G.R. No. L-57211 March 18, 1985 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE GEORGE P.

MACLI-ING, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City and Benguet, BRANCH III, SY PIAO, LEE GIOK YAN, OSCAR SY and JOSE SY, respondents. In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, the Republic seeks to annul the Decision of the former Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet (Branch III), the dispositive portion of which reads: PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City is hereby ordered as prayed for that (a) the Certificate of Live Birth of OSCAR SY and the entries in the corresponding Civil Registry of Births of the Local Civil Registry of Births be corrected by deleting the name 'Esteban' as the name of his father and substituting therein the true, correct and official name 'PIAO', so that the name of his (Oscar Sy's) father be read as "SY PIAO", SY being the family name and PIAO being the first name in the Chinese way of writing names, and (b) the Certificate of Live Birth of JOSE SY as well as the corresponding entries in the Civil Registry of Births of the City Registrar of Baguio be corrected so that the name JOE be corrected to read as "JOSE", after the required fees have been paid and the requirements of the law shall have been complied with. SO ORDERED. In a verified Petition filed before the lower Court (Spec. Proc. Case No. 882 [62]), private respondents sought to correct the entries in the respective Registries of Birth of Oscar Sy and Jose Sy. The entry sought to be corrected in the birth record of Oscar Sy is the name of his father from "Esteban Sy" to "Sy Piao" upon the claim that "Esteban" is only his father's nickname. And as to the birth record of Jose Sy, it is prayed that the name "Joe" therein be corrected to read "Jose". Petitioner opposed the corrections requested on the ground that the remedy availed of was improper considering that the changes sought are substantial in nature. After a full-dress hearing, respondent Court authorized the corrections prayed for, hence, this appeal in so far as the correction of the entry in the record of birth of Oscar Sy is concerned. Thus, the correction ordered entered in the birth record of Jose Sy has become final and executory. The principal ground relied upon in this appeal is that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court upon which private respondents anchor their Petition is applicable only to changes contemplated in Article 412 of the Civil Code, which are clerical or 1 innocuous errors, or to corrections that are not controversial and are supported by indubitable evidence. It is true that the change from Esteban Sy to Sy Piao would necessarily affect the Identity of the father. In that sense, it can be said to be substantial. However, we find indubitable evidence to support the correction prayed for. In the Alien Certificate of Registration of the father (Exhibit "C"), his name appears as "Sy Piao". The same is true in his Immigrant Certificate of Residence (Exhibit "C-3 "). In the "Record of Annual Report in Person of Alien" of the father from 1961 yearly up to 1974, he always signed his name as "Sy Piao". His Income Tax Return for the calendar year 1972 also lists his name as "Sy Piao" (Exhibit "G-1"). The school records of Oscar Sy both in high school and at St. Louis University in Baguio, recorded the name of his father as "Sy Piao" (Exhibits "F" and "F-1"). Oscar Sy and Jose Sy are brothers of the full blood. And yet, in their respective birth certificates, it is only in Oscar's birth certificate that the name of their father listed as "Esteban Sy." In Jose's birth certificate, his father's name is "Sy Piao". Testimonial evidence was likewise presented showing that Esteban is the father's nickname by which he was known by his Filipino friends. That explains why Mrs. Felicidad Meris, who attended to Oscar's birth, supplied the father's name as "Esteban Sy". The mother, Lee Giok Yan, also joined the Petition and declared that Sy Piao is her husband and the father of Oscar and Jose and their four other children. We find no reason to doubt that "Sy Piao" and "Esteban Sy" are one and the same person. In the case of Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 321 (1954), as well as subsequent cases predicated thereon, we forbade only the entering of material corrections in the record of birth by virtue of a judgment in a summary action. The proceedings below, although filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, were not summary. The Petition was published by order of the lower Court once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in accordance with law. The Solicitor General was served with copy of the Petition as well as with notices of hearings. He filed his Opposition to the Petition. The Local Civil Registrar of the City of Baguio was likewise duly served with copy of the Petition. A Fiscal was always in attendance at the hearings in representation of the Solicitor General. He participated actively in the proceedings, particularly, in the cross-examination of witnesses. And, notwithstanding that all interested persons were cited to appear to show cause why the petition should not be granted, no one appeared to oppose except the State through the Solicitor General. But neither did the State present evidence in support of its Opposition. In sum, no doubt has been cast on the credibility of private respondents' allegations nor upon the evidence adduced by them. Noteworthy also is the fact that neither the citizenship, paternity, filiation, or status of Oscar and Jose, nor that of their father is in issue. WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby affirmed. No costs. G.R. No. 112597 April 2, 1996
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VIRGINIA A. LEONOR, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROLINDO D. BELDIA, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Branch 57, and MAURICIO D. LEONOR, JR., respondents. Is a judgment voiding a marriage and rendered by the regional trial court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court valid and proper? May its validity be challenged by the wife in a petition for certiorari against the husband who abandoned her and who is now living abroad with a foreign woman? These are the two main issues that were posed before this Court in this petition for review seeking a partial reversal of the 1 2 3 Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated September 30, 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. 