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Rana Deep Islam

born 1982; currently located in Berlin; studied International Relations at the College of Europe in Bruges. After gaining professional experience at the Johns-Hopkins-University in Washington DC, the European Parliament in Brussels and the InWEnt (German government subcontractor for international cooperation) in Bonn, he started his PhD studies in fall 2009 (supervised by Prof. Stefan Frhlich from Erlangen University, Institute for Political Science). He is also a Junior Fellow at the Dsseldorfer Institut fr Auen- und Sicherheitspolitik. Research interests: European foreign and security policy, Turkish-European relations, Turkish foreign policy. Contact e-mail: rdislam@gmail.com The article was written and completed at the end of November 2010.

Turkish Foreign Policy Reaching Out for New Frontiers?

Summary
In the past years, Turkey was able to readjust the relations it maintains to the states of its neighbourhood. Approaching regional security be it on the Balkans, be it in the Middle East, be it in Central Asia can no longer afford to disregard the strategic role being played by Turkey. However, Ankaras declining relationship to the West raises serious doubt whether the country will really be able to position itself as a reliable partner on the global stage. The structural alienation between Tel Aviv and Ankara or Turkeys hidden agenda on Iran, deliberately overriding US and European interests, illustrate the countrys emancipation from Western considerations. In the end, Turkey might be able to maintain a policy of regional leadership, especially in its Middle Eastern neighbourhood, however, such an approach goes to the disadvantage of its Western anchoring.

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Rana Deep Islam

Turkish Foreign Policy Reaching Out for New Frontiers?

Turkish foreign policy is subject to frequent media coverage and political science debate. Just recently The Economist issued a special report on the question whether Turkey is drifting off the West regarding the countrys current standing in international relations. Devoting a 14-page long extra in an internationally recognized weekly does not necessarily need to be considered as unusual. However, dealing with an ostensible alienation between the West and Turkey, both being tied on common institutional grounds for many decades, would not have been imaginable a couple of years ago. Indeed Ankaras current approach to foreign policy differs significantly from previous governments. The ruling AKP under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan regularly underlines its willingness to break with traditional foreign policy positions. The alignment with the Western camp is one of those principles that seem to erode in the eyes of some political analysts. Turkeys current foreign policy pattern is best represented by Ahmet Davutolu, who has been serving as Turkeys Foreign Minister since 2009. Previously he had been acting as a high-ranking advisor to Erdoan and political science professor. In 2001 and shortly before AKP came to power, Davutolu wrote a remarkable book titled Strategic Depth, sketching out the basic principles Turkish foreign policy should be based on. Not many political scientists actually make it into the real world of political business, being able to implement their ideas they were postulating in academic circles before. However, formulating theoretical concepts of international relations is one side of the coin. On the other hand decision makers see themselves exposed to the limiting role of political pitfalls. Consequently one has to ask, whether the current implementation of Turkish foreign policy is in line with the intellectual desiderata expressed by Davutolu in the run up to his assumption of office as Foreign Minister. Where does Turkey stand in terms of its foreign policy? What are the positive results of its approach towards international issues and what are the setbacks? And finally: Is Davutolus foreign policy thinking really as innovative as experts consider it to be? These are the questions the article will be dealing with on the following pages.

Five Principles of Davutolus Strategic Thinking Old Wine in New Bottles?

The foundations of Davutolus foreign policy mindset are well elaborated in Glistan

