93.19f.) and Philo-
ponus’ (168.23): Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ / Σωκράτης οὐ περιπατεῖ ‘Socrates walks’ /
‘Socrates does not walk’. Opposite things in objects that have a relation to one
another are specified as relatives, as right to left (δεξιὸν ἀριστερόν), while those
in objects that do not have a relation can either as contrary things change into
one another, as whiteness into blackness and cold into heat, or not change into
one another and make the opposition of “faculty” and privation, as sight and
blindness (ὄψις καὶ τυφλότης).
Then, Sergius presents the distinctive features of each opposition, beginning
with faculty and privation. Faculty is described as actuality of a natural power
that acts within us, whereas privation is the lack and corruption of this power.
250 chapter 8

Also Philoponus writes that (168.31–169.2): στέρησιν λέγει οὐ τὴν παντελῆ τῆς
δυνάμεως φθοράν (…) ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας μόνης τὴν ἀπουσίαν ‘he says215 that
privation is not the complete destruction of a power, (…) but rather only the
absence of (an) actuality’. But not every lack can be characterized as privation,
except only when it is absent in a specific part of body in which it is expected to
be actual at the appropriate time, (Cat. 12a26–34). In the Metaphysics (1004b22–
32), Aristotle gives an account of four conditions for what should be called
privation. The same three points that Sergius regards as necessary to investigate
(焯‫ܥܩ‬r‫ ܙܕܩ ܕܢ‬δεῖ σκοπεῖν/παρατηρεῖν) concerning privation are present also
in Ammonius (96.11–28) and Philoponus (175.3–16). The first point we need to
consider is whether the thing in question is naturally capable of receiving (爯q‫ܡ‬
爏‫ ܕܢܩܒ‬πέφυκε δέχεσθαι) the opposite state of possession. The second point is
whether this state of privation is current at its natural time of receiving (焏‫ܒܢ‬熟‫ܒ‬
爏‫ ܕܢܩܒ‬爯q‫ ̇ܗܘ ܕܡ‬ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ ἐν ᾧ πέφυκε, Ammon. καιρός). And the third point
is whether privation has come about in the natural part (爯q‫ ̇ܗܘ ܕܡ‬焏‫ܕܡ‬煿‫ܒ‬
煿‫ܘܐ ܒ‬煿‫ ܕܢ‬ἐν ᾧ μέρει πέφυκε, Ammon. καθ’ ὃ μέρος δεῖ), that is in the part that
can have its opposite state, which is possession.
Next, Sergius gives further explanations and examples for opposition per-
ceived in the composition of speech (焏‫ ܕܡܡܠܠ‬焏‫ܒ‬q‫ܘ‬r‫ )ܒ‬or in the construc-
tion of a statement (‫ܐ‬r‫ ܕܡܠ‬焏‫ܒ‬q‫ܘ‬r‫)ܒ‬, and from the category of relatives.
After that he clarifies contrariety. The discussion on the intermediate position
of contrary things is set out by Aristotle at Cat. 12b26–41. Ammonius writes
in relation to this passage that (95.11–13): τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ μὲν ἄμεσά ἐστιν ὡς
ἄρτιον καὶ περιττόν, τὰ δὲ ἔμμεσα ὡς τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον “Some
contraries have no intermediate, such as odd and even; others have an inter-
mediate, such as white and black and anything like that”, (also Philop. 172.13 f.).
More remarkable is Sergius’ statement that there is no intermediate of light
(‫ܗܪܐ‬熏‫ ܢ‬φάος) and darkness (焏q熏rq σκότος), for which he has an additional
explanation in his Commentary (L.57ra22–34/P.105r6–12): rq‫ ܓ‬爯q‫ ܗܠ‬爏‫ܐܦ ܥ‬
‫ܘܗܝ‬rq‫ܗܪܐ ܐ‬熏‫ ܢ‬焏‫܇ ܕܠ‬焏‫ܢ‬rq‫ܡ ܐ‬煟‫ܗܘܢ ܡ‬r‫ܥ‬犏‫ ܒܡ‬rq‫܉ ܕܠ‬爯qr‫ܐ ܐܡ‬焏q̈‫ܣܓ‬
爯‫ܐ ܡ‬r‫ܦ‬r‫ܡ ̇ܗܘܐ ܒ‬煟‫ܗܪܐ ̇ܗܘ ܕ̇ܩ‬熏‫ ܠܢ‬焏‫ܢ‬rq‫ ܐ‬爯q‫ܐ ܕ‬焏q̈‫ ܣܓ‬.焏q熏rq 焏‫ܘܠ‬
焏q‫ܥ‬犏‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܣ‬qq‫ ܒ‬爯q‫ܡ‬q‫ ̇ܣ‬焏‫܉ ܠ‬焏r‫ܡ‬r ‫ܐ‬熟qr‫ܡ ܕܢ‬煟‫ ܩ‬焏r‫ܡ‬r‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܩ‬q‫ ܕܙܠ‬煿‫ܙܠܓ‬
焏q熏rq‫ܗܪܐ ܠ‬熏‫ ܢ‬rq‫‘ ܕܒ‬also concerning these things many people say that
there is nothing else in the middle of them, which is not light or darkness. Many
others do not place the light that precedes and occurs at daybreak from the

215 Referring to Aristotle and his Physics, but it is unclear to where in this work, cf. also Elias
(244.27–31). This is perhaps another mistake that can be ascribed to Ammonius’ schools,
in addition to those mentioned by Tarán, see ch. 8 n. 174
commentary 251

shining ray of sun, before the sun appears, in the middle order between light
and darkness’. Though Philoponus (172.22–26) gives a very similar account at
the parallel passage, I have not found the same example in the Greek com-
mentaries, but Elias (242.35–37) notes that light and darkness is between the
opposition of contraries, and between that of possession and privation.
Aristotle (Cat. 12a20–25) and the commentators (Ammon. 95.27–96.4,
Philop. 172.22–27) mention that the intermediary positions of some contraries
have names, as there are other colours between white and black,216 while the
intermediate state of some other things is given (Cat. 12a22 f.) τῇ δὲ ἑκατέρου τῶν
ἄκρων ἀποφάσει τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον ὁρίζεται “by the negation of each of the extremes
that the intermediate is marked off”, as that between good (σπουδαῖος) and bad
(φαῦλος). Sergius gives also a Christian example, when he provides the two
extremities ‫ܬܐ‬熏rq煟‫‘ ܩ‬holiness’ and ‫ܬܐ‬熏qqrr ‘wickedness’ (L.45vb30–34).

§95–98 On the distinctions (焏‫ܢ‬rr熏‫ ܦ‬διακρίσεις) of opposition. Sergius’ demar-

cation of the different kinds of opposition follows again the exposition of Aris-
totle and his Alexandrian commentators. At Cat. 12b16–25, Aristotle provides
the distinguishing features of things opposed as possession and privation from
those of relatives, which are also described by Ammonius (97.18–98.5) and oth-
ers. As Sergius notes, faculty and privation are not said to be of each other, that
is belong to each other, as neither sight is said to be of blindness, nor blindness
of sight. For comparison we quote Philoponus here (177.20–23): τὰ πρός τι αὐτὰ
ἅπερ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου λέγεται (ὁ γὰρ πατὴρ υἱοῦ λέγεται πατὴρ καὶ τὸ δεξιὸν
τοῦ ἀριστεροῦ δεξιόν), τὰ δὲ καθ’ ἕξιν καὶ στέρησιν αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν οὐ λέγεται τῶν
ἀντικειμένων· ἡ γὰρ ὄψις οὐ λέγεται τυφλότητος εἶναι ὄψις ‘relatives are affirmed
of their opposites, (for father is stated of the father of a son and right is right in
relation to left). In respect, however, to possession and privation, relatives are
not affirmed of their counterparts, for sight is not said to be the sight of blind-
ness’. Furthermore, possession and privation appear in one and the same part
of a body, whereas the tie of relatives supervenes in two separate entities.
The opposition of faculty and privation is distinguished (‫ܫ‬r‫ ܐܬܦ‬διακρίνε-
σθαι) by Sergius from that of contraries, following Aristotle and only partly his
commentators, (cf. esp. Olymp. 140.8–39). This section extends also over chap-
ter eleven of the Categories (13b36–14a18), where Aristotle discusses contraries
separately. Sergius’ text differs from that of Categories or the Greek commen-
taries, in that he does not follow their thematic order. Sergius proceeds by
presenting the already mentioned explanation that contrary things do change

216 Philoponus gives the intermediate φαιός ‘grey’, ὠχρός ‘pale’, and ξανθός ‘yellow’.
252 chapter 8

into one another, whereas opposite things do not, (cf. also Philop. 183.18–32).
This argument belongs to Aristotle.217 Most interesting here is Sergius’ closing
words, where he notes that privation, as for example blindness, does not revert
to sight ‘according to the natural opinion’. A further elucidation of this is given
in the Commentary (L.57vb6–13/P.106r6–9): 煿̇‫ܐ ܕܒ‬rq‫ܢ‬qq ‫ܐ‬rq‫ ܬܪܥ‬qq‫ܐ‬
r‫ܡ‬焏‫ ܠܡ‬焏‫ ܪ̣ܡ‬焏‫܉ ܠ‬rq‫ܐ‬煿‫ܢ ܐܠ‬r‫ܥ‬r‫ ܕܡܣ‬rq‫ ܓ‬爯q‫ ̇ܗܢ‬爏‫ ܥ‬.爯‫ܢ‬q‫ ܡܡܠܠ‬焏r‫ܗ‬
‫ܗܘܢ‬r‫ ܕܡܠ‬焏rq‫ ܢ‬爟q̣‫ܬܐ ܣ‬熏‫ܠ‬q‫ ܕܡܠ‬焏r‫ ܕܘܪ‬爏‫ ܕܥ‬爯q‫ܠ‬q焏‫‘ ܠ‬according to the nat-
ural opinion within which we speak now. Concerning those things that are
performed divinely, it is not fallen upon them to say, the aim of whose trea-
tise is situated in the study of logic’. Sergius shares this passage with Philo-
ponus, who is the first attested Christian philosopher in Greek to make a similar
reservation towards Aristotle’s statement that sight can possibly be recovered,
(see King 2010b: 244f.). It is not clear whether it is the result of a direct rela-
tionship between Sergius and Philoponus or due to a prevalent point of view
among the Christian students of philosophy in Alexandria. Both alternatives
are probable at once. It is interesting to note how Sergius points out that his
text is of a philosophical nature (on logic) and that the opinions expressed
in such a text ought to be kept separate from a theological discussion. From
a Christian point of view, the thought expressed by Aristotle is problematic
and does not go along with the testimonies of the Gospels about the mira-
cles of Christ and how he gave blind people their sight again. Philoponus has
(169.18f.): οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκ τυφλοῦ τις ἀναβλέψει κατά γε τὸν φυσικὸν ἢ τεχνικὸν λόγον,
εἰ μή που θείᾳ δυνάμει ‘and no one recovers his sight from blindness accord-
ing to the natural and technical opinion, unless it be by divine power’, and
also (184.17f.): κατά γε ἰατρικὸν λόγον καὶ φυσικὸν οὐδείς ποτε τυφλὸς ὢν ἀνέ-
βλεψεν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα κατά τινα θείαν ἔλλαμψιν ‘no blind person recovers his sight
according to medical and physical opinion, unless it be by some divine illu-
mination’. Philoponus is here followed also by Elias who writes (242.10 f.): ἕξις

217 Aristotle has (Cat. 13a17–20): ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ἐναντίων (…) δυνατὸν εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴν γενέσθαι,
εἰ μή τινι φύσει τὸ ἓν ὑπάρχει, οἷον τῷ πυρὶ τὸ θερμῷ εἶναι “with contraries it is possible (…) for
change into one another to occur, unless the one belongs to something by nature as being
hot does to fire.” And (13a31–36): ἐπὶ δέ γε τῆς στερήσεως καὶ τῆς ἕξεως ἀδύνα τον εἰς ἄλληλα
μεταβολὴν γενέσθαι· ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ἕξεως ἐπὶ τὴν στέρησιν γίγνεται μεταβολή, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς
στερήσεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἕξιν ἀδύνατον· οὔτε γὰρ τυφλὸς γενόμενός τις πάλιν ἔβλεψεν, οὔτε φαλακρὸς
ὢν κομήτης ἐγένετο, οὔτε νωδὸς ὢν ὀδόντας ἔφυσεν “With privation and possession, on the
other hand, it is impossible for change into one another to occur. For change occurs from
possession to privation but from privation to possession it is impossible; one who has gone
blind does not recover sight nor does a bald man regain his hair nor does a toothless man
grow teeth.”
commentary 253

γὰρ εἰς στέρησιν μεταβάλλει, στέρησις δὲ εἰς ἕξιν οὐδέποτε ὑπὸ φύσεως ἢ τέχνης· τῇ
γὰρ προνοίᾳ οὐδὲν ἀδύνατον ‘for possession does change into privation, but pri-
vation never changes into possession naturally or by rules of art. However, to
providence nothing is impossible’. An almost identical gloss to that of Philo-
ponus’ εἰ μή που θείᾳ δυνάμει was added to a number of Greek manuscripts of
the Categories, at 13a34f., as reviewed by Bodéüs (1997: 627–631). In addition
to the glosses εἰ μὴ τί γε θείᾳ δυνάμει and εἰ μή τινι θείᾳ δυνάμει ‘unless by some
divine power’, Bodéüs finds also εἰ μὴ θείᾳ προνοίᾳ ‘unless by divine providence’.
Ammonius does not have any such phrase nor does any other pagan commen-
tator.
Due to lack of any good Syriac equivalent for ἀναβλέπειν ‘recover one’s sight’,
Sergius uses what may be considered to correspond to ἀντιμεταβάλλειν, namely
the syntagm 焏‫ܠܦ‬qrr‫ ܡ‬焏q‫̇ܗܦ‬, which I have chosen to translate ‘counter-
change’. This word occurs in fact several times in the works of Philoponus and at
least once in Hippocrates, and it is possible that Sergius had read the writings of
both.218 That the active participle forms of q‫ ̇ܗܦ‬are used as equivalents for ἀντί
is evident from several instances in the anonymous Syriac translation of Por-
phyry’s Eisagoge. Usually, the Greek technical term κατηγορεῖσθαι ‘predicated
of’ is rendered by Sergius and in this anonymous translation by 爏‫ ܥ‬r‫ܐܬܐܡ‬
‘said of’, (see Eis. 7.3,9.19/Eis.Syr.i 15.13,22.1). Accordingly, for ἀντικατηγορεῖσθαι
‘counterpredicated of’ we have 爏‫ܐ ܥ‬r‫ܐܡ‬r‫ ܡ‬焏q‫ ܗܦ‬and r‫ܐܡ‬r‫ ܡ‬q‫ܗܦ‬
爏‫( ܥ‬16.12,12f./Syr.i 36.14f.,15f.), which are asyndetically construed.219 To further
illustrate this we give the reading of the two Syriac versions of Eisagoge:

(Eis. 16.12f.): τὸ μὲν ἴδιον ἀντικατηγορεῖται οὗ ἐστιν ἴδιον, τὸ δὲ γένος οὐδενὸς

ἀντικατηγορεῖται220

(Eis.Syr.i 36.14f.): 煿̇qrq‫ ܕܐ‬焏‫ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‬爏‫ܐ ܥ‬r‫ܐܡ‬r‫ ܡ‬焏q‫ܬܐ ܗܦ‬熏q‫ܠ‬q‫ܕ‬

r‫ܐܡ‬r‫ܡ ܡ‬煟‫ ܡ‬q‫ ܗܦ‬焏‫ ܠ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬焏‫ ܓܢܣ‬爏‫ܬܗ܉ ܥ‬熏q‫ܠ‬q‫ܕ‬

218 See especially Philoponus’ Against Proclus on the Eternity of the World (although written in
529), where it at 296.14–20 is used in the similar context of possession and privation. And
see also Hippocrates’ On Diet in Acute Diseases (8.9 f.).
219 This translator is pragmatic and uses other versions too: for τὸ ἀλλήλων ἀντικατηγορεῖσθαι
he has just ‫ܕܐ‬煟q̈ 爏‫ܘܢ ܥ‬r‫ܐܡ‬r‫( ̇ܗܝ ܕܢ‬20.12/Syr.i 4411f.; while Athanasius revision has
‫ܢ‬熏‫ܓ‬rq‫ܩ‬r‫ܢ ܢ‬熏q‫ܦ‬煿‫ܕܐ ܢ‬煟q̈ 爏‫̇ܗܝ ܕܥ‬, in the imperfect!), or also he uses ‫ܬ‬熏‫ ܠ‬q‫ܦ‬煿‫ܡ‬
for ἀντικατηγορεῖσθαι as at 22.8,9/Syr.i 48.4,6, which otherwise is used for ἀντιστρέφειν
‘reciprocate’.
220 Barnes’ trans.: “a property is counterpredicated of that of which it is a property, a genus is
not counterpredicated of anything.”
254 chapter 8

(Eis.Syr.ii): ‫ܗ܉‬rq‫ܠ‬q‫ ܕ‬煿̇qrq‫ ̇ܗܘ ܕܐ‬爏‫ ܥ‬焏‫ܓ‬rq‫ܩ‬r‫ ܡ‬焏q‫ ܗܦ‬爯‫ܐ ̇ܡ‬rq‫ܠ‬q‫ܕ‬

‫ܓ‬rq‫ܩ‬r‫ ܡ‬q‫ ܗܦ‬焏‫ܡ ܠ‬煟‫ ܡ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬焏‫ ܓܢܣ‬爏‫ܥ‬

At the same time, forms of q‫ ܗܦ‬in afʿel conjugation are usually used for
ἀντιστρέφειν ‘reciprocate’ in Sergius and the anonymous translation, more often
together with ‫ܬ‬熏‫ܠ‬, that is ‫ܬ‬熏‫ ܠ‬q‫ܐܗܦ‬. To illustrate both these cases we
provide another example:221

(Eis. 19.13–15): ἡ μὲν διαφορὰ ἕπεται ἐκείνοις, ὧν ἦν διαφορά, οὐ μὴν καὶ

ἀντιστρέφει· τὰ δὲ ἴδια ἀντικατηγορεῖται ὧν ἂν ᾖ ἴδια διὰ τὸ ἀντιστρέφειν222

(Eis.Syr.i 43.1–5): ‫܉‬爯q煿‫ܢ‬r‫ܪ‬熏‫ܘܗܝ ܦ‬rq‫ ܕܐ‬爯q‫ܢ‬煿̇‫ ܠ‬牯q‫ ܢܩ‬焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܪ‬熏‫ ܕܦ‬爯q‫ܝ ܕ‬煿̇‫ܒ‬

爏‫ܐ ܥ‬r‫ܐܡ‬r‫ ܡ‬223⟨焏q‫ ⟩ܗܦ‬qq‫ ܐ‬爯q‫ܬܐ ܕ‬熏q‫ܠ‬q‫ ܕ‬.‫ܬܗܘܢ‬熏‫ ܠ‬q‫ܦ‬煿‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܠ‬
‫ܠ‬熏q‫܉ ܡ‬煿̇q‫ ܥܠ‬爯q‫ ܐܦ ̇ܗܢ‬.爯q‫ܬܗ‬熏q‫ܠ‬q‫\ ܕ‬爯q‫ܗ‬rq‫ܠ‬q‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܗ‬煿̇qrq‫ ܕܐ‬爯q‫̇ܗܢ‬
焏q‫ܦ‬煿‫ܕܡ‬

(Eis.Syr.ii): ‫ܘܗܝ ܗ̣ܘܐ‬rq‫ܘܢ ܐ‬煿‫ܠ‬q‫ܢ ܕܕ‬熏‫ܢ‬煿̇‫ ܠ‬牯‫ ܢ̇ܩ‬爯‫ ̇ܡ‬焏‫ܠܦ‬q熏r

‫ܢ‬熏‫ ̇ܗܢ‬爏‫ ܥ‬爯‫ܓ‬rq‫ܩ‬r‫ ܡ‬爯q‫ ܗ̈ܦ‬rq‫ܐ ܓ‬rq̈‫ܠ‬q‫ ܕ‬.q‫ܦ‬煿‫ ܡ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬焏‫ ܠ‬.焏‫ܠܦ‬q熏r
爯q‫̈ܦ‬煿‫ ̇ܗܝ ܕܡ‬爏q‫ ܡ‬.‫ܐ‬rq̈‫ܠ‬q‫ܘܢ ܗ̈ܘܝ ܕ‬煿‫ܠ‬q‫ܕܕ‬

Also Proba uses pəʿal participle forms of q‫ ܗܦ‬as equivalents of the Greek
preposition ἀντί in its compound form ἀντι-, as in ἀντικατηγορεῖσθαι. In this
function the participle is inflected for gender and number in accordance with
the equivalent Syriac verb plus the preposition 爏‫ܥ‬. Instead of Sergius’
爏‫ ܥ‬r‫ܐܡ‬r‫ ܡ‬for κατηγορεῖσθαι, Proba employs 爏‫ܓ ܥ‬rq‫ܩ‬r‫ܡ‬, which is a
borrowed form of the Greek word, as some other commentators and transla-
tors also do (see King 2010b: 319). In this connection, see the following exam-
ples from Proba: ‫ܗܝ‬熏‫ܓ ܥܠ‬rq‫ܩ‬r‫ ܡ‬q‫( ܕ̇ܗܦ‬In Isag. 7.7/‫ ܙ‬.٧, cf. also 11.32/.٣٢
焏q), ‫ܕܐ‬煟q̈ 爏‫ ܥ‬爯q‫ܓ‬rq‫ܩ‬r‫ ܡ‬爯qq‫ܘܢ ܗܦ‬煿qr‫( ܬ‬In Isag. 10.27/‫ ܝ‬.٢٧), and once
together with substantive 焏q‫ܦ‬煿‫‘ ܒ‬opposite’ as at ‫ܓ‬rq‫ܩ‬r‫ ܡ‬焏q‫ܦ‬煿‫ ܒ‬熏‫ܠ‬
焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܪ‬熏‫ ܦ‬爏‫ ܥ‬焏r‫( ܐܕ‬In Isag. 10.27/‫ ܝ‬.٢). Also in the Anon. Syr. In Isag. (47.23/
熟‫ ܡ‬.٢٣) we have ‫ܓ‬rq‫ܩ‬r‫ ܡ‬q‫ ܗܦ‬焏‫ܬܐ ܠ‬熏qq 爏‫ ܥ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬焏r‫ܢ‬r‫‘ ܒ‬man is not
counterpredicated of animal’.

221 See also Eis. (7.4/15.15 f.) for the anonymous translator’s use of ‫ܬ‬熏‫ ܠ‬q‫ܦ‬煿‫ ܡ‬for ἀντιστρέ-
φειν, or just q‫ܦ‬煿‫ ܡ‬as at 12.21/28.16.
222 Barnes’ trans.: “Differences follow the items of which they are differences but do not con-
vert, whereas properties are counterpredicated of the items of which they are properties
inasmuch as they convert.”
223 Added by me, though uncertain.
commentary 255

Sergius proceeds to present the distinctive differences between the oppo-

sition of contraries and that of faculty and privation. He has already told us
that some contrary things have an intermediate position, whereas this is not
valid for faculty and privation. The next argument is based on what Aristotle
says at Cat. 13a3–17, and is discussed by Ammonius (99.5–100.2) and Philoponus
(182.6–183.32) among others. Aristotle had declared that contrary things change
into one another, with the exception of the unmediated contraries to which a
condition belongs naturally or is a substantial quality of them, as heat belongs
to fire and cold to snow. And if any of these is removed from its substrate, this
will end it. This cannot be said of faculty and privation, since one of them is
always present in its substrate, and the removal of sight, for example, does not
mean the end of its substrate, the eye, but only the change from one state into
its opposite state, from that of possession into that of privation. Although this
is not clearly expressed by Sergius, he means that either faculty or privation is
always present in its substrate.
Next, he treats the distinction between contraries and relatives. Sergius says
that relatives entail each other (煿‫ ܥܡ‬爏‫ ܡܥ‬συνεισφέρειν) and destroy each
other (煿‫ ܥܡ‬爏q‫ ܡܒ‬συναναιρεῖν),224 since they are simultaneous, whereas
contraries neither entail each other nor are destroyed along with one another
(煿‫ ܥܡ‬爏q‫ܒ‬r‫ ܡ‬συναναιρεῖσθαι). Moreover, relatives have their existence in
two different things, whereas contraries are able to be in one single thing but
at different points of time, (cf. Cat. 14a6–14, Ammon. 102.2–14, Philop. 188.20–
190.5).
Lastly, Sergius distinguishes the opposition (of negation and affirmation)
in statement from that of faculty and privation, of contraries, and of relatives,
which are said to be in objects. He refutes the argument that all statements
signify real objects, and presents examples of some conditions that cannot be
true at any time. Finally, he concludes that opposition in language is concerned
with truth (‫ܪܐ‬rr ἀλήθεια) and falsity (‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ ܕܓܠ‬τὸ ψεῦδος), but the opposition
in objects does not have any such implication, (for this passage, cf. Philop.
184.21–185.23 and Olymp. 141.1–30).

