TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS CAUGHT UP BY REALITY'

EKAVIATHANASSOPOULOU
University ofAthens and Hellenic Foundation
for European and Foreign Policy

I. THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP: BEYOND THF RHETORIC

Anyone familiar with the p<ist Second World War history of US-European
relations is aware lhat one of their constunl and persistcni characlcrisiics is their
frcqucnl unease, even confusion and division. The British-French 1956 aiKcn
ture over .Sue/, ihe 1^62 Cuban missile crisis and the 197.^ Arab-Israeli War
were major turning points in the iran.satlanlic relationship. They eonfirmed the
essential divergence of inlerests between Ihe allies and in varying degrees led
to a reappraisal of the alliance. The Atlantic relationship is currently at another
turning point as it experiences the challenge of whether il can renew itself against
the current stressful background with its plethora of disagreements and souring
relations belwccn the allies.
Many among those who think about the Atlantic relationship have suggested
dKTerent prescriptions as to how to bridge current divisions, re-vamp the partner-
ship and bring ihe Americans and the Europeans back togelher. Most of those
prescriptions share the belief that ihe Atlantic partnership can be rcinvigorated.
What the allies should do. some advise, is to rediseover the art of diplomacy, of
dialogue, mutual respect and tolerance. The transatlantic partners, others stress.
have to recognise the need for reasoning together and making mutual concessions
in order to overcome accumulated difficulties: the relationship could then mature
into a reconstructed, inore balanced partnership that accommodates differences
and is fit to address the challenges of the new international environment as well
as the interests of each side " The first problem with most of these prescriptions
is that they tend to propagate the Atlanticists' fiction that the Atlantic partnership
has been based on a sense of an integrated community of shared attitudes and
values that should be preserved. Yet, this was hardly the case other than in rhetoric.
There was never a true community of the Atlantic, about which the old Atlanticists
in America and Western Europe dreamed of. The intellectual orientations of the

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 Ekiivi Athanassopoulou

Europeans and ihc Americans were (and slill are) dissimilar. 'ITic political and
socio-economic systems, legacies and altitudes of Europe and the United Sialcs
were (and still are) different despite a number of common values and a certain
degree of "Americanisation" ol the urban culture in mosl western European coun-
tries since the sixties. Contrary to postwar America, where scx;ialism was totally
discredited and liberalism, anchored on the American free-enterpri.se system.
became the dominant ideology, contemporary Western European scKieiies were
characterised by deep social cleavajies resulting from strong competition between
the liberals and the left. Besides, while the US emerged after the war as a super
power with world responsibilities and concerns. Wesiern European countries were
inward Icxiking (with the exeeplion of Britain) l(Kked in their domestic and/or
European unity priorities since the late 1950s. In fact the admission of Turkey -
which post-war American political elites did not consider as a member of Western
civilisation' - into NATO in 1952 demonstrated that against Cold War pressures
Washington early on came lo view lhe transatlantic partnership more as a secu-
rity tool rather than an alliance based on a community of nations sharing similar
values. One of the tnain arguments of the Netherlands and NATO's Scandinavian
members against Turkey s membership was that it was contrary to the original
concept ofthe Alliance as an integrated community.'
The second problem witli such prescriptions is that they rest upon the idea that
there was a time when there was a genuinely cohesive .Atlantic partnership based
on eommon interests, while the serious eonlliets and disaeeords within the allianee
during the Cold War are either ignored, or downplayed. Hence the conclusion is
that through reasoning together and mutual concessions conflicts could be over-
come (while many reeent di.sagreements are seen more as a matter of style rather
than subslance). Yet. extended lissutes in the allianee go back more than thirty
years reflecting a consistent tension and serious limits on its cohesion (the natural
consequence of the divergence of interests between the US and tnost European
countries) that need to be appreeiated.
This tensitin was primarily the result of the inequality of power and deeision-
making between the U.S and Western Europe, the source of which was that Eurt)pe
as neither unified nor strong. The transatlantic relationship was built on the basis of
US dominanee rather than on partnership, something that eaused diseord between
the two sides of the Atlantic and among lhe Europeans. Washington refused to give
the Europeans a share of the nuelear deterrent and a voice over ils international
military and eeonomie policies even when they seriously affeeted its European
allies. In faet the United States often used tts dominant position in the allianee
to subordinate the interests of its European allies to its global security priori-
ties, without even eonsulting them. The comparison 1 uropean statesmen - but
also analysis ofAmerican foreign policy' - often tnako these days between the
p(5st-Cold War unilateral trends in American foreign policy and Washington's
multilateral policy in lhe aftermath of the Second World War idealises histt>ry.

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Unilateralism ha.s always run deep in US foreign policy, (It i.s worth remembering
thai the US Senate ratified lhe UN Charter because the United Slalcs would retain
its freedom of action through the veto power, which was given to each permanent
member of the Security Council), The US's post Second World War 'mullilat-
eralism" in reality meant building institutions and frameworks of co-operation,
designed to promote an intemational system framed in the interests of the US,
European allies were compelled to agree with these plans (though France in
particular repeatedly sought to challenge them), due to their economic as well
as security dependency on the US, NATO's first enlargement in 1952 to include
Turkey and Greece is a classic early example of American unilateral deiiancc
of its European allies. The United States brought the two countries into NATO
despite the strong objections of the British and of many smaller members of the
North Atlantic Treaty who complained that they had not even been adequately
informed, let alone consulted, about the issue.* Not only did unilateral Ameriean
policies cause irritation and indignation in European capitals but often seriously
jeopardi.sed the Europeans' security interests. The 1962 Washington-Moscou
confrontation over the Cuban missiles brought the two superpowers close to a
war which might easily have drawn in Europe, though this was an issue of no
vital interest to it. Yet. the Kennedy administration handled the crisis without any
consultation with its Eumpean allies. As the story goes, when former Secretary of
State Dean Acheson was sent to Paris to enlist President de Gaulle's support for
U.S actions in the crisis, the French President asked Aeheson whether he had come
to consult, or to infonn, to which a slightly embarrassed Acheson admitted that his
mission was to inform,^ In another example, as the 197.^ Arab-Israeli war unfolded
(during which the Nixon administration re-armed Israel) Washington placed its
military forces on a worldwide alert. This clearly demonstrated that the US (like
in fact the USSR) considered the conllict to be potentially more than a regional
issue. However, at no point did the Americans properly consult with the European
allies whose security was conceivably jeopardised as a result of Washington's
support for Israel,
Furthermore, the fa(,'ade of the Cold War alliance could not conceal that the
defence interests and strategic priorities of the United States and the Europeans
differed more often than not. This set limits to the cohesion of the alliance and
resulted in lack of political and military reliability between the allies. In the words
of Ronald Steel. 'The Atlantie alliance was built on a reality and marketed on an
illusion. The realily was that the United Stales could not let Western Europe fall
into Russian hands, and that the Europeans wanted American protection. The illu-
sion was that the alliance would lead to a true partnership of equals with virtually
identieal inicrcsts',** E,ssentially, Europe was afraid of being caught in the middle
of a eontiict between the iwo superpowers, as it was thought that most likely any
major pt)wer war (conventional or nuclear) would start and escalate on European
territory. The U,S for its part wanted lo avoid war on American territory due to a

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 Ekavi Athanassiipoulou

conflict with the USSR which could be kept kx:al somewhere in the continent of
Europe, The divergence in defence interests and consequent deterrence strategies
between the two sides of the Atlantic became openly apparent in the early l%()s
when the Soviet Union achieved nuclear parity with the US. Washington made
it clear that it would not defend Europe the way the Europeans preferred to be
defended. In other words the US would be reluctant to risk a nuclear attack against
North American cities in order to rebuff a Soviet conventional testing t>t Westem
European defences, and yet the Americans made it clear that they preserved the
option of a tactical nuclear war in Europe.' The 1973 Arab-Israeli war tore further
away the image ofthe allies' common security interests and shared global politics
perceptions. The Europeans saw the war as a rciiional conllicl and as they stood to
lose far more than the US as a result of the Arab oil embargo ( Europe was much
more dependent than the US on oil imports from the Middle East) resisted military
co-operation wilh Washington to the great irritation of the Americans.
Already by the late 1970s the utility (as well as the bonds) ofthe transatlantic
relationship were weakened as a result ofthe difficulties mentioned above but this
was also owing to a combination of new factors as the international system moved
away from the rigidities of the Cold War, The US had entered a period of detente
with Ihe USSR: Western Europe was resisting American nuclear strategy: and the
US was faced with growing economic competition from a now prosperous Euro-
pean Economic Community.'" Open bickering about burden sharing in NATO
was only the tip of the iceberg. Many Europeans were becoming more and more
frustrated wilh Washington's military strategy and ils private deals with Moscow
(characteristically no Western European government had been consulicd while the
1973 American - Soviet agreement on mutual force reductions was worked out).
But also they were aggravated wiih Washington's drift towards economic nation-
alism, ils interference in the intra-European decision process, its high-handed-
ness when dealing with ils European allies and its overall domination ofthe trans-
atlantic alliance. The Americans for their part were irritated with the Europeans'
failure to speak with one voice, the reluctance of some of them to accept American
calls for monetary co-operation and support many of Washington's foreign policy
initiatives, their refusal to allow NATO bases to be used for anything but Eurtv
pean defence and their unwillingness to accept the US's lead in dealing with inter-
national issues.
In short, rising mutual frustration and irritation rellecled on the one hand
Europe's growth (albeit very slowly) as an entity which struggled to shape its own
identity and therefore il wished to be treated hy Washington as a proper partner. On
the olher il rcllected the growing ambivalence of many leading Americans in their
attitude regarding the desirability of a politically and economically united Europe:
Washington wislicd for a United Europe but only if it did not challenge American
dominance in Atlantic policy. In 1974 Washington's great annoyance had been
poured out publicly in a speech by President Nixon who made brutally clear what