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Grbeys article on Turkish foreign policy under the AKP government, which was published earlier in 2010. 1 However, for a better understanding of Ankaras foreign policy, Davutolus concept formulated in his keynotes and speeches will be briefly summarized in the following. Turkeys Foreign Minister distinguishes five basic principles redefining the countrys international role. First of all, he highlights Turkeys necessity for a holistic approach towards its neighbourhood. He considers the country to be a centrepiece of a region comprising Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caspian Basin and Central Asia. Turkey can accordingly no more afford to neglect any of those regions as happened in the past, when Ankara was predominantly focused on its Western identity which systematically excluded the existing strategic importance of its neighbourhood. Second Davutolu underlines the need to pursue a pro-active and pre-emptive peace diplomacy, meaning that the country should get involved in international affairs before a crisis breaks out. Third, while relations to neighbouring states were conflict-ridden and strained in former times, Davutolu now recommends a policy of zero problems with its surrounding region on the basis of growing economic ties with external trading partners and stronger diplomatic activities. Fourth, the country is expected to follow a multidimensional policy approach. In other words, Turkey shall maintain and deepen its relations to key players like the US, Russia, NATO and the EU at the same time. Relations to one of these partners must not be disadvantageous for relations to others. Instead, Turkeys bilateral affairs need to be complementary and not in competition. And fifth, last but not least, Davutolu regularly refers to the notion of a rhythmic diplomacy. He wants his country to get involved with all relevant matters of international importance through a more distinguished role in international organisations and multilateral bodies of decision-making. These principles represent a different understanding of how Turkey is willing to get involved in international relations today compared to the role it played over long periods of the Cold War history. Anyhow, it would be misleading to characterize this policy to be new or innovative as if it was formulated from scratch. Volker Perthes, head of the Berlin based German Institute for International and Security Affairs, delivered an op-ed calling Recep Tayyip Erdoan to be the Atatrk of the 21st century due to the regional added value of the countrys foreign policy. 2 Comparing the current Prime Minister with the much-glorified founder of the Turkish Republic might be slightly provocative and polemic. However, a statement like this implies a continuity in international politics the current AKP decision makers build on. And indeed the governments juncture of domestic stability as a precondition for an effective and valuable design of its international outreach can be found in Atatrks much quoted saying of peace at home and peace in the world a wording which still serves as the slogan of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The founding fathers non-interventionist policy, which broke with the expansionist and colonial

1 2

Glistan Grbey: Wandel in der trkischen Auenpolitik unter der AKP-Regierung? Auenminister Davutolus Konzept der Strategischen Tiefe, Sdosteuropa Mitteilungen, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2010, pp. 17-27. Volker Perthes: Erdogan ist der Atatrk des 21. Jahrhunderts, Tages-Anzeiger, 10 February 2010.

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heritage of the Ottoman Empire, is another factor resembling the willingness of the current Turkish government to maintain working relations with its neighbourhood. One does not need to go back to the birth of the Turkish state in order to reveal historical similarities. The era of Prime Minister Turgut zal between 1983 and 1993 also gives proof that policy implications which are commonly associated with AKP rulers, already had been in force previously. zal also acknowledged Turkeys diverse regional identity and consequently followed a more active approach towards the countrys regional setting. 3 However, one fundamental difference distinguishes the AKP decision makers and their stance on foreign relations in comparison to initiatives which were put forward by former Turkish heads of state or government. Namely the perception of Turkey among its neighbouring countries has changed dramatically, especially referring to the Middle East. Turkeys willingness to create conciliatory and non-confrontational relations with the Muslim world remained a lip service in the past. The de facto disagreements separating the Middle Eastern region from Ankara were insurmountable and made any real progress impossible, due to mutual discrepancies arising out of political differences, historical stereotypes and societal antagonism. Things apparently have changed in the meantime. Muslim societies in the Middle East see Turkey as positively as never before. 4 Reasons for this development are multilayered and cannot be described here in brief. However, in the end, the improving reputation Turkey enjoys in the region is mirrored by concrete policy initiatives in the field. Consequently the genuinely new aspects of Turkish foreign policy are not the objectives and the instruments, but better chances to profoundly implement the countrys claim to get a say in its region and even more so in international affairs in general.

