The United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Policy Proposal on the Problem of Venezuela April 2010

Front Cover Photo Credit: http://www.statesymbolsusa.org/IMAGES/US-GreatSeal-Obverse600px.jpg

Table of Contents Introduction.................................................................................. 1-1 Nationalization Oil ...................................................................................... 2-5 Telecommunications............................................................................... 6-7 Electricity ...................................................................................... 7-8 Relationship with Latin America The Bolivarian Revolution.........................................................................9-11 Latin American Opposition to Chavez 12-14 Democracy Projects in Latin America.....................................................14-16 Human Rights Political Discrimination ..................................................16-19 The Judiciary System ..................................................... 19-20 The Media ............................................................................20-21 Unlawful Arrest .................................................................21-22 The Joint Solution .............................................................22-25 Venezuelas Relationship with Cuba Current Relations.26-29 Solution..29-30 Venezuelas Nuclear Endeavors Relationship with Russia ...............................................31-35 Relationship with Iran ....................................................35-41

Conclusion ...........................................................................................42-45 Appendices Appendix I A-B ...........................................................................46 Appendix 2 A ..............................................................................47 Appendix 2 B .......................................................................47-52 Appendix 2 C ...............................................................................53 Appendix 3 A .......................................................................54-55 Appendix 3 B .......................................................................55-58 Appendix 4 A-B ......................................................................... 59 Appendix 5 A ................................................................60-66 Appendix 6 A .................................................................................................67-72 Acronyms ................................................................................................... 73 Bibliography .......................................................................................74-84

1 I. Introduction Hugo Chavez and his government in Venezuela is no new problem to the United Statesthe past decade has seen the deterioration of relations between the two nations. While diplomatic relations have improved under President Obama, it is apparent that Chavez has no intention to alter a dramatic change in attitude towards the United States or his style of governance. In contrast, he has only escalated his anti-democratic tendencies, as he recently cracked down on the media and arrested high profile Venezuela citizens who have publicly criticized him or his government. He is also pursuing increasingly friendly relations with Iran, Cuba, and Russia, countries who have had or currently have bad relations with the United States. We, as the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, propose a more active approach towards the numerous disturbing patterns of the Chavez regime that increasingly infringe upon the rights of the Venezuelan people and threaten our national security. Our goal is to seek a middle ground between the current administrations apparent wait-and-see approach, and a more aggressive position towards the Chavez regime, taking into consideration that some issues are more pressing and require a more active solution. Our policy will address Chavezs nationalization of major Venezuelan industries, his expanding infringement on human rights, his growing influence on the rest of Latin America through the spread of his Bolivarian Revolution, his developing relationship with nations such as Cuba and Iran, and the potential danger of Venezuela as a nuclear power. The United States has the opportunity to simultaneously improve relations with Venezuela and Latin America before they are damaged beyond repair, while simultaneously taking a hard-lined stance that will isolate Chvez and prevent the rise of authoritarian rulers who disregard basic human rights and democratic principles in their search for expanding power.

2 II. Nationalization After his reelection in December of 2006, Chvez asserted his power by announcing new reforms to nationalize major industries, resulting in the drastic decrease of privatization and foreign investment. Chvez believes the government should secure certain strategic industries, such as oil, telecommunications, and electricity, which he sees as essential to develop what he calls a socialist republic. a.) Oil Since Hugo Chvezs rise to power in 1998, he has been dedicated to assuring the continued nationalization of the petroleum sectorby and large, Venezuelas most precious natural resource, the largest contributor to Venezuelas GDP, and the primary means of diplomatic leverage.1 He has taken measures such as filling high-level managerial positions with pro-Chvez supporters and removing any that revealed capitalist sentiment. Such actions are pivotal in his largely successful attempt to consolidate government control over the oil industry.2 In addition to these efforts, Chvez has raised taxes on foreign investors to simultaneously gain revenue while he attempted to decrease foreign capitalist influence3. Venezuelas dependence on the oil industry stretches far deeper than simple economic benefits. Specifically, his efforts to provide healthcare and higher levels of education for the poor come directly from the income and success of PDVSA, which is the Venezuelan
1

Cesar Alvarez, "Venezuela's Oil-Based Economy." Council on Foreign Relations, (accessed April 9, 2010).
2

Oil's dark secret - national oil companies. 2006. The Economist 380, (8490): 55. Crowe, Darcy. 2009. "Venezuela, china sign oil deals". The Wall Street Journal2009.

Natalie Pearson, "Analysts Hit Venezuela Nationalization." Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/01/09/AR2007010901632.ht ml (accessed April 10, 2010).

3 governments primary petroleum corporation. The Chvez regime utilizes the method of joint ventures to gain a majority share in oil exploration and extraction in Venezuela. Since oil was first nationalized in the 1970s4, Venezuela has allowed private companies to extract oil. However, since Chvez came to power, it has become increasingly difficult for US based companies to gain a vested interest in Venezuelas oil industry. After Canada, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia, Venezuela is the USs largest supplier of petroleum, providing us with 11.5% of our annual crude oil. Our economic ties run deep the United States is Venezuelas single largest trading partner. The United States imports 45% of all Venezuelan exports. Moreover, the United States imports 72.7% of all crude oil produced in Venezuela.5 Through the government owned Petrleos de Venezuelas (PDVSA) subsidiary, CITGO; Venezuela has an extensive distribution and financial stake in the domestic US petroleum industry, no such comparable American company in Venezuela exists.6 Given our intricate economic ties the need to slowly integrate private organizations that have a vested interest within Venezuelas petroleum sector is a necessity. American based corporations investment in Venezuelas oil industry not only promotes free-market economies, but it is a matter of our national security to maintain a constant supply of oil from Venezuela. Maintaining a consistent supply at a reasonable price is essential for domestic and economic security; a threat to either of these is a direct Oil's dark secret - national oil companies. 2006. The Economist 380, (8490): 55. Crowe, Darcy. 2009. "Venezuela, china sign oil deals". The Wall Street Journal2009.
4

Daniel Workman, "Top Venezuelan Exports & Imports." http://importexport.suite101.com/article.cfm/top_venezuelan_exports_imports (accessed April 10, 2010).
5

Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairshttp://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35766.htm

6

4 risk to our national security. Given this risk, there is no better way to improve our strained relationship between America and Venezuela than to incorporate our economies even further, by giving American oil corporations a stake in the Venezuelan oil industry. As a positive externality, this integration would limit Chvez s use of oil diplomacy. In order for such incorporation to exist, action must be taken soon. The window for American investment in Venezuelas oil is closing. Chvez recently signed several agreements with China to build their economic connections.7 As a result of this deal, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation has agreed to help build an important heavycrude basin in eastern Venezuela. Moreover, the China National Petroleum Corporation has gained control of a section of one of the oil fields in the Orinoco belt. This one section is capable of producing 400,000 barrels per day. This is type of investment in infrastructure is the ventures that America corporations should be making in Venezuela to secure the supply of oil.8 While Venezuelan government involvement in its domestic oil industry may see shortterm growth, as in the increase in GDP over the last two years, (Graph A) history has shown us that long-term nationalization of the oil industry impedes economic progress.9 For example, it leads to an over reliance on oil diplomacy and major inefficiencies due to a lack of competition. Furthermore, economic tensions between Venezuela and the United States have limited our capacity for bilateral cooperation and impeded our ability to maintain and build relationships with Venezuela and the surrounding Latin American countries. Given Americas position on the world stage, it is a moral imperative for the Oil's dark secret - national oil companies, The Economist, www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=7270301 (accessed April 16, 2010).
7 8 9

Ibid.

Mark Sullivan, "Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service, (accessed March 30, 2010).

5 United States to promote free-market economies and Venezuela is no different considering our close economic ties. Economic unity is one of the pillars of a firm peaceful relationship.10 It has been made clear that Chvez has no interest in sharing such financial associations with such a capitalist country. It has been a struggling problem since Chvezs first election; obtaining oil from Venezuelan fields is much more difficult than other major distributors. As a result, Venezuela has not been able to keep up with countries like Saudi Arabia who currently rank number one for exports in oil. They are dealing with rough terrain and a more acidic type of oil, which slows down the production rates. In addition, for every one oil well that produces the oil in Saudi Arabia, Venezuela needs 10, proving that Venezuela needs help in order to advance their oil production. With American countries investing in Venezuelas oil industry, American companies would be able to provide the appropriate technology and labor workers to create better production rates of the oil. American companies would provide the necessary funding and efficient advanced machinery for maximum growth. For both countries, the economic benefits are apparent. The United States needs to create investments similar to that of Chinas. Such investments would provide increase in productivity, the United States would have a secure and stable flow of oil and in turn a stable political relationships would result. In return, Venezuela would receive new job opportunities from American based companies, a sufficient flow of money into Venezuelas oil industry, and improved technology and machinery that could advance the speed and quality of oil production. b.) Telecommunications

10

Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, (New York: Anchor, 2000).

6 The nationalization of the telecommunications industry is central to the Chvez regime in solidifying its power and promoting Chvez s idea of socialism in the 21st century.11 Chvez is able to provide biased information to the vast majority of his citizens through a variety of media. This power allows him to provide false information through television, and Venezuelas education system First, Chvez has taken over control of CANTV, Venezuelas primary broadcasting network. Presently, the government has a controlling stake of 86.2% of the company.12 With Chvez s ability to control the media he is able to influence his citizens belief systems, and propagate misinformation about Americas intentions. Second, his ability to dictate the news and conduct the media especially using his socialist prerogative, gives way to a dangerous propaganda being put forth. The media is not the only means whereby Chaves spreads his opinion. His influence over the youth is apparent in the education system. Chvez is trying to promote a single vision of socialism. For example, by censoring books he violates the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) constitution, which advocates for the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth andthe free exchange of ideas and knowledge." A major long-term U.S. concern is the indoctrination of youth and the general population; indications that Chvez is encouraging schools to promote his idea of socialism are highly apparent. For example, syllabi include quotes from Ernesto Che

11 12

Venezuela Seizes Largest Telecom." New York Times 9 May 2007. Print. Ibib

7 Guevara and the Colombian warlord Manuel Marulanda, whose organization is considered a terrorist group by both the EU and the United States.13 Pursuing these issues further in the United Nations as human rights abuses is the cornerstone to shifting the views of the population. While this is an internal problem, we must make sure that this situation is monitored very closely. His ability to spread lies and deception through what is perceived as credible media sources in Venezuela allows for the ability to shape and transform the way Venezuelans thinks. c.) Electricity Further efforts to promote Chvez socialist economy are revealed through the nationalization of electric power. In 2007 Chvez stated that all power companies would be nationalized, including an American company, Electricidad de Caracas.14 The American run company is still the main provider of energy to the country but it is now under Chvezs control. Government run electricity, in recent years has not been a success, and many cites in Venezuela are experiencing blackouts and electricity rationing. Recently, the government has issued restrictions on energy usage to maintain and control the lack of sufficient energy throughout the country. Such restrictions apply to shopping malls and production industries, which will result in shorter hours of operation and eventually an insufficient power supply to create a strong flow of output. Given the poor production since nationalizing the power industry, Venezuela will not be able to supply sufficient

AP. "Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez Threatens to Take Over Private Schools." Fox News. Associated Press, 17 Sept. 2007. Web. 10 Apr. 2010. <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,297134,00.html>. 14 "Venezuela to Nationalize All Power Firms." Reuters UK. 11 Jan. 2007. Web. 10 Apr. 2010.
13

8 electricity to the entire country, resulting in drastic problems throughout virtually every industry, including oil, water supply, and food. Reprivatization of the industry is a necessity to maintain an acceptable standard of living and to sustain social stability within Venezuela. With his country struggling to get by with an inefficient energy supply, Chvez has begun to, and will continue to look for aid to promote and implement better energy production. We must take control of this situation and opportunity by providing Chvez with the necessary aid. We have the unique ability to strengthen our political ties by encouraging our economic ones. In this instance, America can supply Chvez with something many other developing economies dont have; a strong and sufficient energy production. The United States should provide our advanced technology and training to assist Venezuela in becoming more efficient in the production of energy. Such technological improvements would provide Venezuela not only with efficient and reliable energy, but would positively impact Venezuelas numerous industries, by enhancing productivity, resulting in an increase of revenue for all major sectors of the economy.

9 III. Relationship with Latin America The United States shares a unique relationship with Latin America due to the shared hemisphere and proximity. Modern international relations have produced numerous trade agreements specific to the Americas (for a list of such trade agreements, see appendix 2A), and our recent history has enjoyed a time of relative peace between the nations of North and South America. Recent years, however, have seen increased tensions between the United States and Venezuela, and Latin America has found itself thrust into the spotlight of the global stage. The current administration must pay careful attention to how Venezuelas neighbors will react to the Chvez regime and take into consideration the implications of changing alliances. a). The Bolivarian Revolution Hugo Chvez has consistently advocated a Bolivarian Revolution, an excessively propagandist term that combines two things that appeal to the emotions of Venezuelans Simon Bolivar, the liberator of Venezuela, and Revolution. The concept of Bolivarianism has been around much longer than Chvez. Thought up by Bolivar himself, the concept of Bolivarianism calls for a union of South American nations, public education, and sovereignty. Chvez has since interpreted the ideals of Bolivarianism and incorporated them into his political agenda as part of his Bolivarian Revolution. Chvezs interpretation of Bolivarianism includes not just political sovereignty, but economic sovereignty as well, which Chvez has advocated as anti-imperialism throughout South America. Chvez has refocused Venezeulas foreign policy to economic and social integration of Latin America through the use of reciprocal aid agreements and oil diplomacy.

