Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 146710-15      March 2, 2001
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, 
vs.
ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES,
VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE
PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA,
ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. 146738      March 2, 2001
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,  Pimentel) and the Committee on Justice (then headed by Senator Renato
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner
Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. The
warring personalities are important enough but more transcendental are
the constitutional issues embedded on the parties' dispute. While the
significant issues are many, the jugular issue involves the relationship
between the ruler and the ruled in a democracy, Philippine style.
First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the
crisis in the office of the President.
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was
elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected
Vice-President. Some ten (10) million Filipinos voted for the petitioner
believing he would rescue them from life's adversity. Both petitioner and
the respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30,
1998.
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a
plethora of problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His
sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur
Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner,
went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of
receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.1
The exposẻ immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October
5, 2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., then the Senate Minority
Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled "I
Accuse." He accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million
in jueteng money from Governor Singson from November 1998 to
August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from Governor
Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur.
The privilege speech was referred by then Senate President Franklin
Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino
Cayetano) for joint investigation.2
The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on
Public Order and Security, then headed by Representative Roilo Golez,
decided to investigate the exposẻ of Governor Singson. On the other
hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael
Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the petitioner.
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11,
Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement in behalf of
the Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila, asking petitioner to
step down from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to
govern.3 Two days later or on October 13, the Catholic Bishops
Conference of the Philippines joined the cry for the resignation of the
petitioner.4 Four days later, or on October 17, former President Corazon
C. Aquino also demanded that the petitioner take the "supreme self-
sacrifice" of resignation.5 Former President Fidel Ramos also joined the
chorus. Early on, or on October 12, respondent Arroyo resigned as
Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Services 6 and later
asked for petitioner's resignation.7 However, petitioner strenuously held
on to his office and refused to resign.
The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers,
members of the Council of Senior Economic Advisers, resigned. They
were Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala, former Prime Minister Cesar Virata,
former Senator Vicente Paterno and Washington Sycip.8 On November 2,
Secretary Mar Roxas II also resigned from the Department of Trade and
Industry.9 On November 3, Senate President Franklin Drilon, and House
Speaker Manuel Villar, together with some 47 representatives defected
from the ruling coalition, Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.10
The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session
on November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of
Impeachment11 signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all
the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused
political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was
replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was
unseated by Representative Fuentebella.12 On November 20, the Senate
formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one
(21) senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.13
The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On December
7, the impeachment trial started.14 The battle royale was fought by some
of the marquee names in the legal profession. Standing as prosecutors
were then House Minority Floor Leader Feliciano Belmonte and
Representatives Joker Arroyo, Wigberto Tañada, Sergio Apostol, Raul
Gonzales, Oscar Moreno, Salacnib Baterina, Roan Libarios, Oscar
Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and Antonio Nachura. They were assisted by
a battery of private prosecutors led by now Secretary of Justice
Hernando Perez and now Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo. Serving as
defense counsel were former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, former
Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice Estelito P. Mendoza, former
City Fiscal of Manila Jose Flaminiano, former Deputy Speaker of the
House Raul Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his brother, Atty. Raymund
Fortun. The day to day trial was covered by live TV and during its course
enjoyed the highest viewing rating. Its high and low points were the
constant conversational piece of the chattering classes. The dramatic
point of the December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo,
senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank. She testified that she was
one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature
"Jose Velarde" on documents involving a P500 million investment
agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000.15
After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in
the spirit of Christmas. When it resumed on January 2, 2001, more
bombshells were exploded by the prosecution. On January 11, Atty.
Edgardo Espiritu who served as petitioner's Secretary of Finance took the
witness stand. He alleged that the petitioner jointly owned BW Resources
Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider
trading.16 Then came the fateful day of January 16, when by a vote of
11-1017 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second
envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner
held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose
Velarde." The public and private prosecutors walked out in protest of the
ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President. 18 The
ruling made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger
that hit the streets of the metropolis. By midnight, thousands had
assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were
delivered against the petitioner and the eleven (11) senators.
On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker
Fuentebella tendering their collective resignation. They also filed their
Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment
tribunal.19 Senator Raul Roco quickly moved for the indefinite
postponement of the impeachment proceedings until the House of
Representatives shall have resolved the issue of resignation of the public
prosecutors. Chief Justice Davide granted the motion.20
January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's
resignation. A 10-kilometer line of people holding lighted candles formed
a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in
Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's solidarity in
demanding petitioner's resignation. Students and teachers walked out of
their classes in Metro Manila to show their concordance. Speakers in the
continuing rallies at the EDSA Shrine, all masters of the physics of
persuasion, attracted more and more people.21
On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable.
At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo
Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, had defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the
holding of a snap election for President where he would not be a
candidate. It did not diffuse the growing crisis. At 3:00 p.m., Secretary
of National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together with
the chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine.22 In the
presence of former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and hundreds of
thousands of cheering demonstrators, General Reyes declared that "on
behalf of Your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed
Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support to this
government."23 A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson
and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning
announcement.24 Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant
secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their posts. 25 Rallies
for the resignation of the petitioner exploded in various parts of the
country. To stem the tide of rage, petitioner announced he was ordering
his lawyers to agree to the opening of the highly controversial second
envelope.26 There was no turning back the tide. The tide had become a
tsunami.
January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first
round of negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power
started at Malacañang'' Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive Secretary.
Secretary Edgardo Angara, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon
Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito Banayo, Asst. Secretary Boying
Remulla, and Atty. Macel Fernandez, head of the Presidential
Management Staff, negotiated for the petitioner. Respondent Arroyo was
represented by now Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, now Secretary
of Finance Alberto Romulo and now Secretary of Justice Hernando
Perez.27 Outside the palace, there was a brief encounter at Mendiola
between pro and anti-Estrada protesters which resulted in stone-
throwing and caused minor injuries. The negotiations consumed all
morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would
administer the oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA
Shrine.
At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. 28 At 2:30 p.m.,
petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace.29 He issued
the following press statement:30
"20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the
Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our
country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish
to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and
order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the
seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and
in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the
Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given
to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future
challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our
country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in to
promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the
following letter:31
"Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the
Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I
am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By
 operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall
be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m.
on January 20.23 Another copy was transmitted to Senate President
Pimentel on the same day although it was received only at 9:00 p.m. 33
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo
immediately discharged the powers the duties of the Presidency. On the
same day, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative
Matter No. 01-1-05-SC, to wit:
"A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC — In re: Request of Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo to Take her Oath of Office as President of the
Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice — Acting on
the urgent request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to
be sworn in as President of the Republic of the Philippines,
addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the
Court, dated January 20, 2001, which request was treated as
an administrative matter, the court Resolve unanimously to
confirm the authority given by the twelve (12) members of the
Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to
administer the oath of office of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of January 20,
2001.
This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any
justiciable case that may be filed by a proper party."
Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as
ambassadors and special envoys.34 Recognition of respondent Arroyo's
government by foreign governments swiftly followed. On January 23, in
a reception or vin d' honneur at Malacañang, led by the Dean of the
Diplomatic Corps, Papal Nuncio Antonio Franco, more than a hundred
foreign diplomats recognized the government of respondent Arroyo. 35 US
President George W. Bush gave the respondent a telephone call from the
White House conveying US recognition of her government.36
On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new
Speaker of the House of Representatives.37 The House then passed
Resolution No. 175 "expressing the full support of the House of
Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency, Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines."38 It also approved
Resolution No. 176 "expressing the support of the House of
Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines,
extending its congratulations and expressing its support for her
administration as a partner in the attainment of the nation's goals under
the Constitution."39
On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste
Management Act.40 A few days later, she also signed into law the Political
Advertising ban and Fair Election Practices Act.41
On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto
Guingona, Jr., as her Vice President.42 The next day, February 7, the
Senate adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the nomination of Senator
Guingona, Jr.43 Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan Ponce Enrile,
and John Osmena voted "yes" with reservations, citing as reason
therefor the pending challenge on the legitimacy of respondent Arroyo's
presidency before the Supreme Court. Senators Teresa Aquino-Oreta
and Robert Barbers were absent.44 The House of Representatives also
approved Senator Guingona's nomination in Resolution No.
178.45 Senator Guingona, Jr. took his oath as Vice President two (2) days
later.46
On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the
impeachment court is functus officio and has been terminated.47 Senator
Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated "for the record" that she voted against
the closure of the impeachment court on the grounds that the Senate
had failed to decide on the impeachment case and that the resolution left
open the question of whether Estrada was still qualified to run for
another elective post.48
Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyo's
public acceptance rating jacked up from 16% on January 20, 2001 to
38% on January 26, 2001.49 In another survey conducted by the ABS-
CBN/SWS from February 2-7, 2001, results showed that 61% of the
Filipinos nationwide accepted President Arroyo as replacement of
petitioner Estrada. The survey also revealed that President Arroyo is
accepted by 60% in Metro Manila, by also 60% in the balance of Luzon,
by 71% in the Visayas, and 55% in Mindanao. Her trust rating increased
to 52%. Her presidency is accepted by majorities in all social classes:
58% in the ABC or middle-to-upper classes, 64% in the D or mass class,
and 54% among the E's or very poor class.50
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems
appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the
Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. These are: (1) OMB Case
No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for
bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by
the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for
plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious
misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for Government
Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free
Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder,
forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4)
OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on November
28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and
property, plunder, etc.; (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de
Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery,
violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case
No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000
for plunder, graft and corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent
Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the petitioner. It is
chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with the
following as members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor
Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On
January 22, the panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to file his
counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as other
supporting documents in answer to the aforementioned complaints
against him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner
filed with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings in
Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any
other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the
term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted."
Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for
Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the
lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines
temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring
respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution." Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same
day, February 6, required the respondents "to comment thereon within a
non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001." On February 13,
the Court ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No.
146738 and the filing of the respondents' comments "on or before 8:00
a.m. of February 15."
On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-
hour hearing. Before the hearing, Chief Justice Davide, Jr. 51 and
Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban52recused themselves on motion of
petitioner's counsel, former Senator Rene A. Saguisag. They debunked
the charge of counsel Saguisag that they have "compromised
themselves by indicating that they have thrown their weight on one side"
but nonetheless inhibited themselves. Thereafter, the parties were given
the short period of five (5) days to file their memoranda and two (2)
days to submit their simultaneous replies.
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies
of resolution and press statement for "Gag Order" on respondent
Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738, the Court
resolved:
"(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a
resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of the
President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a
press statement justifying the alleged resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are
officers of the Court under pain of being cited for contempt to
refrain from making any comment or discussing in public the
merits of the cases at bar while they are still pending decision
by the Court, and
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately
 enjoining the respondent Ombudsman from resolving or
deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in his office
against petitioner, Joseph E. Estrada and subject of the cases at
bar, it appearing from news reports that the respondent
Ombudsman may immediately resolve the cases against
petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing
held on February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at
bar moot and academic."53
The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at
bar were deemed submitted for decision.
The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are:
I
Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II
Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy,
whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while
respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
III
Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a
condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner
Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner
is still President, whether he is immune from criminal
prosecution.
IV
Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be
enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.
We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
I
Whether or not the cases
At bar involve a political question
Private respondents54 raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose
a political question, and hence, are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court
to decide. They contend that shorn of its embroideries, the cases at bar
assail the "legitimacy of the Arroyo administration." They stress that
respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency through people power; that
she has already taken her oath as the 14th President of the Republic;
that she has exercised the powers of the presidency and that she has
been recognized by foreign governments. They submit that these
realities on ground constitute the political thicket, which the Court
cannot enter.
We reject private respondents' submission. To be sure, courts here and
abroad, have tried to lift the shroud on political question but its exact
latitude still splits the best of legal minds. Developed by the courts in the
20th century, the political question doctrine which rests on the principle
of separation of powers and on prudential considerations, continue to be
refined in the mills of constitutional law.55 In the United States, the most
authoritative guidelines to determine whether a question is political were
spelled out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case or Baker v.
Carr,56 viz:
"x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-
judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;
or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
 pronouncements by various departments on question. Unless
one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar,
there should be no dismissal for non justiciability on the ground
of a political question's presence. The doctrine of which we treat
is one of 'political questions', not of 'political cases'."
In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted
with cases calling for a firmer delineation of the inner and outer
perimeters of a political question.57 Our leading case is Tanada v.
Cuenco,58 where this Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, held that political questions refer "to those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure." To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has
narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded
the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of government.59 Heretofore, the
judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution
directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. 60 With the new provision,
however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can
do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court
power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry with this intent are other
provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so called political
thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section 18 of Article VII which
empowers this Court in limpid language to "x x x review, in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus) or the extension thereof x x x."
Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines
and/or Oliver A. Lozano v. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al. 61 and
related cases62 to support their thesis that since the cases at bar involve
the legitimacy of the government of respondent Arroyo, ergo, they
present a political question. A more cerebral reading of the cited cases
will show that they are inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held that the
government of former President Aquino was the result of a successful
revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than
the Freedom Constitution63 declared that the Aquino government was
installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people "in
defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended." In is
familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government sired by a
successful revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that
government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In
checkered contrast, the government of respondent Arroyo is not
revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the EDSA Shrine is
the oath under the 1987 Constitution.64 In her oath, she categorically
swore to preserve and defend the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, she has
stressed that she is discharging the powers of the presidency under the
authority of the 1987 Constitution.1âwphi1.nêt
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People
Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of
revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an
exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly
to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected
the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the
legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the
subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the
resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of
the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I
presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief
discourse on freedom of speech and of the freedom of assembly to
petition the government for redress of grievance which are the cutting
edge of EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate.
Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by Filipinos.
Denial of these rights was one of the reasons of our 1898 revolution
against Spain. Our national hero, Jose P. Rizal, raised the clarion call for
the recognition of freedom of the press of the Filipinos and included it as
among "the reforms sine quibus non."65 The Malolos Constitution, which
is the work of the revolutionary Congress in 1898, provided in its Bill of
Rights that Filipinos shall not be deprived (1) of the right to freely
express his ideas or opinions, orally or in writing, through the use of the
press or other similar means; (2) of the right of association for purposes
of human life and which are not contrary to public means; and (3) of the
right to send petitions to the authorities, individually or
collectively." These fundamental rights were preserved when the United
States acquired jurisdiction over the Philippines. In the Instruction to the
Second Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900 issued by President
McKinley, it is specifically provided "that no law shall be passed abridging
the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to
peaceably assemble and petition the Government for redress of
grievances." The guaranty was carried over in the Philippine Bill, the Act
of Congress of July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of
August 29, 1966.66
Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution,67 and
the 197368 Constitution. These rights are now safely ensconced in section
4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
"Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress
of grievances."
The indispensability of the people's freedom of speech and of assembly
to democracy is now self-evident. The reasons are well put by Emerson:
first, freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual
fulfillment; second, it is an essential process for advancing knowledge
and discovering truth; third, it is essential to provide for participation in
decision-making by all members of society; and fourth, it is a method of
achieving a more adaptable and hence, a more stable community of
maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and
necessary consensus."69 In this sense, freedom of speech and of
assembly provides a framework in which the "conflict necessary to the
progress of a society can take place without destroying the
society."70 In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,71 this
function of free speech and assembly was echoed in the amicus
curiae filed by the Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar
Association which emphasized that "the basis of the right of assembly is
the substitution of the expression of opinion and belief by talk rather
than force; and this means talk for all and by all."72 In the relatively
recent case of Subayco v. Sandiganbayan,73 this Court similar stressed
that "… it should be clear even to those with intellectual deficits that
when the sovereign people assemble to petition for redress of
grievances, all should listen. For in a democracy, it is the people who
count; those who are deaf to their grievances are ciphers."
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions.
The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of
certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article
II,74 and section 875 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental
powers under section 1176 of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a
ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve
the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial
publicity. As early as the 1803 case ofMarbury v. Madison,77 the doctrine
has been laid down that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is . . ." Thus, respondent's in
vocation of the doctrine of political question is but a foray in the dark.
II
Whether or not the petitioner
Resigned as President
We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered this
issue as posing a political question. Indeed, it involves a legal question
whose factual ingredient is determinable from the records of the case
and by resort to judicial notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as
President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he
submits that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent
Arroyo took her oath as President.
The issue brings under the microscope the meaning of section 8, Article
VII of the Constitution which provides:
"Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from
office or resignation of the President, the Vice President shall
become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of
death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation
of both the President and Vice President, the President of the
Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall then act as President until the President
or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified.
x x x."
The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should
be considered resigned as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took
her oath as the 14th President of the Public. Resignation is not a high
level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are
beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must
be coupled by acts of relinquishment.78 The validity of a resignation is not
government by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can
be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any
formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in
the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent
Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be
determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January
20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts
and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the
petitioner, it is important to follow the succession of events after the
exposẻ of Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
investigated. The more detailed revelations of petitioner's alleged
misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon investigation spiked the hate against
him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in the House of Representatives
which initially was given a near cipher chance of succeeding snowballed.
In express speed, it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or
more than 1/3 of the House of Representatives. Soon, petitioner's
powerful political allies began deserting him. Respondent Arroyo quit as
Secretary of Social Welfare. Senate President Drilon and former Speaker
Villar defected with 47 representatives in tow. Then, his respected senior
economic advisers resigned together with his Secretary of Trade and
Industry.
As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the people's call for
his resignation intensified. The call reached a new crescendo when the
eleven (11) members of the impeachment tribunal refused to open the
second envelope. It sent the people to paroxysms of outrage. Before the
night of January 16 was over, the EDSA Shrine was swarming with
people crying for redress of their grievance. Their number grew
exponentially. Rallies and demonstration quickly spread to the
countryside like a brush fire.
As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window
on the state of mind of the petitioner. The window is provided in the
"Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," the diary of Executive Secretary
Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer.79 The Angara Diary
reveals that in the morning of January 19, petitioner's loyal advisers
were worried about the swelling of the crowd at EDSA, hence, they
decided to create an ad hoc committee to handle it. Their worry would
worsen. At 1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his small
office at the presidential residence and exclaimed: "Ed, seryoso na ito.
Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this is serious. Angelo has
defected.)"80 An hour later or at 2:30 p.m., the petitioner decided to call
for a snap presidential election and stressed he would not be a
candidate. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where
he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended
to give up the presidency even at that time. At 3:00 p.m., General Reyes
joined the sea of EDSA demonstrators demanding the resignation of the
petitioner and dramatically announced the AFP's withdrawal of support
from the petitioner and their pledge of support to respondent Arroyo.
The seismic shift of support left petitioner weak as a president.
According to Secretary Angara, he asked Senator Pimentel to advise
petitioner to consider the option of "dignified exit or
resignation."81 Petitioner did not disagree but listened intently.82 The sky
was falling fast on the petitioner. At 9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel
repeated to the petitioner the urgency of making a graceful and dignified
exit. He gave the proposal a sweetener by saying that petitioner would
be allowed to go abroad with enough funds to support him and his
family.83 Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to the
suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave
the country.84 At 10:00 p.m., petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara,
"Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days to a week in
the palace."85 This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the
reality that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with the
five-day grace period he could stay in the palace. It was a matter of
time.
The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President
Ramos called up Secretary Angara and requested, "Ed, magtulungan
tayo para magkaroon tayo ng (let's cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and
orderly transfer of power."86 There was no defiance to the request.
Secretary Angara readily agreed. Again, we note that at this stage,the
problem was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The "Opposition's deal
resignation of the petitioner was implied.
7:30 a.m. – Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms.
The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power Macapagal's spokesperson) Rene Corona. For this round, I am
immediately started at 12:20 a.m. of January 20, that fateful Saturday. accompanied by Dondon Bagatsing and Macel.
The negotiation was limited to three (3) points: (1) the transition period
of five days after the petitioner's resignation; (2) the guarantee of the
Rene pulls out a document titled "Negotiating Points." It reads:
safety of the petitioner and his family, and (3) the agreement to open
the second envelope to vindicate the name of the petitioner. 87 Again, we
note that the resignation of petitioner was not a disputed point. The '1. The President shall sign a resignation document within the
petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this fact. According to Secretary day, 20 January 2001, that will be effective on Wednesday, 24
Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the petitioner on the three points and January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the
the following entry in the Angara Diary shows the reaction of the Presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.
petitioner, viz:
2. Beginning to day, 20 January 2001, the transition process for
"x x x the assumption of the new administration shall commence, and
persons designated by the Vice President to various positions
and offices of the government shall start their orientation
I explain what happened during the first round of negotiations.
activities in coordination with the incumbent officials concerned.
The President immediately stresses that he just wants the five-
day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second
envelope to clear his name. 3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police shall function under the Vice President as
national military and police authority effective immediately.
If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by
Monday.
4. The Armed Forced of the Philippines, through its Chief of
Staff, shall guarantee the security of the President and his
The President says. "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na
family as approved by the national military and police authority
masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy,
(Vice President).
intriga. (I am very tired. I don't want any more of this – it's too
painful. I'm tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)
5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second
envelope in connection with the alleged savings account of the
I just want to clear my name, then I will go." 88
President in the Equitable PCI Bank in accordance with the rules
of the Senate, pursuant to the request to the Senate President.
Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The
intent to resign is clear when he said "x x x Ayoko na masyado nang
Our deal
masakit." "Ayoko na" arewords of resignation.

We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads:

The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According to the
Angara Diary, the following happened:
The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their respective
principals, agree and undertake as follows:
'1. A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24
January 2001, at which time President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
will turn over the presidency to Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo.
'2. In return, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed
security and safety of their person and property throughout
their natural lifetimes. Likewise, President Estrada and his
families are guarantee freedom from persecution or retaliation
from government and the private sector throughout their
natural lifetimes.
This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) through the Chief of Staff, as approved by
the national military and police authorities – Vice President
(Macapagal).
'3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate sitting
as an impeachment court will authorize the opening of the
second envelope in the impeachment trial as proof that the
subject savings account does not belong to President Estrada.
'4. During the five-day transition period between 20 January
2001 and 24 January 2001 (the 'Transition Period"), the
incoming Cabinet members shall receive an appropriate briefing
from the outgoing Cabinet officials as part of the orientation
program.
During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine National
Police (PNP) shall function Vice President (Macapagal) as
national military and police authorities.
Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and PNP
director general shall obtain all the necessary signatures as
affixed to this agreement and insure faithful implementation
and observance thereof.
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public
statement in the form and tenor provided for in "Annex A"
heretofore attached to this agreement."89
The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner
has resigned. It will be noted that during this second round of
negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a
given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to
be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period.
According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement, which was
premised on the resignation of the petitioner was further refined. It was
then, signed by their side and he was ready to fax it to General Reyes
and Senator Pimentel to await the signature of the United Opposition.
However, the signing by the party of the respondent Arroyo was aborted
by her oath-taking. The Angara diary narrates the fateful events, viz;90
"xxx
11:00 a.m. – Between General Reyes and myself, there is a
firm agreement on the five points to effect a peaceful transition.
I can hear the general clearing all these points with a group he
is with. I hear voices in the background.
Agreement.
The agreement starts: 1. The President shall resign today, 20
January 2001, which resignation shall be effective on 24
January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the
presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.
xxx
The rest of the agreement follows:
2. The transition process for the assumption of the new
administration shall commence on 20 January 2001, wherein
persons designated by the Vice President to various government
positions shall start orientation activities with incumbent
officials.
'3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of
Staff, shall guarantee the safety and security of the President
and his families throughout their natural lifetimes as approved
by the national military and police authority – Vice President.
'4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall
function under the Vice President as national military and police
authorities.
'5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the
second envelope in the impeachment trial, the contents of
which shall be offered as proof that the subject savings account
does not belong to the President.
The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form
and tenor provided for in Annex "B" heretofore attached to this
agreement.
11:20 a.m. – I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene
Pimentel our agreement, signed by our side and awaiting the
signature of the United opposition.
And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that the
Supreme Court has decided that Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is
President and will be sworn in at 12 noon.
'Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang agreement
(why couldn't you wait? What about the agreement)?' I asked.
Reyes answered: 'Wala na, sir (it's over, sir).'
I ask him: Di yung transition period, moot and academic na?'
And General Reyes answers: ' Oo nga, I delete na natin, sir
(yes, we're deleting the part).'
Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that
there was a double cross.
But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first provision on
resignation since this matter is already moot and academic.
Within moments, Macel erases the first provision and faxes the
documents, which have been signed by myself, Dondon and
Macel, to Nene Pimentel and General Reyes.
I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to General
Reyes for the signatures of the other side, as it is important
that the provisions on security, at least, should be respected.
I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has ruled
that Chief Justice Davide will administer the oath to Gloria at 12
noon.
The President is too stunned for words:
Final meal
12 noon – Gloria takes her oath as president of the Republic of
the Philippines.
12:20 p.m. – The PSG distributes firearms to some people
inside the compound.
The president is having his final meal at the presidential
Residence with the few friends and Cabinet members who have
gathered.
By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the first
line of defense at Mendiola. Only the PSG is there to protect the
Palace, since the police and military have already withdrawn
their support for the President.
1 p.m. – The President's personal staff is rushing to pack as
 many of the Estrada family's personal possessions as they can.
During lunch, Ronnie Puno mentions that the president needs to
release a final statement before leaving Malacañang.
The statement reads: At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of
the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other
legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts
about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as
President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the
restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the
seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and
in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the
Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given
to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future
challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our
country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the
promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.
MABUHAY!"'
It was curtain time for the petitioner.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted.
It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release
containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of
the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about
its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the
presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to
any kind inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as
soon as the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the
people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was
referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as
President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge
that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's
reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to
join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation
and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency.
The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell.
His presidency is now in the part tense.
It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a
temporary leave dated January 20, 2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate
President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer to
the said letter, viz:
"Sir.
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the
Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I
am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By
operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice President shall
be the Acting president.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada"
To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery. 91 The pleadings
filed by the petitioner in the cases at bar did not discuss, may even
intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the
counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances during
the oral argument. It strikes the Court as strange that the letter, despite
its legal value, was never referred to by the petitioner during the week-
long crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint of its existence
when he issued his final press release. It was all too easy for him to tell
the Filipino people in his press release that he was temporarily unable to
govern and that he was leaving the reins of government to respondent
Arroyo for the time bearing. Under any circumstance, however, the
mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it
was prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly as a later
act. If, however, it was prepared after the press released, still, it
commands scant legal significance. Petitioner's resignation from the
presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a
whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of his reputation
by the people. There is another reason why this Court cannot given any
legal significance to petitioner's letter and this shall be discussed in issue
number III of this Decision.
After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he
also argues that he could not resign as a matter of law. He relies on
section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, which allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:
"Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire
pending an investigation, criminals or administrative, or
pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this
Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
bribery."
A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any
comfort to the petitioner. RA No. 3019 originated form Senate Bill No.
293. The original draft of the bill, when it was submitted to the Senate,
did not contain a provision similar to section 12 of the law as it now
stands. However, in his sponsorship speech, Senator Arturo Tolentino,
the author of the bill, "reserved to propose during the period of
amendments the inclusion of a provision to the effect that no public
official who is under prosecution for any act of graft or corruption, or is
under administrative investigation, shall be allowed to voluntarily resign
or retire."92 During the period of amendments, the following provision
was inserted as section 15:
"Sec. 15. Termination of office – No public official shall be
allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or
administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any
offense under the Act or under the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code on bribery.
The separation or cessation of a public official form office shall
not be a bar to his prosecution under this Act for an offense
committed during his incumbency."93
The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned
the legality of the second paragraph of the provision and insisted that
the President's immunity should extend after his tenure.
Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar Senate Bill No. 293,
was thereafter passed. Section 15 above became section 13 under the
new bill, but the deliberations on this particular provision mainly focused
on the immunity of the President, which was one of the reasons for the
veto of the original bill. There was hardly any debate on the prohibition
against the resignation or retirement of a public official with pending
criminal and administrative cases against him. Be that as it may, the
intent of the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act of
resignation or retirement from being used by a public official as a
protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or
administrative case against him and to prevent his prosecution under the
Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal Code.
To be sure, no person can be compelled to render service for that would
be a violation of his constitutional right.94 A public official has the right
not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the
time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative or
criminal investigation or prosecution, such resignation or retirement will
not cause the dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings
against him. He cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid
prosecution.
There is another reason why petitioner's contention should be rejected.
In the cases at bar, the records show that when petitioner resigned on
January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the Ombudsman
were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and
0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed, the respondent
Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary investigation of
the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner
was immune from suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be considered
as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them.
Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner
for it contemplates of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not
suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of
a sitting President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
administrative investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him
from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit
proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an
to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House
administrative proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the time
of Representatives their written declaration that the President is
petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second
Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties
envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public
of the office as Acting President.
prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and
the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no
impeachment case pending against petitioner when he resigned. Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume
III
the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a
majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five
Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the
President. House of Representatives their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose,
We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely
the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-
temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the presidency,
eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of
and hence is a President on leave. As aforestated, the inability claim is
call.
contained in the January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the same
day to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written
declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no
required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both
power to adjudge the inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers
Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to
and duties of the presidency. His significant submittal is that "Congress
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President
has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether
shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue
the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner
exercising the powers and duties of his office."
provided for in section 11 of article VII."95 This contention is
the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he is a President on leave and
respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President. That is the law. Now, the operative facts:

