Canadian Journal of

Political
and Social Theory
Revue canadienne de theorie politique et sociale
Editor
Arthur
Kroker (Concordia)
Managing Editor
Marilouise Kroker
Editorial Board
William L eiss (Simon Fraser)
Michael Weinstein (Purdue)
Deena Weinstein (De Paul)
Eli Mandel (York)
Andrew
Wernick (Trent)
Editorial Correspondents
John Schiller (Berkeley, Calif. )
Gregory Baum (Montreal)
Geraldine Finn (Ottawa)
Jean-Guy Vaillancourt (Montreal)
Charles L evin (Montreal)
Frank Burke (Queen's)
Eileen Manion (Dawson)
David Cook (Toronto)
Ray Morrow (Alberta)
Pamela McCallum (Calgary)
John Fekete (Peterborough)
Russell Jacoby (L os Angeles)
Daniel Drache (Toronto)
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information should be addressed to :
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7141 Sherbrooke St. West
Montreal, Quebec H4B
1R6
TheJournal acknowledges withgratitude the generous assistance of the Social
Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada/Conseil de recherches
en sciences humaines au Canada.
Publication of the journal has been facilitated by the generous
assistance of
Concordia
University,
and
inparticular
by
the Department of Political Science,
bythe Office of the Dean of
Social Science, and by the Fonds F . C. A
. R.
Indexed
in/Indexee
au
: International Political
Science
Abstracts/Documen-
tation politique internationale; Sociological Abstracts Inc . , Advance Biblio-
graphy of Contents : Political Science and Government ; Canadian Periodical
Index; and Alternative Press Index.
Member of the Canadian Periodical Publishers' Association.
Tour droits reserves 1987 Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory
Inc. /
Revue Canadienne de theorie politique et sociale, L tee.
Cover Design: Marilouise Kroker

Cover Photograph: Man RayVis-Art .

ISSN0380-9420 Printed in Canada
Canadian Journal
of
P olit ic al and
Soc ial Theory
Revue c anadienne
de t heorie polit ique
et soc iale
FRENCHFANTASIES
Volume XI: Number
3 :
1987
R
ASHER HOROWITZ
Are-evaluation of Rousseau's cultural and intellectual achievement, in
which Horowitz traces the development in Rousseau's major works of a
new, historical view
of human nature and society.
Cloth $30. 00
L
J. A. LAPONCE
TRANSLATEDBYA. D. MARTIN-SPERRY
In
this translation of his acclaimed Lngue et Territoire Laponce explores
the phenomenon of bilingualism from historical, geographic, political,
and
psychobiological perspectives .
Cloth $35. 00, paper $18. 95
T
C. E. S.
FRANKS
Athoughtful analysis of parliamentary reforms of the past fifteen years,
their successes and failures, their impact on public perceptions, and
future directions that reform efforts may take .
Cloth $27. 50, paper $15. 00
U
OUSSEAU, NATURE, ANDHISTORY
ANGUAGESANDTHEIRTERRITORIES
HE
PARLIAMENTOFCANADA
AWSON'STHEGOVERNMENTOFCANADA
SIXTHEDITION
NORMANWARD
Aclassic in its field . . . There is no comparable
volume that deals with
all
these topics in such a satisfactory fashion . ' Choice on the fifth edition
In this newedition Ward has brought the material up to date and
reorganized it to reflect contemporary students' approach to the subject .
Cloth
$45
. 00, paper $19. 95
FRENCHFANTASIES
of a cynica l sex a nd the
disa ppea ring subject
The
Ga mes of Fouca ult
Arthur Kroker
The End/s of Woma n
NP. Ricci
The Question of the Mora l Subject
in Fouca ult's
Ana lytics of Power
Hwa YolJung
The Limit of Histories : Michel
Fouca ult's
Notion of Pa rta ge
Debora h Cook
When Ba ta ille Atta cked
the Meta physica l
Principle of
Economy
Jea n
Ba udrilla rd
Modernity
Jea n
Ba udrilla rd
DEBATES
Ideology, Critique a nd Contra diction
in Ma rx :
Answering J. La rra in
Gyorgy Ma rkus
The
Politics a t Modernism's Funera l
John
La ffey
THELEGACY
OFC. B . MACPHERSON
C. B . Ma cpherson (1911-1987)
Da niel Dra che /Arthur Kroker
Contents /
Somma ire
Wa sJohn Locke a
Bourgeois Theorist?
ACritica l Appra isa l of Ma cpherson
a nd Tully
Jeffrey Isa a cs
REVIEWS
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy?
The
Nihilism of Resistance
&Freedom 130
Paul Nonnekes
Fading Postmodern Subjects 140
Stephen Pinter
Goodbye to all that : Conservative Theories of Ideology 149
Jeremy
Rayner
Agency,
Unlimited 158
ReneR.
Gadacz
Roderick's 'Social' Amnesia: Habermas
and the Productivist Paradigm
164
Brian Caterino
L'objectivation et la symbolisation 173
Michel Lalonde
CanadianJournal of P olit ic al and
Soc ial Theory /Revue c anadienne de t h6rie polit ique et s oc iale,
Volume XI, No.
3 (1987).
THE
GAMES OFFOUCAULT
Art hur Kroker
Cynic al Sex
Cynic al s ex
:
t his is what we have at t he end of t he world. For s ex
no
longer exis t s as a privileged referent of t he Real nor as t he loc us
of a
s uppres s ed
s ubjec t ivit y, but as pos t modern s ex, fas c inat ing now only on it s
revers e s ide -
t he Bat aillean s ide of expendit ure, was t e, and exc es s .
As ac rific ial
s ex, t hen, t hat exis t s only parodic ally and s c hizoidly bec aus e
s ex
has ent ered int o
it s t hird order of s imulat ion: t he ideologic al mis e-en-s c ene
where t he
pos t modern body promis es it s own negat ion. Here t he
previous ly reflexive
c onnec t ion bet ween s exualit y and des ire is blas t ed
away by t he s educ t ive vis ion
of s ex wit hout organs -a hyperreal,
s urrogat e, and t elemat ic
s ex like t hat promis ed (but never delivered) by t he
c omput erized phone s ex
of
t he
Minit ei s ys t em in Franc e -as t he ult imat e
out -of-body experienc e for t he end
of t he s ec ond millenium . Here t he
t error of t he ruined s urfac es of t he
body t rans lat es immediat ely int o it s
oppos it e -t he ec s t ac y ofc at as t rophe andt he pleas ure
ofs ex wit hout s ec ret ions as a
final, ironic s ign ofour liberat ion.
In his
rec ent s c hizo-biography, Jean Baudrillard s aid
t his about t he
invas ion of t he body,
under t he double s igns of t he pleas ure
of c at as t rophe
and t he t error
of t he s imulac rum, by t he logic of ext erminis m -
t hat is , t he
implos ion
of
t he
pos t modern body int o an indifferent s ign-s lide
bet ween
t he hermet ic s elf and
t he s c hizoid ego:
And if realit y
under our eyes would s uddenly dis s olve?
Not int o
not hingnes s , but int o a real whic h is more t han
real (t he t riumph of
s imulat ion? ) .
