Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989

VICTORIA BRINGAS PEREIRA, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS and RITA PEREIRA NAGAC, Respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies intestate without
leaving any debts? May the probate court appoint the surviving sister of the deceased as the
administratrix of the estate of the deceased instead of the surviving spouse? These are the main
questions which need to be resolved in this case. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed away on January 3,
1983 at Bacoor, Cavite without a will. He was survived by his legitimate spouse of ten months,
the herein petitioner Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein
private respondent. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On March 1, 1983, private respondent instituted before Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of
Bacoor, Cavite, Special Proceeding No. RTC-BSP-83-4 for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira. 1
In her verified petition, private respondent alleged the following: that she and Victoria Bringas
Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the deceased; that the deceased left no will; that there are
no creditors of the deceased; that the deceased left several properties, namely: death benefits
from the Philippine Air Lines (PAL), the PAL Employees Association (PALEA), the PAL
Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA) and the Social Security System
(SSS), as well as savings deposits with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), and a 300 square meter lot located at Barangay
Pamplona, Las Pinas, Rizal and finally, that the spouse of the deceased (herein petitioner) had
been working in London as an auxiliary nurse and as such one-half of her salary forms part of the
estate of the deceased. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On March 23,1983, petitioner filed her opposition and motion to dismiss the petition of private
respondent 2 alleging that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration
and praying in the alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters of administration relating to
the said estate be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In its resolution dated March 28, 1985, the Regional Trial Court, appointed private respondent
Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira upon a
bond posted by her in the amount of Pl,000.00. The trial court ordered her to take custody of all
the real and personal properties of the deceased and to file an inventory thereof within three
months after receipt of the order. 3 chanrobles virtual law library

Not satisfied with the resolution of the lower court, petitioner brought the case to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the appointment of private respondent as administratrix in
its decision dated December 15, 1987. 4 chanrobles virtual law library

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner raises the following issues: (1)
Whether or not there exists an estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes of
administration; (2) Whether or not a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where there
are no debts left by the decedent; and, (3) Who has the better right to be appointed as
administratrix of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira or the
surviving sister Rita Pereira Nagac? chanrobles virtual law library

Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes
of administration for the following reasons: firstly, the death benefits from PAL, PALEA,
PESALA and the SSS belong exclusively to her, being the sole beneficiary and in support of this
claim she submitted letter-replies from these institutions showing that she is the exclusive
beneficiary of said death benefits; secondly, the savings deposits in the name of her deceased
husband with the PNB and the PCIB had been used to defray the funeral expenses as supported
by several receipts; and, finally, the only real property of the deceased has been extrajudicially
settled between the petitioner and the private respondent as the only surviving heirs of the
deceased. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that it is not for petitioner to decide what properties
form part of the estate of the deceased and to appropriate them for herself. She points out that
this function is vested in the court in charge of the intestate proceedings. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner asks this Court to declare that the properties specified do not belong to the estate of the
deceased on the basis of her bare allegations as aforestated and a handful of documents.
Inasmuch as this Court is not a trier of facts, We cannot order an unqualified and final exclusion
or non-exclusion of the property involved from the estate of the deceased. 5 chanrobles virtual law library

The resolution of this issue is better left to the probate court before which the administration
proceedings are pending. The trial court is in the best position to receive evidence on the
discordant contentions of the parties as to the assets of the decedent's estate, the valuations
thereof and the rights of the transferees of some of the assets, if any. 6 The function of resolving
whether or not a certain property should be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate court.
However, the court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject
to the final decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the parties. 7 chanrobles virtual law library

Assuming, however, that there exist assets of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for
purposes of administration, We nonetheless find the administration proceedings instituted by
private respondent to be unnecessary as contended by petitioner for the reasons herein below
discussed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially
administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the
order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had
left one, should he fail to name an executor therein. 8 An exception to this rule is established
in Section 1 of Rule 74. 9 Under this exception, when all the heirs are of lawful age and
there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property
without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an
administrator. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the heirs from
instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do
not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows
the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary
action for partition, the said provision does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons
to take a different course of action. 10 It should be noted that recourse to an administration
proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for
not resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court,
the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and
compelling reasons. 11 chanrobles virtual law library

Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations
to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a
judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of
an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial
administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary
proceedings . 12 chanrobles virtual law library

Now, what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of the estate of a
deceased when the heirs are all of legal age and there are no creditors will depend on the
circumstances of each case. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In one case, 13 We said:

Again the petitioner argues that only when the heirs do not have any dispute as to
the bulk of the hereditary estate but only in the manner of partition does section 1,
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court apply and that in this case the parties are at
loggerheads as to the corpus of the hereditary estate because respondents
succeeded in sequestering some assets of the intestate. The argument is
unconvincing, because, as the respondent judge has indicated, questions as to
what property belonged to the deceased (and therefore to the heirs) may properly
be ventilated in the partition proceedings, especially where such property is in the
hands of one heir.
In another case, We held that if the reason for seeking an appointment as administrator is merely
to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking such appointment wants to ask for the
annulment of certain transfers of property, that same objective could be achieved in an action for
partition and the trial court is not justified in issuing letters of administration. 14 In still another
case, We did not find so powerful a reason the argument that the appointment of the husband, a
usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife, as judicial administrator is necessary in order for
him to have legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings of his wife's deceased mother,
since he may just adduce proof of his being a forced heir in the intestate proceedings of the latter.
15
chanrobles virtual law library

