Professional Documents
Culture Documents
_______________________________________________
Paper Abstract:
London, 28/05/04
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explanations of post-Second World War political developments led scholars to delve into
countries. Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba attempted with the introduction of the term
“political culture” to offer a new tool for the study of political systems. Political culture
soon attracted the interest of academics whose debate gained intensity in the ideologically
polarised environment of the Cold War era. The building blocks of political culture are,
therefore, the knowledge, beliefs, opinions and emotions of individual citizens toward
their form of government (Hague and Harrop, 2001: 78). Political culture is understood
as a set of citizens’ orientations toward political objects based on their knowledge, beliefs,
opinions and emotions and is classified into parochial, subject and participant (Gabriel A.
Almond and Verba, 1963). In parochial political culture there are no specialised political
roles in societies, and for members of these societies political orientations to these roles
are not separated from their religious and social orientations. In subject political culture
∗
Ioannis N. Grigoriadis holds an MIA degree from the School of International and Public Affairs,
Columbia University. He is currently a PhD student in Turkish Politics at the School of Oriental and
African Studies, University of London and a Research Associate at the South East European Studies
Programme, European Studies Centre, St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford.
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aspects of the system, but there are almost no orientations toward specifically input
objects, and toward the self as an active participant. It is essentially a passive system as
be explicitly oriented to the system as a whole. Close attention is paid to politics, while
It should however be clarified that applying the political culture model is not
understood as an immutable property that precludes the possibility of political change and
important for the formation of political culture. School, family and other social groupings
have their contribution in the hammering of perceptions, affects and evaluations that
constitute political culture. Although historical memories and political socialisation have
considerable impact on the formation of political culture, political culture can –to a large
relationship between political culture and political structures is interactive, the survival of
programmes were enforced has indicated that there are certain limits to the plasticity of
political culture (Almond, 1980: 31-32). In other words, political culture should not
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The question whether the political culture of a people is further divisible into smaller sub-
national units (sub-cultures) has resulted to controversy among the exponents of the
political culture concept and a part of their critics that still viewed political culture as a
useful analytical tool in the study of comparative politics. Whether population groups,
distinct on the basis of their ethnicity, religion, class or gender, could hold different
cognitions, affects and evaluations of political systems and states, has been the crux of
this debate. The view that sub-national groups and not only peoples can serve as unit of
political culture analysis has opened new ways in the comparative study of political
a group of scholars who argued that ethnic, social and gender divisions have a crucial
bearing in the formation of distinct orientations toward political systems and states. In
other words, in parallel with existing national political cultures, minority political
cultures exist and have significant influence on national political cultures. Kavanagh
succinctly pointed out in his study of British political culture the usefulness of a study on
British political sub-cultures, both on ethnic and class bases. A comparison of Scottish
political sub-cultures could be illuminating for many aspects of British political culture
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well as of the political sub-cultures of Turkey’s most significant minority groups, Kurds
and Alevis. It will be argued that political and social developments in the late Ottoman
Empire and early republican Turkey had a crucial impact on the formation of a subject
mainstream Turkish political culture. Yet political culture diversity was maintained at the
Kurdish and Alevi political sub-cultures were shaped under the influence of Ottoman
parochial and republican subject political culture elements, while their distinct historical
legacies were also influential. Tribalism and peripherisation were two critical
resistance tradition, peripherisation and support for Atatürk’s reform programme resulted
liberalisation steps since the 1960s have also imbued Kurdish and Alevi political sub-
Prevalence of state interests over fundamental human rights, the model of passive,
deferential citizen, the lack of tolerance for cultural, religious and ethnic diversity, the
exalted role of the military and bureaucratic elite as guardian of the Western and secular
character of the Turkish state and society are all indicators of Turkey’s lack of democratic
consolidation. Despite the Kemalist Westernisation agenda and the introduction of multi-
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attached to the late Ottoman and early republican model, which was dominated by subject
insignificant, while the state viewed any citizens’ effort to engage with issues of broader
social interest with suspicion, if not outright hostility. Citizens had to curtail their critical
thought and individual human rights to the extent that they diverged from the officially
sponsored political, cultural and national models. Dissidents had to choose between
emigration.