If t he modern univers e of c ommunic at ion, t he
s pac e of
hyperc ommunic at ion t hrough
whic h we are plunging, not in forget -
ARTHURKROKER
f u l n e s s , bu t
with an e n ormou s s atu ration
of
ou r s e n s e s , wou l d
con s u me u s in its s u cce s s -withou t trick e ry , withou t s e cre ts ,
withou t
dis tan ce ? I f al l this mu tation did n ot e man ate , as s ome be l ie v e , f rom
the man ipu l ation of s u bj e cts an d opin ion , bu t f rom a l og ic withou t a
s u bj e ct whe re opin ion v an is he s
in to
f as cin ation ? I f
it
wou l d
n o
l on g e r
be corre ct to oppos e tru th to il l u s ion , bu t to
pe rce iv e g e n e ral ize d
il l u s ion as tru e r than tru th? An d if n o othe r be hav ior was pos s ibl e than
that of l e arn in g iron ical l y how to dis appe ar? I f the re we re n o l on g e r
an y f ractu re s , l in e s of f l ig ht or ru ptu re s , bu t a s u rf ace f u l l an d
con tin u ou s , withou t de pth, u n in te rru pte d? An d if al l of this was
n e ithe r a matte r of e n thu s ias m n or de s pair, bu t f atal ?
A' l og ic withou t a s u bj e ct'
in the
l ate
1980s is s e x withou t a body , a s e x that
is in te re s tin g as
e v e ry adv e rtis e r k n ows whe n it is abou t the de ath of
s e du ction ( l ik e the Ne w Look
in Paris f as hion whe re what cou n ts is
"in n oce n ce n ot e xpe rie n ce , " or, as Dorothy Val l e n s s ay s in Bl u e Ve l v e t abou t
s e xu al e n cou n te rs of the hy pe rre al k in d: "y ou hav e pu t y ou r dis e as e in s ide
me ");
or,
more
than this ,
a s e x
which
is
abou t
the
l iqu idation of the body
an d the
can ce l l ation
of
de s ire its e l f -l ik e the TV s e x of Vide odrome or the
"s mart s e x"
of
the Ne w York art s ce n e be cau s e it' s n e o-g e o to e xce s s in an
ag e of the
de ath
of
de s ire an d the s pre adin g ou t e v e ry whe re of a pe rv as iv e
mood of in dif f e re n ce . Hy pe rre al s e x, the re f ore , is a v iol e n t e dg e be twe e n
k its ch an d de cay , be twe e n v iol e n ce an d in e rtia, be twe e n cy be rs pace an d
hy pe r-s u bj e ctiv ity . No l on g e r Fou cau l t' s "l ocal bodie s , " "e f f e ctiv e his tory "
an d "s u bj u g ate d k n owl e dg e , " bu t the ide ol og ical produ ction of cy n ical s e x
e n e rg ize d f rom within by s u bj u g ate d k n owl e dg e , by the con s tan t re cy cl in g
of l ocal his torie s , an d by the e n dl e s s re pris e of dif f e re n ce .
I t is iron ic . 1986 was the 350th an n iv e rs ary of the pu bl ication of
De s carte s ' Dis cou rs de l a me thode an d, with it, the produ ction of the e pis te -
mol og ical me n u f or the e me rg e n ce of the mode rn is t, g e ome trical l y ce n te re d
pe rs pe ctiv e of the thin k in g he ad, f rame d within the dis cu rs iv e s pace of the
l ibe ral body . Al l of the k e y te n de n cie s of con te mporary Fre n ch
thou g ht -
f rom Miche l Se rre s ' bl e ak v is ion of Le paras ite ( whe re the
pos ition s of
pre dator an d paras ite are the re g u l atory pol e s of
hy pe rmode rn e xpe rie n ce ),
an d Batail l e ' s
me ditation s
on
the s ol aran u s an d the pin e al e y e as the priv il e g e d
s ig n s
of
the g e n e ral e con omy of e xce s s , to Miche l Fou cau l t' s e arl y phil o-
s ophical re f l e ction s on madn e s s as an in dif f e re n t abs e n ce , to, f in al l y , Je an
Bau dril l ard' s hol og ram of the pos tmode rn s ce n e -re pre s e n t the f atal
impl os ion of the Carte s ian s u bj e ct . No l on g e r the Carte s ian thin k in g s e l f ,
bu t f ractal s u bj e ctiv ity in a hy pe rmode rn cu l tu re whe re pan ic s cie n ce
is the
l an g u ag e of powe r; n ot ratiocin ation to e xce s s , bu t
paral l e l proce s s in g as the
e pis te mol og ical re f it of pos tmode rn
con s ciou s n e s s ; n ot the l ocal body , bu t
te chn ol og ie s f or the body
immu n e as k e y f e atu re s of a l ibidin al e con omy that
FRENCHFANTASIES
produces toxic bodies and designer aesth etics as its necessary conditions of
operation; and not univocal (grounded) perspective anymore, but th e
fascinating implosion of perspective into th e cyberspace of virtual tech nology .
For wh en we already live beyond gravity (in h yperreal bodies) and beyond
representational space (in th e
math ematical reality
of
fuzzy sets wh ere
individual particles h ave no determinate meaning apart from th eir random
patterning with in larger and more abstract statistical totalities), th en
th e
Cartesian self no longer exists except, perh aps, as an optical afterimage of
th e
present condition of th e post-Cartesian body as dangling subj ectivity in
quantum reality .
Wh at, th en, of th epost-Cartesian body? Th is is th e imploded body of
postmodernism th at h as been traced in all of its detrital residue, in all of its
exh austion as it disappears into th e suffocating, dark density of th e sch izoid
sign ; th e missing body th at h as been marked as th e sutured absence of
Derrida's trace, of Lacan's misrecognition, of Irigaray's speculum ; th e h yper-
modern body th at can be th ematised now as th e ventilated remainder of
dangling subj ectivities in quantum reality because its existence h as been
reduced to th e th reefold traj ectory of a cynical power.
1 . Tech nologically, th e postmodern body is both obj ective remainder
and subj ective constituent of th e tech nical interpellation of identity by
dead and spectral image-systems. Not Foucault's "tech nologies of th e self
wh ereby th e modern self constitutes itself as th e eth ical subj ect of its own
sexual conduct (alth ough th at too), but a h yper-tech nology of th e self to
such a point of violent excess th at th e self is (ideologically) peeled inside
out, exteriorizing all of its bodily parts in society as cyberspace . Like th e
"world strip" of quantumph ysics, music, images, language, all of th e sideral
cultural vibrations, pass th rough th e dead space of h ypermodern bodies,
making of bodies only a topological and surface feature of h yper-
communication. Th e postmodern body, th erefore, is a superconductor for all
of th e dying energies of th e social .
2. Ideologically, th e postmodern body is th e prime after-effect of its
possession by th e violent and excessive language of contractarian liberalism .