224 Philoponus (94.13–16): τῶν γὰρ πρός τι ἴδιον τὸ ἑνὸς τεθέντος τὸ ἕτερον συνεισάγεσθαι καὶ ἀναι-
ρεθέντος συναναιρεῖσθαι· πατρὸς γὰρ τεθέντος συνεισάγεται πάντως καὶ ὁ υἱός, καὶ ἀναιρεθέντος
συναναιρεῖται ‘for it is a property of relatives that if one (of them) is given the other is
introduced along with it, and (if one of them) is destroyed (the other) is destroyed along
with it. For if son is given it by all means introduces with it also father, and when (the
former) is destroyed it destroys (the latter) along with it’, cf. also Philop. (97.5–7, 169.7–
11).
256 chapter 8

§99–105 Priority (and posteriority), (‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܡ‬q煟‫ ܩ‬τὸ πρότερον, Cat. 14a26–14b23,

cf. also Metaph. v.11: 1018b9–1019a14). Another concept that had been intro-
duced by Aristotle in connection with the description of the ten categories is
that of priority, (cf. Olymp. 143.29–144.28 and Elias 251.7–16). In chapter twelve
devoted to priority, Aristotle initially mentions four modes of priority, but then
presents a fifth one.225 The first kind of priority is ‘in time’ (焏‫ܒܢ‬熟‫ ܒ‬τῷ χρόνῳ).
When the coming into being of something occurs before something else, then
the former is said to be prior to the latter in time from the viewpoint of present.
If the compared entities are animate ‘elder’ (爯‫ ܡ‬rqr‫ ܩ‬πρεσβύτερος) is used and
if they are inanimate ‘older’ or ‘more ancient’ (爯‫ ܡ‬犟qr‫ ܥ‬παλαιότερος) is used,
as noted by Sergius, Ammonius (103.7f.), and Philoponus (191.26–192.2) among
others.226
The second kind of priority is described by Aristotle as (Cat. 14a30): τὸ μὴ
ἀντιστρέφον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν “what does not reciprocate as to
implication of existence”, which he later states to be priority by nature (Cat.
14b13).227 This priority by nature (φύσει 焏‫ܢ‬qq‫ ܒ‬and rq焏‫ܢ‬qq) is defined by
Porphyry as that whose existence does not introduce the existence of the
other thing, but whose elimination eliminates the other thing. He says (119.1–
3): ἔμπαλιν ἔχει ἡ ἀναίρεσις πρὸς τὴν ὕπαρξιν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ συναναιροῦν καὶ μὴ
συναναιρούμενον πρότερον, τὸ δὲ συνεισάγον καὶ μὴ συνεισαγόμενον ὕστερον ἐξ
ἀνάγκης “elimination stands in a converse relation to existence: what eliminates
something along with itself but is not itself eliminated by it is prior, but what
introduces something else and is not itself introduced by it is necessarily
posterior.” Again, where the Greek commentators use the example of animal
and man, Sergius has animal and horse, which must be explained as a careful
choice motivated by his Christian faith.
The third way of being prior is said in respect of order (τῇ τάξει) both by
Aristotle and his Greek commentators. Strangely enough, Sergius uses the
original Syriac word ‫ܪܐ‬煟‫ ܣ‬for this kind of priority and not the Greek loan
word 焏‫ܣ‬qq (< τάξις), which he instead applies to the fourth kind of priority.
In meaning, the adverbial use of ‫ܪܐ‬煟‫ ܒܣ‬is closer to Greek ἐφεξῆς ‘in order’, ‘in a
row’, (cf. Philop. 193.32). Nonetheless, he has the same example for it as we find
in Aristotle (14b2f.) and also in Ammonius (103.18f.): ὡς τὸ προοίμιον πρότερον

225 For the enumeration of priority, see Porph. (118.17–19.3), Ammon. (103.3–104.12), Philop.
(191.15–195.4), Olymp. (143.29–145.11), Elias (251.7–252.23), Simpl. (418.22–423.33), and
J.Damasc. Dialec. (ξʹ/60.1–27).
226 Also Simpl. (419.1–5). However, Elias (251.26 f.) writes that of animate things both πρεσβύ-
τερος and παλαιότερος are said, but of the inanimate only παλαιότερος.
227 See also Simpl. (419.34) and n. 959 ad loc. of its translator Gaskin.
commentary 257

τῆς διηγήσεως “in the way that the introduction is prior to the narrative.” He
seems to imply that this kind of order is just a sequential arrangement, without
any further assessments or implications.
Aristotle does not specify the fourth kind of priority by a single word. Instead
he says that some people consider persons who are specially honoured (ἐντιμό-
τεροι) and beloved (ἀγαπώμενοι) to be prior. On that account, Ammonius and
Olympiodorus designate this priority τῷ ἀξιώματι ‘in worth’, while Philoponus
and some others have the almost synonymous τῇ ἀξίᾳ ‘in dignity’.228 Sergius has
also at his first enumeration ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ ܕܪܒ‬焏‫ܣ‬qq‫‘ ܒ‬in order of greatness’, but then
twice ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܒ‬r‫ ܘܒ‬焏‫ܣ‬qq‫‘ ܒ‬in order and in greatness’. But in the Metaphysics
(1018b22), Aristotle calls this priority κατὰ δύναμιν ‘in respect of power’, (cf. also
Simpl. 422.21–24).
After these four ways of being prior, Aristotle treats a fifth one, writing
(14b11–13): τῶν γὰρ ἀντιστρεφόντων κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν τὸ αἴτιον ὁπωσ-
οῦν θατέρῳ τοῦ εἶναι πρότερον εἰκότως φύσει λέγοιτ’ ἄν “For of things which recip-
rocate as to implication of existence, that which is in some way the cause of
the other’s existence might reasonably be called prior in nature”, and exempli-
fies it by saying that real objects are the cause of true statements about them,
but a true statement about an object cannot have been the cause of that object,
(cf. Philop. 194.16–25). This kind of opposition is said conversely of number two
in his account,229 that of being prior in nature. For things within that kind of
priority do not reciprocate with each other, that is to say, the existence of the
posterior thing is not caused or implied by the prior one, i.e. the existence of
man is not implied by animal. The things within the fifth kind of priority do
reciprocate, since one of them is the cause of the other, in the way a father is the
cause of the existence of a son, and these two reciprocate, i.e. if there is father,
there is son, if there is son, there is father, in the way Ammonius (104.2–5) and
some other commentators exemplify this kind of priority.230
Sergius’ description of this priority is rather cryptic. Yet, what he refers to
by a real and equal ‘property’ (‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܠ‬q‫ )ܕ‬is its inclination to reciprocate with
its possessor. This understanding is perceived from his additional explanation
in the commentary to Theodore,231 where he gives the example of ‘man’ and
‘laughter’, and how they are posited of each other equally.232 But since laughter

228 Elias (252.10) and John of Damascus Dialec. (ξʹ/60.13) have κατ᾽ ἀξίαν.
229 Philop. (194.10f.): ἔστι δὲ τὸ δεύτερον τῷ πέμπτῳ ἐναντίον ‘the second is contrary to the fifth’.
230 So also Philoponus (194.10–16), Elias (252.6–9), and John of Damascus (Dialec. ξʹ/60.17f.).
231 See L.59va12–29/P.108v19–109a3, with a minor lacuna in P.
232 Also Olympiodorus (145.5) says that an object and a statement are ‘equal’ (ἐξισάζουσιν) in
this way; (and cf. Simpl. 421.3).
258 chapter 8

is following (煿‫ ܠ‬牯q‫ ܢܩ‬ἀκολούθησις) man, it is considered to be posterior to man,

who consequently is prior. However, Sergius does apply the other important
peculiarity of this kind of priority, that of the prior thing being causative of the
posterior. For Olympiodorus (144.37f.) and John of Damascus (Dialec. ξʹ/60.16–
19) this attribute is dominant and therefore this mode of priority is called τὸ
αἴτιον τοῦ αἰτιατοῦ ‘the cause of the caused’ respectively τὸ αἴτιον καὶ αἰτιατόν
‘the cause and the caused’ in the way father is causative of son. Here, we quote
Simplicius’ concluding comment regarding all five priorities (421.11–13): πέντε
μὲν οὖν αὐτὸς ἐνταῦθα τοῦ προτέρου τοὺς τρόπους ἐξέθετο, τὸν κατὰ χρόνον, τὸν κατὰ
φύσιν, τὸν κατὰ τάξιν, τὸν κατὰ δύναμιν, τὸν κατὰ αἰτίαν “Consequently [Aristotle]
has set out here five varieties of the prior: in respect of time, in respect of nature,
in respect of order, in respect of capacity and in respect of cause.”
In the adaptation of Alexander’s On the Principles of the Universe, Sergius
mentions some additional kinds of priorities in relation to the prime mover.
̈
He says (139.4–7): 焏‫ ܐܠ‬.牟q熟‫ ܡ‬rq焏‫ܡ‬煟‫ ̇ܗܘ ܕܩ‬爿q‫ ܐܘܣ‬爯q煿‫ܠ‬熏q‫ ܠ‬爯q‫ ܕ‬爟q煟‫ܩ‬
qq‫ ܐ‬.‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܒ‬r‫ ܘܒ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܠ‬熏r‫ ܘܒ‬焏‫ܥ‬煟‫ ܒܡ‬爯q煿‫ ܘܠܡܢ‬.焏‫ܒܢ‬熟‫ ܒ‬爟q煟‫ ܩ‬爯q煿‫ܠܡܢ‬
‫ܗ‬r‫ ܥܠ‬煿̇qrq‫ܡ ܕܐ‬煟‫ܘ ܡ‬煿̇‫ܐ ܠ‬r‫ ܥܠ‬焏‫ܡ‬q煟‫ ܕܩ‬爯‫ܢ‬qr‫ ܐܡ‬爯‫ܢ‬q煟‫‘ ܕܡܥ‬but the one
who moves first is prior to all substances, to some of them he is prior in time,
to others in intellect or in authority or in greatness, as we are wont to say that
a cause is prior to the thing whose cause it is’.
Of course, as priority (‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܡ‬q煟‫ ܩ‬τὸ πρότερον) is said of things related or
compared, its opposite counterpart will be called posteriority (‫ܬܐ‬熏qrq‫ ܐ‬τὸ
ὕστερον), (cf. Ammon. 104.8–12, Philop. 194.28–195.4).

§106–107 Motion (κίνησις, Cat. 15a13–15b16). Sergius neither treats simultane-

ity (τὸ ἅμα) separately, as Aristotle does in chapter thirteen of the Categories,
nor ‘having’ (τὸ ἔχειν), which is the topic of the last chapter, being number
fifteen. He instead passes over to the theme of chapter fourteen, namely the
various kinds of motions, which is more extensively treated by Aristotle in the
Physics (esp. book 1 and 5). In the Categories, Aristotle commences the chap-
ter on motion by stating that (15a13f.): κινήσεως δέ ἐστιν εἴδη ἕξ· γένεσις, φθορά,
αὔξησις, μείωσις, ἀλλοίωσις, κατὰ τόπον μεταβολή “There are six kinds of change
[/motion]: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change
of place.”233 Sergius has already cited these six types of motion in connec-
tion with opposition (§89). The commentators, following Aristotle’s account

233 For the expositions of the Greek commentators on this chapter on motion, see Ammon.
(105.9–20), Philop. (197.12–204.21), Olymp. (146.1–30), Elias (253.15–255.23), Simpl. (427.9–
436.12), and J.Damasc. Dialec. (ξβʹ/62.1–52).
commentary 259

in the Physics, characterize the different motions or changes, and here we refer
to Ammonius and Philoponus in parallel to Sergius. Some change is said to
come about substantially (κατ’ οὐσίαν) and some accidentally (κατὰ συμβεβη-
κός). The substantial change is specified as ‘coming into being’ and ‘destruction’,
while the rest are accidental. For the distribution of all the six changes within
the scope of the categories we quote a passage from Ammonius, with which
Sergius’ text concurs closely, (105.16–19): γίνεσθαι τὴν κίνησιν ἐν τέτρασι κατηγο-
ρίαις, ἐν μὲν τῇ οὐσίᾳ γένεσιν καὶ φθοράν, ἐν δὲ τῷ ποσῷ αὔξησιν καὶ μείωσιν, ἐν
δὲ τῷ ποιῷ ἀλλοίωσιν, ἐν δὲ τῇ ποῦ τὴν κατὰ τόπον μεταβολήν “there is change in
four categories—in substance: coming into being and destruction; in quantity:
growth and diminution; in quality: qualitative change; in the where: change
of place.” Sergius also specifies that change in substance is called coming into
being and destruction (焏‫ܒܠ‬q‫ ܘ‬焏q‫ ܗܘ‬γένεσις καὶ φθορά), change in quantity is
named increase and decrease (‫ܘܬܐ‬rq犏‫ܐ ܘܒ‬rq‫ ܬܪܒ‬αὔξησις καὶ μείωσις), and
change in quality (焏‫ܢ‬熟‫ )ܒ‬is called alteration (焏‫ܠܦ‬q熏r ἀλλοίωσις), which some-
times is translated with the inferred meaning ‘qualitative change’. But Sergius
does not provide any category for the last kind of change, that is change of place
or movement from one place to another (焏q‫ܘ‬煟‫ ܠ‬焏q‫ ܕܘ‬爯‫ ܡ‬焏‫)ܙܘܥ‬, which
in Greek is called φορά ‘locomotion’ or ‘spatial motion’ (lit. ‘being carried’), as
we have already established, (Phys. 208a31f.). Ammonius calls this motion ‘in
where’ (ἐν τῇ ποῦ),234 while Philoponus has (199.6 f.): [κίνησίς] τοῦ δὲ τόπου ἡ
κατὰ τόπον μεταβολή, ἥτις καλεῖται φορά ‘[motion] of place, being change in
respect of place, which is called locomotion’, (Simpl. 421.1: κατὰ τόπον and 435.3:
τὸ ποῦ). For the different kinds of motion and change I have generally used the
following terminology in my translation: for 焏q‫ܓܢ‬熏r (μεταβολή) ‘change’, for
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܥܢ‬q‫ܬܙ‬r‫( ܡ‬κίνησις) ‘motion’, for 焏‫( ܙܘܥ‬μεταβολή) ‘movement’, for 焏q‫ܢ‬熏r
(κίνησις) ‘departure’, and for 焏‫ܠܦ‬q熏r (ἀλλοίωσις) ‘alteration’.
In contrast to Ammonius, but in accordance with Philoponus, Sergius de-
scribes more closely movement of place, or locomotion. He presents the forms
of locomotion and its directions. Some motion of objects is said to revolve in
a circle (‫ܕܪܐ‬熏q‫ ܒ‬κύκλῳ), which Aristotle calls κυκλοφορία ‘circular motion’,
while some is moved straight ahead (牟q‫ܬܙ‬r‫ ܡ‬rq‫ܐ‬犏q‫ ܬܪ‬κατ’ εὐθεῖαν or
ἐπ’ εὐθείας), which is named by Aristotle εὐθυφορία ‘rectilinear motion’ (Phys.
227b18). The rotational motion of a wheel implies a motion for the entire
wagon. But according to Aristotle’s geocentric model of the universe with the

234 So also Olymp. (146.4 f. and 146.16: ἐν τῇ ποῦ κατηγορίᾳ, ποιεῖ τὴν καλουμένην κατὰ τόπον
μεταβολήν ‘in the category of where, making what is called change in respect of place’),
and J.Damasc. Dialec. (ξβʹ/62.9).
260 chapter 8

unmoving earth at the centre, the circular motion of a celestial body spinning
on its axis (περὶ ἄξονα, Simpl. 428.20), which is said to be its place, is conceived
here to be ‘motion of the parts’ (Philop. In Phys. 594.8: κίνησις τῶν μορίων), since
it is not the whole body which changes place on the transparent rotating sphere
around the earth, but only its parts, and this kind of motion is called περιφορά
‘revolution’.235 Therefore, in his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, Philoponus
has (In Phys. 556.28–557.1): φορὰ γὰρ ἡ κατ’ εὐθεῖαν κίνησις, ἡ δὲ κύκλῳ οὐ φορά,
ἀλλὰ περιφορά “For motion in straight lines is locomotion; circular motion is not
locomotion, but revolution”, (cf. also Philop. 199.7–10 and In Phys. 602.7–11).
The six forms of straight motion are also specified by Sergius, (so also in
Philop. 204.12–15). The first group of opposite motion is either like that of fire
upwards (爏‫ ܠܥ‬ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω) or like that of water downwards (rqr‫ ܠ‬ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω).
The second pair is the movement towards one of the directions: to right or
to left (焏‫ ܐܘ ܠܣܡܠ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܡ‬q‫ ܠ‬τὴν δ’ εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ τῇ εἰς τὰ ἀριστερά). And the
third group is of what is set in motion by a force, either through pushing (ὦσις)
forwards or through pulling (ἕλξις) backwards (‫ܪܐ‬r‫ ܐܘ ܠܒܣ‬焏‫ܕܡ‬熏‫ ܠܩ‬τὴν δὲ
εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν τῇ εἰς τὸ ὄπισθεν), (cf. Arist. Phys. 208b12–18, and 243a10–244a6,
and Philop. In Phys. 499.8).

§108 In his epilogue, Sergius once again anticipated any criticism and then
concluded his treatise with a suitable biblical quotation from Paul (1 Corinthi-
ans 4:7).

§109 In my edition, I have also included the words of wisdom or an adage

ascribed to the theologian Theodore of Mopsuestia (ca. 350–428). These words
are certainly added to the collection of texts in the manuscript by the anony-
mous East Syrian scribe. Since our manuscript has it origin in the East Syriac
tradition and Theodore is highly venerated in the Church of the East and influ-
ential for its theology, many excerpts and quotations from Theodore’s writings
are found in the writers of that church and manuscripts copied by its mem-
bers. It is rather common for a scribe to add such an appendix to the text he
has copied. Those words do not need to have any direct connection with the
text itself. So, we need not assume that the scribe saw any relation between
Sergius and Theodore, other than that both of them are probably considered
to be wise men. However, the words chosen by the scribe are clearly linked to
Sergius’ concluding Biblical quotation, as he himself indicates.

235 For rotating transparent spheres, see Sorabji (2004a: 337–343, 375–382) and Sorabji (2010:
21–23).
 chapter 9

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John Malalas
Ioannis Malalae Chronographia, edited by Hans Thurn, (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2000).
Trans.: The Chronicle of John Malalas, a translation by Elizabeth Jeffreys, Michael
Jeffreys, and Roger Scott, (Melbourne, 1986).

John of Damascus
Dialectica/Philosophical Chapters: Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos, vol. 1, ed.
P.B. Kotter, (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1969), pp. 47–95, 101–142. Trans.: Saint John of Dam-
ascus: Writings, translated by Frederic H. Chase, Jr., (New York, 1958), pp. 1–110; and
German translation based on Kotter’s edition by Gerhard Richter, Philosophische
Kapitel, (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1982).

John of Tella
“Vita Iohannis Episcopi Tellae”, Vitae virorum apud Monophysitas celeberrimorum i, ed.
E.W. Brooks (Paris, 1907), Syriac text pp. 31–95 and Latin tr. pp. 23–60.

John Philoponus
Philoponi (olim Ammonii) in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, ed. Adolf Busse,
(Berlin: Reimer, 1898). Trans.: Philoponus, On Aristotle Categories 1–5, translated by
Riin Sirkel, Martin Tweedale and John Harris; with Philoponus, A Treatise Concern-
ing the Whole and the Parts, translated by Daniel King, (Bloomsbury, 2014). French
trans.: Jean Philopon, Commentaire sur les Catégories, introduction, traduction par-
tielle [1.1–83.4, ed. Busse] annotée et Bilan de lecture, par Sylvie Laramée, (Université
de Montréal, 2000). (Unpublished thesis). Referred to also as: Laramée (2000).
Opuscula monophysitica Ioannis Philoponi, quae ex manuscriptis Vaticano et Britannico
Syriace edidit et Latine interpretatus est Albert Šanda, (Beryti Phœniciorum, 1930,
reprinted by Gorgias Press, 2010). Trans.: Philoponus, On Aristotle Categories 1–5,
translated by Riin Sirkel, Martin Tweedale and John Harris; with Philoponus, A
Treatise Concerning the Whole and the Parts, translated by Daniel King, (Bloomsbury,
2014). (The latter trans. of Šanda, pp. 81–94).
268 chapter 9

Anti-Arian fragments: Albert van Roey, “Les fragments anti-ariens de Jean Philopon”,
Orientalia Lovaniensia Periodica 10 (1979), pp. 237–250.
Tritheist fragments: Albert van Roey, “Les fragments trithéites de Jean Philopon”, Ori-
entalia Lovaniensia Periodica 11 (1980), pp. 135–163.
On resurrection fragments: Albert van Roey, “Un traité cononite contre la doctrine de
Jean Philopon sur la Résurrection”, αντιδωρον: Hulde aan Dr. Maurits Geerard bij
de voltooiing van de Clavis Patrum Graecorum / Hommage à Maurits Geerard pour
célébrer l’ achèvement de la Clavis Patrum Graecorum, [ed. Jacques Noret], (Wetteren:
Cultura, 1984), pp. 123–139.

Michael the Great

Chronique de Michel le Syrien patriarche jacobite d’Antioche 1166–1199, éditée pour la
première fois et traduite par J.-B. Chabot, (Paris, 1899–1924).
The Edessa-Aleppo Syriac codex of the Chronicle of Michael the Great: A Publication of the
St. George Parish and the Edessan community in Aleppo, edited by Gregorios Yuhanna
Ibrahim; Contribution by Sebastian P. Brock & Hidemi Takahashi; Foreword by
George Anton Kiraz, (Piscataway: Gorgias Press, 2009). (A facsimile edition). Trans.:
The Syriac Chronicle of Michael Rabo (The Great): A Universal History from the Cre-
ation, translation and introduction by Matti Moosa, (Teaneck: Beth Antioch Press,
2014).

Olympiodorus
Olympiodori prolegomena et in Categorias commentarium, ed. Adolf Busse, (Berlin:
Reimer, 1902).

Paul the Persian

Treatise on the Logic of Aristotle: Anecdota Syriaca, iv, ed. J.P.N. Land, (Leiden, 1875),
Text at pp. 1*-32*, Latin translation pp. 1–30, and notes pp. 99–113. Partial trans.: Javier
Teixidor, “Les textes syriaques de logique de Paul le Perse”, Semitica 47 (1997), pp. 117–
138.
Elucidation of Peri Hermeneias: Henri Hugonnard-Roche, “Sur la lecture tardo-antique
du Peri Hermeneias d’ Aristote: Paul le Perse et la tradition d’ Ammonius, édition
du texte syriaque, traduction française et commentaire de l’ Élucidation du Peri
Hermeneias de Paul le Perse”, Studia graeco-arabica 3 (2013), pp. 37–104.

Phocas of Edessa
Preface: Michel van Esbroeck, “La triple préface syriaque de Phocas”, Denys l’ Aréopagite
et sa postérité en orient et en occident: Actes du Colloque International Paris, 21–24
septembre 1994, ed. Ysabel de Andia, (Paris: Institut d’ Études Augustiniennes, 1997),
pp. 167–186.
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Plotinus
Plotinus, Plotini Opera [Enneads], ed. Paul Henry & Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer, (Oxford:
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Porphyry
Porphyrii Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, ed. Adolf Busse, (Berlin:
Reimer, 1887). Trans.: Porphyry, Introduction, translated with a commentary by Jona-
than Barnes, (Oxford University Press, 2003). Trans.: Porphyry, On Aristotle Cate-
gories, translated by Steven K. Strange, (London: Duckworth, 1992).
Porphyre, Commentaire aux Catégories d’ Aristote, édition critique, traduction française,
introduction et notes par Richard Bodéüs, (Paris: J. Vrin, 2008).
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Proba
In Isagogen: Aristoteles bei den Syrern vom v.–viii Jahrhundert. Bd 1: Syrisch-Arabische
Biographieen des Aristoteles. Syrische Commentar zur εισαγωγη [Eisagôgê] des Por-
phyrios, ed./tr. by Anton Baumstark (Leipzig: Teubner, 1900), pp. 焯q–‫ ܕ‬/4–12, tr.
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Pseudo-Elias
Pseudo-Elias (Pseudo-David), Lectures on Porphyry’s Isagoge, Introduction, Text and In-
dices by L.G. Westerink, (Amsterdam, 1967). French trans.: Une initiation à la Philoso-
phie de l’ Antiquité tardive. Les leçons du Pseudo-Elias, tr. by Pascal Mueller-Jourdan,
(Academic Press Fribourg, 2007). Referred to also as: Mueller-Jourdan (2007).

Pseudo-Galen
On the Incorporeity of Qualities: ὅτι αἱ ποιότητες ἀσώματοι βιβλίον (Quod qualitates
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edizione critica, traduzione e note, Michelangelo Giusta, (Torino, 1976).

Pseudo-Zachariah Rhetor
Historia ecclesiastica Zachariae rhetori vulgo adscripta, ed./tr. E.W. Brooks, (Louvain,
1919–1924). Trans.: The Chronicle of Pseudo-Zachariah Rhetor: Church and War in Late
Antiquity, [volume edited by] Geoffrey Greatrex; translated from Syriac and Arabic
270 chapter 9

sources by Robert R. Phenix and Cornelia B. Horn; with introductory material by

Sebastian Brock and Witold Witakowski, (Liverpool University Press, 2011). Referred
to also as: Greatrex (2011).

Ptolemy
Geography: Klaudios Ptolemaios, Handbuch der Geographie: Griechisch—Deutsch, Vol.
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Sergius of Reshaina
Sergius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, to Theodore (British Library Add 14658,
fol. 1–61 and Bibliothèque nationale de France Syr. 354, fol. 1–109).
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129ra34).
Sergius, Concerning the Division of Substance, (British Library Add 14658, fol. 168ra1–
172rb33).
Sergius, A Natural Demonstration, (British Library Add 12155, fol. 178ra21-rb43).
Sergius, On the Primary Causes of the Universe: Emiliano Fiori, “L’épitomé syriaque du
Traité sur les causes du tout d’ Alexandre d’ Aphrodise attribué à Serge de Rešʿaynā”,
Le Muséon 123:1–2 (2010), pp. 127–158. Referred to also as: Fiori (2010b).
Sergius, On the Influence of the Moon, [in:] Inedita Syriaca, ed. Eduard Sachau, (Wien,
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Galen, The Art of Medicine, [in:] Inedita Syriaca, ed. Eduard Sachau, (Wien, 1870),
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Galen, On the Properties of Foodstuffs, [in:] Inedita Syriaca, ed. Eduard Sachau, (Wien,
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Pseudo-Aristotle, On the Cosmos, [in:] Analecta Syriaca, ed. Paul de Lagarde, (Leipzig:
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Simplicius of Cicilia
Simplicii in Aristotelis Categorias commentarium, ed. Karl Kalbfleisch, (Berlin: Reimer,
1907). Trans.: Simplicius, On Aristotle’s “Categories 1–4”, translated by Michael Chase,
(Ithaca, 2003). Referred to also as: Chase (2003). Trans.: Simplicius, On Aristotle’s
“Categories 5–6”, translated by Frans A.J. de Haas & Barrie Fleet, (Ithaca, 2001). Trans.:
Simplicius, On Aristotle’s “Categories 7–8”, translated by Barrie Fleet, (Ithaca, 2002).
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Stephanus of Alexandria
In Isagogen: Aristoteles bei den Syrern vom v.–viii Jahrhundert. Bd 1: Syrisch-Arabische
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Stephanus of Athens
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Theodore of Raithu
Preparation: Analecta Patristica: texte und Abhandlungen zur griechischen Patristik, ed.
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Timothy i
Timothei Patriarchae i, Epistulae, ed. Oscar Braun, vol. 1, (Paris, 1914).

