Association de Agricultores vs.Talisay Silay Milling Co., 88 SCRA 294; February 19, 1979; Barredo, J.

Facts: On 22 June 1952, Republic Act 809 was enacted for the purpose of addressing the necessity to increase the share of planters and laborers in the income derived from the sugar industry. Said act was to regulate the relations among the persons engaged in the sugar industry. Under Section 1 thereof, it was provided that in the absence of written milling agreements between the majority of planters and the millers of sugarcane in any milling district in the Philippines, the unrefined sugar produced in that district from the milling by any sugar central of the sugar cane of any sugarcane planter or planter-owner, as well as all by-products and derivative thereof, shall be divided between them as follows: 60% for the planter and 40% for the central in any district the maximum actual production of which is not more than 400,000 piculs.. The Association de Agricultores de Talisay-Silay Inc. and six sugarcane planters filed a petition to the Secretary of Labor, praying that the latter (1) declare the applicability to the Talisay-Silay Mill District of the sharing participation prescribed by RA 809 for every crop year starting from 1952-1953; (2) adjudicated in favor of the planters and their laborers in the account entitled In trust for Talisay-Silay Milling Co. Inc., and Department of Labor; (3) order the Central to account for any unsold quedans or the proceeds thereof which have been deposited with the PNB in the trust account; (4) order the Central to account for and pay jointly and severally to the planters and their laborers the proceeds of the sugar representing the increased participation for the 1954-1955 crop year plus legal interest in facor of the planters computed on the basis of the average market price during the month within which the sugar was sold. On the other hand, the Talisay-Silay Milling Co. Inc. alleged that (1) RA 809 was invalid and unconstitutional; (2) that even if it was valid, the planters had written milling contracts with the Central at the time the said act went into effect, and (3) the planters who entered into said contracts did so voluntarily and those voluntary contracts may not be altered or modified without infringing the constitutional guarantee on freedom of contracts and non-impairment clause of the Constitution. Issue: Whether RA 809 would violate the non-impairment clause of the Constitution and infringe the Constitutional guarantee on freedom of contracts if applied to the Talisay-Silay Mill District. Held: [No] RA 809 is a social justice and police power measure for the promotion of labor conditions in sugar plantations; hence, whatever rational degree of constraint it exerts on freedom of contract and existing contractual obligation as is constitutionally permissible. The said act was concerned and enacted as a social legislation designed primarily to ameliorate the condition of the laborers in the sugar plantation. Having in view its primary objective, to promote the interests of the labor, it can never be possible that the State would be bereft of constitutional authority to enact legislations of its kind. The imperious mandate of the social justice ideal consecrated in our fundamental laws, asserts its majesty, calling upon the courts to accord utmost consideration to the spirit animating the act assailed, not just for the sake of enforcing the explicit social justice provisions of the article on Declaration of Principles and State Policies, but more fundamentally, to serve the sacred cause of human dignity, which is actually what lies at the core of those constitutional precepts as it is also the decisive element always in the determination of any controversy between capital and labor. RA 809, which provides for bigger shares to the planters in the big milling districts than those in the small milling districts, does not violate the equal protection clause considering that the more a central produces, the bigger could be its margin of profit which can be correspondingly cut for the purpose of enlarging the share of the planters.

G.R. No. L-24626 June 28, 1974 PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE AIR LINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PALEA), PHILIPPINE AIR LINES SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION (PALSA) and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner Philippine Air Lines sought the reversal of the order of respondent Court reinstating one Fidel Gotangco dismissed by his employer, petitioner Philippine Air Lines, for having been found guilty of the breach of trust and violation of the rules and regulations of the company. So it was decreed, considering what was felt to be the severity of dismissal. Petitioner, however, is firm and unyielding in its insistence that this was an appropriate ease for terminating employment. Petitioner Philippine Air Lines, presented an evidence, an exhibit referring to the confiscation of a piece of lead material from his person at one of the gates of the PAL Airfield compound and a signed statement by him, taken at an investigation, wherein he admitted his apprehension by a company security guard with a lead material he intended to take home for his personal use. On the whole, the evidence of respondent is uncontroverted. ISSUE: Whether or not the the order of reinstatement of Fidel Gotangco by the court was proper despite the fact that he "is guilty of breach of trust and violation of the rules and regulations of his employer." HELD: Yes, the order was proper. The whole controversy is centered around the right of the Court of Industrial Relations to order the readmission of a laborer who, it is admitted, had been found derelict in the performance of his duties towards his employer. We concede that the right of an employer to freely select or discharge his employees, is subject to regulation by the State basically in the exercise of its paramount police power. (Com. Act Nos. 103 and 213). But much as we should expand beyond economic orthodoxy, we hold that an employer cannot legally be compelled to continue with the employment of a person who admittedly was guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance towards his employer, and whose continuance in the service of the latter is patently inimical to his interests.'" 6 Its tone of certitude is unwarranted. The very excerpt cited speaks of the paramount police power as a limitation on the right of an employer to freely select or discharge his employees. Moreover, while there was an admission that misfeasance or malfeasance could be a ground for dismissal, the last sentence thereof reads: "The law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer." 7 Where, therefore, it could be shown that the result would be neither oppressive nor self-destructive, it cannot be asserted dogmatically that an outright termination, of employment is justified. n the light of all the circumstances disclosed, particularly that it was a first offense after seventeen years of service, reached the conclusion, neither arbitrary nor oppressive, that dismissal was too severe a penalty, this Court should not view the matter differently. From the facts as found by respondent Court accepted by petitioner, the offense was "breach of trust and violation of the rules and regulations of the company." A lead material of negligible size, in the opinion of respondent Court, its measurement being eight inches by ten inches, with thickness of one-half inch, not shown to be of any use to the company, hardly of any pecuniary worth, It would be too harsh an appraisal to view it as constituting theft.

Group 1: Arellano, Balais, Bodiongan, De Castro, delos Reyes, Dy, Ibera, Salvador, Sarmiento

