Professional Documents
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White Light vs. Lim
White Light vs. Lim
Lim
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs. CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent. DECISION Tinga, J.: With another city ordinance of Manila also principally involving the tourist district as subject, the Court is confronted anew with the incessant clash between government power and individual liberty in tandem with the archetypal tension between law and morality. In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., the Court affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance barring the operation of motels and inns, among other establishments, within the Ermita-Malate area. The petition at bar assails a similarly-motivated city ordinance that prohibits those same establishments from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or "wash up" rates for such abbreviated stays. Our earlier decision tested the city ordinance against our sacred constitutional rights to liberty, due process and equal protection of law. The same parameters apply to the present petition. This Petition under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which seeks the reversal of the 3 Decision in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the Court of Appeals, challenges the validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila" (the Ordinance). I. The facts are as follows: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the Ordinance. The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder: SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City Government to protect the best interest, health and welfare, and the morality of its constituents in general and the youth in particular. SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance" prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging of room rate for less than twelve (12) hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms more than twice a day or any other term that may be concocted by owners or managers of said establishments but would mean the same or would bear the same meaning. SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of this ordinance shall upon conviction thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not exceeding one (1) year or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court; Provided, That in case of [a] juridical person, the president, the manager, or the persons in charge of the operation thereof shall be
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The RTC noted that the ordinance "strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously 18 guarded by the Constitution." Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay, the RTC likened the law to the ordinance annulled in Ynot v. 19 Intermediate Appellate Court, where the legitimate purpose of preventing indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos was sought to be effected through an inter-province ban on the transport of carabaos and carabeef. The City later filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 112471. However in a resolution dated January 26, 1994, the Court treated the petition as a petition 21 forcertiorari and referred the petition to the Court of Appeals.
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ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHUR Associate Justice (On Sick Leave) ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice
(On Official Leave) DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice
Footnotes
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G.R. 118127, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 308. See rollo, pp. 4-41.
Id. at 42-59. Penned by Associate Justice Jaime M. Lantin, concurred in by Associate Justices Ricardo P. Galvez (later, Solicitor-General) and Antonio P. Solano.
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Id. at 46. Id. at 62-69. Id. at 45-46. Id. at 70-77. Id. at 47. Id. Id. Id. at 48. Id. at 81.
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Id. at 82-83. Id. at 84-99. Id. at 104-105. Id. at 49. Id. at 52. Id. at 120. No. L-74457, 20 March 1987, 148 SCRA 659. Rollo, pp. 129-145. Id. at 158. Id. at 53. Id. Id. at 43-59. Id. at 4-40. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). Const., Art. VIII , Sec. 5, Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary Reyes, 466 Phil. 482 (2004).
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Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1608, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979).
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See Domingo v. Carague, G.R. No. 161065, 15 April 2005, 456 SCRA 450. See also Macasiano v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 107921, 1 July 1993, 224 SCRA 236.
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468 U.S. 737 (1984). Supra note 29. 499 U.S. 400 (1991). Id. at p 410-411.
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See Kelsey McCowan Heilman, The Rights of Others: Protection and Advocacy Organizations Associational Standing to Sue, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 237, for a general discussion on advocacy groups.
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381 U.S. 479(1965). Id. at 481. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Id. at 194.
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Chavez v. Comelec, G.R. No. 162777, 31 August 2004, 437 SCRA 415; Adiong v. Comelec, G.R. No. 103956, 31 March 1992, 207 SCRA 712.
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City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., supra note 1; Tatel v. Municipality of Virac, G.R. No. 40243, 11 March 1992, 207 SCRA 157, 161; Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority, G.R. No. 102782, 11 December 1991, 204 SCRA 837, 845; Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., G.R. No. 111097, 20 July 1994, 234 SCRA 255, 268-267.
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Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, 127 Phil. 306 (1967).
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JMM Promotion and Management Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 87, 94 (1996) citing Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660 (1919).