Not contractarian liberalism with its reduction of th e meaning of j ustice to
a barren equality in th e primary
goods of th e
industrial h eartland
of North
America, but a contractual th eory of j ustice th at focusses on body invasion ;
from th e Baby Mcase wh ere th e natural moth er
is
reduced
to
a "h ired
womb" and th e surrogate fath er (h e was, anyway, always j ust borrowed
sperm) is consecrated anew as th e real, living Daddy, to all th e recent cases
of
fetal
appropriation wh ereby th e state intervenes (supposedly on beh alf of
th e righ ts of th e unborn baby) to take j uridical possession of th e body
of
th e moth er ; and th e conflation of th e private property principle and
genetics, wh erein th e reproduction of new life forms is rendered a matter
of market-determination with th e newly legislated power of business to
ARTHUR
KROKER
acquire patent rig h ts on th e g enetic creation of
new l ife- s pecies .
3 .
F inal l y , in th e l ang uag e of fas h ion, or in th e
s emiotics of v is ual
pl eas ure and trans g res s ion, th e pos tmodern body is tattooed by al l of th e
s ig ns
of
th e death of s eduction . In a pos tmodern cul ture dominated by th e
dis appearance of th e Real and by th e s uffocation of natural contexts ,
fas h ion prov ides
aes th etic h ol og rams as mov eabl e texts for th e g eneral
economy of exces s . If fas h ion cy cl es
appear
to
mov e towards g reater and
g reater s peed, v iol ence, and intens ity of circul ation of s ig ns ,
th at is becaus e
fas h ion, in an era wh ere th e body is th e ins cribed s urface of ev ents , is
l ik e
brownian motion : th e g reater th e v iol ence and circul ation of its s urface
features , th e
g reater th e internal mov ement towards s tas is , immobil ity and
interia . Awh ol e pos tmodern cul ture,
th erefore, under th e doubl e s ig n of
cul ture wh ere, as Baudril l ard h as h inted, th e s ecret of
fas h ion
is to
introduce
th e appearance of radical nov el ty wh il e maintaining
th e real ity of no
s ubs tantial ch ang e . Or is it th e oppos ite? Not fas h ion as a referent of th e
th ird (s imul ational ) order of th e real , but as its el f th e s pectacul ar s ig n of a
paras itical cul ture th at, al way s exces s iv e, dis accumul ativ e, and s acrificial , is
drawn inexorabl y towards th e ecs tacy of catas troph e . Th e fas h ion s cene,
and th e tattoed body with it, as a Batail l ean pil ing up of
th e "g roundl es s
refus e of activ ity " becaus e th e s ig n of th e Real h as
now dis appeared into
appearance . Cons equentl y , th e fas h ion s cene, l ik e pornog raph y
before it,
mus t al s o g iv e th e appearance of no s ubs tantiv e ch ang e, wh il e
camoufl ag ing
th e real ity of radical nov el ty in a s urface aes th etics of deep
s ig n continuity .
F as h ion, th erefore, is a cons erv ativ e pol itical ag ent compl icit in defl ecting
th e ey e from fractal s ubj ectiv ity , cul tural dy s l exia, toxic bodies , and
paral l el
proces s ing
as
th e s ocial ph y s ics of l ate twentieth - century experience .
Th ree Games
Ev en as I s peak of th e pos tmodern body as both obj ect
and priv il eg ed
after- imag e of a col onizing power, th e words beg in to
fade into a l aconic
and fatal dis integ ration . I remember,
I mus t remember, th e bitter words
s pok en by F oucaul t in th e firs t
v ol ume of Th e His tory of Sexual ity th at
"(P)ower as a pure l imit s et on
freedom is , at l eas t in our s ociety , th e g eneral
form of its acceptabil ity : "'
th e l imit, th at is , wh ich mak es bearabl e our
ins tatiation
with in a cy nical and indifferent freedom .
But perh aps it is no l ong er, as F oucaul t th eoris ed, th e radical
pl ay
of
domination and freedom with th e s el f as a contes ted s pace of
abs ence (th e
famous recov ery of an "uns pok en s ubj ectiv ity "), but
domination now
under th e s ig n of cy nical power as a
mice- en- s cene of th e truth of th e
pos tmodern body as a Batail l ean s ite of
reck l es s nes s , dis ch arg e, and
uph eav al . Wh en
we h av e al ready pas s ed bey ond th e firs t two orders of
s exual ity ,
bey ond org anic s ex and dis curs iv e s exual ity , to th e th ird s tag e of a
FRENCHFANTASIES
hyperreal sex (where the
body i s doubled i n an en dless labyri n th of medi a
i mages, where tran sgressi on
i s the law, an d bodi es altern ate between
hermeti ci sm
an d schi zophren i a), then even Foucault's pri vi legi n g of the
secon d order of
di scursi ve sexuali ty (where we must pass through what i s
sai d about our sexuali ty, i ts di scourse,
i n order to fi n ally kn ow the truth of
our sex) works n ow on ly to suffocate the
gri sly i mpli cati on s of a hyperreal,
cyn i cal sex .
Thi s would be to clai m, though, that Foucault's fate
was
to
be the last
an d best of all the Cartesi an s : the theori st who on the cli n i cal
groun ds of
medi ci n e, power,
sexuali ty, an d sci en ce thought through the bi tter an alyti cs
of the "thi n ki n g subj ect,"
of rati oci n ati on to excess, even as rati on ali ty
secreted i n to the very con sti tuti on of
the ethi cal subj ect, an d emerged
fi n ally as the en ucleati n g hori zon of western
experi en ce . If Foucault could
n ever thi n k beyon d the dark si de of Kan t, could
n ever escape -whether i n
hi s i n terpretati on of sci en ce as
cyn i cal truth, medi ci n e as cyn i cal power, or
the pan opti c space as the
cyn i cal gaze -the full hori zon of the trap Kan t
had lai d for hi m (j ust as Ni etzsche could
n ever break beyon d a modern i st
en tan glemen t wi th the questi on of the
death of God) ; i f Foucault could
n ever free hi mself from a
resolutely modern i st en tan glemen t wi th Kan t's
n omi n ali sm on the questi on of the death of
truth ; an d i f Foucault could n ot
fi n ally avoi d the compli ci ty of hi s own theory wi th
the un foldi n g di saster of
the "games of truth" ; thi s i s n ot to den y that there i s
everythi n g to be
gai n ed, an d everythi n g at stake, i n medi tati n g an ew on
the games of
Foucault . For the games of Foucault are si multan eously
the li mi t . an d
possi bi li ty of hi s theoreti cal legacy .
Fi rst, a theori st of poli ti cal tran sgressi on
par excellen ce whose
medi tati on s on "relati on al power" could evoke
such an i mpassi on ed mood
of poli ti cal resi stan ce (the eman ci pati on of subj ugated
kn owledge) because
all hi s reflecti on s on power were
leaven ed wi th the hard kn owledge that
tran sgressi on , far from represen ti n g
an experi en ce of rupture, works n ow
on ly to con fi rm the
i mpossi bi li ty
of
traversi n g the li mi t experi en ce .