remained unchanged and void of participant elements or that there has been no interest of
citizens in political and social developments. The 1950-1960 rule of the Democrat Party
has been described as the first attempt to “debureaucratise” Turkish society. DP policies
attempted to loosen the ideological grip of the Kemalist elite over Turkish society by
allowing for the dissemination of alternative political, social and economic programmes.
The military coup of 27 March 1960 can be rightfully seen as a reaction against the
decline of elite influence in Turkish society (Özbudun, 1993: 256-58). Nonetheless, elites
had to come into terms with societal demands. The 1961 Constitution could thus be seen
as a compromise between elites and emerging societal forces: Under the relatively
favourable circumstances of the 1961 Constitution, citizens and civil society associations
incremental steps made toward the adoption of participant political culture elements were
weakened by two more military coups that struck Turkish democracy in 1971 and 1980.
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political culture in Turkey, as it occurred at a time when participant political culture and
democratic stabilisation was spreading all over southern Europe, in Greece, Portugal and
Kemalist ideology and enforcing subject political culture elements, the leadership of the
The importance of studying political sub-cultures becomes evident in the case of Turkey.
Despite long, systematic efforts to forge a unitary Turkish national identity, Turkey’s
Turkish political culture cannot, therefore, be rendered complete, unless it accounts for
the political sub-cultures of Turkey’s minority groups. Turkey’s Kurds, Alevis and other
minor Muslim and non-Muslim minority groups continue to claim a separate identity,
which does not necessarily conflict with Turkish national identity or adopts an inimical
approach toward the Turkish state. While the quest for a Kurdish identity resulted in
insurgency and terrorism in the late 20th century, these acts were by no means
representative of the whole Kurdish identity movement and did not significantly impact
the stance of other minority groups. Due to their different historical and social
backgrounds, Turkey’s minority groups differed in the way they attempted to define their
role inside the Turkish society and negotiate their recognition by the Turkish state. In the
following chapter the political sub-cultures of Turkey’s Kurds and Alevis will be
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and society, while their impact on the formation of minority group sub-cultures will also
be assessed.
3. Kurds
a. Introduction
Turkey’s Kurds are the largest minority1 group in republican Turkey and have repeatedly
and Islam was not translated into willingness to submerge their identity into the modern
Turkish national identity. Kurdish minority rights have been among the most prominent
issues of political debate since the 1960s, while the armed insurgence of the Kurdish
eastern and south-eastern Turkey posed the gravest threat against Turkey’s security and
The spread of nationalist ideas among Kurds was not as successful as in the case of other
ethnic groups that comprised the poly-ethnic mosaic of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman
Kurds remained attached to their religious and tribal identities until the very last years of
1
There is no universally accepted definition of the term “minority” due to its complicated and politically
sensitive nature. For the purposes of this study a minority will be defined as “a group of citizens of a state,
constituting a numerical minority and in a non-dominant position in that state, endowed with ethnic,
religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the majority of the population, having a
sense of solidarity with one another, motivated, if only implicitly by a collective will to survive and whose
aim is to achieve equality with the majority in fact and in law.” See UN Subcommission on the Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, (United Nations, 1985), as quoted in Iván Gyurcsik, "New
Legal Ramifications on the Question of National Minorities" in Jane Leiibowitz, ed., Minorities: The New
Europe's Old Issue (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1993), p. 22
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majority of the Kurdish population remained loyal to the Ottoman rule and sided with
those forces that opposed the partition of the Ottoman Empire along ethnic lines. Strong
tribal identity was an additional reason for the failure of Kurdish nationalism to appeal to