We see no reason not to apply this doctrine to the case at bar. There are only two surviving heirs,
a wife of ten months and a sister, both of age. The parties admit that there are no debts of the
deceased to be paid. What is at once apparent is that these two heirs are not in good terms. The
only conceivable reason why private respondent seeks appointment as administratrix is for her to
obtain possession of the alleged properties of the deceased for her own purposes, since these
properties are presently in the hands of petitioner who supposedly disposed of them
fraudulently. We are of the opinion that this is not a compelling reason which will necessitate a
judicial administration of the estate of the deceased. To subject the estate of Andres de Guzman
Pereira, which does not appear to be substantial especially since the only real property left has
been extrajudicially settled, to an administration proceeding for no useful purpose would only
unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being wasted or squandered. In most instances of a similar
nature, 16 the claims of both parties as to the properties left by the deceased may be properly
ventilated in simple partition proceedings where the creditors, should there be any, are protected
in any event. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We, therefore, hold that the court below before which the administration proceedings are
pending was not justified in issuing letters of administration, there being no good reason for
burdening the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira with the costs and expenses of
an administration proceeding. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

With the foregoing ruling, it is unnecessary for us to delve into the issue of who, as between the
surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira and the sister Rita Pereira Nagac, should be preferred
to be appointed as administratrix. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the letters of administration issued by the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor to Rita
Pereira Nagac are hereby revoked and the administration proceeding dismissed without prejudice
to the right of private respondent to commence a new action for partition of the property left by
Andres de Guzman Pereira. No costs. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., .

 
Endnotes:
1 Page 27, Rollo. chanrobles virtual law library

2 Page 29, Supra. chanrobles virtual law library

3 Page 3, Rollo. chanrobles virtual law library

4 Page 33, Supra. chanrobles virtual law library

5 Ortega v. Court of Appeals (1987). chanrobles virtual law library

6 Sebial v. Sebial, 64 SCRA 385 (1975). chanrobles virtual law library

7 Ortega v. Court of Appeals, Supra; Valera v. Inserts, 149 SCRA

553 (1987); Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, 91 SCRA 540 (1979); Cuizon v. Remolete; 129 SCRA 495 (1984); Lachenal
v. Salas, 71 SCRA 262 (1976); Coca v. Borromeo, 81 SCRA 278 (1978); Garcia v. Garcia, 67 Phil. 353 (1939); Guinguin v.
Abuton, 48 Phil 144 (1925). chanrobles virtual law library

8 Utulo v. Pasion vda. de Garcia, 66 Phil. 303 (1938). chanrobles virtual law library

9 Section 1. Extra-judicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of
age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without
securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the
office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. ..." 10

10 Rodriguez, et al. v. Tan, etc. and Rodriguez, 92 Phil. 273 (1952). chanrobles virtual law library

11 Intestate Estate of Mercado v. Magtibay, 96 Phil, 383 (1953) citing Monserrat v. lbanez, G.R No. L-3369, May 24,1950. chanrobles virtual law library

12 Utulo v. Pasion de Garcia, supra; Fule v. Fule, 46 Phil. 317 (1924); Baldemor v. Malangyaon, 34 Phil. 367 (1916); Bondad v.
Bondad, 34 Phil. 232 (1916); Malafasan v. Ignacio; 19 Phil. 434 (1911); Ilustre v. Alaras Frondora; 17 Phil. 321 (1910). In Orozco
vs. Garcia, 50 Phil 149, it was held that there is nothing in Section 1, Rule 74 which prohibits the heirs from instituting special
proceeding for the administration of the intestate estate, if they cannot agree in the extrajudicial partition and apportionment of the
same. Utulo v. Pasion Vda. de Garcia, Supra reaffirmed the doctrine laid down in the cases previous to Orozco. chanrobles virtual law library

13 Monserrat v. Ibanez, Supra cited in Intestate Estate of Mercado v. Magtibay, Supra. chanrobles virtual law library

14 Intestate Estate of Mercado v. Magtibay, supra. chanrobles virtual law library

15 Utulo v. Pasion vda. de Garcia, supra. chanrobles virtual law library

16 Intestate Estate of Mercado v. Magtibay, supra.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-21993     June 21, 1966

ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL. Petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN DE BORJA, as
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III,
ANATOLIA PANGILINAN and ADELAIDA JACALAN, Respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.: chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioners Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio, surnamed Rodriguez, petition this Court for a writ of
certiorari and prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, for its refusal to grant their motion
to dismiss its Special Proceeding No. 1331, which said Court is alleged to have taken cognizance of
without jurisdiction.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The facts and issues are succinctly narrated in the order of the respondent court, dated June 13, 1963
(Petition, Annex 0), in this wise:

It is alleged in the motion to dismiss filed by Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio Rodriguez,
through counsel, that this Court "has no jurisdiction to try the above-entitled case in view of
the pendency of another action for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Rev. Fr.
Celestino Rodriguez in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, namely, Sp. Proceedings No. 3907
entitled 'In the matter of the Intestate Estate of the deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez
which was filed ahead of the instant case". chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The records show that Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963 in the City of Manila;
that on March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of
Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez; that on March 8, 1963,
Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, through counsel filed a petition for leave of court to
allow them to examine the alleged will; that on March 11, 1963 before the Court could act on
the petition, the same was withdrawn; that on March 12, 1963, aforementioned petitioners
filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate
estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of
Para�aque, Rizal, and died without leaving a will and praying that Maria Rodriguez be
appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate; and that on March 12, 1963 Apolonia
Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this Court for the probation of the will
delivered by them on March 4, 1963. It was stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was
born in Para�aque, Rizal; that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy,
Bulacan, from the year 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963; that he was buried in
Para�aque, and that he left real properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed in the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate, citing as authority in support thereof the case
of Ongsingco Vda. de Borja vs. Tan and De Borja, G.R. No. 7792, July 27, 1955. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take the stand that the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by them of the will
 to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963, and that the case in this Court therefore has
precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963.