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Henry Kissinger had also staled a year earlier: (he American seeurity eommilment
to Europe was linked to the European.s' lull polilieal and cconomie co-operation
with the LFS." Following Nixon's speech. Washington s rhetoric subsided, never-
theless, the tension and eontiiets in the alliance eould not be concealed though
there were trite re-arfirmations of transatlanlie solidarity.
There were gotxl reasons why Atlanticism was preserved and there was no
effort seriously to consider problems that bedeviled it. in spite of the pt>ignancy
of the issues that undermined the coherence and challenged the utility of lhe alli-
ance. The idea of a single coalition holding the world in balance against the infidel
was fundamental to the post-War USA foreign policy establishment'' <an idea that
also inspired many a member of Europe's political elites!. At the same time, iiiosi
American and European political leaders feiired that any public admission that
basic assumptions about permanent common interests and a community of values
were questionable might open a Pandora's box of debate about the purpose of
the alliance. American foreign policy makers were concerned that such a debate
could seriously complicate Washington's relations with the Europeans." given a
hostile public ;ind congressional nuxxJ (as a consequence of Vietnam), and lead to
awkward questions about the indefinite commitment of American lrtx)ps abroad
and to binding alliances. The Europeans were afraid that such a debate could
raise serious questions about the eontinuation of the US security commitment to
llurope. a pledge every single European leader deenicd important to European
security. Nol to mention that the Europeans had become too accustomed to being
dependent lor their security on Washington to welcome a change in habits, which
besides would be rather costly. Relying on the long-accepted concept of Atlanti-
cism was essentially a safe option. American foreign policy planning did not run
the risk of getting upset by isolationist opposition in Congress, or in American
public opinion. I-urlhermore. the preservation of Atlanticism was also an easier
choice for many senior oflicials. bureaucrats and politicians on both sides of the
Atlantic. Drifting along is always more comfortable than intnxlueing change. It has
been observed that: "Atlanticism was by far the preferred policy ot the Departmenl
of State and Pentagon officials. \\ ho would otherwise be engaged in an awkward
pr(Kess of adjustment to a growing - and therefore more demanding - Euro-
pean identity."'^ From a European perspective questioning the Atlantic dcKtrine
also meant striking at the less than eohesive European Community. European
statesmen remained divided regarding the dilemma of whether Western liurope
should accept the transatlantic relationship as it was and that US policies might
conliict with F.uropean interests: or whether differences in interests and positions
justified Europe to follow a separate policy. In other words, between "Atlantic"
integration and European disintegration the Europeans chose the former.''' I mally
one should not underestimate the pt>wer of sentimental attachment to ties born
out of intense historical circumstances. Despite problems and conflicts the trans-
atlantic partnership and idea of a community had been pre.sent in the political life

115
 Ekitvi Athana.\sopoulou

of tiiost statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic - whose inlelleLiual formation

t<H>k plaec in the late forties or in the fifties - for most of their adult years. Thus
the impulse often was to try and preserve what one eould rather than aeeept that
relations may have to be seen through a dilTerent perspective and that even disin-
tegration in the relationship could be expected.
Many of the reasons mentioned above also accounted for the continuation of
the Allantic alliance in the afiennath of the Cold War and lor the downplaying
of its serious problems (although a number nl experts in politics and academia
- on both sides ofthe Atlantie - seriously questioned ils need, being of the view
that it was hii:h time to seriously re-assess the transatlantic military and polilical
relationship), Inliuenlial policy makers in the George Bush and William Clinton
administrations believed that Washington needed the help of ils l-^uropean allies
to addre,ss threats outside Europe. In their minds close co-operalion, ol course
under U.S leadership, between the advaneed industrialised countries was funda-
mental in successfully handling global problems,"" Furthermore NATO would
provide an essential link wilh strategic nuclear forces. Thus Washington chose
to perfect the alliance s military set up (implement the long-iime-soughi Ilex
ibie response and the equitable sharing of defenee burdens) rather than abandon
the alliance. Many Europeans for iheir part still deemed the US eommitment to
Europe's security important. It reassured Germany and the other members ofthe
alliance about Russia (which despiie all of its many problems remained a nuelear
super-power), and about security threats originating in areas of instability such
as the former Yugoslavia and North Afriea. Besides, maintaining NATO meant
lhat the European countries would not have to enter a spiral of increased defense
expenditures while faeing at the same time an increase in insecurity. And like
before, unresolved divisions in liurope about ils role in the world, and how iis
relationship with the USA should be approached, meant thai unless Europe was
to fall into disarray the Atlantic relationship had to be pre.served. Also in many
European capitals US hegemonic presence in Europe was seen as the lesser of
two evils because il was thought that it helped prevent a re-emergenee of power
political tensions between the major European slates.'' lissenlially in the early
1990s many European politieal leaders feared that intra-European tensions in the
lield of security eould also easily spread onto other areas ihus undermining ihc
European project. And, yci again, maintaining the allianee was a sale and comfort-
able choice against the background of the yel unknown posi-Cold war security
environment. The ailianee's structures could help render unfamiliar challenges
and threats in tenns ofthe "lamiliar", I urthermore lor many European leaders and
siraleuisis ihe problems involved in seekini; to maintain and rcsiore the tran.sat-
lantic relationship were less challenging than those inherent in striving to develop
a i.uropean collective .seeurity identity and the political will to build the structures
to support it, as the debacle over Bosnia had showed. Thus the l:uropeanists (those
Europeans who, led by the French, particularl\ objected to Ameriean domination

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 Tran.iatlantic Relations caught up hy Reality

of the transatlantic relationship and believed that there was enough divergence of
interests and positions between l.urope and the US to justify a separate Ruropean
policy), chose lo locus on transforming lhe political structures of the alliance in
a way ihat would make il possible for the Europeans to assume a greater role in
decision making and policy implementation regarding their security. In parallel
they sought to develop a European Defense and Security Identity, which they did
not want subordinated to the alliance, with the aim of developing il as the defence
component of the European Union.

II. ONE SHOULD NOT EXPEC T MIRACLl-S

The third problem with the pre.scriptions of those who tend lo downplay lhe
stresses the allianee experienced over the last three decades, and who advise that
prudenee and reason should prevail among the allies today, is that they often tend
to scale down sonic of the post-Cold War realities and their disintegrating effect
on the alliance. Europe no longer occupies a central position within lhe context of
American global strategy. For quite some time American foreign policy makers
have been moving their attention away from Europe, though the US has remained
signiiicantly involved in European affairs. In fad. even before lhe end of the Cold
War Europe had begun to lose iLs preeminence for the American Congress. Since
the early 1990s conventional wisdom about the importance of Europe lor Amer-
ican strategy steadily gave way in the face of new and urgent issues elsewhere
(particularly in Asia), the emergence of other strong international players, and
the ascendancy for some time in the Republican Party and in Congress ol the
Sun Bell political elite (which the current George W. Bush administration argu-
ably represents). In the view of many observers this elite attached no sentimental
value to the Atlantic relationship and the historic ties with Europe, unlike the old
American East-coasl political establishment. Americans in policy making circles
still viewed NATO as the core of US global defence and security efforts (given
that it remained under US leadership while only small changes were explored).
Bul congressional support for American involvement in Europe to a large degree
depended on a robust NATO. However, most of NATO's post-Cold War political
changes did nol go lo the heart of the alliance's dilemma: how to deline a new
over-arching purpose that would enjoy public support in the US and justify an
Ameriean stake in European security. On the contrary from an American point of
view the contribution of the Huropean core members was becoming loss useful
because ol Lhe growing eapability gap."* At the same time the preoeeupation of
lhe Europeans wiih the completion of the European project and its expansiiin
to include the whole ol Europe (something that the Americans have tended to
dismiss as sell absorbtion). contributed to the decline of Europe's importance for
US global security policy.