10 Since his rise to power, Hugo Chvez has continually advocated greater integration of Latin American states, making clear his intention to leave the United States out of any new agreements or treaties. The establishment of Petrocaribe in 2005 showed the United States that Chvez was not just throwing around empty idealshe planned to follow through on them. The Petrocaribe organization formed an oil alliance between Venezuela and the Caribbean, allowing 17 Caribbean nations to purchase Venezuelan oil on a preferential payment plan. The organization eliminates the middleman, allowing the governments of the Caribbean nations to purchase the petroleum directly from PDVSA.15 This creates the illusion that oil can be obtained cheaply, because the countries are given a massive reduction on the current price, but are still legally and financially bound to pay the actual price of the oil over a 25 years, with interest. This system increases these nations short-term dependence on oil, and ultimately a long-term dependence on Venezuela to supply them with it. Patrick Manning, the Prime Minister to Trinidad and Tobago, who opted out of the agreement, criticized the plan by stating, It is a question of cutting your own throat if you are not careful.16 In addition to the possible vulnerability and dependency being created by entering into such a seemingly beneficial agreement, the creation of an organization such as Petrocaribe allows Chvez to increase his influence in the area through the use of oil diplomacy and preferential treaties. (For full text of the Petrocaribe agreement, see Appendix 2B.)

15

Petrocaribe, PDVSA, http://www.pdvsa.com/index.php?tpl=interface.en/design/readmenuprinc.tpl.html&newsid _temas=48

16

Eric Watkins, PetroCaribe Stirs Critics, Oil and Gas Journal, (Tulsa, OK: January 16, 2006), http://find.galegroup.com.ezproxy.bu.edu/gtx/infomark.do?&contentSet=IACDocuments&type=retrieve&tabID=T003&prodId=AONE&docId=A141730775&source= gale&srcprod=AONE&userGroupName=mlin_b_bumml&version=1.0 (accessed March 30, 2010)

11 Chvez has gone beyond oil diplomacy to spread his idea of a union of South American nations. His brainchild, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) came into fruition in 2004 after the signing of the Cuba-Venezuela Agreement, and has since expanded to include eight nations in the region. ALBA advocates economic, social, and political integration throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, but unlike most trade blocs, which focus mainly on trade liberalization, ALBAs economic agreement is based on government involvement, welfare, and social reform. It goes much deeper than a simple free trade agreement, causing the implications and interdependence between Latin American states to become much more complex. While there are only eight nations who have formally joined ALBA, the United States must not be so nave as to think that it will stop at only the socialist or socialist democratic nations. The threat is that, similar to Petrocaribe, Chvez has created terms and agreements that are so apparently economically beneficial, that Latin American nations who have traditionally not been supporters of the Chvez government will enter into the agreement. As Fidel Castro, one of the biggest proponents of ALBA, said, Now, for the first time, there are three of us - I believe that, one day, all [Latin American] countries can be here."17 The U.S should not lose focus on the importance of strengthening alliances with Latin America. The Cold War mentality that the U.S must oppose any leftist leaning country has been gradually modified and altered. While it is important to foster our relationships with democratic nations of Latin America, it is perhaps more important to focus on how we deal with those countries that are more vulnerable to Chvezs anti-U.S rhetoric. Any policy the U.S takes in the region must be careful to distinguish the difference between the general leftist sentiment of Latin America, and Chvezs controversial conception of socialism.

Leftist Trio Seals Americas Pact, BBC News (April 29, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4959008.stm (accessed April 1, 2010)
17

12 b). Latin American Opposition to Chvez There has been increasing opposition and dissent towards Chvez, not just in his own country, but in neighboring Latin American states as well. Recent polls suggest that even individuals who say they lean towards socialism are more likely to disapprove than approve of Chvezs leadership (See Graph B).18 The current administration can take advantage of this opportunity to go beyond their apparent wait and see policy, and take cautious action throughout South America. While it would be unwise to take any sort of aggressive or military action towards Chvez, we can utilize our alliances with his neighboring countries to contain the spread of his increasingly authoritarian agenda. Fortunately, this would not require any drastic measures, because Chvez, ironically, has already done most of the work for us. Chvez has begun to alienate Latin American nations by being increasingly vocal in his belief that there can be no compromise between Latin American governments and Washington. He contends that these Latin American governments must chose between Latin American unity or free-trade with the United States, a sentiment that is largely opposed by most leaders in the region. In fact, in 2007, Uruguay, one of the more socialist leaning countries in the region, signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement with the United States.19 The for us or against us message that Chvez is advocating has been advocated by the United States in the past, and has not gone over very well, resulting

18

Opinion Briefing: Latin Americas Leftists, Gallup (January 21, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/113902/Opinion-Briefing-Latin-AmericaLeftists.aspx?utm_source=email%2Ba%2Bfriend&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=s haring&utm_term=Opinion-Briefing-Latin-America-Leftists&utm_content=plaintextlink (accessed April 9, 2010)
19

Office of the United States Trade Representative, Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the United States of America and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, USTR (Montevideo, Uruguay: January 2007), http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/ files/uploads/agreements/tifa/asset_upload_file566_15163.pdf (accessed April 9, 2010).

13 in a deeply rooted anti-imperialistic, anti-American sentiment throughout the region, which has allowed for much of Chvezs appeal. We must compromise with Latin American nations to counter Chvezs approach of issues that he views inflexible. By recognizing the autonomy of Latin American nations, we can further strengthen our friendships and alliances throughout the region and reduce Chvezs prestige and influence. In a recent study of South American nations, all but two countries surveyed approved of the United States leadership compared to Venezuelas. The only two nations who preferred Venezuelas leadership to the United States were Uruguay and Venezuela.20 What is most significant about this sentiment, and incredibly optimistic for furthering U.S relations in Latin America, is that these nations tend to lean more to the left of the political spectrum than the right. This means that they recognize and disapprove of the revolutionary tactics that Chvez has been pursuing in recent years. This attitude was shown during the intense debate of allowing Venezuela into Mercosur, a major South American trade bloc, which Chvez is applying to become a full member of. He is calling for the reformatting of the group, to rid it of the neoliberal influence. This attitude directly clashes with the organizations support of open markets and free trade, and has caused worry among members such as Brazil and Argentina. Fortunately for U.S interests, the majority of member states oppose Chvezs view, and despite the fact that Venezuela will most likely gain membership, (Congressional approval by Paraguay is still pending)21 the members of Mercosur seem to already be taking a hard-line towards Chvezs radical views when they directly effect other nations influence.

20 21

Opinion Briefing: Latin Americas Leftists, Gallup.

U.S Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35766.htm, (accessed March 29, 2010)

14 The best and most effective policy the United States can take towards Latin America and Venezuelas influence there is simply maintaining alliances and friendships with Latin America. We must acknowledge that it is economically beneficial for these nations to enter into agreements with Venezuela. Obviously, we are not strangers to trading with a nation whose political philosophy we dont agree with. The United States has always been committed to the concept of free trade, and our policy towards Venezuela and Latin America is no different. We must assure Venezuelas neighbors that there is no threat of them being penalized for entering into agreements with Chvezdirectly countering his current approach. In the short term, this will at the very least maintain our stable relationship with the governments of Latin America, while avoiding doing anything that excessively provokes Chvez, or gives credibility to his polemics. In the long run, this will isolate and trivialize Chvez, while increasing credibility of the United States throughout the regiona win/win for United States and Latin American interests. c). Democracy Projects in Latin America One of the most active approaches the United States can take towards reducing Chvezs appeal throughout Venezuela and Latin America is the funding of democracy and human rights projects throughout the region. One such organization, founded in 2008, is Pathways to Prosperity, an organization that links Western hemisphere countries committed to democracy and open markets in an initiative to promote inclusive growth, prosperity, and social justice.22 Pathways mission is to empower small businesses, farmers, women, and other vulnerable groups to
22

Pathways to Prosperity in the Americas, http://pathwayscaminos.org.dnnmax.com/Home/AboutPathways/Background/tabid/89/language/enUS/Default.aspx (accessed April 11, 2010).

15 participate in the global economy. The U.S government also supports the Partnership Framework under PEPFAR. The Partnership Framework utilizes cooperation between the United States and Central American governments to combat HIV/AIDS through service delivery, policy reform, and financial commitments.23 In addition to the Partnership Framework, the United States supplied aid to numerous countries throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, and plans to continue to do so.24 Further support of programs like Pathways to Prosperity and PEPFAR by the United States and the United Nations will see a potential increase in open-market economies throughout our hemisphere, and specifically in Latin America, as well as an increased credibility of the United States throughout the region. Programs such as The National Endowment for Democracy provide assistance specifically to Venezuela. The NED provided over $1 million for funding of 18 projects specific to issues in Venezuela last year25, and that number is expected to increase in the next fiscal year. Current projects include the Press and Society Institute, which oversee correspondents to monitor and report on freedom of expression and freedom of press violations.26 Funding for these projects are vital to bolstering U.S credibility in Venezuela in the short-term. In the long-term, funding for such initiatives would reduce Chvezs appeal and even diminish his growing grasp over society. The United States and United Nations have long been supporters of organizations that strive to make a difference in the lives of citizens of Latin America. As the political
23

The United States Presidents Plan for Emergency AIDS Relief, http://www.pepfar.gov/countries/index.htm (accessed April 11, 2010)
24 25

Ibid.

National Endowment for Democracy, http://www.ned.org/where-we-work/latinamerica-and-caribbean/venezuela (accessed April 11, 2010).

26

Ibid.

16 landscape in Venezuela has changed, the need for these organizations has grown. Simply increasing funding by 5% could make a huge difference in the basic needs of Venezuelan and Latin American citizens. By striving to better the lives of the people in our own hemisphere, Chvezs anti-American rhetoric will lose much of its relevance, and stop the potential rise of leaders like Chvez in other Latin American nations.

IV. Human Rights:

When Chvez came to power ten years ago, he established a new constitution, which had the opportunity to drastically improve human rights in Venezuela. The constitution of 1999 sought to restore the integrity of the Venezuelan judiciary system by enacting a new Supreme Court with the independence that would be necessary to establish

17 it as the sole promoter and guarantor of fundamental democratic and human rights27. The constitution also stated, that Venezuelas international rights obligations took precedence over domestic law.28 However, this constitution was full of empty promises, as Chvez has only done the opposite of advancing human rights for his country. The coup d'tat in 2002, which temporarily removed Chvez from power, provided for many of the major setbacks regarding human rights in the country. Although the whole ordeal only lasted forty hours, as Chvez and his constitutional order was quickly restored, this event has provided the reasoning behind many government policies that contradict the 1999 constitution and hinder human rights29. In 2007 President Chvez presented a package to reform the 1999 Constitution that included the allowance of an indefinite president re-election, a reorganization of government boundaries, and a redefinition of private property30. Although these reforms were eventually defeated with the help of student groups and opposition organizations, Chvez has made it clear he is planning to pass these reforms based on his presidential decree. Already, there has been a vote regarding a constitutional amendment, which would end term limits for elected officials. Unfortunately, the vote resulted in the passage of this

27

Human Rights Watch, A Decade Under Chvez: Political Intolerance and Lost Opportunities for Advancing Human Rights in Venezuela, Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/09/22/decade-under-ch-vez (accessed April 16, 2010)
28 29

Ibid.

Human Rights Watch, Venezuela: Rights Suffer Under Chvez: Political Discrimination and Weakened Institutions Define Presidency, Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/09/22/decade-under-ch-vez (accessed April 16, 2010)
30

Civic Impulse, LLC, H.R. 2601: Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007, Gov.Track.us, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h1092601&tab=summary, (accessed April 16, 2010)

18 amendment.31 In the following section we will discuss political discrimination, the biased judiciary system, the limited media, and unlawful arrests.

a.) Political Discrimination: Chvezs government has committed many acts of discrimination against political adversaries and critics. As outlined in The Human Rights Watch 2008 Report, Chvez has fired and ostracized those politically against him from certain state agencies and from national companies.32 For example, Chvezs government has supported the statements by his energy minister in which he stated that all employees that did not support the government would be disbanded.33 Furthermore, Chvez has poorly treated and blacklisted media companies, labor unions, and civil society that have made criticisms against his government or participate in political activity that does not support his ideals, and has denied access to social programs to citizens who have different political opinions than that of the government. 34 Chvez is creating an environment that is only conducive to those who believe in and support his government. In doing this he is further cementing his power as his actions threaten those who disagree with him and could potentially run against him for power. It is
31 32

Ibid.