National Service Corp. vs. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122 Facts: The National Service Corporation (NASECO) hired Eugenia Credo as a lady guard on 18 July 1975. Later, she was administratively charged by NASECOs Manager of Finance stemming from her non-compliance with the latters memorandum. When she was called to explain her side, she showed resentment in a scandalous manner and uttering remarks of disrespect in the presence of her co-employees. Thereafter, Credo was placed on forced leave status for 15 days and while on leave, NASECOs Committee on Personnel Affairs recommended Credos termination. On 25 November 1983, due to her failure to explain her side on the charges, Credo was handed a notice of termination effective 1 December 1983. Credo then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal on 6 December 1983 with the Ministry of Labor and Employment. Credo contended that there was absence of just or authorized cause for the dismissal and there was a lack of opportunity to be heard. Issue: Whether Credo was legally dismissed according to the Constitutional and Labor Code provisions on protection to labor. Held: [No] NASECO did not comply with the guidelines in effecting Credos dismissal. Credo was not given ample opportunity to be heard and to defend herself. Rule XIV, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code mandates that the employer must furnish an employee sought to be dismissed two (2) written notices of dismissal before a termination of employment can be legally effected. These are the notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought and the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employers decision to dismiss him. The said guidelines are in consonance with the express provisions of law on protection to labor 18 (which encompasses the right to security of tenure) and the broader dictates of procedural due process necessarily mandate that notice of the employers decision to dismiss an employee, with reasons therefor, can only be issued after the employer has afforded the employee concerned ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. PLDT vs. NLRC, 164 SCRA 671 Facts: Marilyn Abucay, a traffic operator of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), was accused by two (2) complainants of having demanded and received from the the total amount of P3,800 in consideration of her promise to facilitate approval of their applications for telephone installation. Investigated and heard, she was found guilty as charged and accordingly separated from the service. She went tot he Ministry of Labor and Employment claiming she had been illegally removed. After the evidence and arguments of the parties were considered, the company was sustained and the complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiters decision, however, awarded financial assistance to Abucay equivalent to one month of pay for every year of service. Both Abucay and PLDT appealed to the National Labor Relations Borad, which upheld the decision in toto. PLDT filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the petition, affirming the decision of the Board except for the grant of separtation pay in the form of financial assistance, which was disallowed. Issue: Whether Abucay is entitled to financial assistance / separation pay even if she was removed from employment for just case, on the basis of equity and compassion and due to previous decisions of the Supreme Court. Held: The rule embodied in the Labor Code is that a person dismissed for cause (as defined therein) is not entitled to separation pay. The case of Firestone Tire vs. Lariosa, Soco vs. Mercantile Corporation of Davao, Filipino Inc. vs. NLRC, and others, constitute

the exception, based upon considertations of equity. Equity has been defined as justice outside law, being ethical rather than jural and belonging to the sphere of morals than of law. Hence, it cannot prevail against the expressed provision of the labor laws allowing dismissal of employees for cause and without any provision for separation pay. Still, where the exception has been applied, the justification for the grant of separation pay and the amount or rate of such award. has not been consistent. The Court, thus, made distinctions. Where it comes to such valid but not iniquitous causes as failure to comply with work standards, the grant of separation pay to the dismissed employee may be both just and compassionate, particularly if he has worked for some time with the company. Under such circumstances, the award to the employee of separation pay would be sustainable under the social justice policy even if the separation is for cause. Separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. A contrary rule would have the effect of rewarding rather than punishing the erring employee for his offense. The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged.

B.F. GOODRICH PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. B.F. GOODRICH (MARIKINA FACTORY) CONFIDENTIAL & SALARIED EMPLOYEES UNION-NATU, B.F. GOODRICH (MAKATI OFFICE) CONFIDENTIAL & SALARIED EMPLOYEES UNION-NATU, and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 49 SCRA 532 FERNANDO; February 28, 1973 Facts: The Goodrich Unions were seeking to be recognized as the bargaining agent of BF Goodrich Phils employees so that there could negotiations for a collective contract. BF Goodrich countered this by filing for two petitions for certification election with the CIR. Strike notices were sent to the company by the union demanding recognition and soon after a strike was actually held. The company then filed a case of illegal strike and unfair labor practice against the unions. ISSUE: WON the determination of an unfair labor practice case, brought against unions, must precede the holding of a certification election HELD: No. REASONING: - If under the circumstances disclosed, management is allowed to have its way, the result might be to dilute or fritter away the strength of an organization bent on a more zealous defense of labor's prerogatives. - This is not to say that management is to be precluded from filing an unfair labor practice case. It is merely to stress that such a suit should not be allowed to lend itself as a means, whether intended or not, to prevent a truly free expression of the will of the labor group as to the organization that will represent it. - There is no valid reason then for the postponement sought. This is one instance that calls for the application of the maxim, lex dilationes semper exhorret. (The law abhors delays.) - The law clearly contemplates all the employees, not only some of them, to take part in the certification election. (Some of the employees could possibly lose such status, by virtue of a pending unfair labor practice case, if such case is to be resolved first before the election.)

Group 1: Arellano, Balais, Bodiongan, De Castro, delos Reyes, Dy, Ibera, Salvador, Sarmiento

- Another reason (re: no point in the postponement of said election) is that even if the company wins in the pending case, it does not mean that the employees involved automatically would lose their jobs making them ineligible to participate in the cert. election. (Ergo the respondent court decided in the negative.) Besides, it was said in General Maritime Stevedores' Union v. South Sea Shipping Line: the question of whether or not a certification election shall be held "may well be left to the sound discretion of the Court of Industrial Relations, considering the conditions involved in the case."

FEATI UNIVERSITY V BAUTISTA 18 SCRA 1191 ZALDIVAR; December 27, 1966 NATURE Consolidated cases/petitions for certiorari, prohibition w/ writ of preliminary injunction FACTS: -Jan 14, 1963: the President of the Faculty Club wrote to the President of the University a letter informing the latter of the organization of the Faculty Club as a labor union, duly registered with the Bureau of Labor Relations -Jan 22, 1963: another letter was sent, to which was attached a list of demands consisting of 26 items, and asking the President of the University to answer within ten days from date of receipt thereof. -The University questioned the right of the Faculty Club to be the exclusive representative of the majority of the employees and asked proof that the Faculty Club had been designated or selected as exclusive representative by the vote of the majority of said employees. -Feb 1, 1963: the Faculty Club filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a notice of strike alleging as reason therefore the refusal of the University to bargain collectively with the representative of the faculty members. -Feb 18, 1963: the members of the Faculty Club went on strike and established picket lines in the premises of the University, thereby disrupting the schedule of classes. -March 1, 1963: the Faculty Club filed Case No. 3666-ULP for unfair labor practice against the University, but which was later dismissed (on April 2, 1963 after Case 41-IPA was certified to the CIR). -March 7, 1963: a petition for certification election, Case No. 1183MC, was filed by the Faculty Club in the CIR ISSUES: 1. WON the definition of employer in RA875 covers an educational institution like Feati University 2. WON the members of the Faculty Club are independent contractors (If they are, then they are not employees within the purview of the said Act.) HELD: 1. YES. It is true that the SC has ruled that certain educational institutions and other juridical entities are beyond the purview of RA875 in the sense that the CIR has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of ULP charges against them, but the principal reason in ruling in those cases is that those entities are not organized, maintained and operated for profit and do not declare dividends to stockholders. -In the decisions in the cases of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the University of San Agustin, the UST, and LaConsolacion College, this Court was not unanimous in the view that the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act No. 875) is not applicable to charitable, or non-profit