An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
"SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be
1. Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter
claiming inability to the Senate President and Speaker
of the House;
2. Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath
of office as President on January 20, 2001 at about
12:30 p.m.;
3. Despite receipt of the letter, the House of
Representatives passed on January 24, 2001 House
 Resolution No. 175;96
On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House
Resolution No. 17697 which states:
"RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS
CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER
ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE
NATION'S GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, as a consequence of the people's loss of confidence
on the ability of former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada to
effectively govern, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the
Philippine National Police and majority of his cabinet had
withdrawn support from him;
WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the
Supreme Court, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was
sworn in as President of the Philippines on 20 January 2001
before Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.;
WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of
Representatives to exert all efforts to unify the nation, to
eliminate fractious tension, to heal social and political wounds,
and to be an instrument of national reconciliation and solidarity
as it is a direct representative of the various segments of the
whole nation;
WHEREAS, without surrending its independence, it is vital for
the attainment of all the foregoing, for the House of
Representatives to extend its support and collaboration to the
administration of Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, and to be a constructive partner in nation-building, the
national interest demanding no less: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its
support to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the
Philippines, to extend its congratulations and to express its
support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of
the Nation's goals under the Constitution.
Adopted,

WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the (Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.

international community had extended their recognition to Her Speaker
Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the
Republic of the Philippines;
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives
on January 24, 2001.
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
has espoused a policy of national healing and reconciliation with
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
justice for the purpose of national unity and development;
Secretary General"

WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the

On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House
government cannot be achieved if it is divided, thus by reason
Resolution No. 17898 which states:
of the constitutional duty of the House of Representatives as an
institution and that of the individual members thereof of fealty
to the supreme will of the people, the House of Representatives "RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
must ensure to the people a stable, continuing government and ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA,
therefore must remove all obstacles to the attainment thereof; JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President
due to the assumption to the Presidency of Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution,
the President in the event of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice
President from among the members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives who shall assume office upon
confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses
voting separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
has nominated Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona Jr.,
to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the
Philippines;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., is a public servant
endowed with integrity, competence and courage; who has
served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and
patriotism;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling
qualities of true statesmanship, having served the government
in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the Commission on
Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the
Philippines – qualities which merit his nomination to the position
of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of
Representatives, That the House of Representatives confirms
the nomination of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as the Vice
President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives
on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General"
(4) Also, despite receipt of petitioner's letter claiming inability,
some twelve (12) members of the Senate signed the following:
"RESOLUTION
WHEREAS, the recent transition in government offers the nation
an opportunity for meaningful change and challenge;
WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome awesome
challenges the nation needs unity of purpose and resolve
cohesive resolute (sic) will;
WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the forum for
vital legislative measures in unity despite diversities in
perspectives;
WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the new
government of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and resolve
to discharge and overcome the nation's challenges." 99
On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No.
82100 which states:
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL
ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF SEM. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.
AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is vacancy in the Office of the Vice President
due to the assumption to the Presidency of Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution,
the President in the event of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise
President from among the members of the Senate and the passed Senate Resolution No. 83101 which states:
House of Representatives who shall assume office upon
confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses
"RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT COURT
voting separately;
IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO

WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That the Senate recognize
has nominated Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
that the Impeachment Court is functus officio and has been
to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the
terminated.
Philippines;

Resolved, further, That the Journals of the Impeachment Court

WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public servant
on Monday, January 15, Tuesday, January 16 and Wednesday,
endowed with integrity, competence and courage; who has
January 17, 2001 be considered approved.
served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and
patriotism;
Resolved, further, That the records of the Impeachment Court
including the "second envelope" be transferred to the Archives
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling
of the Senate for proper safekeeping and preservation in
qualities of true statemanship, having served the government in
accordance with the Rules of the Senate. Disposition and
various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the
retrieval thereof shall be made only upon written approval of
Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the Commission on
the Senate president.
Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the
land - which qualities merit his nomination to the position of
Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned be furnished copies
of this Resolution.
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate confirm the
nomination of Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as Vice President Adopted,
of the Republic of the Philippines.
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.
Adopted, President of the Senate

(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR. This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7,
President of the Senate 2001.

This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, (Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
2001. Secretary of the Senate"

(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO (5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 "certifying
Secretary of the Senate" to the existence of vacancy in the Senate and calling on the COMELEC to
fill up such vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with the
regular election on May 14, 2001 and the Senatorial candidate garnering
the thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the
unexpired term of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.'
(6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into
law by respondent Arroyo as President.
(7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet,
without any recognition from any sector of government, and without any
support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his inability to
govern is only momentary.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of
Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly
clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner
Estrada. Is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected
petitioner's claim of inability.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of
temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the
decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as
president of the Philippines. Following Tañada v. Cuenco,102 we hold that
this Court cannot exercise its judicial power or this is an issue "in regard
to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative
xxx branch of the government." Or to use the language in Baker vs.
Carr,103 there is a "textually demonstrable or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it." Clearly, the
Court cannot pass upon petitioner's claim of inability to discharge the
power and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature
and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political
issue, which cannot be decided by this Court without transgressing the
principle of separation of powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he
cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground
that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid
to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de
jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be
reviewed by this Court.
IV
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.
Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against
him before the respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he
has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him;
and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal
or civil.
Before resolving petitioner's contentions, a revisit of our legal history
executive immunity will be most enlightening. The doctrine of executive
immunity in this jurisdiction emergedas a case law. In the 1910 case of
Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crosfield,104 the respondent Tiaco, a
Chinese citizen, sued petitioner W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General
of the Philippine Islands. J.E. Harding and C.R. Trowbridge, Chief of
Police and Chief of the Secret Service of the City of Manila, respectively,
for damages for allegedly conspiring to deport him to China. In granting
a writ of prohibition, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Johnson, held:
" The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not
mean that the judiciary has no authority to touch the acts of the
Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his office, do
what he will, unimpeded and unrestrained. Such a construction
would mean that tyranny, under the guise of the execution of
the law, could walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of person
and of property, wholly free from interference of courts or
legislatures. This does not mean, either that a person injured by
the executive authority by an act unjustifiable under the law
has n remedy, but must submit in silence. On the contrary, it
means, simply, that the governors-general, like the judges if
the courts and the members of the Legislature, may not be
personally mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an
act executed in the performance of his official duties. The
judiciary has full power to, and will, when the mater is properly
presented to it and the occasion justly warrants it, declare an
 act of the Governor-General illegal and void and place as nearly
as possible in status quo any person who has been deprived his
liberty or his property by such act. This remedy is assured to
every person, however humble or of whatever country, when
his personal or property rights have been invaded, even by the
highest authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary can
not do is mulct the Governor-General personally in damages
which result from the performance of his official duty, any more
than it can a member of the Philippine Commission of the
Philippine Assembly. Public policy forbids it.
Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief
executive may not be personally sued at all in relation to acts
which he claims to perform as such official. On the contrary, it
clearly appears from the discussion heretofore had, particularly
that portion which touched the liability of judges and drew an
analogy between such liability and that of the Governor-
General, that the latter is liable when he acts in a case so
plainly outside of his power and authority that he can not be
said to have exercised discretion in determining whether or not
he had the right to act. What is held here is that he will be
protected from personal liability for damages not only when he
acts within his authority, but also when he is without authority,
provided he actually used discretion and judgement, that is, the
judicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority to act
or not. In other words, in determining the question of his
authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the
question of his authority was one over which two men,
reasonably qualified for that position, might honestly differ; but
he s not protected if the lack of authority to act is so plain that
two such men could not honestly differ over its determination.
In such case, be acts, not as Governor-General but as a private
individual, and as such must answer for the consequences of his
act."
Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive
was not granted immunity from suit, viz "xxx. Action upon important
matters of state delayed; the time and substance of the chief executive
spent in wrangling litigation; disrespect engendered for the person of
one of the highest officials of the state and for the office he occupies; a
tendency to unrest and disorder resulting in a way, in distrust as to the
integrity of government itself."105
Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific
provision on executive immunity. Then came the tumult of the martial
law years under the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the 1973
Constitution was born. In 1981, it was amended and one of the
amendments involved executive immunity. Section 17, Article VII
stated:
"The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure.
Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by
him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his
tenure.
The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent
President referred to in Article XVII of this Constitution.
In his second Vicente G. Sinco professional Chair lecture entitled,
"Presidential Immunity and All The King's Men: The Law of Privilege As a
Defense To Actions For Damages,"106 petitioner's learned counsel, former
Dean of the UP College of Law, Atty. Pacificao Agabin, brightened the
modifications effected by this constitutional amendment on the existing
law on executive privilege. To quote his disquisition:
"In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one
better by enlarging and fortifying the absolute immunity
concept. First, we extended it to shield the President not only
form civil claims but also from criminal cases and other claims.
Second, we enlarged its scope so that it would cover even acts
of the President outside the scope of official duties. And third,
we broadened its coverage so as to include not only the
President but also other persons, be they government officials
or private individuals, who acted upon orders of the President.
It can be said that at that point most of us were suffering from
AIDS (or absolute immunity defense syndrome)."
The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the repeal of this
Marcosian concept of executive immunity in the 1973 Constitution. The
move was led by them Member of Parliament, now Secretary of Finance,
Alberto Romulo, who argued that the after incumbency immunity
granted to President Marcos violated the principle that a public office is a
public trust. He denounced the immunity as a return to the anachronism
"the king can do no wrong."107 The effort failed.
The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted
from office by the People Power revolution in 1986. When the 1987
Constitution was crafted, its framers did not reenact the executive
immunity provision of the 1973 Constitution. The following explanation
was given by delegate J. Bernas vis:108
"Mr. Suarez. Thank you.
The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting
in the draft proposal the immunity provision for the President. I
agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very
well in striking out second sentence, at the very least, of the
original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973
Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a
restoration of at least the first sentence that the President shall
be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we
do not provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be
spending all his time facing litigation's, as the President-in-exile
in Hawaii is now facing litigation's almost daily?
Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider it
understood in present jurisprudence that during his tenure he is
immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The only
innovation made by the 1973 Constitution was to make that
explicit and to add other things.
Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any
more query, Madam President.
I think the Commissioner for the clarifications."
We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this
history. We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the
reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.
The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout
of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the
presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate
Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus
Officio."109 Since, the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is
untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached
and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted,
would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission
has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better situation
than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to
impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal
prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission
make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot
due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil
cases may already be filed against him, viz:110
"xxx
Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding
has been filed against the President, for example, and the
President resigns before judgement of conviction has been
rendered by the impeachment court or by the body, how does it
affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be necessarily
dropped?
Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to
remove one from office, then his resignation would render the
case moot and academic. However, as the provision says, the
criminal and civil aspects of it may continue in the ordinary
courts."
This is in accord with our ruling In Re: Saturnino Bermudez111 that
'incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to
court during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not beyond.
Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process
against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the
presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua
non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be
convicted in the impeachment proceedings. His reliance on the case of
Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan112 and related cases113 are inapropos for they
have a different factual milieu.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner
as a non-sitting President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are
criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially
plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged
mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any
decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and
wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be
anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for
unlawful acts and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public
officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not
acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser. 114
Indeed, critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will
reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the privilege especially when it
impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In the
1974 case of US v. Nixon,115 US President Richard Nixon, a sitting
President, was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and documents
relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of
President Nixon's associates were facing charges of conspiracy to
obstruct Justice and other offenses, which were committed in a burglary
of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washington's Watergate
Hotel during the 972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was
named an unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash
the subpoena on the ground, among others, that the President was not
subject to judicial process and that he should first be impeached and
removed from office before he could be made amenable to judicial
proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It
concluded that "when the ground for asserting privilege as to
subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on
the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the
fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of
criminal justice." In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 116 the US
Supreme Court further held that the immunity of the president from civil
damages covers only "official acts." Recently, the US Supreme Court had
the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v.
Jones117 where it held that the US President's immunity from suits for
money damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to
unofficial conduct.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the
scope of executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes
of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust. 118 It
declared as a state policy that "the State shall maintain honesty and
integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures
against graft and corruptio."119 it ordained that "public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." 120 It set the rule that 'the
right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees,
shall not be barred by prescription, latches or estoppel." 121 It maintained
the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court.122 It created the office of the
Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to
"investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act
or omission appears to be illegal, unjust improper or inefficient." 123 The
Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy. 124 These
constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioner's claim
that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts
committed during his incumbency.
V
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner
Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity
Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be
stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases filed against him
due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He submits that
the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set file the
criminal cases violation of his right to due process.
There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on
how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the
investigation and trial of high profile cases.125 The British approach the
problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus,
English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an
accused to fair trial suffers a threat.126 The American approach is
different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential
effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial.
They have developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e.,
substantial; probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and
present danger, etc.
This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in
this Court to stop the trials or annul convictions in high profile criminal
cases.127 In People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,128 later reiterated in the case of
Larranaga vs. court of Appeals, et al.,129 we laid down the doctrine that:
"We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the
right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that
the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive
publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials.
Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial
is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible
reporting enhances accused's right to a fair trial for, as well
pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as
the criminal field xxx. The press does not simply publish
information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of
justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial
processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an
accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant
was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by
itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial
judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to
seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and
other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state
of the art of our communication system brings news as they
happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our
bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the
facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and
impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with
the world. We have not installed the jury system whose
members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose
there impartially. xxx xxx xxx. Our judges are learned in the
law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera
performances of parties to litigation. Their mere exposure to
publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect
their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on
the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that
characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In
Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of
possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice
as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity,
there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been
unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the
barrage of publicity. In the case at a bar, the records do not
show that the trial judge developed actual bias against
appellants as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of
the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances
of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed
opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity, which is incapable of
change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant
has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not
discharged the burden.'
We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb
vs. Hon. Raul de Leon, etc.130 and its companion cases, viz:
"Again petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on
their right to due process while undergoing preliminary
investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early
invocation considering the substantial risk to their liberty while
undergoing a preliminary investigation.
xxx
The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational
cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes, its excessiveness has
been aggravated by kinetic developments in the
telecommunications industry. For sure, few cases can match the
high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the
preliminary investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of
facts and fiction about the case continues unabated even today.
Commentators still bombard the public with views not too many

of which are sober and sublime. Indeed, even the principal
actors in the case – the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and
their sympathizers have participated in this media blitz. The
possibility of media abuses and their threat to a fair trial
notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to
the press and public. In the seminal case of Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was
xxx
a. The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal
trial in Anglo-American justice demonstrates
conclusively that at the time this Nation's organic laws
were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England
had long been presumptively open, thus giving
assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly
to all concerned and discouraging perjury, the
misconduct of participants, or decisions based on
secret bias or partiality. In addition, the significant
community therapeutic value of public trials was
recognized when a shocking crime occurs a community
reaction of outrage and public protest often follows,
and thereafter the open processes of justice serve an
important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for
community concern, hostility and emotion. To work
effectively, it is important that society's criminal
process satisfy the appearance of justice,' Offutt v.
United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L ED 11, 75 S Ct 11,
which can best be provided by allowing people to
observe such process. From this unbroken,
uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid
today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that a
presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of
a criminal trial under this Nation's system of justice,
Cf., e,g., Levine v. United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed
2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.
b. The freedoms of speech. Press and assembly,
expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment, share a
common core purpose of assuring freedom of
communication on matters relating to the functioning
of government. In guaranteeing freedom such as those
of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read
as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so
as give meaning to those explicit guarantees; the First
Amendment right to receive information and ideas
means, in the context of trials, that the guarantees of
speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government
from summarily closing courtroom doors which had
long been open to the public at the time the First
Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the right of
assembly is also relevant, having been regarded not
only as an independent right but also as a catalyst to
augment the free exercise of the other First
Amendment rights with which the draftsmen
deliberately linked it. A trial courtroom is a public place
where the people generally and representatives of the
media have a right to be present, and where their
presence historically has been thought to enhance the
integrity and quality of what takes place.
c. Even though the Constitution contains no provision
which be its terms guarantees to the public the right to
attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not
expressly guaranteed, have been recognized as
indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights.
The right to attend criminal trial is implicit in the
guarantees of the First Amendment: without the
freedom to attend such trials, which people have
exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom
of speech and of the press be eviscerated.
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial
publicity under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of
his due process right to fair trial. Thus, inMartelino, et al. vs.
Alejandro, et al., we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial
publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges
have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by
the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in
the records that will prove that the tone and content of the
publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally
infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel.
Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity
on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically
unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is
composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior
State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal
investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether they
 can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed,
their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias
for it does not appear that they considered any extra-record
evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The
length of time the investigation was conducted despite its
summary nature and the generosity with which they
accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well
of their fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek
the disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the
ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial
publicity." (emphasis supplied)
Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to
warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the
petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more
than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.131 He needs to
show more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the
impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note,
the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary
investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the
respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by
the petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have
already been infected by bias because of the pervasive prejudicial
publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with
its findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its
recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.
The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent
Ombudsman himself with bias. To quote petitioner's submission, the
respondent Ombudsman "has been influenced by the barrage of slanted
news reports, and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed
at him by the mobs."132 News reports have also been quoted to establish
that the respondent Ombudsman has already prejudged the cases of the
petitioner133 and it is postulated that the prosecutors investigating the
petitioner will be influenced by this bias of their superior.
Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner
is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports referred to by the
petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially
in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged
prejudice and the presumption of good faith and regularity in the
performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the
theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of
respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, give investigation prosecutors the
independence to make their own findings and recommendations albeit
they are reviewable by their superiors.134 They can be reversed but they
can not be compelled cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In
other words, investigating prosecutors should not be treated like
unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman
resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the latter believes
that the findings of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he
still has the remedy of assailing it before the proper court.
VI.
Epilogue
A word of caution to the "hooting throng." The cases against the
petitioner will now acquire a different dimension and then move to a new
stage - - - the Office of the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call from the
majority for instant justice will hit a higher decibel while the gnashing of
teeth of the minority will be more threatening. It is the sacred duty of
the respondent Ombudsman to balance the right of the State to
prosecute the guilty and the right of an accused to a fair investigation
and trial which has been categorized as the "most fundamental of all
freedoms."135 To be sure, the duty of a prosecutor is more to do justice
and less to prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that the preliminary
investigation of the petitioner shall have a circus-free atmosphere. He
has to provide the restraint against what Lord Bryce calls "the impatient
vehemence of the majority." Rights in a democracy are not decided by
the mob whose judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason. Nor are
rights necessarily resolved by the power of number for in a democracy,
the dogmatism of the majority is not and should never be the definition
of the rule of law. If democracy has proved to be the best form of
government, it is because it has respected the right of the minority to
convince the majority that it is wrong. Tolerance of multiformity of
thoughts, however offensive they may be, is the key to man's progress
from the cave to civilization. Let us not throw away that key just to
pander to some people's prejudice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging
the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of
the Republic are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 CLICK HERE TO VIEW CLICK HERE TO VIEW
CONCURRING OPINION OF CONCURRING OPINION OF
JUSTICE VITUG JUSTICE MENDOZA

Footnotes

 Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI), October 5, 2000, pp. A1 and A17.

1

 PDI, October 6, 2000, pp. A1 and A18.

2

 Ibid., October 12, 2000, pp. A1 and A17.

3

 Ibid., October 14, 2000, p. A1.

4

 Ibid., October 18, 2000, p. A1.

5

 Ibid., October 13, 2000, pp. A1 and A21.

6

 Ibid., October 26, 2000, p. A1.

7

 Ibid., November 2, 2000, p. A1.

8

 Ibid., November 3, 2000, p. A1.

9

10
 Ibid., November 4, 2000, p. A1.

11
 The complaint for impeachment was based on the following grounds:
bribery, graft and corruption, betrayal of public trust, and culpable
violation of the Constitution.

12
 Ibid., November 14, 2000, p. A1.

13
 Ibid., November 21, 2000, p. A1.

14
 Ibid., December 8, 2000, p. A1.
15
 Ibid., December 23, 2000, pp. A1 and A19.  Annex A-1, Petition, G.R. Nos. 146710-15; Rollo, p. 34.
31

16
 Ibid., January 12, 2001, p. A1.  Ibid.
32

 Those who voted "yes" to open the envelope were: Senators Pimentel,
17
 Annex A, Petition, G.R. Nos. 146710-15; Rollo, p. 33.
33

Guingona, Drilon, Cayetano, Roco, Legarda, Magsaysay, Flavier, Biazon,

Osmeña III. Those who vote "no" were Senators Ople, Defensor-
 Philippine Star, January 21, 2001, p. 1; January 23, 2001, pp. 1 and
34
Santiago, John Osmeña, Aquino-Oreta, Coseteng, Enrile, Honasan,
4; January 24, 2001, p. 3; PDI, January 25, 2001, pp. A1 and A15.
Jaworski, Revilla, Sotto III and Tatad.

 Philippine Star, January 24, 2001, p. 1.

35
18
 Philippine Star, January 17, 2001, p. 1.

 PDI, January 25, 2001, p. 1.

36
19
 Ibid., January 18, 2001, p. 4.

 Ibid., p. 2.
37
20
 Ibid., p. 1.

 Annex C, DOJ-OSG Joint Comment; Rollo, GR Nos. 146710-15, p.

38
21
 Ibid., January 19, 2001, pp. 1 and 8.
290.

 "Erap's Final Hours Told" by Edgardo Angara, (hereinafter referred to

22
 Annex D, id; ibid., p. 292.
39
as "Angara Diary"), PDI, February 4, 2001, p. A16.

 PDI, January 27, 2001, p. 1.

40
23
 Philippine Star, January 20, 2001, p. 4.

 PDI, February 13, 2001, p. A2.

41
24
 PDI, February 4, 2001, p. A16.

 Philippine Star, February 13, 2001, p. A2.

42
25
 Philippine Star, January 20, 2001, pp. 1 and 11.

 Annex E, id.; ibid., p. 295.

43
26
 Ibid., January 20, 2001, p. 3.

 PDI, February 8, 2001, pp. A1 & A19.

44
27
 PDI, February 5, 2001, pp. A1 and A6.

 Annex F, id.; ibid., p. 297.

45
28
 Philippine Star, January 21, 2001, p. 1.

 PDI, February 10, 2001, p. A2.

46
29
 PDI, February 6, 2001, p. A12.

 Annex G, id.; ibid., p. 299.

47
 Annex A, DOJ-OSG, Joint Comment; Rollo, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, p.
30

288.
 PDI, February 8, 2001, p. A19.
48
49
 Philippine Star, February 3, 2001, p. 4. Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution, etc. v. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et
al., GR No. 73972; and Councilor Clifton U. Ganay v. Corazon C. Aquino,
et al., GR No. 73990, May 22, 1986.
 "Acceptance of Gloria is Nationwide," Mahar Mangahas, Manila
50

Standard, February 16, 2001, p. 14.

 Letter of Association Justice Reynato S. Puno, 210 SCRA 597 [1992].
62

51
 See The Chief Justice's Extended Explanation for his Voluntary
Inhibition; Rollo, GR Nos. 146710-15, pp. 525-527.  Proclamation No. 3 (1986).
63

 See Letter of Inhibition of Associate Justice Panganiban; Rollo, GR No.

52
 It states:
64

146738, pp.120-125.
I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Vice President of the Philippines, do
53
 Rollo, G.R. No. 146738, p. 134. solemnly swear that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties
as President o the Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution,
execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the
 Leonard de Vera and Dennis Funa; see their Memorandum, pp. 16-27;
54
service of the nation.
Rollo, GR Nos. 146710-15, Vol. III, pp. 809-820.

So help me God.
55
 Gunther and Sullivan, Constitutional law, 13th ed., pp. 45-46.

(Annex I, Comment of the Ombudsman; Rollo, GR Nos. 146710-15, Vol.

56
 369 US 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L. ed 2d 663, 686 (1962).
II, p. 332)

 See e.g., Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, et al., GR

57
No. 141284, 15 August 2000; Miranda v. Aguirre, 314 SCRA 603
(1999); Santiago v. Guingona, 298 SCRA 756 (1998); Tatad v.
Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281 SCRA 330 (1997); Marcos
v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 (1989); Gonzales v. COMELEC, 129 Phil 7
(1967); Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil 1 (1947); Avelino v. Cuenco 83
Phil. 17 (1949); Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil 192 (1946); Alejandrino v.
Quezon, 46 Phil 83 (1942).
58
 103 Phil 1051, 1068 (1957).
 See "Filipinas Despues de Cien Años" (The Philippines a Century
65
Hence), p. 62.
66
 The guaranty was taken from Amendment I of the US Constitution
which provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievance."

 See section 8, Article IV.

67
59
 Section 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.

 See section 9, Article IV.

68
60
 Note that the early treatises on Constitutional Law are discourses on
limitations of power typical of which is, Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations.  Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression, 1970 ed., p. 6, et
69

seq.
 Joint Resolution, Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver
61

A. Lozano v. Pres. Corazon C. Aquino, et al., GR No. 73748; People's

70
 Ibid. See also concurring opinion of Justice Branders in Whitney v. 85
 Ibid.
California (74 US 357, 375-76) where he said "… the greatest menace to
freedom is an inert people …" 86
 PDI, February 5, 2001, p. A1.

71
 307 US 496 (1939). 87
 Ibid., p. A-1.

 Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, 1946 ed., pp. 413-415,
72
88
 Ibid.
421.
89
 PDI, February 5, 2001, P. A6.
73
 260 SCRA 798 (1996).
90
 PDI, February 6, 2001, p. A1.
74
 Section 1, Article II of the 1987 Constitution reads:
91
 In the Angara diary which appeared in the PDI issue of February 5,
"The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty
2001, Secretary Angara stated that the letter came from Asst. Secretary
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
Boying Remulla; that he and Political Adviser Banayo opposed it; and
them."
that PMS head Macel Fernandez believed that the petitioner would not
sign the letter.
75
 Infra at 26.
 Congressional Record, 4th Congress, 2nd Session, March 4, 1959, pp.
92

76
 Infra at 41. 603-604.

77
 1 Cranch (5 US) 137, 2 L ed 60 (1803). 93
 Id., May 9, 1959, p. 1988

78
 Gonzales v. Hernandez, 2 SCRA 228 (1961). Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides: "No
94 

involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for

a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted."
79
 See its February 4, 5, and 6, 2001 issues.

95 
Reply Memorandum, p. 3; Rollo, GR Nos. 146710-15, Vol. IV.
80
 PDI, February 4, 2001, p. A1.

96 
House Resolution No. 175, 11th Congress, 3rd Session (2001), reads:
81
 Ibid.

"RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF

82
 Ibid.
REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF HER EXCELLENCY,
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
83
 Ibid.
WHEREAS, on January 20, 2001, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
84
 Ibid. was sworn in as the 14th President of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, her ascension to the highest office of the land under the 101
 11th Congress, 3rd Session (2001).
dictum, "the voice of the people is the voice of God" establishes the
basis of her mandate on integrity and morality in government; 102
 103 Phil 1051, 1067 (1957).