A Decade Under Chvez: Political Intolerance and Lost Opportunities for Advancing Human Rights in Venezuela
33

Venezuela: Rights Suffer Under Chvez: Political Discrimination and Weakened Institutions Define Presidency
34

A Decade Under Chvez: Political Intolerance and Lost Opportunities for Advancing Human Rights in Venezuela

19 also making his country increasingly anti-democratic for his threatening actions against adversaries, scares and will continue to scare Venezuelan citizens away from free speech and voicing their opinions. b.) The Judiciary System: In 2004, despite the creation of a new independent Supreme Court in 1999, Chvez signed a legislation that allowed his supporters in the National Assembly to pack and purge the existing Supreme Court. Since then, Chvez created and filled twelve new seats with political allies, and many lower court judges have been fired and replaced with those who are considered more politically aligned with Chvez and his government35. This new Supreme Court has showed an attitude of passivity towards government actions that hinder fundamental human rights, as it has failed to rule in favor is safeguarding human rights in many publicized cases regarding organized labor and the media36. Based on the recent passage of a constitutional amendment this past February, which eliminates term limits for all elected officials37, there seems to be no apparent end to this obviously biased Supreme Court. In the long term, this Judiciary corruption leads to unfair trials and verdicts and the sole voicing of only one opinion. A fair and independent judiciary system is vital to a democratic state. Although, Chvez insists that his country follows democratic ideals and Venezuela is currently deemed a democratic state this judiciary corruption shows Chvezs trend of moving away from democracy. c). The Media:

35 36

Ibid. Ibid. 37 Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Venezuela, U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35766.htm#gov, (accessed April 16 2010)

20 Recently policies and actions implemented by Chvez have hindered the democratic right of free speech, as he has taken control of many media outlets. For example, since January Chvez has interrupted sixty separate television and radio broadcasts, making them air his pro-government propaganda38. Subsequently, cable providers under the advisement of Chvez ceased the broadcasting of seven main channels, including TV Chile, Chiles public TV channel, and RCTV International.39 Currently, Chvez is now trying to pass the Media Contents Law, a bill which controls the time slots for certain programs and criminalizes an programming that promotes, condones, or incites disrespect for the legitimate authorities and institutions.40 Furthermore, Chvez has already expanded insult laws, strengthened penalties for criminal offense and penalties, which allow for the adjournment of media outlets, and restricted access to official information to the public. 41 Again Chvezs crackdown of the media only reaffirms his anti-democratic tendencies as he is intentionally hindering the right of free speech and the flow of the ideas and information. If this continues, eventually Venezuelan citizens will not have access to vital information needed to form opinions and ideas. This will only increase Chvezs power for the information that will be available will only support Chvez and his

38

Halvorssen, Thor, Hugo vs. the Media, WeeklyStandard.com, http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/002/785ruylo.asp, (accessed April 16, 2010)
39

Human Rights Watch, Venezuela: Stop Abusing Broadcast Powers, Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/01/26/venezuela-stop-abusing-broadcastpowers, (accessed April 16, 2010)
40

A Decade Under Chvez: Political Intolerance and Lost Opportunities for Advancing Human Rights in Venezuela
41

Ibid.

21 government. There will be no forum to question, speak out, and attempt to make changes to current political situation. d.) Unlawful Arrests: Chvez has now escalated his infringements on human rights by making a series of unlawful arrests of those who publicly criticize his government or do something, which is not aligned with his government policies. For example, former governor of that state of Zulia, Oswaldo lvarez Paz, was arrested March 22 for stating in an interview that Venezuela had become a haven for drug trafficking and mentioning accusations made by a Spanish court that Chvezs government support armed opposition groups42. On March 25, Wilmer Azuaje, parliamentary deputy and public critic of Chvez, was arrested for supposedly insulting and striking a woman police officer43. Also on March 25 Guillermo Zuloaga, owner of TV station Globovision, was arrested for announcing false information and insulting Chvez during his recent meeting with Inter American Press Association.44 Most recently, Judge Maria Lourdes Afiuni has been arrested for a ruling which Chvez deemed unfit and against his personal wishes. While The United Nations has called for her immediate release, Chvez has yet to do so.45 Senior officials insist that these arrests are necessary to stop conspiracies. Yet, it is quite apparent that these arrests are direct examples of Mr. Chvezs recent use of his security and intelligence apparatus squash challenges to his grip on the countrys political

42

Romero, Simon, Chvez Challenges With Arrests of His Critics, New York Times, April 4, 2010, sec. N.
43 44 45

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

22 institutions.46 He is continuing the attempt to strengthen his power and influence over Venezuela and its people and these unlawful arrests only show the escalation in his attempt. Chvez appears more like a dictator than a leader of a democratic country as he arrests people based on whether he agrees with their actions, comments, and opinions. If Chvez has no problem unfairly arresting those who disagree with him, it begs the question of what he will do next if he continues to escalate, and all signs show that he will. e). The Joint Solution: While Chvez has undeniably committed acts against the human rights of his citizens, his acts are not atrocious enough to warrant an intervention. However, it is clear that Chvez is only escalating his infringements on human rights as he politically discriminates, has taken control of the judiciary system, cracked down on media, and made many unlawful arrests of critics. We need to keep a close watch on Chvez and his actions regarding human rights because we will need to make a more aggressive policy towards this issue if Chvez continues to escalate. A more aggressive policy will include economic sanctions toward Venezuela. While there is no doubt we depend on Venezuela as 11% of our oil imports come from them, they still depend on our exports more. We are their biggest trade supplier as 27% of their imports come from us.47 As of now we need to present to the UN the dire necessity to put more heat on Chvez especially regarding his unlawful arrests and political discrimination. As Chvez insists he is a democratic leader of a democratic state it is important for him to stay on good terms with the UN as it is a pillar of democratic ideals. Furthermore, bad relations with the UN will negatively affect his global reputation as a serious leader for the majority

46 47

Ibid. Venezuela, U.S. Department of State,

23 of progressive, powerful states are apart of the UN and consider it a moral authority. Also, bad relations with the UN will hurt Chvezs attempt to create a Latin American coalition as the majority of Latin American counties are fellow members of the UN. We are also in support of the Online Freedom Act of 2009, which states that U.S. businesses do not have to cooperate with repressive governments in using the internet as a source of censorship.48 It helps fulfill the responsibility of the United States Government to promote freedom of expression on the Internet. 49 Therefore, forums like Twitter, Facebook, and Google can be outlets for Venezuelan citizens to share information and promote opinions. Although it is possible for Chvez to expel these companies completely from Venezuela it would still create a very negative situation, as the backlash of the global community would be strong, which was seen in recent events in between China and Google. If this bill is not passed then we will push it through again. Finally, while the H.R. 2601: The Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007 did not pass the Senate; we believe initiatives undertaken by sections 106 and 1025 of the bill must be reintroduced especially because the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for the Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 did not include any funds to be appropriated towards human rights abuses in Venezuela. Sections 106 and 1025 from the 2006/2007 Foreign Relations Authorization Act deal directly with Venezuela. For example, under Section 105, an allotted sum of the budget would go directly to the Broadcasting Board of Governors, allowing them to carry out broadcasting to Venezuela

48

Civic Impulse, LLC, H.R. 2271: Global Online Freedom Act of 2009, Gov.Track.us, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-2601&tab=summary, (accessed April 16, 2010)
49

Ibid.

24 for at least thirty minutes per day of balanced comprehensive television news programming, radio news programming, or both.50 Furthermore, under Section 1025, a portion of the congressional budget would go towards the Economic Support Fund, to help fund activities which support political parties, the rule of law, civil society, an independent media, and otherwise promote democratic, accountable governance in Venezuela.51 Fortunately, the Economic Support Fund for 2009, which we strongly support, includes funding for efforts to preserve and expand democratic space, through programs that strengthen and promote civil society, citizen participation, independent media, human rights organizations, and democratic political parties.52 While this is a solid attempt to help solve the political discrimination and unlawful arrests that are plaguing Venezuela, reintroducing the objectives outlined in Sections 106 and 1025 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2006 and 2007, would more specifically curb the dominance Chvez has over the media, as it would allow for better access to unbiased information. This would in turn lead to an overall reduction of Chvezs influence and power over society, and stop the human rights abuses before they get out of hand. (For full text of the bill and ESF, see Appendix 3A and 3B.) In all, this policy is based on that of wait and see and non-intervention, yet it also makes it clear that we must keep a focused eye on Chvez regarding his actions towards
50

Civic Impulse, LLC, H.R. 2601: Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007, Gov.Track.us, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h1092601&tab=summary, (accessed April 16, 2010)
51 52

Ibid.

Foundation Open Society Institiute,Aid to Latin America Increases 12% in State Department FY2010 request, Just The Facts, http://justf.org/blog/2009/05/12/aid-latinamerica-increases-12-state-department-fy2010-request, (accessed April 16, 2010)

25 human rights and be prepared to act in a more aggressive manner. It also takes advantage of those things we can do to help the human rights situation that do not include intervention like using the UN, U.S. internet companies, and providing economic aid.

V. Venezuelas Relationship with Cuba Prior to Chvezs presidency the relationship between Venezuela and Cuba was not particularly strong. In the past decade however Chvez has made it a point to maintain and increase a strong relationship with Cuba through their shared political ideologies. After the collapse of the Soviet Union Cuba needed to reorganize their trading efforts and connections and find a new trading partner. As Venezuela has made the transition towards a socialist society and economy, the two have formed a mutual socioeconomic partnership. The location of this alliance in our own hemisphere drastically alters the geopolitical

26 relationship. While Cuba once stood alone in the Western Hemisphere against the United States, having Venezuela as their benefactor has resulted in increased power for both leaders, and poses a threat to U.S interests and the relative political stability and democratic leadership the region has enjoyed in recent years. a.) Current Relations Since the beginning of Chvezs reign, the relationship between Venezuela and Cuba has developed into a friendship and alliance that is unparalleled in Latin America, and perhaps even the Western Hemisphere. Their relationship is one between two individuals first, and two countries second. Chvez has called Cuban dictator Fidel Castro his mentor, and insists that Castro represents a revolutionary democracy.53 The two share many similar sentiments and goals, such as anti-imperialism and socialist leanings, which have caused worry for the United States. Castro and Chvez have become increasingly reliant on each other for the support of economic populism and social programs. In October 2000, the two signed the Integral de Cooperacion, which has become economically insistent to Cuba, and socially critical to Venezuela. Under the agreement, the Venezuelan government supplies fifty-three thousand barrels of oil per day to Cuba (this number was raised to ninety thousand in 2005.)54 In return, Cuba provides Venezuela with personnel to advise the Venezuelan government on healthcare, social

Stephen Gibbs, Venezuela Ends Upbeat Cuba Visit, BBC News, August 24, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4179050.stm (accessed April 16, 2010).
53

Britannica Online Encyclopedia, s.v. Cuba: Year in Review 2005, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1090217/Cuba-Year-In-Review-2005 (accessed April 16, 2010).
54

27 programs, and education.55 The alliance between Venezuela and Cuba means that Cuba no longer stands alone against the United States in Latin America. Castros socialist, authoritarian regime based on fear and repression now has an outlet in mainland South America. Already, the two have campaigned for socialist leaders throughout the region, and their support has resulted in the successful election of Evo Morales in Bolivia. In addition, the Chvez government has been linked to violent revolutionary groups throughout the region, specifically in neighboring Colombia. (Appendix) One example of how the Cuba Venezuela relationship is actually hurting Venezuela is through the use of Cuban advisors being sent to oversee Venezuelan governmental affairs. Recently Cuban official Ramiro Valdes was sent to Caracas, Venezuela to help decrease the electricity shortage Venezuela has recently endured.56 Ironically, Valdes held a top position in the Cuban government which specifically oversaw the country experience massive blackouts. Chvez ceases to realize that Valdes will not be improving the Venezuelan energy issue because he has failed to advance his own countries shortage.Valdes is just one of the many officials that have been deployed by Cuba to aid Venezuela in the transformation to a populist democracy. According to the VenaCuba article, eightyfive percent of Venezuelan citizens do not want their country to become like Cuba.57 The United States should not just focus on furthering relations with the government of Venezuela but with its citizens as well. This way we can create and build our credibility throughout the region Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Intermediate Industries Corporation of Venezuela, http://www.corpivensa.gob.ve/acuerdos/7%2520%2520Convenio%2520Integral%2520de%2520Cooperaci%25C3%25B3n%2520Cuba%2 520y%2520Venezuela.pdf&ei=UH_OS6WeCIL48Abamaxw&sa=X&oi=translate&ct=res ult&resnum=1&ved=0CAwQ7gEwAA&prev=/search%3Fq%3Dconvenio%2Bintegral%2 Bde%2Bcooperaci%25C3%25B3n%26hl%3Den%26client%3Dsafari%26rls%3Den (accessed April 11, 2010).
55

Venecuba, A Single Nation, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/world/ americas/displaystory.cfm?story_id=15501911 (accessed April 11, 2010). 57 Ibid.
56

28 and Venezuela will not have to rely solely on Cuba for goods and services. At the same time this would further promote trade between Venezuela and the United States.

Recently, Venezuela has been modeling its political structure after the Cuban government. As a result, Chvez has increased his control over the Venezuelan armed forces and restructured the countrys military doctrine to align itself more with Cuban ideals and military tactics. This includes refocusing Venezuelas military approach in beginning to revolve around the assumption that there will be a military conflict with the United States or other U.S allies in the region. In addition to modeling Venezuelas military system after Cuba, Chvez has also entered into a military collaboration with Cuba. Under this collaboration, Venezuelan militants are trained in the island or for Cuban advisors to train Venezuelans in their own country.58 This military alliance poses a threat to not only the United States, but also our allies throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. The possession of weapons and growing armed forces could give Chvez more influence on his neighbors through the threat of facing military aggression. For now, the best policy towards this growing military alliance is one of wait and see. To take any action would potentially alienate the United States from the region, and destabilize the alliances we have there, giving credibility to Chvezs anti-American actions. We cannot prevent Venezuela from building up their armed forces out of defense, but we can assure them that any attack towards the United States or our allies will be met with force.