Zachariah of Mytilene
Sévère patriarche d’ Antioche 512–518, Vie de Sévère par Zacharie le Scholastique, textes
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Commentary on the Categories, Chapter Two”, De l’ Antiquité tardive au Moyen Âge.
Études de logique aristotélicienne et de philosophie grecque, syriaque, arabe et latine
offertes à Henri Hugonnard-Roche, eds. Elisa Coda & Cecilia Martini Bonadeo, (Paris:
Vrin, 2014), pp. 31–57.
Watt (2014b). Idem, “The Syriac Translations of Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq and their Precur-
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bibliography 293

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294 chapter 9

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 chapter 10

Syriac-Greek Glossary

Syriac Greek English Ref.

爯qr̈‫ܐܕܫ ܐܕ‬ εἶδος εἰδικώτατον lowest species §201

‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܡ‬q‫ܐܘ‬ μελανία blackness §34
焏‫ܐܘܡܢ‬ τεχνίτης artisan §7
rq焏‫ܐܘܡܢ‬ τεχνικῶς according to the art §7
‫ܐ‬r‫ܠ‬q‫ܬܐ ܡܠ‬熏‫ܐܘܡܢ‬ λογικὴ τέχνη logical art, art of logic §1
r‫ ܕܬܠ‬焏q‫ܐܘܣ‬ τρίτη οὐσία tertiary substance §50
爯q‫ ܕܬܪܬ‬焏q‫ܐܘܣ‬ δευτέρη οὐσία secondary substance §44
‫ܐ‬r‫ܒ‬qr‫ ܡ‬焏q‫ܐܘܣ‬ σύνθετος οὐσία compound substance §41
‫ܐ‬rqqr‫ ܦ‬焏q‫ܐܘܣ‬ ἁπλῆ οὐσία simple substance §41
‫ܐ‬rq‫ܡ‬煟‫ ܩ‬焏q‫ܐܘܣ‬ πρώτη οὐσία primary substance §44
焏q‫ ܐܘܪ‬/ ‫ܬܐ‬熏qq‫ܐܪ‬ μῆκος length §26, 67
煟qq‫ܐ‬ συνεχής continuous §66
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬qq‫ܐ‬ σχέσις relation §74
焏qrq‫ܐ‬ ὕστατος, ὕστερος last; posterior §7, 75
‫ܬܐ‬熏qrq‫ܐ‬ τὸ ὕστερον posteriority §105
焏qq‫ܐ‬ πού where (location/place) §9
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܐ‬/ ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܢ‬q‫ܐ‬ ποιότης quality §12,* 9
rq‫ ܐ‬/ rq‫ܕܐ‬ ἔχειν having (habit/state) §9
爯‫ܘܗܝ ̣ܡ‬rq‫ܐ‬ ὑπάρχειν pertain/belong to, exist §36
rq焏qrq‫ܐ‬ οὐσιωδῶς substantially, essentially §8
‫ܐ‬煟qq‫ܐ‬ ἅμα at once, at the same time, simultaneous §57, 75
r‫ ܐܡ‬/ 爏‫ ܥ‬r‫ܐܬܐܡ‬ κατηγορεῖσθαι be predicated of §49*
‫ܝ‬r‫ܐܡ‬ ποτέ when (time) §9
焏q煟q‫ܐܣܦ‬ ψιμύθιον (white) lead §86
‫ܐ‬r‫ܙܠ‬熏‫ܐ ܕܡ‬rq‫ܐܣܦ‬ πλανωμένη σφαῖρα celestial/planetary sphere §72
‫ܐܬܪܐ‬ τόπος space, place §23, 68
‫ܐ‬煟q焏‫ܐ ܒ‬煟q焏‫ܒ‬ κατὰ μέρος one by one, particular; gradually §4, 66
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܡ‬煟‫ ܒ‬煿̇‫ܒ‬ ὁμοίως, ὡσαύτως similarly §41

1 Reference is given only to the first citation for a certain meaning, for complete references see
the Syriac-English Index.
 296 chapter 10

(cont.)

Syriac Greek English Ref.

爏q‫ ܒ‬/ 爏q‫ܐܬܒ‬ ἀναιρεῖν/-εῖσθαι remove, be removed, §75

煿‫ ܥܡ‬煿‫ ܠ‬爏q‫ܒ‬ συναναιρεῖν remove with
煿‫ ܥܡ‬煿‫ ܠ‬爏q‫ܐܬܒ‬ συναναιρεῖσθαι be removed with
‫ܬܐ‬熏rq‫ܒ‬ τὸ φαῦλον evil, baseness §94
牟‫ܒܠ‬ τύπτεσθαι be beaten, struck §74
rq犏‫ܒ‬ χείρων inferior §41
‫ܪ‬犏‫ܒ‬ μειοῦν diminish §68
‫ܪܐ‬犏‫ܒ‬ μείωσις diminution, decrease §68
‫ܘܬܐ‬rq犏‫ܒ‬ τὸ ἧττον; μείωσις less; diminution §61, 89
‫ܐ‬r‫ܒܥ‬ ἀπορία problem, puzzle §45
焏q‫ܘ‬r‫ܒ‬ δημιουργός creator, demiurge §7
焏‫ܬ ܩܠ‬r‫ܒ‬ φωνή word (< sound) §4*
焏r煟‫ܓ‬ συμβεβηκός accident §22
rq焏‫ܢ‬r煟‫ܓ‬ κατὰ συμβεβηκός accidentally, by accident §51
‫ܐ‬熏‫ ܓ‬/ ‫ܐ‬熏‫ܕܓ‬ καθόλου general, in general §3
焏‫ܢ‬熏‫ܓ‬ χρῶμα colour §12
焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫ܓ‬ σῶμα body §10
焏q熏q‫ܓ‬ γελαστικός able to laugh §57
‫ܬܐ‬熏q熏q‫ܓ‬ τὸ γελαστικόν ability to laugh §57
‫ܘܬܐ‬熟q‫ܓܠ‬ στέρησις privation §88
焏‫ܓܠܦ‬ ἐκτύπωμα carving, a carved figure §8
爯q‫ ܓܢ̈ܣ‬爿‫ܓܢ‬ γένος γενικώτατον most generic genus §9
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܕܓܠ‬ τὸ ψεῦδος falsity §6, 98
‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܠ‬q‫ܕ‬ τὸ ἴδιον, ἰδιότης property, peculiarity, peculiar §53
characteristic
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬qq‫ ܐ‬焏‫ܕܠ‬ ἄσχετος without relation, unrelated §90
爏qq 焏‫ܕܠ‬ ἄποιος without quality, qualityless §65
爟qq‫ ܐܣ‬焏‫ܕܠ‬ ἀσχημάτιστος without figure, figureless §65
qq 焏‫ܕܠ‬ ἄψυχος non-living §41
‫ܐ‬r‫ ܡܢ‬焏‫ܕܠ‬ ἀμερής without part §67
焏qr‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܕܠ‬ ἀδιάστατος without extension §67
r‫ ܢܦ‬焏‫ܕܠ‬ ἄψυχος inanimate §20
q‫ ܣ‬焏‫ܕܠ‬ εἰς/ἐπ’ ἄπειρον without end, ad infinitum §71
焏‫ܠܓ‬熏‫ ܦ‬焏‫ܕܠ‬ ἀμέριστος without division, undivided §67
焏qr‫ ܦ‬焏‫ܕܠ‬ ἀπλατής without breadth §67
焏‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ܕܠܩ‬ ἀντικείμενος opposite §61
 syriac-greek glossary 297

Syriac Greek English Ref.

‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ܕܠܩ‬ ἀντίθεσις opposition §88

‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܕܡ‬ μορφή shape §31
‫ܐ‬煿̈‫ܡ‬r rq‫ܕ̈ܡ‬ ὁμώνυμα homonyms §21
爯q‫ܡ‬q̈‫ܐ ܩ‬r‫ܕܬܠ‬ τριχῇ διαστατός three-dimensional §67
(‫ܗܝ‬熏‫ܡ‬q̈‫ܐ ܩ‬r‫)ܕܬܠ‬
‫ܗܝ‬熏‫ܓܠ‬r 爯q‫ܕܬܪܬ‬ δίπους two-footed, biped §55
煿‫ ܕ̇ܗܘܐ ܒ‬焏‫ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‬/ ὑποκείμενον substrate, subject §40, 52*
煿‫ܘܗܝ ܒ‬rq‫ ܕܐ‬焏‫̇ܗܘ ܡ‬
焏q‫ܗܘ‬ γένεσις generation §89
焏q‫ܗܘܠܢ‬ ἔνυλος material, “enmattered” §7
q‫ ܗܦ‬/ ‫ܬ‬熏‫ ܠ‬q‫ܐܗܦ‬ ἀντιστρέφειν reciprocate, convert §57*
牯‫ܠ‬qrr‫ ܐ‬q‫̇ܗܦ‬ ἀντιμεταβάλλειν counterchange §96*
‫ܐ‬rq‫ܗܦ‬ ἔνστασις objection §50
焏‫ܙܒܢ‬ χρόνος time §23
‫ ܙܘܥ‬/ 牟q‫ܐܬܬܙ‬ κινεῖσθαι move §68
焏‫ܙܘܥ‬ μεταβολή movement §41
焏q‫ܘ‬煟‫ ܠ‬焏q‫ ܕܘ‬爯‫ ܕ̣ܡ‬焏‫ܙܘܥ‬ κατὰ τόπον change of place, locomotion §68, 89
μεταβολή, φορά
焏q‫ܢ‬q‫ ܨܒ‬焏‫ܙܘܥ‬ προαιρετικὴ κίνησις voluntary motion §87
焏‫ܙܢ‬ τρόπος, ποιός kind, manner; quality §13, 80
焏r熏rq 焏‫ܙܢ‬ (παθητὴ ποιότης?) affected quality §82
焏‫ܢ‬rq‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܙܢ‬ παθητικὴ ποιότης affective quality §82
爏‫ܒ‬q φθείρειν destroy §38
焏‫ܒܠ‬q / 焏‫ܒܠ‬熏q φθορά destruction §39, 65,89
r‫ܒ‬q περιλαμβάνειν contain §9
‫ܕܪܐ‬熏q / ‫ܕܪܐ‬熏q‫ܒ‬ κύκλος, κύκλῳ circle, in a circle §107
‫ܪܘܬܐ‬熏q / ‫ܬܐ‬r熏q λευκότης, πολιός whiteness, grey hair §34
qq ζῶν living §6
‫ܬܐ‬熏qq ζῷον animal, living being §10
焏‫ܠ‬qq δύναμις, ποιότης, power; potentiality; quality; possession, §12, 57, 65,
ἕξις faculty 80, 88*
‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܠ‬q γλυκύτης sweetness §12
焏‫ܠ‬q‫ܠ‬q κοῖλος concave §72
焏‫ܠܠ‬q κοιλάς hole, hollow §72
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܡ‬q‫ܡ‬q θερμότης heat §65
rrq /‫ܫ‬焏q‫ܕ‬ πάσχειν being-affected §9
焏rq πάθος affection §86
 298 chapter 10

(cont.)

Syriac Greek English Ref.

‫ܐ‬rqrq κύριος proper §50

rq‫ܐ‬rqrq κυρίως properly, truly §104
牟‫ܒ‬q / 牟‫ܒ‬q‫ܐܬ‬ σφραγίζεσθαι imprint, be imprinted §7
焏‫ܒܥ‬q σφραγίς imprint §8
焏‫ܡ‬q‫ܡ‬q πυκνός, στερεός solid §72
‫ܬܐ‬熏rq‫ܒ‬q ξηρότης dryness §65
焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܘܥ‬煟q ἐπιστήμων knower §74
‫ܐ‬r‫ܥ‬煟q ἐπιστήμη knowledge §74
‫ܐ‬rq̈煿‫ܐ ܕܐܠ‬r‫ܥ‬ ̈ 煟q θεολογία theology, metaphysics §3
̈
焏‫ܠܦܢ‬熏q (pl.) μαθήματα mathematical sciences §3*
‫ܘܬܐ‬rqrq τὸ μᾶλλον more §61
焏qr熏q Αἰθίοψ Cushite, Ethiopian §38
rq焏‫ܢ‬qq φύσει, φυσικῶς; κατ’ by nature, naturally; substantially §3, 51, 86
οὐσίαν
焏q‫ܢ‬qq φυσικός physical §7
‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܡ‬q ποσότης quantity §9
焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫ ܓ‬焏‫ ܠ‬/ 焏‫ܡ‬qr‫ ܓ‬焏‫ܠ‬ ἀσώματος incorporeal §41, 66
焏‫ܠ‬q‫ ܡܠ‬焏‫ܠ‬ ἄλογος non-rational, irrational §41
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬q犏‫ܡ‬r‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܠ‬ ἀδυναμία incapacity §81
煿‫ ܡܢ‬r‫ܠܒ‬ χωρίς separate from §10
r‫ܠܓܡ‬ παντελῶς at all, altogether §67
‫ܬ‬熏‫ ܠ‬/‫ܡ‬煟‫ܬ ܡ‬熏‫ܕܠ‬ τὰ πρός τι relatives §9
‫ܬܐ‬rq‫ܠ‬ (ἐπίκτητος) (acquired) after the birth; afterwards §82
焏‫ܢ‬焏‫ܡ‬ ἀγγεῖον vessel §23
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬r‫ܒ‬煟‫ܡ‬ προστασία government §3
焏‫ܙܓ‬熏‫ܡ‬ κρᾶσις, ποιός temperament; quality §40, 80
‫ܐ‬煟‫ܠ‬熏‫ܡ‬ γένεσις generation §65
qq‫ ܡ‬/焏q‫ܡ‬ τύπτειν smite, beat, strike §74
rq焏‫ܢ‬qq‫ܡ‬ οἰκείως appropriately, properly §49*
‫ܐ‬rq‫ܡ‬ γεωμέτρης surveyor, geometer §67
‫ܘܬܐ‬rq‫ܡ‬ γεωμετρία geometry §3
‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܡ‬ θνητός mortal §49
‫ܪ‬rq‫ܡ‬ κρείττων superior §41
‫ܪܘܬܐ‬rq‫ܡ‬ τὸ σπουδαῖον goodness, virtue §94
爯q‫ܡ‬ πέφυκε (naturally) be capable of §91
焏‫ܠ‬q‫ܡܠ‬ λογικός rational (lit. talkative) §36*
 syriac-greek glossary 299

Syriac Greek English Ref.

‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܠ‬q‫ܡܠ‬ λογισμός; λογικότης logic; §20,

rationality 77
‫ܐ‬r‫ܡܠ‬ λόγος word, speech, discourse, etc. §3
‫ܐ‬rq‫ܐ ܐܘܡܢ‬r‫ܡܠ‬ τεχνικὸς λόγος technical speech/language §66*
‫ܐ‬rq‫ܡܢ‬qr‫ܐ ܡ‬r‫ܡܠ‬ ὁριστικὸς λόγος defining description §36*
焏‫ܢ‬qq̈ ‫ܬ‬熏‫ܡܠܠ‬ φυσιολογία physics §3
煿‫ ܘܠ‬煿‫ܡܢ‬ καθ᾽ αὑτό in its own right §88*
‫ܘܬܐ‬煟q‫ܠ‬q 爯‫̣ܡ‬ ἐκ γενετῆς from birth §86
‫ܘܣ‬r‫ ܦ‬爏q 爯‫̣ܡ‬ πάντως of course, certainly, by all means, at any §26
rate
r‫ ܠܒ‬爯‫̣ܡ‬ ἔξωθεν from without/outside §25
爯q‫ܬܐ ܕܕ̈ܡ‬熏̈‫ܡܢ‬ ὁμοιομερῆ similar parts §45*
爯q‫ ܕ̈ܡ‬焏‫ܬܐ ܕܠ‬熏̈‫ܡܢ‬ ἀνομοιομερῆ dissimilar parts §45*
‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܡܢ‬ ἀριθμητική arithmetic §3
焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܡܢ‬ ἀριθμός number §11, 66
焏‫ܓ‬熟‫ܐܦ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܡܢ‬ περιττὸς ἀριθμός odd/uneven number §94
焏q熏r 焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܡܢ‬ ἄρτιος ἀριθμός even number §94
‫ܐ‬r‫ܡܢ‬ μέρος part §22
rq焏‫ܢ‬煟‫ܡܥܒ‬ ἐνεργείᾳ actually §54
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬煟‫ܡܥܒ‬ ἐνέργεια actuality §57
焏rr‫ܡܦ‬ διωρισμένος discrete §66
焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܠ‬犏‫ܡ‬ εὐκτικός precative; (optative) §6
r‫ܥ‬犏‫ ܡ‬/ μέσος, in between; §10
‫ܐ‬r‫ܥ‬犏‫̇ܗܘ ܕܒܡ‬ ἔμμεσος intermediate/subaltern §10
焏‫ܡܩܒܠܢ‬ δεκτικός receptive §37
焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܓ‬r‫ܡ‬ αἰσθητικός sentient §41
‫ܘܬܐ‬rqr‫ܡ‬ πικρότης bitterness §12
焏‫ܠܢ‬焏r‫ܡ‬ ἐρωτηματικός / interrogative §6
πυσματικός
焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܡܠ‬r‫ܡ‬ συμπληρωτικός completive §37
‫ܚ ܠ‬r‫ܡ‬ ἀναφέρειν refer to, ascribe to §74*
焏qr‫ܡ‬ διάστημα, διάστασις extension, dimension §67
焏‫ܢ‬q熟qr‫ܡ‬ ὁρατός perceptible, visible §68
焏‫ܥܢ‬煟qr‫ܡ‬ νοητός intelligible §68
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬q犏‫ܡ‬r‫ܡ‬ δύναμις capacity §81
焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܪܓ‬r‫ܡ‬ αἰσθητός perceivable, perceptible §41
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܥܢ‬q‫ܬܙ‬r‫ܡ‬ κίνησις motion §68, 106
 300 chapter 10

(cont.)

Syriac Greek English Ref.

‫ܬܐ‬熏q熏‫ܢܒ‬ τὸ ὑλακτικόν ability to bark §57

焏rq‫ܢ‬ σκοπός aim, goal §4
‫ܐ‬r‫ܒ‬犏‫ܢ‬ φυτόν plant §29
‫ ܠ‬牯q‫ܢܩ‬ ἅπτεσθαι, ἕπεσθαι, adjoin; §25, 52, 104*
ἀκολούθησις follow upon; be following, attendant on
‫ܕܐ‬煟q̈‫ ܠ‬爯‫ܦ‬q̈‫ܢܩ‬ παρακολουθοῦντες concomitant with each other §75*
焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܢܦ‬ ἔμψυχος animate, ensouled §10
焏q‫ܪ‬熏‫ܣ‬ γραμμή line §66
焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܥ‬熏‫ ܒܣ‬煿‫ܒ‬ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν actually §39, 57
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܒ‬q‫ܣ‬ γῆρας old age §56
‫ ܠ‬爟q‫ܣ‬ ὑποκεῖσθαι underlie, be substrate for §52
爟q‫ ܣ‬/ 爟q‫ܕܣ‬ κεῖσθαι placed (position/posture) §9
焏‫ܡ‬q‫ܣ‬ θέσις position §66
焏‫ܣ‬熏‫ ܢܡ‬爟q‫ܣ‬ νομοθεσία legislation §3
‫ܢ‬熏q‫ܡ‬q‫( ܣ‬Gr.) σημεῖον mark §67
焏q‫ܣ‬ πέρας limit §25
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܡܩ‬熏‫ܣ‬ ἐρύθημα redness §86
爏‫ ܥ‬犟q‫ܣܢ‬ χρῄζειν stand in need of §22
‫ܪܘܬܐ‬熏‫ܣܥ‬ πρᾶξις practice §3
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܩ‬q‫ܣܦ‬ τὸ κενόν void §73
焏q‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ܣܩ‬ ἐναντίος contrary §83*
‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ܣܩ‬ ἐναντιότης contrariety §90*
焏‫ܦ‬焏‫ ܥ‬/ 焏‫ܐܥܦ‬ διπλάσιος double §13, 74
煟‫ ܥܒ‬/ 煟‫ܥܒ‬̇ ‫ܕ‬ ποιεῖν doing (action) §9
焏qr‫ܐ ܒ‬r‫ܥܒ‬ ἔσχατος extreme edge §72
‫ܐ‬煟q‫ ܥ‬/‫ܐ‬煟q‫ܒܥ‬/‫ܐ‬煟q‫ܠܥ‬ συνήθεια common/ordinary usage §65
爏‫ ܥܠ‬/ 煿‫ ܥܡ‬煿‫ ܠ‬爏‫ܐܥ‬ συνεισάγειν, introduce with it, entail §77
συνεισφέρειν
‫ ܒ‬爏‫ܐܬܥܠ‬ χωρεῖν permeated, pervade §83
‫ܐ‬r‫ܥܠ‬ αἰτία cause §74
焏‫ܡܩ‬熏‫ܥ‬ βάθος depth §26
犟q‫ ܪ‬rq焏‫ܥܣܩ‬ δυσαπόβλητος hard to lose §83
爯‫ ܡ‬犟qr‫ܥ‬ παλαιότερος older, more ancient §100
爿qqq‫ܐ‬熏‫( ܦ‬Gr.) ποιότης quality §12
焏‫ܠܓ‬熏‫ܦ‬ διαίρεσις division §44
 syriac-greek glossary 301

Syriac Greek English Ref.

焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܪ‬熏‫ܦ‬ διαφορά, διάκρισις difference, §20,

distinction 98
焿‫ ܦܠ‬/ 焿‫ܐܬܦܠ‬ διαιρεῖσθαι divide, be divided §3
焏‫ܦܠܓ‬ ἥμισυς half §13
焏‫ܩ‬熏‫ܦܣ‬ ἀποφαντικός declarative §6
‫ܕܐ‬熏‫ܦܩ‬ προστακτικός imperative §6
‫ܫ‬r‫ ܦ‬/ (爯‫ܫ )ܡ‬r‫ܐܬܦ‬ κρίνειν, κρίνεσθαι, discern, be discerned; §38, 74, 94
διακρίνεσθαι distinguished
焏qqr‫ܦ‬ ἁπλός simple §4
‫ܪܐ‬rr‫ ܕܢ‬犟qr‫ܦ‬ εὐαπόβλητος easy to lose §86
焏‫ܓܡ‬r‫ܦ‬ συλλαβή syllable §66*
焏qr‫ܦ‬ πλάτος breadth §26
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܨܒ‬ πρᾶγμα object, entity §4
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܨܗܘܠ‬ τὸ χρεμετιστικὸν ability to neigh §57
焏‫ܒ‬q‫ܩܒ‬ κυρτός convex §72
爏‫( ܩܒ‬paʿʿel) δέχεσθαι, receive, §91,
ἐπιδέχεσθαι admit of 65
爟q煟‫ ܩ‬/ 焏q‫ܡ‬煟‫ܩ‬ πρότερος prior §75, 47
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܡ‬q煟‫ ܩ‬/ ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܡ‬煟‫ܩ‬ τὸ πρότερον priority §99, 48
焏‫ܡ‬q熏‫ܩ‬ ὑπόστασις existence, subsistence §11
‫ܗ‬rq‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܡ‬q熏‫ܩ‬ αὐθυπόστασις self-subsistence §7, 22*
‫ܡ‬熏‫ ܩ‬/ 爟q‫ܐܬܩ‬ ὑφίστασθαι constitute, be constituted §12
焏‫ܡ‬q‫ܩ‬ διάστασις dimension §26
焏q煟qqq 焏‫ܡ‬熏‫ܩܢ‬ κατὰ μέρος, ἄτομος particular individual §20
rq焏‫ܡ‬熏‫ܩܢ‬ οὐσιωδῶς essentially §8
‫ܘܬܐ‬rqr‫ܩ‬ ψυχρότης coldness, cold §65
爯‫ ܡ‬rqr‫ܩ‬ πρεσβύτερος elder §100
q‫ ܪܒ‬/焏‫ܪܒ‬ αὐξάνεσθαι increase §68
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܪܒ‬ μέγεθος magnitude §65
‫ܐ‬rr‫ܪܓ‬ αἴσθησις sensation, perception §41, 74
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܒ‬qq‫ܪ‬ ὑγρότης wetness, moisture §65
焏rq‫ܪ‬ ἀρχή starting point, principle §67
焯q‫( ܪ‬paʿʿel) συντιθέναι compound §64
‫ܐ‬r‫ ܡܠ‬焯q‫( ܪ‬paʿʿel) κατασκευάζειν τὸν formulate/construct the argument §71
λόγον
q‫ ܪܢ‬/ 焏‫ܐܬܪܢ‬ ἐπινοεῖν think of/on §37
焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܪܥ‬ νόημα concept §4
 302 chapter 10

(cont.)

Syriac Greek English Ref.