The Court of First Instance, as previously stated denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that a
difference of a few hours did not entitle one proceeding to preference over the other; that, as early as
March 7, movants were aware of the existence of the purported will of Father Rodriguez, deposited in
the Court of Bulacan, since they filed a petition to examine the same, and that movants clearly filed
the intestate proceedings in Rizal "for no other purpose than to prevent this Court (of Bulacan) from
exercising jurisdiction over the probate proceedings". Reconsideration having been denied, movants,
now petitioners, came to this Court, relying principally on Rule 73, section 1 of the Rules of Court, and
invoking our ruling in Ongsingco vs. Tan and De Borja, L-7792, July 27, 1955.

SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. - If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any province which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, as far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a
suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want
of jurisdiction appears on the record.

We find this recourse to be untenable. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963,
even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the
court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued
the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised
Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 77, of the old Rules):

SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be published. - When a will is
delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the Court having jurisdiction,
such Court shall fix a time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to
contest the allowance thereof, and shall cause znotice of such time and place to be published
three (3) weeks successively, previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for probate has been filed by
the testator himself.

The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition for the allowance of a
will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent's
testament, even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made
after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was
delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan
on March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only
on March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is
incontestable. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

But, petitioners object, section 3 of revised Rule 76 (old Rule 77) speaks of a will being delivered to
"the Court having jurisdiction," and in the case at bar the Bulacan court did not have it because the
decedent was domiciled in Rizal province. We can not disregard Fr. Rodriguez's 33 years of residence
as parish priest in Hagonoy, Bulacan (1930-1963); but even if we do so, and consider that he retained
throughout some animus revertendi to the place of his birth in Para�aque, Rizal, that detail would
not imply that the Bulacan court lacked jurisdiction. As ruled in previous decisions, the power to
settle decedents' estates is conferred by law upon all courts of first instance, and the
domicile of the testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court (In re Kaw
Singco, 74 Phil. 239; Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484; Bernabe vs. Vergara, 73 Phil. 676). Neither party
denies that the late Fr. Rodriguez is deceased, or that he left personal property in Hagonoy, province
of Bulacan (t.s.n. p. 46, hearing of June 11, 1963, Annex "H", Petition, Rec., p. 48). That is sufficient
in the case before us. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the Kaw Singco case (ante) this Court ruled that:

"... If we consider such question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court
over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole proceedings including all decisions
on the different incidents which have arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same
case will have to be commenced anew before another court of the same rank in another
province. That this is of mischievous effect in the prompt administration of justice is too
obvious to require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206, December
31, 1942). Furthermore, section 600 of Act No. 190, providing that the estate of a deceased
person shall be settled in the province where he had last resided, could not have been
intended as defining the jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject matter, because
such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters,
and, as we have said time and again, procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over the
subject matter is another. (Attorney General vs. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.)
The law of jurisdiction - Act No. 136, Section 56, No. 5 - confers upon Courts of First Instance
jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. 1
Since, however, there are many Courts of First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of
Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be
brought. Thus, the place of residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction
over the subject matter but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new
Rules of Court the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly
called "venue" (Rule 75, section 1.) Motion for reconsideration is denied.

The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance ahead of any
other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a
case of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court, since the
same enjoins that:

The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. (Sec. 1)

This disposition presupposes that two or more courts have been asked to take cognizance
of the settlement of the estate. Of them only one could be of proper venue, yet the rule
grants precedence to that Court whose jurisdiction is first invoked, without taking venue
into account. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

There are two other reasons that militate against the success of petitioners. One is that their
commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of the delivery of the decedent's will to
the Court of Bulacan, was in bad faith, patently done with a view to divesting the latter court of the
precedence awarded it by the Rules. Certainly the order of priority established in Rule 73 (old Rule 75)
was not designed to convert the settlement of decedent's estates into a race between applicants, with
the administration of the properties as the price for the fleetest. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The other reason is that, in our system of civil law, intestate succession is only subsidiary or
subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will.
Says Article 960 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

ART. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place: chanrobles virtual law library

(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently lost its
validity; chanrobles virtual law library
 (2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the property belonging to the
testator. In such case, legal succession shall take place only with respect to the property in
which the testator has not disposed; chanrobles virtual law library

(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir does not happen or is not
fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator, or repudiates the inheritance, there being no
substitution, and no right of accretion takes place; chanrobles virtual law library

(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in cases provided in this Code.

