Analysis

October 9, 2012

Summary: Turkey has enjoyed a sustained political stability and economic growth from the beginning of the millennium. A stable government with satisfactory economic performance was an object of admiration in a region where authoritarian governments associated with poor economic performance were the rule. The neutral stand in regional issues that had rendered Turkey an accepted partner to all sides began to erode beginning at the end of 2008, first with relations with Israel, then NATO, and finally with the Arab Spring and Syria. Whether it will succeed in restoring its former role as a trusted partner for all countries of the region is open to question.

The Rise and Fall of Turkeys Middle East Policy

by Ilter Turan

Go back a few years, and youll see that Turkey was increasingly referred to as a regional power. But which region? By the very nature of its location, history, and culture, Turkey belongs to several regions (the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East and of course, Europe), regional leader was more often a reference to the Middle East. How had Turkey come to be identified this way? The Roots of Becoming a Regional Power To begin with, Turkey has enjoyed a sustained political stability and economic growth from the beginning of the millennium. In the 2002 elections, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) achieved a parliamentary majority, bringing with it governmental stability that had been long absent from Turkish politics. Pre-2002 politics was characterized by unstable, ineffective coalition governments, and to make things worse, in 1999 the country had entered deep economic crisis. Only a very strict austerity program under the watchful eye of the IMF and a series of structural reforms had put the country back on a path to economic growth. To its credit,

the AKP continued to implement the policies devised by the preceding government, thereby initiating a period of economic prosperity that has continued to this day. A stable government with satisfactory economic performance was an object of admiration in a region where authoritarian governments associated with poor economic performance were the rule. Turkeys export-led economic growth enticed it to take a deeper interest in Middle Eastern countries since they seemed to be promising markets for Turkeys growing exports. Expanding economic means, on the other hand, furnished Turkey with the ability to extend economic assistance, credits, and other facilities to cement the relationships. Relations grew more comprehensive over time through facilitating travel to and from these countries by simplifying or, in some instances, removing visa requirements, initiating new flights to regional centers by Turkish airlines, opening Turkish cultural centers, and offering university scholarships. The increase in the number of Arab and Iranian tourists, growing Arab investments in the Turkish economy, and purchases of real estate are testimony to the

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multi-dimensional nature of the evolving relationship. It should be added that the visitors found in Turkey what they usually lacked in their own country: a liberal, open society where they could wear what they want, eat and drink what they liked, and go to the beaches or shopping centers as they pleased, with no one monitoring their political loyalty or the morality of their behavior. Turkey had become a desired destination and a regional center. Turkeys estimation in the eyes of the regional countries was considerably enhanced by its being invited to begin accession negotiations with the European Union. Although its population was mainly Muslim, Turkey had managed to evolve into a sufficiently democratic country with an operating market economy that qualified it to become a part of one of the most economically and politically advanced clubs in the world. In its initial stages, Turkeys policy appeared to be directed to building a region of peace and prosperity. To that end, Turkey tried both to settle problems with its neighbors and help other neighbors settle their differences. A notable example is Turkeys efforts to expand relations with Syria, which culminated in the mutual repeal of visa requirements and the decision to jointly build a dam on the Orontes, bringing benefits to both societies. Another example is getting both Syria and Iran to start talking with Saudi Arabia. Trying to bring rival Palestinian factions to cooperate toward a solution is a third example. And finally, conducting proximity talks between Syria and Israel in order to bring about a modus vivendi in Golan Heights was a nearly successful major undertaking. During this period, Turkey did not identify closely with any one of the contending parties, maintained an equal distance to all, and managed to gain their confidence. Therefore, all parties were willing to avail themselves to Turkish initiatives. Turkey, acting as a facilitator in addressing conflicts among countries of the region, was said to exercise soft power. Change Challenges Aspirations to Regional Leadership The neutral stand in regional issues that had rendered Turkey an accepted partner to all sides began to erode beginning at the end of 2008. The first departure came when Israel attacked Gaza just after it had created the impression that it was ready to reach an agreement with Syria on

Turkeys estimation in the eyes of the regional countries was considerably enhanced by its being invited to begin accession negotiations with the European Union.
Golan Heights through Turkish mediation. Feeling deceived by the then Israeli premier Ehud Olmert, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan began to utter, ever more frequently, critical remarks about Israel. Discovering that this rhetoric made him very popular on the Arab street, he began to escalate the critical tone of his remarks, culminating in a hostile outbreak against the Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2009. Relations continued to worsen as both parties found opportunities to insult each other. The critical blow came in May 2010 when Israel attacked a civilian vessel carrying humanitarian aid to Palestine on the high seas, killing nine Turks, one with U.S. citizenship. Israel has refused to meet Turkeys conditions that include an apology, compensation, and the unusual demand that it terminate the embargo that it imposes on the Palestinians. Any indication that relations might improve in the short or even medium run is clearly lacking. Understandable as the Turkish indignation may have been about Premier Benjamin Natanyahus behavior, the fact is that, in this way, Turkey abandoned its position of mediator and identified with one side of the single most important conflict in the Middle East. Turkey soon faced another challenge. NATO, responding to U.S. requests, agreed to install an anti-ballistic missile system against Iranian missiles (though not explicitly stated). Turkey was asked to host a forward radar station. As a member of the alliance, saying yes or no constituted a test case of its alliance commitment. Turkeys agreement to the request paved the way to deterioration of relations with Iran where some members of the defense establishment threat-

