While revealing the ‘ground situation’ of Indo-China border in Arunachal Pradesh, the preliminary

report of the BJP fact finding committee said that Thagla Ridge which is about 60 km away from
Zemithang on the north-westerly side of the border, Namka Chu and Sumdrong Chu Valley is under
Chinese occupation since 1986. As a result, lot of traditional grazing land of local people has been lost,
affecting the livelihood of the local herdsmen.

In Bumla sector, the Indian Army post is located not on Mac Mohan Line, Therefore, here the Line of
Actual Control (LAC) is not corresponding with the Machmohan Line, recognized by India.

In Tingbu sector, vast area of traditional grazing land of the local people has been encroached by
Chinese Army, the report said. Even an important and sacred Buddhist statue has been displaced by
the Chinese Army, it added.

In Upper Subansiri district, the Asa-Pila-Maya Army camp which was in Indian Territory is now under
Chinese occupation, the report claimed. In Dibang Valley district, the Athu-Pupu range one of the
important sacred historical place of the local people is now under Chinese occupation since 2006.

In Chaklagam range the three mountain ranges frequented by Indian hunters have been occupied by
the Chinese since 2006.

In Kurung Kumey district, prior to 1962 war, there were nine Army base camps till the actual border.
Today, only two of those camps are under the Indian Army control. Seven of them have been
occupied by the Chinese Army.