Moving On to New Pastures

One of the most striking features of Turkeys new policy approach in the regional arena is its improved relationship to Syria. Just in 1998, the two states stood at the brink of war. Ankara accused its neighbour of giving a safe haven to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which Turkey considers to be a terrorist organization. Furthermore there was disagreement over the water shares of the Tigris-Euphrat Basin and territorial demands made by Syria over the status of the Turkish province Hatay. Since then, however, and especially under the AKP government, the two countries are in a constant process of improving their relationship. The free-trade agreement signed in 2004 as well as the visa-free traffic introduced in 2009 turned out to be a foundation for boosting mutual trade and economy. Trust building
3 4 Emiliano Alessandri: The New Turkish Foreign Policy and the Future of Turkey-EU Relations, research paper, Instituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, February 2010, here pp. 4-5. See also Mensur Akgn / Gke Perinolu / Sabiha Senycel Gndoar: The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East, research paper, The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation / TESEV, Istanbul, December 2009.

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actions like common military exercises or the exchange of military personnel bring the countries together also in terms of security and defence cooperation. And finally these measures are flanked by regular bilateral high-level meetings, which had not been possible in former times. In doing so, the two countries represent a good example for successful bilateral conflict management, possibly serving as a role-model or even a nucleus for the handling of other state-to-state conflicts prevailing in the Middle East. Such progress can also translate into political influence as was seen when Turkey auspiciously mediated between Tel Aviv and Damascus on terminating the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights. The talks could not be concluded successfully due to the Gaza war which broke out in 2008 knocking down any diplomatic activity in the region. However, as negotiations were broken off at a very final stage, informal arrangements which already had been agreed upon can be followed up in the context of future efforts. Syrian decision makers already expressed their willingness to revive a process leading to a settlement with Israel. 5 Whether Turkey is able to assume a mediating role in future can be legitimately put into question due to Israeli-Turkish constraints, which shall be elaborated at a later point. However, taking all this into account, Ankara gave proof that it is able to contribute positively to peace and stability in its neighbourhood. Turkeys willingness for regional engagement is also reflected by its decidedness to align with Syria and Iran in order to better coordinate a common approach towards the integrity of Iraqi statehood. The underlying security rationale relates to the Kurdish entity in Northern Iraq and its desire for autonomy. Iran, Syria and Turkey all fear that Kurdish extremists on their territories might feel inspired by the spread of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq, finally leading to civil unrest and instability in the whole region. Accordingly, the trilateral interest for cooperation is first and foremost negativistic as it is directed against an ethnic group and its struggle for independence rather than being in favour of creating a viable Iraqi state. 6 But in terms of Realpolitik, security communities evolve on the basis of a national interest multiple states have in common. A normative and altruistic dynamic might then develop in the following but the own agenda is dominating at first hand. In this regard it is still to be seen whether this triangle approach turns out to be sustainable beyond the Kurdish issue. For the time being, however, one needs to acknowledge that a group of Middle Eastern countries is seeking a multilateral discussion on the basis of mutual security perceptions a state of affairs still being uncommon for the region. Turkeys determination to foster conflict settlement in its regional context was less successful when looking at the centre of Middle Eastern quarrel, namely the decades-long discord between Israel and the Palestinians. In spite of Ankaras
5 6 William Hale: Turkey and the Middle East in the New Era, Insight Turkey, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2009, pp. 143-159, here pp. 151-152. Heinz Kramer: AKPs new foreign policy between vision and pragmatism, research paper, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, June 2010, pp. 12-13.