焏q‫ܢ‬q‫ܪܥ‬ ἐννοηματικός notional, conceptual §7

rq焏‫ܠ‬q焏r μεταφορικῶς metaphorically, falsely, fictitiously §57*
焏q‫ܓܢ‬熏r μεταβολή change §89, 106
‫ܕܥ‬熏r (√‫ܥ‬煟q) σημαίνειν signify §4
焏‫ܠܦ‬q熏r μεταβολή, ἀλλοίωσις change, alteration §85, 89 106
焏q‫ܡܠ‬熏r τέλος goal, purpose §23*
焏q‫ܢ‬熏r κίνησις motion, departure §68, 82
焏‫ܢ‬熏‫ ܓ‬q‫ܢ‬熏r ὠχρότης departure of colour, paleness §86
‫ܬܦ ܒ‬熏r κοινωνεῖν have in common, share §21
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܬܦ‬熏r μέθεξις participation §88
牯‫ܠ‬qr /‫ ܠ‬牯‫ܠ‬qrr‫ܐ‬ μεταβάλλειν εἰς change into §88
‫ܬܐ‬熏qqqr ἐπιφάνεια (visible) surface §66
‫ ܒ‬qqqr ὑπάρχειν occur in, be present in §86
q‫ܡܠ‬r / q‫ܡܠ‬rr‫ܐ‬ συμπληροῦσθαι complete, be completed §63
焏qrr λύσις solution §35
‫ܪܐ‬rr ἀλήθεια truth §6, 98
‫ܐ‬rq熏q‫ܬ‬ ἀπόδειξις evidence, demonstration §23
焏‫ܡ‬熏q‫ܬ‬ ὁρισμός, ὅρος definition §21
爟q‫ܬ‬ ὁρίζειν define §9
‫ܬܐ‬犏‫ܡ‬q‫ܬ‬ αἰδώς shame §86
爯‫ܬܢ‬ ἐνταῦθα here (in the material world) §8
‫ܐ‬rq‫ܬܪܒ‬ αὔξησις increase §68, 89
rq‫ܐ‬犏q‫ܬܪ‬ κατ’ εὐθεῖαν, ἐπ’ straight ahead §107
εὐθείας
‫ܐ‬rq‫ܬܪܥ‬ διάνοια mind, thought §7
‫ܐ‬熏‫ܐ ܕܓ‬rq‫ܬܪܥ‬ κοινὴ ὑπόληψις common sense §68*
‫ܐ‬rq‫ܢ‬qq ‫ܐ‬rq‫ܬܪܥ‬ φυσικὸς λόγος natural opinion §96
‫ܐ‬rq‫ܥ‬r‫ܬ‬ διήγησις narration §102
 chapter 11

Greek-Syriac Glossary

Greek Syriac English Ref.

ἀγγεῖον 焏‫ܢ‬焏‫ܡ‬ vessel §23

ἀδιάστατος 焏qr‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܕܠ‬ without extension §67
ἀδυναμία ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬q犏‫ܡ‬r‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܠ‬ incapacity §81
αἰδώς ‫ܬܐ‬犏‫ܡ‬q‫ܬ‬ shame §86
Αἰθίοψ 焏qr熏q Cushite, Ethiopian §38
αἴσθησις ‫ܐ‬rr‫ܪܓ‬ sensation, perception §41, 74
αἰσθητικός 焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܓ‬r‫ܡ‬ sentient §41
αἰσθητός 焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܪܓ‬r‫ܡ‬ perceivable, perceptible §41
αἰτία ‫ܐ‬r‫ܥܠ‬ cause §74
ἀκολούθησις ‫ ܠ‬牯q‫ܢܩ‬ attendant on §104
ἀλήθεια ‫ܪܐ‬rr truth §6, 98
ἀλλοίωσις 焏‫ܠܦ‬q熏r alteration §89
ἄλογος 焏‫ܠ‬q‫ ܡܠ‬焏‫ܠ‬ non-rational, irrational §41
ἅμα ‫ܐ‬煟qq‫ܐ‬ at once, at the same time, simultaneous §57, 75
ἀμερής ‫ܐ‬r‫ ܡܢ‬焏‫ܕܠ‬ without part §67
ἀναιρεῖν/-εῖσθαι 爏q‫ ܒ‬/ 爏q‫ܐܬܒ‬ remove, be removed §75
ἀναφέρειν ‫ܚ ܠ‬r‫ܡ‬ refer to, ascribe to §74*
ἀνομοιομερῆ 爯q‫ ܕ̈ܡ‬焏‫ܬܐ ܕܠ‬熏̈‫ܡܢ‬ dissimilar parts §45*
ἀντίθεσις ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ܕܠܩ‬ opposition §88
ἀντικείμενος 焏‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ܕܠܩ‬ opposite §61
ἀντιμεταβάλλειν 牯‫ܠ‬qrr‫ ܐ‬q‫̇ܗܦ‬ counterchange §96*
ἀντιστρέφειν ‫ܬ‬熏‫ ܠ‬q‫ܐܗܦ‬ reciprocate, convert §57*
ἄπειρον, εἰς/ἐπ’ q‫ ܣ‬焏‫ܕܠ‬ without end, ad infinitum §71
ἀμέριστος 焏‫ܠܓ‬熏‫ ܦ‬焏‫ܕܠ‬ without division, undivided §67
ἀπλατής 焏qr‫ ܦ‬焏‫ܕܠ‬ without breadth §67
ἁπλός 焏qqr‫ܦ‬ simple §4
ἀπόδειξις ‫ܐ‬rq熏q‫ܬ‬ evidence, demonstration §23
ἄποιος 爏qq 焏‫ܕܠ‬ without quality, qualityless §65
ἀπορία ‫ܐ‬r‫ܒܥ‬ problem, puzzle §45
ἀποφαντικός 焏‫ܩ‬熏‫ܦܣ‬ declarative §6
ἀριθμητική ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܡܢ‬ arithmetic §3
ἀριθμός 焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܡܢ‬ number §11, 66
 304 chapter 11

(cont.)

Greek Syriac English Ref.

περιττὸς ἀριθμός 焏‫ܓ‬熟‫ܐܦ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܡܢ‬ odd/uneven number §94

ἄρτιος ἀριθμός 焏q熏r 焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܡܢ‬ even number §94
ἀρχή 焏rq‫ܪ‬ starting point, principle §67
ἀσώματος 焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫ ܓ‬焏‫ ܠ‬/ ‫ܡ‬熏r‫ ܓ‬焏‫ ܕܠ‬/ incorporeal §41, 66f.
焏‫ܡ‬qr‫ ܓ‬焏‫ܠ‬
ἄσχετος ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬qq‫ ܐ‬焏‫ܕܠ‬ without relation, unrelated §90
ἀσχημάτιστος 爟qq‫ ܐܣ‬焏‫ܕܠ‬ without figure, figureless §65
ἄτομος, κατὰ μέρος 焏q煟qqq 焏‫ܡ‬熏‫ܩܢ‬ particular individual §20
αὐθυπόστασις ‫ܗ‬rq‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܡ‬q熏‫ܩ‬ self-subsistence §7, 22*
αὐξάνεσθαι 焏‫√( ܪܒ‬q‫)ܪܒ‬ increase §68
αὔξησις ‫ܐ‬rq‫ܬܪܒ‬ increase §68, 89
ἄψυχος qq 焏‫ ;ܕܠ‬r‫ ܢܦ‬焏‫ܕܠ‬ non-living; inanimate §41; 20
βάθος 焏‫ܡܩ‬熏‫ܥ‬ depth §26
γελαστικός 焏q熏q‫ܓ‬ able to laugh §57
τὸ γελαστικόν ‫ܬܐ‬熏q熏q‫ܓ‬ ability to laugh §57
γένεσις ‫ܐ‬煟‫ܠ‬熏‫ ;ܡ‬焏q‫ܗܘ‬ generation §65, 89
γενετῆς, ἐκ ‫ܘܬܐ‬煟q‫ܠ‬q 爯‫̣ܡ‬ from birth §86
γένος 焏‫( ܓܢܣ‬Gr.) genus §7
γένος γενικώτατον 爯q‫ ܓܢ̈ܣ‬爿‫ܓܢ‬ most generic genus §9
γεωμέτρης ‫ܐ‬rq‫ܡ‬ surveyor, geometer §67
γεωμετρία ‫ܘܬܐ‬rq‫ܡ‬ geometry §3
γῆρας ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܒ‬q‫ܣ‬ old age §56
γλυκύτης ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܠ‬q sweetness §12
γραμμή 焏q‫ܪ‬熏‫ܣ‬ line §66
δεκτικός 焏‫ܡܩܒܠܢ‬ receptive §37
δέχεσθαι 爏‫( ܩܒ‬paʿʿel) receive §91
δημιουργός 焏q‫ܘ‬r‫ܒ‬ creator, demiurge §7
διαιρεῖσθαι 焿‫ ܦܠ‬/ 焿‫ܐܬܦܠ‬ divide, be divided §3
διαίρεσις 焏‫ܠܓ‬熏‫ܦ‬ division §44
διακρίνεσθαι ‫ܫ‬r‫ܐܬܦ‬ distinguished §94f.
διάκρισις 焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܪ‬熏‫ܦ‬ distinction §98
διάνοια ‫ܐ‬rq‫ܬܪܥ‬ mind, thought §7
διαστατός 焏‫ܡ‬q‫ܩ‬ dimension §26
τριχῇ διαστατός 爯q‫ܡ‬q̈‫ܐ ܩ‬r‫ܕܬܠ‬ three-dimensional §67
διάστημα, διάστασις 焏qr‫ܡ‬ extension, dimension §67
διαφορά 焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܪ‬熏‫ܦ‬ difference §20
 greek-syriac glossary 305

Greek Syriac English Ref.

διήγησις ‫ܐ‬rq‫ܥ‬r‫ܬ‬ narration §102

διπλάσιος 焏‫ܦ‬焏‫ ܥ‬/ 焏‫ܐܥܦ‬ double §13, 74
δίπους ‫ܗܝ‬熏‫ܓܠ‬r 爯q‫ܕܬܪܬ‬ two-footed, biped §55
διωρισμένος 焏rr‫ܡܦ‬ discrete §66
δύναμις 焏‫ܠ‬qq; ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬q犏‫ܡ‬r‫ܡ‬ power; capacity §69, 81*
δυσαπόβλητος 犟q‫ ܪ‬rq焏‫ܥܣܩ‬ hard to lose §83
εἶδος 焏r‫( ܐܕ‬Gr.) species, form §10, 7f.
εἶδος 爯qr̈‫ܐܕܫ ܐܕ‬ lowest species §20
εἰδικώτατον
ἐκτύπωμα 焏‫ܓܠܦ‬ carving, a carved figure §8
ἐναντίος 焏q‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ܣܩ‬ contrary §83*
ἐναντιότης ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ܣܩ‬ contrariety §90*
ἐνέργεια ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬煟‫ܡܥܒ‬ actuality §57
ἐνεργείᾳ rq焏‫ܢ‬煟‫ܡܥܒ‬ actually §54
κατ’ ἐνέργειαν 焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܥ‬熏‫ ܒܣ‬煿‫ܒ‬ actually §39, 57
ἐννοηματικός 焏q‫ܢ‬q‫ܪܥ‬ notional, conceptual §7
ἔνστασις ‫ܐ‬rq‫ܗܦ‬ objection §50
ἔνυλος 焏q‫ܗܘܠܢ‬ material, “enmattered” §7
ἕξις 焏‫ܠ‬qq faculty, possession §12
ἔξωθεν r‫ ܠܒ‬爯‫̣ܡ‬ from without/outside §25
ἔμψυχος 焏‫ܢ‬r‫ ;ܢܦ‬r‫ܕܢܦ‬ animate, ensouled §10, 43
ἕπεσθαι ‫ ܠ‬牯q‫ܢܩ‬ follow upon; be following §51f.
ἐπιδέχεσθαι 爏‫( ܩܒ‬paʿʿel) admit of §65
ἐπιφάνεια ‫ܬܐ‬熏qqqr (visible) surface §66
ἐνταῦθα 爯‫ܬܢ‬ here (in the material world) §8
ἐρύθημα ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܡܩ‬熏‫ܣ‬ redness §86
(ἐπίκτητος) ‫ܬܐ‬rq‫ܠ‬ (acquired) after the birth; afterwards §82
ἐπινοεῖν 焏‫√( ܐܬܪܢ‬q‫)ܪܢ‬ think of/on §37
ἐπιστήμη ‫ܐ‬r‫ܥ‬煟q knowledge §74
ἐπιστήμων 焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܘܥ‬煟q knower §74
ἔσχατος 焏qr‫ܐ ܒ‬r‫ܥܒ‬ extreme edge §72
ἅπτεσθαι ‫ ܠ‬牯q‫ܢܩ‬ adjoin §25
ἐρωτηματικός 焏‫ܠܢ‬焏r‫ܡ‬ interrogative §6
εὐαπόβλητος ‫ܪܐ‬rr‫ ܕܢ‬犟qr‫ܦ‬ easy to lose §86
εὐθεῖαν, κατ’ rq‫ܐ‬犏q‫ܬܪ‬ straight ahead §107
/ ἐπ’ εὐθείας
εὐκτικός 焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܠ‬犏‫ܡ‬ precative; optative §6
 306 chapter 11

(cont.)

Greek Syriac English Ref.

ἔχειν rq‫ܕܐ‬ having (habit/state) §9

ζῶν qq living §6
ζῷον ‫ܬܐ‬熏qq animal, living being §10
ἥμισυς 焏‫ܦܠܓ‬ half §13
ἧττον, τὸ ‫ܘܬܐ‬rq犏‫ܒ‬ less §61
θεολογία
̈ 煟q
‫ܐ‬rq̈煿‫ܐ ܕܐܠ‬r‫ܥ‬ theology, metaphysics §3
θερμότης ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܡ‬q‫ܡ‬q heat §65
θέσις 焏‫ܡ‬q‫ܣ‬ position §66
θνητός ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܡ‬ mortal §49
ἰδιότης, τὸ ἴδιον ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܠ‬q‫ܕ‬ property, peculiarity, peculiar §53
characteristic
κατασκευάζειν τὸν ‫ܐ‬r‫ ܡܠ‬焯q‫( ܪ‬paʿʿel) formulate/construct the argument §71
λόγον
κατηγορεῖσθαι 爏‫ ܥ‬r‫ܐܬܐܡ‬ be predicated of §49*
καθόλου ‫ܐ‬熏‫ܕܓ‬ general, in general §3
καθ᾽ αὑτό 煿‫ ܘܠ‬煿‫ܡܢ‬ in its own right §88*
κεῖσθαι 爟q‫ܕܣ‬ placed (position/posture) §9
κενόν, τὸ ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܩ‬q‫ܣܦ‬ void §73
κινεῖσθαι 牟q‫)ܙܘܥ√( ܐܬܬܙ‬ move §68
κίνησις ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܥܢ‬q‫ܬܙ‬r‫ ;ܡ‬焏q‫ܢ‬熏r motion; departure §68, 82, 106
κοιλάς 焏‫ܠܠ‬q hole, hollow §72
κοῖλος 焏‫ܠ‬q‫ܠ‬q concave §72
κοινὴ ὑπόληψις ‫ܐ‬熏‫ܐ ܕܓ‬rq‫ܬܪܥ‬ common sense §68*
κοινωνεῖν ‫ܬܦ ܒ‬熏r have in common, share §21
κρᾶσις 焏‫ܙܓ‬熏‫ܡ‬ temperament §40
κρείττων ‫ܪ‬rq‫ܡ‬ superior §41
κρίνειν, κρίνεσθαι ‫ܫ‬r‫ ܦ‬/ (爯‫ܫ )ܡ‬r‫ܐܬܦ‬ discern, be discerned §74
κύκλῳ ‫ܕܪܐ‬熏q‫ܒ‬ in a circle §107
κύριος ‫ܐ‬rqrq proper §50
κυρίως rq‫ܐ‬rqrq properly, truly §104*
κυρτός 焏‫ܒ‬q‫ܩܒ‬ convex §72
λευκότης ‫ܪܘܬܐ‬熏q whiteness §34
λογικὴ τέχνη ‫ܐ‬r‫ܠ‬q‫ܬܐ ܡܠ‬熏‫ܐܘܡܢ‬ logical art, art of logic §1
λογικός 焏‫ܠ‬q‫ܡܠ‬ rational (lit. talkative) §36*
λογισμός; λογικότης ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܠ‬q‫ܡܠ‬ logic; §20,
rationality 77
 greek-syriac glossary 307

Greek Syriac English Ref.

λόγος ‫ܐ‬r‫ܡܠ‬ word, speech, discourse, etc. §3

ὁριστικὸς λόγος ‫ܐ‬rq‫ܡܢ‬qr‫ܐ ܡ‬r‫ܡܠ‬ defining description §36
τεχνικὸς λόγος ‫ܐ‬rq‫ܐ ܐܘܡܢ‬r‫ܡܠ‬ technical speech/language §66*
φυσικὸς λόγος ‫ܐ‬rq‫ܢ‬qq ‫ܐ‬rq‫ܬܪܥ‬ natural opinion §96
λύσις 焏qrr solution §35
μαθήματα 焏‫ܠ̈ܦܢ‬熏q (pl.) mathematical sciences, matematics §3*
μᾶλλον, τὸ ‫ܘܬܐ‬rqrq more §61
μέγεθος ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܪܒ‬ magnitude §65
μέθεξις ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܬܦ‬熏r participation §88
μειοῦν ‫ܪ‬犏‫ܒ‬ diminish §68
μείωσις ‫ܪܐ‬犏‫ܘܬܐ ;ܒ‬rq犏‫ܒ‬ diminution, decrease §68; 89
μελανία ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܡ‬q‫ܐܘ‬ blackness §34
μέρος ‫ܐ‬r‫ܡܢ‬ part §22
κατὰ μέρος ‫ܐ‬煟q焏‫ܐ ܒ‬煟q焏‫ܒ‬ one by one, particular; gradually §4, 66
μέσος, r‫ܥ‬犏‫ ܡ‬/ in between; §10
ἔμμεσος ‫ܐ‬r‫ܥ‬犏‫̇ܗܘ ܕܒܡ‬ intermediate /subaltern §10
μεταβάλλειν εἰς ‫ ܠ‬牯‫ܠ‬qrr‫ܐ‬ change into §88
μεταβολή 焏‫ ;ܙܘܥ‬焏q‫ܓܢ‬熏r; 焏‫ܠܦ‬q熏r movement, change §41, 85, 89,
106
κατὰ τόπον 焏q‫ܘ‬煟‫ ܠ‬焏q‫ ܕܘ‬爯‫ ܕ̣ܡ‬焏‫ܙܘܥ‬ change of place, locomotion §68, 89
μεταβολή
μεταφορικῶς rq焏‫ܠ‬q焏r metaphorically, falsely, fictitiously §57*
μῆκος 焏q‫ ܐܘܪ‬/ ‫ܬܐ‬熏qq‫ܐܪ‬ length §26, 67
μορφή ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܕܡ‬ shape §31
νόημα 焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܪܥ‬ concept §4
νοητός 焏‫ܥܢ‬煟qr‫ܡ‬ intelligible §68
νομοθεσία 焏‫ܣ‬熏‫ ܢܡ‬爟q‫ܣ‬ legislation §3
ξηρότης ‫ܬܐ‬熏rq‫ܒ‬q dryness §65
οἰκείως rq焏‫ܢ‬qq‫ܡ‬ appropriately, properly §49*
ὁμοιομερῆ 爯q‫ܬܐ ܕܕ̈ܡ‬熏̈‫ܡܢ‬ similar parts §45*
ὁμώνυμα ‫ܐ‬煿̈‫ܡ‬r rq‫ܕ̈ܡ‬ homonyms §21
οὐσία 焏q‫( ܐܘܣ‬Gr.) substance §9
οὐσιωδῶς rq焏qrq‫ ;ܐ‬rq焏‫ܡ‬熏‫ܩܢ‬ substantially, essentially §8
ἁπλῆ οὐσία ‫ܐ‬rqqr‫ ܦ‬焏q‫ܐܘܣ‬ simple substance §41
δευτέρη οὐσία 爯q‫ ܕܬܪܬ‬焏q‫ܐܘܣ‬ secondary substance §44
πρώτη οὐσία ‫ܐ‬rq‫ܡ‬煟‫ ܩ‬焏q‫ܐܘܣ‬ primary substance §44
σύνθετος οὐσία ‫ܐ‬r‫ܒ‬qr‫ ܡ‬焏q‫ܐܘܣ‬ compound substance §41
 308 chapter 11

(cont.)

Greek Syriac English Ref.

τρίτη οὐσία r‫ ܕܬܠ‬焏q‫ܐܘܣ‬ tertiary substance §50

κατ’ οὐσίαν rq焏‫ܢ‬qq substantially §86
ὁμοίως, ὡσαύτως ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܡ‬煟‫ ܒ‬煿̇‫ܒ‬ similarly §41
ὁρατός 焏‫ܢ‬q熟qr‫ܡ‬ perceptible, visible §68
ὁρίζειν 爟q‫ܬ‬ define §9
ὁρισμός, ὅρος 焏‫ܡ‬熏q‫ܬ‬ definition §21
(παθητὴ ποιότης?) 焏r熏rq 焏‫ܙܢ‬ affected quality §82
παθητικὴ ποιότης 焏‫ܢ‬rq‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܙܢ‬ affective quality §82
πάθος 焏rq affection §86
παλαιότερος 爯‫ ܡ‬犟qr‫ܥ‬ older, more ancient §100
παντελῶς r‫ܠܓܡ‬ at all, altogether §67
πάντως ‫ܘܣ‬r‫ ܦ‬爏q 爯‫̣ܡ‬ of course, certainly, by all means, at any §26
rate
παρακολουθοῦντες ‫ܕܐ‬煟q̈‫ ܠ‬爯‫ܦ‬q̈‫ܢܩ‬ concomitant with each other §75*
πάσχειν ‫ܫ‬焏q‫√( ܕ‬rrq) being-affected §9
πέρας 焏q‫ܣ‬ limit §25
περιλαμβάνειν r‫ܒ‬q contain §9
πέφυκε 爯q‫ܡ‬ (naturally) be capable of §91
πικρότης ‫ܘܬܐ‬rqr‫ܡ‬ bitterness §12
πλάτος 焏qr‫ܦ‬ breadth §26
ποιεῖν
̇ ‫ܕ‬
煟‫ܥܒ‬ doing (action) §9
ποιός, ποιότης ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܢ‬q‫ ܐ‬/ ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬q‫ ;ܐ‬焏‫;ܙܢ‬ quality §9, 12,* 65,
焏‫ܠ‬qq; 焏‫ܙܓ‬熏‫ ;ܡ‬爿qqq‫ܐ‬熏‫ܦ‬ 80
πολιός ‫ܬܐ‬r熏q (pl.) grey hair §56, 60
ποσότης ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܡ‬q quantity §9
ποτέ ‫ܝ‬r‫ܐܡ‬ when (time) §9
πού 焏qq‫ܐ‬ where (location /place) §9
πρᾶγμα ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܨܒ‬ object, entity §4
πρᾶξις ‫ܪܘܬܐ‬熏‫ܣܥ‬ practice §3
πρεσβύτερος 爯‫ ܡ‬rqr‫ܩ‬ elder §100
προαιρετικὴ κίνησις 焏q‫ܢ‬q‫ ܨܒ‬焏‫ܙܘܥ‬ voluntary motion §87
πρός τι, τὰ ‫ܡ‬煟‫ܬ ܡ‬熏‫ܕܠ‬ relatives §9
προστακτικός ‫ܕܐ‬熏‫ܦܩ‬ imperative §6
προστασία ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬r‫ܒ‬煟‫ܡ‬ government §3
πρότερον, τὸ ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܡ‬q煟‫ܬܐ ;ܩ‬熏q‫ܡ‬煟‫ܩ‬ priority §99, 48
πυκνός, στερεός 焏‫ܡ‬q‫ܡ‬q solid §72
 greek-syriac glossary 309

Greek Syriac English Ref.

πυσματικός 焏‫ܠܢ‬焏r‫ܡ‬ interrogative §6

σημαίνειν ‫ܕܥ‬熏r (√‫ܥ‬煟q) signify §4
σημεῖον ‫ܢ‬熏q‫ܡ‬q‫( ܣ‬Gr.) mark §67
σκοπός 焏rq‫ܢ‬ aim, goal §4
σπουδαῖον, τὸ ‫ܪܘܬܐ‬rq‫ܡ‬ goodness, virtue §94
στέρησις ‫ܘܬܐ‬熟q‫ܓܠ‬ privation §88
συλλαβή 焏‫ܓܡ‬r‫ܦ‬ syllable §66
συμβεβηκός 焏r煟‫ܓ‬ accident §22
κατὰ rq焏‫ܢ‬r煟‫ܓ‬ accidentally, by accident §51
συμβεβηκός
συμπληροῦσθαι q‫ܡܠ‬r / q‫ܡܠ‬rr‫ܐ‬ complete, be completed §63
συμπληρωτικός 焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܡܠ‬r‫ܡ‬ completive §37
συναναιρεῖν 煿‫ ܥܡ‬煿‫ ܠ‬爏q‫ܒ‬ remove with §75
συναναιρεῖσθαι 煿‫ ܥܡ‬煿‫ ܠ‬爏q‫ܐܬܒ‬ be removed with
συνεισάγειν, 煿‫ ܥܡ‬煿‫ ܠ‬爏‫√( ܐܥ‬爏‫)ܥܠ‬ introduce with it, entail §77
συνεισφέρειν
συνεχής 煟qq‫ܐ‬ continuous §66
συνήθεια ‫ܐ‬煟q‫ ܒܥ‬/ ‫ܐ‬煟q‫ܠܥ‬ common/ordinary usage §65, 104
συντιθέναι 焯q‫( ܪ‬paʿʿel) compound §64
σφαῖρα ‫ܐ‬rq‫( ܐܣܦ‬Gr.) sphere §72
πλανωμένη ‫ܐ‬r‫ܙܠ‬熏‫ܐ ܕܡ‬rq‫ܐܣܦ‬ celestial/planetary sphere §72
σφαῖρα
σφραγίζεσθαι 牟‫ܒ‬q / 牟‫ܒ‬q‫ܐܬ‬ imprint, be imprinted §7
σφραγίς 焏‫ܒܥ‬q imprint §8
σχέσις ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬qq‫ܐ‬ relation §74
σῶμα 焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫ܓ‬ body §10
τέλος 焏q‫ܡܠ‬熏r goal, purpose §23*
τεχνίτης 焏‫ܐܘܡܢ‬ artisan §7
τεχνικῶς rq焏‫ܐܘܡܢ‬ according to the art §7
τόπος ‫ܐܬܪܐ‬ space, place §23, 68
τρόπος 焏‫ܙܢ‬ kind, manner §13
τύπτειν 焏q‫ܡ‬ smite, beat, strike §74
τύπτεσθαι 牟‫ܒܠ‬ be beaten, struck §74
ὑγρότης ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܒ‬qq‫ܪ‬ wetness, moisture §65
ὑλακτικόν, τὸ ‫ܬܐ‬熏q熏‫ܢܒ‬ ability to bark §57
ὕλη 焏‫( ܗܘܠ‬Gr.) matter §7
 310 chapter 11

(cont.)