30606 and its Resolution promulgated November 1993, which denied petitioner's motion for partial reconsideration of the Decision. The Facts Petitioner Virginia A. Leonor was married to private respondent Mauricio D. Leonor, Jr., in San Carlos City on March 13, 1960. Out of the union, three children, Mauricio III, Ned and Don, were born. The spouses were separated for a substantial part of their married life for, while Mauricio resided in Switzerland studying and working, Virginia stayed in the Philippines working as a nurse in Laguna. Mauricio became unfaithful and lived with a certain Lynda Pond abroad. This induced petitioner to institute a civil action in Geneva, Switzerland for separation and alimony. Private respondent countersued for divorce. On February 14, 1991, the lower Cantonal Civil Court of Switzerland pronounced the divorce of the spouses Leonor but reserved the liquidation of the matrimonial partnership. The said Swiss Court denied alimony to petitioner. In a letter to the lower Cantonal Civil Court dated March 1, 1991, Mauricio, for the first time, raised the issue of the alleged non-existence of the marriage between him and Virginia. Meanwhile, Virginia learned that the solemnizing officer in the Philippines, Justice of the Peace Mabini Katalbas, failed to send a copy of their marriage contract to the Civil Registrar of San Carlos City for registration. Hence, on July 11, 1991, Virginia applied for the late registration of her marriage. The Civil Registrar, finding said application in order, granted the same. On appeal to the higher Cantonal Civil Court, Mauricio asked for the cancellation of his marriage in the Philippines. On January 17, 1992, the higher Cantonal Civil Court granted petitioner alimony, prompting Mauricio to elevate the matter on appeal to the Federal Court of Switzerland. In its decision dated July 9, 1992, the Federal Court affirmed the decision of 4 the higher Cantonal Civil Court. On May 22, 1992, Mauricio, represented by his brother Teodoro Leonor, filed a petition for the cancellation of the late registration of marriage in the civil registry of San Carlos City with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, San Carlos City (Special proceeding No. RTC-144). Given as grounds for the cancellation were the tardiness of the registration and the nullity of his marriage with Virginia "due to the non-observance of the legal requirements for a valid marriage." Mauricio's petition was filed pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. After several hearings and on December 14, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment declaring said marriage null and void for being sham and fictitious. The dispositive portion of said decision reads: AND IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds and orders that the registration of the marriage contract between Mauricio Leonor, Jr. and Virginia Amor dated March 13, 1960 must be cancelled in (sic) the Books of the Local Civil Registry of San Carlos City for being a null and void marriage not in accordance with a (sic) New Civil code under Articles 52, 53 and 55 now presently amended by the Family Code of the Philippines, Executive Order No. 209 as amended by Executive Order No. 227, without pronouncement as to cost. Virginia received notice of the decision on January 4, 1993, and on January 15, 1993, she filed her notice of appeal. On February 24, 1993, the trial court, on motion of Mauricio's counsel, issued an order dismissing Virginia's appeal on the ground that she had failed to file a record on appeal within thirty days and had thus failed to perfect her appeal. It was the erroneous holding of the trial court that in special proceedings, a record on appeal was an indispensable requisite under Rule 19, Section 6 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines in relation to Rule 109 of the Rules of Court. Such failure, according to respondent Judge, caused the decision to become executory. On April 1, 1993, Virginia filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP NO. 30606) and sought the nullification of both the decision dated December 14, 1992 and the order dated February 24, 1993 of the trial court for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition insofar as it sought the reversal of the decision of the trial court, saying that the remedy for said purpose was an appeal, not a special civil action. The appellate court, however, granted the petition insofar as it sought the nullification of the Order dated February 24, 1993 dismissing the appeal. Said the appellate court:
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Even so, this petition is an appropriate remedy against the dismissal of the petitioner's appeal, which dismissal we sense to be erroneous and issued in excess of jurisdiction. xxx xxx xxx WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered setting aside the questioned order of respondent judge dated February 24, 1993, with instructions to the latter to give due course to petitioner's appeal in the subject special proceeding. Costs against private respondents. Dissatisfied with the above Decision, petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration asking the Court of Appeals to annul the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals denied the motion, stating that the central issue in the special civil action was only the validity of the trial court's order denying petitioner's right to appeal and that said issue was resolved in petitioner's favor. Further, it said that the correctness or validity of the trial court's decision should properly be resolved in the appeal. Hence, the present recourse. Issues Raised by the Parties The petition assailed the respondent Court's Decision and Order mentioned in the second paragraph of this Decision for alleged 1. Procedural Errors . . . in not finding . . . (a) that the lower court gravely abused its discretion" in recognizing the action as one for declaration of "nullity of marriage" instead of a "special proceeding for cancellation of (an) entry", in the civil registry and (b) in not finding that the "lower court had no jurisdiction (over) the issue of nullity"; and 2. Substantive errors . . . in not finding . . . (a) that the lower court gravely erred in declaring the marriage null and void . . . and (b) . . . in disregarding the presumptions in favor of the rights of children and to the administration of the conjugal property . . . and the validity of marriage . . . In her Memorandum, petitioner elucidated and spiritedly argued the above grounds. In fine, the foregoing issues could be restated as follows: 1. Did the respondent Court err in holding that petitioner should have appealed from the trial court's decision instead of filing a petition for certiorari? 