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in-depth relationship to authorities in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, 7 Turkeys effort to reach an agreement between Hamas and Fatah or its mediating role between Hamas and Israel led nowhere. Davutolus talk of proactive peace diplomacy did not work out in this part of the countrys neighbourhood yet. Anyhow it would be unfair to seriously consider this deadlock when judging Turkeys overall outcome of its Middle East strategy. The US and the European Union, actors having more and better diplomatic means at their disposal, constantly fail, too, when trying to curb conflict in the region. Altogether, there is reason enough to see Turkey as an indispensable partner when it comes to international peace initiatives for the Middle East. Ankaras government maintains good relations to many actors and states in the region. It furthermore follows a clear policy of soft-power, exporting commodities and industrial product which elevates the country to an important trading partner in the neighbourhood. And finally Turkish cultural goods like TV-shows and even soap operas are watched in Arab living rooms turning Turkey into an actor who also leaves its cultural footprint in the region. 8 Ankara is accelerating its activities not only in the Arab and Muslim world. As part of its multidimensional foreign policy the country is about to discover the African continent, too. The Ottoman Empire, predecessor of todays modern Turkey, had been the dominating power in Northern Africa for a long time. However during the years of the Cold War, Ankara neglected the continent almost entirely. Interestingly it was Foreign Minister Ismail Cem under the DSP government, who initiated a genuine policy approach towards Africa in 1998. This shows again the already existent foundations the AKP could build on after its coming to power in 2002. Erdoan and his cabinet however intensified Turkeys Africa policy to a significant degree and made the continent a strategic component of their general foreign policy pattern. The Turkish government declared 2005 to be the year of Africa to be followed by state visits of Prime Minister Erdoan. Trade relations and Turkish foreign direct investments as well as the countrys contribution to development aid grew significantly leading to Turkeys membership in the African Development Bank in 2008. The first Africa-Turkey Cooperation Summit, taking place in the same year, furthermore illustrated the willingness on both sides, the African countries as well as Turkey, to institutionalize their mutual relationship on a constant and long-term basis. 9 Just recently the AKP government announced to open embassies in about fifteen African states in the next couple of years. At this point though, Turkeys decision makers reach their limits. The question is whether sufficient diplomatic staff is available to manage the all-encompassing policy outreach determined by the
7 8 9 See also Silke Mertins: Erdogan mutiger als alle arabischen Fhrer, Neue Zrcher Zeitung, 9 June 2010. Ibrahim Kalin: Debating Turkey in the Middle East: The Dawn of a New Geopolitical Imagination?, Insight Turkey, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2009, pp. 83-96. Mehmet zkan / Birol Akgn: Turkeys Opening to Africa, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 48, No. 4, 2010, pp. 525-546.

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government. Turkey needs to boost the education of diplomatic personnel, a process which might take several years in order to conduct the objective of a holistic Africa policy. Furthermore it needs to be said that due to an almost non-existent Turkish-African common heritage the knowledge of the respective other side is not very widespread, neither in African societies nor in Turkey. Ankara would therefore be well advised to complement the formulation of its ambitious goals in Africa with an intensified policy, fostering cultural awareness and educational cooperation, e.g. establishing student exchange programs and cooperation of civil society organisations. 10 Ankaras remarkable engagement in the Western Balkans is another factor indicating Turkeys seriousness about its aim to break new ground in foreign policy. Davutolu regularly underlines the historical Ottoman legacy that this part of Southern Europe and Turkey has in common. Furthermore millions of Turks trace back their ethnic origin to the Balkans making an interest in the region an importance in Turkish every day life. Such a priority is reflected not only by the growing economic ties the Western Balkans and Turkey share. AKP government representatives also try hard to position their country as a pivotal actor for the appeasement between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although the Turkish government raises suspicion to follow a sectarian Islamic and pro-Bosnian policy in the region, it becomes more and more evident that the country cannot be bypassed anymore by the international community when seeking a sustainable conflict settlement in the Western Balkans. And finally its states have reason enough to turn towards Turkey and letting the country play its favoured strategic role, seeing that their future for full-fledged membership in the European Union is fading due to the current enlargement fatigue the EU suffers from. Against this backdrop Turkey becomes a welcome partner who might be able to fill the vacuum EU decision makers leave behind. 11 Last but not least, Turkish-Armenian relations must be mentioned as a prime example for Ankaras revision of prevailing policy principles. It all began with the so called football diplomacy when in 2008 Turkish president Abdullah Gl attended a world cup qualifier between the two countries in Yerevan. This initial move culminated in mutual negotiations which were finally concluded under Swiss brokerage in form of an agreement framing the establishment of diplomatic ties and the reopening of the common border. 12 The bilateral relationship is mainly challenged by the Armenian allegation of genocide committed under Ottoman rule during World War I. Until today Turkey disclaims this narrative. The agreement however established a joint commission of historians and experts in order to examine this period of the beginning 20th century, representing a huge step forward in the