WHEREAS, the House of Representatives joins the church, youth, labor 103
 Baker vs. Carr, supra at 686 headnote 29.
and business sectors in fully supporting the President's strong
determination to succeed;
104
 16 Phil 534 (1910).
WHEREAS, the House of Representatives is likewise one with the people
in supporting President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's call to start the  The logical basis for executive immunity from suit was originally
105

healing and cleansing process for a divided nation in order to 'build an
edifice of peace, progress and economic stability' for the country: Now,
therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its full support to
the administration of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, 14th
President of the Philippines.
founded upon the idea that the "King can do no wrong". [R.J.
Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 Cal. L. Rev., 303 (1959)].
The concept thrived at the time of absolute monarchies in medieval
England when it was generally accepted that the seat of sovereignty and
governmental power resides in the throne. During that historical,
juncture, it was believed that allowing the King to be sued in his courts
was a contradiction to the sovereignty of the King.

With the development of democratic thoughts and institutions, this kind

Adopted,
of rationalization eventually lost its moral force. In the United States, for
example, the common law maxim regarding the King's infallibility had
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR. limited reception among the framers of the Constitution. [J. Long, How
to Sue the President: A Proposal for Legislation Establishing the Extent
of Presidential Immunity, 30 Val. U. L. Rev. 283 (1995)]. Still, the
Speaker
doctrine of presidential immunity found its way of surviving in modern
political times, retaining both its relevance and vitality. The privilege,
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on however, is now justified for different reasons. First, the doctrine is
January 24, 2001. rooted in the constitutional tradition of separation of powers and
supported by history. [Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 451 U. S. 731 (1982)]. The
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO separation of powers principle is viewed as demanding the executive's
independence from the judiciary, so that the President should not be
subject to the judiciary's whim. Second, by reason of public
Secretary General" convenience, the grant is to assure the exercise of presidential duties
and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that
97
 11th Congress, 3rd Session (2001). the Chief Executive is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-
holder's time, also demands undivided attention. [Soliven v. Makasiar,
167 SCRA 393 (1988)]. Otherwise, the time and substance of the chief
98
 11th Congress, 3rd Session (2001). executive will be spent on wrangling litigation, disrespect upon his
person will be generated, and distrust in the government will soon
 Annex 2, Comment of Private Respondents De Vera, et al.; Rollo, GR
99
follow. [Forbes v. Chouco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 534 (1910)]. Third, on grounds
No. 146710-15, Vol. II, p. 231. of public policy, it was recognized that the gains from discouraging
official excesses might be more than offset by the losses from
diminished zeal [Agabin, op cit., at 121.]. Without immunity, the
100
 11th Congress, 3rd Session (2001).
president would be disinclined to exercise decision-making functions in a 121
 See section 15, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.
manner that might detrimentally affect an individual or group of
individuals. [See H. Schechter, Immunity of Presidential Aides from 122
 See section 4, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.
Criminal Prosecution, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 779 (1989)].
123
 See section 13 (1), Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.
106
 62 Phil. L.J. 113 (1987).
124
 See section 14, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.
107
 See Bulletin Today, August 16, 1984, p. 1; December 18, 1984, p. 7.

 See Brandwood, Notes: "You Say 'Fair Trial' and I say 'Free Press:'
125
 Records of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, Vol. II, Records,
108
British and American Approaches to Protecting Defendants' Rights in
p. 423, July 29, 1986.
High Profile Trials," NYU Law Rev., Vol. 75, No. 5, pp. 1412-1451
(November 2000).
109
 Supra at 47.
126
 Id., p. 1417.
110
 Records of Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, July 28, 1986, p. 355.
 See e.g., Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et. al., 32 SCRA 106 (1970);
127

111
 145 SCRA 160 (1986). People v. Teehankee, 249 SCRA 54 (1995)

112
 128 SCRA 324 (1984). 128
 249 SCRA 54 (1955)

 In Re: Raul Gonzalez, 160 SCRA 771 (1988); Cuenco v. Fernan, 158
113 129
 287 SCRA 581 at pp. 596-597 (1998)
SCRA 29 (1988); and Jarque v. Desierto, A.C. No. 4509, 250 SCRA xi-
xiv (1995)., 130
 247 SCRA 652 (1995)

114
 Wallace v. Board of Education, 280 Ala. 635, 197 So 2d 428 (1967).
 Extensive publicity did not result in the conviction of well known
131

personalities. E.g., OJ Simpson, John Mitchell, William Kennedy Smith

115
 418 US 683, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 41 L ed 1039 (1974). and Imelda Marcos.

116
 457 US 731, 73 L ed. 349, 102 S Ct. 2690 (1982).  Memorandum, pp. 29-30; Rollo, GR Nos. 146710-15, Vol. III, pp.
132

572-573.
117
 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
134
 See section 4, Rule 112.
118
 See section 1, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.
135
 Estes v. Texas, 381 US 532, 540 (1965).
119
 See section 27, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution.
 
120
 See, section 1, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.
CONCURRING OPINION
VITUG, J.:
This nation has a great and rich history authored by its people. The EDSA
Revolution of 2001 could have been one innocuous phenomenon buried in the
pages of our history but for its critical dimensions. Now, EDSA 2 would be far
from being just another event in our annals. To this day, it is asked – Is Mr.
Joseph Ejercito Estrada still the President of the Republic of the Philippines?
To retort, one is to trace the events that led to the denouement of the
incumbency of Mr. Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Mr. Estrada, herein petitioner, was
elected to office by not less than 10 million Filipinos in the elections of May 1998,
served well over two years until January 2001. Formally impeached by the Lower
House of Representatives for cases of Graft and Corruption, Bribery, Betrayal of
Public Trust and Culpable violation of the Constitution, he was tried by the
Senate. The Impeachment Tribunal was tasked to decide on the fate of Mr.
Estrada- if convicted, he would be removed from office and face prosecution with
the regular courts or, if acquitted, he would remain in office. An evidence,
however, presented by the prosecution tagged as the "second envelope" would
have it differently. The denial by the impeachment court of the pleas to have the
dreaded envelope opened promptly put the trial into a halt. Within hours after
the controversial Senate decision, an angered people trooped again to the site of
the previous uprising in 1986 that toppled the 20-year rule of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos - EDSA. Arriving in trickles, the motley gathering swelled to
an estimated million on the fourth day, with several hundreds more nearing
Mendiola reportedly poised to storm Malacañang.
In the morning of 20 January 2001, the people waited for Erap to step down and
to heed the call for him to resign. At this time, Estrada was a picture of a man,
elected into the Presidency, but beleaguered by solitude-empty of the support by
the military and the police, abandoned most of his cabinet members, and with
hardly any firm succor from constituents. And despite the alleged popularity that
brought him to power, mass sentiment now appeared to be for his immediate
ouster.
With this capsule, the constitutional successor of Estrada in the person of Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, then incumbent Vice-President, took the cue and requested
the Chief Justice her oath-taking. In a letter, sent through "fax" at about half
past seven o'clock in the morning of 20 January 2001, read:
"The undersigned respectfully informs this Honorable Court that Joseph Ejercito
Estrada is permanently incapable of performing the duties of his office resulting
in his permanent disability to govern the serve his unexpired term. Almost all of
his cabinet members have resigned and the Philippine National police have
withdrawn their support for Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Civil society has likewise
refused to recognize him as President.
"In view of this, I am assuming the position of the president of the Republic of
the Philippines. Accordingly, I would like to take my oath as President of the
republic before the Honorable Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide. Jr., today, 20
January 2001, 12:00 noon at EDSA Shrine, Quezon City, Metro Manila.
"May I have the honor to invite the members of the Honorable Court to attend
the oath-taking."
The tribunal, aware of the grave national crisis which had the marks of yet
intensifying into possible catastrophic proportion, agreed to honor the request:
Therefore, the Court, cognizant that it had to keep its doors open, had to help
assure that the judicial process was seen to be functioning. As the hours passed,
however, the extremely volatile situation was getting more precarious by the
minute, and the combustible ingredients were all but ready to ignite. The country
was faced with a phenomenon --- the phenomenon of a people, who, in the
exercise of sovereignty perhaps too limitless to be explicitly contained and
constrained by the limited words and phrases of the constitution, directly sought
to remove their president from office. On that morning of the 20th of January,
the his tribunal was confronted with a dilemma ----- should it choose a literal and
narrow view of the constitution, invoke the rule of strict law, and exercise its
characteristics reticence? Or was it propitious for it to itself take a hand? The first
was fraught with danger and evidently too risky to accept. The second could very
well help avert imminent bloodshed. Given the realities; the Court was left hardly
with choice. Paradoxically, the first option would almost certainly imperil the
Constitution, the second could save it. The confirmatory resolution was issued
following the en banc session of the Court on 22 January 2001; it read:
"A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC- In re: Request of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
to take her Oath of Office as President of the Philippines before the Chief Justice-
Acting on the urgent request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be
sworn in as President of the Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief
Justice and confirmed letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001, which request
was treated as an administrative matter, the Court resolved unanimously to
CONFIRM the authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then
present to the Chief justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office
to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon
of January 20, 2001.
"This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiceable case
which may be filed by a proper party."
At high noon on the 20th January 2001, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as
the 14th President of the Republic of the Philippines. EDSA, once again, had its
momentous role in yet another "bloodless revolution." The Court could not have
remained placid amidst the worsening situation at the time. It could not in
conscience allow the high-strung emotions and passions of EDSA to reach the
gates of Malacañang. The military and police defections created stigma that could
not be left unguarded by a vacuum in the presidency. The danger was simply
overwhelming. The extra-ordinariness of the reality called for an extra-ordinary
solution. The court has chosen to prevent rather than cure an enigma incapable
of being recoiled.
The alarming social unrest ceased as the emergence of a new leadership so
unfolded. The promise of healing the battered nation engulfed the spirit but it
was not to last. Questions were raised on the legitimacy of Mme. Macapagal-
Arroyo's assumption to office. Mr. Estrada would insist that he was still President
and that Mme. Macapagal-Arroyo took over only in an acting capacity.
So it is argued, Mr. Estrada remains to be the President because under the 1987
Constitution, the Vice-President may assume the presidency only in its explicitly
prescribed instances; to wit, firstly, in case of death, permanent disability,
removal from office, or resignation of the President,1secondly, when the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of representatives his
written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, 2 and thirdly, when a majority of all the members of the cabinet transmit
to the President and to the speaker of the House of representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, 3 the latter two grounds being culled as the "disability."
Mr. Estrada believes that he cannot be considered to have relinquished his office
for none of the above situations have occurred. The conditions for constitutional
succession have not been met. He states that he has merely been "temporarily
incapacitated" to discharge his duties, and he invokes his letters to both
Chambers of the Congress consistent with section 11 of Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. The twin letters, dated 20 January 2001, to the two houses read:
"By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am
hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and
duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President
shall be acting President."
 
Truly, the grounds raised in the petition are as dubitable as the petitioner's real
motive in filling the case.
The pressing issue must now catapult to its end.
Resignation is an act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he renounces
his office indefinitely. In order to constitute a complete and operative act of
resignation, the officer or employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or
surrender his position accompanied by an act of relinquishment. Resignation
implies, of the intention to surrender, renounce, relinquish the office. 4
Mr. Estrada imports that he did not resign from the presidency because the word
"resignation" has not once been embodied in his letters or said in his statements.
I am unable to oblige. The contemporary acts of Estrada during those four critical
days of January are evident of his intention to relinquish his office. Scarcity of
words may not easily cloak reality and hide true intentions. Crippled to discharge
his duties, the embattled President acceded to have negotiations conducted for a
smooth transition of power. The belated proposals of the President to have the
impeachment Court allow the opening of the controversial envelope and to
postpone his resignation until 24 January 2001 were both rejected. On the
morning of 20 January 2001, the President sent to congress the following letter
---
 
"By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII, of the Constitution, I am
hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and
duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the vice-president
shall be the acting president."
Receipt of the letter by the Speaker of the lower house was placed at around
eight o'clock in the morning but the Senate president was said to have received a
copy only on the evening of that day. Nor this Court turn a blind eye to the
paralyzing events which left petitioner to helplessness and inutility in office – not
so much by the confluence of events that forces him to step down the seat of
power in a poignant and teary farewell as the recognition of the will of the
governed to whom he owned allegiance. In his "valedictory message," he wrote:
"At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her
oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other
legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality
and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor
that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
"It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the
presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process of our nation. I leave the palace of our people with gratitude for the
opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any
future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
"I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
"May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.
"MABUHAY!
Abandonment of office is a species of resignation, 5 and it connotes the giving up
of the office although not attending by the formalities normally observed in
resignation. Abandonment may be effected by a positive act or can be the result
of an omission, whether deliberate or not. 6
Mr. Joseph Estrada invokes "temporary incapacity" under Section 11, Article VII
of the Constitution. This assertion is difficult to sustain since the temporary
incapacity contemplated clearly envisions those that are personal, either by
physical or mental in nature, 7 and innate to the individual. If it were otherwise,
when then would the disability last? Would it be when the confluent causes which
have brought about that disability are completely set in reverse? Surely, the idea
fails to register well to the simple mind.
Neither can it be implied that the takeover has installed a revolutionary
government. A revolutionary government is one which has taken the seat of
power by force or in defiance of the legal processes. Within the political context,
a revolution is a complete overthrow of the established government.8 In its
delimited concept, it is characterized often,9albeit not always,10 by violence as a
means and specificable range of goals as ends. In contrast, EDSA 2 did not
envision radical changes. The government structure has remained intact.
Succession to the presidency has been by the duly-elected Vice-president of the
Republic. The military and the police, down the line, have felt to be so acting in
obedience to their mandate as the protector of the people.
Any revolution, whether it is violent or not, involves a radical change. Huntington
sees revolution as being "a rapid, fundamental and violent domestic change in
the dominant values and myths of society in its political institution, social
structure, leadership, government activity and policies.11 " The distinguished A.J.
Milne makes a differentiation between constitutional political action and
a revolutionary political action. A constitutional political action, according to him,
is a political within a legal framework and rests upon a moral commitment to
uphold the authority of law. A revolutionary political action, on the other hand,
acknowledges no such moral commitment. The latter is directly towards
overthrowing the existing legal order and replacing it with something else.12 And
what, one might ask, is the "legal order" referred to? It is an authoritative code
of a polity comprising enacted rules, along with those in the Constitution13 and
concerns itself with structures rather than personalities in the establishments.
Accordingly, structure would prefer to the different branches of the government
and personalities would be the power-holders. If determination would be made
whether a specific legal order is intact or not, what can be vital is not the change
in the personalities but a change in the structure.
 
The ascension of Mme. Macapagal-Arroyo to the presidency has resulted neither
in the obligation of the legal order. The constitutionally-established government
structures, embracing various offices under the executive branch, of the
judiciary, of the legislature, of the constitutional commissions and still other
entities, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police and local governments as well, have all remained intact and functioning.
An insistence that the events in January 2001 transgressed the letter of the
Constitution is to ignore the basic tenet of constitutionalism and to functionalize
the clearly preponderant facts.
 
More than just an eloquent piece of frozen document, the Constitution should be
deemed to be a living testament and memorial of the sovereign will of the people
from whom all government authority emanates. Certainly, this fundamental
statement is not without meaning. Nourished by time, it grows and copes with
the changing milieu. The framers of the constitution could not have anticipated
all conditions that might arise in the aftermath of events. A constitution does not
deal in details, but enunciates the general tenets that are intended to apply to all
facts that may come about but which can be brought within its
directions. 14 Behind its conciseness is its inclusiveness and its apertures
overridingly lie, not fragmented but integrated and encompassing, its spirit and
its intent. The Constitution cannot be permitted to deteriorate into just a petrified
code of legal maxims and hand-tied to its restrictive letters and wordings, rather
than be the pulsating law that it is. Designed to be an enduring instrument, its
interpretation is not be confined to the conditions and outlook which prevail at
the time of its adoption15 instead, it must be given flexible to bring it in accord
with the vicissitudes of changing and advancing affairs of men.16 Technicalities
and play of words cannot frustrate the inevitable because there is an immense
difference between legalism and justice. If only to secure our democracy and to
keep the social order – technicalities must give away. It has been said that the
real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal
technicality but proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role
as a brick in the ultimate development of social edifice.17 Anything else defeats
the spirit and intent of the Constitution for which it is formulated and reduces its
mandate to irrelevance and obscurity.
All told the installation of Mme. Macapagal-Arroyo perhaps came close to, but not
quite, the revolutionary government that we know. The new government, now
undoubtedly in effective control of the entire country, domestically and
internationally recognized to be legitimate, acknowledging a previous
pronouncement of the court, 18 is a de juregovernment both in fact and in law.
The basic structures, the principles, the directions, the intent and the spirit of the
1987 Constitution have been saved and preserved. Inevitably, Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo is the President, not merely an Acting President, of the Republic of the
Philippines.
A reminder of an elder to the youth. After two non-violent civilian uprising within
just a short span of years between them, it might be said that popular mass
action is fast becoming an institutionalized enterprise. Should the streets now be
the venue for the exercise of popular democracy? Where does one draw the line
between the rule of law and the rule of the mob, or between "People Power" and
"Anarchy?" If, as the sole justification for its being, the basis of the Arroyo
presidency lies alone on those who were at EDSA, then it does rest on loose and
shifting sands and might tragically open a Pandora's box more potent than the
malaise it seeks to address. Conventional wisdom dictates the indispensable need
for great sobriety and extreme circumspection on our part. In this kind of arena,
let us be assumed that we are not overcome by senseless adventurism and
opportunism. The country must not grow oblivious to the innate perils of people
power for no bond can be stretched far too much to its breaking point. To abuse
is to destroy that which we may hold dear.1âwphi1.nêt
1
 Section 8, Article VII, 1987 Constitution
2
 Section 11, 1st paragraph, Article VII, 1987 Constitution
3
 Ibid., 2nd paragraph
4
 Ortiz vs. Comelec, 162 SCRA 812
5
 Sangguniang Bayan ng San Andres vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
11883, 16 January 1998
6
 Cruz, Carlos L., The Law on Public Officers, p. 174, 1997 Edition
7
 "Mr. SUAREZ. xxx
"May we now go to Section 11, page 5. This refers to the President's
written declaration of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the
Office of the President. Can this written declaration to be done for and in
behalf of the President if, for example, the President is in no position to
sign his name, like he suffers an accident and both his arms get to be
amputated?
"Mr. REGALADO. We have not a situation like that even in the
jurisdiction from which we borrowed this provision, but we feel that in
remote situation that the Commissioner has cited in that the President
cannot make a written declaration, I suppose an alternative would be
considered wherein he can so expressly manifest in an authentic manner
what should be contained in a written declaration. xxx
"Mr. SUAREZ. xxx I am thinking in terms of what happened to the
President Wilson. Really, the physical disability of the gentleman was
never made clear to the historians. But suppose a situation will happen
in our country where the President may suffer coma and gets to be
unconscious, which is practically a total inability to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, how can he submit a written declaration of
inability to perform the duties and functions of his office?
"x x x x x x x x x Battles in the Supreme Court by Justice Artemio Panganiban, pp. 103-
17 

104
"FR. BERNAS. Precisely. The second paragraph is to take care of the
Wilson situation. Lawyers' League for a Better Philippines vs. President Corazon C.
18 

Aquino, et al., G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986.

"Mr. SUAREZ. I see.
CONCURRING OPINION
"Mr. REGALADO. The Wilson situation was in 1917. Precisely, this
twenty-fifth Amendment to the American Constitution as adopted on MENDOZA, J.:
February 10, 1967 prevent a recurrence of such situation. Besides, it
was not only the Wilson matter. As I have already mentioned here, they
In issue in these cases is the legitimacy of the presidency of respondent Gloria
have had situations in the United States, including those of President
Macapagal-Arroyo. In G.R. No. 146738, the petition for quo warranto seeks a
Garfield, President Wilson, President Roosevelt and President
declaration that petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada is the lawful President of the
Eisenhower."
Philippines and that respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is merely acting
President on account o the former's temporary disability. On the other hand, in
(11 RECORDS, PP. 421-423) G.R. Nos. 146710-15, the petition seeks to prohibit respondent Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto from investigating charges of plunder, bribery, malversation of
public funds, and graft and corruption against petitioner Estrada on the theory
Gitlow vs. Kiely, 44 F. 2d as cited in 46 CJS 1086
8 
that, being still President, he is immune from suit.

Ibid.
9 
In both cases, a preliminary question is raised by respondents whether the
legitimacy of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's presidency is a justiciable controversy.
10 
Ibid. Respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo contends that the matter is not justiciable
because of "the virtual impossibility of undoing what has been done, namely, the
Zarocin, Theories of Revolution in Contemporary Historiography, 88
11  transfer of constitutional power to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as a result of the
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY events starting from the expose of Ilocos Sur Governor Luis 'Chavit' Singson in
October 2000."1 In support of this contention, respondent cites the following
statements of this Court concerning the Aquino government which it is alleged
Milne, Philosophy and Political Action, The Case of Civil Rights, 21
12 
applies to her administration:
Political Studies, 453, 456 (1973)

. . . [T]he legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It

Fernandez, LAW and POLITY: Towards a System Concept of Legal
13 
belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the
validity, 46 Philippines Law Journal, 390-391 (1971) judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the
government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the
14 
16 American Jurisprudence 2d. entire country so that it is not merely a de factogovernment but is in fact and law
a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as
15 
State ex rel Columbus vs. Keterrer, 127 Ohio St 483, 189 NE 252 reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her
government.2
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. vs. Ford Motors Co., 322 Mich 209, 39
16 

NW 2d 763
From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as
"an inherent right of a people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect
radical reforms in their system of government or institutions by force or a general
uprising when the legal and constitutional methods of making such change have
proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable." It has been said
that "the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state"
and from there is derived" the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to
alter any existing form of government without regard to the existing
constitution."3
But the Aquino government was a revolutionary government which was
established following the overthrow of the 1973 Constitution. The legitimacy of a
revolutionary government cannot be the subject of judicial review. If a court
decides the question at all qua court, it must necessarily affirm the existence and
authority of such government under which it is exercising judicial power.4 As
Melville Weston long ago put it, "the men who were judges under the old regime
and the men who are called to be judges under the new have each to decide as
individuals what they are to do; and it may be that they choose at grave peril
with the factional outcome still uncertain."5 This is what the Court did
in Javellana v. Executive Secretary6 when it held that the question of validity of
the 1973 Constitution was political and affirmed that it was itself part of the new
government. As the Court said in Occena v. COMELEC7 and Mitra v.
COMELEC,8 "[P]etitioners have come to the wrong forum. We sit as a Court duty-
bound to uphold and apply that Constitution. . . . It is much too late in the day to
deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution."
In contrast, these cases do not involve the legitimacy of a government. They only
involve the legitimacy of the presidency of respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
and the claim of respondents is precisely that Macapagal-Arroyo's ascension to
the presidency was in accordance with the Constitution.9
Indeed, if the government of respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is a
revolutionary one, all talk about the fact that it was brought about by succession
due to resignation or permanent disability of petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada is
useless. All that respondents have to show is that in the contest for power
Macapagal-Arroyo's government is the successful one and is now accepted by the
people and recognized by the community of nations.
But that is not the case here. There was no revolution such as that which took
place in February 1986. There was no overthrow of the existing legal order and
its replacement by a new one, no nullification of the Constitution.
What is involved in these cases is similar to what happened in 1949 in Avelino v.
Cuenco.10 In that case, in order to prevent Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada from
airing charges against Senate President Jose Avelino, the latter refused to
recognize him, as a result of which tumult broke out in the Senate gallery, as if
by pre-arrangement, as the Court noted, and Avelino suddenly adjourned the
session and, followed by six senators, walked out of the session hall. The
remaining senators then declared the position of President of the Senate vacant
and elected Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco acting president. The question was
whether respondent Cuenco had been validly elected acting president of the
Senate, considering that there were only 12 senators (out of 24) present, one
senator (Sen. Confesor) being abroad while another one (Sen. Sotto) was ill in
the hospital.
Although in the beginning this Court refused to take cognizance of a petition for
quo warranto brought to determine the rightful president of the Senate, among
other things, in view of the political nature of the controversy, involving as it did
an internal affair of a coequal branch of the government, in the end this Court
decided to intervene because of the national crisis which developed as a result of
the unresolved question of presidency of the Senate. The situation justifying
judicial intervention was described, thus:
We can take judicial notice that legislative work has been at a standstill; the
normal and ordinary functioning of the Senate has been hampered by the non-
attendance to sessions of about one-half of the members; warrants of arrest
have been issued, openly defied, and remained unexecuted like mere scraps of
paper, notwithstanding the fact that the persons to be arrested are prominent
persons with well-known addresses and residences and have been in daily
contact with news reporters and photographers. Farce and mockery have been
interspersed with actions and movements provoking conflicts which invite
bloodshed.
. . . Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as obtaining in the upper
chamber of Congress, is highly explosive. It had echoed in the House of
Representatives. It has already involved the President of the Philippines. The
situation has created a veritable national crisis, and it is apparent that solution
cannot be expected from any quarter other than this Supreme Court, upon which
the hopes of the people for an effective settlement are pinned.11
In voting to assume jurisdiction, Chief Justice Paras wrote: "[T]his Court has no
other alternative but to meet the challenge of the situation which demands the
utmost of judicial temper and judicial statesmanship. As herein before stated, the
present crisis in the Senate is one that imperatively calls for the intervention of
this Court."12 Questions raised concerning respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's
presidency similarly justify, in my view, judicial intervention in these cases.
Nor is our power to fashion appropriate remedies in these cases in doubt.
Respondents contend that there is nothing else that can be done about the
assumption into office of respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. What has been
done cannot be undone. It is like toothpaste, we are told, which, once squeezed
out of the tube, cannot be put back.
Both literally and figuratively, the argument is untenable. The toothpaste can be
put back into the tube. Literally, it can be put back by opening the bottom of the
tube — that is how toothpaste is put in tubes at manufacture in the first place.
Metaphorically, the toothpaste can also be put back. In G.R. No. 146738, a writ
can be issued ordering respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to vacate the Office
of the President so that petitioner Joseph E. Estrada can be reinstated should the
judgment in these cases be in his favor. Whether such writ will be obeyed will be
a test of our commitment to the rule of law. In election cases, people accept the
decisions of courts even if they be against the results as proclaimed. Recognition
given by foreign governments to the presidency poses no problem. So, as far as
the political question argument of respondents is anchored on the difficulty or
impossibility of devising effective judicial remedies, this defense should not bar
inquiry into the legitimacy of the Macapagal-Arroyo administration.
This brings me to the main issue, whether respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's
ascension to the Presidency was in accordance with the Constitution. Art. VII. §8
provides in pertinent parts:
In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the
President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired
term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation
of both the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case
of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as
President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and
qualified.
The events that led to the departure of petitioner Joseph E. Estrada from office
are well known and need not be recounted in great detail here. They began in
October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal
gambling (jueteng), and other forms of corruption were made against petitioner
before the Blue Ribbon Committee of the Senate. On November 13, 2000,
petitioner was impeached by the House of Representatives and, on December 7,
impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious
allegations of graft and corruption against petitioner were made and were only
stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to petitioner,
succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against petitioner. As a result, the
impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel
walked out and Senate President Aquilino Pimentel resigned after casting his vote
against petitioner.
The events, as seen through the eyes of foreign correspondents, are vividly
recounted in the following excerpts from the Far Eastern Economic
Review and Time Magazine quoted in the Memorandum of petitioner in G.R. Nos.
146710-15, thus:
1. The decision immediately sent hundreds of Filipinos out into the
streets, triggering rallies that swelled into a massive four-day
demonstration. But while anger was apparent among the
middle classes, Estrada, a master of the common touch, still
retained largely passive support among the poorest Filipinos.
Citing that mandate and exploiting the letter of the
Constitution, which stipulates that a written resignation be
presented, he refused to step down even after all of the armed
forced, the police and most of his cabinet withdrew their
support for him. [FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, "More
Power to The Powerful", id, at p. 18].
2. When an entire night passed without Estrada's resignation, tens
of thousands of frustrated protesters marched on Malacañang
to demand that the president leave office. An air force fighter
jet and four military helicopters buzzed the palace to remind
the president that had lost the reins of power. [FAR EASTERN
ECONOMIC REVIEW, supra, ibid].
3. While the television cameras were focused on the rallies – and
the commentators became lost in reveries about People Power
revisited – behind-the-scenes negotiations had been going on
non-stop between military factions loyal to Estrada and those
who advocated a quick coup to depose the President. Chief of
Staff Reyes and Defense Secretary Mercado had made their
fateful call to Estrada after luncheon attended by all the top
commanders. The officers agreed that renouncing Estrada was
the best course, in part because some commanders were
urging more drastic resolution. If the military did not come to a
consensus, there loomed the possibility of factional fighting or,
worse, civil war. [TIME, "People Power Redux", id at p. 18]
4. It finally took a controversial Supreme Court declaration that
the presidency was effectively vacant to persuade Estrada to
pack up and move out to his family home in Manila – still
 refusing to sign a letter of resignation and insisting that he was
the legal president [FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, "More
Power to the Powerful", supra, ibid.]. Petitioner then sent two
letters, one to the Senate President and the other to the
Speaker of the House, indicating that he was unable to perform
the duties of his Office.13
To recall these events is to note the moral framework in which petitioner's fall
from power took place. Petitioner's counsel claimed petitioner was forced out of
Malacañang Palace, seat of the Presidency, because petitioner was "threatened
with mayhem."14 What, the President of the Philippines, who under the
Constitution is the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces, threatened with
mayhem? This can only happen because he had lost his moral authority as the
elected President.
Indeed, the people power movement did not just happen at the call of some
ambitious politicians, military men, businessmen and/or prelates. It came about
because the people, rightly or wrongly, believed the allegations of graft and
corruption made by Luis "Chavit" Singson, Emma Lim, Edgardo Espiritu, and
other witnesses against petitioner. Their testimonies during the impeachment
trial were all televised and heard by millions of people throughout the length and
breadth of this archipelago. As a result, petitioner found himself on January 19,
2001 deserted as most of his cabinet members resigned, members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police withdrew their support
of the President, while civil society announced its loss of trust and confidence in
him. Public office is a public trust. Petitioner lost the public's trust and as a
consequence remained President only in name. Having lost the command of the
armed forces and the national police, he found Himself vulnerable to threats of
mayhem.
This is the confession of one who is beaten. After all, the permanent disability
referred to in the Constitution can be physical, mental or moral, rendering the
President unable to exercise the powers and functions of his office. As his close
adviser wrote in his diary of the final hours of petitioner's presidency:
The President says: "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na-masyado nang masakit.
Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don't want
any more of this-it's too painful. I'm tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the
intrigue.)15
Angara himself shared this view of petitioner's inability. He wrote in his diary:
"Let us be realistic," I counter. "The President does not have the capability to
organize a counter-attack. He does not have the AFP or the Philippine National
Police on his side.He is not only in a corner – he is also down."16
This is the clearest proof that petitioner was totally and permanently disabled at
least as of 11 P.M. of Friday, January 19, 2001. Hence the negotiations for the
transfer of power to the respondent Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It
belies petitioner's claim that he was not permanently disabled but only
temporarily unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office and therefore
can only be temporarily replaced by respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo under
Art. VII, §11.
From this judgment that petitioner became permanently disabled because he had
lost the public's trust, I except extravagant claims of the right of the people to
change their government. While Art. II, §1 of the Constitution says that
"sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them," it also says that "the Philippines is a democratic and republican state."
This means that ours is a representative democracy — as distinguished from a
direct democracy — in which the sovereign will of the people is expressed
through the ballot, whether in an election, referendum, initiative, recall (in the
case of local officials) or plebiscite. Any exercise of the powers of sovereignty in
any other way is unconstitutional.
Indeed, the right to revolt cannot be recognized as a constitutional principle. A
constitution to provide for the right of the people to revolt will carry with it the
seeds of its own destruction. Rather, the right to revolt is affirmed as a natural
right. Even then, it must be exercised only for weighty and serious reasons. As
the Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776 of the American Congress
states:
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these
are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness — That to secure these Rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the
Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes
destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and
to institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and
organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect
their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long
established should not be changed for light and transient Causes; and
accordingly all Experience hath shewn, that Mankind are more disposed to suffer,
while Evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the Forms to
which they are accustomed. But when a long Train of Abuses and Usurpations,
pursuing invariably the same Object, evinces a Design to reduce them under There has been no proof of this, and so I think this claim should simply be
absolute Despotism, it is their Right, it is their Duty, to throw off such dismissed.
Government, and to provide new Guards for their future Security.17
For the foregoing reasons, I vote to dismiss the petitions in these cases.
Here, as I have already indicated, what took place at EDSA from January 16 to
20, 2001 was not a revolution but the peaceful expression of popular will. The
 
