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Secretariat of the League of Nations: Established by Article 6 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, this was the civil service which supported especially the work of the Council. It had an international staff and was permanently active.
he League of Nations was an ambitious venture aiming to capitalise on some of the best possibilities of mankind. According to Sir Eric Drummond, the rst Secretary General, it involved the creation of permanent institutions and the building up of a system of international co-operation, permanently to maintain the peace of the world (Barros, 1965: 312). Lord Robert Cecil, an early champion of the League and Nobel Prize winner in 1937, believed (sometimes at least) the goal could be achieved by moral force alone (New York Times, 15.1.1919). For individuals such as these, the League of Nations was the rst institution which would have a truly global membership and which would organise global peace comprehensively for the long term. A book published by the Secretariat of the League of Nations in 1930 talked explicitly about the organisation of peace (League of Nations, 1930: ch. 2). As such, it reected a widespread belief that international disorganisation, including chaotic competition among nations, had been a major cause of war in 1914 (Sweetser, 1943a: 149). The League was supposed to replace hostile competition for individual power with constructive and friendly co-operation. To this end, the League was not just an organisation supposed to ght the res of conict as they broke out, or threatened to do so; it was supposed to promote peaceful international conditions so advantageous to people that their governments would be unwilling to throw them away. And if any given statesman did seem ready to provoke war, he would face a phalanx of politicians and peoples prepared to make sacrices to stop him. The League of Nations attempted to address the traditional security areas of military competition between states, diplomatic relations, alliance-building and the peaceful settlement of international disputes by negotiation; but it also aimed to remove the very causes of war by promoting social and economic
justice among its members, and by addressing the needs of vulnerable people. This latter approach corresponds to a very modern idea of security, one which in some respects anticipated the UNs Human Security agenda of 2003 [Doc. 1, p. 116]. In a sense, therefore, the League of Nations was eighty years ahead of its time. It presupposed that the harder nations worked together to address humanitarian, social and economic issues, the more likely they were to establish mutual interests and habits of partnership which would provide a bulwark against future conict ( Jones and Sherman, 1927: 140). In his memoirs, Robert Cecil maintained that although the League of Nations ultimately failed to keep the peace in Europe, its social and economic work was extensive and successful (Cecil, 1941: 321). As it examines how the League of Nations went about its work, this book will show that exciting stories and charismatic individuals are not (as the history of the twentieth century too often seems to suggest) the sole preserve of dictatorships and the battleeld. During its life, the League of Nations witnessed moments of high drama such as Haile Selassie arriving to give a speech in Geneva as Abyssinia (Ethiopia) was being annexed by Italy and dealt with issues of life-and-death importance to ordinary people. Obviously crises relating to war are an important part of the picture, but the League also dealt with fascinating, purposeful and life-afrming issues such as the management of refugees, the ght against infectious diseases, the abolition of slavery and people trafcking, and the campaign to stop opium abuse. The study will highlight some of the adventures that went along with the Leagues humanitarian enterprise. For instance, we will see how Fridtjof Nansen and his staff saved lives through dramatic actions in the Baltic and Black Sea regions, how medical institutions responded to the infection of millions with typhus, and how some women were salvaged from virtual incarceration in Turkey. This book will also attempt to show that although the central and eastern parts of Europe were sites of war, revolution and genocide, they were also from the perspective of the League laboratories for important humanitarian experiments. Nansen, for example, was the rst High Commissioner for Refugees and his efforts are still commemorated by the annual award of Nansen awards by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees to individuals responsible for outstanding work with vulnerable people. By telling stories such as Nansens, this introduction to the League of Nations may motivate readers to look more closely at the organisations good work. There are thousands of boxes of documents barely touched in the Geneva archive, all supplemented by similarly relevant and massive holdings in national archives around the world. In other words, the League of Nations is a fascinating but neglected topic of research. Perhaps for a handful of students at least, this will be a starting point for deeper learning about the League, and ultimately for studies of their own.