the majority of Kurds. Tribal allegiance was stronger than national, which allowed for
state intervention in intra-Kurdish affairs by means of siding with some tribes against
others Intra-Kurdish feuds substantially weakened prospects for the forging of a strong
common Kurdish national identity. Ottoman Kurds fought on the side of Ottoman Turks
in the wars that sealed the demise of the Ottoman Empire. Although the Treaty of Sevres
south-eastern Turkey, the vast majority of Kurds joined Turkish nationalist forces in their
struggle against foreign invaders of Anatolia. The decision to ignore their own nationalist
ambitions and fight on the side of Ottoman Turks showed that religion was still the
primary defining factor of Kurdish identity to be followed by tribal –and not ethnic–
allegiance. When Atatürk-led republican Turkey declared its intention to break its links
with its Ottoman, Islamic heritage and establish an ethnic-based Turkish national identity,
The first armed Kurdish rebellion against Kemalist secularisation and ethnic
homogenisation plans took place in 1925. Atatürk had already become the undisputed
leader of Turkey and set forth his plans for the formation of a modern, secular nation-
state. Atatürk’s position on that issue was not clear during pre-republican years (Gunter,
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post-war Turkey might even get to the point of recognising Kurdish autonomy, while his
aide and eventual successor İsmet İnönü argued that the new state would be a homeland
for Turks and Kurds. Despite all that, the abolition of the Caliphate, the proclamation of
the Turkish Republic and the limitation of public role of Islam were necessary steps
apparent that Atatürk would rid Turkey of all Ottoman and Islamic elements that bound
Turks and Kurds together. Under the leadership of Sheikh Said of Palu, a number of
Kurdish tribes rebelled against Turkish rule. The character of the Sheikh Said revolt was
two-fold, religious and ethnic: Reaction against the forced secularisation of the Turkish
state and society initiated by Atatürk’s modernisation programme was matched with
identity. Turkish armed forces succeeded in quickly suppressing the rebellion, which,
nonetheless, became a watershed: Large-scale purges against Kurdish and other dissident
elements in Turkey followed shortly after. The Turkish regime engaged into violent
policy measures to suppress Kurdish resentment and also gave greater impetus to
military and police measures could not extinguish Kurdish opposition to the Kemalist
programme and willingness to resist. A second rebellion occurred in 1930 in Ağrı and a
third in 1937-1938 in Dersim (Tunceli). Both of them were less important than Sheikh
Said’s rebellion in terms of geographical spread and popular participation, yet they
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The advent of multi-party politics in 1946 improved the condition of Kurds in Turkey as
competing political parties had to provide them with incentives in order to attract their
vote. The coup of 27 March 1960 did not prevent the ongoing politicisation of the
Kurdish issue in Turkey. Interest in Kurdish identity and cause would re-emerge under
the suitable political environment created by the 1961 Turkish Constitution. The liberal
air of the 1961 Constitution favoured the development of a wide spectrum of political
activities. Political groups like Turkish Workers Party (Türkiye İşçi Partisi-TİP) and
socialist perspective; showing clear interest in Turkey’s dispossessed social classes, they
also became interested in human rights and the status of Turkey’s minorities: The
problems of Turkey’s Kurds were articulated, and steps toward their representation in
Turkish politics were made. The 1971 coup and constitution compromised some of the
most liberal elements of the 1961 Constitution, yet the emergence of the Kurdish issue, as
one of the most important political issues in Turkish politics could not be prevented.
Kurdish political groups were formed addressing their agenda in a socialist or nationalist
backdrop. The Revolutionary Eastern Culture Hearths (Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları-
DDKO) and Kurdish Socialist Party or “Road of Freedom” (Özgürlük Yolu) and Kawa
(named after a legendary Kurdish folk hero associated with the Kurdish New Year’s
holiday Newroz) are only a few of the founded Kurdish groups. Political turmoil and
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politics of the 1970s, played an important role in the radicalisation of Kurdish politics in
Turkey.