organizations which include educational institutions not operated for profit. There are members of this Court who hold the view that the Industrial Peace Act would apply also to non-profit organizations or entities, the only exception being the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, in so far as governmental functions are concerned. However, in the Far Eastern University case this Court is unanimous in supporting the view that an educational institution that is operated for profit comes within the scope of the Industrial Peace Act. We consider it a settled doctrine of this Court, therefore, that the Industrial Peace Act is applicable to any organization or entity whatever may be its purpose when it was created. -TEST: Does the University operate as an educational institution for profit? Does it declare dividends for its stockholders? If it does not, it must be declared beyond the purview of Republic Act No. 875; but if it does, Republic Act No. 875 must apply to it. In this case, Feati University itself admits that it has declared dividends. CIR also found that the University is not for strictly educational purposes and that "It realizes profits and parts of such earning is distributed as dividends to private stockholders or individuals. Under this circumstance, and in consonance with the rulings in the decisions of this Court, above cited, it is obvious that Republic Act No. 875 is applicable to herein petitioner Feati University. -RA 875, Sec 2(c): The term employer includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include any labor organization (otherwise than when acting as an employer) or any one acting in the capacity or agent of such labor organization. -It will be noted that in defining the term "employer" the Act uses the word "includes" and not the word "means". In using the word "includes" and not "means", Congress did not intend to give a complete definition of "employer", but rather that such definition should be complementary to what is commonly understood as employer. Congress intended the term to be understood in a broad meaning because, firstly, the statutory definition includes not only "a principal employer but also a person acting in the interest of the employer"; and, secondly, the Act itself specifically enumerated those who are not included in the term "employer", namely: (1) a labor organization (otherwise than when acting as an employer), (2) anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization [Sec. 2(c)], and (3) the Government and any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof insofar as the right to strike for the purpose of securing changes or modifications in the terms and conditions of employment is concerned (Section 11). Among these statutory exemptions, educational institutions are not included; hence, they can be included in the term "employer". This Court, however, has ruled that those educational institutions that are not operated for profit are not within the purview of Republic Act No. 875. -RA 875 does not give a comprehensive but only a complementary definition of the term "employer". The term encompasses those that are in ordinary parlance "employers." What is commonly meant by "employer"? The term "employer" has been given several acceptations. The lexical definition is "one who employs; one who uses; one who engages or keeps in service;" and "to employ" is "to provide work and pay for; to engage one's service; to hire." [see full case for other definitions of the word employer as provided for by the Workmen's Compensation Act, the Minimum Wage Law, the Social Security Act, etc] -Jurisprudence: An employer is one who employs the services of others; one for whom employees work and who pays their wages or salaries (Black Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 618). -Under none of these definitions may the University be excluded. The University engaged the services of the professors, provided them work, and paid them compensation or salary for their services. Even if the University may be considered as a lessee of services under a contract between it and the members of its Faculty, still it is included in the term "employer". "Running through the word `employ' is the

Group 1: Arellano, Balais, Bodiongan, De Castro, delos Reyes, Dy, Ibera, Salvador, Sarmiento

thought that there has been an agreement on the part of one person to perform a certain service in return for compensation to be paid by an employer. 2. NO. -RA 875, Section 2 (d): The term "employee" shall include any employee and shall not be limited to the employee of a particular employer unless the act explicitly states otherwise and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice and who has not obtained any other substantially equivalent and regular employment. -This definition, by the use of the term include is again complementary. This Court has defined the term "employer" as "one who employs the services of others; one for whom employees work and who pays their wages or salaries. Correlatively, an employee must be one who is engaged in the service of another; who performs services for another; who works for salary or wages. -It is admitted by the University that the striking professors and/or instructors are under contract to teach particular courses and that they are paid for their services. They are, therefore, employees of the University. -The contention of the University that the professors and/or instructors are independent contractors, because the University does not exercise control over their work, is likewise untenable. This Court takes judicial notice that a university controls the work of the members of its faculty; that a university prescribes the courses or subjects that professors teach, and when and where to teach; that the professors' work is characterized by regularity and continuity for a fixed duration; that professors are compensated for their services by wages and salaries, rather than by profits; that the professors and/or instructors cannot substitute others to do their work without the consent of the university; and that the professors can be laid off if their work is found not satisfactory. All these indicate that the university has control over their work; and professors are, therefore, employees and not independent contractors. -Moreover, even if university professors are considered independent contractors, still they would be covered by RA 875. This law modelled after the Wagner Act, or the National Labor Relations Act, of the United States, did not exclude "independent contractors" from the orbit of "employees". It was in the subsequent legislation the Labor Management Relation Act (Taft-Harley Act) that "independent contractors" together with agricultural laborers, individuals in domestic service of the home, supervisors, and others were excluded. Petition for certiorari & prohibition with preliminary injunction dismissed. Writs prayed for therein denied. Writ of preliminary injunction dissolved. Costs against Feati University.

Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines vs. Court of Industrial Relations (1977) Facts: The ALPAP is the legitimate labor organization tasked to be the representative of pilots with negotiating collective bargaining agreements with their respective airline employers. A labor dispute between the ALPAP and PAL ensued which led to the mass resignation and retirement of the formers members who were employed by the latter. Capt. Felix Gaston was elected as ALPAPs President by a majority vote of 180 out of 270 members. On the other hand, a day after Gastons election, Capt. Ben Hur Gomez was elected by member pilots who did not resign nor resign from PAL as their President. Gomez was only elected by 45 members. Gomez prays that he be allowed to represent ALPAP because the pilots who resigned/retired ceased to be employees of PAL. Thus, his group is entitled to name, office and funds of the association. Issue: W/N members of a legitimate labor organization are limited to employees of a particular employer? Held: No. This Court cannot likewise subscribe to the restrictive interpretation made by the court below of the term "labor organization," which Section 2(e) of R.A. 875 defines as any union or association of employees which exist, in whole or in part, for the purpose of the collective bargaining or dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment." The absence of the condition which the court below would attach to the statutory concept of a labor organization, as being limited to the employees of particular employer, is quite evident from the law. The emphasis of Industrial Peace Act is clearly on the purposes for which a union or association of employees established rather than that membership therein should be limited only to the employees of a particular employer. Trite to say, under Section 2(h) of R.A 875 "representative" is define as including "a legitimate labor organization or any officer or agent of such organization, whether or not employed by the employer or employee whom he represents." It cannot be overemphasized likewise that labor dispute can exist "regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. (Section 2(j), R.a. 875). A labor union, however, may authorize a segment thereof to bargain collectively with the employer and in the exercise of such authority to have custody of the unions funds, office and name. Having given Gomez the authority to enter and conclude bargaining contracts with PAL, it would be unreasonable to disallow Gomeza certain use of the office, funds and name of ALPAP when such use is necessary or would be required to enable ALPAP to exercise in a proper manner, its delegated authority to bargain collectively with PAL. Note: The SC also considered that the election of Gomez was illegal.

