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Tuesday, 26 June 2007, 07:54

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TAGS PREL, FR">FR, NATO, EUN, GG, UNMIK, YI, RS">RS, UNO

SUBJECT: U/S BURNS'S JUNE 13 MEETING WITH GEORGIAN

PRESIDENT SAAKASHVILI

REF: TBILISI 1387

Classified By: Ambassador Craig R. Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (B & D).

Summary

The cable describes a tense meeting in June 2007 between an

agitated Mikheil Saakashvili and the US's top diplomat William Burns.

President Saakashvili says Putin is determined to wrest away Georgia's

separatist regions. The prediction proved right. Key passages

highlighted in yellow

Read related article

1. (U) June 13, 2007, 11:00 A.M.

2. (U) Participants:

U.S. Under Secretary Burns Special Envoy for Kosovo Wisner

Ambassador Stapleton P Staff Bame POL Deputy Turner (notetaker)

Georgia President Saakashvili Foreign Minister Bezhuashvili

Ambassador to France Kudava Chief of Cabinet Sharashidze Daniel
Kunin
3. (C) SUMMARY: In a June 13 meeting with Georgian President
Saakashvili, U/S Burns confirmed that we would move forward on
Kosovo independence, but assured him we would remain firm in
discouraging Russia from taking action to recognize Abkhazia's
independence. Saakashvili insisted that Putin was personally
committed to removing Abkhazia from Georgia. He worried that Russia
would attempt to use any Kosovo UNSCR, especially one sweetened to
gain Russia's abstention, as a precedent/justification for Abkhazia.
Burns assured Saakashvili that any Russian move to recognize
Abkhazia would isolate Russia internationally and urged the Georgians
to continue to avoid antagonizing them. Saakashvili said the Georgians
were doing their part but that Russia could not be trusted; he urged
the USG to make clear to the Russians that the Caucasus was a powder
keg. He also called for NATO MAP for Georgia as soon as possible as a
"deterrent" against Russian adventurism. Burns assured Saakashvili of
U.S. support for Georgian aspirations while noting that timing (the
December 2007 NATO FM Ministerial, or the April 2008 NATO Summit,
or even later) would depend also on building support among European
Allies. Saakashvili concluded by stressing the strategic importance of
Abkhazia for Georgia and of the Black Sea for Georgia and Ukraine.
END SUMMARY.

KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE

-------------------

4. (C) Burns noted at the outset President Bush's strong stance on

Kosovo, in private and in public, during his recent visit to Pristina and
Sofia. Burns said the President had made clear to President Putin at the
G8 Summit that Kosovo would become independent. Russia could
perhaps delay this outcome, but it could not stop it. The UN had
already taken Kosovo away from Serbia, and it was the Europeans and
U.S., not the Russians, who had troops on the ground to keep the
peace and were providing financial assistance. Burns termed the
Russian threat to recognize Abkhazia in retaliation for Western
recognition of Kosovo hollow, given that other members of the
international community would not follow (with the possible exception
of Belarus; Saakashvili suggested that only Venezuela would support
Russia). Burns and Wisner reiterated that Secretary Rice had made clear
to Putin and FM Lavrov that it would be a grave mistake to recognize
Abkhazia.
IMPACT ON ABKHAZIA

------------------

5. (C) Saakashvili worried about the implications for Georgia of Kosovo

independence and related that Putin, in the course of a recent fifty-
minute bilateral meeting, had invited Georgia to coordinate with
Russia on a response to the U.S. position on Kosovo. Continuing that
Putin had a highly personal interest in Abkhazia, Saakashvili claimed
that Putin had recalled Russian diplomats in Georgia to prepare
documents on Abkhazia. This had led to some strange proposals,
including a Russian proposal at the last CIS summit that Georgia
approach the IOC to host the Olympic games in Abkhazia. More
seriously, a Russian move to recognize Abkhazia risked setting off a
powder keg in the Caucasus. Georgia was not interested in provoking
the Russians, but emotions were high. The Russians, who only
understood frank language, would interpret any flexibility from others
as weakness. They needed to be told that they risked setting off an
explosion in their own backyard that

PARIS 00002725 002 OF 004

could easily redound against them.