operative fact which enabled Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to assume
the presidency was the fact that there was a crisis, nay a vacuum, in the
executive leadership which made the government rife for seizure by lawless (Sgd.)
elements. The presidency was up for grabs, and it was imperative that the rule of
succession in the Constitution be enforced. VICENTE V. MENDOZA

But who is to declare the President's permanent disability, petitioner asks? The Associate Justice
answer was given by petitioner himself when he said that he was already tired
and wanted no more of popular demonstrations and rallies against him; when he
and his advisers negotiated with respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's advisers  
for a transition of powers from him to her; when petitioner's own Executive
Secretary declared that petitioner was not only in a corner but was down. Footnotes

Nor is it correct for petitioner to say that the present situation is similar to our 1
 Joint Memorandum of the Secretary of Justice and Solicitor General, p.
situation during the period (from 1941 to 1943) of our occupation by the 15.
Japanese, when we had two presidents, namely, Manuel L. Quezon and Jose P.
Laurel. This is turning somersault with history. The Philippines had two presidents
at that time for the simple reason that there were then two governments —
2
 Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. President Corazon C.
the de facto government established by Japan as belligerent occupant, of which Aquino, G.R. No. 73746, May 22, 1986.
Laurel was president, and the de jure Commonwealth Government in exile of
President Manuel L. Quezon. That a belligerent occupant has a right to establish a 3
 Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, 210 SCRA 589, 597
government in enemy territory is a recognized principle of international (1992).
law.18 But today we have only one government, and it is the one set up in the
1987 Constitution. Hence, there can only be one President.
 Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (1848).
4

Having reached the conclusion that petitioner Joseph E. Estrada is no longer

 Political Questions, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 296, 305 (1925).
5
President of the Philippines, I find no need to discuss his claim of immunity from
suit. I believe in the canon of adjudication that the Court should not formulate a
rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it  50 SCRA 30 (1973).
6

is applied.
 104 SCRA ! (1981).
7

The only question left for resolution is whether there was massive prejudicial
publicity attending the investigation by the Ombudsman of the criminal charges  104 SCRA 59 (1981).
8

against petitioner. The test in this jurisdiction is whether there has been "actual,
not merely possible, prejudice"19 caused to petitioner as a result of publicity.
 9
 Joint Memorandum of the Secretary of Justice and Solicitor General, p. In the instant case, petitioners seek the issuance of a writ of
2. injunction against the Commissioner of Immigration,
"restraining the latter and/or his authorized representative from
ordering plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung to leave the Philippines and
10
 83 Phil. 17 (1949).
causing her arrest and deportation and the confiscation of her
bond, upon her failure to do so."
11
 83 Phil. At 76 (Perfecto, J., concurring).
The prayer for preliminary injunction embodied in the
12
 Id. at 25-26 (concurring and dissenting). complaint, having been denied, the case was heard on the
merits and the parties submitted their respective evidence.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT The facts of the case, as substantially and correctly stated by
Manila the Solicitor General are these:

EN BANC On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied

for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as
  a non-immigrant. In the interrogation made
in connection with her application for a
temporary visitor's visa to enter the
G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971 Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese
residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she
MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN desired to take a pleasure trip to the
YEUNG, petitioners-appellants,  Philippines to visit her great (grand) uncle
vs. Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month
THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee. (Exhibits "l," "1-a," and "2"). She was
permitted to come into the Philippines on
March 13, 1961, and was permitted to stay
Aruego, Mamaril & Associates for petitioners-appellants. for a period of one month which would expire
on April 13, 1961. On the date of her arrival,
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Frine' Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of
C. Zaballero and Solicitor Sumilang V. Bernardo for respondent-appellee. P1,000.00 to undertake, among others that
said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart
from the Philippines on or before the
 
expiration of her authorized period of stay in
this country or within the period as in his
BARREDO, J.: discretion the Commissioner of Immigration
or his authorized representative might
Appeal from the following decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its properly allow. After repeated extensions,
Civil Case No. 49705 entitled Moy Ya Lim Yao, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to
of Immigration which, brief as it is, sufficiently depicts the factual setting of and stay in the Philippines up to February 13,
the fundamental issues involved in this case thus: 1962 (Exhibit "4"). On January 25, 1962, she
contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao
alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged
 Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated
action of respondent to confiscate her bond
and order her arrest and immediate
deportation, after the expiration of her
authorized stay, she brought this action for
injunction with preliminary injunction. At the
hearing which took place one and a half years
after her arrival, it was admitted that
petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung could not write
either English or Tagalog. Except for a few
words, she could not speak either English or
Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino
neighbor, with a Filipino name except one,
Rosa. She did not know the names of her
brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.
Under the facts unfolded above, the Court is of the considered
opinion, and so holds, that the instant petition for injunction
cannot be sustained for the same reason as set forth in the
Order of this Court, dated March 19, 1962, the pertinent
portions of which read:
First, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law provides:
Effect of the naturalization on wife and
children. — Any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines.
The above-quoted provision is clear and its import unequivocal
and hence it should be held to mean what it plainly and
explicitly expresses in unmistakable terms. The clause "who
might herself be lawfully naturalized" incontestably implies that
an alien woman may be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by
virtue of her marriage to a Filipino citizen only if she possesses
all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications specified
in the law, because these are the explicit requisites provided by
law for an alien to be naturalized. (Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan
and Lee Chiao vs. Emilio Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-11855).
However, from the allegation of paragraph 3 of the complaint,
to wit:
3. That plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung, Chinese by
birth, who might herself be lawfully
naturalized as a Filipino citizen (not being
disqualified to become such by
naturalization), is a Filipino citizen by virtue
of her marriage on January 25, 1962 to
plaintiff MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO
AGUINALDO LIM, under the Naturalization
Laws of the Philippines.
it can be deduced beyond debate that petitioner Lau Yuen
Yeung while claiming not to be disqualified, does not and
cannot allege that she possesses all the qualifications to be
naturalized, naturally because, having been admitted as a
temporary visitor only on March 13, 1961, it is obvious at once
that she lacks at least, the requisite length of residence in the
Philippines (Revised Naturalization Law, Sec. 2, Case No. 2,
Sec. 3, Case No. 3).
Were if the intention of the law that the alien
woman, to be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines by virtue of marriage to a Filipino
citizen, need only be not disqualified under
the Naturalization Law, it would have been
worded "and who herself is not disqualified to
become a citizen of the Philippines."
Second, Lau Yuen Yeung, a temporary Chinese woman visitor,
whose authorized stay in the Philippines, after repeated
extensions thereof, was to expire last February 28, 1962,
having married her co-plaintiff only on January 25, 1962, or
just a little over one month before the expiry date of her stay,
it is evident that said marriage was effected merely for
convenience to defeat or avoid her then impending compulsory
departure, not to say deportation. This cannot be permitted.
Third, as the Solicitor General has well stated:
5. That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having
been admitted as a temporary alien visitor on
the strength of a deliberate and voluntary
representation that she will enter and stay
 only for a period of one month and thereby
secured a visa, cannot go back on her
representation to stay permanently without
first departing from the Philippines as she had
promised. (Chung Tiao Bing, et al. vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, G. R. No. L-
9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se Lun vs.
Board of Commissioners, G. R. No. L-6017,
September 16, 1954; Sec. 9, last par., Phil.
Immigration Law).
The aforequoted argument of the Solicitor General is well
buttressed not only by the decided cases of the Supreme Court
on the point mentioned above, but also on the very provisions
of Section 9, sub-paragraph (g) of the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940 which reads:
An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant
cannot remain in the Philippines permanently.
To obtain permanent admission, a non-
immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to
some foreign country and procure from the
appropriate Philippine Consul the proper visa
and thereafter undergo examination by the
Officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a
Philippine port of entry for determination of
his admissibility in accordance with the
requirements of this Act. (This paragraph is
added by Republic Act 503). (Sec. 9,
subparagraph (g) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940).
And fourth, respondent Commissioner of Immigration is
charged with the administration of all laws relating to
immigration (Sec. 3, Com. Act No. 613) and in the performance
of his duties in relation to alien immigrants, the law gives the
Commissioner of Immigration a wide discretion, a quasi-judicial
function in determining cases presented to him (Pedro Uy So
vs. Commissioner of Immigration CA-G. R. No. 23336-R, Dec.
15, 1960), so that his decision thereon may not be disturbed
unless he acted with abuse of discretion or in excess of his
jurisdiction.
It may also be not amiss to state that wife Lau Yuen Yeung,
while she barely and insufficiently talk in broken Tagalog and
English, she admitted that she cannot write either language.
The only matter of fact not clearly passed upon by His Honor which could have
some bearing in the resolution of this appeal is the allegation in the brief of
petitioners-appellants, not denied in the governments brief, that "in the
hearing ..., it was shown thru the testimony of the plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung that
she does not possess any of the disqualifications for naturalization." Of course, as
an additional somehow relevant factual matter, it is also emphasized by said
appellants that during the hearing in the lower court, held almost ten months
after the alleged marriage of petitioners, "Lau Yuen Yeung was already carrying
in her womb for seven months a child by her husband."
Appellants have assigned six errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, thus:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CLAUSE
"WHO MIGHT HERSELF BE LAWFULLY NATURALIZED" (OF
SECTION 15, REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW)
INCONTESTABLY IMPLIES THAT AN ALIEN WOMAN MAY BE
DEEMED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES BY VIRTUE OF HER
MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN, ONLY IF SHE POSSESSES
ALL THE QUALIFICATIONS AND NONE OF THE
DISQUALIFICATIONS SPECIFIED IN THE LAW.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A WOMAN
FOREIGNER WHO DOES NOT POSSESS ANY OF THE
DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR CITIZENSHIP AND WHO MARRIED A
FILIPINO CITIZEN IS STILL CONSIDERED AN ALIEN EVEN
AFTER SUCH MARRIAGE AS TO FALL WITHIN THE
REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 9, SUB-PARAGRAPH (9) OF THE
PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1940.
III
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG'S
MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN WAS ONLY FOR
 CONVENIENCE, MERELY BECAUSE THE SAME WAS
CELEBRATED JUST OVER A MONTH BEFORE THE EXPIRY DATE
OF HER AUTHORIZED STAY.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE
COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION ACTED WITH ABUSE OF
DISCRETION OR IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION WHEN SAID
OFFICER THREATENED TO SEND OUT OF THE COUNTRY
PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG WITH WARNING THAT HER
FAILURE TO DO SO WOULD MEAN CONFISCATION OF HER
BOND, ARREST AND IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION, IN SPITE OF
THE FACT THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG IS NOW A FILIPINO
CITIZEN.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT AND IN REFUSING TO PERMANENTLY
ENJOIN THE COMMISSIONER FROM ORDERING PLAINTIFF LAU
YUEN YEUNG TO LEAVE THE PHILIPPINES AS A TEMPORARY
VISITOR WHICH SHE IS NOT.
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION EMBODIED IN THEIR COMPLAINT, IN AN ORDER
DATED MARCH 19, 1962. (PAGES 36-41, RECORD ON
APPEAL) .
We need not discuss these assigned errors separately. In effect, the above
decision upheld the two main grounds of objection of the Solicitor General to the
petition in the court below, viz:
That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a
temporary alien visitor on the strength of a deliberate and
voluntary representation that she will enter and stay only for a
period of one month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go
back on her representation to stay permanently without first
departing from the Philippines as she had promised. (Chung
Tiao Bing, et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-
9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se Lun vs. Board of
Commissioners, G.R. No. L-6017, Sept. 16, 1954, Sec. 9, last
par. Phil. Immigration Law);
That the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not
automatically confer on the latter Philippine citizenship. The
alien wife must possess all the qualifications required by law to
become a Filipino citizen by naturalization and none of the
disqualifications. (Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs.
Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-11855, Dec. 25, 1959)
It is obvious from the nature of these objection that their proper resolution would
necessarily cover all the points raised in appellants' assignments of error, hence,
We will base our discussions, more or less, on said objections.
I
The first objection of the Solicitor General which covers the matters dealt with in
appellants' second and fourth assignments of error does not require any lengthy
discussion. As a matter of fact, it seem evident that the Solicitor General's pose
that an alien who has been admitted into the Philippines as a non-immigrant
cannot remain here permanently unless he voluntarily leaves the country first
and goes to a foreign country to secure thereat from the appropriate Philippine
consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by officers of the
Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his
admissibility in accordance with the requirements of the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940, as amended by Republic Act 503, is premised on the assumption
that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung is not a Filipino citizen. We note the same line of
reasoning in the appealed decision of the court a quo. Accordingly, it is but safe
to assume that were the Solicitor General and His Honor of the view that said
petitioner had become ipso facto a Filipina by virtue of her marriage to her
Filipino husband, they would have held her as entitled to assume the status of a
permanent resident without having to depart as required of aliens by Section 9
(g) of the law.
In any event, to set this point at rest, We hereby hold that portion of Section 9
(g) of the Immigration Act providing:
An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in
the Philippines permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a
 non-immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign
country and procure from the appropriate Philippine consul the
proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by the officers
of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for
determination of his admissibility in accordance with the
requirements of this Act.
does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary
visitors, legitimately become Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such
change of nationality naturally bestows upon their the right to stay in the
Philippines permanently or not, as they may choose, and if they elect to reside
here, the immigration authorities may neither deport them nor confiscate their
bonds. True it is that this Court has vehemently expressed disapproval of
convenient ruses employed by alien to convert their status from temporary
visitors to permanent residents in circumvention of the procedure prescribed by
the legal provision already mentioned, such as inChiong Tiao Bing vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 99 Phil. 1020, wherein, thru Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, the Court, reiterating the ruling in Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Immigration
Commissioners, 95 PMI. 785, said:
... It is clear that if an alien gains admission to the Islands on
the strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that
he will enter only for a limited time, and thereby secures the
benefit of a temporary visa, the law will not allow him
subsequently to go back on his representation and stay
permanently, without first departing from the Philippines as he
had promised. No officer can relieve him of the departure
requirements of section 9 of the Immigration Act, under the
guise of "change" or "correction", for the law makes no
distinctions, and no officer is above the law. Any other ruling
would, as stated in our previous decision, encourage aliens to
enter the Islands on false pretences; every alien so permitted
to enter for a limited time, might then claim a right to
permanent admission, however flimsy such claim should be,
and thereby compel our government to spend time, money and
effort to examining and verifying whether or not every such
alien really has a right to take up permanent residence here. In
the meanwhile, the alien would be able to prolong his stay and
evade his return to the port whence he came, contrary to what
he promised to do when he entered. The damages inherent in
such ruling are self-evident.
On the other hand, however, We cannot see any reason why an alien who has
been here as a temporary visitor but who has in the meanwhile become a Filipino
should be required to still leave the Philippines for a foreign country, only to
apply thereat for a re-entry here and undergo the process of showing that he is
entitled to come back, when after all, such right has become incontestible as a
necessary concomitant of his assumption of our nationality by whatever legal
means this has been conferred upon him. Consider for example, precisely the
case of the minor children of an alien who is naturalized. It is indubitable that
they become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. Could it be the law that before
they can be allowed permanent residence, they still have to be taken abroad so
that they may be processed to determine whether or not they have a right to
have permanent residence here? The difficulties and hardships which such a
requirement entails and its seeming unreasonableness argue against such a
rather absurd construction. Indeed, as early as 1957, in Ly Giok Ha vs. Galang,
101 Phil. 459, Mr. Justice Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, already ruled
thus:
... (P)etitioners allege that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly
Giok Ha became also a citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this
conclusion were correct, it would follow that, in consequence of
her marriage, she had been naturalized as such citizen, and,
hence the decision appealed from would have to be affirmed,
for section 40(c) of Commonwealth Act 613 provides that "in
the event of the naturalization as a Philippine citizen ... of the
alien on whose behalf the bond deposit is given, the bond shall
be cancelled or the sum deposited shall be returned to the
depositor or his legal representative." (At. pp. 462-463)
In other words, the applicable statute itself more than implies that the
naturalization of an alien visitor as a Philippine citizen logically produces the
effect of conferring upon him ipso facto all the rights of citizenship including that
of being entitled to permanently stay in the Philippines outside the orbit of
authority of the Commissioner of Immigration vis-a-vis aliens, if only because by
its very nature and express provisions, the Immigration Law is a law only for
aliens and is inapplicable to citizens of the Philippines. In the sense thus
discussed therefore, appellants' second and fourth assignments of error are well
taken.
II
Precisely, the second objection, of the Solicitor General sustained by the trial
judge is that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung's marriage to appellant Moya Lim Yao
alias Edilberto Aguinaldo whose Filipino citizenship is not denied did not have the
effect of making her a Filipino, since it has not been shown that she "might
herself be lawfully naturalized," it appearing clearly in the record that she does
not possess all the qualifications required of applicants for naturalization by the
Revised Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, even if she has proven that
she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications thereunder. In other words,
the Solicitor General implicitly concedes that had it been established in the
proceedings below that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung possesses all the qualifications
required by the law of applicants for naturalization, she would have been
recognized by the respondent as a Filipino citizen in the instant case, without
requiring her to submit to the usual proceedings for naturalization.
To be sure, this position of the Solicitor General is in accord with what used to be
the view of this Court since Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Emilio Galang, etc., et al., G.R.
No. L-11855, promulgated December 23, 1959, 106 Phil., 706,713, 1 for it was
only in Zita Ngo Burca vs. Republic, G.R. NO. L-24252 which was promulgated on
January 30, 1967 (19 SCRA 186), that over the pen of Mr. Justice Conrado
Sanchez, this Court held that for an alien woman who marries a Filipino to be
deemed a Filipina, she has to apply for naturalization in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by the Revised Naturalization Law and prove in said
naturalization proceeding not only that she has all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications provided in the law but also that she has complied with all
the formalities required thereby like any other applicant for naturalization,  2 albeit
said decision is not yet part of our jurisprudence inasmuch as the motion for its
reconsideration is still pending resolution. Appellants are in effect urging Us,
however, in their first and second assignments of error, not only to
reconsider Burca but to even reexamine Lee Suan Ay which, as a matter of fact,
is the prevailing rule, having been reiterated in all subsequent decisions up to Go
Im Ty. 3
Actually, the first case in which Section 15 of the Naturalization Law,
Commonwealth Act 473, underwent judicial construction was in the first Ly Giok
Ha case, 4 one almost identical to the one at bar. Ly Giok Ha, a woman of Chinese
nationality, was a temporary visitor here whose authority to stay was to expire
on March 14, 1956. She filed a bond to guaranty her timely departure. On March
8, 1956, eight days before the expiration of her authority to stay, she married a
Filipino by the name of Restituto Lacasta. On March 9, 1956, her husband
notified the Commissioner of Immigration of said marriage and, contending that
his wife had become a Filipina by reason of said marriage, demanded for the
cancellation of her bond, but instead of acceding to such request, the
Commissioner required her to leave, and upon her failure to do so, on March 16,
1956, the Commissioner confiscated her bond; a suit was filed for the recovery of
the bond; the lower court sustained her contention that she had no obligation to
leave, because she had become Filipina by marriage, hence her bond should be
returned. The Commissioner appealed to this Court. In the said appeal, Mr.
Justice Roberto Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, spoke for the Court, thus:
The next and most important question for determination is
whether her marriage to a Filipino justified or, at least, excused
the aforesaid failure of Ly Giok Ha to depart from the
Philippines on or before March 14, 1956. In maintaining the
affirmative view, petitioners alleged that, upon her marriage to
a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became, also, a citizen of the Philippines.
Indeed, if this conclusion were correct, it would follow that, in
consequence of her marriage, she had been naturalized as such
citizen, and, hence, the decision appealed from would have to
be affirmed, for section 40(c) of Commonwealth Act No. 613
provides that "in the event of the naturalization as a Philippine
citizen ... of the alien on whose behalf the bond deposit is
given, the bond shall be cancelled or the sum deposited shall
be returned to the depositor or his legal representative." Thus
the issue boils down to whether an alien female who marries a
male citizen of the Philippines follows ipso facto his political
status.
The pertinent part of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473,
upon which petitioners rely, reads:
Any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the Philippines, and
who might herself be lawfully naturalized
shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Pursuant thereto, marriage to a male Filipino does not vest
Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she "herself
may be lawfully naturalized." As correctly held in an opinion of
the Secretary of Justice (Op. No. 52, series of 1950),* this
limitation of section 15 excludes, from the benefits of
naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being
naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of said
Commonwealth Act No. 473, namely:
(a) Persons opposed to organized government
or affiliated with any association or group of
persons who uphold and teach doctrines
opposing all organized governments;
 (b) Persons defending or teaching the
necessity or propriety of violence, personal
assault, or assassination for the success and
predominance of their ideas;
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of
polygamy;
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving
moral turpitude;
(e) Persons suffering from mental alienation
or incurable contagious diseases;
(f) Persons who, during the period of their
residence in the Philippines, have not mingled
socially with the Filipinos, or who have not
evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace
the customs, traditions, and ideals of the
Filipinos;
(g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom
the ... Philippines are at war, during the
period of such war;
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country
other than the United States, whose laws
does not grant Filipinos the right to become
naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
In the case at bar, there is neither proof nor allegation in the
pleadings that Ly Giok Ha does not fall under any of the classes
disqualified by law. Moreover, as the parties who claim that,
despite her failure to depart from the Philippines within the
period specified in the bond in question, there has been no
breach thereof, petitioners have the burden of proving her
alleged change of political status, from alien to citizen. Strictly
speaking, petitioners have not made out, therefore a case
against the respondents-appellants.
Considering, however, that neither in the administrative
proceedings, nor in the lower court, had the parties seemingly
felt that there was an issue on whether Ly Giok Ha may "be
lawfully naturalized," and this being a case of first impression in
our courts, we are of the opinion that, in the interest of equity
and justice, the parties herein should be given an opportunity
to introduce evidence, if they have any, on said issue. (At pp.
462-464.) .
As may be seen, although not specifically in so many words, no doubt was left in
the above decision as regards the following propositions: .
1. That under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization
Law, the marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino makes her a Filipina, if she
"herself might be lawfully naturalized";
2. That this Court declared as correct the opinion of the Secretary of Justice that
the limitation of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law excludes from the benefits
of naturalization by marriage, only those disqualified from being naturalized
under Section 4 of the law qouted in the decision;
3. That evidence to the effect that she is not disqualified may be presented in the
action to recover her bond confiscated by the Commissioner of Immigration;
4. That upon proof of such fact, she may be recognized as Filipina; and
5. That in referring to the disqualification enumerated in the law, the Court
somehow left the impression that no inquiry need be made as to
qualifications, 5 specially considering that the decision cited and footnotes several
opinions of the Secretary of Justice, the immediate superior of the Commissioner
of Immigration, the most important of which are the following:
Paragraph (a), section 13 of Act No. 2927, as amended, (now
section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473), provided that "any
woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of
the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized
shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines." A similar provision
in the naturalization law of the United States has been
construed as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications
of residence, good character, etc., as in the case of
naturalization by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of
the race of persons who may be naturalized. (Kelly v. Owen
[Dist. Col. 1868] 7 Wall 496, 5F, 11, 12; ex parte Tryason [D.
C. Wash. 1914] 215 F. 449, 27 Op. Atty. Gen. 507). (Op. No.
168, s. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)
In a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the
clause "who might herself be lawfully naturalized", should be
construed as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications
of residence, good character, etc., as in cases of naturalization
by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the race of
persons who may be naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940)
Inasmuch as the race qualification has been removed by the
Revised Naturalization Law, it results that any woman who
married a citizen of the Philippines prior to or after June 17,
1939, and the marriage not having been dissolved, and on the
assumption that she possesses none of the disqualifications
mentioned in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, follows
the citizenship of her husband. (Op. No. 176, s. 1940 of Justice
Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)
From the foregoing narration of facts, it would seem that the
only material point of inquiry is as to the citizenship of Arce
Machura. If he shall be found to be a citizen of the Philippines,
his wife, Mrs. Lily James Machura, shall likewise be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines pursuant to the provision of Section
15, Commonwealth Act No. 473, which reads in part as follows:
Any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the Philippines, and
who might herself be lawfully naturalized
shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
The phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized", as
contained in the above provision, means that the woman who is
married to a Filipino citizen must not belong to any of the
disqualified classes enumerated in Section 4 of the
Naturalization Law (Ops., Sec. of Jus., No. 28, s. 1950; No. 43,
s. 1948, No. 95, s. 1941; Nos. 79 and 168, s. 1940). Under the
facts stated in the within papers, Mrs. Machura does not appear
to be among the disqualified classes mentioned in the law.
It having been shown that Arce Machura or Arsenio Guevara
was born as an illegitimate of a Filipino mother, he should be
considered as a citizen of the Philippines in consonance with the
well-settled rule that an illegitimate child follows the citizenship
of his only legally recognized parent, the mother (Op., Sec. of
Jus., Nos. 58, 98 & 281, s. 1948; No. 96, s. 1949). Her
husband being a Filipino, Mrs. Machura must necessarily be
deemed as a citizen of the Philippines by marriage (Sec. 15,
Com. Act No. 473.) (Op. No. 52, s. 1950 of Justice Sec. Ricardo
Nepomuceno.)
The logic and authority of these opinions, compelling as they are, must have so
appealed to this Court that five days later, on May 22, 1957, in Ricardo Cua v.
The Board of Commissioners, 101 Phil. 521, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, reiterated
the same ruling on the basis of the following facts:
Tjioe Wu Suan, an Indonesian, arrived in Manila on November 1, 1952, but it
turned out that her passport was forged. On December 10, 1953, a warrant was
issued for her arrest for purpose of deportation. Later, on December 20, 1953,
she married Ricardo Cua, a Filipino, and because of said marriage, the Board of
Special Inquiry considered her a Filipina. Upon a review of the case, however, the
Board of Immigration Commissioners insisted on continuing with the deportation
proceedings and so, the husband filed prohibition and mandamus proceedings.
The lower court denied the petition. Although this Court affirmed said decision, it
held, on the other hand, that:
Granting the validity of marriage, this Court has ruled in the
recent case of Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, supra, p. 459, that the
bare fact of a valid marriage to a citizen does not suffice to
confer his citizenship upon the wife. Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law requires that the alien woman who marries a
Filipino must show, in addition, that she "might herself be
lawfully naturalized" as a Filipino citizen. As construed in the
decision cited, this last condition requires proof that the woman
who married a Filipino is herself not disqualified under section 4
of the Naturalization Law.
No such evidence appearing on record, the claim of assumption
of Filipino citizenship by Tjioe Wu Suan, upon her marriage to
petitioner, is untenable. The lower court, therefore, committed
no error in refusing to interfere with the deportation
proceedings, where she can anyway establish the requisites
indispensable for her acquisition of Filipino citizenship, as well
 as the alleged validity of her Indonesian passport. (Ricardo Cua for any of the causes enumerated in Section 4 of the Act is the
v. The Board of Immigration Commissioners, G. R. No. L-9997, decisive factor that defeats the right of the foreign wife of a
May 22, 1957, 101 Phil. 521, 523.) [Emphasis supplied] . Philippine citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship.