Therefore, as ruled in Castro, et al. vs. Martinez, 10 Phil. 307, "only after final decision as to the
nullity of testate succession could an intestate succession be instituted in the form of pre-established
action". The institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may not thus proceed while the probate of the
purported will of Father Rodriguez is pending. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We rule that the Bulacan Court of First Instance was entitled to priority in the settlement of the estate
in question, and that in refusing to dismiss the probate. proceedings, said court did not commit any
abuse of discretion. It is the proceedings in the Rizal Court that should be discontinued. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Wherefore, the writ of certiorari applied for is denied. Costs against petitioners Rodriguez.

Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1
Now section 44, subpar. (e) of the Judiciary Actz (R.A. No. 296).
q

2
43
 
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-8409.  December 28, 1956.]
In the Matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio. EUGENIO EUSEBIO,
Petitioner-Appellee, vs. AMAND65A EUSEBIO, VIRGINIA EUSEBIO, JUAN EUSEBIO, DELFIN
EUSEBIO, VICENTE EUSEBIO, and CARLOS EUSEBIO, Oppositor-Appellant.
 
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J.:
This case was instituted on November 16, 1953, when Eugenio Eusebio filed with the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of his
father, Andres Eusebio, who died on November 28, 1952, residing, according to said petition,
in the City of Quezon. On December 4, 1953, Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and
Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio, objected to said petition, stating that they are illegitimate
children of the deceased and that the latter was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, and
praying, therefore, that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue had been
improperly filed. By an order, dated March 10, 1954, said court overruled this objection and
granted said petition. Hence, the case is before us on appeal taken, from said order, by
Amanda Eusebio, and her aforementioned sister and brothers.
The appeal hinges on the situs of the residence of Andres Eusebio on November 28, 1952, for
Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court, provides:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the

Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested
in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record.”
It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio was, and had always
been, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, where he had his home, as well as some other
properties. Inasmuch as his heart was in bad condition and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who
treated him, resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City, on October 29, 1952, Andres
Eusebio bought a house and lot at 889-A España Extension, in said City (Exhibits 2). While
transferring his belongings to this house, soon thereafter, the decedent suffered a stroke
(probably heart failure), for which reason Dr. Eusebio took him to his (Dr. Eusebio’s)
aforementioned residence, where the decedent remained until he was brought to the UST
Hospital, in the City of Manila, sometime before November 26, 1952. On this date, he
contracted marriage in articulo mortis with his common law wife, Concepcion Villanueva, in
said hospital. Two (2) days later, he died therein of “acute left ventricular failure secondary
to hypertensive heart disease”, at the age of seventy-four (74) years (Exhibit A).
Consequently, he never stayed or even slept in said house at España Extension.
It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of the decedent was San
Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy (70) years, the presumption is that
he retained such domicile, and, hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the
contrary, for it is well-settled that “a domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile
is gained” (Minor, Conflict of Laws, p. 70; Restatement of the Law on Conflict of Laws, p. chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

47; In re Estate of Johnson, 192 Iowa, 78). Under the circumstances surrounding the case
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

at bar, if Andres Eusebio established another domicile, it must have been one of choice, for
which the following conditions are essential, namely: (1) capacity to choose and freedom chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

of choice; (2) physical presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

permanently (Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp. 109-110; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, p. 169; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary chan

Velilla vs. Posadas, 62 Phil., 624;

roblesvirtua lawlibrary Zuellig vs. Republic of the Philippines, 46 Off. Gaz.
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

Suppl. No. 11, p. 220). Admittedly, the decedent was juridically capable of choosing a
domicile and had been in Quezon City several days prior to his demise. Thus, the issue
narrows down to whether he intended to stay in that place permanently.
There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the decedent appear to have
manifested his wish to live indefinitely in said city. His son, Petitioner-Appellee, who took the
witness stand, did not testify thereon, despite the allegation, in his answer to the
aforemention, opposition of Appellants herein, that “the deceased (had) decided to reside  cralaw

for the rest of his life, in Quezon City”. Moreover, said Appellee did not introduce the
testimony of his legitimate full brother and son of the decedent, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, upon
whose advice, presumably, the house and lot at No. 889-A España Extension was purchased,
and who, therefore, might have cast some light on his (decedent’s) purpose in buying said
property. This notwithstanding, the lower court held that the decedent’s intent to stay
permanently in Quezon City is “manifest” from the acquisition of said property and the
transfer of his belongings thereto. This conclusion is untenable.
The aforementioned house and lot were bought by the decedent because he had been
adviced to do so “due to his illness”, in the very words of herein Appellee. It is not
improbable — in fact, its is very likely — that said advice was given and followed in order
that the patient could be near his doctor and have a more effective treatment. It is well
settled that “domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one’s
own health”, even if coupled with “knowledge that one will never again be able, on
account of illness, to return home.” (The Conflict of Laws, by Beale, Vol. I, pp. 172-173; chan

see, also, Shenton vs. Abbott, Md., 15., A. 2d. 906; U.S. vs. Knight, D.C. Mont., 291 Fed.
roblesvirtua lawlibrary chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