This thinking can be seen in the writings of Robert Cecil and Jan Smuts, both of whom also agreed the League had to concern itself with more than security seen from a strictly military point of view. As Cecil put it, the League had to ensure that the products essential to the welfare and prosperity of mankind . . . be made available to all, and that peoples unable to defend themselves would not be exploited or oppressed (New York Times, 28.12.1918). With people living satised, peaceful lives on this basis, Cecil felt it unlikely that they would ever knowingly opt for war and hence it made sense to assume that public opinion would constitute a force for good in the world [Doc. 2, p. 116]. As he once put it: What we rely upon is public opinion . . . and if we are wrong about it, then the whole thing is wrong (Sharp, 1991: 62). Admittedly this emphasis on the feelings of the masses was unpopular with some other League proponents, especially those wanting the organisation to be more of a super-state ruled from the centre. To French President Clemenceau, for instance, history showed that the voice of the people could become the voice of the devil (Sharp, 1991: 62). Cecil, however, remained more optimistic. Jan Smuts (1870 1950) had fought against Britain in the Boer War (1899 1902), helped establish the Union of South Africa and served in Lloyd Georges Imperial War Cabinet before joining the Empire delegation to the Paris Peace Conference (Ginneken, 2006: 172). In late 1918 he wrote one of the most famous pamphlets, The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion, outlining what a League of Nations should be. Smuts wanted the organisation to be an ever visible working organ of the great polity of civilisation which would function so strongly in the ordinary peaceful intercourse of States that it becomes irresistible (Smuts, 1918: 8). It would be founded in human ideals, in principles of freedom and equality, and in institutions which will for the future guarantee those principles against wanton assault (Smuts, 1918: 14). Apart from heading off international tensions as they arose, Smuts believed the organisation had to work to remove the very causes of war not least by addressing the conditions of life affecting the ordinary masses of the world [Doc. 3, p. 117]. A number of early League supporters, including Smuts and Cecil, not to mention the British foreign minister, Lord Curzon, thought one model for the League existed already. Given that the post-war settlement had broken up old empires, creating many atomised nation states in central and eastern Europe, there needed to be an international organisation arching over all of them, just as the British Empire did its member states (Cecil, 1923: 7; Smuts, 1918: 10; The Times, 27.6.1918). Not everyone, of course, appreciated the parallel between the League of Nations and the British Empire. Woodrow Wilsons Fourteen Points, for instance, spoke of common purpose against the Imperialists, but still there was a germ of an idea here which at least members of the British Empire could relate to.
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In France, Lon Bourgeois saw things differently. He wanted to create an international community of common interest: a collective of states in which benet for one would provide benet for all. Co-operation would bring great advantages: peace, prosperity and social advancement beyond anyones dreams (The Times, 6.9.1919). Under such circumstances, the threat of exclusion from the group would be powerful. The possibility of no longer sharing the advantages conferred by group membership would ensure that everyone adhered to the Leagues expectations. Robert Cecil appreciated this way of thinking. He agreed that co-operation between states would lead to an ever-greater sense of international community and to benets all could enjoy (Cecil, 1923: 38). At a time when technology was advancing very rapidly, this vision of the League foresaw that the discoveries made by its most advanced members would be communicated more quickly to those members who needed them. The League of Nations, then, was not only caught between understanding itself as super-state or partnership, it was also caught between looking to the past or the future. Inspiration in the British Empire, of course, provided a conservative motive for supporting the League: but ideas of developing an international community of common interest were more future-oriented. The latter contradiction helps explain why League supporters considered themselves to be practical and idealistic at one and the same time. They wanted to build on foundations which existed in the world already, but aimed to construct something new and better. They would not have appreciated a chapter about the League entitled The Geneva Dream (Steiner, 2005). As one League ofcial, Salvador de Madariaga, put it: We are not cranks. We are no enthusiasts. We are as coldblooded as any political old-hand and as hard-boiled as any nancier. We do not advocate the League because it is a religion; we advocate it because it is the only reasonable way to solve a denite problem, the terms of which can be put clearly to every man and woman with senses to observe and sense to judge. We believe that no business man would run his business as the world is run to-day, letting every one of its departments steal a march on every other one, allowing them to work in utter lack of cooperation in a spirit of enmity and distrust. We do not advocate holiness. We advocate sense. (Greaves, 1931: 16) League advocate Leonard Woolf believed that utopias had to be consigned to the libraries (Woolf, 1916: 8). Smuts denied the League was Utopian (Smuts, 1918: 7). Lon Bourgeois said, We are not dreamers of Peace. We mean to realize Peace (The Times, 6.9.1919). To minds like these, the
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creation of an organisation of international unity was the only practical way to respond to the most pressing global issues of the day.