2. Did the respondent Court err in refusing to decide upon the merits of the case, that is, to declare whether or not the judgment of the trial court is null and void? Should the Supreme Court now resolve the merits of the case, i.e., decide the issue of nullity of the assailed decision of the trial court? The Court's Ruling Since these issues are intimately intertwined, we shall discuss them together. At the outset, it must be stressed that the Court of Appeals acted within its authority in simply ordering the trial court to give due course to petitioner's appeal without going into the merits of the case. In Municipality of Bian, Laguna vs. Court of Appeals, we held: Respondent Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction in a certiorari proceeding involving an incident in a case to rule on the merits of the main case itself which was not on appeal before it. . . . In other words, the Court of Appeals has already done its duty by declaring that the lower court gravely abused its discretion or acted without jurisdiction in refusing to give due course to petitioner's appeal. Hence, it ordered said court to allow the appeal. Once appeal is perfected, the merits of the case, i.e. the validity/nullity of the trial court's decision, would then be resolved by said Court. Understandably, the Court of Appeals has limited itself to ruling upon the procedural question lodged before it. It cannot be seriously faulted as petitioner vehemently did for opting to navigate within the narrow banks of the placid waters of certiorari. For in doing so, it was strictly following established legal doctrines and precedents. Upon the other hand, the Supreme Court is not just a toothless promoter of procedural niceties which are understood and appreciated only by lawyers and jurists. It cannot shrink from its quintessential role as the fountain of speedy, adequate and substantial justice. If the Court, as the head and guardian of the judicial branch, must continuously merit the force of public trust and confidence which ultimately is the real source of its sovereign power, possessing neither the purse nor the sword and if it must decisively discharge its sacred duty as the last sanctuary of the oppressed and the weak, it must, in appropriate cases like the one before us, pro-actively provide weary litigants with immediate legal and equitable
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relief, free from the delays and legalistic contortions that oftentimes result from applying purely formal and procedural approaches to judicial dispensations. Pursuant to the foregoing principle and considering the peculiar circumstances of the present case which are patent on the basis of the admitted facts, as well as the undisputed copies of the pleadings presented by the parties, and especially the verified copy of the trial court's decision which loudly speaks for itself, the Court therefore resolved to make an exception to the normal procedures and to delve deeper into the substantive issue of the validity/nullity of the trial court's proceedings and judgment. Happily, both parties had expressed a desire to have this case resolved soonest. Upon the other hand, remanding the case back to the trial court for the perfection of the appeal and requiring the parties to relitigate in the Court of Appeals with the use of probably the same documents and arguments ventilated in the kilometric pleadings filed here would just unnecessarily clog the courts' dockets; besides, in all likelihood the parties would eventually come before this Court anyway. Also, it must be observed that Virginia actually filed a proper Notice of Appeal which the trial court disallowed. Hence, she had no choice but to bring her petition for certiorari in the respondent Court. To constrain her to go back to said Court, this time by ordinary appeal, would be tantamount to punishing her and delaying her cause for faults not attributable to her, but rather to the manifest error of the respondent trial judge. So, too, as will be shown shortly, the trial court's decision is really a nullity for utter want of jurisdiction. Hence it could be challenged at any time. It is not disputed that the original petition in the trial court was for "cancellation of entry in the civil registry of the "late registration of the marriage" between Leonor and Mauricio, "in consonance with Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court." Ground alleged for the nullity and cancellation of the marriage was "non-observance of the legal requirements for a valid marriage." Later, on August 22, 1992, an amended petition was filed adding essentially the following allegations: (a) that there was no marriage contract, (b) that the marriage was a "sham . . . to cover-up the (alleged) shame of Virginia Amor who was then pregnant, " (c) that Virginia allegedly assured Mauricio that they "need not live together . . . and Mauricio need not give any support", (d) that the couple always had "trouble (and) quarrel," and (e) that Mauricio had been "transferring 10 11 residence to avoid Virginia until he went abroad for good." The answer of the Civil Registrar and the opposition of Virginia, among others, disputed the propriety of the collateral attack against the marriage, under said Rule. The decision of the trial court is, painfully, a sophomoric and pathetic portrayal of Virginia as allegedly an "unbecoming . . . unmarried woman (who) wormed her way to a (sic) heart of the matriarch of the Leonor Family . . . to summon the son Mauricio to come" to her rescue and as a scheming nurse who lured a "struggling young teacher . . . to this unwelcomed (sic) love affair". These matters, needless to say, border on the incredible, as they were brought up some thirty (30) years after the marriage was celebrated in 1960 and only after Virginia discovered her husband's infidelity. The said decision's 13 crude attempt at literary sophistication is matched only by its jarring syntax and grammatical incongruencies. In so far as this Court can figure out from the convoluted language of the decision, the trial court (a) declared the marriage null and void and (b) ordered the local civil registrar of San Carlos City to cancel its entry in the local civil registry, the sum total of which, coincidentally (and most conveniently) , would enable Mauricio to show to the Swiss courts that he was never married and thus, to convince said courts to reverse their order granting alimony to his abandoned wife. Such blatant abuse and mis-use of court proceedings cannot be countenanced by this Court. The ultimate legal question therefore is this: In disposing of a special proceeding under Rule 108, did the trial court have jurisdiction to declare the marriage null and void and to order the cancellation of its entry in the local civil registry? To contribute to the cause of clarity, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is reproduced hereunder. Rule 108 CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the court of First Instance of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected; (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name. Sec. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. Sec. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. Sec. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