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ened retaliation while members of the diplomatic corps and some political leaders tried to contain the damage. A new challenge came to Turkeys regional role with the outbreak of the Arab Spring. After initial hesitation, Turkey judged that the demands for change had deep support in the respective societies where events were taking place. It further judged that its allies were all in favor of change, as it became most evident in the case of Libya. If Turkey planned to have a role in the shaping of the post-Arab Spring order, it would have to take part in this transformative process. Accordingly, it assumed an active role in supporting the anti-Gaddafi forces in Libya and developed links with the new political movements in Tunisia and Egypt. Furthermore, it appeared that the political movements that stood to improve their political standing and achieve power were political movements that were broadly identified as Muslim Brotherhood, which the AKP considered ideological relatives, facilitating the development of good relations with the new governments. Syria: The Pivotal Case The Arab Spring reached Syria rather late. After antigovernment demonstrations began, both the Turkish prime and foreign ministers visited Syria, trying to persuade Bashar Assad that he should introduce democratic reforms. He agreed and made promises to change but continued with the brutal suppression as soon as the Turkish leaders left. As the Syrian leader escalated his suppression, Turkey began to extend more extensive support to the opposition. It hosted opposition meetings, worked actively to mobilize international support for them, and, allegedly, offered a safe haven for fighters and allowed shipment of supplies including military wares to them. The Syrian government was unmoved. It continued its military campaign against the opposition forces. It was alleged that Assad once more extended support to the Kurdish terrorist organization, the PKK, which has recently escalated its violence in Turkey. Syria also shot down a Turkish air force reconnaissance jet which had briefly (and unintentionally by Turkish accounts) violated Syrian air space. Turkeys political leaders said time and again that their patience was running out and that they would not allow unfriendly actions go unanswered. Yet, there was little

If Turkey planned to have a role in the shaping of the post-Arab Spring order, it would have to take part in this transformative process.
that could be done. Russia and China blocked UN humanitarian intervention. Iran was a major supporter of the Assad regime. The United States and NATOs European members as well as the EU were too deeply immersed in their own troubles to consider anything more than embargoes and symbolic political actions. Turkey, on the other hand, was not in a position to act alone without a broad consensus on military responses to the crisis. In the meantime, Syrian refugees flooded across the border. Turkeys calls for the establishment of protected zones within Syria received little support from its allies since the implementation of such a proposal would be feasible only if military force were committed to enforce it. As these lines were being written, Syrian shells had hit homes in the Turkish town of Akakale across from the Syrian town of Tel al-Biyad, causing the death of five and the wounding of many Turkish citizens. Turkey responded by firing at the artillery units from where the shells had come. The government also asked for and got authorization from parliament to send military forces across the border should conditions warrant. NATO, the EU, and others have announced their support for Turkey. These developments, taken together, may restrain Syria from committing careless acts against Turkish towns, boats, and planes, but it is unlikely that it will change the policies of the Syrian government toward its own people. The Outcome Turkeys involvement in Syria in favor of the Syrian opposition and its simultaneous failure to affect the course of developments despite frequent assertions by the foreign minister that the country is in a position to build a new

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order in the region has brought costs. First, it has strained relations with Iran and Russia, two countries with which Turkey has been working hard to develop close relations during the recent years. Russia supports the Syrian regime to insure a presence in the Eastern Mediterranean where it has no other allies; Iran sees Syria as a means of reaching the Mediterranean and among others, as a way of balancing Turkeys regional claims. Second, there is strong suspicion that Syria has resumed its sponsorship of Kurdish terrorism in Turkey. The extent of this sponsorship is difficult to establish. The increasing autonomy of Kurds within Syria, on the other hand, is likely to raise domestic challenges for Turkey in its relations with its own restive Kurdish population. Third, rightly or wrongly, Turkey has become identified as a pro-Sunni force in the region, eroding its aspirations to be accepted as a regional leader in good standing with all regional actors. This impression does not derive exclusively from Turkeys stand vis a vis Syria, but from the protection it has extended to the Sunni vice president of Iraq, who has been sentenced to death in absentia for conspiracy to kill the Iraqi prime minister, and Turkeys involvement in efforts to replace the Shia prime minister Nouri al-Maliki with the more secular minded Iyad Allawi. Fourth, Syrian developments have had negative economic outcomes. Border regions that had developed a lively trade with Syria and received Syrian tourists have suffered. Turkish trucks that carry goods through Syria to Jordan and the Gulf States have had to be rerouted through more expensive and inefficient routes that involve first sea and then land travel. Finally, the Syrian episode has tested Turkeys capabilities and has shown that Turkey cannot, by itself, play a determining role in the region. Put differently, Turkey is not a regional leader but a power in the region. This is not a position that Turkey envisioned for itself, but it has gotten there in part as a result of its own policies. Whether it will succeed in restoring its former role as a trusted partner for all countries of the region is open to question. One thing is however, certain. It will be a long time before Turkeys regional leadership comes up again. At the moment, Turkey is devoting its energies to meeting the Syrian challenge. Regional leadership is good rhetoric, but it hardly describes Turkeys role in the region.

About the Author

lter Turan is a professor of political science at Istanbuls Bilgi University, where he also served as president between 1998-2001. His previous employment included professorships at Ko University (1993-1998) and Istanbul University (1964-1993), where he also served as the chair of the International Relations Department (19871993), and the director of the Center for the Study of the Balkans and the Middle East (1985-1993). Dr. Turan is the past president of the Turkish Political Science Association and has been a member of the Executive Committee and a vice president of the International Political Science Association (2000-2006). He is a frequent commentator on Turkish politics on TV and newspapers.

About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to promoting better understanding and cooperation between North America and Europe on transatlantic and global issues. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.

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