10 11 12

Mehmet zkan: Turkey Discovers Africa: Implications and Prospects, research paper, Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research / SETA, Ankara, September 2008. Duan Relji: Die Trkei weckt alte Lieben und Feindschaften im Westbalkan, research paper, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, September 2010. See also Michael Gunter / Dirk Rochtus: Special Report: The Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement, Middle East Critique, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2010, pp. 157-172.

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process of reconciling the quarrel over historical truth. Another point of disagreement refers to the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkey, ethnically feeling affiliated with the Azeri state, partially sided against Armenia and unilaterally closed its border to Armenia in 1993. Announcing its reopening caused fierce reactions among government circles in Baku who threatened Ankara to terminate the gas and oil cooperation which is essential for Turkeys goal to become an internationally leading energy hub. The intertwined conflict between Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan finally caused a stalemate in the ratification process of the protocol which is put on hold since. This observation directly leads to the predicament of irreconcilable inconsistencies Turkish foreign policy has to face. The Armenian deadlock illustrates that Ankaras claim for a foreign policy which entails the principles of a preventive peace diplomacy, multidimensionality and zero problems to its neighbours cannot be implemented at the same time. It rather gives evidence for a certain naivety of Turkish foreign policy makers who tend to overestimate their own capabilities. Altogether the AKP government made clear its commitment to walk the talk, putting Davutolus foreign policy pattern into practice. This shall not deny the fact that practical limitations hamper an all-embracing implementation of this policy but the country is on a promising way. Compared with the case of Armenia, where the process of reconciliation is stuck, it still can be stated that at least a process is underway; a significant progress in comparison to former times. Anyhow, negative aspects must not be unmentioned. Especially Ankaras relationship to the West raises serious doubt whether the country will really be able to position itself as a reliable partner on the global stage.

A Critical Assessment Turkey Affronting the West

Analysts in the United States and Europe are increasingly critical of Turkeys foreign policy. And indeed picking out negative aspects is more than legitimate. First of all, it is the Prime Ministers personal way of dealing with issues of global politics, making it difficult to neglect the impression of a certain Turkish estrangement off the West. It is hard to forget about Erdoans eruption during the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2009, when he walked off the stage after having accused Israel to know how to kill, regarding the Gaza military campaign. For someone who follows the goal of turning his country into a serious and generally accepted mediator, such a comment cannot be considered to be helpful for doing so. Furthermore Erdoan raised attention when he received Sudanese President al Basher in Ankara, announcing that no Muslim is able to perpetrate genocide. This statement not only contradicts the Western approach of holding al Basher responsible for the atrocities Sudanese military forces commit in Darfur. It is also another example for Erdoans undiplomatic and biased behaviour perplexing Western observers. One can wonder what Davutolu and President Gl think of their Prime Ministers defiance seeing that the former is trying hard to please everybody and leaving it to the latter to use his representative authority in order to appease Western politicians and not letting them think of