The Kurdish Workers Party (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan-PKK) was one of the several
Kurdish groups with leftist political leanings. The figure of Abdullah Öcalan, founder and
undisputed leader of the group, would gradually rally most Kurdish nationalists and leave
a heavy personal imprint on the Kurdish issue. Founded in 1977, PKK originated from
the National Liberation Army (Ulusal Kurtuluş Ordusu-UKO), which was founded in
1974 by former Dev Genç members; thus, it had a strong Marxist/Leninist political
foundation to which Kurdish nationalism was added. The PKK founding document, titled
“The Path of Kurdish Revolution” (Kürdistan Devrimi Yolu) described Turkey’s south-
eastern and eastern provinces as colonies and argued that the Kurdish feudalists and
bourgeoisie had chosen to side with the Turkish ruling classes in order participate in the
exploitation of the Kurdish peasantry and working class. (Kirişçi and Winrow, 2003: 109-
11) PKK differed from most other Kurdish political groupings in its social composition.
While traditional Kurdish political groups usually had specific regional and tribal
association and were led by Kurdish notable family members, PKK attracted its
membership from the poorest and most marginalised strata, regardless of regional or
tribal affiliations, and eventually succeeded in asserting itself as a “fighter for the
disenfranchised” (Barkey and Fuller, 1998: 23-25). PKK benefited from political anarchy
and turmoil in the late 1970s and severe restrictions in political freedom in the aftermath
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Kurdish political groups that opted for a peaceful resolution of Turkey’s Kurdish question,
while the ascent of military regimes nurtured political extremism among Kurds. The
hardening of state policies in the aftermath of the 1980 coup, which included abolition of
human rights legislation and came to the point of denying the existence of a separate
ethnic Kurdish group in Turkey, increased the popularity of armed struggle among many
Kurdish nationalism in south-eastern and eastern Turkey, which were articulated in the
Turkish-Islamic synthesis (Türk-İslam Sentezi) doctrine, did not deter the growth of PKK
popularity. PKK started attacking Turkish military and police outposts in south-eastern
and eastern Turkey effectively challenging Turkish sovereignty. Turkey’s reaction was
fierce involving major military operations and the establishment of a village guard system
whereby armed local villagers –of mostly Kurdish origin– would supplement the work of
military forces. The attempt of Prime Minister Turgut Özal in the late 1980s to modify
Kemalist national identity doctrine through its inoculation with elements of the Ottoman
identity in Turkey but had little success in reducing violence and PKK appeal to Turkey’s
Kurds (Ataman, 2002: 127-29). The fall of the Communist bloc facilitated the
peak of its activity in the late 1980s and early 1990s when it effectively challenged
Turkish sovereignty over considerable parts of territory and -in effect- monopolised
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Tribalism and marginalisation have been the most important determinates in the
formation of Kurdish political sub-culture. While tribalism allowed for the survival of
toward the Turkish state. The rise of civil society movements since the 1960s has allowed
for the articulation of Kurdish political sub-culture, while urbanisation has contributed in
The tribal base of Kurdish social organisation in south-eastern Turkey has deep
historical roots. Ever since the time Kurdish-populated provinces were split between the
Ottoman and Persian Empires in the 16th century, strong tribal chieftains have
Kurdish tribalism was one of the biggest obstacles in all Ottoman centralisation efforts in
the Tanzimat years, while it was also the main reason for the failure of the Kurdish
nationalist movement to gain any impetus at the grassroots level in the late Ottoman
Empire. When Atatürk launched its nation-building programme in the aftermath of the
and south-eastern Anatolian provinces, he met with resistance also based on the parochial
political culture of the local population. Apart from the ethnic and religious background
of Kurdish uprisings in early republican Turkey, a distinct political sub-culture was also