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 Ekavi Athanassopoulou

The steady UxKening of the transatlantic ties and devaluation of the alliance
in Washington's eyes was manilcsicd in many ways: Washington hy-passed or
igni)red the Europeans and their ohjcciions to aholishing the ABM treaty and tried
directly to reach an accommodation with Moscow The US also adopted a new
strategic doctrine, that of pre-emptive altack, without any consultation in Huro-
pean capitals, though it obviously had serious implications for intemational order
and the Atlantic alliance. In fact Washington's strong message Ihal the transatlantic
relationship, in its historic form, may be redundant hy differentiating hetween
"old" and 'new" Europe reflected the devaluation ofthe transatlantic partnership,
as mueh as it reflected the unilateralist streak in American international poliey. The
American response to lhe 9/11 lerrorisi attaeks only served to further reinforce this
reality. Immediately following 9/11, the response of NATO's European memhers
was lo invoke "Article 5" in support of the US in ils war against terrorism and
the military aetion in Afghanistan,'''Yet. Washington showed no interest in real
ct)nsultation with Europe as such in lhe months following the terrorist attaeks
and declined offers of assistance hy its N.ATO partners. To quote one Ameriean
analyst among many holding a similar view: "The Pentagon undouhtedly worried
that integrating European assets into the Afghan campaign would have diverted
too much attention from the war effort. Also, the political constraints that each
European government would have attached to the use of ils respective contingent
would complicate command and control, all for liiile or no payoff on the battle-
field."-" "The United States spurned the European action, and in doing so Wash-
ington signaled that it did not need NATO and lhat the European allies counted for
little in the greatest threat to US vital interesis sinee perhaps the attack on Pearl
Harhor.""' In the months following operation Enduring Freedom there was almost
no perception in the US that there were also European troops in Afghanistan. In
short, the American-EU strategic co-operalion in Afghanistan (whieh had heen so
troublesome to put together, partly because i>f Ameriean reluctance), is unlikely
to hecome a regular iKcurrcncc, in the foreseeable future (though one may see
similar co-opcraiion on an ad hoc, casc-by-casc hasis).
At the same time, the endemic tension in the alliance owing lo ils domination
by the US should he expeeted to grow, Europe has been liherated from iis depend-
ence on the Ameriean nuclear deterrent. Il is emerging as a new eenler of power
with ambitions to play a bigger role in the world arena (which means a desire
for independence as well as European influence over American policy), whilst
Washington continues to see iiself as the dominant power within the context ofa
glohal Ameriean-European strategic co operation. It is true that the Europeans are
still divided over whal kind of relationship each of ihem and the I-.uropean I'liion
should have with the US." While Erench governments have heen determined to
limit NATO's scope and develop the European Security and Defence Identity,
London has been trying hardest to prcscrsc Atlantic structures, Berlin for its part
has been seeking to stay somcw here in the middle. (Most other European political

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 Tratisattantic Relation.s catif>ht up hy Reatity

leaders are divided more or less along these positions of the three leading Eun>-
pcan countries). Nonetheless, it is equally true that although the EUphoria of the
early 1990s has subsided European integration efforts have come very far. R> the
turn ofthe 2tst century the TAJ had assumed powers traditionally assix'iated with
the nation-state, in the fields of justice and home affairs, while sieps vscrc taken
in developing a common defence ,sysiem. The now presumed dead 200.^ Consti-
tutional Trealy for Europe, ihal gave the Union a single legal personality, illus-
trated the high degree o\' integration, although many on hoth sides of the Atlantic
Joined the Economist in declaring that 'Rejection of the constitution signals that
the dream of deeper politieal integration and, in the 1957 Treaty of Rome's famous
phrase, "ever eloser union; is over","' The uncertainty of the road ahead for the I-.U
following the rejectit)n oftlie Constitutional Treaty hy the referenda in Erance and
the Netherlands should not ohscure the commitment and sense of belonging to the
Union within the majorities (>f the politieal elites of Europe, nor the significance
of the consensus reached helween them over the creation of a eloser integrated
Union. Along with the growth ofthe European entity, conviction, ambition as well
as eonlidence among leading Europeans that the EU can emerge as a p<iwerful
actor in the international system with a genuine contribution to make have also
been developing strongly.
Thus it is rea.sonahle to argue that to expect a change of attitudes among Europe's
Atlantieists may not be loo farfetched. Constantly the French and other Europcan-
isis had to accept an "Atlantic" Europe favoured b\ Europe's Atlanticisis out of
a fear of undermining lhe European project (besides European security consider-
ations), Ttxlay Atlanticists in Europe, out of growing eontidence and loyalty lo lhe
idea of a strong Union seem close to accepting the Europeanisis' argument that
Atlanticism prevents Europe from finding its self-identity, colleetive security role
in the world, and the political will (o implement it, Fhereforc, as the Europcanists
maintain, Europe musi develop a common intemational policv in association with
lhe United States (when appropriate), but independently from American glohal
policies and US domination. Already many among ihose in Europe who (led by
the Briti.sh), eh(K)se rather close co-operation with the Americans lalk more about
solidarity hetween Europe and the US rather than an Atlantic Europe which has its
place in an intemational system determined hy Washington, The security prov isions
- agreed upon hy all EU governments - in Ihe 2(X)3 Constitutional Treaty showed
that an important step had been taken in the direetion ofthe Europeans reaching a
con,sensus along the lines mentioned above. The treaty went much further, through
the establishment o f a federal defense security apparatus, than previous attempts
to promciie the de\ elopment of a common European delence policy independently
ol NATO, Sceptics argued vsiih good reason that these provisions did not amount
to much more than wishful thinking given the significant military gap between the
I'S and Europe, and shrinking defence European budgets. This scepticism could
not be easily dismissed. It was unlikely that the Europeans would be ready to put

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 Ekavi Athanassopoulou

together the EU 6().(XX) defence foree that they had been detemiined lo have in
place by 2(X)3. Nor did they seem that they had finally accepted to substantially
inerease military spending. Nonetheless, the EU diK's nol need to waii to build
the adequate security forces in order to develop a European voice on security
issues and an independent global political role venturing into international lields
that Washington expects to dominate. Military force is not automatically the mosi
relevant tool required in dealing with international affairs today. What is of impor-
tance here is lhat the Trealy did constitute a major break through in the eontext
of elTorts to achieve European integration in foreign poliey and defense matters,
which might one day lead to a common army. The Huropean project has not been
evolving according to a blue print; the exact outcome of this ongoing process can
neither be predicted nor guaranteed as the two referenda proved. Nonetheless, one
can feel conlident that European unily is going lo grow and not diminish - though
there may be more crises yet to come - alongside the desire for I-.urope's di.stinc-
live voice in international affairs. Thus Britain, the most consistent advtKale ofa
common defence policy in close co-operation with the US (a stance that reflects
a continuous British ambivalence towards Huropean integration), will eventually
have to decide whether it will give ils full support to elToris lo artieulate such a
voice (and thus also help shape it).
Some argue that transatlantic relatiiins could be re-invenied on lhe basis of
proposals for a grand bargain"'' in which Europe spends more on defenee. develops
a coherent strategy, and assumes a significant global security role in co-operation
with the US. As a result. Wa.shington would agree to genuine consultations with
its European allies hefore acting. Grand bargain ad\iK-ates disregard reality. More
than a decade following the end of the Cold War. efforts within the alliance to
address the fundamental burden and pt)wer-sharing problems have prcxiuced no
satisfactory deals for either side. The Americans and lhe Europeans have been
consistently assessing differently how much defence burden each carries and as a
result they have been disagreeing about how much decision-making power each
should have. The Europeans have adopted the view lhat the .\merican desire to
lead lhe alliance is out of tune with ils financial contributions. The Americans for
their part have not been prepared to acknowledge the value of Europe's economic
assistance regionally and globally. The American rejeetion of the importance
of Europe's financial contributions, and the consequciu resistance lo a more
balanced power-sharing relationship with the Europeans, does nol simply refleet
the preferred US approaeh to security issues, ihat is pre-eminence of hard versus
soft power (as some would like to argue), but also Washington's wish to continue
lo dominate the alliance. In fact, the background has been a specific concern with
asserting .American global leadership now lhat the EU seems lo challenge it.
In short, Washington's traditional ambi\alence regarding European unity
continues. On the one hand, since the end of the Cold War decision makers in Wash-
ington have lavoured a united Europe as a means lo enhance European stability

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but also in order to unify Westem policy. To hoth these ends they have suppt»ned
the idea of Europe assuming a bigger international security role. At the same time,
from a more narrow US perspective, such a role would mean that the Europeans
would finally have to share more of the military burden. IncreiLsed European
military spending would, in its tum. close the substantial and growing military
gap between the US and the European eountries thus turning them into reliable
and eredible allies, on whom the US eould eount in dealing with seeurity prob-
lems outside Europe. However, on the other hand Washington has heen resisting
the development of any truly substantial independent European defence institu-
tions. Certainly, US policy regarding the development ofa European Security and
Defence Identity has been constantly evolving since the early 199()s, Nonetheless
American concern about European competition (with or within NATO), has been
consistent as it is essential for the US to lead the transatlantic policy in matters
which are of American concern or interest.
George W, Bush did not express simply a personal or popular helief among
influential Republicans when he said that 'he must state a new strategic direc-
tion, or policy with hold, clear moves. And hecause it would he the policy of the
United States, the only superpower, the rest ofthe world would have to move over,
would adjust over time',"' Most DemtKrals think similarly despite pronounce-
ments that the United States needs to consult more with ils allies. Eor instance, in
the WDrds of lhe White House National Security Strategy dcKument of the second
Clinton administration: 'The ability to a.ssure global security, shared prosperity
and IreedtMii is heyond the power of any one nation. But the actions of many
nations often follow from the aetions of one',"''The Clinton administration sought
to promote American leadership internationally in a less provocative manner than
George W, Bush and his team during his (irsi term in office, but in the final analysis
lhe difference was one of taetics and rheioric, not substance,"^ As David Halher-
stam has put it, one ofthe early conclusions ofthe Clinton While House in relation
to American international policy was that the "United States would not consult. It
should decide in advance on its policy and then explain that poliey to its allies."
'" In fact Clinton sought to maximise the American position of strength through
US dominated multilateral institutions and coalitions in which the United States
was expected lo assume primary responsibility for .shaping their agenda, objec-
tives, strategy and responsibilities."' In other words, "Americans are instrumental
multilateralisis".'" Whilst evidently there is a wide diversity of opini<ins (opinions
oflen cutting across party lines), among influential American, regarding issues
sucli as America's international role, the role to be delegated to US allies, and how
relations with them can best be handled, there is a broad consensus that global
leadership" is something that the US, and the US alone, should exercise. And in
the lexicon of American political elites, leadership is all about taking the initia-
tive, showing the way and being in control,'- In short. America should make all
the important decisions. Others are expected to follow beeause they will eventu-