129).
Again, the decedent did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga.
Moreover, some of his children, who used to live with him in San Fernando, Pampanga,
remained in that municipality. Then, again, in the deed Exhibit 2, by virtue of which said
property at No. 889-A España Extension, Quezon City, was conveyed to him, on October 29,
1952, or less than a month before his death, the decedent gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as
his residence. Similarly, the “A” and “B” residence certificates used by the decedent in
acknowledging said Exhibit 2, before a notary public, was issued in San Fernando, Pampanga.
Lastly, the marriage contract Exhibit 1, signed by the deceased when he was married, in
articulo mortis, to Concepcion Villanueva, at the UST Hospital, on November 26, 1952, or two
(2) days prior to his demise, stated that his residence is San Fernando, Pampanga. It is
worthy of notice that Alfonso Eusebio, one of the legitimate full brothers of the herein
Appellee, was a witness to said wedding, thus indicating that the children of the deceased by
his first marriage, including said Appellee, were represented on that occasion and would
have objected to said statement about his residence, if it were false. Consequently, apart
from Appellee’s failure to prove satisfactorily that the decedent had decided to establish his
home in Quezon City, the acts of the latter, shortly and immediately before his death, prove
the contrary. At any rate, the presumption in favor of the retention of the old domicile 1 —
which is particularly strong when the domicile is one of the origin 2 as San Fernando,
Pampanga, evidently was, as regards said decedent — has not been offset by the evidence of
record.
The lower court, however, rejected said Exhibits 1 and 2, upon being offered in evidence,
and refused to entertain the same in the order appealed from. The reasons therefor are
deducible from its resolution in rejecting said documents during the hearing of the incident
at bar. The court then held:chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“Exhibits ‘1’ and ‘2’ are rejected but the same may be attached to the records for whatever
action Oppositors may want to take later on because until now the personality of the
Oppositors has not been established whether or not they have a right to intervene in this
case, and the Court cannot pass upon this question as the Oppositors refuse to submit to the
jurisdiction of this Court and they maintain that these proceedings should be dismissed. (P.
10, t. s. n.)
In short, the lower court believed that said documents should not be admitted in evidence
before Appellants had established their “personality” to intervene in the case, referring
seemingly to their filiation. When Appellants, however, sought, during said hearing, to
establish their relation with the deceased, as his alleged illegitimate children, His Honor, the
trial Judge sustained Appellee’s objection thereto stating: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of this Court, and it seems that you are
now trying to prove the status of your client; you are leading to that. The main point here
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

is your contention that the deceased was never a resident of Quezon City and that is why I
allowed you to cross-examine. If yon are trying to establish the status of the Oppositors, I will
sustain the objection, unless you want to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court. This is not
yet the time to declare who are the persons who should inherit.” p. 1, t. s. n.)
Thus, the lower court refused to consider Appellant’s evidence on the domicile of the
decedent, because of their alleged lack of “personality”, but, when they tried to establish
such “personality”, they were barred from doing so on account of the question of venue
raised by them. We find ourselves unable to sanction either the foregoing procedure
adopted by the lower court or the inferences it drew from the circumstances surrounding
the case.
To begin with, His Honor, the trial Judge had taken inconsistent positions. While, on the one
hand, he declared that Appellants could not be permitted to introduce evidence on the
residence of the decedent, for they contested the jurisdiction of court, on the other hand, he
held, in the order appealed from, that, by cross-examining the Appellee, said Appellants had
submitted themselves to the authority of the court.
What is more, this conclusion is refuted by the record. At the beginning of the hearing, in the
lower court, Appellants’ counsel announced that he would take part therein “only to
question the jurisdiction, for the purpose of dismissing this proceeding,” (p. 2, t. s. n.). During
the cross-examination of Petitioner herein, said counsel tried to elicit the relation between
the decedent and the Appellants. As, the Appellee objected thereto, the court said,
addressing Appellants’ counsel: “Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of the
chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

court . If you are trying to establish the status of the Oppositors, I will sustain the objection,
 cralaw

unless you want to submit to the jurisdiction of the court” (p. 7, t. s. n.). Thereupon,
Appellants’ counsel refused to do so, stating: “I will insist on my stand.” Then, too, at the chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

conclusion of the hearing, the court rejected Exhibits 1 and 2, for the reason that Appellants
“refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this court and they maintain that these proceedings
should be dismissed.” Thus, Appellants specifically made of record that they were not
submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, except for the purpose only of
assailing the same, and the court felt that Appellants were not giving up their stand, which
was, and is, a fact.
At any rate, Appellants were entitled to establish facts tending to prove, not only their right
to object to Appellee’s petition, but, also, that venue had been laid improperly. Such facts
were: (a) their alleged relationship with the decedent, 3 which, if true, entitle them to
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

proceed him under the Civil Code of the Philippines; and (b) his alleged residence is chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

Pampanga. In other words, the lower court should have admitted Exhibits 1 and 2 in
evidence and given thereto the proper effect, in connection with the issue under
consideration.
Appellee, however, asks: “What will happen if this case be dismissed in the Court of First
chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