one of the factors that instigated Kurdish reaction. As political space was not separated
from religious and social space, there were no specialised political roles in the local
society, which would be undertaken by the state. Kurdish tribal groups were accustomed
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male conscription without limiting the fundamental religious and social values of their
political from the social and religious. Tribal, religious and local affiliations were
disregarded, and citizenship of republican Turkey was seen as the sole acceptable
affiliation. The Turkish state was actively introducing a novel type of subject political
culture, which could not tolerate the continuation of alternative allegiances. Kurdish
uprisings were suppressed by Turkish armed forces, yet the dissemination of a subject
political culture among Turkey’s Kurdish population was not as successful. On the
within the Turkish state and society. Since the beginning of the Tanzimat in the 19th
periphery under the firm control of the Ottoman state administration and elites. The same
struggle continued in republican years, when the Kemalist elite attempted to take
Turkey’s periphery under its ideological control. Kurds were among the biggest periphery
groups, and state efforts for their ideological proselytisation were often met with
opposition. While a significant part of Turkey’s Kurdish population was eventually co-
opted2, other Kurds resisted the imposition of subject political culture championing an
2
The migration of a big part of Turkey’s rural Kurdish population from eastern and south-eastern Turkey to
urban centres in the west of the country, part of a gigantic urbanisation trend in post-World War II Turkey,
greatly facilitated state homogenisation programmes. These populations, uprooted from their original
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participant elements. Since the 1960s there has been Kurdish political extremism and
strongly parochial political sub-culture. The obdurate opposition of the Turkish state to
any form of political culture other than the state-sponsored model of subject political
4. Alevis
a. Introduction
Alevis3, the second most numerous ethno-religious minority of republican Turkey, have
attracted increasing attention since the 1960s due to the largely unexpected revival of
their communal identity. At a moment when Alevis were expected to merge with the
mass of the Turkish secular population, Alevi identity became instead the focus of
Empire. The legendary figure of Hacı Bektaş Veli inspired the formation of two main
be called Alevis and b. Bektaşî, sedentary populations based mainly in the Balkans
communities and in need for recognition in their new social environment, easier adopted state-sponsored
subject political culture.
3
The word Alevi most probably comes from the name of Caliph Ali, son-in-law of the Prophet and most
revered among Shiite Muslims.
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importance given to descent and family lineage for membership eligibility has
differentiated Alevis from Bektaşis and added an ethnic element to the Alevi identity. As
Iréne Mèlikoff put it, “Everyone can become Bektaşi, but no-one who is not born Alevi
can later become one” (Melikoff, 1999: 10). While Sultan Selim I was claiming the title
of Caliph after the conquest of the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina in the early
16th century, monopolising the Sunni political and religious authority, Alevis challenged
the dominant Hanefi Sunni version of Ottoman Islam through their own syncretistic,
tolerant and flexible version of popular Islam, a blend of Shiite Islamic, Turkic, Christian
and other local religious and cultural influences. The wars between the Ottoman Empire
and Shiite Safavid Iran would challenge the loyalty of heterodox Alevis toward the
Ottoman Sultan, while the Celâli insurrections would further indicate Alevi
The preservation of a distinct Alevi identity would necessarily cause conflict with
dominant Sunni Hanefi orthodoxy. Sunni Muslims classified Alevis among non-believers
to Islam (gâvur): Alevi faith was denigrated as apostasy from Islamic faith and heresy or
integration into Sunni Islam. Soon the Sunni majority of the Ottoman Muslim population
4
The Alevi case has striking similarities with the Druze in that respect.
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identity.