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 Ekavi AthaiuLssapoitlou

ally either sec the merits of the Ameriean approach, or hecau.se little alternative
seems to he on offer. (Henee Ameriean acceptance ol multilateralism rests upon
lhe understanding that the UvS as a glohal leader has the ahility. hut also the right
to aet unilaterally).
In lad it would he a remarkahle lirst for a dominant glohal power like the U.S to
voluntarily surrender its drive for hegemony, a drive which seems to characterise
all great powers. In other words, it is unlikely the United States will change the
way it has heen operating in the world system since the Second World War. Sueh a
change would essentially amount lo compromising the US's own particular glohal
vision and to sharing decision-making pnvser. which in effect is the suhslance of
power. The United .States might accept the need to share power if it began to seri-
ously lose conlidenee in its capahilities. like Britain did in the wake ofthe Second
World War. However, tcxlay the US - despite ils hruised moral authority - is the
world's eeonomic leader, al technok>gy's cutting edge, the only country that can
project military power anywhere on the globe, the only one that can deter nuelear
war. thai ean assure Ihe free How of commerce hy patrolling the sea lanes, that
has communications and intelligence eapahilities of glohal reach, and that can
concei\ahly keep China in line. Moreover, il sees itself as a most dynamic siKiely.
which exports us popular culture all over the world and constitutes a development
model that attracts many. .\s discussed ahove Ameriean leaders are fully aware
that the US needs allies to suppori an international system in accord with its inter-
ests, but their role is seen as strictly suhsidiary. It is not just that .Xmericans are
conftdent in their military and technological superiority and their development
model, or that they believe thai the US is the only country with a "will to power.""
Underlying this confidence are two profound beliefs (albeit contradictory), which
lie at the heart of Ameriean foreign policy in the 2()th century: Firstly that the US is
exceptional, and secondly that American values (or most of them), are universal.'''
In other words, the conviction among American leaders that the US must main-
tain global leadership is particularly strong because it has grown hand in hand
with a deep rooted eertainty that Ameriean leadership is es.sential in maintaining
international order; a belief that has been consistent in the hislory ol .'\inerican
foreign policy in the 2()th century. When the Former .Secretary of State. Madeleine
Alhright. stated that .America was "the indispensable nation". Americans "stand tall
and hence see further than other nations." she was far from saying anything new.
From an American perspecti\e the US is destined to be the world leader heeause
the American nation alone has "sunicient moral force" (Woixlrow Wilson), or
"moral standing " (George Bush).^'
In 1992 a Pentagon internal document entitled Defence Plunning Guidance.
argued that the United Stales; 'must discourage the adsanced industrial nations
from challenging our leadership or even aspiring lo a larger regional or global
rolc\ To prevent this from happening, the US. according to the same document,
musi 'retain the preemincni responsihilily for addressing ... those wrongs which

122
 Transatlantic Relations caught up hy Reality

threaten not only our interests, hut those of allies or friends, or which eould seri-
ously unsettle internaiional relations"."" This dix'ument. whieh was leaked to the
New York Times, caused controversy in the Uniled States, yel not so much heeause
of its stated objectives, but rather because of the implications they eould have for
US defence hudgets. as well as its tone which could disturh many US allies." The
Pentagon"s new Defence Planning Guidance d(x;ument which was leaked in the
L<).'< Angele.s Times in July 2(X)2 contained all the key elements ofthe 1992 doeu-
menl.'"
The other problem with the "grand bargain" idea is ihat ils advocates tend to
fcx:us on military problems within the allianee yet the military gap is not acci-
dental; it refleets a divergenee of interests and values. In the final analysis what is
striking al the heart ofthe trans-Atlantie relationship is that slill today there is not
an integrated community of shared attitudes and values across the Atlantie despite
the defeat of Communism and the growing influence of the eapitalisi markel-
based model in Europe sinee the welfare state crisis developed during the 199()s.
The Europeans have their own understanding of what constitute healthy society
and also the freedom of the individual. They have their own understanding of
the meaning of equality, the pursuit of happiness, cohesive communities, and the
market-driven economies." (Furthermore, on some of these issues there is not
even a consensus within or among European eountries.) The gradual alignment
of European and American social and political systems that many soeial .scientists
foresaw lor some time has not happened. The Europeans today have the eeonotnie
power and enough teehnological expertise to substantially close the military gap.
In fact some European states have made a genuine effort to adapt Iheir defenee to
the post Cold war changed security environment.^ However, pressed hy domestic
priorities European governments do not wish to curtail s(x;ial welfare programmes
lo finance ambitious defenee programmes particularly as they believe that "none
of the new threats is purely military; nor ean any be taekled by purely military
means"".^' Essentially the Amerieans" and Europeans" assessment of post Cold-
War threats differs significantly. The US has been emphasising that against the
new uneertain intemational environment security requires managing ""multiple
potential adversaries"" (state but also non-state aetors) with a range of military
capabilities hesides the threat to retaliate.^" The Europeans have been emphasising
deterrence based on the threat of retaliation and have been attaehing much less
importance to questions of military defence while fcKusing their attention on a
wider range of instruments to respond to a wider range of threats sueh as illegal
immigrati(3n, refugees, and trans-border organi.sed erime.^' The Deeember 2(H)3
European Security Strategy^'' which acknowledged lhe need for forward defence
to deal with intemational threats including terrorism may he bringing closer the
Atlantie allies' diverging security agendas in the short, perhaps medium tenn.
Yet. it is unlikely that they will agree on what are the right instruments for the
long-term management of new security threats, given that neither the Ameriean
 Ekavi Athanassoptnthnt

claim of a hroadly conceived right to pre-empt danger.^^ nor many Europeans"

nervousness, or clear aversion lo the idea of provcniive attacks are going to disap-
pear (particularly as the US does not intend to share veto power over its security
poliey). It is worth noting that at the end of 2005 European leaders publicly elaimcd
that iheir "soft" approach lo developing Ihc Muslim world - hased on economic
development, dialogue, strengthening the rule of law - had greater credibility wilh
Muslim leaders ihan lhe Bush administration's conception which focused on mili-
tary intervention and aggressive diplomacy.'"
In short, inlo the 21 si century Americans and Europeans continue to diverge
in their perceptions of security, the requisites of a deterrence strategy that most
enhances Iransatlanlic security (including how lo hesi tight lhe threat of the day,
international terrorism), and whether hallistic ttiissile defences contribute to
or undermine lhe security of Europe^ (like in lhe past lhe debate over tnissile
defence has been reflecling European doubts regarding lhe credibility of U.S secu-
rity commitment to its allies). These fundamental disagreements, which are nol
new. have heen reinforced as lhe emergence of lar more complex seeurity chal-
lenges seetn to promise the sharpening of old dilTerences and lhe inlroduclion
of new ones between lhe United Slates and lhe Europeans, wht). as they gain in
confidence, arc developing their own perspeclivcs on many of lhe present security
threats. Besides, there is a marked difference of opinion hetween many Euro-
pean counlrics and Ihc US on how to approach tnany international questic>ns. The
disagreement over Iraq was far from exceptional. The .\mericans and tnost Eurcv
pean governments disagree, over whal is ihc best long lerm poliey towards Iran
(despite lhe narrowing of differences on thai front). Syria. Israel. China.^" Also
there is a clash of strategic priorities between the Europeans (who are eoncen-
irating their energies on lhe European cotnmunity and iheir region) and the Ameri-
cans who are selling glohal goals. The end of the war of words across the Atlantic.
Washington's more conciliatory altitude towards European allies' rhetoric during
the second Bush administration, and ofiicial statements about "an increasingly
shared strategie vision wilh Europe".'*'' cannol conceal the existence of serious
disagreements. Nor does it conceal lhe fact ihal already ihc EU when acting on the
glohal security stage is seeking to promote a more European view of the world just
as Henry Kissinger warned in The Troubled Partnership fortv years ago.**
In the tinal analysis the idea of an Atlantic partnership and alliance was born
out of a specific security need, to proiecl western Europe, and was in tune with the
simple pattern of the Cold War international order. Today, in the post-Cold War
environment this simple pattern cannot be restored particularly as the transatlantic
relationship today does not simply suffer from circutnsiantial disagreemenls and
tensions among like-tiiinded players but from sottielhing deeper, a larger ideo-
logical battle. As Isaiah Berlin, the European liberal philosopher, has einphasised,
people sharing the same ideological heliefs can often have acule disagreements;
moreover, ihese ottcn prove lo be irreconcilable.'"