Group 1: Arellano, Balais, Bodiongan, De Castro, delos Reyes, Dy, Ibera, Salvador, Sarmiento

Lopez Sugar Corp. vs. Sec. of Labor (1995) Facts: NATIONAL CONGRESS OF UNIONS IN THE SUGAR INDUSTRY OF THE PHILIPPINES-TUCP (NACUSIP-TUCP) filed a petition for direct certification or for certification election to determine the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of the supervisory employees of herein petitioner, Lopez Sugar Corporation ("LSC"), at its sugar central in Fabrica, Sagay, Negros Occidental. It avers in this petition that it was a legitimate national labor organization; that LSC was employing 55 supervisory employees, the majority of whom were members of the union; that no other labor organization was claiming membership over the supervisory employees; that there was no existing collective bargaining agreement covering said employees; and that there was no legal impediment either to a direct certification of NACUSIP-TUCP or to the holding of a certification election. It submitted a charter certificate. LSC contended, among other things, that the petition was bereft of any legal or factual basis; that the petition was nothing more than a useless scrap of paper designed to harass the company; and that its employees above the rank-and-file category were in truth unaware of the petition. The Commercial and Agro-Industrial Labor Organization ("CAILO"), a registered labor organization also claiming to count substantial membership among the LSC supervisory employees, moved to intervene. The motion was granted. One Carlos S. Gevero, asserting a right to represent the "supervisors of LSC," filed a motion to dismiss the petition for lack of interest on the part of the supervisory employees. The Med-Arbiter granted the petition for direct certification because of the non-appearance of NACUSIP-TUCP and CAILO on two hearing dates. He ruled that under Article 257 of the Labor Code, as amended, the Med-Arbiter was left with no option but to order the conduct of a certification election immediately upon the filing of the petition. The Sec. of Labor denied the appeal of LSC ruling that the holding by the Med-Arbiter of a certification election is mandatory under Article 257 of the Labor Code. Hence, this appeal. Issue: W/N the dismissal of the appeal was proper. Held: No. Indeed, the law did not reduce the Med-Arbiter to an automaton which can instantly be set to impulse by the mere filing of a petition for certification election. He is still tasked to satisfy himself that all the conditions of the law are met, and among the legal requirements is that the petitioning union must be a legitimate labor organization in good standing. The petition for certification election, in the case at bench, was filed by the NACUSIP-TUCP, a national labor organization duly registered with the DOLE render Registration Certificate No. FED402-6390-IP. The legitimate status of NACUSIP-TUCP might be conceded; being merely, however, an agent for the local organization (the NACUSIP-TUCP Lopez Sugar Central Supervisory Chapter), the federation's bona fide status alone would not suffice. The local chapter, as its principal, should also be a legitimate labor organization in good standing. Since the "procedure governing the reporting of independently registered unions" refers to the certification and attestation requirements contained in Article 235, paragraph 2, it follows that the constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books of accounts submitted by the local and chapter must likewise comply with these requirements. The same rationale for requiring the submission of duly subscribed documents upon union registration exists in the case of union affiliation. The only document extant on record to establish the legitimacy of the NACUSIP-TUCP Lopez Sugar Central Supervisory Chapter is a charter certificate and nothing else. The instant petition, at least for now, must thus be GRANTED.

San Miguel Corp. Employees Union vs. Bersamira Facts: SMC entered into contracts with Lipercon and Drite which are independent contractors. It was expressed in their contract that there was to be no employer-employee relationship between the contractors and/or its workers, on the one hand, and SMC on the other. Petitioner San Miguel Corporation Employees UnionPTWGO(authorize labor union) advised Sanmig that some Lipercon and D'Rite workers had signed up for union membership and sought the regularization of their employment with SMC. Failing to obtain a favourable response from Sanmig, the union filed a notice of strike. Despite Conciliatory meetings, pickets were staged by Lipercon and D'Rite workers in various SMC plants and offices. SMC filed a complaint for damages and injunction to enjoin the union from representing the Lipercon and Drite workers, calling or holding of a strike etc .The union filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because it was a labor dispute. The trial court found the complaint sufficient in form and substance and issued an injunction to put a stop to the acts complained of. The trial court reasoned that there was no employer-employee relationship that exists between the parties which cancelled out a labor dispute. Issue: W/N a labor dispute can exist even without an employeremployee relationship? Held: Yes. A "labor dispute" as defined in Article 212 (1) of the Labor Code includes "any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." While it is SanMig's submission that no employer-employee relationship exists between itself, on the one hand, and the contractual workers of Lipercon and D'Rite on the other, a labor dispute can nevertheless exist "regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relationship of employer and employee" (Article 212 [1], Labor Code, supra) provided the controversy concerns, among others, the terms and conditions of employment or a "change" or "arrangement" thereof (ibid). Put differently, and as defined by law, the existence of a labor dispute is not negative by the fact that the plaintiffs and defendants do not stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. That a labor dispute, as defined by the law, does exist herein is evident. At bottom, what the Union seeks is to regularize the status of the employees contracted by Lipercon and D'Rite in effect, that they be absorbed into the working unit of SanMig. This matter definitely dwells on the working relationship between said employees vis-a-vis SanMig. Terms, tenure and conditions of their employment and the arrangement of those terms are thus involved bringing the matter within the purview of a labor dispute.

Group 1: Arellano, Balais, Bodiongan, De Castro, delos Reyes, Dy, Ibera, Salvador, Sarmiento

NESTLE PHILS., INC. V NLRC (NUEZ) 195 SCRA 340 GRIO-AQUINO; March 18, 1991 FACTS - The private respondents, who were employed by Nestl either as sales representatives or medical representatives, availed of the petitioner's car loan policy. Under that policy, the company advances the purchase price of a car to be paid back by the employee through monthly deductions from his salary, the company retaining the ownership of the motor vehicle until it shall have been fully paid for. - After having participated in an illegal strike, the private respondents were dismissed from service. Nestl directed the private respondents to either settle the remaining balance of the cost of their respective cars, or return them to the company for proper disposition. - Private respondents failed and refused to avail of either option, so the company filed in the Regional Trial Court of Makati a civil suit to recover possession of the cars. The private respondents sought a temporary restraining order in the NLRC to stop the company from cancelling their car loans and collecting their monthly amortizations. The NLRC, en banc, granted their petition for injunction. - The company filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied for tardiness. Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued a labor injunction without legal basis and in the absence of any labor dispute related to the same. ISSUE WON there is a labor dispute between the petitioner and the private respondents HELD NO Ratio Paragraph (1) of Article 212 of the Labor Code defines a labor dispute as follows: "(1) 'Labor dispute' includes any controversy or matters concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." Nestls demand for payment of the private respondents' amortizations on their car loans, or, in the alternative, the return of the cars to the company, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves debtor-creditor relations, rather than employee-employer relations. Reasoning Whether or not the private respondents remain as employees of the petitioner, there is no escape from their obligation to pay their outstanding accountabilities to the petitioner; and if they cannot afford it, to return the cars assigned to them. The options given to the private respondents are civil in nature arising from contractual obligations. There is no labor aspect involved in the enforcement of those obligations. The NLRC gravely abused its discretion and exceeded its jurisdiction by issuing the writ of injunction to stop the company from enforcing the civil obligation of the private respondents under the car loan agreements and from protecting its interest in the cars which, by the terms of those agreements, belong to it (the company) until their purchase price shall have been fully paid by the employee. The terms of the car loan agreements are not in issue in the labor case. The rights and obligations of the parties under those contracts may be enforced by a separate civil action in the regular courts, not in the NLRC. Petition is granted.