Secon d,
a hi stori an of the quan tum ki n d -i ron i c, ambi valen t an d
paradoxi cal on the
questi on of the i rreali ty of the hi stori cal momen t -
who could si multan eously refuse hi stori cal totali sati on s as a wi ll to power
an d n othi n g besi des, an d then work to create a double recuperati ve
momen t : the famous method of hi stori cal gen ealogy wi th i ts pri vi legi n g of
zon es of kn owledge wi th low epi stemologi cal profi les ; an d a marked
preferen ce for plural hi stori es of local subj ecti vi ty, a hyper-materi ali ty of
pleasures an d desi res, n ot value . Ulti mately, Foucault was of
that peculi ar
order of
a reluctan t hi stori an : a hi stori an who refused hi story as a game of
truth, on ly to
i n stall i n i ts place the game of effecti ve hi story, a "hi story whi ch
descen ds . "
An d thi rd, an an ti -epi stemologi st who could be so relen tless i n
ARTHURKROKER
tracking down the discursive networking of the "games
of
truth" -in
sex ual ity , in science, in penol ogy , in psy chiatry
-
since he was al l al ong onl y
the l atest of the phil osophical ex ponents of the l ogic of quantum science, of
a quantum epistemol ogy which functions by the mirroring of code el ements
(the constitutive conditions of possibil ity of a structural sex , a structural
power, and a structural madness) and l ocal historical practices . Probabl y
against his own theoretical intentions, Foucaul t's thought was the breaking-
edge of the advanced l iberal mindwith its ful l aestheticiz ation
of
knowl edge .
His discourse was al so that of the dy ing
day s of
an
episteme :
the l iberal
episteme
with
its
rel ational power, rel ational truth, and regul atory ethics
achieving, final l y , sel f-refl ection on itsel f. Amurderer of the ol d humanist
author, Foucaul t was al so an inscribed "l ocal subject" who ful fil l ed
Unamuno's precept : "I am I in the human circumstance and the human
circumstance is L"
Foucaul t's then was the ful l y modern l iberal mind at the height
of
his
times
. In
him
al one y ou see
them al l ,
because this was the aestheticiz ed
l iberal
mind
at its most intense
and
acute point of auto-critique, bril l iance,
and ambiguity : simul taneousl y a master parody of the fate of the panoptic
body and an ironic meditation on the fate of a rel ational , sideral , and
topographical postmodern scene . Consequentl y , in Foucaul t al one there
are to be found al l of the key panic sites at the fin-de-mil l enium :
Panic Science : Foucaul t's earl y encounter with Canguil hem where
science is
forced
to confess its secret
:
that it never was any thing more than
an irreal cosmol ogy ,
and
one
in which
moreover the object of
scientific
investigation
was,
in the depl oy ed form of power/knowl edge, a prime
after-image
and constitutive
condition
of justification
for
the scientific
episteme itsel f.
Panic Medicine : Foucaul t's geneal ogy of the discourse of
the cl inic
reveal ed the great epistemic shifts in medical discourse for what they al way s
were : the inscription
of
a shifting social phy sics and its associated hieratics
of
the body and ex cl usionary power strategies onto the purel y fictional and
topol ogical terrain of what French intel l ectual s these day s l ike to cal l -
Quel Corps?
Panic Madness : Not just the suppression into sil ence of the imagin-
ation by the wil l to truth of psy chiatry , not just, that is, Bl ake's dark dream
of the sl eep of reason begetting monsters ofMadness andCivil iz ation, but al l
of the panic suppressions :
-the panic power of Discipl ine and Punish where the prisoner
entombed
within the gaz e of
the
panoptic is
reduced
to
a sil houette, and the jail er
al so is entangl edin
a
deep
compl icity with the ey e ofpower,
of
which he
is al so a necessary rhetorical function .
-

the panic gender of Hercul ine Barbin, the real story of which is not so
much about the normal iz ation of sex ual ity under the patriarchal
FRENCH
FANTASIES
medical, r elig io u s , and p s y ch iat r ic g aze ( as Fo u cau lt w ill claim) , bu t
abo u t a g ender and a bo dy -t h e w o man's bo dy o f Her cu line Bar bin -
t h at is no t allo w ed t o be s p o ken, and abo u t t h e dr eam o f ano t h er s ex
w h ich mu s t be s u icided becau s e it is ins u r r ect io nar y .
Panic Er o t ics : Fo u cau lt 's las t t w o
bo o ks -Th e Car e o ft h e Selfand Th e
Us e o f Pleas u r e abo u t t h e r edu ct io n o f t h e
bo dy , in At h ens and Ro me, t o an
" aes t h et ics o f exis t ence," t o a t u t elar y r eg ime o f t h e mo r al
p r o blemat izat io n
o f p leas u r e -ar e t ext s t h at can be s o dis ap p o int ing t o s o me becau s e t h ey
r eco ver ( br illiant ly ) t h e er o t ic s u bject o nly t o r eveal t h is er o t ic s u bject as a
p anic s it e . Fo r Fo u cau lt 's
er o t ic s u bject is co lo nized fr o m w it h in by t h e
p u blicis at io n o f dr eam life in Ar t emido r u s ,
w h er e dr eams ar e als o emp t y
s ig n-s y s t ems w ait ing t o be ins cr ibed by all t h e p r imit ive my t h s ;
ins cr ibed
fr o m w it h o u t by an ap h r o dis ia -an " aes t h et ics o f exp er ience" -t h at
w as
r eg u lat o r y no t o nly o f t h e car e o f t h e bo dily h u mo u r s , o f
p leas u r e u nder t h e
s ig n o f h ig h aes t h et ics , bu t als o o f mar it al
r elat io ns and t h e er o t ic r efit s o f
" bo y s lo ving bo y s . " Th e Car e o ft h e Self
and Th e Us e o fPleas u r e ar e t ext s abo u t
p anic er o t ics : t h at mo ment w h en t h e bo dy dis ap p ear s
int o an emp t y s ig n,
int er p ellat ed by all t h e ideo lo g ies , t at t o o ed by
t h e p leas u r es o f a fu lly
aes t h et icized s exu alit y , and ins cr ibed by t h e lang u ag es o f
medicine, p h ilo -
s o p h y , and o neir o h eu r eu t ics .
Wait ing fo r Au g u s t ine
In s h o r t , Panic Fo u cau lt : a t h inker , w h o s e p ar t icu lar br illiance is t h at h e
act u ally beco mes w h at h e s o u g h t t o des cr ibe : a s liding s ig nifier , o s cillat ing
bet w een t h e s u ffo cat ing ant ino mies o f mo der nis t dis co u r s e, s liding bet w een
a g r is ly and clinical examinat io n o f t h e p r o du ct io n o f cy nical p o w er , cy nical
t r u t h , cy nical s ex, and cy nical lang u ag e ; and a famo u s , bu t u lt imat ely fu t ile,
at t emp t t o r eco ver t h e t r u t h o f s exu alit y
in a medit at io n
o n
At h ens , Ro me,
and Jer u s alem
.
Like Fr eu d's
Mich elang elo
befo r e
h im, Fo u cau lt w o ke t o
find
h ims elfin t h e mids t
o f t h e
nig h t mar e h e t h o u g h t h e w as o nly dr eaming .