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 Transatlantic Relatiotis caught up by Reality

The American way of trying lo solve intemational problems is seriously

questioned by the majority of the European intelligentsia, the news media and the
political classes. European critics of the US sec it as Janus-like in the way it acts in
international affairs preaching for freedom, demtKraey and a liberal world order,
but often undermining them with its aetions. Eumpean criticistn of the US and
its intemational policies, whieh has been mueh more open than in the pa.st, draws
upon a belief ihat the Amerieans often betray and discredit liberal and dem(v
cratic principles, undermine the effectiveness of intemational instituiions and are
weakening confidence in the West around the glohe. becau.se of their preference
for the use of force as the solution lo force, rather than Ihe Law. their unques-
tioning eonfidenee in America's unfailing virtue and moral clarity, their belief
in their omnipotence, iheir blind patriotism, their tendency to act unilaterally, to
endorse the idea that the end justifies the means, to take upon themselves the role
of global policeman while lhe failures of their leadership are very often assumed
by the protected parties, and to dis[)ense with intcrnationai rules when they arc
deemed inconvenient. In short American policies are attacked for being driven hy
narrow self-interest dependent on US domestic factors, and American actions on
the international scene for being based heavily on the use of foree. In fact critics
ask whether, in the final analysis, the United Stales and Europe even adhere lo ihe
same Wesiem principles in lhe conduct of iheir inlernational policy. This criticism,
whether or not rational or balanced (or free of stereotypes), cuts across national
boundaries." It has been coming nol only from the iradilional quarters (pacificists
and lhe lefl). but has even been voiced, often loudly, by the populist righl^\ whieh
has been growing in power in a number of European countries, as well as in those
circles that are keen for Europe to tnaintain a vigorous link with lhe US. Il has
also been fairly consistent despite the profound variance let alone clear dilTerences
in ideological orientation and operational style among the critics. And the chorus
is growing without serious opposition in Western Europe now that explicitly pro-
American parties, or leaders, have disappeared from the political scene (In fact the
US is nol much discussed in Westem Europe unless it is lo he criiicised). If the
transatlantic partnership were heing built from scratch today it might well exclude
a few of the historic European allies who have beeome so openly disgruntled with,
and critical of. Washington.
It would be wrong to assume that this criticism is mere posturing, or jusi the
expression of many Europeans' dissatisfaction with the power sharing stattds quo
within the allianee. It would also be erroneous lo trace ils roots simply to domestic
politics, in other words ihat it is another way for many Europeans lo assert their
separaleness from the Americans in order lo shape iheir own identity,'''' or that it
reflects domestic political costs and henelits calculations (ihough ihere is a good
deal of iruth in all of the above).''' Of equal itnporlance. is ihat many Europeans
have internalised tnore than Americans lhe Vietnam War lessons. The Europeans
have learned, for instance, that liberal ends cannol be sustained by illiberal means.

I2.S
 Ekavi Athattassopoukm

that force is adverse to liberty and ihat attempts to regulate (ralher ihan manage),
lhe international system may evoke unforeseen and unwanted reaction and often
result in reinforcing tension and violence. It is interesting to note ihal most Euro-
peans fell thai lhe Americans should have seen 9/11 also as a lesson in humility in
their pursuit of intemational policy, and lamented the fact that Washington drew
almost exactly the opposite conclusion.
Eor their part most Americans in policy making circles tend to hold lhe view
Ihal lhe Europeans are weak, unrealistic, lack resolve, and accuse ihem of being
hypocrilieal. The American view is ihal lhe Europeans criticise the US lor failing
liberal values, but in practice it is the Europeans who betray liberal ideals because
they arc unable to act in a robust manner against the enemies of the liberal system.
whether this is Slobodan Milosevic. Osama bin Laden, or Saddam Hussein. Some
right-wing Americans, piqued hy European criticism (and apparently oblivious of
the new face of Europe), even go so lar as to privately suggest that Europe, in light
of its fascist experience, lhe Holocaust and - in Iheir view - the present existence
of strong anti-Semitism, is hardly qualified to preach humanitarian and deincKratic
values lo lhe Americans.'* The view of a majority wiihin Atnerican political elites
is thai those Europeans who preach for Law and iniernalional institutions tend to
overlook the fact Ihat force is often needed lor Law to prevail, and that it is power
politics more often ihan law that maintain peace and stability in the world. In fact
European erilieism of US international policies has been perceived in lhe US nol
as an efforl to promote liberalism. demcKracy or international eo-operation. bul as
an obstacle to addressing US perceived needs and challenges within the context of
a threatening intemational environment, if taken .seriously, there would he a risk of
the Europeans debating the Americans into inaction.
Essentially, at lhe core of the divide between lhe United States and many Euro-
peans lies lhe question as to who is heller qualified lo safeguard the heart and soul
of lhe Western world, spread ils message of liberalism and democracy, and help
promote a liberal world order. The iradilional confidence and belief of Amerieans
in their exceplionalism and in iheir system as the primary demcKTatic and liberal
socio-political model, "a standing monutncnt & example for the aim and imita-
tion of other countries." in the words of Thomas Jefferson*', is now rivalled by
the confidence of European Union political leaders and senior bureaucrats in the
exceptionalistn of the EU. Their belief in the uniqueness of the Union based on
detiKKracy. freedom, and in its responsibility to serve as a model for the world is
not to be doubled. .Xs Rotnano Prcxli, when President oi lhe European Commis-
sion, put it in his speech to lhe European Parliatncnl in 2(XX): 'Europe needs lo
project its tnodel of s(K"iely into lhe wider world. We are not simply here lo defend
our interests: we have a unique historic experience lo offer: the experience of
liberating people from poverty, war. oppression and intolerance. We have Ibrgcd
a mixlcl of devclopmeni and continental integration based on ihc principles of
demtKracy. freedom and solidarity and it is a model thai works.'^" It is not sitnply

126
 TransatUmtic Relation.^ caught up by Reality

ihat each side believes that it is lhe more uhie guardian of liberal, dem(x:ratie and
humanitarian values, but also that increasingly many Europeans now feel that the
U.S is acting in a way ihal undentiines them.

III. BRIDGING THE GAP?

At some point this acute tension between Americans and many Europeans thai
reflects diverging values and beliefs concerning the nature and scope of foreign
and security policy and how power should be exercised globally may be reduced,
if the gap between these values as well as beliefs is bridged. Yet, the likelihood of
this hap[)ening d(x:s not seem very high, unless both sides make a systematic elforl
to balance and moderate their attitudes to the breach between them.
For instance. American political leaders and the public could appreciate the
paradox that has long been identified by students of American foreign policy:
cfforis to spread American liberal ideals "require the expansion of American
p<iwer and thus make it more ditTicull for American institutions and policies to
conform to those ideals".'' They could recognise the danger that the expansion of
American power poses for the success of liberal values around the world and ask
a number of hard questions. To suggest only a few: is the United States becoming
complacent about this danger? DCK'S military force have an undue iniluence on
US intemationai policy after having kicked the Vietnam Syndrome, that is having
regained confidence in its ability to militarily intervene anywhere in the Third
World in order to promote ils inicrcsts?*^'Also Americans could reflect more upon
the fact that around the world the US is not only seen as a contributor to liberal
order (or indeed lo world stability), bul also a disrupter of it: a result of ils mili-
tary interventions, or unholy coalitions with, and military economic support for.
diclators around the world. The post-war record of the United .Slates probably
compares favourably with lhe records of other powers in the same peritxJ. bul
this is not good enough when judged by the aspirations either of the American
people (or of friends of the West around the world), who believe that US foreign
|K)licy should conform with their liberal and demcKratic values, and ihal Western
powers should be held to a higher standard. Now in the aftermath ol lhe wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Washington s laek of an effective plan lo secure lhe peace
in these couniries raises further questions regarding the current US commitineni
to promoting a liberal order. Also those Americans who have been arguinp that
Europe's significance for American global interests is not whal il u.sed lo be. and
Ihal the Uniied Stales should ralher lurn its focus on Asia, or, ihose who extol
co-operation between the United States and former European communist states,
could a.sk themselves just how much China, or Rumania could help in promoting
liberal goals around lhe world. And American leaders could show due awareness
of the fact that American political culture has been turning inwards. It is an obvious

127
 Ekavi AthatHissopoitloH

point ihal the more expert Washington's leadership is. in matters of international
affairs, the more sueeessful its foreign policy is bound to be. As has been noted
for some time a growing number df members of the House and Senate (Democrats
and Republicans) have no intemational orientation, do not care about international
affairs, do not travel abroad, and in many cases do nol have passports.*'
TTie Europeans for their part eould more readily recognise that there is indeed a
paradox between liberal ideals and the practical requirements of exercising world
power, an old dilemma that is never easily resohcd. They could also rellect upon
the fact that in the United States (unlike in most European countries), there has
been for a long lime a significant public debate about the relationship of liberal
ideals and values in the conduct of foreign poliey. Huropean intellectuals, who are
invariably hostile to the intemational choices ofthe United States, and arc uncon-
ditionally against the use of force, logeiher with those Europeans, who do accept
that sometimes force is needed to uphold the law. but insist that force should be
used within the limits of law. could perhaps give some thought to the dilemmas one
is often confronted with in the real world. Though history shows that violence dcx;s
indeed breed more violence, it also shows that non-violence is not at all conta-
gious. To state the obvious, democracies may prefer to regulate relations between
themselves through Law and treaties, but this is not yet a dem(Kratie globe regu-
lated by demiK-ratic institutions. Of course, the Westem world needs for the sake
of its own soul to live up to its own standards and prineiplcs. However, in a world
whieh is not yet completely governed by the rule of law often these principles and
standards are exploited by brutal regimes in order to perpetuate tyranny. In other
words to suggest that there is a straight choice between the use of force or Law
in foreign policy is tcx) simplistic in the light ofthe complexity of intemational
affairs. It is as simplistic as to suggest that force is the ultimate guarantee of world
stability. So tcx). the Europeans eould acknowledge that the foreign policy goals
of most European states, or of the EU. are not always acted on in the spirit of the
continent s highly held liberal ideals. For example, the EU routinely used to state
in its official dtKuments its interest in the promotion of demiKracy in Palestine
and eamiarked aid for individual projeets aimed at denKK'rati.sation. However, in
practice the primary objective of its policies towards the Palestinian Authority was
politieal stability, which direetiy contradicted the stated goal of democratisation.
given the lack of interest in democratisation by the Palestinian political leadership
and the autocratic nature ofthe Palestinian political system under the late Yasser
Arafat."-
Europeans who readily and earnestK accuse the US of undermining interna-
tit)nal institutions eould seriously question whether the promise of international
institutions to deal with intemational conflict is true or false.'"' Can the UN offer
solutions to problems such as intemational terrorism, violations ol human rights,
or the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destmction.' The history of international
insiitutions shows lhat their effectiveness depends on a communitv of interests