In addition to attempting the spread of the Bolivarian Revolution, both leaders have profoundly condemned U.S. favored free market principles and organizations, specifically the FTAA (Appendix), as being violent and belligerent to Latin Americas

Hernn Yates, The Cuba-Venezuela Alliance: Emancipatory Neo-Bolivarismo or Totalitarian Expansion? Institute for Cuban and Cuban American Studies, http://www6.miami.edu/iccas/Cuba-Venezuela-e.pdf (accessed April 11, 2010).
58

29 economic future and well being. The two seek to undermine the open market and trade liberalization principles that are not only advocated by the United States, but which have been widely accepted throughout Latin America and adopted by major organizations such as Mercosur and CAN. As Venezuelan politician Pablo Medina, who was once an ally of Chvez, has stated, Venezuela is headed toward a dictatorship, and the Castro brothers are helping him establish it.59 b.) Solution The relationship poses a unique situation to the United States. Washington cannot take aggressive action towards a nation for simply having diplomatic relations with Cuba (in that case, we would stand against Canada and the European Union.)60 At the same time, however, it is the governments duty to protect not only U.S interests abroad, but the best interests of other nations as well. Political ideologies aside, Fidel Castros regime has been brought about by fear and repression, and is not, as Chvez claims, a revolutionary democracy. Having Venezuela as such a strong ally and outpost gives Castro unprecedented power, as well as the support Chvez needs to carry out the Bolivarian Revolution beyond the borders of Venezuela. The relationship between Cuba and Venezuela has the capability to completely alter the social, political, and economic landscape of Latin America. Their alliance grows stronger every day, and despite increasingly poor health, Fidel Castro is still the person who Chvez conducts his primary means of business with, and until his passing will continue to do so. However,

59

The Associated Press, "Chavez Hosts Latin American Allies for Summit," The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2010/04/19/world/AP-LT-VenezuelaSummit.html (accessed April 20, 2010). EU Relations with Cuba, EUROPA- European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/ development/geographical/regionscountries/countries/country_profile.cfm?cid=cu &lng=en (accessed April 16, 2010).
60

30 considering the relationship between Venezuela and Cuba is primarily founded on two individuals and not based on widespread public support, it will be interesting to note how the relationship between the two nations will change in coming years.61. We must pay careful attention to how the Venecuba relationship changes under the rule of Fidel Castros brother, Raul. While Raul Castro does follow the same political ideology as his brother, there has been hope throughout Washington that he will bring about small but significant easing of government control over the Cuban economy, and further open trade with the United States.62 While the United States does not have the right to control who Chvez can and cannot form alliances and a friendship with, we can monitor the increasing relationship between Cuba and Venezuela and any change in relations must be carefully monitored and analyzed. Any deterioration in relations, no matter how small, can provide the basis for a huge opportunity for U.S interests in the region. In the meantime, we support the passage of bills such as the Social Investment and Economic Development for the Americas Act, which is currently being deliberated in Congress. The bill would establish a Social Investment and Economic Development for the Americas Fund to reduce poverty, expand the middle class, and foster increased economic opportunity in that region, to promote engagement on the use of renewable fuel sources and on climate change in the Americas, and for other purposes. Through cautious engagement in the region of Latin America as a whole, the U.S government can counteract the spreading influence of the Cuba-Venezuela alliance. VI. Venezuelas Nuclear Endeavors

Known to be in poor health, at 81 years old, it is not likely that Fidel Castro will be around much longer.
61

Thomas Catan, Who is Raul Castro, Cubas New Leader? The Times Online, February 19, 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/ us_and_americas/article3396201.ece (accessed April 16, 2010).
62

31 Between 2005 and 2006, Venezuela solidified relationships with Russia and Iran based on the development of nuclear advancements. Even though each of these countries historically and presently have different political systems, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran and President Dimitri Medvedev of Russia have both become friendly contributors to Hugo Chvezs nuclear power undertakings. In effect, their contributions arouse anti-American sentiment, which threatens the power of the United States. a.) Relationship with Russia: The stable diplomatic relationship that Russia and Venezuela formed in April 1970 has continually grown stronger since Chvez took over the country in 1999, as Venezuela has become Russias most important trading and military ally in Latin America. They have relied on each other for money, oil, weapons, and more recently have even announced a nuclear union. Since 2005, Venezuela has been relying on billions of dollars worth of arms including helicopters, fighter jets and 100,000 Kalashnikov rifles from Russia in order to build a stronger military63. Between 2005 and 2007 alone, dozens of contracts were signed granting Venezuela over $4.4 billion for the supply of arms64. In September 2008, Russian
63

Russia Offers Venezuela Nuclear Help, Chavez Says, The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2010/04/02/world/AP-LT-VenezuelaRussia.html?_r=2&scp=1&sq=space%20industry,%20venezuela&st=cse (accessed April 4, 2010).
64

Matthew Poletti, Military shopping spree in Latin America: Venezuela is the frontrunner in the impending arms race. Military Periscope Special Reports (October 22, 2009), http://find.galegroup.com.ezproxy.bu.edu/gps/retrieve.do?contentSet=IACDocuments&resultListType=RESULT_LIST&qrySerId=Locale%28en%2C%2C%29%3A FQE%3D%28ke%2CNone%2C7%29Poletti%24&sgHitCountType=None&inPS=true&so rt=DateDescend&searchType=BasicSearchForm&tabID=T003&prodId=IPS&searchId=R 1&currentPosition=4&userGroupName=mlin_b_bumml&docId=A210863380&docType= IAC&contentSet=IAC-Documents (accessed April 6, 2010).

32 Tupolev Tu-160 bombers were sent to Venezuela for military training flights, marking the first time Russian bombers came to the Western Hemisphere since the Cold War. In addition, Russia gave Venezuela a $1 billion loan to help finance programs for military technical cooperation65 and most recently, on April 2, 2010, Chvez and Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin announced a plan which included the selling of more arms and the development of a nuclear power plant. Concurrently with this announcement, Putin sold 2,250 Russian-built Lada vehicles to Venezuelas government and delivered four MI-17 helicopters.66 Furthermore, both leaders recently signed agreements that solidified the relationship between Russia and Venezuela in social, military, and economical manners. One of the most imperative agreements signed was a joint venture between the two countries to finance an expanded oil and gas exploration in the Orinoco river basin. This oil-rich area has the potential of providing these two countries with a substantial amount of oil, specifically 400,000 barrels a day.67

65

Nima Gerami and Sharon Squassoni, Venezuela: A Nuclear Profile, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22568 (accessed April 4, 2010).
66

Simon Romero, Putin Visits Venezuela to Discuss Oil and Arms, The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/03/world/americas/03venez.html?scp=5&sq=putin%20 &st=cse (accessed April 4, 2010).
67

Joint Press Conference with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez (as released by the Kremlin), Russian Government Transcripts (September 11, 2009), http://find.galegroup.com.ezproxy.bu.edu/gtx/retrieve.do?contentSet=IACDocuments&resultListType=RESULT_LIST&qrySerId=Locale%28en%2C%2C%29%3A FQE%3D%28KE%2CNone%2C22%29joint+press+conference%3AAnd%3AFQE%3D% 28TX%2CNone%2C31%29joint+press+conference%2C+Russia+%24&sgHitCountType= None&inPS=true&sort=DateDescend&searchType=BasicSearchForm&tabID=T003&pro dId=AONE&searchId=R2&currentPosition=1&userGroupName=mlin_b_bumml&docId= A207796274&docType=IAC (accessed April 10, 2010).

33 The apparent growing relationship between Russia and Venezuela is becoming increasingly suspicious, especially due to the seemingly strong initiative of building a nuclear plant together. With such ample amounts of oil, it seems odd that Venezuela would invest on a nuclear power plant. Chvez insists, "We aren't going to make an atomic bomb, but we are going to develop atomic energy with peaceful aims," and says that his country, a major oil exporter, has to prepare for a post-oil world.68 Although Chvezs statement could be completely valid, we are still apprehensive because of his increasingly harsh rhetoric towards the United States and his advocacy of a world without America as a superpower. Both Chvez and Putin have directly and publicly communicated with the U.S. with the message that they do not care what we think. Chvez stated, "the Yankee Empire doesn't want us to have one single little plane," and, "We don't really care what Washington thinks. We aren't making alliances here against Washington." Putin responded by making it clear that the Russian empire also does not care what the United States thinks. Regarding the U.S.s unwillingness to send arms to Venezuela he stated, well, thats good for us. If the United States doesnt want to sell arms to Venezuela, Russia will gladly go ahead and do so.69 Also, Chvez is increasingly alluding to the idea of a world with more than one dominant power. He stated, when explaining the importance of his meetings with Russia,

68

Russia, Venezuela Strengthen Ties, The Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304871704575160280621236098.html (accessed April 5, 2010).
69

Russia Offers Venezuela Nuclear Help.

34 We are forging, like steel, a new multipolar world.70 Furthermore, he has stated about his country, We are a young country, a dynamic country, a country that only recently liberated itself from colonialism and directly referred to his country being oppressed by the empire of the Yankees. He pronounced that, now we are free, and we need to build up our defense capability.71 These statements mark Chvezs desire to move away form an unbalanced world, in which United States is the superpower, and increase Venezuelas power and status. Although Russian-Venezuelan relations are something for the U.S. to be weary about, specifically regarding the copious amounts of oil Russia is supplying to Venezuela, it is not our place to directly hinder the growing diplomatic relationship and alliance between the two countries. However, we can and must take a stance and state our prerogative to protect the United States. The weapons that Venezuela is supplied with should be used only as a defense mechanism towards the country, and not as an offensive towards other countries, especially in Latin America. The same action should be taken against nuclear technology as well. The use of nuclear power in Venezuela should be fully disclosed to the United Nations, to prevent the possibility of it being used as weapons. Furthermore, if Chvez eventually acquires enough weapons to be considered a world military power, we must take the necessary precautions to provide protection to neighboring Latin American countries, which could fall under his influence. We can do this in one of two ways. First, to create U.S. military bases in the neighboring countries and second, by providing them with military training to strengthen their own military

70

Putin offers to help Venezuelas Space Industry, The Peninsula, http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/Display_news.asp?section=world_news&month=april2 010&file=world_news201004032142.xml (accessed April 5, 2010).
71

Joint Press Conference.

35 programs, thus increasing their protection. In addition, we support the passage of H.R 375: The Western Hemisphere Counterterrorism and Nonproliferation Act of 2009. Under Section 209 of this bill, restrictions would be placed upon countries sharing nuclear technology in regards to the advancement of Venezuelas nuclear program.72 We hope that in the long run this bill will force Venezuela to rethink their nuclear endeavors and only use their nuclear power towards peaceful purposes. If Chvez does not cooperate properly and fully disclose their process of utilizing nuclear technology and their supply of arms, Venezuela will face major ramifications. If these demands are not met, the United Nations has the right to intervene.

b). Relationship with Iran: Beginning May 2005, prior to Chvezs strengthened relationship with Ahmadinejad, Chvez promoted the idea of developing nuclear energy. At the time few took him seriously.73 However, Chvezs growing alliance with Iran has increased this threat resulting in The United States becoming increasingly wary of the developing relationship between Chvez and Ahmadinejad. The leaders alliance is based on their ideological compatibility, common interests in oil, as they are both members of OPEC, military cooperation, and open hostility towards the U.S.74

72

Civil Impulse, LLC, H.R 375: The Western Hemisphere Counterterrorism and Nonproliferation Act of 2009, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h111375 (accessed April 16, 2010).
73

Squassoni, Sharon and Nima Gerami. Venezuela: A Nuclear Profile. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 18 December 2008. <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=2256>. Gratius, Susanne and Henner Furtig. Iran and Venezuela: Bilateral alliance and global power projections. Fride.org.

74

36 The relationship between Iran and Venezuela can be seen as potentially threatening in more ways than one. First, their countries represent 8% of global oil production. Therefore, they use oil revenue as a mechanism to gain political authority and to contain their enemies breadth of influence, as they can cease supplying oil to respected countries whenever they so choose. Already, Chvez and Ahmedinejad consider themselves part of the energy-rich rogue states against the U.S.75 Also, several economic agreements have been signed between 2004 and 2009 between Petroleo de Venezuela (PDVSA) and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).76 Furthermore, both countries membership in OPEC promotes mutual cooperation in trade, investments, and military power. Currently, Iran has sent military equipment and military advisors to Venezuela with the goal of training the Venezuelan police and secret service77. Historically, Venezuelas policies towards nuclear weapons started out as nonthreatening. In 1967 Venezuela signed the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco), and later signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1975. Subsequently Venezuela discarded its only known research reactor.78 Currently, Chvez insists that he is pursuing a nuclear program based on peaceful means. If what Chvez says is true, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace suggests that he should adopt an Additional Protocol (AP), and join organizations which promote nuclear safety such as the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. In doing this Chvez would be following the lead of other
75 76 77 78

Gratius, Susanne. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

37 Latin American countries like Chile and Peru, who both have safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).79 As a whole, Latin American nations energy systems are underdeveloped and overreliant; however, Venezuelas system is slightly more advanced. Most countries wholly depend on the system of hydroelectric power, which is erratic and unstable, for the supply of this kind of power varies according to the seasons. However, Venezuela has modified its system so that is it not only relies on hydroelectric power as 25% of the electrical generation comes from natural gas, oil and diesel.80 In this way Venezuela has attempted to distinguish itself from its less electrically advanced Latin American neighbors; however, it would still require at least fifteen years for Venezuela to develop the necessary intellectual infrastructure to operate their first nuclear plant safely.81 Furthermore, the current economic recession and the declining price of oil, does not make for a conducive environment to establish a functioning nuclear plant for the cost between $5 and $10 billion to run. In July 2006, Ahmadinejad awarded Chvez its highest state medal for supporting Tehran in its nuclear standoff, which marked the beginning of their relationship.82 Venezuela also joined Cuba and Syria as the only nations to vote against the U.N. resolution, which stated that due to Irans failure to abide by U.N. nuclear declarations it should be reported to the Security Council, who would ultimately decide whether to

79 80 81 82

Ibid. Squassoni, Sharon. Ibid. Ahmadinejad Gives Venezuelas Chavez Irans Highest National Medal. Fox News. 30 July 2006. <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,206266,00.html>.