He w as a t h inker , in t h e end, w it h no exit . Becau s e in h is medit at io ns o n t h e
t r u t h
o f
s exu alit y ( an aes t h et ics
o f
p leas u r e) , Fo u cau lt co u ld never t h ink
t h r o u g h , finally , t h e t r u t h o f t h e Ch r is t ianit y o f Au g u s t ine . Like t h e
Ro man s t o ics befo r e h im, and t h at p ecu liar s t r ain o f Gr eek s kep t icis m
befo r e t h em, Fo u cau lt ended h is life w it h t h e melanch o ly r es ig nat io n o f
int ellect u al fu t ilit y ; t h at is , t h e co ns cio u s nes s o f mu ch bu t no exit fr o m t h e
nig h t mar e o f t h e info lded t ech no lo g ies o f s elf t o w h ich h e h ad aw o ken.
Fo u r t h cent u r y Ch r is t iant it y w as no t a co nt inu at io n o f Gr eek and
Ro man t h eo r ies
o f t h e
s elf, no r t h eir s imp le and abr u p t r ever s al,
bu t , at
leas t
in
t h e
w r it ing s
o f
Au g u s t ine,
a
s o lu t io n
t o
a fu ndament al cr is is
o f
t h e
s elf t h at neit h er t h e Gr eeks w it h t h eir " aes t h et ics o f exis t ence" no r t h e
Ro mans w it h t h eir r edu ct io n o f t h e s elf
t o
a p u r ely ju r idical and co r p o r at ive
ARTHURKROKER
concept rooted i n domi ni um properti um could resolve .
What Foucault i n hi s last wri ti ngs
avoi ds, and as a fallen-away
Cartesi an
must avoi d, i s that nei ther rati onali sed ethi cs nor materi ali sti c
concepti ons of bodi ly pleasures could provi de a di rectly experi enced
medi ati on of the anti nomi es of exi stence .
Consequently, when calami ti es arose, whether i n
the
form
of the
Atheni an plague of the fi fth-century B
. C . or
the fai lure
of the
Democri tean
i deal of democracy or the bi tter
sense of fatali sm and i ntellectual futi li ty
that swept
the
Roman
i mperi um when, at the hei ght of i ts power, the
corrosi ve questi on arose : now that we have conquered an empi re, now that
we have become the si gn i tself of empi re for whom the spear i s our symbol,
a restless wi ll to survi ve at any cost i s our domi nant psychology, and the
acqui si te spi ri t of pri vate possesi on our most cheri shed beli ef, what
are to
be the ulti mate ends
of
empi re?
s
How,
that i s, and why go on wi lli ng when
there are
no longer substanti ve purposes to the ends we choose, i n a
uni verse i ndi fferent to the choi ces we wi ll i n full freedom?
Whi le the Greeks and the Romans moved ulti mately i n the gri p of
fatal
necessi ty, the Chri sti ans, and Augusti ne speci fi cally, solved the cri si s
by maki ng the self an i ndi vi dual
psychology ; and, moreover, produci ng a
vi si on of the self, not j ust the
confessi ng self but also the ecstati c self, as a
di rectly experi enced medi ati on for summoni ng
i nto a
new
epi steme, a new
uni ty, all the di vi ded anti nomi es
of the classi cal experi ence of Athens
and
Rome . Agai nst Athens and Rome wi th thei r purely external pri nci ples of
uni ty - the moral problemati sati on of the pleasures i nto an aestheti cs of
experi ence on the one hand, and the reducti on of the self to an i nstrument
of pri vate property on the other - the early Chri sti an thi nkers held out the
possi bi li ty of a hyper-materi al theory, not only of bodi ly pleasure, but also
of bodi ly sufferi ng. In thei r eschatology, the pri nci ple of the uni ty of
western experi ence was fi nally rendered i nternal to the psychology of self.
Indeed, i n the Augusti ni an vi si on,
metaphysi cs secretes i nto the bodi ly
ti ssues, maki ng
the
body a
wi ll
and
nothi ng besi des . It was from Jerusalem,
not Athens or Rome, that the self as aconsti tuti vely ni hi li sti c wi ll
to
power
began to spread out. Foucault's "confessi onal self' as an early warni ng
system of panopti ci sm mi sses the whole poi nt of the Chri sti an negati on
that subordi nated the body - wi ll, i ntelli gence, and feeli ngs - to the
extermi ni st si gn of the tri ni ty . Ulti mately, the di rectly experi enced tri ni -
tari an body - the western body - wi thi ts breaki ng of the wi ll i nto i tself,
wi th i ts new starti ng-poi nt i n i ndi vi dual psychology, i s the real truth of
Chri sti ani ty, of whi ch Foucault's theses on the confessi ng self and the
panopti c
are
soci ologi cal di versi ons, reflecti ng as they do only the rei fi ed
mani festati ons
of
the already extermi nated body .
Because Foucault mi ssed the secret of the truth of Chri sti ani ty
(readi ng the Chri sti an body under the si gn of the panopti c, the "confessi ng
FRENCH
FANTASIES
s e l f ' ) , he was
conde mne d to re capitul ate in his own l if e and de ath the f atal
ne ce s s ity ,
the trag ic s e ns e of f util ity , and the l as t dark l aug hte r of the
parodis t,
of Gre e k e nl ig hte nme nt . If The Care of the Se l f coul d e ndbl e akl y by
noting the s te ril ity
of the phil os ophe r' s virtue f or "boy s l oving boy s , '
14
this
was be caus e
Foucaul t' s mind was , once ag ain, an outbre ak of the ( cl as s ical )
dial e ctic of e nl ig hte nme nt . In his thoug ht, the me l anchol y pl ay of chance
that ul timate l y das he d the be s t inte l l e ctual
hope s of the Athe nians and
made inte l l e ctual l y f util e the mil itant
andimpe rial ambitions of the Roman
s toics is re capitul ate d with
s uch inte ns ity that Foucaul t mus t have known
that he was onl y
awaiting anothe r Aug us tine .
The g ame of Foucaul t was a daring and bril l iant one . As a phil os ophe r
whos e thoug ht trans g re s s e d the white s pace of indif f e re nce ,
Foucaul t
al way s s aid that his inte ntion was
to e xamine both the dif f e re nce that ke e ps
us
at a re move f rom
a way of
thinking in which we re cog niz e the orig in of our own, and
the
proximity
that re mains in s pite of that dis tance which we ne ve r ce as e
to e xpl ore . '
This is the g ame of the inte l l e ctual
imag ination, of l if e andde ath, to s uch a
point of me l anchol ic e xce s s and
bril l iant inte ns ity that thoug ht be g ins to
f ol d in on its e l f , making of Foucaul t a marke r
of the pos tmode rn f ate .
His is the s e l f -conf e s s ion of the
f ul l y e xhaus te d l ate mode rnis t mind,
the mind of the dy ing day s of ae s the ticiz e d l ibe ral is m,
which f unctions onl y
to conf irmthe impos s ibil ity of the my thic l e g acy
of the dial e ctic of e nl ig ht-
e nme nt
. If , f or e xampl e , Foucaul t coul d e nd his l if e
with two te xts on the
cons titution
of the s e xual s e l f as an e thical s ubje ct and an anal y tics
of s e xual
aus te rity , this is
be caus e , in the s e l as t works , Foucaul t f inal l y came
home to
his Kantian s e l f .