128
 Transatlantic Relations caught tip hy Reatity

which oticn dcK's not exist and certainly cannot be crcutcd al will. Europeans
(uho tend lo feel free to adnn)nish the Uniled States on account of its unilaior-
alism). could also recognise that many European governments consistently lack
commitment to the multilateralism they demand ofthe US. Mighl it not be true
to say that the split within the EU over Iraq was partly due to the indilterence
and arrogance with which France and Germany treated the other members ol the
Union, and ihat no effort was made by the members ofthe EU to use the consulta-
tion mechanism of the Union to reach a consensus of opinion7 The same Euro-
peans could ask themselves whether multilateralism should be the sole standard
for judging the correctness, or effectiveness, of Ameriean policies. The creed of
multilateralism, which essentially reflects opposition to concentrated authority,
certainly carries a lot of merit. Yet. il alst) has the tendency to blur reality, il only
because it implies that a nation s unilateral policies have no valid basis other than
in Ihe promotion of its selfish interests, whieh are bound to be detrimental to lhe
interesis ofthe rest. Faith in the dcK*trine ol' multilateralism confuses expeeiaiions
about how a better, more balanced management of world alTairs might emerjie
More spet ilically. such faith implies that better policies are guaranteed when more
international actors are engaged. This a.ssumption is debatable. Multilateralism
recently has come to be endowed by many critics ofthe US in Europe with almost
magic qualities which it clearly does not have, at leasi not in ils applied fomi.
Multilateralism as we have come to know it is not by detinition a recipe for a
morv just world. Nor can it automatically guarantee a more stable, or better func-
tioning intemational system. While it is true to say that unilateralism means the
interesis of one. clearly multilateralism d(x;s not mean lhe intercsis of all. Nor is it
axiomatic that collective decisions - usually reached on the basis of compromises
and expeditious (often unholy) alliances - always produce the besi results for any
uiven situation in hand.
If attitudes across the Atlantic could be gradually tempered along some ol ihe
lines suggested above the gap in values and beliefs might be reduced at some
point. The probability of this occurring in the foreseeable future is hard to predict
since this gap is the product of the complex interplay of p<ilitical. ideological
and cultural forces in the US and in I Europe. At the same time it is clear that a
hypocritical blindness to the existence of the gap. or a cynical acceptance ol it
by Americans and Europeans, is bound to intensify tension and conflict between
them.

tV. IHOt GHTS ABOUT THE FUTUKI

Current elTorts to reconstruct the transatlantic alliance and reform the .'\ineric;iii
European relationship do not hold the promise to ease the aceumulated frustra-
tion and edgy relations that exist between the allies. The solutions at hand cannot

129
 Ekavi Athanassopoulou

provide appropriate answers to an array of problems, lisscntially ihev do inn

promise to lully satisfy the American desire lor a scctirity organisation which
can he used to promote their jzlohal siraicgv. since many items on the American
strategic "list" have strong opponent.s in Eurtipe. At the same time these soltitions
arc jioinj; lo fall well short of European hopes lor a partnership of equals wilh
the United States. There is. in fact, no cas\ policy, and no easy consensus (not
only hetwecn the Americans and the Europeans but also among the Europeans
themselves) as to what could, or should be done to build a grand transatlantic
alliance and partnership for the future. Even if an ideal formula were lo he found,
it would more likely founder on diverging sectjrity perceptions and ideological
dilTerences. Nonetheless, both sides currently prefer to follow a mixlerate eourse
of action and keep the pnK'ess of modifying NATO alive. Thus, they arc prt>b-
ahly going to continue to .settle lor whatever second hc.st alternative arrangements
they can agree, at least for the time being, in an effort to maintain a certain level
of co-operation. After all habitual prescriptions for functional or institutionalised
ways to bridge differences have been the means of choice for keeping the Atlantic
relationship together lor some time now; though, most often ihey have merely
managed to perpetuate rather than solve problems, something tew are willing to
acknowledge.
Hence the transatlantic relationship, and the rhetoric it generates, will picrsisi
in the short-iuedium term in one fonn or another, though it is highly unlikely that
it will be able to develop in a clo.scr. more fulfilling manner. Certainly there will
he different degrees of US-tiU co-operation on political and security glohal issues
in the future. However, any impetus for et>-operation wilt mosi certainly he the
result of a convergence of interests on funetional issues and not the automatic
outcome ol a special relationship", or an Acquis .\thmtique!'^ In laci ihis reaiily
was reflected on N.ATO's Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) initiativ e As it has
been pointed out. "although CJTFs certainly do enhance flexibility w iih respect to
the use of people and resources, it is a Hexihility that is driven by the centrifugal
reality of an increasingly Iragmented alliance, which in tum reliccts the growing
divergence of interests and values".*' Until there is a genuinely united European
front the transatlantic relationship will likely eontinue along the path taken in
recent times - flexible coalitions depcndinii on the issues in hand. At the same
time the Americans most likely will seek to strengthen their bilateral ties with
those liU governments which they can identify as kindred spirits. Also they will
seek to inaximi.se co-operation with Gennany. one of the three major Eumpean
countries (the other two beint; Britain and France), with which Washington has
had a long solid relationship, in the hope that it will act as sonic kind of a break for
the Europeanists. For their part the Europeanists will continue to strive lo ttevelop
and strengthen the I--1) security and defence policy.
The changing rules ot American-European co-operation (based on ad h(x; ism.
bilateralism and functionalitv ) have not merciv shown the futiliiv of the belief thut
 Transatlantic Relations ccitii^ht up hy Reality

an American-European partnership can be constructed to fit new circumstances by

invoking a nostalgic (albeit/«M.v) sense of community spirit and common interesis
They also point to the new way that the US has cho.sen to play the international
CO operation game. Efforts to perpetuate, or build new grand structures of strategic
co-operation based on the presumption of perpetual common interests in interna-
tional affairs (reflecting a static rather than dynamic international environment),
seem to be relkxcs of a bygone era. In fact it is these same rules that to some extent
have also been shaping security co-operation between European countries?**
Of course it is still far from clear whether functional unity rather than more
traditional patterns of co-operaiion will prove to be an effective modus operandi in
international relations in the years to come. Certainly, the former is more flexible
and therefore desirable, but its unpredictability may increase rather than decrease
the vulnerability of status-quo powers like the US. when seen from a long term
perspective. At least within the context of the ELI one can anticipate that foreign
policy coalitions between memher states risk raising suspicions within the Union
that the KU will be used in the promotion of their interests even if there is no
mandate from all its members. Therefore, in a paradoxical way ad hoc coalitions
among EU groups of countries may result in strengthening the drive towards uniiy
in foreign and security policy among EU members.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Reasoning together, making concessions and an effort to improve mutual under-

standing are frequently prescribed as solutions to restore, or renew the badly
damaged transatlantic relationship. These calls for rational and responsible action
bave the tendency to disregard that in a world of politics what is rexsonablc.
responsible, or indeed realistic is in the eye ofthe beholder. Furthermore, they tend
to minimise the deep-rooted causes of the current tension and \oo often invoke an
idyllic pa.st strategic partnership and community that never truly existed and that
is even harder to imagine today. The EU has grown politically and economically
independent from the US. It is developing as an entity which desires to ;irticulatc
its own identity and voice in the world arena, while there are no signs from Wash-
ington that it is willing to accept adjustments in the Atlantic relationship to reflect
Europe's political evolution, by limiting US freedom of action. Many American
leaders believe that the day when the Europeans will be able to raise a single and
effective voice in challenging US international policies is t(K) far away lo really
matter. But. perhaps this point in time is not as distant as it appears. Even if it is.
Europe's autonomy in matters of international policy is bound to keep growing
causing confrontations with the US. Despite cleavages between EU members on
foreign policy issues and on the Union's relations with the US there has been
substantial progress in putting together a European security and defence policy in