38 eliminate Irans nuclear weapons program.83 Furthermore, Iran is also helping Venezuela uncover its uranium sources. Former Venezuelan officials have estimated that Venezuela could have up to 50,000 tons of uranium (an approximate amount that has not been finalized).84 Chvez agreed to sell Iran 20,000 barrels of gasoline in return for their help and continues to insist that his country is uncovering uranium only for peaceful purposes.85 Yet, the U.S and the IAEA fear that Iran is on the verge of violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty86 and is seeking to produce nuclear weapons for its own purposes through its search for strategic minerals like uranium in Venezuela. 87 Iran insists that it is only seeking to produce fuel for nuclear energy production, not nuclear weapons, but in contrast to this statement, the IAEA found that Iran was hiding its plants from inspection, which is contrary to the U.N. resolution regarding nuclear safety.88 In 2007, during a visit Chvez made to Tehran (Chvez made a total of seven visits until 2009), the two nations declared an axis of unity against the U.S. and Ecuador.89 Chvez has been sending mixed messages to the rest of the world about his intentions in his diplomacy with Iran. He has repeatedly said that all countries should end

83

Romero, Simon. Venezuela Strengthens Its Relationships in the Middle East. The New York Times. 21 August 2006. <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/21/world/americas/21venez.html?_r=2>. Padgett, Tim. Chavez to Iran: How About Some Uranium? Time Magazine. 8 October 2009. <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1929256,00.html>. Ibid. Padgett, Tim. Squassoni, Sharon. Ibid. Gratius, Susanne.

84

85 86 87 88 89

39 their nuclear weapons programs, but at the same time said that Iran and Venezuela have a sovereign right to pursue peaceful nuclear ambitions.90 Venezuelas relationship with Iran calls for a closer watch on both of the countries nuclear programs. Johanna Forman, a senior associate for the Americas at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., said its still too early to tell what Venezuela is really doing. Other experts say that it is skeptical as to how much, if any, uranium Venezuela has provided Iran or any other country. We agree with both these comments, but also think its safe to assume based on Irans and Venezuelas growing relations that if Iran is building a bomb, they could definitely slip Venezuela some of its nuclear technology. We do not want Venezuela to become a platform for the entrance of Iranian mischief in the hemisphere.91 Furthermore, Chvez has threatened U.S. specifically as he has made some crude comments concerning U.S. objections to the development of nuclear power, and has threatened to cut off oil supplies to the U.S. if provoked in some way. He also threatened war if the U.S. were to attack Iran.92 While Chvez could have made these remarks to be provocative and attract attention, his involvement with Iran is real and we must take into consideration that if certain opportunities arose he would go through with his threats against the U.S. Venezuela and Irans partnership has further threatened the U.S. because Chvez supported Irans effort to price oil in euros instead of dollars as a way to weaken the

90

Sturcke, James. Chavez jokes about helping Iran build nuclear bomb. The Guardian. 7 October 2009. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/07/hugo-chaveziran-nuclear-bomb>. Padgett, Tim. Ibid.

91 92

40 influence of Americas and investment banks and hedge funds.93 Manhattan district attorney, Robert Morganthau, has been investigating these arrangements and believes that Iran is using the Venezuelan banking system to avoid U.S. and U.N. sanctions. While this may seem like a bold statement, we believe it is a valid belief seeing that the development of nuclear weapons are extremely costly and it is clear both nations have a great interest in obtaining nuclear power. While there has not been any hard evidence to back this assumption The State Department said that they would look into this theory94 and we believe it is extremely important to our wait and see policy to explore such theories in which the U.S. is directly and negatively affected by Venezuela. Finally, Venezuelas relationship with Iran poses a real threat because they are trying to influence surrounding Latin American countries. For example, both leaders are promoting social programs to gain popularity as Ahmadinejad and Chvez created a $1 billion program for social funds in Venezuela and Latin America.95 More importantly, Venezuela has supposedly tried to secretly facilitate arms trades between Iran and Latin American countries, which could constitute a violation of legally-binding U.N. council resolutions related to Irans nuclear program. Due to this influence, other Latin American countries have followed suit by supporting Iran in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which directly opposes UN nuclear declarations.96

93 94

Romero, Simon. A Friend to Iran: Does the Obama administration know what Venezuela is doing to assist Tehrans weapons programs? 10 September 2009. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/09/09/AR2009090902607.html>. Gratius, Susanne. Squassoni, Sharon.

95 96

41 Venezuela is conflating sovereign rights of nations to be independent and selfgoverning which the U.S. supports, with illegal activities such as proposing the development of nuclear weapons, which violates the Non-proliferation Treaty. Ultimately, we believe the chances for long-term Iranian success with Venezuela and Latin America are doubtful since any ideological solidarity will be far more limited to each countrys immediate leadership.97 Furthermore, Irans Islamic Revolution has been an ongoing and long-lasting global movement, whereas Chvezs Bolivarian Revolution is much more personal and has limiting regional influence and will disintegrate when he ceases to be a leader. Yet, it is growingly clear that the Iranian-Venezuelan alliance is something we need to keep a watchful eye on seeing as they seem intent to build up nuclear power and have committed actions that go directly against the U.S. and the UN. We need to be prepared to take further aggressive action if necessary and the only way to do this is to constantly watch and be informed about the two countries continuing relationship.

VII. Conclusion The past decade has seen an increase in tensions between the United States and Venezuela and a growing threat to U.S. interests in Latin America. Chvez has continually

97

Ibid.

42 advocated anti- democratic, anti-imperialistic policies not just in Venezuela but throughout the Latin American region as a whole. The previous Bush administration oversaw the deterioration of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The current administration has tried significantly to reflect a change towards the deteriorating tensions, however in doing so they have created an apparently passive wait and see policy. We believe that while this wait and see policy works in some aspects, the U.S. has to take a more proactive approach towards diminishing relations with Chvezs Venezuela. America needs to redouble its efforts to ensure continued political as well as economic unity with Venezuela. This mutual cooperation, while primarily grounded in economic unity will not only ensure a stable supply of oil to the United States, but will serve as the foundation for future generations to build an ever strengthening relationship between our two nations. This proposal allows for America to infiltrate Chvezs socialist position with capitalist investments and provides American companies new opportunities to establish an oil industry. In return, Venezuela is provided with provisions for their infrastructure and efficient energy. Chvezs growing influence throughout Latin America directly opposes Western ideals that have been adopted throughout the region, and promoted by the United States. He continually enforces socialist ideas and policies, not only in his own country, but through the spread of the Bolivarian Revolution. His use of preferential payments for oil throughout Latin America and the Caribbean has caused concern for the United States that nations throughout the region will become increasingly dependent on Venezuela, raising their vulnerability to his political and ideological influence, even in areas where democracy is strong. Our policy will counteract Venezuelas expanding influence on Latin America by maintaining alliances and assuring Venezuelas neighbors of our friendly intentions and acknowledgement of their autonomy. A more proactive approach

43 includes the support of democracy projects throughout Venezuela and Latin America, targeted at reducing poverty and enforcing democracy throughout the region. This policy will simultaneously better the lives of Latin American citizens, increase American credibility, and lessen the appeal of Chvez, which in turn will reduce the potential rise of additional authoritarian-leaning leaders. Chvez has begun implementing policies that drastically hinder the democratic and human rights of the Venezuelan people regarding free speech, the access of unbiased information, and political discrimination. While his actions against human rights are not appalling enough to warrant military intervention, it is definitely something the U.S. needs to keep an eye on and attempt to improve with other means like using the UN to keep sending messages to Chvez to release his political prisoners and promote a politically free society. We also plan to see certain acts passed that will encourage the promotion of democratic ideals like the Online Freedom Act of 2009 and certain initiatives found in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2006 and 2007, which specifically deals with Venezuela and the hindering of anti human rights policies. It is important that we take action so we do not send the message that it is acceptable for Chvez to commit such acts against human rights. In the past few years, Chavez has formed a close relationship with Cuban dictator, Fidel Castro. Since Chavez came to power, both countries have been part of a trade agreement in which Venezuela gives Cuba oil in return for health services. This agreement formed the basis of the leaders close relationship, which has led to Castros socialist influence on Chavezs ideals, specifically when it comes to his leadership over the military and increasing control over society. Thus, this developing relationship has been a source of fear in the surrounding region. Although the Fidel Castros current state of health is unknown, he still appears to hold as much, if not more power, than he previously did as

44 designated dictator, and the relationship between Cuba and Venezuela only continues to grow. The U.S. must monitor this expanding alliance through the use of the wait and see policy, for this VenaCuba98 relationship could be a potential threat to western society. We must be aware and informed about Venezuelas relationship with Cuba, as this will help the U.S. monitor Venezuelas actions and intentions, and thus ensure Venezuela stays a democratic nation. In recent years, Venezuela has expanded its ties with nations that have become strategically opposed to the United States, specifically Russia and Iran. These strengthening relationships are threatening to the United States and Latin American security because they threaten the development of Venezuela as a nuclear power. The government of Russia has been supplying Venezuela with armaments and nuclear technology. While this does not cause for an immediate response from the United States, it is imperative that we monitor how the situation is developing and what in specific the government of Venezuela proceeds to use these weapons and technology towards. If they fail to disclose any of the previous information, the United Nations has the right to intervene and take a stronger stance towards Venezuelan government. Likewise, although Chvezs relationship with Ahmadinejad does not call for immediate action, it has the potential to create a more serious threat against the U.S. and neighboring Latin American countries. The U.S. has the unique opportunity to stop Chvez from gaining too much momentum and reaching a level of power possessed by leaders such as Ahmadinejad and Kim Jung Il. At this point, the best policy the U.S. should implement is to wait and see if they establish a relationship that directly violates U.N. laws, which would call for a more aggressive policy than has been taken in the past. Venecuba, A Single Nation, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/world/ americas/displaystory.cfm?story_id=15501911 (accessed April 11, 2010).
98

45 Hugo Chvez gains more control over Venezuelan society every day, and shows no signs of relinquishing his power in the near future. His increasingly poor human rights record, the spread of the Bolivarian Revolution, and the danger of Venezuela as a nuclear power are all issues that not only directly clash with U.S interests, but also oppose the basic democratic principles that have been enjoyed by the Latin American region in recent years. While aggressive action towards the Chvez regime is not yet warranted, the United States should strive to reach a policy that marries the current administrations apparent wait and see approach with a more active strategy towards the region. Through the support of organizations and legislation that better the lives of Venezuelan and Latin American citizens, we can directly counter Chvezs polemics and increase our diplomatic relationship with the Venezuelan government, while bolstering trade and investment for both American and Latin American companies. In the long term, this will hopefully result in the removal of Chvez from power, and prevent the rise of future authoritarian leaders in the region.

Appendix 1
A. Companies Affected by Nationalization Major companies such as ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips left Venezuela after being pushed out by Chvezs increasingly nationalistic fiscal policies towards the petroleum industry. Source: Exxon Mobil and ConocoPhillips reject Venezuela deal, The New York Times, June 26, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/26/business/ worldbusiness/26iht-oil.4.6343978.html (accessed April 16, 2010). B. Additional Problems with Telecommunications Control In addition, Chvez has closed down RCTV, which was vocally critical of his policies. He airs a television and radio show in which he addresses the nation weekly. As a result of his expanding control over the media, all private television and radio stations are required by law to broadcast Presidential speeches and government events.

46 Source: Democracy and Human Rights in Venezuela, (Document, Organization of American States, Washington, DC, December 30, 2009), Inter-American Commission on Human Rights http://cidh.org/countryrep/Venezuela2009eng/ VE09.TOC.eng.htm (accessed April 16, 2010). C.