Gold City Integrated Port Services vs. NLRC 245 SCRA 627 Facts: Early in the morning of April 30, 1985, employees of Gold City Integrated Port Services Inc, stopped working and gathered in a mass action to express their grievances regarding wages, thirteenth month pay and hazard pay. On the same morning, the strikers filed individual notices of strike with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment. With the failure of conciliation conferences between the company (Gold City Integrated port Services, Inc., INPORT, for short) and the strikers, the former (INPORT) filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for Illegal Strike with prayer for a restraining order/preliminary injunction. The NLRC issued a temporary restraining order which prompted the strikers to return to work. The strike staged by the said workers was found by the Labor Arbiter to be illegal for not complying with the requirements in Article 246 of the Labor Code. The NLRC affirmed with the modification the Arbiters decision. It held that the concerted action by the workers was more of a protest action than a strike. However, the Commission still affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision which declared the strike illegal. Issue:Whether or not the mass action of the employees is the result of labor dispute between the parties involved. Held: A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or condition or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees. Private respondents and their co-workers stopped working and held the mass action on April 30, 1985 to press for their wages and other benefits. What transpired then was clearly a strike, for the cessation of work by concerted action resulted from labor dispute.

Group 1: Arellano, Balais, Bodiongan, De Castro, delos Reyes, Dy, Ibera, Salvador, Sarmiento

RCPI vs. PCEEWF 65 SCRA 82;July 15, 1975 Barredo Facts: -In a labor dispute involving RCPI and RCPI employees' union where union members were dismissed following a strike due to their defiance of a return to work order issued by the Industrial Court, this Court declared the dismissal illegal and ordered immediate reinstatement of the illegally dismissed employees. -RCPIEU filed a petition for a modified judgment to include an award of backwages to the employees concerned in addition to reinstatement. -RCPI opposed upon the ground that the issue of payment of backwages was neither raised in nor passed upon by the Industrial Court and not even touched in the previous pleadings of the respondents. Additionally, the matter is being looked into by National Relations Board, hence it is not necessary for this Court to take it up. Issue : WON the Court may modify its judgment to include an award of backwages Held: -The Industrial Court had no discretion in the matter for there was no issue of fault it had to decide. If it overlooked the award, that was plain error which is within the Court's prerogative to correct motu propio, as it is done in appeals by writ of error (sec. 7 rule 51). -Such award is in order, for it is a logical and inescapable consequence of the order of reinstatement that one is actually incomplete without the other. -Not ruling on this point now to leave it for action by the National Labor Relations Board and thereby give rise to another possible appeal in this Court is to unnecessarily lengthen the process for the respondents to get what is rightfully due them, contrary to the Constitutional duty to give protection to labor.

G.R. No. L-48347 October 3, 1978 SCOUT RAMON V. ALBANO MEMORIAL COLLEGE, petitioner, vs. HON. CARMELO C. NORIEL, and FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS (Scout Ramon V. Albano Memorial College Chapter), respondents. FERNANDO, Acting C.J.: Facts: Prviate respondent union (FFW: Scout Ramon V. Albano Memorial College Chapter) filed for certification election among the colleges workers to decide on whether or not to form a union, collecting 67 signatures out of a workforce of 200. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss based on respondents failure to meet the 30% consent requirement of total employees, which was 75 as the employer claimed there were actually 250 employees. In response FFW submitted an additional 22 signatures to meet this requirement. Petitioner filed its opposition to the respondent, arguing that the 30% requirement must be met at the time of filing which the Med-Arbiter took cognizance of and dismissed respondents petition. They in turn appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations (public respondent) which granted their motion for certification election 20 days from the receipt of his decision. Petitioner then moved for reconsideration and later appeal with the Secretary of Labor to no avail. Hence the present petition. Issue: Notwithstanding the failure of private respondent to produce signatures of 30% of the total employees of the college may the Bureau of Labor Relations still order the holding of a certification election? Held: Petition lacks merit. Existing doctrine based on preceding jurisprudence, particularly the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions decision, recognized the authority of the BLR, at its discretion, to conduct certification elections when petitioned despite the failure of the petitioning party to meet the 30% requirement. Hence petitioners argument stands infirm especially considering that the respondent later made up the deficiency by submitting additional signatures. Furthermore the court emphasized the importance of the certification election in the collective bargaining process that, It is a fundamental postulate that the will of the majority given expression in an honest election with freedom on the part of the voters to make their choice, is controlling. No better device can assure the institution of industrial democracy with the two parties to a business enterprise, management and labor, establishing a regime of self-rule. That is to accord respect to the policy of the Labor Code, indisputably partial to the holding of a certification election so as to arrive in a manner definitive and certain concerning the choice of the labor organization to represent the workers in a collective bargaining unit. Concurrently the court also noted the dubious nature of the petitioners motion for dismissal considering that it was filed by one of the adversarial parties in the collective bargaining process adding, Sound policy dictates that as much as possible, management is to maintain a strictly hands-off policy. For if it does not, it may lend itself to the legitimate suspicion that it is partial to one of the contending unions. That is repugnant to the concept of collective bargaining. That is against the letter and spirit of welfare legislation intended to protect labor and to promote social justice. The judiciary then should be the last to look with tolerance at such efforts of an employer to take part in the process leading to the free and untrammeled choice of the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers.

Motion of respondent RCPIEU for modification of judgment granted.

Group 1: Arellano, Balais, Bodiongan, De Castro, delos Reyes, Dy, Ibera, Salvador, Sarmiento

G.R. No. L-54334 January 22, 1986 KIOK LOY, doing business under the name and style SWEDEN ICE CREAM PLANT, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC) and PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG PAGGAWA (KILUSAN), respondents. CUEVAS, J.: Facts: The present petition is for certiorari to annul public respondents (NLRC) previous ruling in favor of private respondent (KILUSAN) which found the petitioner (Sweden Ice Cream Plant) guilty of unfair labor practice for its unjustified refusal to bargain in violation of Article 249 paragraph G of the Labor Code and further declared that the draft proposal of the respondent union for a collective bargaining agreement was to govern between employees and management. Prior to this petition, respondent union, after having been duly certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of the petitioners employees furnished the company with draft proposals for a collective bargaining agreement and solicited counter proposals on the matter. However petitioner refused to engage the respondents in any dialogue to a protracted period of time hence the CBA could not be enacted. Left with no recourse, respondent union served a notice to strike, entering into the 30-day statutory cooling off period after which they submitted to compulsory arbitration by the NLRC. Again petitioner company was unresponsive during negotiations, contriving several excuses to delay or derail the proceedings when finally the labor arbiter, after the failure of the company representative to appear, declared that the company had waived its right to present further evidence and then promulgated the presently assailed decision. Issue: Whether the petitioners right to procedural due process had been violated? Was the petitioner company guilty of unfair labor practice? Held: The court sustains the assailed ruling of the NLRC that found the petitioner guilty of unfair labor practice for its refusal to respond to respondent unions entreaties to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement which had already been set in motion under the following preconditions (1) possession of the status of majority representation of the employees' representative in accordance with any of the means of selection or designation provided for by the Labor Code; (2) proof of majority representation; and (3) a demand to bargain under Article 251of the New Labor Code. In the case at bar, It has been indubitably established that (1) respondent Union was a duly certified bargaining agent; (2) it made a definite request to bargain, accompanied with a copy of the proposed Collective Bargaining Agreement, to the Company not only once but twice which were left unanswered and unacted upon; and (3) the Company made no counter proposal whatsoever all of which conclusively indicate lack of a sincere desire to negotiate. Furthermore throughout the entire arbitration process, by its frequent requests for postponement, petitioner company has displayed behavior that is in derogation of the policy enshrined in the Labor Code which is aimed at expediting economic disputes thus the Labor Arbiter cannot be faulted as violating procedural due process for denying petitioners last motion for postponement.