131
 Ekavi Athanit.s.sopoulou

the last three years. Apart from EU aspirations lor a global security role. I-.uropcan
leaders have become acutely aware of the reduction of US strategic interest in
their continent, which means that they seriously have to face up to the responsi-
bility of taking care of security in Europe and the surrounding neighbourhotxis.
It is also clear that even those among them who have been cautioning against
antagonistic relations between the EU and the US. desire a relationship of equals
between Brussels and Washington. Besides, the future viability ofthe transatlantic
partnership will depend on the congruence of the interesis of the .Americans and
Europeans, the compatibility of their securiiy conceptions and policy outlooks but
also on the broader ideas and beliefs that influence political leaders in the US and
the EU as well as their domestic constituencies. We already know that some of
the security conceptions, policy outUwks and hroader beliefs across the Atlantic
differ drastically. In fact what one may call a philosophical split has been emerging
between Americans and the majority of leading Europeans, causing the allies to
disagree over solutions to common problems. Hven the old Atlantic rhetoric that
the US and Europe need a common policy and strategy lo sueeessfully promote
shared interests is openly challenged by many Americans and Europeans alike
who refute the logic that the best, or inore desirable answers, are to be found in
common approaches.
Failure to renew the transatlantic strategic partnership, disturbing as it may be
for Atlanticists. does not mean that the West will suffer any apocalyptic conse-
quences, assuming that the overall general objectives of l^uropean policy do not
clash with those ofthe United States. In fact the boundaries of liberal dem(K-racy
may he expanded to the extent that divisions between the US and the EU reflect
a genuine European desire and commitment to achieve a better balance between
a (xiwer-approach and the promotion of international Law in international policy,
alongside a sustained interest in strengthening international co-operation as an
instrument nl global stability. However, if the US and many European eouniries
continue to drift apart not only in terms of strategic co-operation, but also psycho-
logically then the Western world will be weakened. The real danger, in otber
words, is that divisions (divergence of interests, value eonlliets. mutual negative
perceptions), and bickering can eventually blur the importance of those fundamen-
tals that the Americans and the Europeans share as heirs ofthe European 1-nlight-
enment. Arguahly we have already witnessed signs of this. If this trend grows it
could lead to the Americans and the Europeans allowing themselves to become not
simply rivals, but even opponents demonising each other's methixis and choices
whilst exalting their own. Therefore, ihere is a challenge for both to acknowledge
some of their weaknesses and genuinely appreciate the limits of iheir strengths and
virtues as an attempt in the direction of avoiding unnecessary confrontation.
We are in the midst of a dynamic environment which may yet hold many future
surprises for transatlantie relations. Accepting reality, rather than pretending
otherwise as has been the case for a long time, may well be the lirst real step
 Transatlantic Relations caught up h\ Reality

in strengthening relations between the VS and Europe for the future. American
and Huropcan leaders should he pragmatic in iheir appreciation of what can be
achieved on the basis of their differences, which are real, and of what each side is.
isn't, or cannot he. They should direct their energies into protnoting co-operalion
on issues they agree upon both in terms of |X)lic> and strategy, being always
prepared to faee up to the faet that an agreement may be elusive. A minimalistic
stcp-hy-step approach seems to be a realistic ehoice under eurrent circumstance>
as it seems likely that we are not far from witnessing the emergence of two poles
of the Wesiem system ecvoperating and competing at the same time.

NOTI S

' ki.-sc;irch for this paper was completed during n stay at the P-aeilic ("ouneil on Interna-
tional Policy (L.A.) as a Getnian Marshall Fund of the United States Eurujvan Visiting
Research Fellow. A larj;c part of research in the US was ba.sed on inter\ii.-v\s; I woulil
liko Ul especially thank caeh and every one of the interviewees (who wished not to be
quoted).
" See lor in.stance. Ronald D. Asmus. "Rebuilding the Atlantic Allianci.-". Fort-ign AlTairs,
vol.S2. no..*). Sopt/(3et 2()().'; Dominique Moisi. "Reinventing the West \ l-'oreign Afjairs.
vol.82, no.d. Nin/Dec 2t)()3. Jiri .Scvidi. [no title|. inC. Lindstrom and B. .Sehmitt (eds.i.
One Year on: Ix'ssoiis l-'irmi Iraq (Paris. Institute for Security Studies. Chaillot Paper.
no.68. MnrLh2(XM). p.lO8.
' Lord Inverehapel (British anibas.sador to Washington) to the Foreign OITice. 22 March
1948. F().ni/68067 AN 1276/1195/45 (Public ReetirdsOllicc. London): 2< March 1948.
Foreign Relations of the United St,urs. vol.111, pp.64-.*>.
* Ekavi Athanassopouldu. Turkey: .\iii;li>.\merifan Security Intert'sts I945-I'^f?2: The
lust l-jitargement of NATO i Londtm. Frank C ass. 1999). p.217.
' For instance. Robert W\ Tucker and David C. Hendriekson. "The Souaes of American
Legitimacy", ti'ivivn Affairs, vol.8.^. no.6. Nov/Dce 2(X)4. pp.21-2.
'' Athanassopoulou. Inrkiw pp. 214-17.
' To whieh de Gaulle rcs[ionded by saying that it was the right of any nation to act inde-
pendently.
* Ronald .Steel. "The Abdication of Europe", in Janies Cha.se and I iiil C. Ravenal (cdsi.
.\tlantis Lost: U.S.-luiniiH-an Relations .Xftcr the Cold War (New York. Council on
Foreign Relations. 1976).
' The ambiguous language whieh NATO intentionally u.sed to describe it's novs I Icxible
Respt)nse deteiTcncc dixtrine (formally adopted in 1967) favoured by the I'S reflected
the wish to maintain the polilieal eohesion nl the allianee rather than a resolution ol
their dilTerent seeurity interests. Ivo H. Daalder. lltv Nature and Practice of I'le.xihlc
Response. NATO Striiit'i;\ and Theater Nuclear Forces Since 7967 (Now York. Columbia
University Press. 1991) p.I.V
'" Sec lor instance. Karl Kaiser. "Europe and Ameriea: A CHtieal Phase". Foreign affairs.
vol.52, no.4. July 1974
'' Steel. "Abdication ul Europe", p.57.
'' Godfrev ll(XJgst)n./lm<'n<-« in OtirTime (Vintage B(K)ks. New York. 1976). p.l2()
'' Niehola.s Wahl. "The Atitonomy of 'Domestie Structures' in European-.Vmeriean Rela-
tions", in Chase and Ravenal . Atlantis Ijist. p.2.M.
'* Andrew J. Pierre. "Ameriea Taccs Westem Europe in the 1980s: Atlanticism Prescrvetl.
 Ekavi Athanassopoulou

Disengauement. ur Devolution.'"', in Cha.se and Ravenal. Atlanits iMst. p.191.

'•* Stanley llolTmann. "No Trumps. No Luek. No Will: Gloomy Thoughts on lurope's
Plight", in Chase and Ravenal. Atlantis iMst. p.27.
'" Ronald I). Asmus. Roben I) Blaekwill and F. Stephen Larrabee.' C an NATO Survne.'".
Washington (Jtuirterly vol.19, no. 2. Spring 1996.
" Robert J Art. AShy Westem Europe Needs the United .States ami NATO". Political
Science Quarterly. \Q\. I l l . n o . I. 1996. Art's paper was bx"ied on inoa" than a hunda'd
interviews with leading European strategic planners. One ofhis major litidings was that
their biggest eoneem was that, if the I S withdrew from Europe. European states would
eompete Tor power and infliienee among themselves.
'* The New York Times. 16 March 2()()2: Riehard N Haass. -Charting a New Course in the
Transatlantie Relationship". Remarks to the Centre for Euro|x:an Reform. London. H)
Jutie 2«)2. available at w w \v.Mate.gov7s/p/rem/l0968.htm: Riehard I. Russell. "NAT( ) \
European Members: Partners or Dependents?", The X'mal Wur Cotlei;<- Rf\tc\s\ VDI.LVI.
no. I. Winter 2(X)3. available at vmw.nwc.navy.mil/press/Re\iciv/2(H).iA\intir.
''' This was the lirsi time in N.'Vl'Os history that Artiele 5 had been lorinally invoked.
•" Russell. "Partners or Dependents.'".
"' Steven E. Meyer. "Careass of IX'ad Policies: The Irrelevaneeof NATO". Parameters {VS
Army WarCollct;e Quarterly). vol.XXXIII. no.4. Winter 2(X).V4. pp.94-.'S. availiable at
earlisle w w w .army.mil/usawe/Parameters
•- These divisions (x;eur not only across national borders but also within European coun-
tries.
-' "The 1 urope that Died". The EcotumLst. 2 June 2(K).'i.
"•' See for instance. Julian Lindley-Freneh. Terms of Engagement: The Parado.x of American
PoMCi aitJ till- Transatlantic Dilemma Post-11 St-piemht-r (Paris. Institute lor Seeurily
Studies. Chaillot Papers. no..'i2. May 2(X)2). p.77- 9; Peter Ludlow.' Waiiietl: A Global
Partner", in .Alexander I J. Lennon (ed). What Does ilu- World Want from America?
(Cambridge. M;LSS:. The MIT Press. 2(H)2). pp.l23-2.S: Andrew Moraxesik. "Striking
a New Transatlantic Bargain'. Foreign Affairs. July/.\ugust 20().^; Reginald Dale. "In
.Se;irchofa New Trans Atlantie Template'./n/('rmj;/(»m;/W<'mW7'n7«inf. 1.^ May 2()()4:
Gustav Gustenau. |no titlel. in Lindstrom. U'ssons From Iraq. p.76.
-' Bob WiKKlward. Httsh At War (New York. Simon and Schuster. 2(X)2). p. 281.
•'' .A Xiiliiiiuil Sectirity S t i a l c t ; \ for lhe Global A g e . T h e W h i t e H o u s e . IX'C.20<X). iv.
•' Similarly the less aggressi\e intemational leadership style employed by the .seeond
Cicorye W. Bush administration amounted to little more than a more clever publie
poliey.
-* na\ id Halberstam. War in A tnm- of Peace: Btish. C 'linton and the Generals (New York.
Simon and Schuster. Hm). p.229.
""' Linda P. Brady. "Working With Allies: Clinum Defense Policy and the Management of
Mullilateralisin". in Stephen J. Cimbala. Clinton and I'ost-Cold Defense (Wcsiproi. Con:
Praeger. 19%). espeeially 7 6 - 7 .
"' Rob de Wijk |iio title|. in Lind.strom. lA-s.sons From Inn/, p.49.
" Ameriean inliuentials pereeive global leadership to imply both responsibilities and free-
doms that other nations do not have
'- Conelusit)ns based on the author's interviews in 2(X)2 and 2(X);< with prominent Demo-
crats and Republicans in Washington D.C. and Califomia.
" Steel is usinj; this to nuike the point that "Europe lacks a fundamental quality that a state
needs to be a major global aetor. li laeks a will to power". Ronald Steel, liurope: The
Phantom Pillar", in R. Laurence M(K)re and Mauri/io Vaudagna (eds). Thf Aimiimn
Cenittry in l-.iirope {llhaax. Comell University Press. 2()().^). p.74.
" On the contradiction in these two beliefs see. Walter Lal eher. ""Ihe United States and
 Transatlantic Relations caught up hy Reality