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Sec. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceeding is brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. Sec. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record. On its fce, the Rule would appear to authorize the cancellation of any entry regarding "marriages" in the civil registry for any reason by the mere filing of a verified petition for the purpose. However, it is not as simple as it looks. Doctrinally, the only errors that can be cancelled or corrected under this Rule are typographical or clerical errors, not material or 14 substantial ones like the validity or nullity of a marriage . "A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing (Black vs. Republic, L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958); or some harmless and innocuous change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a 15 mis-statement of the occupation of the parent (Ansalada vs. Republic, No. L-10226, Feb. 14, 1958)" . Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of petitioner and her children from legitimate 16 1 to illegitimate, the same cannot be granted except only in an adversarial proceeding . In Vda. de Castro vs. Republic; 7 this Court held: . . . It has been the consistent ruling of this Court since the Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 321, that substantial alterations, such as those affecting the status and citizenship of a person in the Civil Registry Records, can not be ordered by the court unless first threshed out in an "appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented" (see Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court), and that the summary proceedings under Article 412 of the Civil Code only justify an order to correct innocuous or clerical errors, such as mis-spellings and the like, errors that are visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding. (Baybayan vs. Republic of the Philippines, 16 SCRA 403.) Clearly and unequivocally, the summary procedure under Rule 108, and for that matter under Art. 412 of the Civil Code, cannot be used by Mauricio to change his and Virginia's civil status from married to single and of their three children from legitimate to illegitimate. Neither does the trial court, under said Rule, have any jurisdiction to declare their marriage null and void and as a result thereof, to order the local civil registrar to cancel the marriage entry in the civil registry. Further, the respondent trial judge gravely and seriously abused his discretion in unceremoniously expanding his very limited jurisdiction under such rule to hear evidence on such a controversial matter as nullity of a marriage under the Civil Code and/or Family Code, a process that is proper only in ordinary adversarial proceedings under the Rules. A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void; ". . . it may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated 18 as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head." WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING NULL and VOID the decision of the respondent judge dated February 14, 1992 in Special Proceedings No. RTC-144 and MODIFYING accordingly the Decision dated September 30, 1993 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-30606. Let a copy of this Decision be spread in the records of respondent Judge in the Office of the Court Administrator. Costs against private respondent Mauricio D. Leonor, Jr. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 111180 November 16, 1995 DAISIE T. DAVID, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. VILLAR, respondents. Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine, born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988. The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's legal wife. After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually accepted by his legal family. In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year. On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.

After hearing, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58 at Angeles City, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the respondent: 1. the rightful custody of the minor Christopher J. T. David is hereby given to the natural mother, the herein petitioner Daisie T. David; 2. respondent is hereby ordered to give a temporary support of P3,000.00 a month to the subject minor Christopher J. T. David, Christine David and Cathy Mae David to take effect upon the finality of this decision; and 3. to pay the costs of this suit. SO ORDERED. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding: We agree with the respondent-appellant's view that this is not proper in a habeas corpus case. Law and jurisprudence wherein the question of custody of a minor child may be decided in a habeas corpus case contemplate a situation where the parents are married to each other but are separated. This is so because under the Family Code, the father and mother have joint parental authority over their legitimate children and in case of separation of the parents there is need to determine rightful custody of their children. The same does not hold true in an adulterous relationship, as in the case at bar, the child born out of such a relationship is under the parental authority of the mother by express provision of the law. Hence, the question of custody and support should be brought in a case singularly filed for the purpose. In point of fact, this is more advisable in the case at bar because the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the other minor children of the petitioner-appellee and respondent-appellant and, therefore, cannot properly provide for their support. Admittedly, respondent-appellant is financially well-off, he being a very rich businessman; whereas, petitioner-appellee depends upon her sisters and parents for support. In fact, he financially supported petitioner-appellee and her three minor children. It is, therefore, for the best interest of Christopher J that he should temporarily remain under the custody of respondent-appellant until the issue on custody and support shall have been determined in a proper case. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE, and a NEW ONE ENTERED dismissing the petition for habeas corpus in Special Proceeding No. 4489. Daisie in turn filed this petition for review of the appellate court's decision. Rule 102, 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that the determination of the right to the custody of minor children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to each other, are for some reason separated from each other. It 1 does not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other situation. For example, in the case of Salvaa v. Gaela, it was held that the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor daughter even though the latter be in the custody of a third person of her free will because the parents were compelling her to marry a man against her will. In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such 2 authority, is entitled to have custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. Indeed, Rule 1021 1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child. The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age 3 shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of her children, especially considering that she has been able to rear and support them on her own since they were born. Petitioner is a market