Appendix 2
A. Treaties Specific to the Americas: NAFTA DR-CAFTA Free Trade Agreements between the United States and: Peru, Costa Rica, Dom Rep, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chile Source: http://www.export.gov/fta/ B. Full Text of the Petrocaribe Agreement: We, the Heads of State and / or Government, gathered in the City of Puerto la Cruz, Venezuela, within the framework of the Energy Meeting for the creation of

47 PETROCARIBE: 1. WELCOME the initiative of the President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela for the creation of PETROCARIBE, the fundamental objective of which is to contribute to the energy security, the social and economic development and the integration of the Countries of the Caribbean through the sovereign use of energy resources based entirely on the principles for integration referred to as the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA); 2. RATIFY the commitments assumed at the First Meeting of Energy Ministers of the Caribbean held in Caracas, Venezuela, on 10 July 2004 and at the Second PETROCARIBE Meeting of Energy Ministers held in Montego Bay, Jamaica, from 26 to 27 August 2004; 3. AGREE that, for the Latin American and the Caribbean region, integration is an essential condition for striving to achieve development in the midst of the increasing creation of large regional blocks occupying major positions in the world economy; 4. CONCLUDE that only integration based on cooperation, solidarity and the common will to advance to higher levels of development can help fulfil the needs and aspirations of the peoples of Latin America and the Caribbean while allowing them to preserve their independence, sovereignty and identity; 5. REITERATE that the objective of PETROCARIBE is to help in the transformation of Latin American and Caribbean societies by making them fairer, more educated, participatory and harmonious nations. For this reason, PETROCARIBE has been conceived as an integral process intended to promote the eradication of social inequalities and to foster improved living standards and more effective participation by nations in their efforts to shape their own destiny; 6. RECOGNISE the need to adopt measures, within the context of PETROCARIBE, based on a special and differentiated treatment for the Latin American and the Caribbean countries exhibiting less relative development, and on complementarity and cooperation between the countries of the region; 7. GUARANTEE absolute respect for the principles governing the equality of States, sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, free determination and the right of each nation to freely determine the social, economic and political systems of its choice 8. CONCERNED about global economic trends and particularly about the policies and practices which now prevail in industrialized countries and which may lead to a greater marginalization of the smaller countries of the Third World whose economies are heavily dependant on foreign countries; 9. GIVEN the special circumstances of heavily indebted poor countries, all terms and conditions of the applicable financing arrangements will be determined through bilateral discussions with such countries;

48 10. RECOGNISE the importance of Trinidad & Tobago as an energy exporting country of the CARICOM as a reliable source of supply; 11. WE HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED that, within the context of an unfair economic order inherited from colonialism, and imposed by the wealthy developed and rich countries, the current global energy-related trends marked by the enormous waste of consumer societies, by the reduced availability of production capacities and by speculation leading to the rise in hydrocarbon prices, have all continuously exerted a negative impact on both the economic performance of, and the social conditions in the countries of the Caribbean. In most cases, the exports of these countries have been even more seriously affected by the fall in the prices of their products, mainly agricultural products, such as sugar, bananas and others. In view of this situation, the countries of the Caribbean need to possess reliable sources of energy and must be assured that prices will not represent an obstacle to their development. For these reasons, we, the Heads of State and / or Government, have agreed to sign this: AGREEMENT On the basis of this Agreement, it has been decided to immediately create PETROCARIBE as a body aimed at facilitating the development of energy policies and plans for the integration of the nations of the Caribbean through the sovereign use of natural energy resources to directly benefit their peoples. In this regard, PETROCARIBE will be responsible for coordinating and managing all issues associated with the energyrelated links between the signatory countries in accordance with this Agreement. In order to guarantee the achievement of these objectives and given the dynamic nature and complexity of the energy issue, PETROCARIBE emerges as an organization capable of ensuring the coordination and harmonization of energy policies, including oil and oilderivatives, gas, electricity and the efficient use of these resources, technological cooperation, training, development of energy infrastructure and the harnessing of alternative sources of energy such as wind, solar and other kinds of energy. I. INSTITUTIONAL PLATFORM In order to achieve its objectives, PETROCARIRE shall be furnished with a Ministerial Council formed by the Ministers of Energy or their equivalents and assigned the following functions: * Coordinate relevant policies, strategies and plans; * Delegate functions and responsibilities to the agencies created for the fulfilment of specific tasks, whenever necessary; * Agree on and approve issues of absolute priority to the organization, as well as studies, workshops and work sessions, with a view to providing the necessary technical and legal support for these issues; * Exercise its fullest authority with regard to the performance of the Executive Secretariat;

49 * Agree on the admission or withdrawal of members whenever required. The Council of Ministers shall appoint a President and a Deputy, who shall call and chair the meetings. Regular meetings shall be held once per year and special meetings shall be held as often as needed. PETROCARIBE shall also posses an Executive Secretariat ascribed to the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and assigned the following functions: * Prepare the agendas of the meetings of the Council of Ministers; * Directly manage and administer PETROCARIBE-related affairs; * Ensure the implementation and follow-up of the decisions adopted by the Council of Ministers and submit the relevant reports and recommendations; * Prioritize the studies and projects defined by the Council of Ministers; * Propose the allocation of resources for the performance of all necessary studies.

II. ALBA CARIBE FUND FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT In order to help foster the social and economic development of the countries of the Caribbean, PETROCARIBE shall have at its disposal a Fund earmarked for the financing of social and economic programs and consisting of contributions from financial and nonfinancial instruments. Such contributions may, upon agreement, be drawn from the financed portion of oil invoicing and the savings from direct trade. This fund shall be called the ALBA-CARIBE Fund. In order to activate the ALBA-CARIBE Fund, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela shall contribute an initial capital of Fifty Million Dollars (US$50 million). III. OPERATING ASPECTS 1. With a view to commencing operations, Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) has created a special-purpose affiliate under the business name of PDV CARIBE. 2. Upon beginning its operations, this affiliate shall possess adequate cargo capacity for covering its various supply-related obligations. 3. Freight expenses arising from these operations shall be charged at cost price, which represents additional savings for the signatories to this Agreement.

50 4. PDV CARIBE shall guarantee a direct trade relationship without intermediaries in the supply process. This arrangement shall help generate additional savings for the consumer countries. 5. To this end, PDV CARIBE shall also be responsible for organizing a logistics network of ships, storage facilities and terminals. This will include, whenever possible, refining and distribution facilities for fuels and products. Priority shall be given to countries in greatest need. 6. This affiliate shall adopt training programs designed to strengthen professional capacities and to promote a non-contaminating, more energy-efficient and more rational use of conventional energy and of renewable energy. IV. FINANCING MECHANISMS AND COMPENSATIONS Apart from the benefits set forth in the San Jos Agreement and in the Caracas Energy Cooperation Agreement, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela shall extend credit facilities to the countries of the Caribbean exhibiting less relative development on the basis of bilaterally fixed quotas. 2. Long-term Financing (%) PERCENTAGE TO BE FINANCED >= 15 dollars per barrel 5 >= 20 dollars per barrel 10 >= 22 dollars per barrel 15 >= 24 dollars per barrel 20 >= 30 dollars per barrel 25 >= 40 dollars per barrel 30 >= 50 dollars per barrel 40 >= 100 dollars per barrel 50 With regard to financing, the grace period provided for in the CEA shall be extended from one to two years. 3. Short-term Financing The portion to be paid in the short-term shall be extended from thirty to ninety days. 4. Deferred Payment The same bases of the Caracas Energy Cooperation Agreement shall apply for 17 years (including the 2-year grace period mentioned), provided that the price per barrel remains below 40 dollars. Should the price per barrel exceed 40 dollars, the payment period shall be extended to 25 years, including the 2-year grace period specified at 1% interest. With regard to deferred payments, Venezuela shall be able to determine the portion that shall be paid with goods PRICE PER BARREL

51 and services for which it shall offer preferential rates. The products that Venezuela may purchase at preferential rates may include certain items such as sugar, bananas or other goods or services to be determined that are believed to be affected by the trade policies of rich countries. V. ENERGY EFFICIENCY One essential feature of the objective of PETROCARIBE shall be to add energy saving programs to supply-related agreements. In this regard, PETROCARIBE may arrange credits and exchange technologies to enable beneficiary countries to develop highly functional energy-efficient programs and systems, as well as other measures making it possible for them to reduce their oil consumption and to provide a wider range of services. VI. THE ACTORS Within the framework of PETPOCARIBE, state bodies shall be required to implement energy-related operations. Venezuela offers technical cooperation to support the creation of state agencies in countries not possessing qualified state institutions for this purpose. This Agreement is signed in two original and equally authentic copies drafted in English and Spanish in the City of Puerto la Cruz, on 29 June 2005 by: Willmoth Daniel Deputy Prime Minister of Antigua and Barbuda Leslie Miller Minister of Trade and Industry of the Bahamas Vildo Marin Minister of Health, Energy and Communications of Belize Fidel Castro Ruz President of the State Council and the Government of the Republic of Cuba Roosevelt Skerrit Prime Minister of Commonwealth of Dominica Leonel Fernandez President of the Dominican Republic Keith Mitchell Prime Minister of Grenada Samuel Hinds Prime Minister of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana Percival Patterson Prime Minister of Jamaica Ralph Gonsalves Prime Minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines Petrus Compton Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Civil Aviation of St. Lucia

52 Earl Asim Martin Minister of Public Affairs and Energy of St. Kitts and Nevis Jules Rattankoemar Ajodhia Vice President of the the Republic of Suriname Hugo Chavez President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

Source: PetroCaribe Energy Cooperation Agreement, http://www.guyana.org/

spanish/petro_agreement.html (accessed April 16, 2010).

C. Gallup Poll

Source: Approval of U.S and Venezuelan Leadership Among South American Populations, graph, Latin Americas Leftists (Washington, DC: Gallup Poll, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/113902/Opinion-Briefing-Latin-AmericaLeftists.aspx?utm_source=email%2Ba%2Bfriend&utm_medium=email&utm_campaig n=sharing&utm_term=Opinion-Briefing-Latin-AmericaLeftists&utm_content=plaintextlink

53

54

Appendix 3

A. Full Text of Sections 106 and 1025 of H.R 2601 EC. 106. UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING ACTIVITIES. The following amounts are authorized to be appropriated to carry out United States Government international broadcasting activities under the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act, the Television Broadcasting to Cuba Act, the United States International Broadcasting Act of 1994, and the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, and to carry out other authorities in law consistent with such purposes: (1) INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING OPERATIONS- For `International Broadcasting Operations', $603,394,000 for fiscal year 2006 and $621,495,820 for fiscal year 2007. Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated under this paragraph, $5,000,000 is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2006 and $5,000,000 is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2007 for increased broadcasting to Belarus.

(2) BROADCASTING CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS- For `Broadcasting Capital Improvements', $10,893,000 for fiscal year 2006 and $10,893,000 for fiscal year 2007. (3) BROADCASTING TO CUBA- For `Broadcasting to Cuba', $37,656,000 for fiscal year 2006 and $29,931,000 for fiscal year 2007, to remain available until expended, for necessary expenses to enable the Broadcasting Board of Governors to carry out broadcasting to Cuba, including the purchase, rent, construction, and improvement of facilities for radio and television transmission and reception, and the purchase, lease, and installation of necessary equipment, including aircraft, for radio and television transmission and reception. (4) RADIO FREE ASIA- In addition to such amounts as are otherwise authorized to be appropriated for the Broadcasting Board of Governors, there are authorized to be appropriated $9,100,000 for fiscal years 2006 and 2007 to overcome the jamming of Radio Free Asia by Vietnam. (5) BROADCASTING TO VENEZUELA- For broadcasting to Venezuela, such sums as may be necessary for fiscal year 2006 and such sums as may be necessary for fiscal year 2007, to remain available until expended, to allow the Broadcasting Board of Governors to carry out broadcasting to Venezuela for at least 30 minutes per day of balanced, objective, and comprehensive television news programming, radio news programming, or both. SEC. 1025. ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND ASSISTANCE FOR VENEZUELA. There are authorized to be appropriated to the President $9,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2006 and 2007 for assistance under chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act

55 of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346 et seq.; relating to the `Economic Support Fund') to fund activities which support political parties, the rule of law, civil society, an independent media, and otherwise promote democratic, accountable governance in Venezuela. Source: Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007, GovTrack, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-2601 (accessed April 10, 2010)

B. Full Text of the Economic Support Fund The FY 2009 request for the Economic Support Fund (ESF) will support programs in Restrictive and Rebuilding countries, as identified in the Foreign Assistance Framework (available at http://f.state.gov/docs/plan/AnnexB_ExtendedFramework.pdf). ESF will also support global and regional programs administered by Department of State bureaus that support specific U.S. foreign policy goals. Where appropriate, ESF will also assist states critical to the Global War on Terror, particularly those on the front lines. Many of these countries previously received funding in both the ESF and the Development Assistance (DA) account. This budget more clearly identifies countries into categories consistent with the purposes of the ESF and DA accounts. This will also help improve transparency and facilitate monitoring of country-level performance. This represents a better alignment of U.S. foreign assistance goals for those countries with long-term development programs funded from the DA account. When considered together, the overall DA and ESF request has increased for FY 2009 compared to the FY 2008 enacted levels. The FY 2009 ESF request advances U.S. interests by helping countries overcome short and long-term political, economic, and security hurdles. ESF also supports programs that encourage countries to respond to the needs of their people, thereby joining the community of well-governed states that act responsibly in the international system. In the Near East, ESF supports such objectives as advancing peace and stability, building accountable and transparent institutions, creating economic and educational opportunities for youth, and countering extremist ideology. In South Asia, ESF is a vital part of U.S. counter-terrorism, counternarcotics, and reconstruction and stabilization initiatives. In Africa, ESF programs focus on stabilization, reconstruction, recovery, governance, and economic growth. In the Western Hemisphere, programs address anti-corruption, trade capacity building, economic growth and democratic strengthening, as well as alternative development. ESF supports key foreign policy initiatives, such as the Middle East peace process, regional economic integration in East Asia and the Pacific, and regional security in Europe. The FY 2009 request for the ESF account represents a slight decrease from the Presidents FY 2008 request, but an increase from the FY 2008 enacted levels. Funding for some programs the President requested in FY 2008 has been shifted to the DA account. The FY 2009 request includes funding for several new or expanded initiatives. The FY 2009 ESF request for the State Departments Human Rights and Democracy Fund has increased significantly over the FY 2008 request. The request also includes increased ESF resources to alleviate rural poverty in Nepal to reduce the appeal of Maoist rebels operating in that country. An increase is requested for programs in the South and Central Asia region to

56 improve transportation, communication, and cultural linkages between Afghanistan and its Central Asian neighbors. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative will also receive ESF funding to expand its programming into North Africa. The Administration did not include a detailed FY 2009 supplemental request within the Budget. When needs are better known, the Administration will request additional funds for foreign operations, including costs related to supporting freedom in Iraq and building a stable Afghanistan. Highlights: The Administrations strategic priorities for ESF funding in FY 2009 include: Partners in the Global War on Terror: ESF resources mitigate the influence of terrorist groups and reduce their potential to recruit, particularly by addressing the economic despair and lack of political participation that terrorists exploit. Afghanistan - ESF funds will support continued reconstruction and stabilization activities. Particular emphasis will be placed on enabling the government of Afghanistan to extend the reach of good governance by providing basic social services, infrastructure, justice administration, and rural development to its people. Pakistan - ESF funds will support education and health service delivery, job creation, and improved democratic governance. Funding will also support Pakistans Sustainable Development Plan for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas with vocational training, health and education service delivery, and business development programs. Iraq - ESF funding is needed to consolidate the security gains made by our military and help Iraq transition to be a self-reliant country. The program includes implementing governance reforms at the local, provincial, and national-levels of government and strengthening Iraqs private sector economy. In addition, the program stabilizes strategic Iraqi cities and regions through economic growth and jobs creation programs. Lebanon ESF resources will support that countrys democratic traditions by establishing credible, transparent governing institutions that exercise authority throughout the country, fostering human rights, supporting civil society organizations, and improving educational and economic opportunities among the Lebanese people. Certain funds will target programs in southern Lebanon, reducing the ability of Hezbollah to divide the populace and erode support for the current Government. Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) ESF funds efforts to sustain the momentum for democratic reform in the Middle East by encouraging political, economic and educational transformation and the empowerment of women. At-Risk States: ESF resources assist countries and regions at risk of civil unrest by helping these countries fight poverty, build democratic institutions to guarantee human rights, and provide basic services and economic opportunities to their populations. Sudan ESF funds will support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to ensure a just peace in Sudan and support peace processes in Darfur.