Given the increasingly important role of Islam in the formation of Ottoman political
ideology in the last years of the Ottoman Empire, Alevis welcomed Atatürk’s political
Sultan Abdülhamid and Ottoman Pan-islamists. The abolition of the Caliphate and the
proclamation of the Turkish republic nurtured Alevi hopes that religious discrimination
against them would come to an end. Further steps that Atatürk made in order to introduce
and solidify secularism found support among Alevi circles, although these measures were
–among others– also targeting the Alevi faith. The banning of religious orders (tarikat)
and associations as well as the decisive removal of religion from all aspects of public life
did not exclude Alevi institutions, customs and practices; yet Atatürk’s secularization
programme still found resonance among Alevis, as they could only welcome the radical
diminution of the role of Sunni Islam in republican Turkey, planned through these
measures. Alevis joined republican secular political forces in their effort to combat Sunni
Islamic political and cultural domination: A strictly secular Turkey equally repressive for
the public manifestation of all religions and faiths was deemed preferable to preferential
treatment of Sunni Islam against Alevism, which was the rule in the Ottoman times.
Alevi relief over the decline of Sunni Islam influence on Turkish state and society would,
nonetheless, come to an end after a series of measures that mitigated the strictly secular
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hatip), the reluctant return of Islam into visible aspects of the social sphere and its
which was largely identified with the policies of DP, Turkey’s ruling party in the 1950s.
Alevis were then identified with the opposition Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet
Halk Partisi-CHP), which had lost power in the 1950 elections. The ideological shift of
the party toward the left coincided with Alevi secular and socialist leanings, and Alevis
constituted one of the major CHP support groups, as the attempt to found in 1966 an
exclusively Alevi political party, the Turkish Unity Party (Türkiye Birlik Partisi-TBP),
The military coups of 1960 and 1971 polarised Turkish politics, and Alevis found
themselves on the leftist camp. Their identification with leftist political forces led to
debates whether Alevi identity should be retained or fused into the secularist, leftist strata
of Turkish society. Urbanisation and immigration trends moved a large part of Alevi
populations from rural Anatolia to Turkish urban centres or Western Europe. Traditional
developed (Bilici, 1998: 51-62). Alevis took active part in the ideological debates that
dominated Turkey in the 1970s and were finally among those to count the most civil
strife victims. The slaughters of Kahramanmaraş and Çorum in 1978 may well be
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and increasing re-alienation of Alevis from official state policies. According to the
to become the official ideology of the Turkish state, Islam (namely Sunni Islam) was
considered to be one of the cornerstones of Turkish identity and culture; this came in total
contradiction with Atatürk’s intense efforts to dissociate Turkishness and Islam in the
early years of the Turkish republic. Mandatory religious (i.e. Sunni Islamic) education
was introduced, while the State Directorate of Religious Affairs recognised and
financially supported only Sunni Islamic institutions. No special provisions were made
for Alevi citizens, who again felt that their distinct identity was threatened by state
homogenisation policies in favour of Sunni Islam. The threat of Alevi fusion into the
Sunni majority acted as cementing factor for the protection of a distinct Alevi identity
The emergence of the Kurdish nationalist movement in the 1960s and 1970s and
the advent of guerrilla warfare in the 1980s would also galvanise Alevi efforts to
articulate their own distinct voice in Turkish society. Although the challenge of Turkey’s
ethnic and religious homogeneity as well as increasing demands for human and minority
rights found stronger resonance among Kurds, their activities helped shape similar
movements within Alevis. The latter never came to the use of violent means in order to
further their goals, yet they demanded that their distinct religious and cultural identity be
respected by the Turkish state. This influence was particularly strong among Kurdish-
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an additional reason for the revival of Alevi identity. Socialist political ideas had become
very popular among Alevis in the 1960s and 1970s and were thought to become a
substitute for Alevism itself. As religious faith became less popular, Alevi social and
cultural elements were viewed through a socialist lens and supplemented accordingly.
Nonetheless, the end of communist domination in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
in the late 1980s dramatically reduced the popularity of socialist ideas. This ideological
vacuum was filled through greater interest in Alevi culture and identity; an increasing
number of young people became interested in exploring their Alevi religious and cultural
heritage.
Alevi political sub-culture was formed under the influence of a long resistance tradition,
peripherisation and identification with the modernisation campaign of the Kemalist elite.