6. (C) Saakashvili asked if there were quid pro quos other than
Abkhazia that Russia was seeking for Kosovo independence. Burns
said that the U.S. was currently focused on finding ways to encourage
a Russian abstention, for instance through the eventual appointment
of a UN envoy for Serbian refugee affairs or extending negotiations
between the Serbs and Albanians for another 3-5 months. The USG
was willing to meet the Russians half-way, provided the end result
would be independence. Wisner added that the USG was not proposing
a division between Kosovo's Serbian and Kosovar Albanian
communities. Saakashvili said it was important that "nothing" in any
eventual Kosovo decision be viewed as a precedent for other conflicts;
nor did Georgia want to be associated with the process in any way. He
worried that Russia would use any negotiations on an amended UNSCR
to insert language that could later be cited as justification for its
actions on Abkhazia. Burns reiterated the U.S. position that the record
of UN involvement in Kosovo put it exactly opposite from the situation
in Abkhazia.
EU DYNAMICS, FRENCH PROPOSAL

----------------------------

7. (C) Saakashvili asserted that Putin had promised him to veto Kosovo
independence. Burns responded that Putin had stopped short of using
the word "veto" in his discussions with the President; Wisner pointed
out that the Russians had been careful in their language, saying they
were "ready" to veto "this" resolution (as opposed to another one).
Burns commented that the Europeans in general were "too" obsessed
with the threat of a Russian veto, mainly because of the divisions it
would likely engender within the EU itself. For instance, Slovakia and
Greece had said they would oppose recognizing Kosovo's
independence. Burns reviewed his meetings with French officials in
Paris and other aspects of the state of play on Kosovo.

8. (C) Picking up on an earlier comment by Burns that Kosovo was 95

percent ethnic Kosovar Albanian, Saakashvili noted that 500,000
ethnic Georgians had been forced out of Abkhazia. He asked how the
USG and others would respond to possible Russian parallel demands
for an international presence aimed at postponing until some point in
the future a decision on independence for Abkhazia. He urged Burns
to reject such arguments out of hand, given that the Russians were
responsible for the war in Abkhazia and that this was a merely a
stratagem to re-absorb their lost empire piece by piece. They had
recovered Chechnya and would like to recover Georgia; failing success
on the latter, they would take Abkhazia.

RUSSIAN DESIGNS ON ABKHAZIA

---------------------------

9. (C) Wisner responded that breaking off Abkhazia would call into
question the consensual break-up of the former Soviet Union. He
urged Tbilisi not to make the same mistake as Belgrade had in
refusing to engage, and encouraged the Georgians to have informal
contacts with the Abkhaz. Saakashvili responded that the Abkhaz were
refusing contact with the GOG, were fully under the control of the
Russian FSB, and were already effectively isolated. Georgia's best hope
was to develop economically and internationally in a way to show the
Abkhaz that they would be better off associating themselves with
Georgia rather than the Russians. For the moment, however, Georgia
had little leverage. He noted ominously that Putin had once spoken of
a possible negotiated solution to Abkhazia, but no longer mentioned it
as a possibility.

10. (C) Saakashvili asserted that Putin had originally bet on regime
change in Georgia, but that this had failed. His current plan was
therefore to use Abkhazia to destroy Georgia. This also served Russia's
broader interest in interrupting any alternative energy corridors in the
Caucasus. Saakashvili indicated, in contrast to Abkhazia, that the
Russians had given up playing the South Ossetia card against Georgia.
Putin had told him that he did not care about South Ossetia, so long as
Georgia avoided bloodshed and solved the problem quietly. The
downside was that this left Abkhazia as Russia's last bargaining chip.

U.S. SUPPORT AND NATO MAP

-------------------------

11. (C) Commenting that Putin viewed the U.S. as his main

PARIS 00002725 003 OF 004

competitor and surmising that Putin wanted his legacy to be one of

toughness, Saakashvili said only blunt language from the U.S. could
force Putin to modify his "reckless" behavior and realize what was at
stake for Russia. He saw a need for two specific "deterrents" in dealing
with Russia: 1) the U.S., supported by the Europeans, should on a
regular, perhaps monthly basis, warn the Russians against recognizing
Abkhazia; and 2) the Russians needed to be told that Russia stood to
lose more in any destabilization of the former Soviet space than
others. With respect to NATO, Saakashvili stressed that Georgia viewed
the conclusion of a Membership Action Plan (MAP) as less a promise
for early membership than a key deterrent against Russian
adventurism.
12. (C) Burns noted that the issue of when precisely to offer MAP to
Georgia was complicated. It would be difficult to ask the Europeans to
agree on MAP at the same time they were managing the Kosovo
problem. If Kosovo could be put to bed in the early fall, then the
December NATO ministerial or following April NATO Summit might be
used to push forward on MAP. He advised the Georgians to work
quietly and to build more support among European nations through
reforms designed to show that Georgia was ready for MAP. Although
the U.S. approach viewed the process strategically, the Germans and
French were hesitant and afraid to irk Russia.