57 West Bank and Gaza ESF funds will promote Israeli-Palestinian peace by laying the groundwork for a sustainable Palestinian state through building credible, transparent institutions and improving governance; advancing the rule of law; expanding public health and basic education; building infrastructure; creating jobs; and generating microenterprise. Colombia ESF funds will continue our comprehensive campaign against narcotics trafficking and terrorism and will strengthen Colombias institutional capacity to promote economic, social, democratic and alternative development. Liberia ESF resources will support a broad range of programs--including governance, education, and economic opportunity--that support the countrys recovery from years of civil unrest. Haiti ESF funds will provide key support for a comprehensive program to strengthen democratic reform, foster long-term stability, and promote socio-economic development. Somalia ESF funds will support political reconciliation and governance activities, and it will be used to provide basic social services.

Democracy Issues in States of Concern: ESF programming encourages democratic reform and builds civil society so that states will respond to the needs of their people. Iran ESF funds will support the aspirations of the Iranian people for a democratic and open society by promoting civil society, civic participation, media freedom and freedom of information. Zimbabwe ESF funds will support the USG's efforts to advance democratic governance to address the country's development challenges. Cuba ESF resources will further implement program recommendations from the Committee to Assist a Free Cuba II, including strengthening civil society. In addition to assisting Cuba's embattled human rights activists and independent journalists, the U.S. will reach out to courageous Afro- Cubans, women, youth, and student activists. Burma ESF funds will promote democracy and human rights and provide humanitarian assistance and basic education to internally displaced persons inside the country as well as to refugees and migrants on the Thailand-Burma border. Venezuela ESF funds will support efforts to preserve and expand democratic space, through programs that strengthen and promote civil society, citizen participation, independent media, human rights organizations, and democratic political parties. Global and Regional Programs: ESF resources administered by the Department of State directly support U.S. foreign policy goals: Human Rights and Democracy Fund ESF resources will promote democracy in priority

58 countries where egregious human rights violations occur, where democracy and human rights advocates are under pressure, where governments are not democratic or are in transition, and where the demand for respect for human rights and democracy is growing. Western Hemisphere Regional program ESF funds will enhance diplomatic, economic, health, education, disaster preparedness, and law enforcement cooperation and collaboration with the Caribbean through the Third Border Initiative. U.S. assistance will support initiatives stemming from the 2009 Summit of the Americas and strengthen the shared commitment to the Inter-American Democratic Charter. Trade capacity building funds in this program and in country-specific allocations will enhance the labor and environmental conditions in Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) countries, contributing to the effective implementation of CAFTA-DR. Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate ESF funds will promote clean development, enhance energy security, catalyze economic growth, and address climate change. Oceans, Environment, and Science Partnerships ESF funds will to promote cooperation and build global capacity for sound stewardship of environmental and natural resources in concert with global economic growth and social development. Trafficking in Persons ESF resources will support anti-trafficking efforts in critical and at-risk countries identified in the State Departments Trafficking in Persons Reports.

Source: United States Agency for International Development, Economic Support Fund, USAID (Washington, DC: 2009), http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2009/101425.pdf (accessed April 14, 2010).

59

Appendix 4
A. Connections to Revolutionary Groups Chvez has been linked to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, (FARC) a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary group. They have been involved in the ongoing conflict in Colombia, and have proclaimed themselves as being inspired by the Bolivarian revolution. In January of 2008, Chvez urged the Colombian government and the European Union to remove FARC from their list of terrorist groups. After the bombing of a FARC base camp, recovered laptops from the organizations contained documents potentially linking the Venezuelan government with efforts to support the FARC. In a turn of events, on June 8, 2008, President Chvez publicly urged the FARC to end its armed struggle, and release all hostages. While the next few years will most likely not be able to prove the extent of the Venezuelan government Source: Mark Sullivan, Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S Policy, Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32488.pdf (accessed March 29, 2010). B. Rejection of the FTAA The Free Trade Area of the Americas was a U.S backed agreement that would eliminate or reduce trade barriers among all nations in the Americas, with the exception of Cuba. Chvez viewed the FTAA as an extension of American imperalism and exploitation of Latin America. To counteract it, he proposed ALBA, which was adopted by Cuba and Venezuela, and has since spread throughout Latin America.

Source: Mark Sullivan, Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S Policy, Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32488.pdf (accessed March 29, 2010).

60

Appendix 5
A. TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS The need to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons was evident from the first days of the nuclear era. On November 15, 1945, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada proposed the establishment of a U.N. Atomic Energy Commission for the purpose of "entirely eliminating the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes." The Baruch plan of 1946, offered by the United States, sought to forestall nuclear arms proliferation by placing all nuclear resources under international ownership and control. But the early postwar efforts to achieve agreement on nuclear disarmament failed. The Soviet Union in 1949, the United Kingdom in 1952, France in 1960, and the Peoples Republic of China in 1964, became nuclear-weapon states. And increasingly it was becoming apparent that earlier assumptions about the scarcity of nuclear materials and the difficulty of mastering nuclear technology were inaccurate. Other developments and prospects further underscored the threat of nuclear proliferation. In the early 1960s the search for peaceful applications of nuclear energy had brought advances in the technology of nuclear reactors for the generation of electric power. By 1966 such nuclear reactors were operating or under construction in five countries. It was estimated that by 1985 more than 300 nuclear power reactors would be operating, under construction, or on order. Nuclear reactors produce not only power, but plutonium -- a fissionable material which can be chemically separated and used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. By 1985 it was estimated that the quantity of plutonium being produced worldwide would make possible the construction of 15 to 20 nuclear bombs daily, depending upon the level of the technology employed. If the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful purposes was not prevented by an international nuclear nonproliferation regime, and if a growing number of nations came to possess nuclear weapon arsenals, it was believed that the risks of nuclear war as a result of accident, unauthorized use, or escalation of regional conflicts would greatly increase. The possession of nuclear weapons by many countries would add a grave new dimension of threat to world security. A succession of initiatives beginning in the 1950s by both nuclear and non-nuclear powers sought to check proliferation. Indeed the effort to achieve a nuclear test ban -- culminating in the Treaty of 1963 -- had as one of its main purposes inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons. But much before that, in August 1957, the Western powers (Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) submitted a "package" of measures in the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, which included a commitment "not to transfer out of its control any nuclear weapons, or to accept transfer to it of such weapons," except for self-defense. Although the Soviet Union opposed proliferation, it claimed that this Western formula would allow an aggressor to judge his own actions, and to use nuclear weapons "under cover of the alleged right of self-defense." It therefore sought to couple a ban on transfer of nuclear weapons to other states with a prohibition on stationing nuclear weapons in foreign countries.

61 In 1961 the UN General Assembly unanimously approved an Irish resolution calling on all states, particularly the nuclear powers, to conclude an international agreement to refrain from transfer or acquisition of nuclear weapons. In addition, the general disarmament plans which had been submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union during the period 1960 -1962 included provisions banning the transfer and acquisition of nuclear weapons. The United States, on January 21, 1964, outlined a program to halt the nuclear arms race in a message from President Johnson to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC). This program, unlike the 1957 proposal, was not a "package." It included a nondissemina-tion and nonacquisition proposal -- based on the Irish resolution -- and safeguards on international transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes, combined with acceptance by the major nuclear powers that their peaceful nuclear activities undergo increasingly "the same inspection they recommend for other states." An issue that was to be the principal stumbling block for the next three years was the proposed multilateral nuclear force (MLF) then under discussion by the United States and its NATO allies. The Soviet Union strongly objected to this plan and maintained that no agreement could be reached on nonproliferation so long as the United States held open the possibility of such nuclear-sharing arrangements in NATO. These arrangements would constitute proliferation, the Soviet Union contended, and were devices for giving the Federal Republic of Germany access to or control of nuclear weapons. On August 17, 1965, the United States submitted a draft nonproliferation Treaty to the ENDC. This draft obliged the nuclear-weapon powers not to transfer nuclear weapons to the national control of any non-nuclear country not having them. Non-nuclear nations would undertake to facilitate the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or equivalent safeguards to their peaceful nuclear activities. A Soviet draft Treaty was submitted to the General Assembly on September 24. In an accompanying memorandum, the Soviet Union declared that the greatest danger of proliferation was posed by the MLF and the alternative British proposal for an Atlantic nuclear force (ANF). The Soviet draft prohibited the transfer of nuclear weapons "directly or indirectly, through third States or groups of States not possessing nuclear weapons." It also barred nuclear powers from transferring "nuclear weapons, or control over them or their emplacement or use" to military units of non-nuclear allies, even if these were placed under joint command. The draft included no safeguards provisions. In March 1966, the United States tabled amendments to its draft Treaty in the ENDC, seeking to clarify and emphasize the Western view that collective defense arrangements would not violate the principle of nonproliferation. The U.S. representative stressed that the United States would not relinquish its veto over the use of U.S. weapons. The Soviet Union objected that the amendments did not prevent the transfer of nuclear weapons through such alliance arrangements as the MLF, the ANF, or units placed under joint command. The U.S. retention of a veto, the Soviet representative argued, did not provide security against dissemination. Despite strong disagreement on the issue of collective defense arrangements, it was apparent that both sides recognized the desirability of an agreement on nuclear

62 nonproliferation. Moreover, the interest of non-nuclear powers in such a Treaty was increasingly manifest. It was shown in 1964 at the African summit conference and at the Cairo conference of nonaligned states and expressed in a series of resolutions in the General Assembly urging that nuclear nonproliferation receive priority attention. In May 1966, the U.S. Senate unanimously passed a resolution sponsored by Senator Pastore of Rhode Island and 55 other Senators commending efforts to reach a nuclear nonproliferation agreement and supporting continued efforts. In the fall of 1966 the U.S. and Soviet co-chairmen of the ENDC began private talks, and by the end of the year they had reached tentative agreement on the basic nontransfer and nonacquisition provisions of a Treaty, as well as on a number of other aspects. There followed a long and arduous series of consultations between the United States and its allies. The allies raised a number of questions regarding the effect of the Treaty on NATO nuclear defense arrangements, and the United States gave its interpretations. The United States considered that the Treaty covered nuclear weapons and/or nuclear explosive devices, but not delivery systems. It would not prohibit NATO consultation and planning on nuclear defense, nor ban deployment of U.S.-owned and -controlled nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear NATO members. It would not "bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its members." The allies questions and the United States answers were provided to the Soviet Union, which did not challenge the U.S. interpretations. On August 24, 1967, the United States and the Soviet Union were able to submit separate but identical texts of a draft Treaty to the ENDC. Other ENDC members proposed numerous amendments, largely reflecting the concerns of the non-nuclear states. In response to these, the drafts underwent several revisions, and the co-chairmen tabled a joint draft on March 11, 1968. With additional revisions, the joint draft was submitted to the U.N. General Assembly, where it was extensively debated. Further suggestions for strengthening the Treaty were made, and in the light of these, the United States and the Soviet Union submitted a new revised version, the seventh, to the First Committee of the General Assembly on May 31. The General Assembly on June 12 approved a resolution commending the text and requesting the depositary governments (the U.S., U.K., and Soviet Union) to open it for signature. France abstained in the General Assembly vote, stating that while France would not sign the Treaty, it "would behave in the future in this field exactly as the States adhering to the Treaty." In the course of these extended negotiations, the concerns of the non-nuclear powers centered particularly on three main issues: Safeguards. There was general agreement that the Treaty should include provisions designed to detect and deter the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful to weapons use. Two problems were involved. One was to reconcile the Soviet insistence that all nonnuclear parties accept IAEA1 safeguards with the desire of the non-nuclear members of EURATOM2 (Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) to preserve their regional system. To meet this concern, the final draft provided that non-nuclear parties could negotiate safeguards agreements with IAEA either