Greek Syriac English Ref.

ὑπάρχειν 爯‫ܘܗܝ ̣ܡ‬rq‫ ܒ ;ܐ‬qqqr pertain/belong to, exist; occur in, be §36, 86
present in
ὑποκείμενον 煿‫ ܕ̇ܗܘܐ ܒ‬焏‫ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‬/ substrate, subject §40, 52*
煿‫ܘܗܝ ܒ‬rq‫ ܕܐ‬焏‫̇ܗܘ ܡ‬
ὑποκεῖσθαι ‫ ܠ‬爟q‫ܣ‬ underlie, be substrate for §52
ὑπόστασις 焏‫ܡ‬q熏‫ܩ‬ existence, subsistence §11
ὕστατος, ὕστερος 焏qrq‫ܐ‬ last; posterior §7, 75
ὕστερον, τὸ ‫ܬܐ‬熏qrq‫ܐ‬ posteriority §105
ὑφίστασθαι 爟q‫ܡ√( ܐܬܩ‬熏‫)ܩ‬ constitute, be constituted §12
φαῦλον, τὸ ‫ܬܐ‬熏rq‫ܒ‬ evil, baseness §94
φθείρειν 爏‫ܒ‬q destroy §38
φθορά 焏‫ܒܠ‬q / 焏‫ܒܠ‬熏q destruction §39, 65,89
φορά 焏q‫ܘ‬煟‫ ܠ‬焏q‫ ܕܘ‬爯‫ ܕ̣ܡ‬焏‫ܙܘܥ‬ change of place, locomotion §68, 89
φύσει, φυσικῶς rq焏‫ܢ‬qq by nature, naturally §3, 51
φυσικός 焏q‫ܢ‬qq physical §7
φυσιολογία 焏‫ܢ‬qq̈ ‫ܬ‬熏‫ܡܠܠ‬ physics §3
φύσις 焏‫ܢ‬qq nature §37
φυτόν ‫ܐ‬r‫ܒ‬犏‫ܢ‬ plant §29
φωνή 焏‫ܬ ܩܠ‬r‫ܒ‬ word (< sound) §4*
χείρων rq犏‫ܒ‬ inferior §41
χρεμετιστικὸν, τὸ ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܨܗܘܠ‬ ability to neigh §57
χρῄζειν 爏‫ ܥ‬犟q‫ܣܢ‬ stand in need of §22
χρόνος 焏‫ܙܒܢ‬ time §23
χρῶμα 焏‫ܢ‬熏‫ܓ‬ colour §12
χωρεῖν ‫ ܒ‬爏‫√( ܐܬܥܠ‬爏‫)ܥܠ‬ permeated, pervade §83
χωρίς 煿‫ ܡܢ‬r‫ܠܒ‬ separate from §10
ψεῦδος, τὸ ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܕܓܠ‬ falsity §6, 98
ψιμύθιον 焏q煟q‫ܐܣܦ‬ (white) lead §86
ψυχρότης ‫ܘܬܐ‬rqr‫ܩ‬ coldness, cold §65
ὠχρότης 焏‫ܢ‬熏‫ ܓ‬q‫ܢ‬熏r departure of colour, paleness §86
 chapter 12

Greek Names in Sergius’ Introduction

Greek Syriac English Ref.

Ἀκαδήμεια 焏q‫ܡ‬煟‫ܐܩ‬ The Academy §7

Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Μακεδών 焏q‫ܘܢ‬煟‫ܪܘܣ ܡܩ‬煟‫ܣܢ‬q‫ܐܠ‬ Alexander the Macedonian § 21
Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Πάρις 爿qr‫ܪܘܣ ܦ‬煟‫ܣܢ‬q‫ܐܠ‬ Alexander Paris § 21, 24
Ἀριστοτέλης 爿q‫ܠ‬q熏q‫ܐܪܣ‬ Aristotle § 9, 22, 48, 52,
75, 79
Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεύς ‫ܘܣ‬焏qq‫ܢ ̇ܗܘ ܩ‬熏‫ܢ‬q‫ܙ‬ Zeno of Citium § 71*
Ἴλιον ‫ܢ‬熏q‫ܠ‬q‫ܐ‬ Ilium/Troy § 24
(Κατηγορίας ‫ܣ‬熏qr‫ܓ‬q‫ܩ‬ The Categories title)
Πελοποννήσιον 焏q‫ܢ‬熏‫ܣ‬q‫ܦ‬q‫ܠ‬q‫ܦ‬ Peloponnesian § 76
Πλάτων (τῶν Ἀθηνῶν) (焏q‫ܢ )ܐܬܢ‬熏q‫ܦܠ‬ Plato (the Athenian) § 4, 7, 14, 41, 51,
52, 76
Πορφύριος ‫ܣ‬熏q‫ܪ‬熏‫ܦ‬r‫ܦ‬ Porphyry § 38
Πυθαγόρας ‫ܪܘܣ‬熏‫ܓ‬rq‫ܦ‬ Pythagoras § 76
Στωϊκοί 熏̇‫ܩ‬q̈‫ܘ‬焏q‫ܐܣ‬ Stoics § 80
Σωκράτης 爿qqr‫ܩ‬熏‫ܣ‬ Socrates § 4 passim
Φιλόθεος ‫ܐܘܣ‬r‫ܠ‬q‫ܦ‬ Philotheos § 1, 108
 chapter 13
Syriac-English Index
‫( ܐܐܪ‬Gr. ἀήρ) air § 65, 68, 72
焏‫ ܐܒ‬father §13, 74–75, 78–79, 93, 97
焏r‫( ܐܕ‬Gr. εἶδος) species § 10, 20–21, 23, 29– ‫ܐ‬煟qq‫ ܐ‬at once §57, simultaneous §75,
30, 42–45, 47, 49–52, 54–60, 82, 86, 90,
95; form §7–8 (see ch. 7 nn. 2–3), 23,
31, 41; kind § 66, 84–87, 90; mode § 89,
107
‫ܐ‬r‫ ܕܡܠ‬焏r‫ ܐܕ‬type of speech § 6–7
爯qr̈‫ ܐܕܫ ܐܕ‬lowest species § 20 (see
ch. 7 n. 7)
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܡ‬q‫ ܐܘ‬blackness § 34, 38–39, 82, 86,
90, 94, 96–97
焏‫ ܐܘܡܢ‬artisan § 7, 66
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ ܐܘܡܢ‬art § 1, 4, 8, 54, 66, 74, 108; work
of art §66
rq焏‫ ܐܘܡܢ‬according to the art § 7
焏q‫( ܐܘܣ‬Gr. οὐσία) substance § 9–12, 20,
22–23, 34, 36, 39, 41–44, 46–52, 61–64,
66, 78, 106
r‫ ܕܬܠ‬焏q‫ ܐܘܣ‬tertiary substance § 50,
52
爯q‫ ܕܬܪܬ‬焏q‫ ܐܘܣ‬secondary substance
§44, 46–52
‫ܐ‬r‫ܒ‬qr‫ ܡ‬焏q‫ ܐܘܣ‬compound substance
§41
‫ܐ‬rqqr‫ ܦ‬焏q‫ ܐܘܣ‬simple substance
§41
‫ܐ‬rq‫ܡ‬煟‫ ܩ‬焏q‫ ܐܘܣ‬primary substance
§44, 46–52
焏q‫ ܐܘܪ‬length §26, 65, 67, 72–73
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬qq‫ ܐ‬relation § 74, affinity § 87
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬qq‫ ܐ‬焏‫ ܕܠ‬without relation § 90
焏qrq‫ ܐ‬last § 6–8, 20, 57, 66; posterior § 47;
(final §109)
‫ܬܐ‬熏qrq‫ ܐ‬posteriority § 105
‫ܐ‬rq‫ܢ‬rq‫ ܐ‬different (≈ heteronyms) § 21 (see
comm. ad loc.)
焏q‫ ܕܐܬ‬qq‫ ܐ‬just like that/by chance § 91
焏qq‫ ܐ‬where (i.e. category of place/location)
§9, 14
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܐ‬quality § 12 (see comm. ad loc.)
‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܢ‬q‫ ܐ‬quality § 9
rq‫ ܐ‬/ rq‫ ܕܐ‬having (i.e. category of state)
§9, 16
焏qrq‫ ܐ‬essence §8
rq焏qrq‫ ܐ‬essentially §8
78–79
‫ܐ‬犏‫ ܐܠ‬necessary §40, 46–47, 70, 75, 77, 96–
97, 101
rq‫ܐ‬犏‫ ܐܠ‬necessarily §77, 97
焏‫ ܐܡ‬cubit §11
r‫ ܐܡ‬/ 爏‫ ܥ‬r‫ܐܡ‬r‫ ܡ‬predicated of §49,
51–52, 57 (see comm. to §95–98)
‫ܝ‬r‫ ܐܡ‬when (i.e. category of time) §9, 15
焏q‫ܢ‬q‫ܪ‬煟‫( ܐܢ‬Gr. ἀνδριάντα, in acc.) statue §31
焏‫ ܐܢܢܩ‬/q‫( ܐܢܢܩ‬Gr. ἀνάγκη) necessary §73,
97, 101
q‫ ܐܢܢܩ‬爯‫( ܡ‬Gr. ἀνάγκῃ) necessarily/by
necessity §77, 79
焏‫ܣ‬q熏q‫( ܐܣ‬Gr. στοιχεῖον) element §65
焏q‫ܡ‬熏‫ܘܢ‬rq‫( ܐܣ‬Gr. ἀστρονομία) astronomy
§3 (see ch. 8 n. 10)
‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ ܐܣ‬medicine §54
焏‫ܡ‬qq‫( ܐܣ‬Gr. σχῆμα) figure §7, 12, 21, 65,
80–81, 87
‫ܐ‬r‫ ܕܡܠ‬焏‫ܡ‬qq‫ ܐܣ‬form of expression
§57
爟qq‫ ܐܣ‬焏‫ ܕܠ‬without figure, figureless
§65
焏q煟q‫( ܐܣܦ‬white) lead §86
‫ܐ‬rq‫( ܐܣܦ‬Gr. σφαῖρα) sphere §72
焏‫ܓ‬熟‫ܐܦ‬: 焏‫ܓ‬熟‫ ܐܦ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܡܢ‬odd number
§94
‫ܣ‬熏‫( ܐܦܠ‬Gr. ἁπλῶς) simply §91
‫ܬܐ‬熏qq‫ ܐܪ‬length §67, 73
焏‫ܬ ̈ܡܠ‬熏qq‫ ܐܪ‬verbosity §68
‫ܘܣ‬rqqq‫( ܐܪ‬Gr. ἀρχιατρός) archiatros, chief
physician (title, §109)
焏‫ܢ‬熏q‫( ܐܪ‬Gr. ἄρχων) archon, ruler §103
焏q‫ܢ‬熏‫( ܐܪܡ‬Gr. ἁρμονία) harmony §40
‫ ܐܬܪܐ‬pl. ‫ܘܬܐ‬r‫ ܐܬ‬place §66, location
§14, 74, space §23, 25–26, 36–37, 68–73,
107
‫ܐ‬煟q焏‫ܐ ܒ‬煟q焏‫ ܒ‬one by one §4; particular
§41, 77; gradually §66
‫ܐ‬rqrq‫ ܒ‬briefly/in brief §1, 65, 68
syriac-english index 313

‫ܐ‬r‫̈ܩ‬q‫ ܒܦܣ‬briefly/in brief § 43, 72, 87, 91, 爯q‫ ܓܢ̈ܣ‬爿‫ ܓܢ‬most generic genera §9–
98 10, 20 (see ch. 7 n. 4)
焏‫ ܕܒܦܣܩ‬qq‫ ܐ‬briefly/in brief § 72 焏‫ܒ‬r‫ ܓ‬jar §25f.
‫ܬܐ‬熏rq‫ ܒ‬evil §94 焏‫ܡ‬qr‫( ܓ‬corporeal): 焏‫ܡ‬qr‫ ܓ‬焏‫ ܠ‬incorpo-
焏r‫ ܐܕ‬煟q r‫ ̈ܒܢ‬of one species (≈ synonyms) real §66–68, 70, 80
§21 (see comm. ad loc.)
‫ܐ‬rq‫ ܒܥ‬beast/animal § 41–43 ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ ܕܓܠ‬falsity §6, 98
‫ܐ‬r‫ ܒܥ‬problem §50, 52; question § 75; ‫ܐ‬rq‫ ܕܘ‬pl. ‫ܐ‬rqq̈‫ ܕܘ‬place §14, 66, 68, 70–
dispute §44, 47, 62 71, 89, 106–107, location §68
rq犏‫ ܒ‬inferior §41 焏q‫ ܕܘܡ‬image §66
‫ܪܐ‬犏‫ ܒ‬diminution/decrease § 68 焏q‫ ܕܘܡ‬爯‫ ̣ܡ‬on analogy §68
‫ܘܬܐ‬rq犏‫ ܒ‬less (lit. ‘lessness’) § 61; diminu- 焏r‫ ܕܘܪ‬study §1, 20, 53
tion/decrease § 89, 106 ‫ܐ‬r‫ܠ‬q‫ ܕ‬fear §86
‫ܐ‬r‫ ܒ‬son §13, 74–75, 78–79, 93, 97 ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܠ‬q‫ ܕ‬property §53–54, 56–57, 61, 104–
焏q‫ܘ‬r‫ ܒ‬creator §7–8 105 (see comm. to §53–60)
‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܘ‬r‫ ܒ‬creatorship § 8 焏‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ ܕܠܩ‬opposite §19, 61, 91–93, 97,
‫ܐ‬rqr‫ ܒ‬creation (§109), pl. ‫ܐ‬rqr‫ ܒ‬created against §2 (see comm. to §88–94)
things §73 ‫ ܕܗܕܐ‬焏‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ ܕܠܩ‬on the contrary §63
焏‫ܬ ܩܠ‬r‫ ܒ‬pl. 焏‫ ̈ܩܠ‬r‫ ̈ܒܢ‬word § 4–5, 10, 12–16, ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ ܕܠܩ‬opposition §88, 90–94, 96–
18–19, 22, 45, 47, 98–99 98 (see comm. to §88–94)
焏‫√( ܕܡ‬q‫ )ܕܡ‬be similar §45, 47, 74
‫ܫ‬煟‫ ܓ‬appear/occur § 38–39, 41, 80, 82–83, ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ ܕܡ‬shape §31, 65, 80–81, 87
85–86, 89, 95–97, 106 ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܡ‬煟‫ ܒ‬煿̇‫ ܒ‬similarly §41–42, 107
焏r煟‫ ܓ‬geḏšā accident § 22–23, 34–41, ‫ܐ‬煿̈‫ܡ‬r rq‫ ܕ̈ܡ‬homonyms §21 (see comm.
51–52, 62–64; (gǝḏāšā?) appearing, ad loc.)
occurring §83 焏r̈‫ ܐܕ‬rq‫ ܕ̈ܡ‬of the same species (≈
rq焏‫ܢ‬r煟‫ ܓ‬by accident/accidentally § 51 polyonyms) §21 (see comm. ad loc.)
‫ܐ‬熏‫ ܓ‬/‫ܐ‬熏‫§( ܕܓ‬2 ‫ܐ‬熏‫ )ܠܓ‬general § 2–3, 6, ‫ ܕܪܟ‬afʿel comprehend §68
10, 12, 15, 19–20, 42, 48, 102 ‫ܗܝ‬熏‫ܓܠ‬r 爯q‫ ܕܬܪܬ‬two-footed §55, 59 (see
‫ܐ‬熏‫ܐ ܕܓ‬rq‫ ܬܪܥ‬common sense § 68 section 5.4 (m))
焏q‫ܢ‬熏‫( ܓ‬adj.) general § 66
焏‫ܢ‬熏‫ ܓ‬colour § 12, 80, 82, 86, 94 焏‫ ܗܕܡ‬member/part of the body §27–28,
焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫ ܓ‬body §10, 20, 25–27, 34, 37–43, 91, 95
65–70, 72–73, 80, 85–85, 107 煿‫ܘܗܝ ܒ‬rq‫ ܕܐ‬焏‫ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‬substrate /subject (lit.
焏‫ܢ‬r‫ ܢܦ‬焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫ ܓ‬animate body § 10, 20, ‘that in which it is’) §40, 104 (see comm.
41–42 to § 52)
‫ܡ‬熏r‫ ܓ‬焏‫ ܕܠ‬incorporeal § 67, 68, 70–72 煿‫ ܕ̇ܗܘܐ ܒ‬焏‫ ̇ܗܘ ܡ‬substrate/subject (lit.
焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫ ܓ‬焏‫ ܠ‬incorporeal § 41, 70, 80 ‘that in which it occurs’) §38, 40 (see
焏q熏q‫ ܓ‬able to laugh § 57 comm. to §52)
‫ܬܐ‬熏q熏q‫ ܓ‬laughing § 57 焏q‫ ܗܘ‬coming into being §7–8, 100;
焏r‫ܢ‬r‫ܬܗ ܕܒ‬熏q熏q‫ ܓ‬man’s ability to laugh generation §89, 106
§57 焏‫( ܗܘܠ‬Gr. ὕλη) matter §7–8, 23, 31, 41, 65
焏‫ܓܠ‬q‫ ܓ‬: ‫ܐ‬r‫ ܕܥܓܠ‬焏‫ܓܠ‬q‫ ܓ‬wheel of a 焏q‫ ܗܘܠܢ‬material §7
wagon §107 焏‫ ܗܘܢ‬mind §68; pl. meanings §1
‫ܘܬܐ‬熟q‫ ܓܠ‬privation § 88, 90–91, 95–97 q‫ ܗܦ‬/ ‫ܬ‬熏‫ ܠ‬q‫ܦ‬煿‫ ܡ‬reciprocate with §57–
焏‫( ܓܢܣ‬Gr. γένος) genus § 7–20, 23, 29– 58, 60
30, 41, 43–45, 47, 49–52, 81; category 牯‫ܠ‬qrr‫ ܡ‬q‫ ̇ܗܦ‬counterchange §96
§20, 74–75, 78–79, 81, 85, 87–88, 90, (see comm. to §95–98)
93 ‫ܐ‬rq‫ ܗܦ‬objection §50
314 chapter 13