Referring to India’s recent troop deployment in Arunachal Pradesh and the construction of a
new airbase at Tezpur, Assam, Zhang Haizjou writing in China Daily on June 10, 2009 states
that “India is attempting to extend its control over a disputed border area…” Similarly, Li
Hongmei writing in the People’s Daily has held India responsible for hiking tension over
Arunachal Pradesh by harbouring “awe, vexation, envy and jealousy – in the face of its
giant neighbour” China. These are the latest in a spate of recent writings in the official
media blaming India for increasing bilateral tensions by deploying troops in Arunachal
Pradesh. The sheer barrage of these scathing writings makes it prudent for India to take
note of the trends in Chinese thinking on India’s border areas. It appears that at the
moment China might choose to raise its concerns over Indian troop deployment in the
region at the forthcoming Special Representatives level meeting scheduled in August.
China appears to have taken India’s recent strategic moves in Arunachal seriously,
portraying them as a “complex development” in the bilateral relationship. The Chinese
reaction appears resolute. A mixture of anger, concern and anxiety is visible among Chinese
scholars, party officials and media analysts trying to identify the rationale behind India’s
strategic decision to revitalize its North-East region. Two dominant discourses are visible.
One, to understand and evaluate India’s strategic/military moves in the North-East region.
Two, to gauge India’s competitiveness both in protecting Arunachal and in comparison to
China’s overall progress. For instance, referring to India’s increasing military presence in the
region, Bi Mingxin emphasizes (Xinhua, 15 June 2009) that “capable of carrying nuclear
weapons and tailor-made for Indian specifications … Tezpur has become the third dedicated
Sukhoi-30MKI airbase in the country after Pune in Western India and Bareilly in Northern
India.” The piece goes on to outline that the Indian Air Force (IAF) is in the process of
upgrading “five bases in the eastern and north-eastern parts of the country, including
Tezpur, Chabua, Jorhat (Assam), Panagarh (West Bengal) and Purnea.”
Chinese writings also display concern over India’s strategic competitiveness on a range of
issues. A prime example is the piece titled “India’s unwise military moves,” published in the
official Global Times on 11 June 2009, which states:
“India likes to brag about its sustainable development, but worries that it is being left
behind by China. China is seen in India as both a potential threat and a competitor to
surpass. But India can’t actually compete with China in a number of areas, like international
influence, overall national power and economic scale … China won’t make any compromises
in its border disputes with India … India’s current course can only lead to rivalry between
the two countries. India needs to consider whether or not it can afford the consequences of
a potential confrontation with China.”
An interaction with leading Chinese experts from SIIS, SASS, CIIS, CICIR and government
officials indicates that China is in no mood to relax its stance over Arunachal. In fact, there
is a growing feeling that India will have to “manage” its relationship carefully with a more
assertive China. There seems to be a consensus among leading Chinese experts in
influential think-tanks that “India is adopting the military means in the north-eastern sector
to have a good control over the disputed issue of Arunachal Pradesh.” China has been
particularly riled by the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) approval of a loan worth US$60
million for infrastructure development in Arunachal Pradesh. Reacting strongly to the
development, the Foreign Ministry spokesperson Qin Gang had commented that the ADB’s
financial approval “cannot change the existence of the China-India territorial disputes, nor
China’s position on the issue.” Beijing had strongly opposed the loan, though India
resolutely managed to push through with the strong support of the US, Japan and South
Korea.
In principle, public opinion in China is in favour of taking an official call on Arunachal
Pradesh by denouncing the earlier “agreed official principles”. Interactions with Chinese
experts confirm the fact that their understanding is that “mutually agreed principles” have
only a tactical value for them. The Chinese have no hesitation in unilaterally rejecting any
principle if it creates barriers to the promotion of their national interests. The recent media
and scholarly discourse on how to respond to India’s strategic move in Arunachal Pradesh
underlines this fact – that China should not hold sacrosanct the settled principles for
boundary demarcation agreed upon in 2005 that “in reaching the boundary settlement, the
two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas.”
Publicly renouncing this provision on 6 June 2007, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi stated that
“mere presence” in populated areas would not affect China’s claim. Earlier, the former
Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Yuxi remarked on 20 November 2006 on CNN-IBN
Television that “historically, the whole of Arunachal Pradesh” belongs to China.
At the very least, this Chinese posture may be seen as a pointer to the danger of China
making its campaign public that “Arunachal Pradesh is a disputed territory”. China has
constantly been referring to Arunachal Pradesh as a “complex historical chapter” in the
China-India border dispute. Most Chinese experts refer to the fact that the sixth Dalai Lama
hailed from Monyul in Arunachal Pradesh. In the Chinese contention, three parts of this
region – Monyul, Loyul and Lower Tsayul – were under the Tibetan administrative and
jurisdictional control. Though it has officially claimed time and again 90,000 sq. km. of land
in Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim, Beijing’s primary interest is limited to Tawang. A leading
expert in Shanghai asserts that “historically, Tawang belongs to Tibet; and India should
realize this fact quickly in order to avoid a situation like 1962.”
Today, public opinion in China is keen on once again taking a strong position on Arunachal.
In the wake of India’s strategic planning in the North-East, Chinese experts rue their
government’s mistake in not gaining control of Arunachal Pradesh during the 1962 War. A
scholar in Shanghai points out, for example, that “it was a costly error on the part of China”
to have declared a unilateral cease-fire on 21 November 1962 without gaining control over
the region.
Experts cite several assumptions as to this “great political mistake” was made. One, though
not the primary reason, was that the Chinese military was short of “logistical support”. More
importantly, the military decided to retreat from Arunachal because it wanted to uphold the
principle of “peaceful solution” to the boundary issue with India in future. An expert in
Shanghai opines that the Chinese political leadership did not set much store on gaining
control over Arunachal because it never anticipated that the Tibet crisis would hurt the
Chinese as deeply as it does today. A well-known expert on India in Beijing holds the view
that external factors like the anticipated US support to India and the problematic Sino-
Soviet relationship forced the Chinese to retreat from Arunachal Pradesh.
To this day, China refers to Arunachal Pradesh as “Southern Tibet” and lays claims to this
territory. Though the Chinese rhetoric does not get much notice in India, these public
outbursts on India’s strategic planning in Arunachal reveal the Chinese anxiety. To an
extent, many in Beijing possibly believe that the time has come to get tough on the issue.
Assumptions and assessments are still being made in the Chinese public discourse over
Arunachal in the context of its past, present and future. Officials and experts remain quite
alert when it comes to affairs related to Tibet and the China-India boundary issue. Though
Chinese have not reacted publicly to India’s recent moves in the region, it goes without
saying that the issue of Arunachal is taken very seriously both within the government and in
the public discourse. At the moment China’s views on Arunachal appear more complex than
ever.