Pe rmitting hims e l f the dis continuity he had al way s
pe rmitte d othe rs ,
Foucaul t' s me ditation re turne d to the proje ct which runs
throug h al l of his the oris ations
on me dicine , s cie nce , powe r, and ps y chiatry :
that is , s tudy ing inte ntl y the
"conditions of pos s ibil ity " f or our e nucl e ation
within the wil l to truth,
the wil l to s e xual ity , and the wil l to powe r as our
ownprimal .
Having re f l e cte d on cy nical powe r and
cy nical truth toode e pl y e ve r to
be conte nt with the phe nome nol og ical
re ductions of Me rl e au-Ponty and
too much a trag ician on the matte r of
the dis curs ive inf ol ding of powe r
e ve r to make
his pe ace with Sartre ' s moral is ing his toricis m, and
too much a
f l oating s ig nif ie r to be
conte nt with Irig aray or Cixous , Foucaul t, f inal l y ,
was that rarity : an unf inis he d, radical l y
dis continuous , and ambig uous
thinke r .
The l as ting f as cination and s e duction
of the g ame s of Foucaul t is l e s s
phil os ophical or
pol itical than, pe rhaps , pure l y l ite rary . It may
s ome day be
ARTHURKROKER
written th a t rea ding Fouca ult
is perceiving h ow th e lib era l mind a t th efzn-
de-millenium liked
to
th ink
of its h is tory ( genea logica l, b ut with pos s ib ilities
for rupture), its
epis temology ( nomina lis t, b ut la ter nomis t), its eth ics
( a
little cynicis m, a little piety), its th eory of politics ( th e Ka ntia n
regula tories ), its power ( rela tiona l a nd topologica l), a nd its th eory of th e
s elf ( tra pped in
a
continuing deb a te a mong Ath ens , Rome a ndJerus a lem) .
Fouca ult's lega cy would th en b e th a t h e is th e la tes t of th e elega nt
tomb s tones of th e dying da ys of a es th eticized lib era lis m.
If h e could b e s o
deeply evoca tive, it is b eca us e h is entire
th eoris a tion with its b rillia nt
medita tions on th e cynica l a na lytics
of
power,
s ex ua lity, truth a nd ma dnes s
is a ls o a clona l a fter-ima ge
of a n a ge th a t h a s a lrea dy cea s ed to ex is t .
Notes
1 .

Jea n Ba udrilla rd, LAutre pa r lui-meme, ( P a ris :

1 987), pp. 53-54
.
2 .

Mich el Fouca ult . Th e His tory of Sex ua lity : Volume I, tra ns

. b y Rob ert Hurley, ( New York :
P a nth eon, 1 978), p. 86 .
3 .

Ch a rles Norris Coch ra ne, Ch ris tia nity a nd Cla s s ica l Culture,
( Ox ford : Ox ford Univers ity P res s ,
1 980), ch a pters 2 a nd
3 .
4 .

Mich el Fouca ult, Th e Ca re of th e Self Volume 3, ( New York : P a nth eon, 1 986), P a rt 6, "Boys ",
pp. 1 87-2 32 .
5 .

Mich el Fouca ult, Th e Us e of P lea s ure: Volume 2 , ( New York : Vinta ge, 1 986), p . 7.
P olitica l Science
Concordia Univers ity
CanadianJournal of P olit ic al and Soc ial Theory /Revue c anadienne de t heorie polit ique et s oc iale,
Volume XI, No. 3 (1987) .
THEEND/S OF WOMAN
N. P . Ric c i
As t he arc haeology of our t hought eas ily s hows , man
is
an
invent ion of
rec ent dat e . And one perhaps nearing it s end.
Mic hel
Fouc ault , The Order of Things
Wit h t he dis appearanc e
of man, what happens t o woman? Having
only rec ent ly gained a
voic e as women, feminis t s are now c onfront ed wit h
t he propos it ion t hat t o s peak as a woman is merely t o reins c ribe ones elf
wit hin
t he logic of an androc ent ric epis t emology, t he very logic , in ot her
words , whic h feminis t s have been t rying t o c ombat . The dec ent ering of t he
s ubjec t advoc at ed by
Mic hel Fouc ault and ot her Frenc h t heoris t s has
moved us , apparent ly, beyond
s exual ident it y, int o a new lands c ape where
men c an be women and women
men, and where s ubjec t s are s imply proper
nouns . But if t he dis appearanc e
of 'man, ' t he dis s olut ion of t he s overeign
Cart es ian ego, ens ures t hat "Menwill no longer
s peak for mankind[, s ]hould
women, by implic at ion, no longer, i . e . never
s peak as women?"
z
While
writ ers like Fouc ault have provided women wit h
t he t ools required t o
'dec ons t ruc t ' t he s ys t ems of power t hat have
oppres s ed t hem, does n't t he
c urrent eliding of s exual ident it y require from feminis t s a
not e of s kept ic is m,
a
warines s t hat t he new polemic does not s imply reaut horiz e old
injus t ic es ?
1 : Subjec t s and Subjec t ion
The individual is an
effec t of power, and at t he s ame t ime, or prec is ely
t o t he ext ent t o whic h it is t hat effec t , it
is
t he
element of it s art ic ulat ion.
The individual whic h power has c ons t it ut ed
is at t he s ame t ime it s
vehic le .
Fouc ault , P ower/Knowledge 3
N.P. RICCI
The question of id entity , and hence
of sexual id entity , ar ises out of the
gener al
posts tr uctur alist cr itique of humanism and Wester n metaphy sics .
In
cur r ent theor y , id entity -ind iv id uality , subject-hood -is held to be a
constr uct complicitous with cer tain mod es of r estr ictiv e logic . What
Fr ench theor ists hav e been tr y ing
to d o -wr iter s lik eJacques Der r id a and
Roland Bar thes -
is to
wear
away the ontological gr ound which has
tr ad itionally accr ued ar ound the " I" of d iscour se, to question the self-
pr esence of the speak ing subject, to show how subjects ar e spok en r ather
than speak -that is, how they ar e constituted by a web of for ces of which
consciousness is the effect r ather than
the point of
or igin
.
The most thor oughly histor ical
cr itique of the subject, and per haps
the one most useful
to feminists, is that of Michel Foucault . Though
Foucault d oes not specifically pose thequestion of sexual id entity , his wor k
on the subject' s histor ical constitution lay s out the ter ms in which such a
question might tak e for m . Thr oughout his r esear ch, Foucault has been
concer ned to show how the ind iv id ual is constituted " as effect and
object
of power , as effect and object of
k nowled ge." ' In
a
Foucauld ian fr amewor k ,
then, the question of woman comes d own to a question of k nowled ge and
power .