焏‫ ܙܒܢ‬time §11, 15, 23–24, 38, 66, 76, 78, 91, 爏qq 焏‫ ܕܠ‬without quality/qualityless §65
97, 99–100, 102, 105 ‫ܐ‬r‫ܡ‬qq wisdom §3, 105, 108
爯‫ܒ‬熟‫ ܒ‬sometimes § 3, 12, 56–57, 60, 68, 80, ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܠ‬q sweetness §12, 34, 85
96 焏‫ܠ‬q‫ܠ‬q concave §72
爯‫ ܙܒ‬爯‫ܒ‬熟‫ ܒ‬from time to time § 8 焏‫ܠܠ‬q hollow/hole §72
爯‫ܒ‬熟‫ܠ‬q‫ ܒ‬always § 10, 20, 40, 52, 56–57, 66, ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܡ‬q‫ܡ‬q heat, hotness §65, 85, 90, 96–
69, 78–79, 91, 96, 98, 107 98
爯q‫ ܙ̈ܒܢ‬焏‫ܡ‬q occasionally § 32, 98 ‫ܐ‬r‫ܡ‬q wrath §86
‫ܢ‬焏q‫ ܣ̈ܓ‬爯q‫ ܙ̈ܒܢ‬many times § 97 焏q‫ܢ‬r‫ܡ‬q wrathful §86
rq焏‫ ܙܕܩ‬duly §108 焏‫ܣܡ‬q envy §2
‫ ܙܘܥ‬: 牟q‫ ܐܙ‬/ 牟q‫ ܐܬܬܙ‬move/cause to move 焏‫ܢ‬qrq controversy §38, 67
§41, 68, 87, 107; shake/be terrified § 2 rq (√rrq) be affected §69
焏‫ ܙܘܥ‬motion/movement § 41, 68, 89, 106– 焏rq affection §86
107 焏r熏rq affected §81–82, 85–86
焏q‫ܢ‬q‫ ܨܒ‬焏‫ ܙܘܥ‬voluntary motion § 87 焏r熏̈rq 焏q‫ ̈ܙܢ‬affected qualities §81–82,
焏q‫ܡ‬q̈q‫( ܙ‬Gr. ζητήματα, in pl.) disputes § 35 85
焏‫ ܙܢ‬way/manner § 7, 13, 23, 26, 28, 44, 焏r熏̈rq 焏‫ܠ‬q̈q affected qualities §86
46, 50–57, 60, 63, 71, 74, 78, 99, 105; ‫ܐ‬rrq feeling §85
sort/kind/form § 66, 104, 107–108; 焏q熏rq darkness §94
quality §65, 80–83; 84–87, 106 ‫ܐ‬rqrq proper/real §51, 57
‫ܪܘܬܐ‬熏‫ ܙܥ‬smallness § 45, 73 rq‫ܐ‬rqrq properly/truly §94
‫ܘܬܐ‬rqrq reality §53
‫ܫ‬焏̇q (√rrq) being-affected (i.e. category of
affection) §9, 19, 74 牟‫ܒ‬q imprint (v.) §7–8, 66
爏‫ܒ‬q / 爏‫ܒ‬q‫ ܐܬ‬paʿʿel/ʾeṯpaʿʿal destroy/be 焏‫ܒܥ‬q imprint (n.) §8
destroyed §38, 40, 69, 80, 96 ‫ܪܐ‬熏q measure §70
焏‫ܒܠ‬q destruction § 39–41, 69, 91, 106 焏‫ܣ‬qq (Gr. τάξις) order §4, 48, 99, 103, 105,
r‫ܒ‬q contain §9–10, 15–18, 25, 41–42, 49, 108; degree 94; arrangement §1; class
54, 69–70, 72, 74, 87; include § 36–38; §52; classification §80
surround §26 焏‫ܣ‬qq‫ ܒ‬successively § 21
焏‫ܒ‬熏q love §2, 108 焏‫ܣ‬qq 爯‫ ܡ‬r‫ ܠܒ‬out of place (extraordi-
焏‫ܒܠ‬熏q destruction § 40, 65, 89 nary) §2
‫ܕܪܐ‬熏q : ‫ܕܪܐ‬熏q‫ ܒ‬in rotation § 107 焏‫ܡ‬q‫ܡ‬q solid §72
‫ܪܐ‬熏q model §66 焏‫ܡ‬熏‫ܥ‬q taste §80
‫ܪܘܬܐ‬熏q whiteness § 34, 82, 86, 90, 94, 96–
97 ‫ܬܐ‬熏rq‫ܒ‬q dryness §65
‫ܬܐ‬r熏q grey hair § 56, 60 焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܘܥ‬煟q knower §74
焏‫ܒ‬r熏q imagination § 39, 67; notion ‫ܥ‬煟q know §2–3, 49; ‫ܥ‬煟q‫ ܐܬ‬be known
§47 §69–70, 74, 98; be perceived §4; be
焏q熟q sight §91, 95–96 recognized §52, 90, 99
‫ܬܐ‬熟q sight §90, 98 rq焏‫ܥ‬煟q explicitly §61
焏qq living §42–43, 49, 51–52; qq‫ § ܕ‬41–43; ‫ܐ‬r‫ܥ‬煟q knowledge §1, 8, 74, 94
alive §6 ‫ܐ‬rq̈煿‫ܐ ܕܐܠ‬r‫ܥ‬ ̈ 煟q metaphysics/theology
‫ܬܐ‬熏qq animal § 10, 20, 29–30, 42–43, 45, 77, §3
87, 101 (see ch. 7 n. 6) ‫ܐ‬r‫ܥ‬煟q 焏‫ ܠ‬ignorance §94
焏‫ܠ‬qq power/force § 69, 107; quality § 65, 80, 焏‫ܠܦܢ‬熏q learning §1, 74; science §54, 58;
86, 94, faculty § 12, 80, 85, 88, 90–91, 95–
̈
pl. 焏‫ܠܦܢ‬熏q mathematics §3 (see ch. 8
97; implication § 36; potentiality § 57 n. 6)
(see comm. to § 88–94) 焏q煟qqq particular §42, 48
syriac-english index
焏q煟qq̈q 焏‫ܡ‬熏̈‫ ܩܢ‬particular individuals
§20, 42–43, 50–52, 54
焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܡ‬q right §74, 90, 93, 95, 98, 107
‫ܘܬܐ‬rqrq more (lit. ‘moreness’) § 61
焏q‫ܢ‬熏q appellation § 4, 42, 74, 94
焏‫ܪܗܢ‬熏q sickness §82
焏‫ܢ‬qq nature §37, 40, 41–43, 47, 58, 65, 68–
69, 73, 80, 85; physical thing § 3, 8, 12,
72–74, 80
焏q‫ܢ‬qq physical/natural § 7–8, 65, 96;
physiological §91, pl. ‫ܐ‬rq̈‫ܢ‬qq physical
things §74
rq焏‫ܢ‬qq naturally/by nature § 5, 7, 51–52,
65, 73, 77, 86, 101, 105
焏‫ܢ‬qq‫ ܒ‬naturally/by nature § 5, 41, 76–
79, 99
焏‫ܢ‬qq 爟q‫ ܩ‬constitution § 80
焏‫ܠܒ‬q dog §20, 29–30, 57, 101
‫ܐ‬r‫ ܕܓܢܒ‬焏‫ܠܒ‬q dog of Orion constella-
tion (i.e. Sirius) § 21, 45 (see textual
note to 122.11/B.90r7)
焏r‫ܒ‬q‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܠܒ‬q dog of land § 21, 45
焏q‫ ܕ̈ܡ‬焏‫ܠܒ‬q dog of water (i.e. otter)
§21, 45,
rq‫ ܕܨ‬焏‫ܠܒ‬q depicted dog § 45
焏‫ܦ‬熏‫ܠܣ‬q‫ ܦ‬焏‫ܠܒ‬q philosopher dog (i.e. a
Cynic) §21
‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܡ‬q quantity § 9, 11–12, 66–68, 72–73,
106
爿‫ܣ‬q / 爿‫ܣ‬q‫ ܐܬ‬ʾeṯpǝʿel be contradicted
§80
爯‫ ܡ‬r‫ ܠܒ‬/ 煿‫ ܡܢ‬r‫ ܠܒ‬out of, beside, apart from
§2, 15, 57, 73; separate from § 10, 20,
36–37, 80
‫ܡ‬煟‫ܬ ܡ‬熏‫ ܠ‬/ ‫ܡ‬煟‫ܬ ܡ‬熏‫ ܕܠ‬relatives (lit. ‘toward
something’) §9, 13, 74–75, 78–79, 88, 90,
93, 95, 97
爟q‫ ܠ‬be applicable § 39; embrace § 104
‫ܬܐ‬rq‫ ܠ‬afterwards; (acquired) after the
birth/later in life § 82, 86, (109)
‫ܐ‬r‫ܡ‬焏‫ ܡ‬tract (title), treatise § 50, 102
焏‫ܢ‬焏‫ ܡ‬vessel §23, 26, 87
爏q‫ ܒ‬remove §75, 77, 79, 97; invalidate § 51
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬r‫ܒ‬煟‫ ܡ‬government § 3
焏‫ܥ‬煟‫ ܡ‬intellect §66
焏‫ܙܓ‬熏‫ ܡ‬temperament § 40; quality § 80
(see comm. to § 12)
315
‫ܐ‬r‫ܙܠ‬熏‫ ܡ‬celestial (body) §72, 107
‫ܐ‬煟‫ܠ‬熏‫ ܡ‬birth §82, 86; generation §65
‫ܘܬܐ‬r‫ܩ‬q‫ܣ‬熏‫( ܡ‬Gr. μουσική) music §3
rq焏‫ܢ‬qq‫ ܡ‬appropriately §49 (see comm.
ad loc.)
‫ܐ‬rq‫ ܡ‬geometer, surveyor §67
‫ܘܬܐ‬rq‫ ܡ‬geometry §3, 54
‫ܐ‬r‫ܒ‬rq‫ ܡ‬thought § 67
焏‫ܢ‬rq‫ ܡ‬affective §81–82, 85–86
焏‫ܢ‬rq̈‫ ܡ‬焏q‫ ̈ܙܢ‬affective qualities §81–82,
85
焏‫ܢ‬rq̈‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܠ‬q̈q affective qualities §86
‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ ܡ‬mortal §49
‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ ܡ‬焏‫ ܠ‬immortal §6
‫ܪ‬rq‫ ܡ‬superior §41, 49, 69
‫ܪܘܬܐ‬rq‫ ܡ‬virtue §94
爯q‫ ܡ‬capable of §91, 95, 97, constituted §51
焏q焏‫ ܡܠ‬angel §77
焏‫ܠ‬q‫ ܡܠ‬rational §5, 41, 49, 66, 77, 80; logical
§ 1, 4, §53, 66, 74, 108
rq焏‫ܠ‬q‫ ܡܠ‬logically §21
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܠ‬q‫ ܡܠ‬logic § 20; rationality § 77
焏‫ܢ‬qq̈ ‫ܬ‬熏‫ ܡܠܠ‬physics §3
‫ܐ‬r‫ ܡܠ‬discourse §2, 99, 108, (109); speech
§ 2, 6–7, 39; language §66; argument
§ 65, 71; account §75; statement §88,
90, 98; expression §57; definition §36,
94; discussion §41, 44
‫ܐ‬rq‫ܐ ܐܘܡܢ‬r‫ ܡܠ‬technical language
§ 66
‫ܐ‬rq‫ܡܢ‬qr‫ܐ ܡ‬r‫ ܡܠ‬defining descrip-
tion §36, 39
焏‫ ܡܡܠܠ‬speech §66, 92
‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ ܡܢ‬arithmetic §3
焏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܡܢ‬number §11, 20, 42, 48, 66, 94
爯q‫ ܡ̈ܢ‬焏‫ ܕܠ‬countless number §10
焏‫ܓ‬熟‫ ܐܦ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܡܢ‬odd number §94
焏q熏r 焏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܡܢ‬even number §94
‫ܐ‬r‫ ܡܢ‬pl. ‫ܬܐ‬熏̈‫ ܡܢ‬part §3, 22–23, 27, 36–
37, 62–63, 67, 73, 91, 95
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬r‫ ܡܣܒ‬assumption §68
‫ܬܘܬܐ‬r‫ ܡܣ‬stability §81, 83
‫ܬܘܬܐ‬r‫ ܡܣ‬焏‫ ܠ‬instability §81, 83
rq焏‫ܢ‬煟‫ ܡܥܒ‬actually §54
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬煟‫ ܡܥܒ‬activity §18, actuality §57, 91
‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ ܡܥܠ‬superiority §69
焏q‫ܘ‬r‫ ܒ‬犟‫ ܡܦ‬defence/apology §35, 39
焏‫ ܡܦܩܢ‬conclusion §44
焏rr‫ ܡܦ‬separate §41; discrete §66
316
rq焏rr‫ ܡܦ‬separately § 91
焏q犏‫ ܡ‬possible § 39, 70, 73, 83
焏q犏‫ ܡ‬焏‫ ܠ‬impossible § 9, 13, 22, 36–37,
46, 70
焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܠ‬犏‫ ܡ‬precative § 6
r‫ܥ‬犏‫ ܡ‬/ ‫ܐ‬r‫ܥ‬犏‫ ܒܡ‬between/in the middle
§94, 96; in between/intermediate § 10,
20, 94, 96
焏q‫ܥ‬犏‫ ܡ‬middle (adj.) § 66
‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܥ‬犏‫ ܡ‬intermediacy § 94
焏‫ ܡܩܒܠܢ‬receptive § 37, 61, 65, 70
‫ܐ‬r‫ ܡ‬master §13, 32, 74–75, 78, 93
‫ܘܬܐ‬rqr‫ ܡ‬bitterness § 12, 34
焏‫ܠܢ‬焏r‫ ܡ‬interrogative § 6
‫ܐ‬rq熏r‫ ܡ‬pl. ‫ܐ‬rq̈r熏‫ ܡ‬measure § 11–12,
70
焏‫ܠܦ‬qr‫ ܡ‬different § 26, 42, 47, 74
焏qqr‫ ܡ‬possible § 1, 13, 44, 70, 73, 77
rq焏q‫ܠ‬r‫ ܡ‬authoritatively § 6
焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܡܠ‬r‫ ܡ‬completive § 37, 63
焏qr‫ ܡ‬mǝṯāḥā extension § 65, 67, 70, 72–
73; meṯḥā period § 76
焏‫ܢ‬q熟qr‫ ܡ‬perceptible, visible § 68
焏‫ܥܢ‬煟qr‫ ܡ‬intelligible § 68
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬q犏‫ܡ‬r‫ ܡ‬capacity § 81, 84
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬q犏‫ܡ‬r‫ ܡ‬焏‫ ܠ‬incapacity § 81, 84
焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܪܓ‬r‫ ܡ‬perceivable/perceptible § 41,
67–67, 73–74
煿‫ ܢܒ‬emanate §8
‫ܬܐ‬熏q熏‫ ܢܒ‬barking § 57
焏‫ܠܒ‬q‫ܬܗ ܕ‬熏q熏‫ ܢܒ‬dog’s ability to bark
§57
‫ܐ‬r‫ ܢܓ‬carpenter § 7
rq‫ܐ‬rq煿‫ ܢ‬clearly § 20
‫ܐ‬r‫ܓ‬熏‫ ܢ‬duration § 76
‫ܐ‬r‫ܓ‬熏‫ ܢ‬爯‫ ܡ‬long ago § 98
‫ܗܪܐ‬熏‫ ܢ‬nuhhārā elucidation § 35 nūhrā
light §94
‫ܬܐ‬煟‫ܩ‬熏‫ ܢ‬dot §67
‫ܪܐ‬熏‫ ܢ‬fire § 65, 85, 96, 107
焏rq‫ ܢ‬bronze §31, 80, 87
焏rq‫ ܢ‬aim §2
焏‫ܣ‬熏‫( ܢܡ‬Gr. νόμος) law § 3
焏‫ܣ‬熏̈‫ ܢܡ‬爟q‫ ܣ‬legislation § 3
焏r‫ ܢܦ‬soul/self §6, 66, 86; as reflexive
pronoun §3, 57, (109)
r‫ ܕܢܦ‬animate § 43, 87, 100
r‫ ܢܦ‬焏‫ ܕܠ‬inanimate § 20, 41, 87, 100
chapter 13
焏‫ܢ‬r‫ ܢܦ‬animate §10, 20, 41–43, 51–52
‫ܐ‬rq‫ܢ‬r̈‫ ܢܦ‬animate things §87
‫ܐ‬r‫ܒ‬犏‫ ܢ‬plant §29–30, 43
牯‫ ܢܩ‬proceed §47
牯q‫ ܢܩ‬follow/attend/be attached §37,
51–52, 57, 61, 70, 77, 82, 87, 99, 104;
adjoined/surround §25, 72
‫ܕܐ‬煟q̈‫ ܠ‬爯‫ܦ‬q̈‫ ܢܩ‬concomitant with each
other §75, 78–79
rq焏‫ ܢܩܦ‬accordingly §48
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܦ‬q‫ ܢܩ‬entailment §13, adherence §105
‫ܪܐ‬煟‫ ܣ‬sequence §99, 102, 105 (see comm. to
§99–105)
焏‫ܠ‬q熏‫ ܣ‬intelligence §74; understanding §1
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܡܩ‬熏‫ ܣ‬redness §86
焏‫ܢܩܢ‬熏‫ ܣ‬requirement §65
焏q‫ܣ‬熏‫ ܣ‬horse §10, 20, 29–30, 57, 77, 101
焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܥ‬熏‫ ܣ‬deed §6; pl. 焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܥ‬熏‫ ܣ‬concrete
objects §98
焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܥ‬熏‫ ܒܣ‬煿‫ ܒ‬actually §39, 57
焏q‫ܪ‬熏‫ ܣ‬line §66–67, 73
‫ܬܬܐ‬熏‫ ܣ‬base §66
‫ܐ‬rq‫ ܣ‬direction §107
爟q‫ ܣ‬/爟q‫ ܕܣ‬placed (i.e. category of position)
§9, 17
‫ ܠ‬爟q‫ ܣ‬be subject/substrate for §52 (see
comm. ad loc.)
焏‫ܡ‬q‫ ܣ‬posture § 17, position § 66, 74
‫ܢ‬熏q‫ܡ‬q‫( ܣ‬Gr. σημεῖον) mark §67
焏q‫ ܣ‬limit §25–26, 72
焏qr‫ ܒ‬焏q‫ ܣ‬outer/exterior limit §26, 72
焏q熏‫ ܓ‬焏q‫ ܣ‬inner/interior limit §25–
26, 72
q‫ ܣ‬焏‫ ܕܠ‬without end §71
焏‫ ܣܡܠ‬left §74, 90, 93, 95, 98, 107
犟q‫ ܣܢ‬stand in need §22, 49, 52, 87
‫ܪܘܬܐ‬熏‫ ܣܥ‬practice §3
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܩ‬q‫ ܣܦ‬void § 73
rq焏‫ ܣܦܩ‬sufficiently §73, 107
焏q‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ ܣܩ‬contrary §83, 88, 94, 96–97 (see
comm. to §88–94)
‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ ܣܩ‬contrariety §90, 94, 97 (see
comm. to §88–94)
焏‫ܢ‬r‫ ܣ‬axis §107
焏‫ܦ‬焏‫ ܥ‬/ 焏‫ ܐܥܦ‬double §13, 74, 93
̇ ‫ ܕ‬doing (i.e. category of action)
煟‫ ܥܒ‬/ 煟‫ܥܒ‬
§9, 18, 74
syriac-english index
‫ܐ‬煟‫ ܥܒ‬slave §13, 74–75, 78, 93
‫ܐ‬煟‫ ܥ̈ܒ‬crafts §7
‫ܕܘܬܐ‬熏‫ ܥܒ‬manufacture § 65
焏qr‫ܐ ܒ‬r‫ ܥܒ‬extreme edge § 72
焏q‫ܠ‬煟‫ ܥ‬criticism/blame § 35, 108
焏‫ܗܕܢ‬熏‫ ܥ‬memory § 7–8
焏‫ܡܩ‬熏‫ ܥ‬depth §26, 65, 67
焏‫ܩܒ‬熏‫ ܥ‬investigation § 73
‫ܐ‬煟q‫ ܥ‬: ‫ܐ‬煟q‫ ܒܥ‬/ ‫ܐ‬煟q‫ ܠܥ‬in common usage
§65, 104
爏‫√( ܥ‬爏‫ )ܥܠ‬afʿel introduce § 73, 77,
97
‫ܐ‬r‫ ܥܠ‬cause §74, reason § 83
rq焏‫ ܥܣܩ‬with difficulty § 83
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܩ‬qr‫ ܥ‬ancientness § 100
‫ܐ‬r‫ ܦܓ‬human/animate body § 27–28, 40,
85–86
爿qqq‫ܐ‬熏‫( ܦ‬Gr. ποιότης) quality § 12 (see
comm. to §12)
焏‫ܠܓ‬熏‫ ܦ‬division §1, 4, 44, 46–48, 67, 74, 90,
108
焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܪ‬熏‫ ܦ‬distinction § 20, 98; difference/dif-
ferentia §41–43
焏‫ܡ‬q‫ ܦ‬comparison § 66
焏‫ܦ‬熏‫ܠܣ‬q‫( ܦ‬Gr. φιλόσοφος) philosopher (title)
§6, 21, 65, 73, 75, 91
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܦ‬熏‫ܠܣ‬q‫( ܦ‬Gr. φιλοσοφία) philosophy
§8
‫ܐ‬rq‫ܢ‬qq ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܦ‬熏‫ܠܣ‬q‫ ܦ‬natural philosophy
§65, 108
‫ܐ‬r‫ܠ‬q‫ܬܐ ܡܠ‬熏‫ܦ‬熏‫ܠܣ‬q‫ ܦ‬logical philosophy
§53
焿‫ ܦܠ‬/ 焿‫ ܐܬܦܠ‬divide/be divided § 3 f., 7,
20–22, 29, 41–47, 66, 74, 81 f., 86, 88, 101,
107f.
焏‫ ܦܠܓ‬half § 13, 74, 93
焏‫ܩ‬熏‫ ܦܣ‬declarative § 6
‫ܕܐ‬熏‫ ܦܩ‬imperative § 6
‫ܢ‬熏q‫ܐܘܡ‬r‫( ܦ‬Gr. προοίμιον) preface § 102
‫ܫ‬r‫ ܦ‬/ ‫ܫ‬r‫ ܐܬܦ‬separate/be separated § 38–
40, 83, 94; differentiate § 48; discern/be
discerned §74; be distinguished § 95,
97–98
(爯‫ )ܡ‬rqr‫ ܦ‬distinct (from) § 20, 42, 96–
98
焏qqr‫ ܦ‬simple §4, 7, 10, 41
焏qr‫ ܦ‬span §11
焏qr‫ ܦ‬breadth §26, 65, 67, 72–73
317
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ ܨܒ‬object §4–5, 7–11, 21–22, 25–27, 29,
31, 36, 44–48, 73–75, 78–79, 85–90, 95,
97–98, 100; thing/matter/entities §24,
91–92, 94
‫ܐ‬rqqr̈‫ܬܐ ܦ‬熏‫ ܨ̈ܒ‬simple objects §4
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ ܨܗܘܠ‬neighing §57
焏q‫ܣ‬熏‫ܬܗ ܕܣ‬熏‫ ܨܗܘܠ‬horse’s ability to
neigh §57
‫ܐ‬rqq‫ ܨܘ‬insult §108
‫ܪܘܬܐ‬焏‫( ܩ‬Gr. κηρός) wax §80
焏‫ܒ‬q‫ ܩܒ‬convex § 72
爏‫ ܩܒ‬paʿʿel receive §58, 65, 70, 80, 85, 91;
admit of §46
焏‫ ܩܒܥ‬construction §66
爟q煟‫ ܩ‬prior § 75–79, 100–103
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܡ‬q煟‫ ܩ‬priority §99–100, 104–105
焏q‫ܡ‬煟‫ ܩ‬first §6, 49, 54, 58, 66, 67 (initial),
74, 86, 89, 99; primary §7–10, 20, 41,
44, 46–52, 65; prior §47; before 10, 20;
ancient §53
rq‫ܡ‬煟‫ ܩ‬firstly/at first §3, 7, 44, 49, 65,
68, 74, 102
‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܡ‬煟‫ ܩ‬priority §48
焏‫ܣ‬煟‫( ܩ‬Gr. κάδος) jar §72
焏‫ܡ‬q熏‫ ܩ‬subsistence §7, 11, 36, 63, 68, 78–80,
87, 93–94, 97; constitution §73, 94
‫ܗ‬rq‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܡ‬q熏‫ ܩ‬self-subsistence §7, 22,
40, 44 (see ch. 8 n. 65)
‫ܡ‬熏‫ ܩ‬/ 爟q‫ ܐܬܩ‬ʾeṯpaʿʿal subsist §22, 37, 40,
52, 85, 106; constitute(d) §12, 14, 63, 67,
89–90, 98
爟q‫ ܡܩ‬subsist §7, 64; constitute §67,
uphold 97; introduce §79, produce §65
‫ܣ‬熏‫ܩܢ‬熏‫ ܩ‬pl. 熏̇‫̈ܩܢ‬熏‫( ܩ‬Gr. κύκνος) swan §82,
86
焏‫ܡ‬q‫ ܩ‬dimension §26, 65, 67
爯q‫ܡ‬q̈‫ܐ ܩ‬r‫ ܕܬܠ‬three-dimensional §67
[should perhaps be emended to
‫ܗܝ‬熏‫ܡ‬q̈‫ܐ ܩ‬r‫ܕܬܠ‬, see textual note
to 136.15/B.94r2]
‫ܐ‬r‫ܢ‬q‫ ܩ‬melody §40
‫ܪܐ‬rq‫( ܩ‬Gr. κιθάρα) cither §40
焏‫ܡ‬熏‫ ܩܢ‬individual §20, 41–43, 50–52, 54–
̈
57; 焏‫ܡ‬熏‫ ܩܢ‬pl. realities §8; essence
§ 36, 77, 98; existence/being §12, 99; as
reflexive pronoun §3, 7, 26, 40
焏q煟qq̈q 焏‫ܡ‬熏̈‫ ܩܢ‬particular individuals
§ 20, 42–43, 50–52, 54
318 chapter 13

焏rr‫ ܡܦ‬焏‫̈ܡ‬熏‫ ܩܢ‬separate individuals 焏q‫ܡܠ‬熏r purpose/goal §23, 33; perfection