Alevis have historically been suspected by the Ottoman Empire for their religious links
with the Shiite Persian Empire. Persecutions were not uncommon, and their frequency
increased for the additional reason that the Ottoman Empire started adopting a more
explicitly Sunni Islamic character. Like Ottoman Kurds, Ottoman Alevis were influenced
by Ottoman parochial political culture. Yet their long-standing struggle against Ottoman
took the shape of modernising centralisation policies and active support toward Sunni
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Ottoman state, two processes that became clearer than ever in the late Ottoman years,
rural and dispossessed populations of Central and Eastern Anatolia, which had little –if
any- influence on decision making processes. This situation changed only marginally in
the republican period as the basic elements of centre-periphery relations in the late
Ottoman Empire persisted (Mardin, 1973: 308-09). Multi-party politics, urbanisation and
political liberalisation steps facilitated the emergence of Alevi civil society movements
influence in the Turkish state and society. Despite setbacks brought about by political
turmoil, the instillation of participant elements into Alevi political sub-culture was largely
successful, and a growing degree of Alevi self-conscience and mobilisation has been
Overt support toward Atatürk and its modernisation programme also crucially
liberating Alevis from centuries of Sunni oppression and was, therefore, fully supported,
despite Alevi Islam was also among the victims of Atatürk’s militant secularisation
campaign. Alevis considered the secular Turkish republic to be much more tolerant
toward them than the Islamic Ottoman Empire and identified with the programme and
6
Ottoman Islamisation policies referred to the introduction of Hanefi Sunni Islam rules to all aspects of
Ottoman political and social life and were by no means accommodating toward the rest of the schools of
Sunni Islamic jurisprudence (Hanbali, Maliki and Shafii) and even less so toward heterodox beliefs (Alevi,
Shiite Islam).
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well-accepted, and the convergence of Alevi political sub-culture with the dominant one
was remarkable. Yet the Alevi revival of the 1960s showed that despite being closer to
the dominant Turkish political culture paradigm that Kurdish political sub-culture, Alevi
5. Conclusions
degree of diversity and points out that the role of sub-national groups as political actors is
all but marginal. Turkey’s Kurds, Alevis and other religious and ethnic minority groups
all share to a degree a political culture rooted on the legacy of the Ottoman Empire and
and state policies toward them resulted in the formation of distinct political sub-cultures,
mainstream and minority political cultures, Turkish political culture indicates the extent
to which liberalisation of the Turkish state and society has been successful.
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Gabriel A Almond, "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept" in Gabriel A
Almond and Sidney Verba, ed., The Civic Culture Revisited (Newbury Park CA,
London, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1980)
Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and
Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963)
Mühittin Ataman, "Özal Leadership and Restructuring of Turkish Ethnic Policy in the
1980s", Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 38, No. 4 (2002)
Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, Turkey's Kurdish Question (New York: Rowman
& Littlefield Publishers, 1998)
Faruk Bilici, "The Function of Alevi-Bektashi Theology in Modern Turkey" in Tord
Olsson, Elisabeth Özdalga and Catharina Raudvere, ed., Alevi Identity: Cultural,
Religious and Social Perspectives (Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute, 1998)
Reha Çamuroğlu, "Alevi Revivalism in Turkey" in Tord Olsson, Elisabeth Özdalga and
Catharina Raudvere, ed., Alevi Identity: Cultural, Religious and Social
Perspectives (Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute, 1998)
Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds and the Future of Turkey (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1997)
Iván Gyurcsik, "New Legal Ramifications on the Question of National Minorities" in
Jane Leiibowitz, ed., Minorities: The New Europe's Old Issue (Boulder CO:
Westview Press, 1993)
Rod Hague and Martin Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction
(New York, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001)
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OXFORD UNIVERSITY BALKAN SOCIETY
2ND OUBS GRADUATE WORKSHOP 2004
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