Assembly of the League of Nations: Established by Article 3 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, this was the organisations parliament. Member states each sent up to three representatives to sit in the Assembly where they debated the issues of the day. The Assembly met once a year, generally in September. Council of the League of Nations: Established in Article 4 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, this was the main decisionmaking and executive body of the organisation. Its permanent members initially were Britain, France, Italy and Japan. These were supplemented by the same number of temporary members. In later years, the membership of the Council was reformed and expanded. So Germany, for instance, when it joined the League, received a permanent seat in the Council. Its decisions were supposed to be made unanimously.
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to recommend changes to the treaties and Article 20 said that treaties at variance with the Covenant could be abrogated at once. More specically, Article 21 specied that the Covenant was not at variance with the Monroe Doctrine, i.e. the idea, dating back to the early nineteenth century, that external Powers (especially European ones) should not interfere in the Americas internal affairs. Article 22 established the mandates system, whereby formerly colonial lands of Turkey and Germany could be allowed differing degrees of autonomy under international supervision. Social and economic affairs appeared in Article 23 which specied that the League would promote progressive ends in related areas. Article 24 continued in this vein, stating that already-existing international organisations (many of which dealt with relevant social issues) would henceforth be brought under the Leagues umbrella; meanwhile, in Article 25, member states promised to promote the activities of the Red Cross, and to act to prevent disease and in the mitigation of suffering throughout the world. Finally, Article 26 outlined how the Covenant could be amended [Doc. 4, p. 118].
The Council
The Council was arguably the most important institution of all. It was the small executive body responsible for supervising the implementation of the Covenant and dealing with any international disputes as they arose. It was to do this by agreeing to a course of action based on a unanimous decision. The Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations came into force on 10 January 1920, and the Council rst met in Paris just six days later. Its membership was supposed to include the ve victorious Great Powers, but when the US Senate refused to ratify the Treaty, the number was reduced to four (Britain, France, Italy and Japan). In addition, the Council had four non-permanent members who were elected by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly. Initially these were Belgium, Brazil, Greece and Spain. In 1922 the number of non-permanent members was increased to six, but the composition was overhauled more drastically still in 1926 when Germany was given a permanent seat and two semi-permanent seats were created for Spain
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and Poland. In 1933 Germany left the League, but the Soviet Union became a member of the Council the next year. At rst the Council held four main sessions a year, but these were decreased to three as of 1929. It met for the last time on 14 December 1939 (Ginneken, 2006: 64 5; Aims, Methods and Activity, 1935: 32 4). The Council had numerous important responsibilities. Under Article 11 of the Covenant, it was the body to which states appealed if they became involved in a serious international dispute, and as such it was expected to provide arbitration. In addition, it was responsible for setting up committees to address the affairs of national minorities, it supervised the work of various technical committees and it took an interest in the administration of mandate territories (see p. 86).
The Assembly
The Assembly was a kind of international parliament. Each member state sent three representatives to sit in it. In all, there were 42 member states in 1920 and 55 in 1927. Across the history of the organisation, some 63 states belonged to the League at one time or another and so were represented in the Assembly (Ginneken, 2006: 38). As with the Council, major decisions had to be reached unanimously, but in the Assembly everyone was equal (i.e. there was no distinction between permanent and non-permanent members). Hence there was a kind of balance struck between the needs of the Great Powers which were guaranteed in the Council (by their permanent seats and disproportionate numbers), and the needs of the other states which could be pursued in the Assembly (where all were present on the same footing). Also there was a balance between the small body which was more effective when it came to getting things done (the Council), and the forum underlining that the League should really be about the participation of all (the Assembly) (Mowrer, 1931: 387). The Assemblys agenda was drawn up, in the rst instance, by the Secretary General, although it could revise the list of issues it wanted to discuss so long as two-thirds of the house agreed. Although the Assembly met only once a year, it was nonetheless a powerful institution. Not only could it elect the non-permanent members of the Council and admit new members, but it could debate the most urgent issues of the day. As a result, the Assemblys proceedings always aroused the interest of the worlds press even of states which were not League members. Consequently words uttered by Assembly members really were heard by a global audience. Robert Cecil rightly described the Assemblys rst meeting on 15 November 1920 as a turning point for the League (New York Times, 15.11.1920). What happened in the Assembly
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was supposed to be an important source of moral pressure on statesmen in general. A number of committees were attached to the Assembly. They dealt with the organisation of the League, economic, social and technical issues, international justice, budget and stafng, the admission of new members, and political questions.
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as a nurse and had served in the Red Cross during the First World War. During the rst decade of the League she headed the Committee on Social Affairs and Opium.