§41 §108
rq焏‫ܡ‬熏‫ ܩܢ‬essentially § 8 焏q‫ܢ‬熏r change § 68, departure § 82, 86
焏‫ܢ‬熏‫( ܩܢ‬Gr. κανών) rule § 1 焏q‫ܪ‬熏r beginning §2, 67
rq焏‫ܢ‬熏‫ ܩܢ‬regularly (in a regular manner) ‫ܬܦ‬熏r share/have in common §21,
§4, 21 participate §90
‫ܬܐ‬熏qr‫ ܩ‬baldness § 40 ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܬܦ‬熏r participation §88, 90
‫ܘܬܐ‬rqr‫ ܩ‬cold §65, 90, 96–98 牯‫ܠ‬qr / 牯‫ܠ‬qrr‫ ܐ‬turn/change §57, 86, 88,
‫ܬܐ‬熏rqr‫ ܩ‬agedness § 100 90, 94; alter §80
牯‫ܠ‬qrr‫ ܡ‬q‫ ̇ܗܦ‬counterchange §96
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ ܪܒ‬largeness/greatness § 45, 73, 99, 103, (see comm. to §95–98)
105; magnitude § 65, 67; size § 72 焏‫ܡ‬qqr single §47
焏r‫ܓ‬r senses §85 rq焏‫ܡ‬qqr merely §78
‫ܐ‬rr‫ ܪܓ‬sensation § 41, 85; perception § 74 ‫ܬܐ‬熏qqqr surface §66–67, 70, 72
焏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܪܘ‬complaint § 108 焏‫ܡ‬r pl. ‫ܐ‬煿̈‫ܡ‬r name §4, 21, 42, 61, 74, 94;
焏‫ܒ‬q‫ ܪܘ‬construction § 88, 90, 98; composi- word §66
tion §41 q‫ܡܠ‬r / q‫ܡܠ‬rr‫√( ܐ‬q‫ )ܡܠ‬be completed
焏qq‫ ܪ‬mill §107 §63, 108
犟q‫ ܪ‬/ 犟q‫ ܐܬܪ‬go away/depart § 38–39, 68, 焏q‫ܢ‬r insanity (n.), insane (adj.) §86
80, 83, 96 焏qrr solution §35, 52
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܒ‬qq‫ ܪ‬moisture § 65 焏qrr 焏‫ ܕܠ‬without solution §47
焏rq‫ ܪ‬head §28, 45, 107, starting point/prin- ‫ܐ‬rqrr real §60
ciple §67, beginning § 102 ‫ܪܐ‬rr truth §2, 6, 57, 72, 98
焏qrq‫ ܪ‬main §9–10, 51–52 ‫ܐ‬r‫ܐܣ‬rr foundation §65
q‫ ܪܢ‬/ q‫ ܐܬܪܢ‬think of/be thought of § 13, 37,
39; consider § 65, 67 焏q‫ ܬܐܘܪ‬theory §3
q‫ ܪܥ‬/ q‫ ܐܬܪܥ‬think (of/about) § 4, 8; ‫ܘܢ‬rq‫( ܬܐ‬Gr. θέατρον) theatre §14
consider §66 ‫ܐ‬rq熏q‫ ܬ‬evidence/demonstration §23
焏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܪܥ‬concept § 4–5, 8, 10 焏‫ܡ‬熏q‫ ܬ‬definition §21, 35, 37–40, 47, 57, 61,
焏q‫ܢ‬q‫ ܪܥ‬conceptual § 7 87
爟q‫ ܬ‬define §9, 22, 36, 38
‫ܕܐ‬焏r demon §77 焏‫ܡ‬qr‫ ܡ‬delimited §66
焏‫ܠ‬q焏r metaphorical, false § 60 ‫݁ܬܐ‬犏‫ܡ‬q‫ ܬ‬shame §86
rq焏‫ܠ‬q焏r metaphorically § 57 (see ch. 8 ‫ܐ‬r‫ܦ‬rq‫ ܬ‬supplication §6
nn. 132–133) 焏‫ ܬܠܓ‬snow §86, 96
‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܠ‬q焏r‫ ܒ‬by metaphor § 53 ‫ܐ‬rq‫ ܬܪܒ‬increase §68, 89, 106
‫ܐ‬熏r (√‫ܝ‬熏r) be equal § 74, 94, 99, 104 ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬q‫ ܬܪ‬posteriority (lit. ‘secondness’)
焏q‫ܓܢ‬熏r change § 89, 106–107 §48
‫ܕܥ‬熏r (√‫ܥ‬煟q) signify § 4, 6, 10–12, 14–18, 20, rq‫ܐ‬犏q‫ ܬܪ‬straight ahead §107
49, 51, 61, 66, 74, 98–99 ‫ܐ‬rq‫ ܬܪܥ‬mind §7; reason §66; sense §68;
焏‫ܘܕܥ‬熏r hallmark/headmark § 20, 91 opinion §96
焏‫ܠܦ‬q熏r change § 85; alteration § 89, 106 ‫ܐ‬熏‫ܐ ܕܓ‬rq‫ ܬܪܥ‬common sense §68
‫ܐ‬煿‫ܡ‬熏r title §42–43 ‫ܐ‬rq‫ܢ‬qq ‫ܐ‬rq‫ ܬܪܥ‬natural opinion §96
 chapter 14
English-Syriac Index
Accident 焏r煟‫§ ܓ‬22–23, 34–41, 51–52, 62–
64, (§83)
Accidentally/by accident rq焏‫ܢ‬r煟‫ § ܓ‬51
Account ‫ܐ‬r‫§ ܡܠ‬75
Activity ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬煟‫ § ܡܥܒ‬18
Actuality ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬煟‫ § ܡܥܒ‬57, 91
Actually rq焏‫ܢ‬煟‫ § ܡܥܒ‬54;
焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܥ‬熏‫ ܒܣ‬煿‫ § ܒ‬39, 57
Adherence ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܦ‬q‫ § ܢܩ‬105
Adjoined 牯q‫§ ܢܩ‬25, 72
Affected, be rq (√rrq) § 69
̈
affected qualities 焏r熏rq 焏q‫ § ̈ܙܢ‬81–82,
̈ ̈
85; 焏r熏rq 焏‫ܠ‬qq § 86
Affection/being-affected ‫ܫ‬焏q‫ § ܕ‬9, 19, 74;
焏rq §86
Affective 焏‫ܢ‬rq‫§ ܡ‬81–82, 85–86
affective qualities 焏‫ܢ‬rq̈‫ ܡ‬焏q‫ § ̈ܙܢ‬81–82,
85; 焏‫ܢ‬rq̈‫ ܡ‬焏‫ܠ‬q̈q § 86
Agedness ‫ܬܐ‬熏rqr‫ § ܩ‬100
Aim 焏rq‫§ ܢ‬2
Air ‫( ܐܐܪ‬Gr. ἀήρ) §65, 68, 72
Alive qq‫§ ܕ‬6
Alteration 焏‫ܠܦ‬q熏r § 89, 106
Analogy 焏q‫§ ܕܘܡ‬68
Ancientness ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܩ‬qr‫ § ܥ‬100
Angel 焏q焏‫§ ܡܠ‬77
Animal ‫ܬܐ‬熏qq §10, 20, 29–30, 42–43, 45,
77, 87, 101 (see ch. 7 n. 6)
Animate 焏‫ܢ‬r‫§ ܢܦ‬10, 20, 41–43, 51–52; r‫ܕܢܦ‬
§43, 87, 100
animate things ‫ܐ‬rq‫ܢ‬r̈‫ § ܢܦ‬87
Appear/occur ‫ܫ‬煟‫ § ܓ‬38–39, 41, 80, 82–83,
85–86, 89, 95–97, 106
Appellation 焏q‫ܢ‬熏q § 4, 42, 74, 94
Applicable, be 爟q‫ § ܠ‬39
Appropriately rq焏‫ܢ‬qq‫ § ܡ‬49 (see comm.
ad loc.)
Archiatros/chief physician ‫ܘܣ‬rqqq‫( ܐܪ‬Gr.
ἀρχιατρός) (title, § 109)
Archon/ruler 焏‫ܢ‬熏q‫( ܐܪ‬Gr. ἄρχων) § 103
Argument ‫ܐ‬r‫§ ܡܠ‬65, 71
Arrangement 焏‫ܣ‬qq (Gr. τάξις) § 1
Art ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫§ ܐܘܡܢ‬1, 4, 8, 54, 66, 74, 108
according to the art rq焏‫ § ܐܘܡܢ‬7
Artisan 焏‫§ ܐܘܡܢ‬7, 66
Arithmetic ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫§ ܡܢ‬3
Astronomy 焏q‫ܡ‬熏‫ܘܢ‬rq‫( ܐܣ‬Gr. ἀστρονομία)
§ 3 (see ch. 8 n. 10)
Assumption ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬r‫§ ܡܣܒ‬68
Axis 焏‫ܢ‬r‫§ ܣ‬107
Authoritatively rq焏q‫ܠ‬r‫§ ܡ‬6
Baldness ‫ܬܐ‬熏qr‫§ ܩ‬40
Barking ‫ܬܐ‬熏q熏‫§ ܢܒ‬57
dog’s ability to bark 焏‫ܠܒ‬q‫ܬܗ ܕ‬熏q熏‫ܢܒ‬
§ 57
Base ‫ܬܬܐ‬熏‫§ ܣ‬66
Beast ‫ܐ‬rq‫§ ܒܥ‬41–43
Beginning 焏q‫ܪ‬熏r §2, 67
Bitterness ‫ܘܬܐ‬rqr‫§ ܡ‬12, 34
Blackness ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܡ‬q‫§ ܐܘ‬34, 38–39, 82, 86,
90, 94, 96–97
Body 焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫§ ܓ‬10, 20, 25–27, 34, 37–43,
65–70, 72–73, 80, 85–85, 107;
human/animate body ‫ܐ‬r‫§ ܦܓ‬27–28,
40, 85–86
Breadth 焏qr‫§ ܦ‬26, 65, 67, 72–73
Briefly ‫ܐ‬rqrq‫§ ܒ‬1, 65, 68; ‫ܐ‬r‫̈ܩ‬q‫§ ܒܦܣ‬43,
72, 87, 91, 98; 焏‫ ܕܒܦܣܩ‬qq‫§ ܐ‬72
Bronze 焏rq‫§ ܢ‬31, 80, 87
Capable of 爯q‫§ ܡ‬51, 91, 95, 97
Capacity ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬q犏‫ܡ‬r‫§ ܡ‬81, 84
Carpenter ‫ܐ‬r‫§ ܢܓ‬7
Category 焏‫( ܓܢܣ‬Gr. γένος) §20, 74–75,
78–79, 81, 85, 87–88, 90, 93
Cause/reason ‫ܐ‬r‫§ ܥܠ‬74, 83
Celestial (body) ‫ܐ‬r‫ܙܠ‬熏‫§ ܡ‬72, 107
Change 焏q‫ܓܢ‬熏r §89, 106–107; 焏q‫ܢ‬熏r §68;
焏‫ܠܦ‬q熏r §85
Change/turn/alter 牯‫ܠ‬qr / 牯‫ܠ‬qrr‫§ ܐ‬57,
80, 86, 88, 90, 94, 96
Cither ‫ܪܐ‬rq‫( ܩ‬Gr. κιθάρα) §40
Class 焏‫ܣ‬qq (Gr. τάξις) §52
Classification 焏‫ܣ‬qq §80
Cold ‫ܘܬܐ‬rqr‫§ ܩ‬65, 90, 96–98
Colour 焏‫ܢ‬熏‫§ ܓ‬12, 80, 82, 86, 94
Coming into being 焏q‫§ ܗܘ‬7–8, 100
320
Common sense ‫ܐ‬熏‫ܐ ܕܓ‬rq‫ § ܬܪܥ‬68
Comparison 焏‫ܡ‬q‫ § ܦ‬66
Complaint 焏‫ܢ‬q‫ § ܪܘ‬108
Completed, be q‫ܡܠ‬rr‫ § ܐ‬63, 108
Completive 焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܡܠ‬r‫ § ܡ‬37, 63
Composition 焏‫ܒ‬q‫ § ܪܘ‬41
Comprehend ‫ ܕܪܟ‬afʿel § 68
Concept 焏‫ܢ‬q‫ § ܪܥ‬4–5, 8, 10
Concave 焏‫ܠ‬q‫ܠ‬q § 72
Conclusion 焏‫ § ܡܦܩܢ‬44
Concomitant with each other ‫ܕܐ‬煟q̈‫ ܠ‬爯‫ܦ‬q̈‫ܢܩ‬
§75, 78–79
Constitute(d) 爟q‫ܡ√( ܐܬܩ‬熏‫ § )ܩ‬12, 14, 63,
67, 89–90, 98; 爟q‫ § ܡܩ‬67
Constitution 焏‫ܢ‬qq 爟q‫ § ܩ‬80; 焏‫ܡ‬q熏‫ § ܩ‬73,
94
Construction 焏‫ܒ‬q‫ § ܪܘ‬88, 90, 98; 焏‫ܩܒܥ‬
§66
Contain r‫ܒ‬q §9–10, 15–18, 25, 41–42, 49, 54,
69–70, 72, 74, 87
Contradicted, be 爿‫ܣ‬q‫√( ܐܬ‬爿‫ܣ‬q) § 80
Contrary 焏q‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ § ܣܩ‬83, 88, 94, 96–97 (see
comm. to §88–94)
Contrariety ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܒܠ‬熏‫ § ܣܩ‬90, 94, 97 (see
comm. to §88–94)
Controversy 焏‫ܢ‬qrq § 38, 67
Convex 焏‫ܒ‬q‫ § ܩܒ‬72
Counterchange 牯‫ܠ‬qrr‫ ܡ‬q‫ § ̇ܗܦ‬96 (see
comm. to §95–98)
Crafts ‫ܐ‬煟‫§ ܥ̈ܒ‬7
Creation ‫ܐ‬rqr‫ §( ܒ‬109), pl. ‫ܐ‬rqr‫ ܒ‬created
things §73
Creator 焏q‫ܘ‬r‫ § ܒ‬7–8; ‫ܕܐ‬熏‫ § ܥܒ‬8
Creatorship ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܘ‬r‫ § ܒ‬8
Criticism/blame 焏q‫ܠ‬煟‫ § ܥ‬35, 108
Cubit 焏‫§ ܐܡ‬11
Darkness 焏q熏rq § 94
Declarative 焏‫ܩ‬熏‫ § ܦܣ‬6
Defence/apology 焏q‫ܘ‬r‫ ܒ‬犟‫ § ܡܦ‬35,
39
Define 爟q‫§ ܬ‬9, 22, 36, 38
Definition 焏‫ܡ‬熏q‫ § ܬ‬21, 35, 37–40, 47, 57, 61,
87; ‫ܐ‬r‫ § ܡܠ‬36, 94
defining description ‫ܐ‬r‫ܡܠ‬
‫ܐ‬rq‫ܡܢ‬qr‫ § ܡ‬36, 39
Degree 焏‫ܣ‬qq 94
Delimited 焏‫ܡ‬qr‫ § ܡ‬66
Demon ‫ܕܐ‬焏r §77
chapter 14
Depart/go away 犟q‫ ܪ‬/ 犟q‫§ ܐܬܪ‬38–39, 68,
80, 83, 96
Departure 焏q‫ܢ‬熏r §82, 86
Depth 焏‫ܡܩ‬熏‫§ ܥ‬26, 65, 67
Destroy/be destroyed 爏‫ܒ‬q / 爏‫ܒ‬q‫§ ܐܬ‬38,
40, 69, 80, 96
Destruction 焏‫ܒܠ‬q §39–41, 69, 91, 106;
焏‫ܒܠ‬熏q §40, 65, 89
Difference/differentia 焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܪ‬熏‫§ ܦ‬41–43
Different 焏‫ܠܦ‬qr‫§ ܡ‬26, 42, 47, 74
Differentiate ‫ܫ‬r‫ ܦ‬paʿʿel §48
Dimension 焏‫ܡ‬q‫§ ܩ‬26, 65, 67
three-dimensional 爯q‫ܡ‬q̈‫ܐ ܩ‬r‫§ ܕܬܠ‬67
Diminution/decrease ‫ܘܬܐ‬rq犏‫§ ܒ‬89, 106;
‫ܪܐ‬犏‫§ ܒ‬68
Direction ‫ܐ‬rq‫§ ܣ‬107
Discern/be discerned ‫ܫ‬r‫ ܦ‬/ ‫ܫ‬r‫§ ܐܬܦ‬74
Discourse ‫ܐ‬r‫§ ܡܠ‬2, 99, 108, (109)
Discussion ‫ܐ‬r‫§ ܡܠ‬41, 44
Dispute(s) 焏q‫ܡ‬q̈q‫( ܙ‬Gr. ζητήματα, in pl.)
§35; see also ‫ܐ‬r‫ܒܥ‬
Distinct (from) (爯‫ )ܡ‬rqr‫§ ܦ‬20, 42, 96–98
Distinction 焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܪ‬熏‫§ ܦ‬20, 98
Distinguished, be ‫ܫ‬r‫§ ܐܬܦ‬95, 97–98
Divide/be divided 焿‫ ܦܠ‬/ 焿‫§ ܐܬܦܠ‬3f., 7,
20–22, 29, 41–47, 66, 74, 81f., 86, 88, 101,
107f.
Division 焏‫ܠܓ‬熏‫§ ܦ‬1, 4, 44, 46–48, 67, 74, 90,
108
Dog 焏‫ܠܒ‬q §20, 21, 29–30, 45, 57, 101 (see
textual note to 122.11/B.90r7)
̇
Doing (i.e. category of action) 煟‫§ ܕܥܒ‬9, 18,
74
Dot ‫ܬܐ‬煟‫ܩ‬熏‫§ ܢ‬67
Double 焏‫ܦ‬焏‫ ܥ‬/ 焏‫§ ܐܥܦ‬13, 74, 93
Dryness ‫ܬܐ‬熏rq‫ܒ‬q §65
Duly rq焏‫§ ܙܕܩ‬108
Duration ‫ܐ‬r‫ܓ‬熏‫§ ܢ‬76
Element 焏‫ܣ‬q熏q‫( ܐܣ‬Gr. στοιχεῖον) §65
Elucidation ‫ܗܪܐ‬熏‫§ ܢ‬35
Emanate 煿‫§ ܢܒ‬8
Embrace/cover 爟q‫§ ܠ‬104
Entailment ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܦ‬q‫§ ܢܩ‬13
Envy 焏‫ܣܡ‬q §2
Equal, be ‫ܐ‬熏r (√‫ܝ‬熏r) §74, 94, 99, 104
Essence 焏qrq‫§ ܐ‬8; 焏‫ܡ‬熏‫§ ܩܢ‬36, 77, 98
Essentially rq焏qrq‫§ ܐ‬8; rq焏‫ܡ‬熏‫§ ܩܢ‬8
Evidence/demonstration ‫ܐ‬rq熏q‫§ ܬ‬23
english-syriac index
Evil ‫ܬܐ‬熏rq‫§ ܒ‬94
Explicitly rq焏‫ܥ‬煟q § 61
Expression ‫ܐ‬r‫ § ܡܠ‬57
Extension 焏qr‫§ ܡ‬65, 67, 70, 72–73
Extreme edge 焏qr‫ܐ ܒ‬r‫ § ܥܒ‬72
Faculty 焏‫ܠ‬qq §12, 65, 80, 85, 88, 90–91, 95–
97
Father 焏‫§ ܐܒ‬13, 74–75, 78–79, 93, 97
Fear ‫ܐ‬r‫ܠ‬q‫§ ܕ‬86
Feeling ‫ܐ‬rrq §85
Figure 焏‫ܡ‬qq‫( ܐܣ‬Gr. σχῆμα) § 7, 12, 21, 65,
80–81, 87
Fire ‫ܪܐ‬熏‫§ ܢ‬65, 85, 96, 107
Firstly/at first rq‫ܡ‬煟‫ § ܩ‬3, 7, 44, 49, 65, 68,
74, 102
Follow/attend/be attached 牯q‫ § ܢܩ‬37, 51–
52, 57, 61, 70, 77, 82, 87, 99, 104
Form 焏r‫( ܐܕ‬Gr. εἶδος) § 7–8, 23, 31, 41 (see
ch. 7 nn. 2–3)
form of expression ‫ܐ‬r‫ ܕܡܠ‬焏‫ܡ‬qq‫ܐܣ‬
§57
Foundation ‫ܐ‬r‫ܐܣ‬rr § 65
General ‫ܐ‬熏‫( ܕܓ‬see ‫ܐ‬熏‫ § )ܓ‬2–3, 6, 10, 12,
15, 19–20, 42, 48, 102; 焏q‫ܢ‬熏‫ § ܓ‬66
Generation ‫ܐ‬煟‫ܠ‬熏‫ § ܡ‬65; 焏q‫ § ܗܘ‬89, 106
Genus 焏‫( ܓܢܣ‬Gr. γένος) § 7–20, 23, 29–30,
41, 43–45, 47, 49–52, 81
̈
most generic genera 爯q‫ ܓܢܣ‬爿‫ § ܓܢ‬9–
10, 20 (see ch. 7 n. 4)
Geometry ‫ܘܬܐ‬rq‫ § ܡ‬3, 54
Government ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬r‫ܒ‬煟‫ § ܡ‬3
Gradually ‫ܐ‬煟q焏‫ܐ ܒ‬煟q焏‫ § ܒ‬66
Half 焏‫§ ܦܠܓ‬13, 74, 93
Hallmark/headmark 焏‫ܘܕܥ‬熏r § 20, 91
Harmony 焏q‫ܢ‬熏‫( ܐܪܡ‬Gr. ἁρμονία) § 40
Heat, hotness ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܡ‬q‫ܡ‬q § 65, 85, 90, 96–
98
Heteronyms ≈ ‫ܐ‬rq‫ܢ‬rq‫‘ ܐ‬different’ § 21 (see
comm. ad loc.)
Hollow/holes 焏‫ܠܠ‬q § 72
Homonyms ‫ܐ‬煿 ̈ ‫ܡ‬r rq‫ § ܕ̈ܡ‬21 (see comm.
ad loc.)
Horse 焏q‫ܣ‬熏‫§ ܣ‬10, 20, 29–30, 57, 77, 101
Ignorance ‫ܐ‬r‫ܥ‬煟q 焏‫ܠ‬ § 94
Image 焏q‫§ ܕܘܡ‬66
321
Imagination 焏‫ܒ‬r熏q §39, 47, 67
Immortal ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ ܡ‬焏‫§ ܠ‬6
Imperative ‫ܕܐ‬熏‫§ ܦܩ‬6
Impossible 焏q犏‫ ܡ‬焏‫§ ܠ‬9, 13, 22, 36–37, 46,
70
Imprint (v.) 牟‫ܒ‬q §7–8, 66
Imprint (n.) 焏‫ܒܥ‬q §8
Inanimate r‫ ܢܦ‬焏‫§ ܕܠ‬20, 41, 87, 100
Incapacity ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬q犏‫ܡ‬r‫ ܡ‬焏‫§ ܠ‬81, 84
Incorporeal 焏‫ܡ‬r熏‫ ܓ‬焏‫§ ܠ‬41, 70, 80; 焏‫ܕܠ‬
‫ܡ‬熏r‫§ ܓ‬67, 68, 70–72; 焏‫ܡ‬qr‫ ܓ‬焏‫ܠ‬
§ 66–68, 70, 80
Increase ‫ܐ‬rq‫§ ܬܪܒ‬68, 89, 106
Individual 焏‫ܡ‬熏‫§ ܩܢ‬20, 41–43, 50–52, 54–
57
̈
particular individuals 焏q煟qq̈q 焏‫ܡ‬熏‫ܩܢ‬
§ 20, 42–43, 50–52, 54
Inferior rq犏‫§ ܒ‬41
Insanity (n.), insane (adj.) 焏q‫ܢ‬r §86
Instability ‫ܬܘܬܐ‬r‫ ܡܣ‬焏‫§ ܠ‬81, 83
Insult ‫ܐ‬rqq‫§ ܨܘ‬108
Intellect 焏‫ܥ‬煟‫§ ܡ‬66
Intelligence 焏‫ܠ‬q熏‫§ ܣ‬74
Intelligible 焏‫ܥܢ‬煟qr‫§ ܡ‬68
Intermediacy ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܥ‬犏‫§ ܡ‬94
Interrogative 焏‫ܠܢ‬焏r‫§ ܡ‬6
Introduce 爏‫√( ܥ‬爏‫ )ܥܠ‬afʿel §73, 77, 97;
爟q‫§ ܡܩ‬79
Investigation 焏‫ܩܒ‬熏‫§ ܥ‬73
Jar 焏‫ܒ‬r‫§ ܓ‬25f.; 焏‫ܣ‬煟‫( ܩ‬Gr. κάδος) §72
Kind 焏r‫( ܐܕ‬Gr. εἶδος) § 66, 84–87, 90;
焏‫( ܓܢܣ‬here 爿‫ ܓܢ‬爏q) §80
Knower 焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܘܥ‬煟q §74
Knowledge ‫ܐ‬r‫ܥ‬煟q §1, 8, 74, 94
Language ‫ܐ‬r‫§ ܡܠ‬66
Largeness/greatness ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫§ ܪܒ‬45, 72–73, 99,
103, 105
Last 焏qrq‫§ ܐ‬6–8, 20, 57, 66
Laughing ‫ܬܐ‬熏q熏q‫§ ܓ‬57
man’s ability to laugh 焏r‫ܢ‬r‫ܬܗ ܕܒ‬熏q熏q‫ܓ‬
§ 57
able to laugh 焏q熏q‫§ ܓ‬57
Law 焏‫ܣ‬熏‫( ܢܡ‬Gr. νόμος) §3
Lead, (white) 焏q煟q‫§ ܐܣܦ‬86
Learning 焏‫ܠܦܢ‬熏q §1, 74
Left 焏‫§ ܣܡܠ‬74, 90, 93, 95, 98, 107
322
̈
Legislation 焏‫ܣ‬熏‫ ܢܡ‬爟q‫ § ܣ‬3
Length ‫ܬܐ‬熏qq‫ § ܐܪ‬67, 73; 焏q‫ § ܐܘܪ‬26, 65,
67, 72–73
Less ‫ܘܬܐ‬rq犏‫( ܒ‬lit. ‘lessness’) § 61
Light ‫ܗܪܐ‬熏‫§ ܢ‬94
Limit 焏q‫§ ܣ‬25–26, 72
Line 焏q‫ܪ‬熏‫§ ܣ‬66–67, 73
Living 焏qq §42–43, 49, 51–52; qq‫ § ܕ‬41–43
Logic ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܠ‬q‫ § ܡܠ‬20
‘logical art’ ‫ܐ‬r‫ܠ‬q‫ܬܐ ܡܠ‬熏‫ § ܐܘܡܢ‬1, 4,
66, 74, 108
logical philosophy ‫ܐ‬r‫ܠ‬q‫ܬܐ ܡܠ‬熏‫ܦ‬熏‫ܠܣ‬q‫ܦ‬
§53
logically rq焏‫ܠ‬q‫ § ܡܠ‬21
Love 焏‫ܒ‬熏q §2, 108
Magnitude ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ § ܪܒ‬65, 67
Main 焏qrq‫§ ܪ‬9–10, 51–52
Manufacture ‫ܕܘܬܐ‬熏‫ § ܥܒ‬65
Mark ‫ܢ‬熏q‫ܡ‬q‫( ܣ‬Gr. σημεῖον) § 67
Master ‫ܐ‬r‫§ ܡ‬13, 32, 74–75, 78, 93
Mathematical sciences/mathematics 焏‫ܠܦܢ‬熏q
̈ odd number 焏‫ܓ‬熟‫ ܐܦ‬焏‫ܢ‬q‫§ ܡܢ‬94
§3 (see ch. 8 n. 6)
Matter 焏‫( ܗܘܠ‬Gr. ὕλη) § 7–8, 23, 31, 41, 65
material 焏q‫ § ܗܘܠܢ‬7
̈
Meanings 焏‫ § ܗܘܢ‬1
Measure ‫ܐ‬rq熏r‫ ܡ‬pl. ‫ܐ‬rq̈r熏‫ § ܡ‬11–12,
70; ‫ܪܐ‬熏q §70
Medicine ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ § ܐܣ‬54
Melody ‫ܐ‬r‫ܢ‬q‫ § ܩ‬40
Member/part of the body 焏‫ § ܗܕܡ‬27–28,
91, 95
Memory 焏‫ܗܕܢ‬熏‫ § ܥ‬7–8
Merely rq焏‫ܡ‬qqr § 78
Metaphorical 焏‫ܠ‬q焏r § 60
metaphorically rq焏‫ܠ‬q焏r § 57 (see ch. 8
nn. 132–133)
by metaphor ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܠ‬q焏r‫ § ܒ‬53
Metaphysics/theology ‫ܐ‬rq̈煿‫ܐ ܕܐܠ‬r‫ܥ‬煟q
̈ 37, 62–63, 67, 73, 91, 95
§3
Mill 焏qq‫§ ܪ‬107
Mind 焏‫§ ܗܘܢ‬68 ‫ܐ‬rq‫ § ܬܪܥ‬7
Mode 焏r‫§ ܐܕ‬89, 107
Model ‫ܪܐ‬熏q §66
Moisture ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܒ‬qq‫ § ܪ‬65
More ‫ܘܬܐ‬rqrq (lit. ‘moreness’) § 61
Mortal ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ § ܡ‬49
Motion/movement 焏‫ § ܙܘܥ‬41, 68, 89, 106–
107
chapter 14
Move/cause to move 牟q‫ ܐܙ‬/ 牟q‫( ܐܬܬܙ‬see
‫§ )ܙܘܥ‬41, 68, 87, 107
Music ‫ܘܬܐ‬r‫ܩ‬q‫ܣ‬熏‫( ܡ‬Gr. μουσική) §3
Name 焏‫ܡ‬r §4, 21, 42, 61, 74, 94
Nature 焏‫ܢ‬qq §37, 40, 41–43, 47, 58, 65, 68–
69, 73, 80, 85
natural, see physical
natural opinion ‫ܐ‬rq‫ܢ‬qq ‫ܐ‬rq‫§ ܬܪܥ‬96
Naturally/by nature rq焏‫ܢ‬qq §5, 7, 51–52,
65, 73, 77, 86, 101, 105 and 焏‫ܢ‬qq‫§ ܒ‬5, 41,
76–79, 99
Necessary 焏‫( ܐܢܢܩ‬Gr. ἀνάγκη) §73, 97, 101;
‫ܐ‬犏‫§ ܐܠ‬40, 46–47, 70, 75, 77, 96–97, 101
Necessarily rq‫ܐ‬犏‫§ ܐܠ‬77, 97; q‫ ܐܢܢܩ‬爯‫ܡ‬
(Gr. ἀνάγκῃ) §77, 79
Need/stand in need 犟q‫§ ܣܢ‬22, 49, 52, 87
Neighing ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫§ ܨܗܘܠ‬57
horse’s ability to neigh ‫ܬܗ‬熏‫ܨܗܘܠ‬
焏q‫ܣ‬熏‫§ ܕܣ‬57
Number 焏‫ܢ‬q‫§ ܡܢ‬11, 20, 42, 48, 66, 94
even number 焏q熏r 焏‫ܢ‬q‫§ ܡܢ‬94
Object ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫§ ܨܒ‬4–5, 7–11, 21–21, 25–27, 29,
31, 36, 44–48, 73–75, 78–79, 85–90, 95,
97–98, 100
concrete objects 焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܥ‬熏‫§ ܣ‬98
Objection ‫ܐ‬rq‫§ ܗܦ‬50
Opposite 焏‫ܒܠ‬熏‫§ ܕܠܩ‬2, 19, 61, 91–93, 97 (see
comm. to §88–94)
Opposition ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܒܠ‬熏‫§ ܕܠܩ‬88, 90–94, 96–
98 (see comm. to §88–94)
Order 焏‫ܣ‬qq (Gr. τάξις) §4, 48, 99, 103, 105,
108
out of place (extraordinary) 爯‫ ܡ‬r‫ܠܒ‬
焏‫ܣ‬qq §2
̈
Part ‫ܐ‬r‫ ܡܢ‬pl. ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫§ ܡܢ‬3, 22–23, 27, 36–
Participate ‫ܬܦ‬熏r §90
Participation ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܬܦ‬熏r §88, 90
Particular 焏q煟qqq §42, 48; ‫ܐ‬煟q焏‫ܐ ܒ‬煟q焏‫ܒ‬
§41, 77
Perceptible/perceivable 焏‫ܢ‬r‫ܪܓ‬r‫§ ܡ‬41,
67–67, 73–74; 焏‫ܢ‬q熟qr‫‘ ܡ‬visible’ §68
Perception ‫ܐ‬rr‫§ ܪܓ‬74
Perfection 焏q‫ܡܠ‬熏r §108
Philosopher 焏‫ܦ‬熏‫ܠܣ‬q‫( ܦ‬Gr. φιλόσοφος) (title)
§6, 21, 65, 73, 75, 91
english-syriac index 323