vendor earning from P2,000 to P3,000 per month in 1993 when the RTC decision was rendered. She augments her income by working as secretary at the Computer System Specialist, Inc. earning a monthly income of P4,500.00. She has an arrangement with her employer so that she can personally attend to her children. She works up to 8:00 o'clock in the evening to make up for time lost during the day. That she receives help from her parents and sister for the support of the three children is not a point against her. Cooperation, compassion, love and concern for every member of the family are characteristics of the close family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it what it is. Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private respondent promises if the child lives with him. It is enough, however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to support her children according to her means. The Regional Trial Court ordered private respondent to give temporary support to petitioner in the amount of P3,000.00 a month, pending the filing of an action for support, after finding that private respondent did not give any support to his three children by Daisie, except the meager amount of P500.00 a week which he stopped giving them on June 23, 1992. He is a rich man who professes love for his children. In fact he filed a motion for the execution of the decision of the Court of Appeals, alleging that he had observed his son "to be physically weak and pale because of malnutrition and deprivation of the luxury and amenities he was accustomed to when in the former custody of the respondent." He prayed that he be given the custody of the child so that he can provide him with the "proper care and education." Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of support in this case is justified by the fact that private respondent has expressed willingness to support the minor child. The order for payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the grant to him of custody of the child. Under Art. 204 of the Family Code, a person obliged to give support can fulfill his obligation either by paying the allowance fixed by the court or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who is entitled to support unless, in the latter case, there is "a moral or legal obstacle thereto." In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must respect the "choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if private respondent loves his child, he should not condition the grant of support for him on the award of his custody to him (private respondent). WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and private respondent is ORDERED to deliver the minor Christopher J. T. David to the custody of his mother, the herein petitioner, and to give him temporary support in the amount of P3,000.00, pending the fixing of the amount of support in an appropriate action. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-18127 April 5, 1967

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHANGES OF NAME OF GERTRUDES JOSEFINA DEL PRADO, THRU HER NATURAL GUARDIAN CORAZON ADOLFO CALDERON, petitioner-appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant. This is an appeal by the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of First Instance of Davao granting the petition of petitioner-appellee, Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, for a change of name. On July 23, 1959, Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, a minor, through her mother and natural guardian, Corazon Adolfo Calderdon, filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Davao, praying that her name "Gertrudes Josefina del Prado" be changed to "Getrudes Josefina Calderon." It is alleged in the petition that the petitioner is an illegitimate child, born on March 17, 1956, out of a bigamous marriage contracted by Manuel del Prado with Corazon Adolfo; that the surname "Del Prado" which the petitioner carries is a stigma of illegitimacy, by reason of which she has become the subject of unfair comments; that the surname which the petitioner carries would constitute a handicap in her life in later years, and would give cause for constant irritation in her social relations with other people; that petitioner is living with her mother who is now married to Engineer Romeo C. Calderon; and that it is the desire of the petitioner to have her surname changed from "Del Prado" to "Calderon "which is the surname of her foster father, the husband of her mother. The publication of the order for the hearing of the petition was duly made. On July 11, 1960, the Provincial Fiscal of Davao, representing the Solicitor General, filed an opposition to the petition upon the ground that the change of surname of the petition is unwarranted, considering that said petitioner was born out of a bigamous marriage and as such she has the status of an acknowledged natural child by legal fiction and under the law she should bear the surname of her father Manuel del Prado; and that the change of the surname of the petitioner would be prejudicial to the rights and interest which she has by virtue of the judgment in Civil Case No. 2272 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, annulling the marriage of her mother, Corazon Adolfo, to Manuel del Prado, and would also be prejudicial to her rights as conferred upon her by law. Counsel for the petitioner filed in reply to the opposition, the provincial fiscal filed a supplemental opposition, and counsel for the petitioner filed a reply to the supplemental opposition.1wph1.t

After hearing the court a quo issued an order, under date of July 28, 1960, granting the petition and ordering the change of the name of the petitioner from "Gertrudes Josefina, del Prado," to "Gertrudes Josefina Calderon." The dispositive portion of the order of the court further states: "This order, however, shall not operate to deprive the petitioner of her status, rights and obligations as recognized by law." From the above-mentioned order the provincial fiscal, representing the Solicitor General, appealed to this Court. In this appeal the Solicitor General contends (1) that the lower court erred in finding as proper and reasonable ground for the change of the surname of the petitioner the reason that petitioner's present surname carries the stigma of illegitimacy, and (2) that the lower court erred in declaring "that although the law is specific that petitioner shall principally use the 1 surname of the father yet it does not follow that petitioner is prohibited from using other surnames when justified." The issue to be resolved in the present case is whether the lower court's order granting the petition is, based upon "proper and reasonable cause" as required by Section 5 of Rule 103 of the new Rules of Court. The lower court found that petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del Prado was born on March 17, 1956, an illegitimate child of Manuel del Prado and Corazon Adolfo as a result of their bigamous marriage which was annulled on July 18, 1957, after a judgment of conviction of said Manuel del Prado on the complaint for bigamy on December 5, 1956; that subsequently, on December 26, 1957, Corazon Adolfo, mother of the petitioner, got married to Romeo C. Calderon; that the petitioner is living with her mother and her foster father; and that Romeo C. Calderon declared in open court his consent to the petitioner's adopting his surname, especially so because he is the one supporting her. The lower court says, "In the opinion of the Court the reasons adduced by the petitioner are valid and will redound to the best interests of said minor who after all is not at fault to have come to this world as an illegitimate child." We agree with the court a quo. A petition to change the name of an infant, as in this case, should be granted only where to do so is clearly for the best interest of the child. When the mother of the petitioner filed the instant petition she had in mind what she believed was for the best interest of her child considering that her husband Romeo C. Calderon is the one supporting the child and that he is agreeable to the child's using his surname. The mother had considered the generous attitude of her husband as an opportunity for her to promote the personality, and enhance the dignity, of her daughter, by eliminating what constitutes a stigma of illegitimacy which her child would continue to bear if her surname is that of her illegitimate father. The Solicitor General, in his brief, avers that the evident purpose of petitioner in seeking a change of her surname is to conceal her status as an illegitimate child and that any attempt to conceal illegitimacy cannot be motivated by good faith and an honest purpose. The Solicitor General further alleges that to authorize the change of the name of the petitioner would be to sanction a misrepresentation because the petitioner wants to appear as if she is the daughter of Romeo C. Calderon. We cannot agree with the view of the Solicitor General. The Solicitor General seems to support the idea that since the petitioner has the misfortune of being born illegitimate she must bear that stigma of illegitimacy as long as she lives. That idea should not be countenanced. Justice dictates that every person be allowed to avail of any opportunity to improve his social standing as long as in so doing he does not cause prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of other people. The Solicitor General also contends that the status of the petitioner is that of a natural child by legal fiction and under Article 367 of the Civil Code she shall principally enjoy the surname of the father. We agree with the lower court when it said that "While it is true that the Code provides that a natural child by legal fiction as the petitioner herein shall principally enjoy the surname of the father, yet, this does not mean that such child is prohibited by law, from taking another surname with the latters consent and for justifiable reasons." If under the law a legitimate child may secure a change of his name through judicial proceedings, upon a showing of a "proper and reasonable cause", We do not see any reason why a natural child cannot do the same. The purpose of the law in allowing a change of name, as contemplated by the provisions of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, is to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and to promote his interests. We are satisfied that the facts and circumstances as borne out by the record amply justify the change of the surname of the petitioner, as ordered by the lower court . We have held that the matter whether to grant or deny a petition 2 for a change of name is left to the sound discretion of the court, and in the present case We believe that the court a quo has exercised its discretion in a judicious way when it granted the petition. The Solicitor General expresses an apprehension that because the petitioner here is of tender age, who cannot as yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of her name, may be prejudiced in her rights under the law. This apprehension is dispelled by the pronouncement of this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Makalintal, as follow: ... But a change of name as authorized under Rule 103 does not by itself define, or affect a change in, one's existing family relations, or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom; nor does it create new family rights and duties where none before was existing. It does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status, or citizenship. What is altered is only the name, which is that word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from others and which he bears as a label or appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him (38 Am. Jur. 596). (In Re Petition for Change of Name of Joselito Yu, Juan S. Barrera vs. Republic of the Philippines, L-20874, May 25, 1966) In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to the costs. It is so ordered. G.R. No. L-26982 May 8, 1969

ROSALINDA MATIAS, petitioner-appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant. Appeal by the State from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, dated 14 August 1961, directing the Civil Registrar of Malabon, Rizal, to insert the name of the petitioner in the opposite space left blank in the certificate of birth. Petitioner had filed in the court of first instance above named a petition averring that she was born in Malabon, Rizal, on 28 February 1941; that when she needed a copy of her birth certificate in connection with her designation as exchange student it was discovered that in her birth certificate the space destined for the name of the child being registered had been left blank; that the particulars stated in the certificate, such as date, time and place of birth, names and domicile of parents, etc., corresponded with her own. Wherefore, she prayed that, after hearing, the court direct the insertion of her name in the corresponding blank in the birth certificate records of the Civil Registrar of Malabon. Her petition, by direction of the court, was published by posting copies thereof in the provincial capitol building in Pasig as well as in the municipal building of Malabon for at least two weeks, and by service of the same upon the Solicitor General and the Civil Registrar of Malabon, Rizal. In due time, the officers last named opposed the granting of the petition on the ground that a petition for correction of entries in the Civil Registrar under Article 412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines could only refer to clerical errors, and that the amendment sought by the petitioner was not of this kind, and could not be granted by the court. At the hearing, the petitioner presented the testimony of the nurse