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Yerevan in the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (Nansen, 1976). His collaborators, such as T.F. Johnson and Philip Noel Baker, added to the literature ( Johnson, 1938; Noel Baker, e.g. 1926). William Rappard worked on mandates issues, but subsequently publicised the work of the League more generally too (Rappard, 1931). This extensive praise was, however, quickly balanced by much more critical voices. A text, written by a number of authors who published under the name Vigilantes, came out soon after the Abyssinia crisis. It carried the title Why the League has Failed and argued that the organisation needed to be re-invigorated through greater work with the Soviet Union (Vigilantes, 1938: 91). The journalist Robert Dell was less overtly political in his critique. For many years he had commentated on events in Geneva, and not long after the outbreak of the Second World War wrote The Geneva Racket. This attempted to expose everything corrupt about the organisation. From an early point he was cynical about this fraudulent institution which betrayed public condence. It was a centre of international intrigues and displayed a childish attitude towards politics (Dell, 1941: 7 8). He went on: It is by its success or lack of success in achieving its ends for which it was primarily created that the League of Nations must be judged and, judged by that test it must be held to have failed . . . It has failed in every important case in which a Great Power was directly or indirectly interested. (Dell, 1941: 25) To Dells mind, the organisation had failed to challenge the primacy of national sovereignties, had exhibited systematic bias towards Europe over the rest of the world, failed to treat all states equally and, of course, failed to prevent the outbreak of the Second World War [Doc. 6, p. 122]. Critical opinion did not disappear with the passage of time. In 1975 Elmer Bendiner repeated Dells accusation that the League was insubstantial to the point of deceit, saying that the Assembly ran on words. Many of them without consequence, but uttered grandly and solemnly for the record or for a constituency (Bendiner, 1975: 171). He added criticisms that the League was not adequately democratic and that the inhabitants of some mandate territories were treated like children (Bendiner, 1975: 96).
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traditional diplomacy as pursued by the Great Powers hence what it could achieve would always be limited (Steiner, 2005: 349). By necessity, it was also liable to be affected, either benecially or detrimentally, by developments beyond its immediate sphere of inuence (Zimmern, 1936: 284). At the time, in fact, on some occasions at least the public realised this was the case and asked whether a given crisis owed more to the League or the actions of national statesmen (Zilliacus, 1929: 15). In the end, as the analogy with the car suggested, the League was a mechanism that always needed the active involvement of national politicians to give it direction and purpose. They had to participate in the organisation and help turn the idea of international fraternity into reality. But, as a British commentary on the Covenant of the League of Nations said, there was no necessity they would do so: If the nations of the future . . . are in the main selsh, grasping and warlike, no instrument of machinery will restrain them. It is only possible to establish an organisation which may make peaceful co-operation easy and hence customary, and to trust in the inuence of custom to mould opinion. (Northedge, 1988: 54) Under the circumstances, it was logical that politicians and commentators found there could be no foolproof guarantee of peace. Lord Grey, Britains foreign minister in 1914, believed no organisation could provide complete security (The Times, 11.10.1918). Lord Curzon, Britains representative at the rst meeting of the Council, agreed that choosing war could be made more risky, but that the possibility of war could never be eliminated entirely (The Times, 27.6.1918). Even League stalwart Philip Noel Baker wondered if the organisation would have time to establish itself before war swept it away (Noel Baker, 1926: 129). In other words, a nal assessment of the success and failure of the League will have to be realistic. It will have to locate the organisation in the context of inter-war international relations and recognise its intrinsic limitations.
CONCLUSION
The League of Nations was a highly ambitious undertaking, but was neither perfect nor perfected. It was always a compromise between a model of a super-state and a model of a loose association of nations. It was a mixture of conservatism and idealism. The League sought to apply its best intentions in practical ways. It tried to balance the needs of Great Powers against those
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of small states. It was neither universal, nor the sole means of conducting international relations. With a meaningful lifespan of barely twenty years, it hardly had time to become a nished product; it was always a work in progress. It did not have time to mature before it faced the most challenging circumstances. Perhaps the League suffered from coming into existence at a time of ux. A change was under way from a world of states governed by narrow selfinterest, to one that was more willing to pursue conciliation and co-operation (Rappard, 1931: 115). As such, it was a time of hope, but of serious challenges too. Nonetheless, while it remains true that the League of Nations was dealt a fatal blow by the outbreak of world war in 1939, its central pre-occupations would live on.