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any kind of Turkish Sonderweg. Or as the Turkish newspaper Milliyet put it: Davutolu makes, Erdoan breaks and Gl picks up the pieces. 13 However, focusing on Erdoans personal behaviour would not comprehend the issue of Turkish-Western alienation in its entirety. It is not only what the Turkish Prime Minister says but also what his government does that causes serious frictions with authorities in capitals all over Europe and the US. First of all the dispersing conflict lines between Turkish and Israeli officials meanwhile take form of a structural rift rather than of temporal dysfunctions. Such an assumption is illustrated by the bilateral disagreement on the treatment of the Gaza flotilla which was led by the Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief IHH, a Turkish charity group which was mainly responsible for planning the maritime convoy. In May 2010 its vessels were carrying relief supplies to be delivered to the Palestinian people of the Gaza Strip. In doing so the flotilla was trying to intentionally break Israels Gaza blockade which finally led to a military operation conducted by an Israeli special unit costing the lives of nine Turkish activists. The use of force was indeed disproportionate as stated in the final report of an investigation under the heading of the United Nations Human Rights Council. However, Ankaras first reaction to the raid was one-sided and populist opposing usual bilateral information and consultation mechanisms: The Turkish government recalled its ambassador from Tel Aviv, terminated scheduled military exercises with the Israeli army and closed its airspace which by then had been used by the Israeli air force. The Turkish reaction took place at a point of time when no concrete information was available on the sequence of actions. The Turkish government furthermore must have known of the IHH and its Islamist and antiIsraeli background. 14 And indeed armed IHH members joined the activists, what in turn should have given reason enough to consider the eventuality of an arranged provocation of the organizers who were in charge and to question their seemingly peaceful intentions. In this regard Turkish officials had been better off if they had curbed down their fierce reactions for the sake of diplomacy. Even more so, Davutolu himself threatened the Israeli government to cancel diplomatic relations to Israel completely, if the country does not issue an apology or accept the establishment of an independent commission of investigation (not to be confused with the UNHCR probe). Such a body was set up in the meantime. But even if it comes to a verdict making Israel primarily responsible for the escalation of violence, it is illusive to assume that the government in Tel Aviv will formally apologize and cover subsequent payments of compensation. Such a scenario would not only contribute to a major setback for Israeli-Turkish relations but it will also lead to a situation where one side definitively looses face.
13 14 Citation to be found in The Davutoglu Effect, The Economist Special Report, 21 October 2010. Evan F. Kohlmann: The Role of Islamic Charities in International Terrorist Recruitment and Financing, research paper, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, 2006/7.

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The way Ankara is approaching Iran is another matter of concern in the eyes of Western decision makers. To a certain degree it needs to be seen positively how successful the two countries are mending their relationship after years of mutual crisis. The Islamic Republic and Turkey with its distinguished form of secularity are not only divided by political systems that could not be any more different from each other. Iran furthermore gave support for extremist organisations operating on Turkish soil in order to export its own Islamic revolution, which in turn seriously strained bilateral relations in the past. Meanwhile a certain sense of pragmatism entered the climate between the two states, being illustrated by growing economic ties and political cooperation. But apparently this detente goes to the disadvantage of Turkeys affiliation with the West. In May 2010, Turkey and Brazil brokered a nuclear swap deal with Iran. Accordingly Teheran agrees to enrich its uranium abroad. 15 Although the deal reveals only a weak binding character, one could appreciate Turkeys ambition to reach a diplomatic settlement of Irans nuclear programme. Anyhow, the initiative was not well adjusted with the Western engagement which took place at the same time. Ankara knew of the United States long-term efforts to form a majority in the United Nations Security Council for imposing coercive measures against Iran. Finally Washington was successful in doing so and could even get China and Russia on board, who usually follow a conciliatory approach refraining from sanctions. Consequently, Ankara and Brasilia represented as non-permanent members in the Security Council voted against the US-led alliance and its resolution issuing a new round of sanctions against the Teheran regime. From this perspective it can be concluded that Turkey knowingly worked against the US, put itself apart from the Security Councils consensus and finally weakened the Western negotiation basis towards Iran in general. At the end of the day, Ankara has proven that it is indeed able to influence the international agenda and to pursue its own policy, but not necessarily in harmony with its Western partners. What are the gains of such a policy which breaks with former allies? Is there any added value the Turkish government is trying to reach while putting up the eventuality to step out of the Western mainstream? For sure Ankara is polishing up its profile as centre of gravity in the Muslim world. Since Egypt is constantly withdrawing as power that brings order to the Middle East and against the backdrop of a regional security architecture that is getting ever more complicated, Turkey is about to fill a vacuum other actors have left. Western analysts however face this development with a growing unease. Columnist Thomas Friedman from the New York Times significantly suspects Turkey of joining a Hamas-Hezbollah-Iran resistance front against Israel. 16 Although this statement is exaggerated it shows the deep-rooted mistrust towards Turkeys foreign policy among Western observers.