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U.S. v. Rodriguez, 38 Phil. 759. People v. Chan, 65 Phil. 611 (1938). Javier v. Earnshaw, 64 Phil. 626 (1937). Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal, 56 Phil. 123 (1931). See U.S. v. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil. 104 (1908); Insular Government v. Ling Su Fan, 15 Phil. 58 (1910). Lopez v. Director of Lands, 47 Phil. 23, 32 (1924).
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See City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., supra note 1 at 330 citing CHEMERINSKY, ERWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, 2nd Ed. 523 (2002).
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304 U.S. 144 (1938). Id, at 152. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988). 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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Central Bank Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531 (2004); Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. Nos. 78742, 79310, 79744, and 79777, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343; In Ermita-Malate, supra note 1 at 324, the Court in fact noted: "if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of government acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects what are at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is wider."
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Central Bank Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, supra note 57. Id.
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Mendoza, J., Concurring Opinion in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, 19 November 2001, 369 SCRA 394.
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Id. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). It has been opined by Chemerinsky that the use of the equal protection clause was to avoid the use of substantive due process since the latter fell into disfavor in the United States. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies (2nd ed. 2002).
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Morfe v. Mutuc, 130 Phil. 415 (1968). Id. at 440. City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., supra note 1 at 336-337. Rollo, p. 258.
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"Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to consummate their bonds in intimate sexual conduct within the motel's premises be it stressed that their consensual sexual behavior does not contravene any fundamental state policy as contained in the Constitution. (See Concerned Employee v. Glenda Espiritu Mayor, A.M. No. P-02-1564, 23 November 2004) Adults have a right to choose to forge such relationships with others in the confines of their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows persons the right to make this choice. Their right to liberty under the due process clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government, as long as they do not run afoul of the law. Liberty should be the rule and restraint the exception. Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is the beginning of all freedom it is the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr. supra note 1 at 337-338.
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Metro Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., G.R. Nos. 170656 and 170657, 15 August 2007, 530 SCRA 341.
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Carlos Superdrug v. DSWD, G.R. No. 166494, June 29, 2007, Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, 24 Phil. 172 (1968); U.S. v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102 (1918).
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Philippine Press Institute v. Comelec, 314 Phil. 131 (1995). Supra note 1.
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City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., supra note 1; De La Cruz, et al. v. Hon. Paras, et al., 208 Phil. 490 (1983); Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, supra note 42.
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"The end of the state is not mere life; it is, rather, a good quality of life." Therefore any state "which is truly so called, and is not merely one in name, must devote itself to the end of encouraging goodness. Otherwise, a political association sinks into a mere alliance" The law "should be a rule of life such as will make the members of a [state] good and just." Otherwise it "becomes a mere covenant or (in the phrase of the Sophist Lycophron) a guarantor of mens rights against one another." Politics II.9.68.1280 31-1280bii; cited in Hamburger, M., Morals and Law: The Growth of Aristotles Legal Theory (1951 ed.), p. 178.
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Steven G., Render Unto Caesar that which is Caesars, and unto God that which is Gods, 31 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 495. He cites the example of the failed Twentieth (?) Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which prohibited the sale and consumption of liquor, where it was clear that the State
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cannot justly and successfully regulate consumption of alcohol, when huge portions of the population engage in its consumption. See also Posner, Richard H., The Problematics of Moral And Legal Theory, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press (2002). He writes: . . . Holmes warned long ago of the pitfalls of misunderstanding law by taking its moral vocabulary too seriously. A big part of legal education consists of showing students how to skirt those pitfalls. The law uses moral terms in part because of its origin, in part to be impressive, in part to speak a language that the laity, to whom the commands of the law are addressed, is more likely to understand and in part, because there is a considerable overlap between law and morality. The overlap, however, is too limited to justify trying to align these two systems of social control (the sort of project that Islamic nations such as Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan have been engaged in of late). It is not a scandal when the law to pronounce it out of phase with current moral feeling. If often is, and for good practical reasons (in particular, the law is a flywheel, limiting the effects of wide swings in public opinion). When people make that criticismas many do of the laws, still found on the statute books of many states, punishing homosexual relationswhat they mean is that the law neither is supported by public opinion nor serves any temporal purpose, even that of stability, that it is merely a vestige, an empty symbol.
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