For emphasis, it is reiterated that in the above two cases, this Court expressly xxx xxx xxx
gave the parties concerned opportunity to prove the fact that they were not
suffering from any of the disqualifications of the law without the need of
Does petitioner, Lim King Bian, belong to any of these groups
undergoing any judicial naturalization proceeding. It may be stated, therefore,
The Commissioner of Immigration does not say so but merely
that according to the above decisions, the law in this country, on the matter of
predicates his negative action on the ground that a warrant of
the effect of marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino is that she thereby
deportation for "overstaying" is pending against the petitioner.
becomes a Filipina, if it can be proven that at the time of such marriage, she
does not possess any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the
Naturalization Law, without the need of submitting to any naturalization We do not believe the position is well taken. Since the grounds
proceedings under said law. for disqualification for naturalization are expressly enumerated
in the law, a warrant of deportation not based on a finding of
unfitness to become naturalized for any of those specified
It is to be admitted that both of the above decisions made no reference to
causes may not be invoked to negate acquisition of Philippine
qualifications, that is, as to whether or not they need also to be proved, but, in
citizenship by a foreign wife of a Philippine citizen under Section
any event, it is a fact that the Secretary of Justice understood them to mean that
15 of the Naturalization Law. (Inclusio unius est exclusio
such qualifications need not be possessed nor proven. Then Secretary of Justice
alterius) (Op. No. 12, s. 1958 of Justice Undersec. Jesus G.
Jesus Barrera, who later became a distinguished member of this Court,  6 so ruled
Barrera.)
in opinions rendered by him subsequent to Ly Giok Ha, the most illustrative of
which held: .
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman
married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine
At the outset it is important to note that an alien woman
citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of
married to a Filipino citizen needs only to show that she "might
Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition
herself be lawfully naturalized" in order to acquire Philippine
for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration
citizenship. Compliance with other conditions of the statute,
alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino
such as those relating to the qualifications of an applicant for
citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her
naturalization through judicial proceedings, is not necessary.
husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth
(See: Leonard v. Grant, 5 Fed. 11; 27 Ops. Atty. Gen [U.S.]
Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which
507; Ops. Sec. of Justice, No. 776, s. 1940, and No. 111, s.
should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of
1953.
the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the
petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by
This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al. v. the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen
Galang et al., G.R. No. L-10760, promulgated May 17, 1957, (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration
where the Supreme Court, construing the abovequoted section conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order
of the Naturalization Law, held that "marriage to a male Filipino or decision granting or denying the petition. (Op. No. 38, s.
does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife," unless 19058 of Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
she "herself may be lawfully naturalized," and that "this
limitation of Section 15 excludes, from the benefits of
This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al., v.
naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being
Galang et al. (G.R. No. L-10760, promulgated May 17, 1957),
naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under Section 4 of said
where the Supreme Court, construing the above-quoted section
Commonwealth Act No. 473." In other words, disqualification
 in the Revised Naturalization Law, held that "marriage to a
male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign
wife, unless she herself may be lawfully naturalized," and that
"this limitation of Section 15 excludes, from the benefits of
naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being
naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under Section 4 of said
Commonwealth Act No. 473." In other words, disqualification
for any of the causes enumerated in section 4 of the Act is the
decisive factor that defeats the right of an alien woman married
to a Filipino citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship. (Op. 57, s.
1958 of Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
The contention is untenable. The doctrine enunciated in the Ly
Giok Ha case is not a new one. In that case, the Supreme Court
held that under paragraph I of Section 15 Of Commonwealth
Act No. 473, 'marriage to a male Filipino does not vest
Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife unless she "herself may
be lawfully naturalized"', and, quoting several earlier opinions
of the Secretary of Justice, namely: No. 52, s. 1950; No. 168,
s. 1940; No. 95, s. 1941; No. 63, s. 1948; No. 28. s. 1950,
"this limitation of section 15 excludes from the benefits of
naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being
naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of said
Commonwealth Act No. 473." (Op. 134, s. 1962 of Justice
Undersec. Magno S. Gatmaitan.)
It was not until more than two years later that, in one respect, the above
construction of the law was importantly modified by this Court in Lee Suan
Ay, supra, in which the facts were as follows:
Upon expiration of the appellant Lee Suan Ay's authorized
period of temporary stay in the Philippines (25 March 1955), on
26 March 1955 the Commissioner of Immigration asked the
bondsman to present her to the Bureau of Immigration within
24 hours from receipt of notice, otherwise the bond will be
confiscated(Annex 1). For failure of the bondsman to comply
with the foregoing order, on 1 April 1955. the Commissioner of
Immigration ordered the cash bond confiscated (Annex E).
Therefore, there was an order issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration confiscating or forfeiting the cash bond. Unlike in
forfeiture of bail bonds in criminal proceedings, where the Court
must enter an order forfeiting the bail bond and the bondsman
must be given an opportunity to present his principal or give a
satisfactory reason for his inability to do so, before final
judgment may be entered against the bondsman,(section 15,
Rule 110; U.S. v. Bonoan, 22 Phil. 1.) in forfeiture of bonds
posted for the temporary stay of an alien in the Philippines, no
court proceeding is necessary. Once a breach of the terms and
conditions of the undertaking in the bond is committed, the
Commissioner of Immigration may, under the terms and
conditions thereof, declare it forfeited in favor of the
Government. (In the meanwhile, on April 1, 1955, Lee Suan Ay
and Alberto Tan, a Filipino, were joined in marriage by the
Justice of the Peace of Las Piñas, Rizal.)
Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla speaking for a unanimous court which included Justices
Concepcion and Reyes who had penned Ly Giok Ha, and Ricardo Cua, ruled thus:
The fact that Lee Suan Ay (a Chinese) was married to a Filipino
citizen does not relieve the bondsman from his liability on the
bond. The marriage took place on 1 April 1955, and the
violation of the terms and conditions of the undertaking in the
bond — failure to depart from the Philippines upon expiration of
her authorized period of temporary stay in the Philippines (25
March 1955) and failure to report to the Commissioner of
Immigration within 24 hours from receipt of notice — were
committed before the marriage. Moreover, the marriage of a
Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer
Philippine citizenship upon the latter. She must possess the
qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by
naturalization.* There is no showing that the appellant Lee
Suan Ay possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided for by law to become a Filipino citizen
by naturalization.
Pertinently to be noted at once in this ruling, which, to be sure, is the one relied
upon in the appealed decision now before Us, is the fact that the footnote of the
statement therein that the alien wife "must possess the qualifications required by
law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization" makes reference to Section 15,
Commonwealth Act 473 and precisely, also to Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, supra. As
will be recalled, on the other hand, in the opinions of the Secretary of Justice
explicitly adopted by the Court in Ly Giok Ha, among them, Opinion No. 176,
Series of 1940, above-quoted, it was clearly held that "(I)n a previous opinion
rendered for your Office, I stated that the clause "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized", should be construed as not requiring the woman to have the
qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in cases of naturalization by
judicial proceedingsbut merely that she is of the race by persons who may be It is to be noted that the petitioner has anchored her claim for
naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940) citizenship on the basis of the decision laid down in the case of
Leonard v. Grant, 5 Swy. 603, 5 F 11, where the Circuit Court
of Oregon held that it was only necessary that the woman
Since Justice Padilla gave no reason at all for the obviously significant
"should be a person of the class or race permitted to be
modification of the construction of the law, it could be said that there was need
naturalized by existing laws, and that in respect of the
for clarification of the seemingly new posture of the Court. The occasion for such
qualifications arising out of her conduct or opinions, being the
clarification should have been in Kua Suy, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of
wife of a citizen, she is to be regarded as qualified for
Immigration, G.R. No. L-13790, October 31, 1963, penned by Mr. Justice J.B.L.
citizenship, and therefore considered a citizen." (In explanation
Reyes, who had rendered the opinion in Ricardo Cua,supra, which followed that
of its conclusion, the Court said: "If, whenever during the life of
in Ly Giok Ha, supra, but apparently seeing no immediate relevancy in the case
the woman or afterwards, the question of her citizenship arises
on hand then of the particular point in issue now, since it was not squarely raised
in a legal proceeding, the party asserting her citizenship by
therein similarly as in Lee Suan Ay, hence, anything said on the said matter
reason of her marriage with a citizen must not only prove such
would at best be no more than obiter dictum, Justice Reyes limited himself to
marriage, but also that the woman then possessed all the
holding that "Under Section 15 of the Naturalization Act, the wife is deemed a
further qualifications necessary to her becoming naturalized
citizen of the Philippines only if she "might herself be lawfully naturalized," so
under existing laws, the statute will be practically nugatory, if
that the fact of marriage to a citizen, by itself alone, does not suffice to confer
not a delusion and a share. The proof of the facts may have
citizenship, as this Court has previously ruled in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 54 O.G.
existed at the time of the marriage, but years after, when a
356, and in Cua v. Board of Immigration Commissioners, 53 O.G. 8567; and
controversy arises upon the subject, it may be lost or difficult
there is here no evidence of record as to the qualifications or absence of
to find.")
disqualifications of appellee Kua Suy", without explaining the apparent departure
already pointed out from Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua. Even Justice Makalintal,
who wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion merely lumped together In other words, all that she was required to prove was that she
Ly Giok Ha, Ricardo Cua and Lee Suan Ay and opined that both qualifications and was a free white woman or a woman of African descent or
non-disqualifications have to be shown without elucidating on what seemed to be nativity, in order to be deemed an American citizen, because,
departure from the said first two decisions. with respect to the rest of the qualifications on residence, moral
character, etc., she was presumed to be qualified.
It was only on November 30, 1963 that to Mr. Justice Roberto Regala fell the task
of rationalizing the Court's position. In Lo San Tuang v. Galang, G.R. No. L- Like the law in the United States, our former Naturalization Law
18775, November 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 638, the facts were simply these: Lo San (Act No. 2927, as amended by Act No. 3448) specified the
Tuang, a Chinese woman, arrived in the Philippines on July 1, 1960 as a classes of persons who alone might become citizens of the
temporary visitor with authority to stay up to June 30, 1961. She married a Philippines, even as it provided who were disqualified. Thus, the
Filipino on January 7, 1961, almost six months before the expiry date of her pertinent provisions of that law provided:
permit, and when she was requested to leave after her authority to stay had
expired, she refused to do so, claiming she had become a Filipina by marriage,
Section 1. Who may become Philippine
and to bolster her position, she submitted an affidavit stating explicitly that she
citizens — Philippine citizenship may be
does not possess any of the disqualifications enumerated in the Naturalization
acquired by (a) natives of the Philippines who
Law, Commonwealth Act 473. When the case reached the court, the trial judge
are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law;
held for the government that in addition to not having any of the disqualifications
(b) natives of the Insular possessions of the
referred to, there was need that Lo San Tuang should have also possessed all the
United States; (c) citizens of the United
qualifications of residence, moral character, knowledge of a native principal
States, or foreigners who under the laws of
dialect, etc., provided by the law. Recognizing that the issue squarely to be
the United States may become citizens of said
passed upon was whether or not the possession of all the qualifications were
country if residing therein.
indeed needed to be shown apart from non-disqualification, Justice Regala held
affirmatively for the Court, reasoning out thus: .
Section 2. Who are disqualified. — The
following cannot be naturalized as Philippine
citizens: (a) Persons opposed to organized
government or affiliated with any association
or group of persons who uphold and teach
doctrines opposing all organized government;
(b) persons defending or teaching the
necessity or propriety of violence, personal
assault or assassination for the success and
predominance of their ideas; (c) polygamists
or believers in the practice of polygamy; (d)
persons convicted of crimes involving moral
turpitude; (e) persons suffering from mental
alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
(f) citizens or subjects of nations with whom
the United States and the Philippines are at
war, during the period of such war.
Section 3. Qualifications. — The persons
comprised in subsection (a) of section one of
this Act, in order to be able to acquire
Philippine citizenship, must be not less than
twenty-one years of age on the day of the
hearing of their petition.
The persons comprised in subsections (b) and
(c) of said section one shall, in addition to
being not less than twenty-one years of age
on the day of the hearing of the petition,
have all and each of the following
qualifications:
First. Residence in the Philippine Islands for a
continuous period of not less than five years,
except as provided in the next following
section;
Second. To have conducted themselves in a
proper and irreproachable manner during the
entire period of their residence in the
Philippine Islands, in their relation with the
constituted government as well as with the
community in which they are living;
Third. To hold in the Philippine Islands real
estate worth not less than one thousand
pesos, Philippine currency, or have some
known trade or profession; and
Fourth. To speak and write English, Spanish,
or some native tongue.
In case the petitioner is a foreign subject, he
shall, besides, declare in writing and under
oath his intention of renouncing absolutely
and perpetually all faith and allegiance to the
foreign authority, state or sovereignty of
which he was a native, citizen or subject.
Applying the interpretation given by Leonard v. Grant supra, to
our law as it then stood, alien women married to citizens of the
Philippines must, in order to be deemed citizens of the
Philippines, be either (1) natives of the Philippines who were
not citizens thereof under the Jones Law, or (2) natives of other
Insular possessions of the United States, or (3) citizens of the
United States or foreigners who under the laws of the United
States might become citizens of that country if residing therein.
With respect to the qualifications set forth in Section 3 of the
former law, they were deemed to have the same for all intents
and purposes.
But, with the approval of the Revised Naturalization Law
(Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June 17, 1939, Congress has
since discarded class or racial consideration from the
qualifications of applicants for naturalization (according to its
proponent, the purpose in eliminating this consideration was,
first, to remove the features of the existing naturalization act
which discriminated in favor of the Caucasians and against
Asiatics who are our neighbors, and are related to us by racial
affinity and, second, to foster amity with all nations [Sinco,
Phil. Political Law 502 — 11 ed.]), even as it retained in Section
15 the phrase in question. The result is that the phrase "who
might herself be lawfully naturalized" must be understood in
the context in which it is now found, in a setting so different
from that in which it was found by the Court in Leonard v.
Grant.
 The only logical deduction from the elimination of class or racial
consideration is that, as the Solicitor General points out, the
phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be
understood as referring to those who under Section 2 of the law
are qualified to become citizens of the Philippines.
There is simply no support for the view that the phrase "who
might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be understood
as requiring merely that the alien woman must not belong to
the class of disqualified persons under Section 4 of the Revised
Naturalization Law. Such a proposition misreads the ruling laid
down in Leonard v. Grant. A person who is not disqualified is
not necessarily qualified to become a citizen of the Philippines,
because the law treats "qualifications" and "disqualifications" in
separate sections. And then it must not be lost sight of that
even under the interpretation given to the former law, it was to
be understood that the alien woman was not disqualified under
Section 2 of that law. Leonard v. Grant did not rule that it was
enough if the alien woman does not belong to the class of
disqualified persons in order that she may be deemed to follow
the citizenship of her husband: What that case held was that
the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized, merely
means that she belongs to the class or race of persons qualified
to become citizens by naturalization — the assumption being
always that she is not otherwise disqualified.
We therefore hold that under the first paragraph of Section 15
of the Naturalization Law, an alien woman, who is married to a
citizen of the Philippines, acquires the citizenship of her
husband only if she has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided by law. Since there is no proof in this
case that petitioner has all the qualifications and is not in any
way disqualified, her marriage to a Filipino citizen does not
automatically make her a Filipino citizen. Her affidavit to the
effect that she is not in any way disqualified to become a
citizen of this country was correctly disregarded by the trial
court, the same being self-serving.
Naturally, almost a month later in Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner of
Immigration, G.R. No. L-20784, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 875, wherein the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs reversed a previous resolution of the preceding
administration to allow Sun Peck Yong and her minor son to await the taking of
the oath of Filipino citizenship of her husband two years after the decision
granting him nationalization and required her to leave and this order was
contested in court, Justice Barrera held:
In the case of Lo San Tuang v. Commissioner of
Immigration (G.R. No. L-18775, promulgated November 30,
1963; Kua Suy vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-13790,
promulgated October 31, 1963), we held that the fact that the
husband became a naturalized citizen does not automatically
make the wife a citizen of the Philippines. It must also be
shown that she herself possesses all the qualifications, and
none of the disqualifications, to become a citizen. In this case,
there is no allegation, much less showing, that petitioner-wife is
qualified to become a Filipino citizen herself. Furthermore, the
fact that a decision was favorably made on the naturalization
petition of her husband is no assurance that he (the husband)
would become a citizen, as to make a basis for the extension of
her temporary stay.
On the same day, in Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21136, December 27,
1963, 9 SCRA 876, Justice Barrera reiterated the same ruling and citing
particularly Lo San Tuang and Kua Suy, held that the marriage of Tong Siok Sy to
a Filipino on November 12, 1960 at Taichung, Taiwan and her taking oath of
Filipino citizenship before the Philippine Vice-Consul at Taipeh, Taiwan on January
6, 1961 did not make her a Filipino citizen, since she came here only in 1961 and
obviously, she had not had the necessary ten-year residence in the Philippines
required by the law.
Such then was the status of the jurisprudential law on the matter under
discussion when Justice Makalintal sought a reexamination thereof in Choy King
Tee v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18351, March 26, 1965, 13 SCRA 402. Choy King Tee's
husband was granted Philippine citizenship on January 13, 1959 and took the
oath on January 31 of the same year. Choy King Tee first came to the Philippines
in 1955 and kept commuting between Manila and Hongkong since then, her last
visa before the case being due to expire on February 14, 1961. On January 27,
1961, her husband asked the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel her alien
certificate of registration, as well as their child's, for the reason that they were
Filipinos, and when the request was denied as to the wife, a mandamus was
sought, which the trial court granted. Discussing anew the issue of the need for
qualifications, Justice Makalintal not only reiterated the arguments of Justice
Regala in Lo San Tuang but added further that the ruling is believed to be in line
with the national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship.  7
No wonder, upon this authority, in Austria v. Conchu, G.R. No. L-20716, June 22,
1965, 14 SCRA 336, Justice J.P. Bengzon readily reversed the decision of the
lower court granting the writs of mandamus and prohibition against the
Commissioner of Immigration, considering that Austria's wife, while admitting
she did not possess all the qualifications for naturalization, had submitted only an
affidavit that she had none of the disqualifications therefor. So also did Justice
Dizon similarly hold eight days later in Brito v. Commissioner, G.R. No. L-16829,
June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 539.
Then came the second Ly Giok Ha case 8 wherein Justice J. B. L. Reyes took
occasion to expand on the reasoning of Choy King Tee by illustrating with
examples "the danger of relying exclusively on the absence of disqualifications,
without taking into account the other affirmative requirements of the law."  9
Lastly, in Go Im Ty v. Republic, G.R. No. L-17919, decided on July 30,
1966, 10 Justice Zaldivar held for the Court that an alien woman who is widowed
during the dependency of the naturalization proceedings of her husband, in order
that she may be allowed to take the oath as Filipino, must, aside from proving
compliance with the requirements of Republic Act 530, show that she possesses
all the qualifications and does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under
the Naturalization Law, citing in the process the decision to such effect discussed
above, 11 even as he impliedly reversed pro tanto the ruling in Tan Lin v.
Republic, G.R. No. L-13786, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383.
Accordingly, in Burca, Justice Sanchez premised his opinion on the assumption
that the point now under discussion is settled law.
In the case now at bar, the Court is again called upon to rule on the same issue.
Under Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, providing
that:
SEC. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. —
Any woman, who is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have
been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens
thereof.
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the
time of the naturalization of the parent, shall automatically
become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born child, who is not
in the Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be
deemed a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he
begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a
minor, in which case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen
even after becoming of age.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of
his parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen unless within
one year after reaching the age of majority he fails to register
himself as a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the
country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of
allegiance.
is it necessary, in order that an alien woman who marries a Filipino or who is
married to a man who subsequently becomes a Filipino, may become a Filipino
citizen herself, that, aside from not suffering from any of the disqualifications
enumerated in the law, she must also possess all the qualifications required by
said law? if nothing but the unbroken line from Lee Suan Ay to Go Im Ty, as
recounted above, were to be considered, it is obvious that an affirmative answer
to the question would be inevitable, specially, if it is noted that the present case
was actually submitted for decision on January 21, 1964 yet, shortly after Lo San
Tuang, Tong Siok Sy and Sun Peck Yong, all supra, and even before Choy King
Tee, supra, were decided. There are other circumstances, however, which make
it desirable, if not necessary, that the Court take up the matter anew. There has
been a substantial change in the membership of the Court since Go Im Ty, and of
those who were in the Court already when Burca was decided, two members,
Justice Makalintal and Castro concurred only in the result, precisely, according to
them, because (they wanted to leave the point now under discussion open in so
far as they are concerned. 12 Truth to tell, the views and arguments discussed at
length with copious relevant authorities, in the motion for reconsideration as well
as in the memorandum of the amici curae 13 in the Burca case cannot just be
taken lightly and summarily ignored, since they project in the most forceful
manner, not only the legal and logical angles of the issue, but also the imperative
practical aspects thereof in the light of the actual situation of the thousands of
alien wives of Filipinos who have so long, even decades, considered themselves
as Filipinas and have always lived and acted as such, officially or otherwise,
relying on the long standing continuous recognition of their status as such by the
administrative authorities in charge of the matter, as well as by the courts. Under
these circumstances, and if only to afford the Court an opportunity to consider
the views of the five justices who took no part in Go Im Ty (including the writer
of this opinion), the Court decided to further reexamine the matter. After all, the
ruling first laid in Lee Suan Ay, and later in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee stand
the second (1966) Ly Giok Ha, did not categorically repudiate the opinions of the
Secretary of Justice relied upon by the first (1959) Ly Giok Ha. Besides, some
points brought to light during the deliberations in this case would seem to
indicate that the premises of the later cases can still bear further consideration.
Whether We like it or not, it is undeniably factual that the legal provision We are
construing, Section 15, aforequoted, of the Naturalization Law has been taken
directly, copied and adopted from its American counterpart. To be more accurate,
said provision is nothing less than a reenactment of the American provision. A
brief review of its history proves this beyond per adventure of doubt.
The first Naturalization Law of the Philippines approved by the Philippine
Legislature under American sovereignty was that of March 26, 1920, Act No.
2927. Before then, as a consequence of the Treaty of Paris, our citizenship laws
were found only in the Organic Laws, the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Act of the
United States Congress of March 23, 1912 and later the Jones Law of 1916. In
fact, Act No. 2927 was enacted pursuant to express authority granted by the
Jones Law. For obvious reasons, the Philippines gained autonomy on the subjects
of citizenship and immigration only after the effectivity of the Philippine
Independence Act. This made it practically impossible for our laws on said subject
to have any perspective or orientation of our own; everything was American.
The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided pertinently: .
SECTION 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
continuing to reside herein who were Spanish subjects on the
eleventh day of April, eighteen-hundred and ninety-nine, and
then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the
United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve
their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and
Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight.
This Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 was amended by Act of Congress of
March 23, 1912, by adding a provision as follows:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to
provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within
the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular
possessions of the United States, and such other persons
residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of
the United States, under the laws of the United States, if
residing therein.
The Jones Law reenacted these provisions substantially: .
SECTION 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who
were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said islands, and
their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and
held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall
have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain
in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December
tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such
others as have since become citizens of some other country:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is
hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands
who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of
the insular possessions of the United States, and such other
persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the
United States under the laws of the United States if residing
therein.
For aught that appears, there was nothing in any of the said organic laws
regarding the effect of marriage to a Filipino upon the nationality of an alien
woman, albeit under the Spanish Civil Code provisions on citizenship, Articles 17
to 27, which were, however, abrogated upon the change of sovereignty, it was
unquestionable that the citizenship of the wife always followed that of the
husband. Not even Act 2927 contained any provision regarding the effect of
naturalization of an alien, upon the citizenship of his alien wife, nor of the
marriage of such alien woman with a native born Filipino or one who had become
a Filipino before the marriage, although Section 13 thereof provided thus: .
SEC. 13. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have
died. — In case a petitioner should die before the final decision
has been rendered, his widow and minor children may continue
the proceedings. The decision rendered in the case shall, so far
as the widow and minor children are concerned, produce the
 same legal effect as if it had been rendered during the life of
the petitioner.
It was not until November 30, 1928, upon the approval of Act 3448, amending
Act 2977, that the following provisions were added to the above Section 13:
SECTION 1. The following new sections are hereby inserted
between sections thirteen and fourteen of Act Numbered
Twenty-nine hundred and Twenty-seven:
SEC. 13(a). Any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippine Islands and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen
of the Philippine Islands.
SEC. 13(b). Children of persons who have
been duly naturalized under this law, being
under the age of twenty-one years at the
time of the naturalization of their parents,
shall, if dwelling in the Philippine Islands, be
considered citizens thereof.
SEC. 13(c). Children of persons naturalized
under this law who have been born in the
Philippine Islands after the naturalization of
their parents shall be considered citizens
thereof.
When Commonwealth Act 473, the current naturalization law, was enacted on
June 17, 1939, the above Section 13 became its Section 15 which has already
been quoted earlier in this decision. As can be seen, Section 13 (a) abovequoted
was re-enacted practically word for word in the first paragraph of this Section 15
except for the change of Philippine Islands to Philippines. And it could not have
been on any other basis than this legislative history of our naturalization law that
each and everyone of the decisions of this Court from the first Ly Giok Ha to Go
Im Ty, discussed above, were rendered.
As stated earlier, in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in the first Ly Giok
Ha, it was quite clear that for an alien woman who marries a Filipino to become
herself a Filipino citizen, there is no need for any naturalization proceeding
because she becomes a Filipina ipso facto from the time of such marriage,
provided she does not suffer any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4
of Commonwealth Act 473, with no mention being made of whether or not the
qualifications enumerated in Section 2 thereof need be shown. It was only in Lee
Suan Ay in 1959 that the possession of qualifications were specifically required,
but it was not until 1963, in Lo San Tuang, that Justice Regala reasoned out why
the possession of the qualifications provided by the law should also be shown to
be possessed by the alien wife of a Filipino, for her to become a Filipina by
marriage.
As may be recalled, the basic argument advanced by Justice Regala was briefly
as follows: That "like the law in the United States, our Naturalization Law
specified the classes of persons who alone might become citizens, even as it
provided who were disqualified," and inasmuch as Commonwealth Act 473, our
Naturalization Law since 1939 did not reenact the section providing who might
become citizens, allegedly in order to remove racial discrimination in favor of
Caucasians and against Asiatics, "the only logical deduction ... is that the phrase
"who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be understood as referring
to those who under Section 2 of the law are qualified to become citizens of the
Philippines" and "there is simply no support for the view that the phrase "who
might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be understood as requiring
merely that the alien woman must not belong to the class of disqualified persons
under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law." 14
A similar line of reasoning was followed in Choy King Tee, which for ready
reference may be qouted:
The question has been settled by the uniform ruling of this
Court in a number of cases. The alien wife of a Filipino citizen
must first prove that she has all the qualifications required by
Section 2 and none of the disqualifications enumerated in
Section 4 of the Naturalization Law before she may be deemed
a Philippine citizen (Lao Chay v. Galang, L-190977, Oct. 30,
1964, citing Lo San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963;
Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner of Immigration, L-20784,
December 27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, December
27, 1963). The writer of this opinion has submitted the
question anew to the court for a possible reexamination of the
said ruling in the light of the interpretation of a similar law in
the United States after which Section 15 of our Naturalization
Law was patterned. That law was section 2 of the Act of
February 10, 1855 (Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the
U.S.). The local law, Act No. 3448, was passed on November
30, 1928 as an amendment to the former Philippine
Naturalization Law, Act No. 2927, which was approved on
March 26, 1920. Under this Naturalization Law, acquisition of
Philippine citizenship was limited to three classes of persons,
(a) Natives of the Philippines who were not citizens thereof; (b)
natives of the other insular possessions of the United States;
In the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court further fortified the arguments in favor of
and (c) citizens of the United States, or foreigners who, under
the same conclusion thus:
the laws of the United States, may become citizens of the latter
country if residing therein. The reference in subdivision (c) to
foreigners who may become American Citizens is restrictive in
character, for only persons of certain specified races were
qualified thereunder. In other words, in so far as racial
restrictions were concerned there was at the time a similarity
between the naturalization laws of the two countries and hence
there was reason to accord here persuasive force to the
interpretation given in the United States to the statutory
provision concerning the citizenship of alien women marrying
American citizens.
This Court, however, believes that such reason has ceased to
exist since the enactment of the Revised Naturalization Law,
(Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June 17, 1939. The racial
restrictions have been eliminated in this Act, but the provision
found in Act No. 3448 has been maintained. It is logical to
presume that when Congress chose to retain the said provision
— that to be deemed a Philippine citizen upon marriage the
alien wife must be one "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized," the reference is no longer to the class or race to
which the woman belongs, for class or race has become
immaterial, but to the qualifications and disqualifications for
naturalization as enumerated in Sections 2 and 4 of the statute.
Otherwise the requirement that the woman "might herself be
lawfully naturalized" would be meaningless surplusage,
contrary to settled norms of statutory construction.
The rule laid down by this Court in this and in other cases
heretofore decided is believed to be in line with the national
policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship, which
after all is a privilege granted only to those who are found
worthy thereof, and not indiscriminately to anybody at all on
the basis alone of marriage to a man who is a citizen of the
Philippines, irrespective of moral character, ideological beliefs,
and identification with Filipino ideals, customs and traditions.
Appellee here having failed to prove that she has all the
qualifications for naturalization, even, indeed, that she has
none of the disqualifications, she is not entitled to recognition
as a Philippine citizen.
On cross-examination, she (Ly Giok Ha) failed to establish that:
(1) she has been residing in the Philippines for a continuous
period of at least (10) years (p. 27, t.s.n., id.); (2) she has a
lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation (p. 13,
t.s.n., id.); and (3) she can speak and write English, or any of
the principal Philippine languages (pp. 12, 13, t.s.n., id.).
While the appellant Immigration Commissioner contends that
the words emphasized indicate that the present Naturalization
Law requires that an alien woman who marries a Filipino
husband must possess the qualifications prescribed by section 2
in addition to not being disqualified under any of the eight ("a"
to "h") subheadings of section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473,
in order to claim our citizenship by marriage, both the appellee
and the court below (in its second decision) sustain the view
that all that the law demands is that the woman be not
disqualified under section 4.
At the time the present case was remanded to the court of
origin (1960) the question at issue could be regarded as not
conclusively settled, there being only the concise
pronouncement in Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Galang, G. R. No. L-
11855, Dec. 23, 1959, to the effect that:
The marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien
does not automatically confer Philippine
citizenship upon the latter. She must possess
the qualifications required by law to become a
Filipino citizen by naturalization.
Since that time, however, a long line of decisions of this Court
has firmly established the rule that the requirement of section
15 of Commonwealth Act 473 (the Naturalization Act), that an
alien woman married to a citizen should be one who "might
herself be lawfully naturalized," means not only woman free
from the disqualifications enumerated in section 4 of the Act
but also one who possesses the qualifications prescribed by
section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 (San Tuan v. Galang, L-
18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Com. of Immigration,
L-20784, Dee. 27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, Dec.
27, 1963; Austria v. Conchu, L-20716, June 22, 1965; Choy
King Tee v. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965; Brito v. Com. of
Immigration, L-16829, June 30, 1965).
Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications
prescribed under section 2 of the Naturalization Act, and the
disqualifications enumerated in its section 4 are not mutually
exclusive; and if all that were to be required is that the wife of
a Filipino be not disqualified under section 4, the result might
well be that citizenship would be conferred upon persons in
violation of the policy of the statute. For example, section 4
disqualifies only —
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; and
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude,
so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of gambling or bawdy
houses, not previously convicted by a competent court would
not be thereby disqualified; still, it is certain that the law did
not intend such person to be admitted as a citizen in view of
the requirement of section 2 that an applicant for citizenship
"must be of good moral character."
Similarly, the citizen's wife might be a convinced believer in
racial supremacy, in government by certain selected classes, in
the right to vote exclusively by certain "herrenvolk", and thus
disbelieve in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution; yet she would not be disqualified under section 4,
as long as she is not "opposed to organized government," nor
affiliated to groups "upholding or teaching doctrines opposing
all organized governments", nor "defending or teaching the
necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or
assassination for the success or predominance of their
ideas." Et sic de caeteris.
The foregoing instances should suffice to illustrate the danger
of relying exclusively on the absence of disqualifications,
without taking into account the other affirmative requirements
of the law, which, in the case at bar, the appellee Ly Giok Ha
admittedly does not possess.
As to the argument that the phrase "might herself be lawfully
naturalized" was derived from the U.S. Revised Statutes
(section 1994) and should be given the same territorial and
racial significance given to it by American courts, this Court has
rejected the same in Lon San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775,
November 30, 1963; and in Choy King Tee v. Galang, L-18351,
March 26, 1965.
It is difficult to minimize the persuasive force of the foregoing rationalizations,
but a closer study thereof cannot bat reveal certain relevant considerations which
adversely affect the premises on which they are predicated, thus rendering the
conclusions arrived thereby not entirely unassailable.
1. The main proposition, for instance, that in eliminating Section 1 of Act 2927
providing who are eligible for Philippine citizenship, the purpose of
Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, was to remove the
racial requirements for naturalization, thereby opening the door of Filipino
nationality to Asiatics instead of allowing the admission thereto of Caucasians
only, suffers from lack of exact accuracy. It is important to note, to start with,
that Commonwealth Act 473 did away with the whole Section 1 of Act 2927
which reads, thus:
SECTION 1. Who may become Philippine citizens. — Philippine
citizenship may be acquired by: (a) natives of the Philippines
who are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law; (b) natives
of the other Insular possessions of the United States; (c)
citizens of the United States, or foreigners who under the laws
of the United States may become citizens of said country if
residing therein.
and not only subdivision (c) thereof. Nowhere in this whole provision was there
any mention of race or color of the persons who were then eligible for Philippine
citizenship. What is more evident from said provision is that it reflected the