In his analy sis of penal r efor m in Discipline and Punish, Foucault shows
how " a r efinement of power r elations" in the nineteenth centur y helped
foster thegr owth of those sciences k nown ( aptly , feminists hav e noted ) as
" the sciences of man." At the center of these new sciences stood a new
object of k nowled ge, the ind iv id ual,
inv ested
thr ough and
thr ough by the
sy stems of power whichhad
cr eated it . Hencethe r ecent v intage of " man" :
in Foucault' s v iew, " ind iv id uality "
is a social constr uction whoseor igins ar e
tr aceable to the institution
of
a new
technology of power . By cr eating new
for ms of k nowled ge, power
constitutes its own objects ; and the objects
which power has thus constituted then become
the elements of its own
ar ticulation . " It is a d ouble pr ocess, then : an epistemological
' thaw' thr ough
a r efinement of power r elations ; a multiplication of the effects
of
power
thr ough the for mation and accumulation of new for ms of k nowled ge"
( DP, 224) . Thus the human sciences, which gr ew out of a web of power
r elations spanning ev er y thing fr om med icine, psy chiatr y and ed ucation to
militar y tr aining and penal r efor m, helped per petuate those v er y r elations
by constituting the ind iv id ual as a new object of k nowled ge.
Foucault' s per spectiv e on subject-hood , then, is d ecid ed ly polemical :
to becomesubject means to be subjected . " We should tr y to gr asp subjection
in its mater ial instance as a constitution of subjects" ( P/K, 97) . The human
sciences, by r eor d er ing our way s of k nowing and focussing our attention on
the ind iv id ual, hav e mad e
it possible for power to entr ench itself mor e
fir mly into thesocial bod y . Foucault giv es the example
of thehomosexual,
who ar oseas ' a species' at thepoint wher e homosexuality
was char acter ized
FRENCH
FANTASIES
" l e s s by
a type of s e xual re l ations than by a ce rtain qual ity
of s e xual
s e ns ibil ity"
-whe n, in othe r words , e mphas is s hifte d from
the act to the
individual . ' But it has be e n this ve ry
s ort of s hift, according to Foucaul t,
through which individual ity has
be e n cons titute d
.
Around this ne w obje ct
aris e ne w dis cours e s -in
the re al m ofme dicine , ps ychiatry, criminol ogy -
and through
the m " powe r re ache s into the ve ry grain of individual s ,
touche s the ir bodie s and ins e rts its e l f into the ir actions and attitude s , the ir
dis cours e , l e arning proce s s e s and e ve ryday l ive s " (P/K,39)
.
But in Foucaul t' s vie w it woul d be wrong
to
imagine
that powe r
s impl y acts agains t individual s , in the form
of prohibition and oppre s s ion .
On the contrary, " individual s are the
ve hicl e s of powe r, not its point of
appl ication" (P/K,97)
;
in
othe r words , powe r pas s e s through individual s ,
us ing the m to furthe r -
its own e nds . Thus the " I" which powe r and
knowl e dge
have jointl y cons titute d is al s o the " e ye " of powe r and know-
l e dge , that which
s ubje cts e ve rything to its normal izing, hie rarchizing gaze .
To be come s ubje ct, the n,
al s o me ans to s ubje ct, to give priority to ide ntity,
to authors hip, to owne rs hip,
to s ituate cons cious ne s s at the origin of truth
whil e e xcl uding e ve rything that
is diffe re nt and ' othe r. '
It is this as pe ct
of the s ubje ct which Foucaul t attacks in his critique
of
traditional
his toricis m. In his pre face to The Orde r of Things ,
Foucaul t
dis s ociate s
hims e l f from the " phe nome nol ogical approach"
to
his tory,
that
" which give s
abs ol ute priority to the obs e rving s ubje ct, which attribute s
a
cons titue nt rol e
to
an
act, which pl ace s its own point ofvie w at the origin
of
al l his toricity -which,
in s hort, l e ads to a trans ce nde ntal cons cious ne s s "
(OT,xiv) . The s ame te chnol ogy
of powe r which has cre ate d individual s
as
obje cts of knowl e dge al s o s ituate s
the m as s ubje cts of knowl e dge . This
" s ove re ignty
of the s ubje ct" has l e d to what Foucaul t cal l s " continuous
his tory" :
Continuous his tory is the indis pe ns abl e corre l ative
of the founding
function of the s ubje ct : the guarante e that e ve rything
that has e l ude d
him may be re s tore d to him; the ce rtainty that
time wil l dis pe rs e
nothing without re s toring it in a re cons titute d unity
; the promis e that
one day the s ubje ct -in the form of his torical
cons cious ne s s -wil l
once again bring back unde r his s way, al l thos e things
that
are
ke pt at a
dis tance by diffe re nce , and find in the m what might be cal l e d his
abode
.
Total izing and total itarian,
continuous his tory, the his tory of " trans -
ce nde ntal cons cious ne s s ," s trive s to s ituate
its e l f at the privil e ge d s ource of
truth, and
s o " to pre s e rve , agains t al l de ce nte rings ,
the s ove re ignty of the
s ubje ct,
and the twin figure s of anthropol ogy and
humanis m" (AK,12) .
Thus the
s ubje ct e me rge s in Foucaul t' s work as the ne xus
of ce rtain
N.P.
RICCI
"mechanics ofpower" -as both effect and vehicle ofpower, as that which
subjects and is subjected. Foucault's task
has
been
to write a history without
a subject, "to get
rid
of the subject
itself' (P/K,117), and so to expose the
complicities of knowledge and power which have led to the
subject's
historical constitution.
II: Foucault and
Feminism
Interviewer: Do you feel that your 'History of S exuality' will
advance
the women's question? I have in mind what you say about the hyster-
isation and psychiatrisation of the female body.
Foucault: There are [ a] few ideas there, but only hesitant ones, not yet
fully crystallised. It will be the discussion and criticism after each
volume that will perhaps allow them to become
clarified . But it is not
up to me to lay down how the book should be used
(PK,192).
Foucault's critique of humanism and of the subject offers obvious
points of
convergence with feminist interests. Throughout his work,
Foucault has been concerned
with marginal groups, the insane, the delin
quent, the sexually perverse -groups
which, like women, have been
traditionally silenced by the
powers-that-be, and excluded from the privi-
leged realm of "truth." But
truth, in Foucault's view, as the end point of
knowledge, "is linked in a circular relation
with systems of power which
produce and sustain it, and to effects of
power which it induces and which
extend it" (PIK,133)
-
thus those groups which are barred
from it will
always be forced to the margins of discourse.
Women have traditionally
occupied that margin, and the androcentric
humanism which Foucault
deconstructs -with its "universals,"
its canons, its privileging of (an
overwhelmingly male) tradition -has certainly been one more link in a
long history of
women's oppression.
But a thoroughly Foucauldian analysis would have to proceed at the
level of the "micro-techniques of power" through which
woman has not
only been silenced, but constituted as object ofpowerand knowledge,
much
as delinquents, the insane, and the sexually perverse
have become "species"
which power has used for its own ends. What
historical determinants have
moulded what we understand by the term
"woman"? What nexus have
women occupied
in the web of power relations within a given episteme,
what functions have they
served? Foucault gives the example of how the
creation
and medicalisation of female sexuality served part of a larger
strategy
for the policing of families and populations.
It is worth remembering that the first figure to be invested by the
deployment of sexuality, one of the first to be 'sexualiz ed,' was the
14
FRENCHFANTASIES
' i d l e ' woman. She i nhabi te d the oute r e d ge of the "worl d ," i n whi ch
she al ways had to appe ar as a v al ue , and of the fami l y, whe re she was
assi gne d a ne w d e sti ny charge d wi th conjugal and pare ntal
obl i gati ons (HS,121) .