G.R. No. 93983 June 29, 1992 DAVAO INTEGRATED PORT AND STEVEDORING SERVICES CORPORATION, Petitioner, chanrobles virtual law library vs. ALFREDO C. OLVIDA IN HIS CAPACITY AS VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR, AND THE ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS (ATU-TUCP)., Respondents.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library GRIO-AQUINO, J.:p FACTS The DAVAO INTEGRATED PORT AND STEVEDORING SERVICES CORPORATION filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order impugns the Decision dated May 19, 1990 of the Voluntary Arbitrator, Alfredo C. Olvida. The controversy centers on the interpretation of two provisions of the five-year Collective Bargaining Agreement (effective April 15, 1989 up to April 14, 1994) between the petitioner, Davao Integrated Port and Stevedoring Services Corporation (or "DIPSSC"), and the respondent, Association of Trade Unions [ATU-TUCP] (the Union, for short). Those provisions are: 1. ARTICLE VIII - SICK, VACATION AND EMERGENCY LEAVES. Sec. 4 - Emergency Leaves. The Company agrees to grant a maximum or six (6) days Emergency Leave with pay per calendar year to all regular field workers, covered by this agreement who have rendered at least six months of service (including overtime) per calendar year, are members of the Regular Labor Pool, upon prior approval by the company. Said Emergency Leave is not cumulative (sic) nor commutable." (pp. 46-47, Rollo; Emphasis supplied.) ARTICLE XVII - SPECIAL PROVISIONS. Sec. 4 - Union Education and Training Fund. The Company agrees to contribute twelve thousand (P12,000.00) pesos per year to the Union Education and Training Fund. (p. 48, Rollo.) According to petitioner Assistant General Manager Benjamin Marzo, insisted that the above provisions are to be interpreted as: 1. Under Article VIII, Section 4 (Emergency Leave) - that before the intermittent field workers who are members of the Regular Labor Pool can avail of the six (6) days Emergency Leave provided in this provision, the workers must have rendered at least six months of service per calendar year regardless of their employment status (i.e., regular or probationary). Thus, all regular (non-intermittent) field workers, who belong to the Regular Labor Pool must have rendered at least six months of service per calendar year to be entitled to the six days Emergency Leave Pay. Petitioner pointed out that the phrase "per calendar year" is used twice in Section 4, the first of which modifies the word "pay" and the second modifies the phrase "who or rendered at least six months of service." (pp. 130-131.) The entitlement and enjoyment of the emergency leave must be strictly availed in the calendar year on which the six months service was rendered. law library 2. Under Article XVII, Section 4 (Union Education and Training Fund) - petitioner required that the Union should first prepare and submit a seminar program before it can avail of the Education and Training Fund of P12,000.00 per annum. After due hearing, respondent arbitrator rendered a decision on interpretations of Article VIII, Section 4 and Article XVII, Section 4, of the Collective Bargaining Agreement different to the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the respondent arbitrator is correct on its interpretation of the provision in the said CBA.

Group 1: Arellano, Balais, Bodiongan, De Castro, delos Reyes, Dy, Ibera, Salvador, Sarmiento

HELD: The Supreme Court agrees to the petitioner contention. The Court finds the petitioner's interpretation of Section 4, Article VIII (emergency leave) more logical than the Arbitrator's and the Union's. The provision of the CBA is clear: (1) the employee must be a member of the Regular Labor Pool; (2) he is entitled to only six (6) days emergency leave with pay per calendar year; and (3) he must have rendered service for at least six (6) months during the year when he took his emergency leave. The emergency leave may be staggered or it may last for any number of days as emergencies arise but the employee is entitled only to six (6) days of emergency leave "with pay" per year. Since the emergency leave is allowed to enable the employee to attend to an emergency in his family or household, it may be taken at any time during the calendar year but he must render at least six months service for that year to be entitled to collect his wages for the six (6) days of his emergency leave. Since emergencies are unexpected and unscheduled happenings, it would be absurd to require the employee to render six (6) months service before being entitled to take a six-day emergency leave with pay for it would mean that no emergency leave can be taken by an employee during the first six months of a calendar year. law library With regard to the provision on Union Education and Training Fund in Section 4, Article XVII of the CBA, the petitioner's requirement that the Union submit a seminar program for each calendar year before it may claim the company's P12,000 yearly donation to the fund, is not warranted by the terms of the CBA. The Arbitrator did not abuse his discretion in ruling that the respondent company should comply with its obligation to contribute to the Union Education and Training Fund the amount of Twelve Thousand (P12,000.00) pesos per year by paying said amount to the Union at the beginning of each and every year, or contributing P1,000.00 at the end of each and every month during the lifetime or the CBA, at the option of the company. As correctly observed by the Arbitrator, the employer's demand for the submission of a seminar program "is foreign to the language of the contract" with the union.ch

G.R. No. L-49046 January 26, 1988 SATURNO A. VICTORIA, petitioner, vs. HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, DEPUTY MINISTER, and FAR EAST BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC., respondents. FERNAN, J.: Facts: Complainant Saturno Victoria is the president of the Far East Broadcasting Company Employees Union. After registering their association with the then Department of Labor, they demanded recognition of said association by the company but the latter refused on the ground that being a non-profit, non-stock, non-commercial and religious corporation, it is not covered by Republic Act 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act, the labor law enforced at that time. On September 8, 1972, the said union declared a strike against respondent company. On September 11, 1972, respondent filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Civil Case No. 750V, for the issuance of an injunction and a prayer that the strike be declared illegal. On October 24, 1972, complainant together with the other strikers filed with the ad hoc National Labor Relations Commission Case Nos. 0021 and 0285 for reinstatement. The Arbitrator rendered a decision in said case on December 28, 1972, wherein he ordered