inevitable subordination of our legislation during the pre-Commonwealth
American regime to the understandable stations flowing from our staffs as a
territory of the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris. In fact, Section 1 of
Act 2927 was precisely approved pursuant to express authority without which it
could not have been done, granted by an amendment to Section 4 of the
Philippine Bill of 1902 introduced by the Act of the United States Congress of
March 23, 1912 and which was reenacted as part of the Jones Law of 1916, the
pertinent provisions of which have already been footed earlier. In truth,
therefore, it was because of the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth
and in the exercise of our legislative autonomy on citizenship matters under the
Philippine Independence Act that Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated, 15 and
not purposely to eliminate any racial discrimination contained in our
Naturalization Law. The Philippine Legislature naturally wished to free our
Naturalization Law from the impositions of American legislation. In other words,
the fact that such discrimination was removed was one of the effects rather than
the intended purpose of the amendment.
2. Again, the statement in Choy King Tee to the effect that "the reference in
subdivision (c) (of Section 1 of Act 2927) to foreigners who may become
American citizens is restrictive in character, for only persons of certain specified
races were qualified thereunder" fails to consider the exact import of the said
subdivision. Explicitly, the thrust of the said subdivision was to confine the grant
under it of Philippine citizenship only to the three classes of persons therein
mentioned, the third of which were citizens of the United States and, corollarily,
persons who could be American citizens under her laws. The words used in the
provision do not convey any idea of favoring aliens of any particular race or color
and of excluding others, but more accurately, they refer to all the
disqualifications of foreigners for American citizenship under the laws of the
United States. The fact is that even as of 1906, or long before 1920, when our
Act 2927 became a law, the naturalization, laws of the United States already
provided for the following disqualifications in the Act of the Congress of June 29,
1906:
SEC. 7. That no person who disbelieves in or who is opposed to
organized government, or who is a member of or affiliated with
any organization entertaining and teaching such disbelief in or
opposition to organized government, or who advocates or
teaches the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful
assaulting or killing of any officer or officers, either of specific
individuals or of officers generally, of the Government of the
United States, or of any other organized government, because
of his or their official character, or who is a polygamist, shall be
naturalized or be made a citizen of the United States.
and all these disqualified persons were, therefore, ineligible for Philippine
citizenship under Section 1 of Act 2927 even if they happened to be Caucasians.
More importantly, as a matter of fact, said American law, which was the first "Act
to Establish a Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization and to provide for a
Uniform Rule for Naturalization of Aliens throughout the United States" contained
no racial disqualification requirement, except as to Chinese, the Act of May 6,
1882 not being among the expressly repealed by this law, hence it is clear that
when Act 2927 was enacted, subdivision (e) of its Section 1 could not have had
any connotation of racial exclusion necessarily, even if it were traced back to its
origin in the Act of the United States Congress of 1912 already mentioned
above. 16 Thus, it would seem that the rationalization in the qouted decisions
predicated on the theory that the elimination of Section 1 of Act 2927 by
Commonwealth Act 473 was purposely for no other end than the abolition of
racial discrimination in our naturalization law has no clear factual basis. 17
3. In view of these considerations, there appears to be no cogent reason why the
construction adopted in the opinions of the Secretary of Justice referred to in the
first Ly Giok Ha decision of the Chief Justice should not prevail. It is beyond
dispute that the first paragraph of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 is a
reenactment of Section 13(a) of Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448, and that the
latter is nothing but an exact copy, deliberately made, of Section 1994 of the
Raised Statutes of the United States as it stood before its repeal in
1922. 18 Before such repeal, the phrase "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized" found in said Section 15 had a definite unmistakable construction
uniformly foIlowed in all courts of the United States that had occasion to apply
the same and which, therefore, must be considered, as if it were written in the
statute itself. It is almost trite to say that when our legislators enacted said
section, they knew of its unvarying construction in the United States and that,
therefore, in adopting verbatim the American statute, they have in effect
incorporated into the provision, as thus enacted, the construction given to it by
the American courts as well as the Attorney General of the United States and all
administrative authorities, charged with the implementation of the naturalization
and immigration laws of that country. (Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil., 635
[1946]; Laxamana v. Baltazar, 92 Phil., 32 [1952]; Hartley v. Commissioner, 295
U.S. 216, 79 L. ed. 1399, 55 S Ct. 756 [19353; Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S.
79, 83 L ed. 52, 59 S Ct. 45 [1938]; Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
306 U.S. 110, 83 L ed. 536, 59 S Ct. 423 [1939]. [p. 32, Memo of Amicus
Curiae]).
A fairly comprehensive summary of the said construction by the American courts
and administrative authorities is contained in United States of America ex
rel. Dora Sejnensky v. Robert E. Tod, Commissioner of Immigration, Appt., 295
Fed. 523, decided November 14, 1922, 26 A. L. R. 1316 as follows:
Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat. 3948, 2 Fed.
Sta. Anno. 2d ed. p. 117) provides as follows: "Any woman
who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
United States, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized,
shall be deemed a citizen."
Section 1944 of the Revised Stat. is said to originate in the Act
of Congress of February 10, 1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, chap.
71), which in its second section provided "that any woman, who
might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws, married,
or who shall be married to a citizen of the United States, shall
be deemed and taken to be a citizen."
And the American Statute of 1855 is substantially a copy of the
earlier British Statute 7 & 8 Vict. chap. 66, s 16, 1844, which
provided that "any woman married, or who shall be married, to
a natural-born subject or person naturalized, shall be deemed
and taken to be herself naturalized, and have all the rights and
privileges of a natural born subject."
The Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 (42 Stat. at L.
1021, chap. 411, Comp. Stat. 4358b, Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp.
1922, p. 255), being "An Act Relative to the Naturalization and
Citizenship of Married Women," in 2, provides "that any woman
who marries a citizen of the United States after the passage of
this Act, ... shall not become a citizen of the United States by
reason of such marriage ..."
Section 6 of the act also provides "that 1994 of the Revised
Statutes ... are repealed."
Section 6 also provides that `such repeal shall not terminate
citizenship acquired or retained under either of such
sections, ..." meaning 2 and 6. So that this Act of September
22, 1922, has no application to the facts of the present case, as
the marriage of the relator took place prior to its passage. This
case, therefore, depends upon the meaning to be attached to
1994 of the Revised Statutes.
In 1868 the Supreme Court, in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 498,
19 L. ed. 283, 284, construed this provision as found in the Act
of 1855 as follows: "The term, "who might lawfully be
naturalized under the existing laws," only limits the application
of the law to free white women. The previous Naturalization
Act, existing at the time, only required that the person applying
for its benefits should be "a free white person," and not an
alien enemy."
This construction limited the effect of the statute to those aliens
who belonged to the class or race which might be lawfully
naturalized, and did not refer to any of the other provisions of
the naturalization laws as to residence or moral character, or to
any of the provisions of the immigration laws relating to the
exclusion or deportation of aliens.
In 1880, in Leonard v. Grant (C. C.) 5 Fed. 11, District Judge
Deady also construed the Act of 1855, declaring that "any
woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of
the United States, and might herself be lawfully naturalized,
shall be deemed a citizen." He held that "upon the authorities,
and the reason, if not the necessity, of the case," the statute
must be construed as in effect declaring that an alien woman,
who is of the class or race that may be lawfully naturalized
under the existing laws, and who marries a citizen of the United
States, is such a citizen also, and it was not necessary that it
should appear affirmatively that she possessed the other
qualifications at the time of her marriage to entitle her to
naturalization.
In 1882, the Act of 1855 came before Mr. Justice Harlan, sitting
in the circuit court, in United States v. Kellar, 13 Fed. 82. An
alien woman, a subject of Prussia came to the United States
and married here a naturalized citizen. Mr. Justice Harlan, with
the concurrence of Judge Treat, held that upon her marriage
she became ipso facto a citizen of the United States as fully as
if she had complied with all of the provisions of the statutes
upon the subject of naturalization. He added: "There can be no
doubt of this, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court of
the United, States in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 19 L. ed.
283." The alien "belonged to the class of persons" who might
be lawfully naturalized.
In 1904, in Hopkins v. Fachant, 65 C. C. A. 1, 130 Fed. 839, an
alien woman came to the United States from France and
entered the country contrary to the immigration laws. The
immigration authorities took her into custody at the port of
New York, with the view of deporting her. She applied for her
release under a writ of habeas corpus, and pending the
disposition of the matter she married a naturalized American
citizen. The circuit court of appeals for the ninth Circuit held,
affirming the court below, that she was entitled to be
discharged from custody. The court declared: "The rule is well
settled that her marriage to a naturalized citizen of the United
States entitled her to be discharged. The status of the wife
follows that of her husband, ... and by virtue of her marriage
her husband's domicil became her domicil." .
In 1908, the circuit court for the district of Rhode Island in Re
Rustigian, 165. Fed. 980, had before it the application of a
husband for his final decree of naturalization. It appeared that
at that time his wife was held by the immigration authorities at
New York on the ground that she was afflicted with a
dangerous and contagious disease. Counsel on both sides
agreed that the effect of the husband's naturalization would be
to confer citizenship upon the wife. In view of that contingency
District Judge Brown declined to pass upon the husband's
application for naturalization, and thought it best to wait until it
was determined whether the wife's disease was curable. He
placed his failure to act on the express ground that the effect of
naturalizing the husband might naturalize her. At the same
time he express his opinion that the husband's naturalization
would not effect her naturalization, as she was not one who
could become lawfully naturalized. "Her own capacity (to
become naturalized)," the court stated "is a prerequisite to her
attaining citizenship. If herself lacking in that capacity, the
married status cannot confer it upon her." Nothing, however,
was actually decided in that case, and the views expressed
therein are really nothing more than mere dicta. But, if they
can be regarded as something more than that, we find
ourselves, with all due respect for the learned judge, unable to
accept them.
In 1909, in United States ex rel. Nicola v. Williams, 173 Fed.
626, District Judge Learned Hand held that an alien woman, a
subject of the Turkish Empire, who married an American citizen
while visiting Turkey, and then came to the United States,
could not be excluded, although she had, at the time of her
entry, a disease which under the immigration laws would have
been sufficient ground for her exclusion, if she bad not had the
status of a citizen. The case was brought into this court on
appeal, and in 1911 was affirmed, in 106 C. C. A. 464, 184
Fed. 322. In that case, however at the time the relators
married, they might have been lawfully naturalized, and we
said: "Even if we assume the contention of the district attorney
to be correct that marriage will not make a citizen of a woman
who would be excluded under our immigration laws, it does not
affect these relators."
We held that, being citizens, they could not be excluded as
aliens; and it was also said to be inconsistent with the policy of
our law that the husband should be a citizen and the wife an
alien. The distinction between that case and the one now before
the court is that, in the former case, the marriage took place
before any order of exclusion had been made, while in this the
marriage was celebrated after such an order was made. But
such an order is a mere administrative provision, and has not
the force of a judgment of a court, and works no estoppel. The
administrative order is based on the circumstances that existed
at the time the order of exclusion was made. If the
circumstances change prior to the order being carried into
effect, it cannot be executed. For example, if an order of
exclusion should be based on the ground that the alien was at
the time afflicted with a contagious disease, and it should be
made satisfactorily to appear, prior to actual deportation, that
the alien had entirely recovered from the disease, we think it
plain that the order could not be carried into effect. So, in this
case, if, after the making of the order of exclusion and while
she is permitted temporarily to remain, she in good faith
marries an American citizen, we cannot doubt the validity of
her marriage, and that she thereby acquired, under
international law and under 1994 of the Revised Statutes,
American citizenship, and ceased to be an alien. There upon,
the immigration authorities lost their jurisdiction over her, as
that jurisdiction applies only to aliens, and not to citizens.
In 1910, District Judge Dodge, in Ex parte Kaprielian, 188 Fed.
694, sustained the right of the officials to deport a woman
under the following circumstances: She entered this country in
July, 1910, being an alien and having been born in Turkey. She
was taken into custody by the immigration authorities in the
following September, and in October a warrant for her
deportation was issued. Pending hearings as to the validity of
that order, she was paroled in the custody of her counsel. The
ground alleged for her deportation was that she was afflicted
with a dangerous and contagious disease at the time of her
entry. One of the reasons assigned to defeat deportation was
that the woman had married a citizen of the United States
pending the proceedings for her deportation. Judge Dodge
declared himself unable to believe that a marriage under such
circumstances "is capable of having the effect claimed, in view
of the facts shown." He held that it was no part of the intended
policy of 1994 to annul or override the immigration laws, so as
to authorize the admission into the country of the wife of a
naturalized alien not otherwise entitled to enter, and that an
alien woman, who is of a class of persons excluded by law from
admission to the United States does not come within the
provisions of that section. The court relied wholly upon the
dicta contained in the Rustigian Case. No other authorities were
cited.
In 1914, District Judge Neterer, in Ex parte Grayson, 215 Fed.
449, construed 1994 and held that where, pending proceedings
to deport an alien native of France as an alien prostitute, she
was married to a citizen of the United States, she thereby
became a citizen, and was not subject to deportation until her
citizenship was revoked by due process of law. It was his
opinion that if, as was contended, her marriage was conceived
in fraud, and was entered into for the purpose of evading the
immigration laws and preventing her deportation, such fact
should be established in a court of competent jurisdiction in an
action commenced for the purpose. The case was appealed and
the appeal was dismissed. 134 C. C. A. 666, 219 Fed. 1022.
It is interesting also to observe the construction placed upon
the language of the statute by the Department of Justice. In
1874, Attorney General Williams, 14 Ops. Atty. Gen. 402,
passing upon the Act of February 10, 1855, held that residence
within the United States for the period required by the
naturalization laws was riot necessary in order to constitute an
alien woman a citizen, she having married a citizen of the
United States abroad, although she never resided in the United
States, she and her husband having continued to reside abroad
after the marriage.
In 1909, a similar construction was given to the Immigration
Act of May 5, 1907, in an opinion rendered by Attorney General
Wickersham. It appeared an unmarried woman, twenty-eight
years of age and a native of Belgium, arrived in New York and
went at once to a town in Nebraska, where she continued to
reside. About fifteen months after her arrival she was taken
before a United States commissioner by way of instituting
proceedings under the Immigration Act (34 Stat. at L. 898,
chap. 1134, Comp. Stat. 4242, 3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p.
637) for her deportation, on the ground that she had entered
this country for the purpose of prostitution, and had been found
an inmate of a house of prostitution and practicing the same
within three years after landing. It appeared, however, that
after she was taken before the United States commissioner, but
prior to her arrest under a warrant by the Department of
Justice, she was lawfully married to a native-born citizen of the
United States. The woman professed at the time of her
marriage an intention to abandon her previous mode of life and
to remove with her husband to his home in Pennsylvania. He
knew what her mode of life had been, but professed to believe
in her good intentions. The question was raised as to the right
to deport her, the claim being advance that by her marriage
she bad become an American citizen and therefore could not be
deported. The Attorney General ruled against the right to
deport her as she had become an American citizen. He held
that the words, "who might herself be lawfully naturalized,"
refer to a class or race who might be lawfully naturalized, and
that compliance with the other conditions of the naturalization
laws was not required. 27 Ops. Atty. Gen. 507.
Before concluding this opinion, we may add that it has not
escaped our observation that Congress, in enacting the
Immigration Act of 1917, so as to provide, in 19, "that the
marriage to an American citizen of a female of the sexually
immoral classes ... shall not invest such female with United
States citizenship if the marriage of such alien female shall be
solemnized after her arrest or after the commission of acts
which make her liable to deportation under this act."
Two conclusions seem irresistibly to follow from the above
change in the law:
(1) Congress deemed legislation essential to prevent women of
the immoral class avoiding deportation through the device of
marrying an American citizen.
 (2) If Congress intended that the marriage of an American
citizen with an alien woman of any other of the excluded
classes, either before or after her detention, should not confer
upon her American citizenship, thereby entitling her to enter
the country, its intention would have been expressed, and 19
would not have been confined solely to women of the immoral
class.
Indeed, We have examined all the leading American decisions on the subject and
We have found no warrant for the proposition that the phrase "who might herself
be lawfully naturalized" in Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes was meant solely
as a racial bar, even if loose statements in some decisions and other treaties and
other writings on the subject would seem to give such impression. The case
of Kelley v. Owen, supra, which appears to be the most cited among the first of
the decisions 19 simply held:
As we construe this Act, it confers the privileges of citizenship
upon women married to citizens of the United States, if they
are of the class of persons for whose naturalization the
previous Acts of Congress provide. The terms "married" or
"who shall be married," do not refer in our judgment, to the
time when the ceremony of marriage is celebrated, but to a
state of marriage. They mean that, whenever a woman, who
under previous Acts might be naturalized, is in a state of
marriage to a citizen, whether his citizenship existed at the
passage of the Act or subsequently, or before or after the
marriage, she becomes, by that fact, a citizen also. His
citizenship, whenever it exists, confers, under the Act,
citizenship upon her. The construction which would restrict the
Act to women whose husbands, at the time of marriage, are
citizens, would exclude far the greater number, for whose
benefit, as we think, the Act was intended. Its object, in our
opinion, was to allow her citizenship to follow that of her
husband, without the necessity of any application for
naturalization on her part; and, if this was the object, there is
no reason for the restriction suggested.
The terms, "who might lawfully be naturalized under the
existing laws," only limit the application of the law to free white
women. The previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time
only required that the person applying for its benefits should be
"a free white person," and not an alien enemy. Act of April
14th, 1802, 2 Stat. at L. 153.
A similar construction was given to the Act by the Court of
Appeals of New York, in Burton v. Burton, 40 N. Y. 373; and is
the one which gives the widest extension to its provisions.
Note that write the court did say that "the terms, "who might lawfully be
naturalized under existing laws" only limit the application to free white
women" 20 it hastened to add that "the previous Naturalization Act, existing at
the time, ... required that the person applying for its benefits should be (not
only) a "free white person" (but also) ... not an alien enemy." This is simply
because under the Naturalization Law of the United States at the time the case
was decided, the disqualification of enemy aliens had already been removed by
the Act of July 30, 1813, as may be seen in the corresponding footnote hereof
anon. In other words, if in the case of Kelly v. Owen only the race requirement
was mentioned, the reason was that there was no other non-racial requirement
or no more alien enemy disqualification at the time; and this is demonstrated by
the fact that the court took care to make it clear that under the previous
naturalization law, there was also such requirement in addition to race. This is
impotent, since as stated in re Rustigian, 165 Fed. Rep. 980, "The expression
used by Mr. Justice Field, (in Kelly v. Owen) the terms "who might lawfully be
naturalized under existing laws" only limit the application of the law to free white
women, must be interpreted in the application to the special facts and to the
incapacities under the then existing laws," (at p. 982) meaning that whether or
not an alien wife marrying a citizen would be a citizen was dependent, not only
on her race and nothing more necessarily, but on whether or not there were
other disqualifications under the law in force at the time of her marriage or the
naturalization of her husband.
4. As already stated, in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha,
the Court drew the evidence that because Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated
by Commonwealth Act 473, it follows that in place of the said eliminated section
particularly its subdivision (c), being the criterion of whether or not an alien wife
"may be lawfully naturalized," what should be required is not only that she must
not be disqualified under Section 4 but that she must also possess the
qualifications enumerated in Section 2, such as those of age, residence, good
moral character, adherence to the underlying principles of the Philippine
Constitution, irreproachable conduct, lucrative employment or ownership of real
estate, capacity to speak and write English or Spanish and one of the principal
local languages, education of children in certain schools, etc., thereby implying
that, in effect, sails Section 2 has been purposely intended to take the place of
Section 1 of Act 2927. Upon further consideration of the proper premises, We
have come, to the conclusion that such inference is not sufficiently justified.
To begin with, nothing extant in the legislative history, which We have already
explained above of the mentioned provisions has been shown or can be shown to
indicate that such was the clear intent of the legislature. Rather, what is definite
is that Section 15 is, an exact copy of Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States, which, at the time of the approval of Commonwealth Act 473 had
already a settled construction by American courts and administrative authorities.
Secondly, as may be gleaned from the summary of pertinent American decisions
quoted above, there can be no doubt that in the construction of the identically
worded provision in the Revised Statutes of the United States, (Section 1994,
which was taken, from the Act of February 10, 1855) all authorities in the United
States are unanimously agreed that the qualifications of residence, good moral
character, adherence to the Constitution, etc. are not supposed to be considered,
and that the only eligibility to be taken into account is that of the race or class to
which the subject belongs, the conceptual scope of which, We have just
discussed. 21 In the very case ofLeonard v. Grant, supra, discussed by Justice
Regala in Lo San Tuang, the explanation for such posture of the American
authorities was made thus:
The phrase, "shall be deemed a citizen" in section 1994 Rev.
St., or as it was in the Act of 1855,supra, "shall be deemed and
taken to be a citizen" while it may imply that the person to
whom it relates has not actually become a citizen by ordinary
means or in the usual way, as by the judgment of a competent
court, upon a proper application and proof, yet it does not
follow that such person is on that account practically any the
less a citizen. The word "deemed" is the equivalent of
"considered" or "judged"; and, therefore, whatever an act of
Congress requires to be "deemed" or "taken" as true of any
person or thing, must, in law, be considered as having been
duly adjudged or established concerning "such person or thing,
and have force and effect accordingly. When, therefore,
Congress declares that an alien woman shall, under certain
circumstances, be "deemed' an American citizen, the effect
when the contingency occurs, is equivalent to her being
naturalized directly by an act of Congress, or in the usual mode
thereby prescribed.
Unless We disregard now the long settled familiar rule of statutory construction
that in a situation like this wherein our legislature has copied an American statute
word for word, it is understood that the construction already given to such
statute before its being copied constitute part of our own law, there seems to be
no reason how We can give a different connotation or meaning to the provision in
question. At least, We have already seen that the views sustaining the contrary
conclusion appear to be based on in accurate factual premises related to the real
legislative background of the framing of our naturalization law in its present
form.
Thirdly, the idea of equating the qualifications enumerated in Section 2 of
Commonwealth Act 473 with the eligibility requirements of Section 1 of Act 2927
cannot bear close scrutiny from any point of view. There is no question that
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 is more or less substantially the same as
Section 3 of Act 2927. In other words, Section 1 of Act 2927 co-existed already
with practically the same provision as Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. If it
were true that the phrase "who may be lawfully naturalized" in Section 13 (a) of
Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448, referred to the so-called racial requirement
in Section 1 of the same Act, without regard to the provisions of Section 3
thereof, how could the elimination of Section 1 have the effect of shifting the
reference to Section 3, when precisely, according to the American jurisprudence,
which was prevailing at the time Commonwealth Act 473 was approved, such
qualifications as were embodied in said Section 3, which had their counterpart in
the corresponding American statutes, are not supposed to be taken into account
and that what should be considered only are the requirements similar to those
provided for in said Section 1 together with the disqualifications enumerated in
Section 4?
Fourthly, it is difficult to conceive that the phrase "who might be lawfully
naturalized" in Section 15 could have been intended to convey a meaning
different than that given to it by the American courts and administrative
authorities. As already stated, Act 3448 which contained said phrase and from
which it was taken by Commonwealth Act 473, was enacted in 1928. By that,
time, Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States was no longer in
force because it had been repealed expressly the Act of September 22, 1922
which did away with the automatic naturalization of alien wives of American
citizens and required, instead, that they submit to regular naturalization
proceedings, albeit under more liberal terms than those of other applicants. In
other words, when our legislature adopted the phrase in question, which, as
already demonstrated, had a definite construction in American law, the
Americans had already abandoned said phraseology in favor of a categorical
compulsion for alien wives to be natural judicially. Simple logic would seem to
dictate that, since our lawmakers, at the time of the approval of Act 3448, had
two choices, one to adopt the phraseology of Section 1994 with its settled
construction and the other to follow the new posture of the Americans of
requiring judicial naturalization and it appears that they have opted for the first,
We have no alternative but to conclude that our law still follows the old or
previous American Law On the subject. Indeed, when Commonwealth Act 473
was approved in 1939, the Philippine Legislature, already autonomous then from
the American Congress, had a clearer chance to disregard the old American law
and make one of our own, or, at least, follow the trend of the Act of the U.S.
Congress of 1922, but still, our legislators chose to maintain the language of the
old law. What then is significantly important is not that the legislature maintained
said phraseology after Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated, but that it continued
insisting on using it even after the Americans had amended their law in order to
provide for what is now contended to be the construction that should be given to
the phrase in question. Stated differently, had our legislature adopted a phrase
from an American statute before the American courts had given it a construction
which was acquiesced to by those given upon to apply the same, it would be
possible for Us to adopt a construction here different from that of the Americans,
but as things stand, the fact is that our legislature borrowed the phrase when
there was already a settled construction thereof, and what is more, it appears
that our legislators even ignored the modification of the American law and
persisted in maintaining the old phraseology. Under these circumstances, it
would be in defiance of reason and the principles of Statutory construction to say
that Section 15 has a nationalistic and selective orientation and that it should be
construed independently of the previous American posture because of the
difference of circumstances here and in the United States. It is always safe to say
that in the construction of a statute, We cannot fall on possible judicial fiat or
perspective when the demonstrated legislative point of view seems to indicate
otherwise.
5. Viewing the matter from another angle, there is need to emphasize that in
reality and in effect, the so called racial requirements, whether under the
American laws or the Philippine laws, have hardly been considered as
qualifications in the same sense as those enumerated in Section 3 of Act 2927
and later in Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. More accurately, they have
always been considered as disqualifications, in the sense that those who did not
possess them were the ones who could not "be lawfully naturalized," just as if
they were suffering from any of the disqualifications under Section 2 of Act 2927
and later those under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473, which, incidentally,
are practically identical to those in the former law, except those in paragraphs (f)
and (h) of the latter. 22 Indeed, such is the clear impression anyone will surely
get after going over all the American decisions and opinions quoted and/or cited
in the latest USCA (1970), Title 8, section 1430, pp. 598-602, and the first
decisions of this Court on the matter, Ly Giok Ha (1959) and Ricardo Cua, citing
with approval the opinions of the secretary of Justice. 23 Such being the case,
that is, that the so-called racial requirements were always treated as
disqualifications in the same light as the other disqualifications under the law,
why should their elimination not be viewed or understood as a subtraction from
or a lessening of the disqualifications? Why should such elimination have instead
the meaning that what were previously considered as irrelevant qualifications
have become disqualifications, as seems to be the import of the holding in Choy
King Tee to the effect that the retention in Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473
of the same language of what used to be Section 13 (a) of Act 2927 (as amended
by Act 3448), notwithstanding the elimination of Section 1 of the latter,
necessarily indicates that the legislature had in mind making the phrase in
question "who may be lawfully naturalized" refer no longer to any racial
disqualification but to the qualification under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act
473? Otherwise stated, under Act 2927, there were two groups of persons that
could not be naturalized, namely, those falling under Section 1 and those falling
under Section 2, and surely, the elimination of one group, i.e. those belonging to
Section 1, could not have had, by any process of reasoning, the effect of
increasing, rather than decreasing, the disqualifications that used to be before
such elimination. We cannot see by what alchemy of logic such elimination could
have convicted qualifications into disqualifications specially in the light of the fact
that, after all, these are disqualifications clearly set out as such in the law
distinctly and separately from qualifications and, as already demonstrated, in
American jurisprudence, qualifications had never been considered to be of any
relevance in determining "who might be lawfully naturalized," as such phrase is
used in the statute governing the status of alien wives of American citizens, and
our law on the matter was merely copied verbatim from the American statutes.
6. In addition to these arguments based on the applicable legal provisions and
judicial opinions, whether here or in the United States, there are practical
considerations that militate towards the same conclusions. As aptly stated in the
motion for reconsideration of counsel for petitioner-appellee dated February 23,
1967, filed in the case of Zita Ngo Burca v. Republic, supra:
Unreasonableness of requiring alien wife to prove
"qualifications" —
There is one practical consideration that strongly militates
against a construction that Section 15 of the law requires that
an alien wife of a Filipino must affirmatively prove that she
possesses the qualifications prescribed under Section 2, before
she may be deemed a citizen. Such condition, if imposed upon
an alien wife, becomes unreasonably onerous and compliance
therewith manifestly difficult. The unreasonableness of such
requirement is shown by the following:
1. One of the qualifications required of an
Applicant for naturalization under Section 2 of
the law is that the applicant "must have
resided in the Philippines for a continuous
period of not less than ten years." If this
requirement is applied to an alien wife
married to a Filipino citizen, this means that
for a period of ten years at least, she cannot
hope to acquire the citizenship of her
husband. If the wife happens to be a citizen
of a country whose law declares that upon
her marriage to a foreigner she automatically
loses her citizenship and acquires the
citizenship of her husband, this could mean
that for a period of ten years at least, she
would be stateless. And even after having
acquired continuous residence in the
Philippines for ten years, there is no
guarantee that her petition for naturalization
will be granted, in which case she would
remain stateless for an indefinite period of
time.
2. Section 2 of the law likewise requires of
the applicant for naturalization that he "must
own real estate in the Philippines worth not
less than five thousand pesos, Philippine
currency, or must have some known lucrative
trade, profession, or lawful occupation."
Considering the constitutional prohibition
against acquisition by an alien of real estate
except in cases of hereditary succession (Art.
XIII, Sec. 5, Constitution), an alien wife
desiring to acquire the citizenship of her
husband must have to prove that she has a
lucrative income derived from a lawful trade,
profession or occupation. The income
requirement has been interpreted to mean
that the petitioner herself must be the one to
possess the said income. (Uy v. Republic, L-
19578, Oct. 27, 1964; Tanpa Ong vs.
Republic, L-20605, June 30, 1965; Li Tong
Pek v. Republic, L-20912, November 29,
1965). In other words, the wife must prove
that she has a lucrative income derived from
sources other than her husband's trade,
profession or calling. It is of common
knowledge, and judicial notice may be taken
of the fact that most wives in the Philippines
do not have gainful occupations of their own.
Indeed, Philippine law, recognizing the
dependence of the wife upon the husband,
imposes upon the latter the duty of
supporting the former. (Art. 291, Civil Code).
It should be borne in mind that universally, it
is an accepted concept that when a woman
marries, her primary duty is to be a wife,
mother and housekeeper. If an alien wife is
not to be remiss in this duty, how can she
hope to acquire a lucrative income of her own
to qualify her for citizenship?
3. Under Section 2 of the law, the applicant
for naturalization "must have enrolled his
minor children of school age, in any of the
public schools or private schools recognized
by the Office of the Private Education of the
Philippines, where Philippine history,
government and civics are taught or
prescribed as part of the school curriculum
during the entire period of residence in the
Philippines required of him prior to the
hearing of his petition for naturalization as
Philippine citizen." If an alien woman has
minor children by a previous marriage to
another alien before she marries a Filipino,
and such minor children had not been
enrolled in Philippine schools during her
period of residence in the country, she cannot
qualify for naturalization under the
interpretation of this Court. The reason
behind the requirement that children should
be enrolled in recognized educational
institutions is that they follow the citizenship
of their father. (Chan Ho Lay v. Republic, L-
5666, March 30, 1954; Tan Hi v. Republic, 88
Phil. 117 [1951]; Hao Lian Chu v. Republic,
87 Phil. 668 [1950]; Yap Chin v. Republic, L-
4177, May 29, 1953; Lim Lian Hong v.
Republic, L-3575, Dec. 26, 1950).
Considering that said minor children by her
first husband generally follow the citizenship
of their alien father, the basis for such
 requirement as applied to her does not
exist. Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex.
4. Under Section 3 of the law, the 10-year
continuous residence prescribed by Section 2
"shall be understood as reduced to five years
for any petitioner (who is) married to a
Filipino woman." It is absurd that an alien
male married to a Filipino wife should be
required to reside only for five years in the
Philippines to qualify for citizenship, whereas
an alien woman married to a Filipino husband
must reside for ten years.
Thus under the interpretation given by this Court, it is more
difficult for an alien wife related by marriage to a Filipino citizen
to become such citizen, than for a foreigner who is not so
related. And yet, it seems more than clear that the general
purpose of the first paragraph of Section 15 was obviously to
accord to an alien woman, by reason of her marriage to a
Filipino, a privilege not similarly granted to other aliens. It will
be recalled that prior to the enactment of Act No. 3448 in 1928,
amending Act No. 2927 (the old Naturalization Law), there was
no law granting any special privilege to alien wives of Filipinos.
They were treated as any other foreigner. It was precisely to
remedy this situation that the Philippine legislature enacted Act
No. 3448. On this point, the observation made by the Secretary
of Justice in 1941 is enlightening:
It is true that under, Article 22 of the
(Spanish) Civil Code, the wife follows the
nationality of the husband; but the
Department of State of the United States on
October 31, 1921, ruled that the alien wife of
a Filipino citizen is not a Filipino citizen,
pointing out that our Supreme Court in the
leading case of Roa v. Collector of Customs
(23 Phil. 315) held that Articles 17 to 27 of
the Civil Code being political have been
abrogated upon the cession of the Philippine
Islands to the United States. Accordingly, the
stated taken by the Attorney-General prior to
the envictment of Act No. 3448, was that
marriage of alien women to Philippine citizens
did not make the former citizens of this
counting. (Op. Atty. Gen., March 16, 1928) .
To remedy this anomalous condition, Act No.
3448 was enacted in 1928 adding section
13(a) to Act No. 2927 which provides that
"any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the Philippine Islands,
and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippine Islands. (Op. No. 22, s. 1941;
emphasis ours).
If Section 15 of the, Revised Naturalization Law were to be
interpreted, as this Court did, in such a way as to require that
the alien wife must prove the qualifications prescribed in
Section 2, the privilege granted to alien wives would become
illusory. It is submitted that such a construction, being contrary
to the manifested object of the statute must be rejected.
A statute is to be construed with reference to
its manifest object, and if the language is
susceptible of two constructions, one which
will carry out and the other defeat such
manifest object, it should receive the former
construction. (In re National Guard, 71 Vt.
493, 45 A. 1051; Singer v. United States, 323
U.S. 338, 89 L. ed. 285. See also, U.S. v.
Navarro, 19 Phil. 134 [1911]; U. S. v. Toribio,
15 Phil. 85 [1910).
... A construction which will cause
objectionable results should be avoided and
the court will, if possible, place on the statute
a construction which will not result in
injustice, and in accordance with the
decisions construing statutes, a construction
which will result in oppression, hardship, or
inconveniences will also be avoided, as will a
construction which will prejudice public
interest, or construction resulting in
 unreasonableness, as well as a construction We respectfully suggest that this articulation of the national
which will result in absurd consequences. policy begs the question. The avowed policy of "selectives
admission" more particularly refers to a case where citizenship
is sought to be acquired in a judicial proceeding for
So a construction should, if possible, be
naturalization. In such a case, the courts should no doubt apply
avoided if the result would be an apparent
the national policy of selecting only those who are worthy to
inconsistency in legislative intent, as has
become citizens. There is here a choice between accepting or
been determined by the judicial decisions, or
rejecting the application for citizenship. But this policy finds no
which would result in futility, redundancy, or
application in cases where citizenship is conferred by operation
a conclusion not contemplated by the
of law. In such cases, the courts have no choice to accept or
legislature; and the court should adopt that
reject. If the individual claiming citizenship by operation of law
construction which will be the least likely to
proves in legal proceedings that he satisfies the statutory
produce mischief. Unless plainly shown to
requirements, the courts cannot do otherwise than to declare
have been the intention of the legislature, an
that he is a citizen of the Philippines. Thus, an individual who is
interpretation which would render the
able to prove that his father is a Philippine citizen, is a citizen of
requirements of the statute uncertain and
the Philippines, "irrespective of his moral character, ideological
vague is to be avoided, and the court will not
beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs, and
ascribe to the legislature an intent to confer
traditions." A minor child of a person naturalized under the law,
an illusory right. ... (82 C.J.S., Statutes, sec.
who is able to prove the fact of his birth in the Philippines, is
326, pp. 623-632).
likewise a citizen, regardless of whether he has lucrative
income, or he adheres to the principles of the Constitution. So
7. In Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, emphasis was laid on the need it is with an alien wife of a Philippine citizen. She is required to