Philosophy ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܦ‬熏‫ܠܣ‬q‫( ܦ‬Gr. φιλοσοφία) Real/proper ‫ܐ‬rqrq §51, 57; ‫ܐ‬rqrr §60
§1, 3–4, 22, 54 properly/truly rq‫ܐ‬rqrq §94
logical philosophy ‫ܐ‬r‫ܠ‬q‫ܬܐ ܡܠ‬熏‫ܦ‬熏‫ܠܣ‬q‫ܦ‬ Reality ‫ܘܬܐ‬rqrq §53
§53 Reason ‫ܐ‬rq‫§ ܬܪܥ‬66
natural philosophy ‫ܐ‬rq‫ܢ‬qq ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܦ‬熏‫ܠܣ‬q‫ܦ‬ Receive 爏‫ ܩܒ‬paʿʿel §46, 58, 65, 70, 80, 85,
§65, 108 91
̈
Physics 焏‫ܢ‬qq ‫ܬ‬熏‫ § ܡܠܠ‬3 Receptive 焏‫§ ܡܩܒܠܢ‬37, 61, 65, 70
physical thing 焏‫ܢ‬qq § 8, 12, 72–74, 80 Relatives ‫ܡ‬煟‫ܬ ܡ‬熏‫ ܠ‬/ ‫ܡ‬煟‫ܬ ܡ‬熏‫§ ܕܠ‬9, 13,
physical/natural 焏q‫ܢ‬qq § 7–8, 65, 91 74–75, 78–79, 88, 90, 93, 95, 97
(physiological), 96 Requirement 焏‫ܢܩܢ‬熏‫§ ܣ‬65
physical things pl. ‫ܐ‬rq̈‫ܢ‬qq § 74 Rational 焏‫ܠ‬q‫§ ܡܠ‬5, 41, 49, 66, 77, 80
̈
Place ‫ܐ‬rq‫ ܕܘ‬pl. ‫ܐ‬rqq‫ § ܕܘ‬14, 66, 68, Rationality ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܠ‬q‫§ ܡܠ‬77
70–71, 89, 106–107; ‫ § ܐܬܪܐ‬14, 66,
̈
Realities (pl.) 焏‫ܡ‬熏‫§ ܩܢ‬8
74 Reciprocate with ‫ܬ‬熏‫ ܠ‬q‫ܦ‬煿‫§ ܡ‬57–58, 60
Placed (i.e. category of position) 爟q‫ ܣ‬/爟q‫ܕܣ‬ Redness ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܡܩ‬熏‫§ ܣ‬86
§9, 17 Regularly (in a regular manner) rq焏‫ܢ‬熏‫ܩܢ‬
Plant ‫ܐ‬r‫ܒ‬犏‫§ ܢ‬29–30, 43 § 4, 21
Polyonyms ≈ 焏r ̈ ‫ ܐܕ‬rq‫‘ ܕ̈ܡ‬of the same Relation/affinity ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬qq‫§ ܐ‬74, 87
species’ §21 (see comm. ad loc.) without relation ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬qq‫ ܐ‬焏‫§ ܕܠ‬90
Position 焏‫ܡ‬q‫§ ܣ‬66, 74, posture § 17 Remove 爏q‫§ ܒ‬51, 75, 77, 79, 97
Possible 焏qqr‫§ ܡ‬1, 13, 44, 70, 73, 77; Right 焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܡ‬q §74, 90, 93, 95, 98, 107
焏q犏‫§ ܡ‬39, 70, 73, 83 Rotation, in ‫ܕܪܐ‬熏q‫§ ܒ‬107
Posterior 焏qrq‫§ ܐ‬47 Rule 焏‫ܢ‬熏‫( ܩܢ‬Gr. κανών) §1
Posteriority ‫ܬܐ‬熏qrq‫ § ܐ‬105; ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬q‫( ܬܪ‬lit.
‘secondness’) §48 Science 焏‫ܠܦܢ‬熏q §54, 58
Potentiality 焏‫ܠ‬qq §57 Science of natural things/physics ‫ܬ‬熏‫ܡܠܠ‬
Practice ‫ܪܘܬܐ‬熏‫ § ܣܥ‬3 焏‫ܢ‬qq̈ §3
Precative 焏‫ܢ‬q‫ܠ‬犏‫ § ܡ‬6 Sequence ‫ܪܐ‬煟‫§ ܣ‬99, 102, 105 (see comm. to
Predicated of 爏‫ ܥ‬r‫ܐܡ‬r‫ § ܡ‬49, 51–52, 57 § 99–105)
(see comm. to § 95–98) Sensation ‫ܐ‬rr‫§ ܪܓ‬41, 85
Preface ‫ܢ‬熏q‫ܐܘܡ‬r‫( ܦ‬Gr. προοίμιον) § 102 Senses 焏r‫ܓ‬r §85
Primary 焏q‫ܡ‬煟‫§ ܩ‬7–10, 20, 41, 44, 46–52, 65 Separate/be separated ‫ܫ‬r‫ ܦ‬/ ‫ܫ‬r‫§ ܐܬܦ‬38–
Principle 焏rq‫§ ܪ‬67 40, 83, 94
Prior 爟q煟‫§ ܩ‬75–79, 100–103; 焏q‫ܡ‬煟‫ § ܩ‬47 Separate (adj.) 焏rr‫§ ܡܦ‬41; discrete
Priority ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܡ‬q煟‫ § ܩ‬99–100, 104–105; § 66
‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܡ‬煟‫§ ܩ‬48 separately rq焏rr‫§ ܡܦ‬91
Privation ‫ܘܬܐ‬熟q‫ § ܓܠ‬88, 90–91, 95–97 Shame ‫݁ܬܐ‬犏‫ܡ‬q‫§ ܬ‬86
Problem/question/dispute ‫ܐ‬r‫ § ܒܥ‬44, 47, Shape ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫§ ܕܡ‬31, 65, 80–81, 87
50, 52, 62, 75 Share/have in common ‫ܬܦ‬熏r §21
Property ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܠ‬q‫ § ܕ‬53–54, 56–57, 61, 104– Sickness 焏‫ܪܗܢ‬熏q §82
105 (see comm. to § 53–60) Single 焏‫ܡ‬qqr §47
Purpose/goal 焏q‫ܡܠ‬熏r § 23, 33 Signify ‫ܕܥ‬熏r (√‫ܥ‬煟q) §4, 6, 10–12, 14–18,
20, 49, 51, 61, 66, 74, 98–99
Quality ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܢ‬q‫ § ܐ‬9; ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܢ‬q‫ § ܐ‬12; 焏‫ܙܢ‬ Sight 焏q熟q §91, 95–96; ‫ܬܐ‬熟q §90, 98
§65, 80–83; 84–87, 106; 焏‫ܠ‬qq § 80, 86, Similar, be 焏‫√( ܕܡ‬q‫§ )ܕܡ‬45, 47, 74
84, 94; 焏‫ܙܓ‬熏‫ § ܡ‬80; 爿qqq‫ܐ‬熏‫( ܦ‬Gr. Similarly ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܡ‬煟‫ ܒ‬煿̇‫§ ܒ‬41–42, 107
ποιότης) §12 (see comm. to § 12) Simple 焏qqr‫§ ܦ‬4, 7, 10, 41
Quantity ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܡ‬q § 9, 11–12, 66–68, 72–73, Simply ‫ܣ‬熏‫( ܐܦܠ‬Gr. ἁπλῶς) §91
106 Simultaneous ‫ܐ‬煟qq‫§ ܐ‬57, 75, 78–79
324
Slave ‫ܐ‬煟‫§ ܥܒ‬13, 74–75, 78, 93
Smallness ‫ܪܘܬܐ‬熏‫ § ܙܥ‬45, 73
Snow 焏‫§ ܬܠܓ‬86, 96
Solid 焏‫ܡ‬q‫ܡ‬q § 72
Solution 焏qrr §35, 52
without solution 焏qrr 焏‫ § ܕܠ‬47
Son ‫ܐ‬r‫§ ܒ‬13, 74–75, 78–79, 93, 97
Soul/self 焏r‫ § ܢܦ‬6, 66, 86
Space ‫ ܐܬܪܐ‬pl. ‫ܘܬܐ‬r‫ § ܐܬ‬23, 25–26,
36–37, 68–73, 107
Span 焏qr‫§ ܦ‬11
Species 焏r‫( ܐܕ‬Gr. εἶδος) § 10, 20–21, 23, 29–
30, 42–45, 47, 49–52, 54–60, 82, 86, 90,
95
lowest species 爯qr ̈ ‫ § ܐܕܫ ܐܕ‬20 (see
ch. 7 n. 7)
Speech 焏‫ § ܡܡܠܠ‬66, 92; ‫ܐ‬r‫ § ܡܠ‬2, 6–7,
39
Sphere ‫ܐ‬rq‫( ܐܣܦ‬Gr. σφαῖρα) § 72
Stability ‫ܬܘܬܐ‬r‫ § ܡܣ‬81, 83
Starting point/principle 焏rq‫ § ܪ‬67
Statement ‫ܐ‬r‫ § ܡܠ‬88, 90, 98
Statue 焏q‫ܢ‬q‫ܪ‬煟‫( ܐܢ‬Gr. ἀνδριάντα, in acc.)
§31
Straight ahead rq‫ܐ‬犏q‫ § ܬܪ‬107
Study 焏r‫§ ܕܘܪ‬1, 20, 53
Subject/substrate 煿‫ܘܗܝ ܒ‬rq‫ ܕܐ‬焏‫̇ܗܘ ܡ‬
§40, 104; 煿‫ ܕ̇ܗܘܐ ܒ‬焏‫ § ̇ܗܘ ܡ‬38, 40;
(see comm. to § 52); be subject for 爟q‫ܣ‬
‫§ ܠ‬52 (see comm. ad loc.)
Substance 焏q‫( ܐܘܣ‬Gr. οὐσία) § 9–12, 20,
22–23, 34, 36, 39, 41–44, 46–52, 61–64,
66, 78, 106
compound substance ‫ܐ‬r‫ܒ‬qr‫ ܡ‬焏q‫ܐܘܣ‬
§41
primary substance ‫ܐ‬rq‫ܡ‬煟‫ ܩ‬焏q‫ܐܘܣ‬
§44, 46–52
secondary substance 爯q‫ ܕܬܪܬ‬焏q‫ܐܘܣ‬
§44, 46–52
simple substance ‫ܐ‬rqqr‫ ܦ‬焏q‫ܐܘܣ‬
§41
tertiary substance r‫ ܕܬܠ‬焏q‫ § ܐܘܣ‬50,
52
Subsist 爟q‫ܡ√( ܐܬܩ‬熏‫ § )ܩ‬22, 37, 40, 52, 85,
106; 爟q‫ § ܡܩ‬7, 64;
Subsistence 焏‫ܡ‬q熏‫ § ܩ‬7, 11, 36, 63, 68, 78–
80, 87, 93–94, 97
self-subsistence ‫ܗ‬rq‫ ܕ‬焏‫ܡ‬q熏‫ § ܩ‬7, 22,
40, 44 (see ch. 8 n. 65)
chapter 14
Successively 焏‫ܣ‬qq‫§ ܒ‬21
Sufficiently rq焏‫§ ܣܦܩ‬73, 107
Superior ‫ܪ‬rq‫§ ܡ‬41, 49, 69
Superiority ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫§ ܡܥܠ‬69
Supplication ‫ܐ‬r‫ܦ‬rq‫§ ܬ‬6
Surface ‫ܬܐ‬熏qqqr §66–67, 70, 72
Surveyor/geometer ‫ܐ‬rq‫§ ܡ‬67
̇
Swan ‫ܣ‬熏‫ܩܢ‬熏‫ ܩ‬pl. 熏‫̈ܩܢ‬熏‫( ܩ‬Gr. κύκνος) §82,
86
Sweetness ‫ܬܐ‬熏q‫ܠ‬q §12, 34, 85
Synonyms ≈ 焏r‫ ܐܕ‬煟q r‫‘ ̈ܒܢ‬of one species’
§21 (see comm. ad loc.)
Taste 焏‫ܡ‬熏‫ܥ‬q §80
Temperament 焏‫ܙܓ‬熏‫§ ܡ‬40
Theatre ‫ܘܢ‬rq‫( ܬܐ‬Gr. θέατρον) §14
Theology/metaphysics ‫ܐ‬rq̈煿‫ܐ ܕܐܠ‬r‫ܥ‬煟q
̈
§3
Theory 焏q‫§ ܬܐܘܪ‬3
Thing/matter/entities ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫§ ܨܒ‬24, 91–92,
94
Think (of/about) q‫( ܐܬܪܥ‬see q‫§ )ܪܥ‬4, 8;
q‫ ܪܢ‬/ q‫( ܐܬܪܢ‬see q‫§ )ܪܢ‬13, 37, 39
Thought ‫ܐ‬r‫ܒ‬rq‫§ ܡ‬67
Time 焏‫§ ܙܒܢ‬11, 15, 23–24, 38, 66, 76, 78, 91,
97, 99–100, 102, 105
Title ‫ܐ‬煿‫ܡ‬熏r §42–43
Tract/treatise ‫ܐ‬r‫ܡ‬焏‫( ܡ‬title), § 50,
102
Truth ‫ܪܐ‬rr §2, 6, 57, 72, 98
Type of speech ‫ܐ‬r‫ ܕܡܠ‬焏r‫§ ܐܕ‬6–7
Two-footed ‫ܗܝ‬熏‫ܓܠ‬r 爯q‫§ ܕܬܪܬ‬55, 59 (see
section 5.4 (m))
Understanding 焏‫ܠ‬q熏‫§ ܣ‬1
Usage, in common ‫ܐ‬煟q‫ ܒܥ‬/ ‫ܐ‬煟q‫§ ܠܥ‬65,
104
Vessel 焏‫ܢ‬焏‫§ ܡ‬23, 26, 87
Virtue ‫ܪܘܬܐ‬rq‫§ ܡ‬94
Void ‫ܬܐ‬熏‫ܩ‬q‫§ ܣܦ‬73
Voluntary motion 焏q‫ܢ‬q‫ ܨܒ‬焏‫ܙܘܥ‬ §87
Wax ‫ܪܘܬܐ‬焏‫( ܩ‬Gr. κηρός) §80
Wheel of a wagon ‫ܐ‬r‫ ܕܥܓܠ‬焏‫ܓܠ‬q‫ܓ‬
§107
When (i.e. category of time) ‫ܝ‬r‫§ ܐܡ‬9, 15
Where (i.e. category of place/location) 焏qq‫ܐ‬
§9, 14
english-syriac index 325

Whiteness ‫ܪܘܬܐ‬熏q § 34, 82, 86, 90, 94, 96– 12–16, 18–19, 22, 45, 47, 98–99; 焏‫ܡ‬r
97 § 66
Wisdom ‫ܐ‬r‫ܡ‬qq § 3, 105, 108 Wrath ‫ܐ‬r‫ܡ‬q §86
Word 焏‫ܬ ܩܠ‬r‫ ܒ‬pl. 焏‫ ̈ܩܠ‬r‫ § ̈ܒܢ‬4–5, 10, Wrathful 焏q‫ܢ‬r‫ܡ‬q §86
 chapter 15

Name and Place Index

Abdisho bar Berikha 9 Athanasius of Balad 18, 79, 85, 186f., 196, 199,
Abu Uthman al-Dimashqi 15, 77 205, 216, 218, 220, 247, 253 n. 219
Agapetus i of Rome 4–8, 26 Athens 19, 26 n. 37, 47, 52, 54, 60
Agapius of Manbij 8 Academy of Athens 47, 54, 99
Agathias 3 n. 2
Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā Thaʿlab 186 n. 37 Bar Bahlul 11, 71, 187 n. 38, 226
Ajax 197f. Bardaisan ix, 11, 75, 241f.
al-Maʾmūn 37 Bar ʿEbroyo 3f., 8 n. 21, 17, 36–38, 196, 199
Albinus 241 (see next) Beirut 26, 43
Alcinous 178 n. 4, 212 n. 119 (see previous) Boethos of Sidon 206f. n. 104
Alexander of Aphrodisias 9, 15–17, 20 f., 27
n. 39, 31, 38 n. 73, 52 f., 54 n. 8, 56 n. 13, Chalcedon(ian) 3f., 7, 87
63, 78, 79 n. 16, 88, 199 n. 88, 228, 233, Council of Chalcedon 4
248, 258 Chosroes 60, 180
Alexander Paris 109, 111, 197–199 Cicero 184, 192 n. 66
Alexander the Great/Macedonian 109, 197– Clement of Alexandria 19, 199 n. 88, 212
199 n. 119
Alexandria(n) ix–x, 1, 4, 6 f., 10 f., 18, 21, 25– Constantinople 5, 7f., 60
27, 29, 36f., 39, 41–60, 62 f., 67 f., 70 f., 75, Cronamon 22 n. 29
88, 176f., 180f., 199, 230 f., 251 f. Cyril of Alexandria 194 n. 70
Ali ibn Ridwan 43–44, 46 n. 14, 72 n. 9
Ammonius Hermeiou ix, xii, 11, 27, 29, 41– Dadisho Qatraya 45
48, 51–58, 60, 63 f., 71 n. 7, 88, 176 f., 179 f., Damascius 55, 60
182 n. 15, 184–192, 194–196, 198–203, Damascus 25, 36
205–210, 212–220, 222–230, 232 n. 160, David 55, 58–60, 68, 171, 177, 180, 183 n. 22,
235–240, 242–246, 248–251, 253, 255– 190 n. 53, 208f., 213, 218 n. 129, 220f.
259 nn. 131/132, 228
Alqosh 85 David the Invincible 58 n. 16, 59
Allinus 188 Dawid bar Paulus 87
Anatolius of Laodicea 53 Dexippus xii, 54, 198 n. 84, 206 n. 104, 210,
Anonymous Greek paraphrase on Categories 214f.
(by Sophonias?) xii, 60 f., 195 n. 74, 196, Diogenes Laertius 186 n. 37, 226
198–199, 201 n. 94, 208 nn. 108/110, 210, Dionysius Thrax 80, 185, 196f.
239 n. 190, 241 n. 192, 242 f. nn. 196/198,
246 n. 206 Elias xii, 55, 59f., 63f., 68, 88, 176f., 180–182,
Anthimus i of Constantinople 4–7 190f. nn. 53/63, 197, 198 n. 84, 201 n. 94,
Antioch 3–4, 6–8 202–209, 213f., 215 n. 126, 218–220, 224
Apollonius 58 n. 16 n. 140, 226f. nn. 143/146, 237–239, 241
Archimedes 58 n. 16 n. 192, 242f. n. 196, 246f. nn. 205/206,
Arethas of Caesarea 61 250–252, 256–258
Asclepiades 44 Elias of Nisibis 8
Asclepiodotus of Alexandria 42 n. 5 Elias of Tirhan 85, 87
Asclepius of Tralles 42 n. 5, 46 f., 54 f. Ephraem of Antioch 3–8, 26
Asylus of Reshaina 4, 6 f., 40 Ephrem the Syrian 83, 241f.
name and place index 327

Epictetus 48 n. 16, 60 Jafar al-Sadiq 87

Euclid 227 Job of Edessa 25, 34
Eusebius of Alexandria 86 John of Damascus 61, 69, 201 n. 94, 203–205,
Eustathius of Amid 5, 7 208 n. 108, 210 n. 115, 212f., 220 n. 131,
Eutocius of Ascalon 55, 58–60 237 n. 185, 239 n. 190, 241 n. 192, 242 f.
Evagrius of Pontus 19, 20 n. 22, 45, 50, 58, nn. 196/198, 246f. n. 206, 256–259
88f. John of Tella 7
Joseph/Ishoyab bar Malkon 86f.
Gabriel Bokhtisho (Bôkht-Îshoʿ / Jibrāʾīl ibn Joseph Huzaya 185
Bakhtīshūʿ) 37f. Justinian i 4–6, 8, 60
Gabriel Qatraya 19f., 71
Galen ix, 10f. n. 1, 21–25, 27, 29, 31 f., 35–39, Khabur River 40 n. 2
41f., 46f., 51, 55, 65, 88 f., 241 Kom el-Dikka 42, 49
George, Bishop of the Arabs xii, 34, 81, 170,
194f., 216, 243, 247–249 Lucius (Annaeus Cornutus) 206f. n. 104
Gesius of Petra 25, 46 f., 55 Lyceum 203

Harran 60 Mama 85
Helen 197 n. 81 Mar Aha (ʾAḥḥā) 40f.
Henanisho 87 Mar Zena Monastery 9
Heraclius 60 Medes (war of) 147, 240
Hermeias 54f., 60 Menas of Constantinople 6
Hippocrates 21, 24f., 27, 29, 32, 36, 41, 46, 89, Michael Badoqa (Bazud/Bazwad & Abzud/
253 Abzwad) 87
Homer 197 n. 83 Michael Psellos 61
Hunayn ibn Ishaq 10 n. 1, 16 f., 21–24, 30, 37– Michael the Great (Rabo = Elder?) 3–5
39, 41 Mubārak ibn Muḥammad ibn Yaʿqūb al-
Naḥwī 86
Iamblichus of Chalcis 53 f., 60, 181–183, 190 Musa ibn Khalid the Interpreter 37, 89
n. 54, 237f.
Iamblichian 57 Najran 79 n. 18
Ibas of Edessa 18 Neoplatonic/st/-ism ix, 1, 27, 29, 35, 42 n. 5,
Ibn Abi Usaibia 21 n. 24, 36–38, 47, 89 47–50, 53f., 56f., 69f., 176, 180, 182f., 185,
Ibn al-Qifti 37f. n. 71 189, 191, 195 n. 73, 200, 214, 218, 225f., 230
Ibn al-Ṭayyib 61, 87, 179
Ibn Jumay 46 n. 14 Olympiodorus xii, 9, 55, 58–60, 63f., 68, 88,
Ibn Zurʿa 55f. n. 12 176, 180–182, 195 n. 74, 198 n. 84, 199
Ibrahim ibn Abdallah al-Nasrani al-Katib 15 n. 89, 210–205, 215 n. 126, 224 n. 140,
Ilian War 203 226–228, 237–239, 241 n. 192, 242f.
Ilium 111, 311 n. 196, 246f. n. 206, 251, 255–259
Illyrians 153, 245 Origen 4, 8, 19, 50, 58, 88
Isaiah of Tahal 87 Orion constellation 109, 123, 172
Ishobokht 87
Ishoyab, see Joseph bar Malkon Palladius of Alexandria 29
Italy 5 Paul of Alexandria 22
Paul the Persian 1, 82, 178–180, 186 f., 189,
Jacob/Severus bar Shakko 17, 178 n. 6, 179, 195 f., 199, 216
190 n. 61, 212f. n. 120, 218 n. 129 Paul the Apostle 260
Jacob/Jacobus Psychrestus 42 n. 5 Peloponnesian(s) 147, 175, 240
328 chapter 15

Peripatetic(s) 34, 49, 52, 70, 73, 191, 214 f., 223, Severus Sebokht 15, 86, 186 n. 31, 195f., 199
226, 234, 241 Sextus Empiricus 212 n. 119
Peter of Reshaina 5, 20 Shemon vii Ishoyab 85
Philip of Macedon 197 Silverius of Rome 6
Philoponus xii, 18 f., 51, 54–57, 59 f., 63 f., Simeon of Beth Arsham 79 n. 18
71 n. 7, 176–178, 180–182, 184, 192 f., Simeon the Stylite 83
195–208, 210, 212 f., 215–217, 220 n. 131, Simplicius of Cicilia xii, 44 n. 8, 48 n. 16, 53–
222–240, 243, 245–253, 255–260 55, 60, 64, 176, 180–184, 195–201, 203,
Phocas of Edessa 19 206f. n. 104, 210, 212, 214f., 217, 220 n. 131,
Photius 61 222, 224 n. 140, 228–235, 237–239, 241,
Plato 41, 47–49, 53, 56–59, 62, 74, 88 f., 97, 242f. n. 196, 244, 246f. nn. 204/206,
99, 105, 119, 127, 147, 157, 171, 184, 189, 214, 256–260
226, 229, 231f. Sirius (the star) 109, 172
Platonic/Platonism/Platonist x, 12, 49 f., 53, Socrates 82, 97, 105, 115, 119, 125, 127, 155, 163,
70, 88, 99, 176, 178 n. 4, 189–191, 214 f., 171, 184, 196, 203, 205f., 249
223, 241f. Stephanus of Alexandria xii, 9, 29, 55, 60,
Porphyry xii, 1, 13, 17 f., 27, 44 f., 47 f., 52–54, 179, 185, 190 n. 61, 212f. nn. 119/120, 218–
56, 58–61, 63 f., 67–69, 71, 73, 77–80, 85 f., 220
88, 115–119, 127 n. 11, 177, 179, 182 f., 186, Stephanus of Byzantium 40
189, 192, 194–199, 201 nn. 92/94, 203– Stephen (an assistant to Sergius) 27, 38, 65
208, 210–212, 214–218, 221 f., 225–229, Stoic(s) 12, 74f., 149, 176, 185f., 212 n. 119, 223,
234, 236f. nn. 181/182, 239 f., 242 n. 196, 226, 235 n. 174, 241f.
246f., 253, 256 Syrianus 54, 195 n. 73
Priam 197
Proba 1, 28f., 34, 86, 182 f., 186 f., 254 Theaetetus 198
Proclus 47, 50, 54, 56, 63, 185, 253 n. 218 Theodora 5 n. 13, 7
Protagoras 186 n. 37 Theodore of Karkh Guddan 10f. (esp. n. 1),
Pseudo-Aristotle, On the Cosmos 16, 27, 30– 16, 21–23, 26f., 29f., 38, 53, 59, 63, 65,
33, 78, 171, 247 n. 208 67–69, 180, 257
Pseudo-Aristotle, On Virtue 87 Theodore of Merv 10 n. 1
Pseudo-Dionysius(/-ian corpus) x, 5, 19 f., 27, Theodore of Mopsuestia 169, 260
30f., 33, 38, 49 f., 65, 88 f., 191 Theodore of Raithu 62, 200
Pseudo-Elias 55, 59 Theodosiopolis, see Reshaina
Pseudo-Zachariah Rhetor 3–8, 11 n. 2, 19 f., Theodosius i (emperor) 40 n. 1
50, 88 Theodosius i of Alexandria 4–7
Pythagoras 48 n. 16, 73, 147 Timothy i 9
Trojan War 197 n. 80, 203
Rabban Hormizd Monastery 85
Reshaina 40f. Yaballaha of Gulmar 84f.
Rome 5–8, 85 Yoḥannan bar Zoʿbi 85, 179

Sabrisho bar Galaldin 84 f.
Salmawaih ibn Bunan 24
Sergius the Interpreter 3 n. 2
Severus bar Shakko, see Jacob bar Shakko
Severus of Antioch 4–7, 26, 43 f., 57
Zachariah of Mytilene 3, 26, 43f., 46, 55, 57,
64, 224 n. 137
Zeno of Elea (not of Citium) 74, 141, 174, 235
Zoora the Stylite 4 n. 7