15 16

See also Kadir stn: Turkeys Iran Policy: Between Diplomacy and Sanctions, Insight Turkey, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2010, pp. 19-26. Thomas L. Friedman: Letter from Istanbul, New York Times, 16 June 2010.

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Conclusion
When analysing the current pattern of Turkish foreign policy, one comes to a very ambivalent conclusion. In the past years, Ankara was able to readjust the relations it maintains to the states of its neighbourhood. Approaching regional security be it on the Balkans, be it in the Middle East, be it in Central Asia can no longer afford to disregard the strategic role being played by Turkey. From this perspective the country is in the process of reaching new frontiers concerning its foreign policy outreach. Indeed Atatrk and the zal era displayed certain similarities regarding their understanding of international affairs. However, both of them were not able to seriously implement such a policy. The AKP government seems to do better in this regard as its policy parameters do not remain on a speech act level only but are systematically being put into practice. However in this context it also needs to be said that AKP decision makers benefit from the current pattern of international politics. The US and the EU are still being crippled by the financial crisis and its domestic reconditioning while rising actors like India, China, Brazil and Russia are advancing fast in political as well as in economic terms. All this creates new geostrategic structures and a revised map of international relations. Only this redistribution of power allows a country like Turkey to develop a bigger say on a global scale. Though international affairs do not necessarily comply with the logic of a zero-sum game, it seems to be the case when looking at Turkeys relationship with the Western world. The countrys harsh and partisan critique against Israel, its favouring of the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or Sudanese leader Hassan al Bashir, both being a persona non grata in Europe and the US, or finally Turkeys open lobbying in the UN Security Council against the United States; all this creates the impression of a growing estrangement among partners who had been tied together for more than half a century. Indeed Turkeys rising reputation illustrates that its policy falls on fertile ground among societies in the Middle East. And in fact it may be welcomed that people show their solidarity with Recep Tayyip Erdoan, a freely elected Prime Minister thus being a representative of democracy which still has a hard time in the Muslim world. However, seeing mass demonstrations crowding their way through Middle Eastern capitals yelling anti-American and anti-Israeli slogans and celebrating Erdoan as their hero at the same time makes clear: The Turkish politician is not applauded for his democratic credentials but for his fierce and polemic stance over Western politics. This definitively does not help to reduce doubts of Turkeys Western affiliation. Legitimately it can be argued that Turkey now fulfils the role it was assigned to in the wake of the September 11 attacks. Since then experts and high-ranking politicians are discussing the possibilities how to address the Islamic world more effectively. Against this backdrop Turkey was seen to be an intercivilisational bridge being able to narrow the gap between the Middle East and the West. Turkeys foreign policy therefore may also be considered as a reply to the expectations being laid on the country by foreign observers and as a practical realisation of approaching the Islamic world.
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However, at the moment this bridge looks like an asymmetrical one showing a gravitational spin eastwards. Turkey increasingly turns from a mediator who tries to keep the balance to a country which is getting actively involved in regional turmoil. This makes the bridge notion ever more superfluous as well as Davutolus principles of multidimensionality and zero problems. Turkeys policy of partisanship goes to the disadvantage of the countrys relations with the US and Europe. In the end Turkey might be able to win over public opinion on Arab streets. However, in the mid-term perspective the country will not only loose its Western anchoring but also its ability to serve as an honest broker in a crisis-prone region.

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