respondent to reinstate complainants without prejudice to whatever decision the Court of First Instance may promulgate on Civil Case No. 750-V and to the requirements the existing order may need of people working with the mass media of communications." Since said decision was affirmed by the NLRC, the Secretary of Labor, and the Office of the President of the Philippines, complainants were reinstated pursuant thereto. In a Decision dated April 23, 1975, in Civil Case No. 750-V, promulgated by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, the strike staged by herein complainant and the other strikers was declared illegal. Based on said Decision, respondent dismissed complainant from his employment. Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint for illegal dismissal. Issue: Whether or not a clearance from the Secretary of Labor is still necessary before the petitioner herein could be dismissed. Held: Technically speaking, no clearance was obtained by private respondent from the then Secretary of Labor, the last step towards full compliance with the requirements of law on the matter of dismissal of employees. However, the rationale behind the clearance requirement was fully met. The Secretary of Labor was apprised of private respondent's intention to terminate the services of petitioner. This in effect is an application for clearance to dismiss petitioner from employment. The strike staged by the union in 1972 was a futile move. The law then enforced, Republic Act 875 specifically excluded respondent company from its coverage. Even if the parties had gone to court to compel recognition, no positive relief could have been obtained since the same was not sanctioned by law. Because of this, there was no necessity on the part of private respondent to show specific acts of petitioner during the strike to justify his dismissal. This is a matter of responsibility and of answerability. Petitioner as a union leader, must see to it that the policies and activities of the union in the conduct of labor relations are within the precepts of law and any deviation from the legal boundaries shall be imputable to the leader. He bears the responsibility of guiding the union along the path of law and to cause the union to demand what is not legally demandable, would foment anarchy which is a prelude to chaos. Petitioner should have known and it was his duty to impart this imputed knowledge to the members of the union that employees and laborers in non- profit organizations are not covered by the provisions of the Industrial Peace Act and the Court of Industrial Relations [in the case at bar, the Court of First Instance] has no jurisdiction to entertain petitions of labor unions or organizations of said non-profit organizations for certification as the exclusive bargaining representatives of said employees and laborers. As a strike is an economic weapon at war with the policy of the Constitution and the law at that time, a resort thereto by laborers shall be deemed to be a choice of remedy peculiarly their own and outside of the statute, and as such, the strikers must accept all the risks attendant upon their choice. If they succeed and the employer succumbs, the law will not stand in their way in the enjoyment of the lawful fruits of their victory. But if they fail, they cannot thereafter invoke the protection of the law for the consequences of their conduct unless the right they wished vindicated is one which the law will, by all means, protect and enforce. Petition is dismissed.

Group 1: Arellano, Balais, Bodiongan, De Castro, delos Reyes, Dy, Ibera, Salvador, Sarmiento

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. (PAL), petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER ISABEL P. ORTIGUERRA and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PALEA), respondents 225 SCRA 301 FACTS: On March 15, 1985, the Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) completely revised its 1966 Code of Discipline. The Code was circulated among the employees and was immediately implemented, and some employees were forthwith subjected to the disciplinary measures embodied therein. Thus, on August 20, 1985, the Philippine Airlines Employees Association (PALEA) filed a complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for unfair labor practice with the following remarks: "ULP with arbitrary implementation of PAL's Code of Discipline without notice and prior discussion with Union by Management". It prayed that implementation of the Code be held in abeyance; that PAL should discuss the substance of the Code with PALEA; that employees dismissed under the Code be reinstated and their cases subjected to further hearing; and that PAL be declared guilty of unfair labor practice and be ordered to pay damages. PAL filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting its prerogative as an employer to prescibe rules and regulations regarding employess' conduct in carrying out their duties and functions, and alleging that by implementing the Code, it had not violated the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) or any provision of the Labor Code. PAL asserts that when it revised its Code on March 15, 1985, there was no law which mandated the sharing of responsibility therefor between employer and employee. ISSUE: Whether or not the formulation of a Code of Discipline among employees is a shared responsibility of the employer and the employees. HELD: Indeed, it was only on March 2, 1989, with the approval of Republic Act No. 6715, amending Article 211 of the Labor Code, that the law explicitly considered it a State policy "(t)o ensure the participation of workers in decision and policy-making processes affecting the rights, duties and welfare." However, even in the absence of said clear provision of law, the exercise of management prerogatives was never considered boundless. Thus, in Cruz vs. Medina (177 SCRA 565 [1989]) it was held that management's prerogatives must be without abuse of discretion. The exercise of managerial prerogatives is not unlimited. The implementation of the provisions (PALs 1966 Code of Discipline) may result in the deprivation of an employee's means of livelihood which, as correctly pointed out by the NLRC, is a property right (Callanta, vs Carnation Philippines, Inc., 145 SCRA 268 [1986]). In view of these aspects of the case which border on infringement of constitutional rights, we must uphold the constitutional requirements for the protection of labor and the promotion of social justice, for these factors, according to Justice Isagani Cruz, tilt "the scales of justice when there is doubt, in favor of the worker" (Employees Association of the Philippine American Life Insurance Company vs. NLRC, 199 SCRA 628 [1991] 635). Verily, a line must be drawn between management prerogatives regarding business operations per se and those which affect the rights of the employees. In treating the latter, management should see to it that its employees are at least properly informed of its decisions or modes action. Indeed, industrial peace cannot be achieved if the employees are denied their just participation in the discussion of matters affecting their rights. Thus, even before Article 211 of the labor Code (P.D. 442) was amended by Republic Act No. 6715, it was already declared a policy of the State, "(d) To promote the enlightenment of workers concerning their rights and obligations . . .

as employees." This was, of course, amplified by Republic Act No 6715 when it decreed the "participation of workers in decision and policy making processes affecting their rights, duties and welfare." PAL's position that it cannot be saddled with the "obligation" of sharing management prerogatives as during the formulation of the Code, Republic Act No. 6715 had not yet been enacted (Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 44; Rollo, p. 212), cannot thus be sustained. While such "obligation" was not yet founded in law when the Code was formulated, the attainment of a harmonious labor-management relationship and the then already existing state policy of enlightening workers concerning their rights as employees demand no less than the observance of transparency in managerial moves affecting employees' rights.

CALTEX FILIPINO MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION petitioner, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., W.E. MENEFEE and B.F. EDWARDS, respondents. 44 SCRA 350 FACTS: The Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors' Association is a labor organization of Filipino managers supervisors in Caltex (Philippines), Inc., respondent Company in this proceeding. On February 8, 1965 the Association sent a set of proposals to the Company wherein one of the demands was the recognition of the Association as the duly authorized bargaining agency for managers and supervisors in the Company. To this the Company countered stating that a distinction exists between representatives of management and individuals employed as supervisors and that it is Company's belief that managerial employees are not qualified for membership in a labor organization; hence, it is digested that the Association institute a certification proceeding so as to remove any question with regard to position titles that should be included in the bargaining unit. The Association felt disinclined to follow the suggestion of the Company and so on February 22, 1965 the Company initiated a certification proceeding docketed as Case 1484MC. On March 8, 1965 the Association filed notice to strike. On the basis of the strike notice filed on March 8, 1965 and in view of acts committed by the Company which the Association considered as constituting unfair labor practice, the Association struck on April 22, 1965. The Company, filed Case No. 1484-MC(1) praying among others, to declare the strike of Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association illegal.. The Association's charge for unfair labor practices against the Company and its officials on September 10, 1965, in Case No. 4344ULP against Caltex (Philippines), Inc., W. E. Menefee and B.F. Edwards. According to the latter, the Company and some of its officials, including B.F. Edwards, inquired into the organization of the Association and he manifested his antagonism to it and its President; that another Company official, W.E. Menefee issued a statement of policy designed to discourage employees and supervisors from joining labor organizations; that the Company refused to bargain although the Association commands majority representation; that due to the steps taken by the Company to destroy the Association or discourage its members from continuing their union membership, the Association was forced to file a strike notice; that on April 22, 1965 it declared a strike; and that during the strike the Company and its officers continued their efforts to weaken the Association as well as its picket lines. The Company in its answer