13. (C) Saakashvili worried that if a decision were postponed until the
Bucharest Summit, Allies might be reluctant to displease the recently
elected new Russian president. He thought that Secretary Rice would
need to make a personal push on Georgia's behalf in European
capitals. Burns reminded Saakashvili that the Bucharest Summit also
needed to take decisions on the Adriatic Three (Croatia, Albania, and
Macedonia), as well as on Ukraine. Burns stated that USG decisions on
timing for Georgia would depend on when we could succeed in lining
up support among key Allies Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the UK.
Saakashvili expressed the hope that there would be no crisis with
Russia in the fall, which he called a doomsday scenario. He noted
ominously that the Russians mentioned Cyprus a lot, suggesting the
possibility of a military adventure.

GEORGIAN REFORMS CAN HELP

-------------------------

14. (C) Burns reiterated the importance of reform in persuading

European Allies to support MAP for Georgia, highlighting judicial
reforms and free elections. Saakashvili responded that Georgia was
working on them and would succeed in achieving them. That said, he
predicted that the Europeans would then seek some new excuse to
deny Georgia its due.

MANAGING RUSSIA

---------------
15. (C) Burns asked Saakashvili for his views on Russia's CFE-related
Istanbul commitments. Without responding directly, Saakashvili said
Moldovan President Veronin had told him that he no longer expected
the Russians to do anything about Transnistria to resolve the problem,
and he would now approach the Europeans for more assistance.
Saakashvili nonetheless believed that Russia could eventually be
brought to deal on Moldova, as with South Ossetia, if not Abkhazia.
Putin was emotionally attached to Sochi and viewed Abkhazia's
location as strategic; it had a deep sea port and 900 million barrels of
oil on shore, with untold quantities potentially available offshore. The
only thing still holding Putin back from recognizing Abkhazia was his
fear of the United States, not the Europeans. The USG needed to be
tough with Putin, and would need to neutralize European
accommodationist tendencies vis-a-vis Russia. Burns responded that
sentiment in the Congress was negative toward Russia, but that the
President was attempting to strike a balance, cooperating with Russia
on counter-terrorism and non-proliferation while criticizing it for lack
of press and other freedoms, and for its recent harassment of Estonia.

GEORGIA NOT PROVOKING RUSSIA

----------------------------

16. (C) Burns suggested it was also important that Russia not be able
to cite perceived Georgian provocations as grounds for its actions.
Saakashvili assured him that Georgia knew how to be patient, citing
the quiet Georgian reaction to a recent unidentified attack on Georgian
territory most likely perpetrated by Russian forces. Saying that "time
works for us, but we should also be given time,"

PARIS 00002725 004 OF 004

he assured Burns that Georgia's preference was for reformers rather

than generals, and that even the Russians were fascinated by the pace
and breadth of Georgian reforms. Unfortunately, the Russian goal was
to kill reforms -- for themselves and others. In a brief discussion of
Estonia, Saakashvili commented that Estonian leaders had appeared to
be panicking under the pressure. Georgia had seen worse, he added,
but would succeed in remaining calm only to a point.
STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF ABKHAZIA, BLACK SEA

-------------------------------------------

17. (C) Saakashvili stressed the strategic importance of Abkhazia to

Georgia, noting that re-integration of the province had the potential to
triple the Georgian economy. The loss of Abkhazia, by contrast, would
destroy the backbone of Georgia. Ascribing to Russia a Black Sea
strategy, he expressed concern that the USG was underestimating the
importance of the Black Sea. Burns agreed that Allies had thus far
shown insufficient interest in the region, but that that this was one of
the reasons NATO had chosen Bucharest for its 2008 summit.
Saakashvili commented that the Turks in particular had wanted to keep
NATO out and preserve their own influence, and opined that a greater
Western political and military presence in the Black Sea region would
deter Russia and bolster Georgia and Ukraine. By contrast, a Turkish
incursion into Iraq would only encourage the Russians to follow that
example. Burns informed Saakashvili of USG efforts to counter the PKK
problem in northern Iraq, Turkey, and elsewhere.

MEETING WITH SARKOZY

--------------------

18. (C) Saakashvili concluded the meeting with a request for advice in
dealing with President Sarkozy. Ambassador Stapleton and Wisner
described Sarkozy as a plain speaker who should be engaged directly
and bluntly. They also noted his skepticism about Russian intentions.
They welcomed Saakashvili's decision to meet with him so early in his
Administration, as he would likely prove to be a key, perhaps even the
dominant, European leader. Burns encouraged Saakashvili to brief
Sarkozy on his assessments of Turkey and Russia. Saakashvili agreed
that Sarkozy's decision to meet with him was an important gesture.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:

http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

STAPLETON