for aligning the construction of Section 15 with "the national policy of selective prove only that she may herself be lawfully naturalized, i.e.,
admission to Philippine citizenship." But the question may be asked, is it that she is not one of the disqualified persons enumerated in
reasonable to suppose that in the pursuit of such policy, the legislature Section 4 of the law, in order to establish her citizenship status
contemplated to make it more difficult if not practically impossible in some as a fact.
instances, for an alien woman marrying a Filipino to become a Filipina than any
ordinary applicant for naturalization, as has just been demonstrated above? It
A paramount policy consideration of graver import should not
seems but natural and logical to assume that Section 15 was intended to extend
be overlooked in this regard, for it explains and justifies the
special treatment to alien women who by marrying a Filipino irrevocably deliver
obviously deliberate choice of words. It is universally accepted
themselves, their possessions, their fate and fortunes and all that marriage
that a State, in extending the privilege of citizenship to an alien
implies to a citizen of this country, "for better or for worse." Perhaps there can
wife of one of its citizens could have had no other objective
and will be cases wherein the personal conveniences and benefits arising from
than to maintain a unity of allegiance among the members of
Philippine citizenship may motivate such marriage, but must the minority, as
the family. (Nelson v. Nelson, 113 Neb. 453, 203 N. W. 640
such cases are bound to be, serve as the criterion for the construction of law?
[1925]; see also "Convention on the Nationality of Married
Moreover, it is not farfetched to believe that in joining a Filipino family the alien
Women: Historical Background and Commentary." UNITED
woman is somehow disposed to assimilate the customs, beliefs and ideals of
NATIONS, Department of Economic and Social Affairs E/CN,
Filipinos among whom, after all, she has to live and associate, but surely, no one
6/399, pp. 8 et seq.). Such objective can only be satisfactorily
should expect her to do so even before marriage. Besides, it may be considered
achieved by allowing the wife to acquire citizenship derivatively
that in reality the extension of citizenship to her is made by the law not so much
through the husband. This is particularly true in the Philippines
for her sake as for the husband. Indeed, We find the following observations anent
where tradition and law has placed the husband as head of the
the national policy rationalization in Choy King Tee and Ly Giok Ha (the second)
family, whose personal status and decisions govern the life of
to be quite persuasive:
the family group. Corollary to this, our laws look with favor on
the unity and solidarity of the family (Art. 220, Civil Code), in
 whose preservation of State as a vital and enduring interest.
(See Art. 216, Civil Code). Thus, it has been said that by
tradition in our country, there is a theoretic identity of person
and interest between husband and wife, and from the nature of
the relation, the home of one is that of the other. (See De la
Viña v. Villareal, 41 Phil. 13). It should likewise be said that
because of the theoretic identity of husband and wife, and the
primacy of the husband, the nationality of husband should be
the nationality of the wife, and the laws upon one should be the
law upon the other. For as the court, in Hopkins v.
Fachant (9th Cir., 1904) 65 C.C.A., 1, 130 Fed. 839, held: "The
status of the wife follows that of the husband, ... and by virtue
of her marriage her husband's domicile became her domicile."
And the presumption under Philippine law being that
the property relations of husband and wife are under the
regime of conjugal partnership (Art. 119, Civil Code), the
income of one is also that of the other.
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of
family unity and identity that a husband should be a citizen and
the wife an alien, and that the national treatment of one should
be different from that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the
husband's interests in property and business activities reserved
by law to citizens should not form part of the conjugal
partnership and be denied to the wife, nor that she herself
cannot, through her own efforts but for the benefit of the
partnership, acquire such interests. Only in rare instances
should the identity of husband and wife be refused recognition,
and we submit that in respect of our citizenship laws, it should
only be in the instances where the wife suffers from the
disqualifications stated in Section 4 of the Revised
Naturalization Law. (Motion for Reconsideration, Burca vs.
Republic, supra.)
With all these considerations in mind, We are persuaded that it is in the best
interest of all concerned that Section 15 of the Naturalization Law be given effect
in the same way as it was understood and construed when the phrase "who may
be lawfully naturalized," found in the American statute from which it was
borrowed and copied verbatim, was applied by the American courts and
administrative authorities. There is merit, of course in the view that Philippine
statutes should be construed in the light of Philippine circumstances, and with
particular reference to our naturalization laws. We should realize the disparity in
the circumstances between the United States, as the so-called "melting pot" of
peoples from all over the world, and the Philippines as a developing country
whose Constitution is nationalistic almost in the come. Certainly, the writer of
this opinion cannot be the last in rather passionately insisting that our
jurisprudence should speak our own concepts and resort to American authorities,
to be sure, entitled to admiration, and respect, should not be regarded as source
of pride and indisputable authority. Still, We cannot close our eyes to the
undeniable fact that the provision of law now under scrutiny has no local origin
and orientation; it is purely American, factually taken bodily from American law
when the Philippines was under the dominating influence of statutes of the United
States Congress. It is indeed a sad commentary on the work of our own
legislature of the late 1920's and 1930's that given the opportunity to break
away from the old American pattern, it took no step in that direction. Indeed,
even after America made it patently clear in the Act of Congress of September
22, 1922 that alien women marrying Americans cannot be citizens of the United
States without undergoing naturalization proceedings, our legislators still chose
to adopt the previous American law of August 10, 1855 as embodied later in
Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of 1874, Which, it is worth reiterating, was
consistently and uniformly understood as conferring American citizenship to alien
women marrying Americansipso facto, without having to submit to any
naturalization proceeding and without having to prove that they possess the
special qualifications of residence, moral character, adherence to American ideals
and American constitution, provided they show they did not suffer from any of
the disqualifications enumerated in the American Naturalization Law. Accordingly,
We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise
notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien
woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a
Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under
Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband
the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not
suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.
As under any other law rich in benefits for those coming under it, doubtless there
will be instances where unscrupulous persons will attempt to take advantage of
this provision of law by entering into fake and fictitious marriages or mala
fide matrimonies. We cannot as a matter of law hold that just because of these
possibilities, the construction of the provision should be otherwise than as
dictated inexorably by more ponderous relevant considerations, legal, juridical
and practical. There can always be means of discovering such undesirable
practice and every case can be dealt with accordingly as it arises.
III.
The third aspect of this case requires necessarily a re-examination of the ruling of one for naturalization, and, in fact, declared petitioner "a citizen
this Court in Burca, supra, regarding the need of judicial naturalization of the Philippines."
proceedings before the alien wife of a Filipino may herself be considered or
deemed a Filipino. If this case which, as already noted, was submitted for
In other words, under this holding, in order for an alien woman marrying a
decision in 1964 yet, had only been decided earlier, before Go Im Ty, the
Filipino to be vested with Filipino citizenship, it is not enough that she possesses
foregoing discussions would have been sufficient to dispose of it. The Court could
the qualifications prescribed by Section 2 of the law and none of the
have held that despite her apparent lack of qualifications, her marriage to her co-
disqualifications enumerated in its Section 4. Over and above all these, she has
petitioner made her a Filipina, without her undergoing any naturalization
to pass thru the whole process of judicial naturalization apparently from
proceedings, provided she could sustain, her claim that she is not disqualified
declaration of intention to oathtaking, before she can become a Filipina. In plain
under Section 4 of the law. But as things stand now, with the Burca ruling, the
words, her marriage to a Filipino is absolutely of no consequence to her
question We have still to decide is, may she be deemed a Filipina without
nationality vis-a-vis that of her Filipino husband; she remains to be the national
submitting to a naturalization proceeding?
of the country to which she owed allegiance before her marriage, and if she
desires to be of one nationality with her husband, she has to wait for the same
Naturally, if Burca is to be followed, it is clear that the answer to this question time that any other applicant for naturalization needs to complete, the required
must necessarily be in the affirmative. As already stated, however, the decision period of ten year residence, gain the knowledge of English or Spanish and one of
in Burca has not yet become final because there is still pending with Us a motion the principle local languages, make her children study in Filipino schools, acquire
for its reconsideration which vigorously submits grounds worthy of serious real property or engage in some lawful occupation of her own independently of
consideration by this Court. On this account, and for the reasons expounded her husband, file her declaration of intention and after one year her application
earlier in this opinion, this case is as good an occasion as any other to re- for naturalization, with the affidavits of two credible witnesses of her good moral
examine the issue. character and other qualifications, etc., etc., until a decision is ordered in her
favor, after which, she has to undergo the two years of probation, and only then,
but not before she takes her oath as citizen, will she begin to be considered and
In the said decision, Justice Sanchez held for the Court:
deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines. Briefly, she can become a Filipino
citizen only by judicial declaration.
We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a
Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this country must apply
Such being the import of the Court's ruling, and it being quite obvious, on the
therefore by filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she
other hand, upon a cursory reading of the provision, in question, that the law
possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section 2 and none
intends by it to spell out what is the "effect of naturalization on (the) wife and
of the disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised
children" of an alien, as plainly indicated by its title, and inasmuch as the
Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in the Court
language of the provision itself clearly conveys the thought that some effect
of First Instance where petitioner has resided at least one year
beneficial to the wife is intended by it, rather than that she is not in any manner
immediately preceding the filing of the petition; and (3) Any
to be benefited thereby, it behooves Us to take a second hard look at the ruling,
action by any other office, agency, board or official,
if only to see whether or not the Court might have overlooked any relevant
administrative or otherwise — other than the judgment of a
consideration warranting a conclusion different from that complained therein. It
competent court of justice — certifying or declaring that an
is undeniable that the issue before Us is of grave importance, considering its
alien wife of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is
consequences upon tens of thousands of persons affected by the ruling therein
hereby declared null and void.
made by the Court, and surely, it is for Us to avoid, whenever possible, that Our
decision in any case should produce any adverse effect upon them not
3. We treat the present petition as one for naturalization. Or, in contemplated either by the law or by the national policy it seeks to endorse.
the words of law, a "petition for citizenship". This is as it should
be. Because a reading of the petition will reveal at once that
AMICI CURIAE in the Burca case, respectable and impressive by their number
efforts were made to set forth therein, and to prove afterwards,
and standing in the Bar and well known for their reputation for intellectual
compliance with Sections 2 and 4 of the Revised Naturalization
integrity, legal acumen and incisive and comprehensive resourcefulness in
law. The trial court itself apparently considered the petition as
research, truly evident in the quality of the memorandum they have submitted in
said case, invite Our attention to the impact of the decision therein thus:
The doctrine announced by this Honorable Court for the first
time in the present case -- that an alien woman who marries a
Philippine citizen not only does not ipso facto herself become a
citizen but can acquire such citizenship only through ordinary
naturalization proceedings under the Revised Naturalization
Law, and that all administrative actions "certifying or declaring
such woman to be a Philippine citizen are null and void" — has
consequences that reach far beyond the confines of the present
case. Considerably more people are affected, and affected
deeply, than simply Mrs. Zita N. Burca. The newspapers report
that as many as 15 thousand women married to Philippine
citizens are affected by this decision of the Court. These are
women of many and diverse nationalities, including Chinese,
Spanish, British, American, Columbian, Finnish, Japanese,
Chilean, and so on. These members of the community, some of
whom have been married to citizens for two or three decades,
have all exercised rights and privileges reserved by law to
Philippine citizens. They will have acquired, separately or in
conjugal partnership with their citizen husbands, real property,
and they will have sold and transferred such property. Many of
these women may be in professions membership in which is
limited to citizens. Others are doubtless stockholders or officers
or employees in companies engaged in business activities for
which a certain percentage of Filipino equity content is
prescribed by law. All these married women are now faced with
possible divestment of personal status and of rights acquired
and privileges exercised in reliance, in complete good faith,
upon a reading of the law that has been accepted as correct for
more than two decades by the very agencies of government
charged with the administration of that law. We must
respectfully suggest that judicial doctrines which would visit
such comprehensive and far-reaching injury upon the wives
and mothers of Philippine citizens deserve intensive scrutiny
and reexamination.
To be sure, this appeal can be no less than what this Court attended to in Gan
Tsitung vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-20819, Feb. 21, 1967, 19 SCRA 401 — when
Chief Justice Concepcion observed:
The Court realizes, however, that the rulings in the Barretto
and Delgado cases — although referring to situations the
equities of which are not identical to those obtaining in the case
at bar — may have contributed materially to the irregularities
committed therein and in other analogous cases, and induced
the parties concerned to believe, although erroneously, that the
procedure followed was valid under the law.
Accordingly, and in view of the implications of the issue under
consideration, the Solicitor General was required, not only, to
comment thereon, but, also, to state "how many cases there
are, like the one at bar, in which certificates of naturalization
have been issued after notice of the filing of the petition for
naturalization had been published in the Official Gazette only
once, within the periods (a) from January 28, 1950" (when the
decision in Delgado v. Republic was promulgated) "to May 29,
1957" (when the Ong Son Cui was decided) "and (b) from May
29, 1957 to November 29, 1965" (when the decision in the
present case was rendered).
After mature deliberation, and in the light of the reasons
adduced in appellant's motion for reconsideration and in the
reply thereto of the Government, as well as of the data
contained in the latter, the Court holds that the doctrine laid
down in the Ong Son Cui case shall apply and affect the validity
of certificates of naturalization issued after, not on or before
May 29, 1957.
Here We are met again by the same problem. In Gan Tsitung, the Court had to
expressly enjoin the prospective application of its construction of the law made in
a previous decision, 24 which had already become final, to serve the ends of
justice and equity. In the case at bar, We do not have to go that far. As already
observed, the decision in Burca still under reconsideration, while the ruling in Lee
Suan Ay, Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and others that followed them have at
the most become the law of the case only for the parties thereto. If there are
good grounds therefor, all We have to do now is to reexamine the said rulings
and clarify or modify them.
For ready reference, We requote Section 15:
Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any
woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of
 the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized
shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have
been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens
thereof.
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the
time of naturalization of the parents, shall automatically
become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born minor child,
who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is
naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his
minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the
Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to
be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of
his parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen, unless
within one year after reaching the age of majority, he fails to
register himself as a Philippine citizen at the American
Consulate of the country where he resides, and to take the
necessary oath of allegiance.
It is obvious that the main subject-matter and purpose of the statute, the
Revised Naturalization Law or Commonwealth Act 473, as a whole, is to establish
a complete procedure for the judicial conferment of the status of citizenship upon
qualified aliens. After laying out such a procedure, remarkable for its elaborate
and careful inclusion of all safeguards against the possibility of any undesirable
persons becoming a part of our citizenry, it carefully but categorically states the
consequence of the naturalization of an alien undergoing such procedure it
prescribes upon the members of his immediate family, his wife and
children, 25 and, to that end, in no uncertain terms it ordains that: (a) all his
minor children who have been born in the Philippines shall be "considered
citizens" also; (b) all such minor children, if born outside the Philippines but
dwelling here at the time of such naturalization "shall automatically become"
Filipinos also, but those not born in the Philippines and not in the Philippines at
the time of such naturalization, are also redeemed citizens of this country
provided that they shall lose said status if they transfer their permanent
residence to a foreign country before becoming of age; (c) all such minor
children, if born outside of the Philippines after such naturalization, shall also be
"considered" Filipino citizens, unless they expatriate themselves by failing to
register as Filipinos at the Philippine (American) Consulate of the country where
they reside and take the necessary oath of allegiance; and (d) as to the wife, she
"shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" if she is one "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized". 26
No doubt whatever is entertained, so Burca holds very correctly, as to the point
that the minor children, falling within the conditions of place and time of birth
and residence prescribed in the provision, are vested with Philippine citizenship
directly by legislative fiat or by force of the law itself and without the need for
any judicial proceeding or declaration. (At p. 192, 19 SCRA). Indeed, the
language of the provision, is not susceptible of any other interpretation. But it is
claimed that the same expression "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" in
reference to the wife, does not necessarily connote the vesting of citizenship
status upon her by legislative fiat because the antecedent phrase requiring that
she must be one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" implies that such
status is intended to attach only after she has undergone the whole process of
judicial naturalization required of any person desiring to become a Filipino. Stated
otherwise, the ruling in Burca is that while Section 15 envisages and intends
legislative naturalization as to the minor children, the same section deliberately
treats the wife differently and leaves her out for the ordinary judicial
naturalization.
Of course, it goes without saying that it is perfectly within the constitutional
authority of the Congress of the Philippines to confer or vest citizenship status by
legislative fiat. (U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 42 L ed. 890 [1898]; See,
1 Tañada & Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines 152 [1961 ed.]) In fact, it
has done so for particular individuals, like two foreign religious prelates, 27 hence
there is no reason it cannot do it for classes or groups of persons under general
conditions applicable to all of the members of such class or group, like women
who marry Filipinos, whether native-born or naturalized. The issue before Us in
this case is whether or not the legislature hag done so in the disputed provisions
of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law. And Dr. Vicente G. Sinco, one of the
most respect authorities on political law in the Philippines 28 observes in this
connection thus: "A special form of naturalization is often observed by some
states with respect to women. Thus in the Philippines a foreign woman married to
a Filipino citizen becomes ipso facto naturalized, if she belongs to any of
the classeswho may apply for naturalization under the Philippine Laws." (Sinco,
Phil. Political Law 498-499 [10th ed. 1954]; emphasis ours; this comment is
substantially reiterated in the 1962 edition, citing Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo
Cua,supra.)
More importantly, it may be stated, at this juncture, that in construing the
provision of the United States statutes from which our law has been
copied, 28a the American courts have held that the alien wife does not acquire
American citizenship by choice but by operation of law. "In the Revised Statutes
the words "and taken" are omitted. The effect of this statute is that every alien
woman who marries a citizen of the United States becomes perforce a citizen
herself, without the formality of naturalization, and regardless of her wish in that
respect." (USCA 8, p. 601 [1970 ed.], citing Mackenzie v. Hare, 1913, 134 P.
713, 165 Cal. 766, affirmed 36 S. Ct. 106, 239 U.S. 299, 60 L ed. 297.) .
We need not recount here again how this provision in question was first enacted
as paragraph (a) of Section 13, by way of an insertion into Act 2927 by Act 3448
of November 30, 1928, and that, in turn, and paragraph was copied verbatim
from Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which by that
time already had a long accepted construction among the courts and
administrative authorities in that country holding that under such provision an
alien woman who married a citizen became, upon such marriage, likewise a
citizen by force of law and as a consequence of the marriage itself without having
to undergo any naturalization proceedings, provided that, it could be shown that
at the time of such marriage, she was not disqualified to be naturalized under the
laws then in force. To repeat the discussion We already made of these undeniable
facts would unnecessarily make this decision doubly extensive. The only point
which might be reiterated for emphasis at this juncture is that whereas in the
United States, the American Congress, recognizing the construction, of Section
1994 of the Revised Statutes to be as stated above, and finding it desirable to
avoid the effects of such construction, approved the Act of September 22, 1922
Explicitly requiring all such alien wives to submit to judicial naturalization albeit
under more liberal terms than those for other applicants for citizenship, on the
other hand, the Philippine Legislature, instead of following suit and adopting such
a requirement, enacted Act 3448 on November 30, 1928 which copied verbatim
the aforementioned Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes, thereby indicating its
preference to adopt the latter law and its settled construction rather than the
reform introduced by the Act of 1922.
Obviously, these considerations leave Us no choice. Much as this Court may feel
that as the United States herself has evidently found it to be an improvement of
her national policy vis-a-vis the alien wives of her citizens to discontinue their
automatic incorporation into the body of her citizenry without passing through
the judicial scrutiny of a naturalization proceeding, as it used to be before 1922,
it seems but proper, without evidencing any bit of colonial mentality, that as a
developing country, the Philippines adopt a similar policy, unfortunately, the
manner in which our own legislature has enacted our laws on the subject, as
recounted above, provides no basis for Us to construe said law along the line of
the 1922 modification of the American Law. For Us to do so would be to indulge
in judicial legislation which it is not institutionally permissible for this Court to do.
Worse, this court would be going precisely against the grain of the implicit
Legislative intent.
There is at least one decision of this Court before Burca wherein it seems it is
quite clearly implied that this Court is of the view that under Section 16 of the
Naturalization Law, the widow and children of an applicant for naturalization who
dies during the proceedings do not have to submit themselves to another
naturalization proceeding in order to avail of the benefits of the proceedings
involving the husband. Section 16 provides: .
SEC. 16. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have
died. — In case a petitioner should die before the final decision
has been rendered, his widow and minor children may continue
the proceedings. The decision rendered in the case shall, so far
as the widow and minor children are concerned, produce the
same legal effect as if it had been rendered during the life of
the petitioner.
In Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13706, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383, this Court
held:
Invoking the above provisions in their favor, petitioners-
appellants argue (1) that under said Sec. 16, the widow and
minor children are allowed to continue the same proceedings
and are not substituted for the original petitioner; (2) that the
qualifications of the original petitioner remain to be in issue and
not those of the widow and minor children, and (3) that said
Section 16 applies whether the petitioner dies before or after
final decision is rendered, but before the judgment becomes
executory.
There is force in the first and second arguments. Even the
second sentence of said Section 16 contemplate the fact that
the qualifications of the original petitioner remains the subject
of inquiry, for the simple reason that it states that "The
decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the widow and
minor children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as
if it had been rendered during the life of the petitioner." This
phraseology emphasizes the intent of the law to continue the
proceedings with the deceased as the theoretical petitioner, for
if it were otherwise, it would have been unnecessary to
consider the decision rendered, as far as it affected the widow
and the minor children.
xxx xxx xxx
 The Chua Chian case (supra), cited by the appellee, declared
that a dead person can not be bound to do things stipulated in
the oath of allegiance, because an oath is a personal matter.
Therein, the widow prayed that she be allowed to take the oath
of allegiance for the deceased. In the case at bar, petitioner
Tan Lin merely asked that she be allowed to take the oath of
allegiance and the proper certificate of naturalization, once the
naturalization proceedings of her deceased husband, shall have
been completed, not on behalf of the deceased but on her own
behalf and of her children, as recipients of the benefits of his
naturalization. In other words, the herein petitioner proposed to
take the oath of allegiance, as a citizen of the Philippines, by
virtue of the legal provision that "any woman who is now or
may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and
who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines. Minor children of persons naturalized
under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be
considered citizens thereof." (Section 15, Commonwealth Act
No. 473). The decision granting citizenship to Lee Pa and the
record of the case at bar, do not show that the petitioning
widow could not have been lawfully naturalized, at the time Lee
Pa filed his petition, apart from the fact that his 9 minor
children were all born in the Philippines. (Decision, In the
Matter of the Petition of Lee Pa to be admitted a citizen of the
Philippines, Civil Case No. 16287, CFI, Manila, Annex A; Record
on Appeal, pp. 8-11). The reference to Chua Chian case is,
therefore, premature.
Section 16, as may be seen, is a parallel provision to Section 15. If the widow of
an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not
required to go through a naturalization preceeding, in order to be considered as a
Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be
denied the same privilege. This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no
evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently.
Additionally, We have carefully considered the arguments advanced in the motion
for reconsideration in Burca, and We see no reason to disagree with the following
views of counsel: .
It is obvious that the provision itself is a legislative
declaration of who may be considered citizens of the
Philippines. It is a proposition too plain to be disputed that
Congress has the power not only to prescribe the mode or
manner under which foreigners may acquire citizenship, but
also the very power of conferring citizenship by legislative fiat.
(U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 42 L. Ed. 890 [1898] ;
see 1 Tañada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines 152
[1961 ed.]) The Constitution itself recognizes as Philippine
citizens "Those who are naturalized in accordance with law"
(Section 1[5], Article IV, Philippine Constitution). Citizens by
naturalization, under this provision, include not only those who
are naturalized in accordance with legal proceedings for the
acquisition of citizenship, but also those who acquire citizenship
by "derivative naturalization" or by operation of law, as, for
example, the "naturalization" of an alien wife through the
naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of an alien
woman to a citizen. (See Tañada & Carreon, op. cit. supra, at
152, 172; Velayo, Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization 2
[1965 ed.]; 1 Paras, Civil Code 186 [1967 ed.]; see also 3
Hackworth, Digest of International Law 3).
The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" found
in Section 14 of the Revised Naturalization Law clearly
manifests an intent to confer citizenship. Construing a similar
phrase found in the old U.S. naturalization law (Revised
Statutes, 1994), American courts have uniformly taken it to
mean that upon her marriage, the alien woman becomes by
operation of law a citizen of the United States as fully as if she
had complied with all the provisions of the statutes upon the
subject of naturalization. (U.S. v. Keller, 13 F. 82; U.S.
Opinions of the US Attorney General dated June 4, 1874 [14
Op. 4021, July 20, 1909 [27 Op. 507], December 1, 1910 [28
Op. 508], Jan. 15, 1920 [32 Op. 2091 and Jan. 12, 1923 [23
398]).
The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen," in
Section 1994 Revised Statute (U.S. Comp.
Stat. 1091, 1268) or as it was in the Act of
1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, Chapt. 71, Sec. 2),
"shall be deemed and taken to be a citizens"
while it may imply that the person to whom it
relates has not actually become a citizen by
the ordinary means or in the usual way, as by
the judgment of a competent court, upon a
proper application and proof, yet it does not
follow that such person is on that account
practically any the less a citizen. The word
 "deemed" is the equivalent of "considered" or
"judged," and therefore, whatever an Act of
Congress requires to be "deemed" or "taken"
as true of any person or thing must, in law,
be considered as having been duly adjudged
or established concerning such person or
thing, and have force and effect accordingly.
When, therefore, Congress declares that an
alien woman shall, under certain
circumstances, be "deemed" an American
citizen, the effect when the contingency
occurs, is equivalent to her being naturalized
directly by an Act of Congress or in the usual
mode thereby prescribed. (Van Dyne,
Citizenship of the United States 239, cited in
Velayo, Philippine Citizenship and
Naturalization 146-147 [1965 ed.]; emphasis
ours).
That this was likewise the intent of the Philippine legislature
when it enacted the first paragraph of Section 15 of the Revised
Naturalization Law is shown by a textual analysis of the entire
statutory provision. In its entirety, Section 15 reads:
(See supra).
The phrases "shall be deemed" "shall be considered," and "shall
automatically become" as used in the above provision, are
undoubtedly synonymous. The leading idea or purpose of the
provision was to confer Philippine citizenship by operation of
law upon certain classes of aliens as a legal consequence of
their relationship, by blood or by affinity, to persons who are
already citizens of the Philippines. Whenever the fact of
relationship of the persons enumerated in the provision concurs
with the fact of citizenship of the person to whom they are
related, the effect is for said persons to become ipso
facto citizens of the Philippines. "Ipso facto" as here used does
not mean that all alien wives and all minor children of Philippine
citizens, from the mere fact of relationship, necessarily become
such citizens also. Those who do not meet the statutory
requirements do not ipso factobecome citizens; they must
apply for naturalization in order to acquire such status. What it
does mean, however, is that in respect of those persons
enumerated in Section 15, the relationship to a citizen of the
Philippines is the operative fact which establishes the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by them. Necessarily, it also
determines the point of time at which such citizenship
commences. Thus, under the second paragraph of Section 15, a
minor child of a Filipino naturalized under the law, who was
born in the Philippines, becomes ipso facto a citizen of the
Philippines from the time the fact of relationship concurs with
the fact of citizenship of his parent, and the time when the child
became a citizen does not depend upon the time that he is able
to prove that he was born in the Philippines. The child may
prove some 25 years after the naturalization of his father that
he was born in the Philippines and should, therefore, be
"considered" a citizen thereof. It does not mean that he
became a Philippine citizen only at that later time. Similarly, an
alien woman who married a Philippine citizen may be able to
prove only some 25 years after her marriage (perhaps, because
it was only 25 years after the marriage that her citizenship
status became in question), that she is one who might herself
be lawfully naturalized." It is not reasonable to conclude that
she acquired Philippine citizenship only after she had proven
that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized." It is not
reasonable to conclude that she acquired Philippine citizenship
only after she had proven that she "might herself be lawfully
naturalized."
The point that bears emphasis in this regard is that in adopting
the very phraseology of the law, the legislature could not have
intended that an alien wife should not be deemed a Philippine
citizenunless and until she proves that she might herself be
lawfully naturalized. Far from it, the law states in plain terms
that she shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines if she is
one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized." The proviso
that she must be one "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized" is not a condition precedent to the vesting or
acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of fact
necessary to establish her citizenship as a factum probandum,
i.e., as a fact established and proved in evidence. The word
"might," as used in that phrase, precisely replies that at the
time of her marriage to a Philippine citizen, the alien woman
"had (the) power" to become such a citizen herself under the
laws then in force. (Owen v. Kelly, 6 DC 191 [1867], aff'd Kelly
v. Owen, 76 US 496, 19 L ed 283 [1869). That she establishes
such power long after her marriage does not alter the fact that
at her marriage, she became a citizen.
(This Court has held) that "an alien wife of a Filipino citizen
may not acquire the status of a citizen of the Philippines unless
there is proof that she herself may be lawfully naturalized"
(Decision, pp. 3-4). Under this view, the "acquisition" of
citizenship by the alien wife depends on her having proven her
qualifications for citizenship, that is, she is not a
citizen unless and until she proves that she may herself be
lawfully naturalized. It is clear from the words of the law that
the proviso does not mean that she must first prove that she
"might herself be lawfully naturalized" before she shall be
deemed (by Congress, not by the courts) a citizen. Even the
"uniform" decisions cited by this Court (at fn. 2) to support its
holding did not rule that the alien wife becomes a citizen
only after she has proven her qualifications for citizenship.
What those decisions ruled was that the alien wives in those
cases failed to prove their qualifications and therefore they
failed to establish their claim to citizenship. Thus in Ly Giok Ha
v. Galang, 101 Phil. 459 [l957], the case was remanded to the
lower court for determination of whether petitioner, whose
claim to citizenship by marriage to a Filipino was disputed by
the Government, "might herself be lawfully naturalized," for the
purpose of " proving her alleged change of political status from
alien to citizen" (at 464). In Cua v. Board, 101 Phil. 521
[1957], the alien wife who was being deported, claimed she
was a Philippine citizen by marriage to a Filipino. This Court
finding that there was no proof that she was not disqualified
under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law, ruled that:
"No such evidence appearing on record, the claim of
assumption of Philippine citizenship by Tijoe Wu Suan, upon
her marriage to petitioner, is untenable." (at 523) It will be
observed that in these decisions cited by this Court, the lack of
proof that the alien wives "might (themselves) be lawfully
naturalized" did not necessarily imply that they did not become,
in truth and in fact, citizens upon their marriage to Filipinos.
What the decisions merely held was that these wives failed to
establish their claim to that status as a proven fact.
In all instances where citizenship is conferred by operation of
law, the time when citizenship is conferred should not be
confused with the time when citizenship status is established as
a proven fact. Thus, even a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, whose citizenship status is put in issue in any
proceeding would be required to prove, for instance, that his
father is a citizen of the Philippines in order to factually
establish his claim to citizenship.* His citizenship status
commences from the time of birth, although his claim thereto is
established as a fact only at a subsequent time. Likewise, an
alien woman who might herself be lawfully naturalized becomes
a Philippine citizen at the time of her marriage to a Filipino
husband, not at the time she is able to establish that status as
a proven fact by showing that she might herself be lawfully
naturalized. Indeed, there is no difference between a statutory
declaration that a person is deemed a citizen of the
Philippines provided his father is such citizen from a declaration
that an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen of the
Philippines provided she might herself be lawfully naturalized.
Both become citizens by operation of law; the former becomes
a citizen ipso facto upon birth; the later ipso facto upon
marriage.
It is true that unless and until the alien wife proves that she
might herself be lawfully naturalized, it cannot be said that she
has established her status as a proven fact. But neither can it
be said that on that account, she did not become a citizen of
the Philippines. If her citizenship status is not questioned in any
legal proceeding, she obviously has no obligation to establish
her status as a fact. In such a case, the presumption of law
should be that she is what she claims to be. (U.S. v. Roxas, 5
Phil. 375 [1905]; Hilado v. Assad, 51 O.G. 4527 [1955]). There
is a presumption that a representation shown to have been
made is true. (Aetna Indemnity Co. v. George A. Fuller, Co., 73
A. 738, 74 A. 369, 111 ME. 321).
The question that keeps bouncing back as a consequence of the foregoing views
is, what substitute is them for naturalization proceedings to enable the alien wife
of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and
established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she
has to perform an act or enter in to a transaction or business or exercise a right
reserved only to Filipinos? The ready answer to such question is that as the laws
of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such
procedure, but such paucity is no proof that the citizenship under discussion is
not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship,
as the case may be, for the truth is that the same situation objections even as to
native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding
court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again
and again as the occasion may demand. This, as We view it, is the sense in which
Justice Dizon referred to "appropriate proceeding" in Brito v.
Commissioner, supra. Indeed, only the good sense and judgment of those
subsequently inquiring into the matter may make the effort easier or simpler for
the persons concerned by relying somehow on the antecedent official findings,
even if these are not really binding.
It may not be amiss to suggest, however, that in order to have a good starting
point and so that the most immediate relevant public records may be kept in
order, the following observations in Opinion No. 38, series of 1958, of then Acting
Secretary of Justice Jesus G. Barrera, may be considered as the most appropriate
initial step by the interested parties:
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman
married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine
citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of
Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition
for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration
alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino,
citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her
husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth
Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which
should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of
the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the
petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by
the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen
(please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration
conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order
or decision granting or denying the petition.
Once the Commissioner of Immigration cancels the subject's registration as an
alien, there will probably be less difficulty in establishing her Filipino citizenship in
any other proceeding, depending naturally on the substance and vigor of the
opposition.
Before closing, it is perhaps best to clarify that this third issue We have passed
upon was not touched by the trial court, but as the point is decisive in this case,
the Court prefers that the matter be settled once and for all now.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court a quo dismissing
appellants' petition for injunction is hereby reversed and the Commissioner of
Immigration and/or his authorized representative is permanently enjoined from
causing the arrest and deportation and the confiscation of the bond of appellant
Lau Yuen Yeung, who is hereby declared to have become a Filipino citizen from
and by virtue of her marriage to her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen on January 25, 1962. No costs.
Dizon, Castro, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ., concur.
 