midwife who attended her birth on the date stated in the birth certificate; and said nurse attested to petitioner's identity with the child referred to in the birth certificate and affirmed to the court that the lack of name was due to omission by oversight. The nurse was corroborated by petitioner's father. Her baptismal certificate, giving her name as Rosalinda Matias, coinciding with the recorded certificate of birth as to date of birth and parentage of the child, was, likewise, introduced and admitted in evidence. The court of first instance granted the petition on 14 August 1961, and the Solicitor General duly appealed. Without questioning the probative value of petitioner's evidence, the State insists that the correction sought is not allowable under the law and jurisprudence on the subject. We believe the appeal to be untenable. From the official certificate of birth itself (Exhibit "A"), it appears that the name of a newly born child need not be made to appear at the time the birth is entered in the record of the Civil Register but may be subsequently inserted. In fact, the birth certificate itself, after the blank provided for the name of the new-born child, recites the following instruction: If the child is not yet named make a supplemental report as directed. Si al recien nacido no se le ha puesto nombre todavia enviese un report suplementario segun instrucciones. It can thus be seen that the name of the child does not necessarily have to appear in the record of birth at the time it is entered, but may be supplied later. And if the name may be recorded subsequently on the strength of a supplemental report, there is no reason why the same may not be done upon a judicial order, issued after proper hearing. Granting that the supplying of a name that was left blank in the original recording of the birth does not constitute, as contended by the Solicitor General, a rectification of a mere clerical error, it is well to observe that the doctrine of the case 1 of Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic 94 Phil. 321, and subsequent adjudications predicated thereon, forbade only the entering of material corrections or amendments in the record of birth by virtue of a judgment in a summary action against the Civil Registrar. In the case of petitioner herein, however, the proceedings were not summary, considering the publication of the petition made by order of the court in order to give notice to any person that might be interested, including direct service on the Solicitor General himself. Considering the peculiar circumstances of this particular case, the fact that no doubt is cast on the truth of petitioner's allegations, or upon her evidence in support thereof, the absence of any showing that prejudice would be caused to any party interested (since petitioner's own father testified in her favor), and the publicity given to the petition, we are of the opinion that the Ty Kong Tin doctrine is not controlling in this case. WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is affirmed. No costs.lawphi1.et G.R. No. L-31065 February 15, 1990 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. PIO R. MARCOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet and PANG CHA QUEN representing the minor, MAY SIA alias MANMAN HUANG, respondents. This is a petition for review of the order dated February 12, 1969 of respondent Judge Pio R. Marcos of the then Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court of Baguio and Benguet, granting the petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court and authorizing "the name of the minor child May Sia alias Manman Huang, also known as Mary Pang [to] be changed to Mary Pang De la Cruz" (p. 12, Rollo).

On March 30, 1968, a verified petition was filed by private respondent Pang Cha Quen alleging that she is a citizen of Nationalist China, married to Alfredo De la Cruz, a Filipino citizen; that she had resided in Baguio City since her birth on January 29, 1930; that by a previous marriage to Sia Bian alias Huang Tzeh Lik, a citizen of Nationalist China, she gave birth to a daughter, May Sia alias Manman Huang on January 28, 1958 in the City of Manila; that on January 12, 1959, she caused her daughter to be registered as an alien under the name of Mary Pang, i.e., using the maternal surname, because the child's father had abandoned them; that her daughter has always used the name Mary Pang at home and in the Baguio Chinese Patriotic School where she studies; that on August 16, 1966, petitioner Pang Cha Quen married Alfredo De la Cruz; that as her daughter has grown to love and recognize her stepfather, Alfredo De la Cruz, as her own father, she desires to adopt and use his surname "De la Cruz" in addition to her name "Mary Pang" so that her full name shall be Mary Pang De la Cruz; that Alfredo De la Cruz gave his conformity to the petition by signing at the bottom of the pleading; that the petition was not made for the purpose of concealing a crime as her ten-year old daughter has not committed any, nor to evade the execution of a judgment as she has never been sued in court, and the petition is not intended to cause damage or prejudice to any third person. She prayed that her daughter be allowed to change her name from May Sia, alias Manman Huang, to Mary Pang De la Cruz. On April 4, 1968, respondent Judge issued an order setting the hearing of the petition on September 16, 1968 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning and inviting all interested persons to appear and show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. The order also directed that it be published at the expense of the petitioner in the Baguio and Midland Courier, a newspaper of general circulation in Baguio City and Mountain Province, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, the first publication to be made as soon as possible. The order also commanded that the Solicitor General and the City Attorney of Baguio be furnished copies of the order and petition. On September 16, 1968, when the petition was called for hearing, nobody opposed it. Upon motion of petitioner's counsel, respondent Judge authorized the Clerk of Court or his deputy to receive the evidence of the petitioner, Pang Cha Quen. Finding the petition meritorious, respondent Judge issued an order on February 12, 1969 authorizing the name of the minor, May Sia alias Manman Huang, also known as Mary Pang, to be changed to Mary Pang De la Cruz. The Government, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the Supreme Court on the ground that the court's order is contrary to law. In its petition f r review, the Government raised two (2) issues namely: (1) whether or not respondent Judge had acquired jurisdiction over the case; and (2) whether respondent Judge erred in granting the petition although private respondent Pang Cha Quen failed to adduce proper and reasonable cause for changing the name of the minor "May Sia" alias Manman Huang." On the first issue, the Government pointed out that