Group 1: Arellano, Balais, Bodiongan, De Castro, delos Reyes, Dy, Ibera, Salvador, Sarmiento

filed with respondent court denied the charges of unfair labor practice. ISSUE: (a) Whether or not the CIR has jurisdiction over Case No. 1484-MC(1); (b) Whether or not the strike staged by the Association on April 22, 1965 is illegal and, incident thereto, whether respondent court correctly terminated the employee status of Jose Mapa, Dominador Mangalino and Herminigildo Mandanas and reprimanded and admonished the other officers of the Association; and (c) Whether or not respondent court correctly absolved the respondents in Case No. 4344-ULP from the unfair labor practice charge. HELD:Respondent's court's jurisdiction over Case No. 1484-MC(1) has to be tested by the allegations, reading of said pleading shows that the same is for injunctive relief under Section 9(d) of Republic Act No. 875 (Magna Carta of Labor); for contempt, obviously pursuant to See, 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 in conjunction with Sec. 3 (b) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court; and for forfeiture of the employee status of the strikers by virtue of their participation in what the Company considered as an "illegal strike." It is well known that the scheme in Republic Act No. 875 for achieving industrial peace rests essentially on a free and private agreement between the employer and his employees as to the terms and conditions under which the employer is to give work and the employees are to furnish labor, unhampered as far as possible by judicial or administrative intervention. On this premise the lawmaking body has virtually prohibited the issuance of injunctive relief involving or growing out of labor disputes. The prohibition to issue labor injunctions is designed to give labor a comparable bargaining power with capital and must be liberally construed to that end (U.S. vs. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 79 F. Supp. 485, Certiorari denied, 69 S. Ct. 137, 335 U.S. 867, cause remanded on other grounds, 174 F. 2nd 160, 85 U.S. App. D.C., certiorari denied 70 S. Ct. 140, 338 U.S. 872, 94 L. Ed. 535). It is said that the prohibition creates substantive and not purely procedural law. (Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Board, 49 F. Supp. 886). Within the purview of our ruling, speaking through Justice Labrador, in Social Security Employees Association (PAFLU), et al. vs. The Hon. Edilberto Soriano, et al. (G.R. No. L-20100, July 16, 1964, 11 SCRA 518, 520), there can be no injunction issued against any strike except in only one instance, that is, when a labor dispute arises in an industry indispensable to the national interest and such dispute is certified by the President of the Philippines to the Court of Industrial Relations in compliance with Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 875. As a corollary to this, an injunction in an uncertified case must be based on the strict requirement See. 9 (d) of Republic Act No. 875; the purpose of such injunction is not to enjoin the strike itself, but only unlawful activities. To the extent, then, that the Company sought injunctive relief under Sec. 9(d) of Republic Act No.875, respondent court had jurisdiction over the Company's "Urgent Petition" dated April 26, 1965. We now come to the issue as to whether the strike staged by the Association on April 22, 1965 is illegal. To begin with, we view the return-to-work agreement of May 30, 1965 as in the nature of a partial compromise between the parties and, more important, a labor contract; consequently, in the latter aspect the same "must yield to the common good" (Art. 1700, Civil Code of the Philippines) and "(I)n case of doubt ... shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer" (Art. 1702, ibid). To our mind when the Company unqualifiedly bound itself in the return-to-work agreement that all employees will be taken back "with the same employee status prior to April 22, 1965," the Company thereby made manifest its intention and conformity not to proceed with Case No. 1484-MC, (c) relating the illegality of the strike incident. For while it is true that there is a reservation in the return-to-work agreement as follows:

6. The parties agree that all Court cases now pending shall continue, including CIR Case No. 1484-MC. we think the same is to be construed bearing in mind the conduct and intention of the parties. The failure to mention Case No. 1484-MC(1) while specifically mentioning Case No. 1484-MC, in our opinion, bars the Company from proceeding with the former especially in the light of the additional specific stipulation that the strikers would be taken back with the same employee status prior to the strike on April 22, 1965. The records disclose further that, according to Atty. Domingo E. de Lara when he testified on October 9, 1965, and this is not seriously disputed by private respondents, the purpose of Paragraph 10 of the return-to-work agreement was, to quote in part from this witness, "to secure the tenure of employees after the returnto-work agreement considering that as I understand there were demotions and suspensions of one or two employees during the strike and, moreover, there was this incident Case No. 1484-MC(1)" (see Brief for the Petition pp. 41-42). To borrow the language of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Citizens Labor Union Pandacan Chapter vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Company (G.R. No. L-7478, May 6, 1955), in so far as the illegality of the strike is concerned in this proceeding and in the light of the records. ... the matter had become moot. The parties had both abandoned their original positions and come to a virtual compromise and agreed to resume unconditionally their former relations. To proceed with the declaration of illegality would not only breach this understanding, freely arrived at, but to unnecessarily revive animosities to the prejudice of industrial peace. In addition, it is clear that the strike of the Association was declared not just for the purpose of gaining recognition but also for bargaining in bad faith on the part of the Company and by reason of unfair labor practices committed by its officials. Significantly, in the voluntary return-to-work agreement entered into between the Company and the Association, thereby ending the strike, the Company agreed to recognize for membership in the Association the position titles mentioned in Annex "B" of said agreement. The guilty conduct of the Company before, during after the strike of April 22, 1965 cannot escape the Court's attention. It will suffice to mention typical instances by way of illustration. Long prior to the strike, the Company had interferred with the Cebu Supervisors' Union by enticing Mapa into leaving the Union under the guise of promotion in Manila; shortly before the strike, B.R. Edwards, Manager-Operations, had inquired into the formation and organization of the petitioner Association in this case. During the strike, in addition to the culpable acts of the Company already narrated above, due significance must be given to the inclusion initially of J.J. Mapa and A. Buenaventura, the Association's President and Vice-President respectively, in 1965, in two coercion cases filed at that time and their subsequent elimination from the charges the initiative of the Company after the settlement of strike; the cutting off of telephone facilities extended Association members in the refinery; and the use of a member of the Association to spy for the company. The discriminatory acts practiced by the Company against active unionists after the strike furnish further evidence that Company committed unfair labor practices as charged.

Group 1: Arellano, Balais, Bodiongan, De Castro, delos Reyes, Dy, Ibera, Salvador, Sarmiento