Footnotes
1 Followed in Kua Suy, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of
Immigration, G.R. No. L-13790, promulgated Oct. 31, 1963, 9
SCRA 300; Lu Choy Fa vs. Commissioner, G.R. No. L-20597,
Nov. 29, 1963, 9 SCRA 604; the other cases are discussed in
the opinion.
2 Justices Makalintal and Castro concurred only in the result.
3 Kua Suy v. Commissioner, G.R. No. L-13790, Oct. 31, 1963,
9 SCRA 300; Lo San Tuang v. Galang, G. R. No. L-18775, Nov.
30, 1963, 9 SCRA 638; Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner, G.R.
No. L-20784, Dec. 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 874; Tong Siok Sy v.
Vivo, G.R. No. L-21136, Dec. 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 876; Choy King
Tee v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18351, March 26, 1965, 13 SCRA
402; Austria v. Conchu, G.R. No. L-20716, June 22, 1965, 14
SCRA 336; Brito v. Commissioner, G.R. No. L-16829, June 30,
1965, 14 SCRA 539; Ly Giok Ha v. Galang (2nd), G. R. No. L-
21332, March 18, 1966, 16 SCRA 414; Go Im Ty v. Rep., G.R.
No. L-17919, July 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 797.
4 Supra. (101 Phil. 459).
* See, also Ops. Sec. of Justice, No. 28, s. 1950; No. 96, s.
1949; Nos. 43, 58, 98 and 281, s. 1948; No. 95, s. 1941; Nos.
79 and 168, s. 1940.
5 In the deliberations, Chief Justice Concepcion explained that
his opinion was not meant to give that impression.
6 Justice Barrera penned the decision in Sun Peck Yong, supra,
and Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, supra.
* Section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473; Ly Giok Ha @ Wy
Giok Ha v. Galang, 54 Off. Gaz., 356.
7 To avoid repetition, the pertinent portions of the opinion will
be quoted in a more appropriate place later in this decision.
8 G.R. No. L-21332, March 18, 1966, 16 SCRA 414.
9 Pertinent portions of the opinion of Justice Reyes will be
quoted later in a more appropriate place in this decision.
10 17 SCRA 797.
11 See id., pp. 801-804.
12 One can easily perceive from the language of Justice
Makalintal in Choy King Tee that he was expressing the
consensus of the Court's membership then rather than his own
personal views.
13 The law firms PAREDES, POBLADOR & NAZARENO;
LICHAUCO, PICAZO & AGCAOLI; MEER, MEER & MEER; PONCE
ENRILE, SIGUION REYNA, MONTECILLO & BELO; RAMIREZ &
ORTIGAS; SALVA, CHUA & ASSO.; and SYCIP, SALAZAR, LUNA,
MANALO & FELICIANO.
14 See quotation from Lo San Tuang earlier on pp. 27-32 of
this opinion.
15 See opinion of the Secretary of Justice, No. 79, s. 1940.
16 For ready reference, attached as an appendix of this
decision is a brief study of all the naturalization laws of the
United States from 1790 to 1970 showing how the matter of
qualifications and disqualifications, whether racial or otherwise,
have been treated in the said statutes, from which it can be
readily seen that the disqualification of alien wives from
becoming citizens has not been always exclusively on racial
grounds during the period that the Act of Feb. 10, 1855 and,
later, section 1994 of the Revised Statutes were in force.
17 The statement in Sinco's book cited by Justice Regala in Lo
San Tuang does not indicate any authoritative source. In any
event, for the reasons already stated the racial motive could at
most be only one of the reasons for the elimination of Section
1.
18 A more extensive discussion of the relevance of this repeal
of 1922 is made further in this opinion.
19 Decided, April 15, 1869, next to Burton v. Burton, 40 N. Y.
373.
20 More accurately, the phrase "free white persons," does not
only refer to people of the white race but also to non-slaves.
21 In this connection, it is to be noted that all the naturalization
laws of the United States from 1790 provided for such
qualifications of residence, good moral character, adherence to
the Constitution.
22 (f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the
Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who
have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the
customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the
United States, whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to
become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
23 After Ly Giok Ha and Cua, the Secretary of Justice found
more reason to sustain the previous view of the Department on
the matter. See opinions already cited.

24 Og Son Cui v. Republic, G.R. No. L-9858, May 29, 1957, 101
Phil. 649.

25 Somehow, the language of the whole law conveys the idea

that only male aliens are contemplated for judicial
naturalization.

26 Three possible situations are contemplated, namely: (a) the

woman is already married to the alien before the latter's
naturalization; (b) she marries him after such naturalization; or
(c) she marries a native-born Filipino; in all these instances,
the effect of marriage is the same.

27 Brother Cannon of La Salle College and Father Moran of

Ateneo University.

28 Former Dean of the College of Law, U.P. and later President

of the University, now delegate to the Constitutional
Convention of 1971.

28a Sec. 1994 Revised Statutes.

* It should be observed, parenthetically, that by its very

nature, citizenship is one of the most difficult facts to prove.