63 individually or together with other states.3 The other problem was to satisfy the widespread concern among non-nuclear states that IAEA safeguards might place them at a commercial and industrial disadvantage in developing nuclear energy for peaceful use, since the nuclear powers would not be required to accept safeguards. To help allay these misgivings, the United States offered, on December 2, 1967, to permit the IAEA to apply its safeguards, when such safeguards were applied under the NPT, in all nuclear facilities in the United States, excluding only those with "direct national security significance." The United Kingdom announced that it would take similar action. Its safeguards agreement with the IAEA was concluded in 1976 and is now in force. The U.S.-IAEA agreement, signed on November 18, 1977, was submitted by the President to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification on February 9, 1978, and entered into force on December 9, 1980. In 1977, France opened negotiations with the IAEA, and a safeguards agreement entered into force on September 12, 1981. In June 1982, the Soviet Union announced its readiness to put some of its nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards, and on June 10, 1985, its safeguards agreement with the IAEA entered into force. In September 1985 China declared at the IAEA that it would place some of its civil nuclear facilities under international safeguards, and a safeguards agreement was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in September 1988. Balanced Obligations. Throughout the negotiations most non-nuclear states held that their renunciation of nuclear weapons should be accompanied by a commitment on the part of the nuclear powers to reduce their nuclear arsenals and to make progress on measures toward comprehensive disarmament. General provisions were included in the Treaty affirming the intentions of the parties to negotiate in good faith to achieve a cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament. Further, to meet objections about possible discriminatory effects, the Treaty stipulated that parties were to participate in, and have fullest access to materials and information for, peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Treaty also provided that any potential benefits of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes would be made available to non-nuclear weapon parties on a nondiscriminatory basis. Security Assurances. Non-nuclear-weapon states sought guarantees that renunciation of nuclear arms would not place them at a permanent military disadvantage and make them vulnerable to nuclear intimidation. But, it was argued, the security interests of the various states, and groups of states, were not identical; an effort to frame provisions within the Treaty that would meet this diversity of requirements for unforeseeable future contingencies would create inordinate complexities. To resolve the issue, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom submitted in the ENDC, on March 7, 1968, a tripartite proposal that security assurances take the form of a U.N. Security Council resolution, supported by declarations of the three powers. The resolution, noting the security concerns of states wishing to subscribe to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, would recognize that nuclear aggression, or the threat of nuclear aggression, would create a situation requiring immediate action by the Security Council, especially by its permanent members. Following submission of the Treaty itself to the U.N. General Assembly, the tripartite resolution was submitted to the Security Council. In a formal declaration, the United

64 States asserted its intention to seek immediate Security Council actions to provide assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty that was the object of nuclear aggression or threats. The Soviet Union and the United Kingdom made similar declarations. France abstained from voting on the Security Council resolution; the French representative said that France did not intend its abstention to be an obstacle to adoption of the tripartite proposal, but that France did not believe the nations would receive adequate security guarantees without nuclear disarmament. In addition to this "positive" security assurance, the United States in 1978 issued a policy statement on "negative" security assurances in connection with the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament. Secretary of State Vance made the following statement on June 12, 1978: After reviewing the current status of the discussions in the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, after consultations with our principal allies, and on the basis of studies made in preparation for the Special Session, the President has decided to elaborate the U.S. position on the question of security assurances. His objective is to encourage support for halting the spread of nuclear weapons, to increase international security and stability, and to create a more positive environment for success of the Special Session. To this end, the President declares: "The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a state allied to a nuclear weapon state, or associated with a nuclear weapon state in carrying out or sustaining the attack." In 1982, then-ACDA Director Eugene Rostow reaffirmed the assurance in the Genevabased Committee on Disarmament. It is the U.S. view that this formulation preserves U.S. security commitments and advances U.S. collective security, as well as enhances the prospect for more effective arms control and disarmament. This declaration has been reaffirmed by every successive Administration, most recently at the 1990 NPT Review Conference. The Treaty was opened for signature on July 1, 1968, and signed on that date by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and 59 other countries. On July 9, President Johnson transmitted it to the Senate, but prospects for early U.S. ratification dimmed after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August. The Senate adjourned without voting on the Treaty. In February, 1969, President Nixon requested Senate approval of the Treaty, and in March the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification. The Treaty entered into force with the deposit of U.S. ratification on March 5, 1970. In broadest outline, the basic provisions of the Treaty are designed to:

prevent the spread of nuclear weapons (Articles I and II); -- provide assurance, through international safeguards, that the peaceful nuclear activities of states which have not already developed nuclear weapons will not be diverted to

65 making such weapons (Article III); -- promote, to the maximum extent consistent with the other purposes of the Treaty, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to include the potential benefits of any peaceful application of nuclear explosion technology being made available to non-nuclear parties under appropriate international observation (Articles IV and V); -- express the determination of the parties that the Treaty should lead to further progress in comprehensive arms control and nuclear disarmament measures (Article VI). Article VIII provides for a conference to be held five years after entry into force of the Treaty to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. Four such review conferences have been held since the Treaty entered into force. The first review conference, held in Geneva in May 1975, produced a strong reaffirmation of support for the Treaty by the parties thereto. It also expressed solid support for IAEA safeguards and recommended that greater efforts be made to make them universal and more effective. The 1975 conference urged common export requirements designed to extend safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities, so-called "comprehensive safeguards" in importing nonnuclear-weapon states not party to the Treaty, and urged all suppliers and recipients to accept these requirements. It also concluded that NPT adherence should facilitate access to peaceful nuclear assistance and credit arrangements. At the second review conference, which was held in Geneva August 11 - September 7, 1980, a thorough exchange of views on progress toward fulfillment of the Treatys objectives was heard. Although the participants failed to agree on a final document, the national statements of the parties present and the ensuing debate revealed continued strong support for the NPT and its objectives. The third review conference was held August 27 - September 21, 1985, in Geneva. The conference adopted by consensus a Final Declaration which reaffirmed the parties support for the NPT and their appreciation of its essential contribution to international peace and security. The 1985 conference reaffirmed the importance of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons and concluded that the Treaty continued to meet this basic objective. It also affirmed that the nonproliferation and safeguards commitments of the NPT provide an essential framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation and acknowledged that there has been appreciable bilateral cooperation and multilateral technical assistance in the area of peaceful nuclear uses. Ways to strengthen peaceful nuclear cooperation were identified. The conference also strongly endorsed the IAEA and its safeguards system, as well as efforts to enhance further their effectiveness. Although it was unable to agree that comprehensive safeguards should be a precondition for significant nuclear exports to nonNPT, non-nuclear-weapon states, the conference agreed not only on the desirability of such safeguards in non-nuclear-weapon states, but also that effective steps should be taken to achieve them. As expected, evaluation of the progress made since 1970 in achieving the arms control and disarmament goals of Article VI evoked great disappointment and produced the most criticism. In particular, virtually all parties present supported immediate negotiations on and urgent conclusion of, a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB). The United States,

66 while stating its commitment to the long-term goal of a CTB, stressed its conviction that deep reductions in existing nuclear arsenals should have the highest priority, and that it would continue to negotiate seriously and flexibly to this end in the Geneva negotiations. Both views were set out in the Final Declaration. The NPT emerged from the 1985 review conference widely recognized as an arms control success, and the results of the conference reinforced the international norm of nonproliferation. The fourth NPT review conference was held August 1990, in Geneva. A comprehensive and thorough review of the operation of the NPT over the previous five years was conducted during the conference, which once again affirmed that the NPT was a vital instrument for preserving global stability and security. The conference made progress on some important issues on which there was consensus, including the need for full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of significant nuclear supply, tighter export controls on nuclear technology transfers, and the need for scrupulous adherence to the obligations of the Treaty. Consensus was also achieved on such issues as negative security assurances and positive security assurances, prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the importance of IAEA safeguards and effective export controls, and on nuclear safety. A very important result of the conference was the strong commitment by a clear majority of participating states to the importance of extending the life of the NPT in 1995. Unfortunately, this conference also demonstrated that a small number of states might be willing to risk damage to the Treaty by linking its extension to negotiations of other arms control measures, such as a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTB). Article X (2). In accordance with the terms of the NPT, a conference was held in 1995 to decide whether the NPT should continue in force indefinitely or be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. On May 11, more than 170 countries attending the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference in New York decided to extend the Treaty indefinitely and without conditions. The NPT remains the cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. With over 180 parties, it is the most widely adhered to arms control agreement in history. This impressive membership, which continues to grow, is a concrete reflection of the growing international support for nuclear nonproliferation.

Source: "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/npt1.html (accessed April 16, 2010).

67

Appendix 6
A. General Information 1. Map and Flag of Venezuela

Source: Map of Venezuela, map, U.S State Department, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35766.htm (accessed April 19, 2010).

68

2. Map of The Americas and Latin America:

Source: Map of the Americas, map, http://www.state.gov/p/wha/ci/index.htm (accessed April 19, 2010).

69

3. Timeline of Crucial Events Leading up to the Chvez Regime 1522: The first permanent Spanish settlement in South America, Nuevo Toledo 1821: Independence from Spain a. First combined with Colombia and Ecuador as the Republic of Greater Colombia 1830: Became an independent republic The first half of the 20th century was marked by periods of authoritarianism--including dictatorships from 1908-35 and from 1950-58. 1908-1935: Juan Vicente Gomez - After the discovery of large petroleum reserves in Venezuela, Gomez was able to vastly deflate the nations debt - Also widened the social stratification gap 1945-1948; 1959-1964: Romulo Betancourt - Moderate ruler who wanted to steer Venezuela towards democracy - Strong ally of U.S, helped isolate Cuba from many trade agreements 1974-1979, 1989-1993: Carlos Andres Perez - Nationalized oil industry in 1976 - First term saw economic and social gains - Second term saw massive unrest - Faced two (unsuccessful) coups o First coup led by Hugo Chvez - Removed from office in 1993 1994-1999: Rafael Caldera - Oversaw massive inflation and political unrest - Pardoned figures involved in 1992 coup, effectively allowing Chvez to rise to power 4. Geography of Venezuela - Area: 912,050 sq. km - Capital: Caracas - Terrain: i. Andes Mountains and Maracaibo Lowlands in northwest ii. Central plans iii. Guiana Highlands in southeast b. Climate c. Varies from tropical temperate d. Population: Around 30 million people i. Annual population growth of 1.6% 5. Religion - Roman Catholic: 96% - Protestant: 2% - Other: 2%

6. Language - Spanish is the official language with numerous indigenous dialects

70 7. Major Political Parties - United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) - Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) - Democratic Action (AD) - Christian Democrats (COPEI) 8. Economic Situation - GDP according to sources in 2008: $313 billion - At least 50% of the population is under the age of 25 - Most of the population lives in Urban Areas

Source: Nathalie Malinarich, Venezuelas middle class feels the squeeze, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6186990.stm, (accessed April 15, 2010).

71 9. Trade - Exports (2009)--$60.9 billion: petroleum ($57.6 billion), aluminum, steel, chemical products, iron ore, cigarettes, plastics, fish, cement, and paper products. - Major markets (2005)--U.S. 57.5%, the Netherlands 5.2%, Mexico 4.5%, Colombia 4.5%. Imports (2009)--$38.5 billion: consumer goods, machinery and transport equipment, manufactured goods, and construction materials. - Major suppliers (Jan.-Oct. 2009)--U.S. 27.0%, Colombia 12.6%, China 10.2%, Brazil 8.2%. 10. Current Political System - The judicial branch is headed by the Supreme Tribunal of Justice - The National Assembly appoints justices, who serve 12-year terms. - The citizens branch consists of three components - The attorney general ("fiscal general") - The "defender of the people" or ombudsman - The comptroller general. - The "Electoral Power," otherwise known as the National Electoral Council (CNE), is responsible for organizing elections at all levels. - The National Assembly also elects its five members to 7-year terms. - In addition to Washington, DC, Venezuela maintains consulates in Boston, Chicago, Houston, Miami, New Orleans, New York, San Francisco, and Puerto Rico. 11. Elections during Chavezs Rule - Originally came to power in 1998 - 2000: Chavez re-elected - Electoral process was considered free and fair by international community - 2006: Chavez re-elected - International observers did not find evidence for election fraud, but there has been concern about abuse of government power in supporting Chavez, voter intimidation, and manipulation of the voter registry 12. Altering the Constitution - January 2007: Chvez announced a renewed effort to implement his vision of "21st Century Socialism" in Venezuela. - Asked National Assembly to grant him special constitutional powers via an "enabling law" to rule by decree with respect to a broad range of issues. - The all-chavista Assembly granted those powers, for a period of 18 months. - Chavez used that authority to take major steps to nationalize the telecommunications and electricity sectors, as well as to finalize a majority government share in many oil projects - These sectors all had significant foreign investments. - August 15, 2007: Chvez proposed a package of reforms to the 1999 Constitution, including measures that allow indefinite presidential re-election, a reorganization of the geographic boundaries of government, and a redefinition of private property

72 - December 2, 2007: Proposed reforms were narrowly defeated in a public referendum after student groups, traditional opposition leaders, and former Chvez allies urged Venezuelans to reject the package. - First electoral loss for President Chvez since he assumed office - Seen as rebuke of his efforts to gain greater power in executive office - February 15, 2009: Constitutional amendment to end term limits for all elected officials approved Source: U.S Department of State, Venezuela, February 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35766.htm (accessed April 2, 2010).

73 LIST OF ACRONYMS

ALBA AP CARICOM CAN CANTV CITGO ESF FTAA GDP HR 2601 IAEA UNESCO MERCOSUR NAM NED NIOC NPT OPEC PDVSA PEPFAR RCTV UN

Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America The Associated Press The Caribbean Community and Single Market and Economy Andean Community of Nations Compaa Annima Nacional de Telefonos de Venezuela Citgo Petroleum Corporation Economic Support Fund Free Trade Area of the Americas Gross Domestic Product The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for the Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007 International Atomic Energy Agency United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Southern Common Market Non- Aligned Movement National Endowment for Democracy National Iranian Oil Company Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Petroleums of Venezuela U.S. Presidents Emergency Plan for AIDs Relief Radio Caracas Television International United Nations

74

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