Europe in an Ace ol American Unilalcralism"". in Moore. American Century in

p.:.s.
" Robert VV luckcr and I);t\ id C, Hcndrickson. I'he Imperial Icmptcition: The New World
Onii-rimdAmeriitt's Purpose (New York. Council on Foreign Kclutions. 1992). p,.S7.
** Quoted in SlecL "Phanioni Pillar", in Moore and Vaudagna (edsi. The :\iiurican Century.
p.72.
" Following the controversy lhe 1992 Guidance was appaivntly reviewed, bul its objection-
able part.s were not removed, unly sottcned. Barton Gellman, "Pentagon .Abandons Goal
of Thwarting I S Rivals. The Washington Post. 24 Miiy 1992.
'* David Armstrong. "Dick Cheney's Song ol Atnerica: Drafting a Plan lor Global l>i>nii-
natKe"\ Haqiers (Ocl 2(X)2). p.81.
•'* I iM an iniercstinj: stuil\ of Europe in this regard see Jeremy RilVin. The Europttin
Dream: How Eumpe s Vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream
(NcwYork.Tarcher. 2(X)4i
•"' Collectively Europe spends IW) billion euros per year on defence. (The US spends two
thirds more than Europe).
^' European ("ouneil. "Etiropean .Security Strategy. 12 Dec 2(K)3". in Antonio Missiroli
(cottipl. Enmi Copenlutgett to Brussels: European Defence: Core Diximietits. xol.lV
(Paris. Institute lor Security Studies. Chaillol Papers, no.67. December 200.^). p.32S.
*- George W. Bush. 2(X)I. "Retnarks by the President to Siudent.s atid Faculty at National
Defense University." Washingtoti. D.C. Available al http://www,v\hitflu>iisf,i;(n/nfw,<i/
rekases/2tK)IA)5/2()OIO5OI~lO,htmi. Donald Rutnsfeld. "Toward 21" Cenlury Deter-
rence" I he Wall Street Jounml. 21 June 2(K)l:AI(i.
^' Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams (eds). International RitatiDtn flu ory and the
Politics (if Euro/wan Integration: Power. Security aiui Community (London. Roulledge.
2(XX)).
** l-rotn Copenhaagen to Bni'iscts, vol.1 V. pp..'24-.VVv
*'' On US strategy during lhe seeond Bush adtninistration sec John Lewis Gaddis. "Grand
Strategy in lhe Second Tenn". Foreign Affairs, vol.84, no. 1. 2(K).S.
" International Herald Tribune. 28 Nov. 2(X).'i. p.3.
•*' The Missile l>:fensc.Aol of 1991 authorised lhe development of Theatre Missile IXMense
Systctns and National Missile Defense Systems, to intercept and dcstrov a litnited attack,
allhough Ihc US had nol proposed a specilic missile defence programme by lhe end of
the Clinion Administration. The (k-orge W. Bush Administration made it clear in lhe
lirsi half of 20()l thai il intended to priKeed with research and development ol a missile
defence prt>gratnme. European opposition to Bush's tnissilc defenee plans has not been
unanimous.
•"* Reginald Dale. "Trans-Atlantic Dispute Over Arming China". Intenwtional Herald
Tribune. LS July 2(X)4. US policy towards Israel has repeaietlly caused great tension
even with London.
•''' John Vinix:ur. "U.S. Views Atlantic Ties with l^abored Optimism". Intemationai Herald
Tribune. 22 No\ 2(X).'i.
'" Henry Kissinger. The Trotibled Partnership: A Re-appraisal of the Aildiiiic Alliance
(New York. Doubleday. I9(i6).p.4()
^' Isaiah Berlin. "Two Concepts ol Liberty", in Henry Hardy (ed), Ilw Proper Sttuly of
A/uiiJt/m/ (Lotidon, Chatto atid Windus. 1997). p. 197.
^' Many analysts lend to simplily the dynamics of tension in transatlantic relations by
making a distinction, at most, between the 'old' and 'new' Europe, or those eountries
which clashed with the US over Iraq (France. Germany) and the other liU metnbers
(although European governments that supported Washington's policy o\cr the Iraq crisis
did tiot always carry public opinion). While support for US policies is big among Eitst
 Ekavi Athanassopouhm

European political leaders criiicism of many US policies is sironj: across European

national boundaries including Eastem linrope.
'^ In fact the cutting edge of anti-Americanism has been coming from Ihe populist right.
'^•' For an interesting analysis that views the Atlantic divide as a siruggle over post-Cold
War identities v\iihin and among continenial Europe. Britain, and the US al Ihe heart of
the Atlantic see Timt)thy Garlon Ash. Free World: .\merica. Europe, and the Surprising
Future of the West (New York. Randotn House. 2004).
" Clearly political success in a lew European countries including France. Germany. Spain,
has inereasingly becoming also dependent on disagreeing with Washington on many of
the most importanl intemational issues.
^ Certainly Ihis is not a new poinl. but generally is made in reference to the pre-Second
World War Europe, see tor instance David Fromkin. In the Time of the Ameriams (New
York. Alfred A Knopf. \mf>).
' ' Cited in Tucker. Imperial Temptation, p. 172.
^^ Romano Prodi. "2()(X)-2(K)5: Shaping the New Europe". Speech to the European Parlia-
ment. \ft Feb 20(X). Strasbourg. The .similarities in senior European officials' under-
standing of what the essence and purpose of ihe EU political paradigm is. with those
underlined hy the early Americans, are striking. Daniel Webster, the 19th eentury Amer-
ican statesman and orator v\as declaring in a speech in 1826: "America held out Ihe lar
dilTerent prospect dlbeingable. 'by the mere influence of civil liberty and relijiioiis toler-
ation, to dry up these outpouring tounlains of bkuHl. and to extinguish these consuming
lircs of war.'" in Tucker. Imperial Temptation. 168.
'''' Samuel P. Huntington. "American Ideals Versus American In.stitutions". in G. John
Ikenberry icd). American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essaw (Glenview. Illinois. Scott.
Foresman and Company. 1989). p.236.
"" Upon the victory in the Gulf War a jubilant President Bush told state govemment
oflicials. "By God. we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all", quoted in
Douglas Little. American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle i.u\t Since
1945 (London. I.B. Tauris. 2(X)2). p.2(i2.
*"' David R. Gergen. "The Media and Intemational Relations and Foreign Poliey". in David
L. Boren and Edward J. Perkins (eds). Preparing America's Foreign Policy for the 21"
C<'/i/«n'(University of Oklahoma Press: Norman. 1997). p.28l.
''^ Stephan Stetter. "Democratization without f)emocracy'.'The Assistance of the European
Union lor Democratization PriKesses in Palestine". Mediterranean Politics, vol.8, fio.2-

'"' John J. Mearsheimer. "The False Promise of Intemational Institutions'. International

Security, vol.19, no..^. 1994/1995.
"^ It ha.s been argued that transatlantic relations are based on an Acquis Atlatuique. that
is detined as a set of live principles: a common transatlantic heritage: demixrracy:
liberty; peaee: prosperity. Peter BarsehdortT. Facilitating Transatlantic Cooperation
After the Cold War: :\ii Acqias Attantiqtie (Palgrave. Lit Verlag. 2(K)I). p.2.^: It is worth
mentioning ihai currently ihe most important relationship between Europe and the I'S
revolves around economic imeresis. In this (ield the two are partners as well as strong
competitors..
"^ Meyer. "The Irrelevance ul NATO". p.9.V
** A goixl example is ihe eo-operaiion between Germany, the UK and France in dealing
wilh the question ol Iran's nuclear programme.