Instance of Quezon City on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or improper venue?” In this
connection, it appears that on November 14, 1953, the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga received a petition of Appellants herein, dated November 4, 1953, for the
settlement of the “Intestate Estate of the late Don Andres Eusebio”. Attached to said petition
was another petition for the docketing thereof free of charge, pursuant to Rule 3, section 22,
of the Rules of Court. The latter petition was granted by an order dated November 16, 1953,
which was received by the cashier of said court on November 17, 1953, on which date the
case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 957. On December 14, 1953, Jesus, Eugenio,
Amando and Alfonso, all surnamed Eusebio (the children of the decedent by first marriage,
including Petitioner herein), moved for the dismissal of said proceedings, owing to the
pendency of the present case, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, since November 16,
1953. This motion was granted in an order dated December 21, 1953, relying upon the above
Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court, pursuant to which “the court first taking cognizance
of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts.”
Although said order is now final, it cannot affect the outcome of the case at bar. Said order
did not pass upon the question of domicile or residence of the decedent. Moreover, in
granting the court first taking cognizance of the case exclusive jurisdiction over the same,
said provision of the Rules of Court evidently refers to cases triable before two or more
courts with concurrent jurisdiction. It could not possibly have intended to deprive a
competent court of the authority vested therein by law, merely because a similar case had
been previously filed before a court to which jurisdiction is denied by law, for the same
would then be defeated by the will of one of the parties. More specifically, said provision
refers mainly to non- resident decedents who have properties in several provinces in the
Philippines, for the settlement of their respective estates may be undertaken before the
court of first instance of either one of said provinces, not only because said courts then have
concurrent jurisdiction — and, hence, the one first taking cognizance of the case shall
exclude the other courts — but, also, because the statement to, this effect in said section 1
of Rule 75 of the Rules of Court immediately follows the last part of the next preceding
sentence, which deals with non-resident decedents, whose estate may be settled before the
court of first instance of any province in which they have properties.
In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing that: chanroblesvirtua llawlibrary

“ The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
cralaw

decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceedings,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record.”
if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident are instituted in two or
more courts, and the question of venue is raised before the same, the court in which the first
case was filed shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide said issue, and we so held in the case
of Taciana Vda. de Borja vs. Tan, L-7792 (July 27, 1955). Should it be decided, in the
proceedings before the said court, that venue had been improperly laid, the case pending
therein should be dismissed and the corresponding proceedings may, thereafter, be initiated
in the proper court.
In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San
Fernando, Pampanga; that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no authority, therefore,
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to appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid
improperly; and that it should, accordingly, have sustained Appellants’ opposition and
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dismissed Appellee’s petition.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed and Appellee’s petition is dismissed,
with costs against the Appellee. It is SO ORDERED.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia and Felix,
JJ., concur.
 
Endnotes: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

  1.  “There is a presumption in favour of the continuance of an existing domicile. Therefore,

the burden of proving a change lies in all cases upon those who alleged that he change has
occurred. This presumption may have a decisive effect, for if the evidence is so conflicting
that it is impossible to elicit with certainty what the resident’s intention is, the Court, being
unable to reach a satisfactory conclusion one way or the other, will decide in favour of the
existing domicile.” (Private International Law by Cheshire, pp. 218-219.)
      “In the absence of any circumstances from which the courts may infer the animus, they
are accustomed to fall back on two legal presumptions, without which it would in some cases
be impossible to arrive at any conclusions as to a party’s domicile.
      “The first of these is the presumption that the party has retained the last domicile known
to have been possessed by him. This follows from the principle that a domicile once acquired
is retained until another is gained, and from the other principle growing out of it that the
burden of proof is on him who alleges a change of domicile.” (Conflict of Laws by Minor, p.
123.).
  2.  “It is often said, particularly in the English cases, that there is a stronger presumption
against change from a domicile of origin than there is against other changes of domicile.
‘Domicile of origin differs from domicile of choice mainly in this — that is character is more
  cralaw

enduring, its hold stronger, and less easily shaken off.’ The English view was forcibly
expressed in a Pennsylvania case in which Lewis, J., said: ‘The attachment which every one
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feels for his native land is the foundation of the rule that the domicile of origin is presumed to
continue until it is actually changed by acquiring a domicile elsewhere. No temporary sojourn
in a foreign country will work this change.’ In a federal case in Pennsylvania the same point
was emphasized.” (The Conflict of Laws, by Beale, Vol. I, p. 129.)
  3.  Which has not been categorically denied, Appellee’s counsel having limited themselves
to alleging, in an unsworn pleading, that they have no knowledge sufficient to form a belief
on said claim of the Appellants.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge,

Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch Vl, Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, Respondents.

G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAÑO, Presiding

Judge of Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B.
GARCIA, respondents.

MARTIN, J.: chanrobles virtual law library

These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word "resides" in Section
1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring to the situs of the settlement of the
estate of deceased persons, means. Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special
administrator is sought to be reviewed. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at
Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of administration,
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G.
Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving
real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even date, May 2,
1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973, contending
that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was issued without
jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of administration has been served
upon all persons interested in the estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in the
proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the surviving spouse of
Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix;
and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia,
therefore, prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of
Virginia G. Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court, Preciosa B.
Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix
alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for reconsideration of May
8, 1973 that her appointment was obtained through erroneous, misleading and/or
incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has adverse interest against the
estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration filed by
Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was published on
May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation in
Southern Luzon. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the

Appointment of Regular Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental
petition modified the original petition in four aspects: (1) the allegation that during the
lifetime of the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional Delegate for the
First District of Laguna and his last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the
deletion of the names of Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G.
Garcia; (3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the
original petition, is the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she has expressly
renounced her preferential right to the administration of the estate in favor of Virginia G.
Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the regular administratrix. The
admission of this supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for the reason,
among others, that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, of which the court was not possessed at the beginning because the original petition
was deficient. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and supplemental
petitions for letters of administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of
interest of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of
Virginia G Fule as special administratrix. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973, praying for authority
to take possession of properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of third persons as
well as to secure cash advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion, calling attention to the limitation
made by Judge Malvar on the power of the special administratrix, viz., "to making an
inventory of the personal and real properties making up the state of the deceased." chanrobles virtual law library