the captions of the petition and of the published order of the court did not include the name "Mary Pang" as one of the names that the minor has allegedly been using, hence, the petition and the published order contain a fatal jurisdictional defect. The Government's contention is well-taken. Thus did we rule in the case of Jesus Ng Yao Siong vs. Republic, 16 SCRA 483, 487-88: Petitioner himself admits that he is known by all these names. This gives rise to the necessity of including his aliases in the title of the petition not only in the body thereof. xxx xxx xxx We accordingly hold that for a publication of a petition for a change of name to be valid, the title thereof should include, first, his real name, and second, his aliases, if any In Republic vs. Zosa, G.R. No. 48762, September 12, 1988, this Court explained the reason for the rule requiring the inclusion of the name sought to be adopted and the other names or aliases of the applicant in the title of the petition, or in the caption of the published order. It is that the ordinary reader only glances fleetingly at the caption of the published order or the title of the petition in a special proceeding for a change of name. Only if the caption or the title strikes him because one or all of the names mentioned are familiar to him, does he proceed to read the contents of the order. The probability is great that he will not notice the other names or aliases of the applicant if they are mentioned only in the body of the order or petition. In the case at bar, the caption of both the verified petition dated March 30,1968, and the published order of the trial court dated April 4, 1968 read, thus: IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF THE MINOR MAY SIA ALIAS MANMAN HUANG TO MARY PANG DE LA CRUZ, PANG CHA QUEN, Petitioner. (P. 15, Rollo.) The omission of her other alias-- "Mary Pang"-- in the captions of the court's order and of the petition defeats the purpose of the publication. In view of that defect, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject of the proceedings, i.e., the various names and aliases of the petitioner which she wished to change to "Mary Pang De la Cruz."

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In Go Chin Beng vs. Republic, L-29574, August 18, 1972, we held that all aliases of the applicant must be set forth in the title of the published petition, for the omission of any of such aliases, would be fatal to the petition even if such other aliases are mentioned in the body of the petition. The second ground for the Government's appeal is the failure of the petitioner below, Pang Cha Quen, to state a proper and reasonable cause for changing the name/names of her daughter. The following have been considered valid grounds for a change of name: (1) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (3) when the change will avoid confusion (Haw Liong vs. Republic, L-21194, April 29,1966; Chill Hap Chin vs. Republic, L20018, April 30, 1966; Republic vs. Tanada, et al., L-31563, November 29, 1971; Alfon vs. Republic, I,51201, May 29, 1980); (4) having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of his alien parentage (Josefina Ang Chay vs. Republic, L-28507, July 31, 1980); or (5) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage all in good faith and not to prejudice anybody (Uy vs. Republic, L-22712, November 29, 1965). As may be gleaned from the petition filed in the lower court, the reasons offered for changing the name of petitioner's daughter are: (1) that "her daughter grew up with, and learned to love and recognize Alfredo de la Cruz as her own father" (p. 23, Rollo); (2) to afford her daughter a feeling of security (pp. 23-24, Rollo); and (3) that "Alfredo de la Cruz agrees to this petition, and has signified his conformity at the foot of this pleading" (p. 24, Rollo). Clearly, these are not valid reasons for a change of name. The general rule is that a change of name should not be permitted if it will give a false impression of family relationship to another where none actually exists (Laperal vs. Republic, L-18008, October 30, 1962; Johnson vs. Republic, L-18284, April 30, 1963; Moore vs. Republic, L-18407, June 26, 1963). In Padilla vs. Republic, 113 SCRA 789, we specifically held that our laws do not authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname of a person not their father, for to allow them to adopt the surname of their mother's husband, who is not their father, can result in confusion of their paternity. Another reason for disallowing the petition for change of name is that it was not filed by the proper party. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, provide: SECTION 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Court of First Instance of the province in which he resides, or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. SEC. 2. Contents of petition.- A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth: (a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing; (b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought; (c) The name asked for Clearly, the petition for change of name must be filed by the person desiring to change his/her name, even if it may be signed and verified by some other person in his behalf. In this case, however, the petition was filed by Pang Cha Quen not by May Sia. Hence, only May Sia herself, alias Manman Huang, alias Mary Pang, when she shall have reached the age of majority, may file the petition to change her name. The decision to change her name, the reason for the change, and the choice of a new name and surname shall be hers alone to make. It must be her personal decision. No one else may make it for her. The reason is obvious. When she grows up to adulthood, she may not want to use her stepfather's surname, nor any of the aliases chosen for her by her mother. In Moore vs. Republic, 8 SCRA 282, 284, we held: Another factor to be reckoned with is the fact that the child concerned is still a minor who for the present cannot fathom what would be his feeling when he comes to a mature age. Any way, if the time comes, he may decide the matter for himself and take such action as our law may permit. For the present we deem the action taken by petitioner premature. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the State has an interest in the name borne by each individual for purposes of identification and the same should not be changed for trivial reasons like the instant case (Ty vs. Republic L-18669, November 29, 1965). A change of name is a mere privilege and not a matter of right (Ong Peng Oan vs. Republic, L8035, November 29, 1957; Yu vs. Republic, L- 22040, November 29, 1965) and because the petition to change the name of the minor May Sia is not supported by weighty reasons, the trial court erred in granting it. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the order appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside. No costs. SO ORDERED.

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