However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order, received by Preciosa
B. Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the
order of May 2, 1973, appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting
the supplementation petition of May 18,1973. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1)
jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest has not been acquired by the
court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as
she is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to substitute

Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, reasoning that the said Virginia G. Fule
admitted before before the court that she is a full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an
illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom the deceased Amado G. Garcia has no
relation.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one, to enjoin the
special administratrix from taking possession of properties in the hands of third persons
which have not been determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the
special administratrix for acting outside her authority and against the interest of the estate;
and still another, filed in behalf of the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for
want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of Virgina G.
Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss,
Judge Malvar ruled that the powers of the special administratrix are those provided for in
Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1 subject only to the previous qualification made
by the court that the administration of the properties subject of the marketing agreement
with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association should remain
with the latter; and that the special administratrix had already been authorized in a
previous order of August 20, 1973 to take custody and possession of all papers and
certificates of title and personal effects of the decedent with the Canlubang Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar
Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was ordered to deliver to Preciosa B.
Garcia all certificates of title in her name without any qualifying words like "married to
Amado Garcia" does not appear. Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled
that the issue of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973, denying
Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the appointment of Virginia G. Fule and
admitting the supplemental petition, the failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original
petition for letters of administration in the place of residence of the decedent at the time of
his death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections thereto by praying to be
appointed as special and regular administratrix of the estate. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973 to clarify or
reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view of previous court order limiting
the authority of the special administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa B.
Garcia also asked for the resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack of cause
of action, and also that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia. Resolution of her motions to
substitute and remove the special administratrix was likewise prayed for. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first, denying
Preciosa B. Garcia's motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix, and the
second, holding that the power allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct
and submit an inventory of the assets of the estate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the foregoing orders
of November 28, 1973 and December 19, 1973, insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on
the issues raised by her: (a) legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue;
(c) jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and removal of special administratrix; and
(e) delivery to the special administratrix of checks and papers and effects in the office of the
Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying Preciosa B.
Garcia's motion for reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar
issued the other three questioned orders: one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba
Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as
special administratrix, copy of the statement of accounts and final liquidation of sugar
pool, as well as to deliver to her the corresponding amount due the estate; another,
directing Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles presumably
belonging to the estate; and another, directing Ramon Mercado to deliver to the court all
certificates of title in his possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified
with the word "single" or "married to Amado Garcia." chanrobles virtual law library

During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Judge
Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that
his residence at the time of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia
presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three months
before his death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that
Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he
was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action
for certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge
Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in the
alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that court, viz., one dated March 27,
1974, denying their motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss
the criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue, among others, of jurisdiction, and the
three others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing the delivery of certain properties to the
special administratrix, Virginia G. Fule, and to the court. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings
before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Calamba,
Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule forthwith
elevated the matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. L-
40502.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of Appeals,
Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of
administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed
as Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On February
10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as special administratrix
of the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia
as special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and
assumed the office. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge Ericta of the
pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, and the annulment of the proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on January
30, 1975. She manifested, however, her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should
the decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the proceedings before the Court of First
Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become final, it being the subject of a
motion for reconsideration. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings before his
court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court of the final outcome of the case pending
before the Court of Appeals. This notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December
11, 1975, an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations." chanrobles virtual law library

On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question Venue
and Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in the previous special appearance of
March 3, 1975, and calling attention that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration had been appealed to this Court; that the
parties had already filed their respective briefs; and that the case is still pending before the
Court. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an
order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate
Obligations" in that the payments were for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a
cloud of doubt on the validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January 12,1976. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for
certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-
19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz Paño from further acting in the case. A
restraining order was issued on February 9, 1976. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-
42670 for the reasons and considerations hereinafter stated. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will
shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of
First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had
estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his
estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in
the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular
regard to letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court
demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction
to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as death,
the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets,
intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the right of the person who seeks administration,
as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and
his last residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent
proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an
inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction
is conferred on the court to grant letters of administration. 3 chanrobles virtual law library

The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so
far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate,"
is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of
Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It could not have been intended to define the
jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of
procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction
over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the subject
matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or
authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in
which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though
that if the power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural law,
purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. However,
this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that
the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby
be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this
provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to
do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a
matter of method, of convenience to the parties. 5 chanrobles virtual law library

The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction
over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Because of
the existence of numerous Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court,
however, purposedly fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. A
fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and
issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the
Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate of a deceased
person shall be settled as "venue." 6chanrobles virtual law library

2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to
the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the
doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms
"residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or
purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. 7 In the application of venue statutes
and rules - Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature - residence
rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same
meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. 9 Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. 10 No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 11 chanrobles virtual law library

3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the
residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her original petition
for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna,
Virginia G. Fule measely stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property
owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and
personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to satisfy the
jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of venue. For her, the quoted statement
avers no domicile or residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property
owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non
sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death
certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in other
papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel
Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia G. Fule
categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of residence was at Calamba,
Laguna." chanrobles virtual law library

On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was
at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A
death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his
death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence
by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of
residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the
deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death; the
Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971 turning over the
administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring part
of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and
certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents
that Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion
becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna.
Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver.
Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states: "When improper venue is not
objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case before Us the Court of
Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the
jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but
availed of a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving
spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the
proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special

administratrix is another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to the
appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay
in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal
from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator
to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the
delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment
of a special administrator was only proper when the allowance or disallowance of a will is
under appeal. The new Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment and such
appointment is now allowed when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or
administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree among themselves. 14 Nevertheless,
the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate court. 15 That,
however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and
dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that discretion must
be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the same
fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should
not be taken into account in the appointment of a special administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong
for the judge to consider the order of preference in the appointment of a regular
administrator in appointing a special administrator. After all, the consideration that
overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of
the decedent. 17 Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion
of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For
such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate
correctly than any other next of kin. The good or bad administration of a property may
affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of a property. 18 chanrobles virtual law library

Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of the late
Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that Virginia G. Fule
has no relation whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister
of the latter, incapable of any successional rights. 19 On this point, We rule that Preciosa B.
Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix. It needs be
emphasized that in the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary and subsists
only until a regular administrator is appointed, 20 the appointing court does not determine
who are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to the
administration. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution,
and the findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be
the basis of distribution. 21 The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient reason. In
a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in
favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married to Preciosa B. Garcia.
22
In his certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention
for the First District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the name of
Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced with these documents and the presumption
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the
surviving spouse of the late Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. 24 chanrobles virtual law library

5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, 25
this Court under its supervisory authority over all inferior courts may properly decree that
venue in the instant case was properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon City and that
it is in the interest of justice and avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's
exercise of jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the deceased Amado G. Garcia
and the appointment of special administratrix over the latter's estate be approved and
authorized and the Court of First Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from continuing
with the case and instead be required to transfer all the records thereof to the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975, granting the
"Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by Preciosa B. Garcia in
Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R. No. L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang
Sugar Estate to deliver to her as special administratrix the sum of P48,874.70 for payment
of the sum of estate obligations is hereby upheld. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R.
No. L-40502 and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby denied, with costs against petitioner. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Muñoz Palma, J., took no part.

Endnotes:
* Court of Appeals, Special First Division, composed of JJ. Reyes, L.B., Gaviola, Jr. and De Castro. chanrobles virtual law library

1 Sec. 2. Powers and duties of special administrator. - Such special administrator shall take possession and charge of the
goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator
afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such
perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the
deceased unless so ordered by the court. chanrobles virtual law library

2 July 2, 1973, July 26, 1973, August 9, 1973, July 17, 1974, July 25, 1974, at 270-391, Rollo of No. L-40502. chanrobles virtual law library

3 Diez v. Serra, 51 Phil. 286 (1927). chanrobles virtual law library

4 See Malig v. Bush, L-22761, May 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 453-454. chanrobles virtual law library

5 Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General, 20 Phil. 530-32 (1911). chanrobles virtual law library

6 In re Kaw Singco. Sy Oa v. Co Ho, 74 Phil. 241-242 (1943); Rodriguez v. Borja, L-21993, June 21, 1966, 17 SCRA 442. chanrobles virtual law library

7 McGrath v. Stevenson, 77 P 2d 608; In re Jones, 19 A 2d 280. chanrobles virtual law library

8 See 92 C.J.S. 813-14; See also Cuenco v. Court of Appeals, L-24742, October 26,1973, 53 SCRA 377. chanrobles virtual law library

9 See 77 C.J.S. 286. chanrobles virtual law library

10 Kemp v. Kemp, 16 NYS 2d 34. chanrobles virtual law library

11 See 92 C.J.S. 816. chanrobles virtual law library

12 See Rules of Court, Francisco, Vol. V-B, 1970 Ed., at 32; Manzanero v. Bongon, 67 Phil. 602 (1939). chanrobles virtual law library

13 A special administrator is a representative of decedent, appointed by the probate court to care for and preserve his
estate until an executor or general administrator is appointed. (Jones v. Minnesota Transfer R. Co., 121 NW 606, cited in
Jacinto, Special Proceedings, 1965 ed., at 106. chanrobles virtual law library

14 See Proceedings of the Institute on the Revised Rules of Court, UP Law Center, 1963, at 99. chanrobles virtual law library

15 J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. De Guzman, 99 Phil. 281 (1956); Hon. Alcasid v. Samson, 102 Phil. 736 (1957). chanrobles virtual law library

16 Ozaeta v. Pecson, 93 Phil. 419-20 (1953). chanrobles virtual law library

17 Roxas v. Pecson, 92 Phil. 410 (1948). chanrobles virtual law library

18 Idem, at 411. chanrobles virtual law library

19 Article 992 of the Civil Code provides: An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child.
chanrobles virtual law library

20 Fernandez v. Maravilla, L-18799, March 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 597. chanrobles virtual law library

21 Ngo The Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, L-17091, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 113. chanrobles virtual law library

22 Vide, Rollo of No. L-40502, at 219, Annex "SS" to Petition for certiorari and/or Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction
by Preciosa B. Garcia in CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. chanrobles virtual law library

23 Vide, Rollo of No. L-40502, at 268; Annex 5 to Answer filed by Virginia G. Fule to petition of Preciosa B. Garcia in C.A.-
G.R. No. 03221-SP. chanrobles virtual law library

24 See Perido vs. Perido, L-28248, March 12, 1975, Makalintal, C.J. ponente, First Division, 63 SCRA 97. chanrobles virtual law library

25 53 SCRA 381.