A
Foucaul d i an hi story of wome n, the n, woul d be gi n at the poi nt whe re
"woman" i s re v e al e d to be a soci al constructi on.
But i t woul d be wrong, the re fore , tose e i n Foucaul t me re l y
a proje ct
for the re cl amati on of l ost v oi ce s . Whi l e Foucaul t' s own
stud i e s are ofte n
e xe mpl a
of
the
re cupe rati on of margi nal or se l d om consi d e re d mate ri al s,
fe mi ni st
hi stori e s whi ch conce ntrate sol e l y on fi l l i ng i n the gaps and
l acunae
of trad i ti onal hi story, on gi v i ng a v oi ce to wome n' s si l e nce d
"si ste rs," may fi nd the mse l v e s fi rml y re i nscri be d wi thi n
the te ne ts of
humani sti c hi stori ci sm,
substi tuti ng, for e xampl e , a "gre at wome n' s" hi story
for
that of the "gre at me n. " One of the buzz word s of humani sm whi ch
Foucaul t
d e constructs i n The Archae ol ogy of Knowl e d ge i s "trad i ti on. " "The
probl e m," wri te s
Foucaul t, "i s nol onge r one of trad i ti on, of traci ng a l i ne ,
but
one of d i v i si on, of l i mi ts ; i t i s no l onge r one of l asti ng found ati ons,
but
one of transformati ons
that se rv e as ne w found ati ons, the re bui l d i ng
of
found ati ons" (AK,5) . Once "woman" i s se e n as a
soci al constructi on, the
que sti on of "traci ng a l i ne ," of re cl ai mi ng wome n' s
l ost
hi story,
be come s
some what anachroni sti c .
But on what "ne w found ati on," the n, i s fe mi ni sm
to bui l d i ts abod e ?
As fe mi ni sts be gi n toe xami ne the i r ownworki n the l i ght
of
a
Foucaul d i an
cri ti que , the y are fi nd i ng
that what Foucaul t may offe r i s not
so
much
an
e xte nsi on of works-i n-progre ss
as a change i n d i re cti on.
III
: Be -se xual i sati on
The re al stre ngth of the wome n' s l i be rati on
mov e me nts i s not that of
hav i ng l ai d cl ai m to the spe ci fi ci ty
of the i r se xual i ty and the ri ghts
pe rtai ni ng to i t, but that the y hav e actual l y d e parte d
fromthe d i scourse
cond ucte d wi thi n the apparatuse s of se xual i ty .
The se mov e me nts d o
i nd e e d e me rge i n the ni ne te e nth ce ntury
as d e mand s for se xual
spe ci fi ci ty . What has the i r outcome be e n?
Ul ti mate l y a v e ri tabl e
mov e me nt of d e -se xual i sati on, a
d i spl ace me nt e ffe cte d i n re l ati on to
the se xual ce nte ri ng of the probl e m,
formul ati ng the d e mand for
forms of cul ture , d i scourse , l anguage and so on,
whi ch are no l onge r
part
of that ri gi d assi gnati on and pi nni ng-d ownto the i r se x whi ch
the y
had i ni ti al l y i n
some se nse be e npol i ti cal l y obl i ge d to acce pt i n ord e r to
make the mse l v e s
he ard (PK,219-220) .
Among Fre nch wome nthe ori sts, the wri te r
who se e ms to hav e come
N.P. RICCI
c l o s e s t t o Fo uc aul t 's ide as o n de -s e xual is at io n is
Jul ia Kris t e va . In he r
art ic l e "Wo me n's Time ," Kris t e va is o l at e s t wo
phas e s in t he wo me n's
mo ve me nt 's s t rat e g ie s fo r de al ing wit h wo me n's
t radit io nal e xc l us io n
fro m t he s o c ial c o nt rac t .' In t he firs t , wo me n "as pire d t o g ain a pl ac e
in
l ine ar t ime as t he t ime o f pro je c t and his t o ry" (WT,36) - in o t he r wo rds ,
t o
rig ht
t he
fac t
o f
t he ir e xc l us io n by making c e nt ral what had be e n
marg inal ize d, by bring ing
wo me n in,
o n
an e qual fo o t ing wit h me n, t o a
s ys t e m whic h wo ul d no t be
fundame nt al l y c hang e d by t he fac t o f wo me n's
inc l us io n. In t he s e c o nd phas e , "l ine ar
t e mpo ral it y has be e n al mo s t t o t al l y
re fus e d, and as a c o ns e que nc e t he re has aris e n an
e xac e rbat e d dis t rus t o f t he
e nt ire po l it ic al dime ns io n" (WT,37) . In t his phas e wo me n have
re je c t e d
t radit io nal s o c io po l it ic al and c ul t ural mo de l s as inimic al t o
wo me n's ne e ds ,
s inc e s uc h mo de l s are pe rme at e d t hro ug h and t hro ug h by t he
mal e l ibidinal
e c o no my
whic h has c re at e d t he m. Ins t e ad, wo me n o f t his s e c o nd g e ne rat io n
have s o ug ht
al t e rnat ive c ul t ural mo de l s whic h wil l be mo re e xpre s s ive o f a
unique fe minine ide nt it y .
The dang e r o f t he s e s t rat e g ie s - and I t hink
Kris t e va and Fo uc aul t
wo ul d ag re e he re - is t hat bo t h c an be e as il y re appro priat e d by t he s ys t e ms
o f
po we r t he y s t rug g l e ag ains t . The firs t mo s t c l e arl y, s inc e it s t rive s no t s o
muc h t o
c hang e t he s ys t e m as t o find a pl ac e fo r wo me nwit hin it . But t he
s e c o nd al s o , de s pit e it s
re je c t io n o f mal e -c e nt re d mo de l s , s inc e in po s it ing a
fe minine ide nt it y it t e nds t o
e l ide t he que s t io n o f s o c ial c o ns t ruc t io n and
t ake re fug e in a
pre c ario us e s s e nt ial is m . Pro po ne nt s o f a unique fe minine
ide nt it y have us ual l y had t o
re s o rt
t o
a t he o ry o f bio l o g ic al diffe re nc e whic h
t riumphs fe mal e s e xual it y as t he bas is
fo r t he s ubve rs io n o f mal e -do minat e d
s ys t e ms .' But it has be e n pre c is e l y o n t he
bas is
o f
bio l o g ic al diffe re nc e t hat
wo me nhave be e n
t radit io nal l y o ppre s s e d ; any t he o ry whic h re s o rt s t o s uc h
diffe re nc e as it s g ro und me re l y re ins c ribe s it s e l f wit hin an o l d l o g ic
and
ris ks
pe rpe t uat ing o l d s t e re o t ype s . And Fo uc aul t 's anal ys is o f t he de pl o yme nt
o f
s e xual it y s ho ul d al e rt fe minis t s t o t he dang e rs o f s e e ing
any g re at
l ibe rat ing po t e nt ial in fe mal e s e xual it y ; s e xual it y
it s e l f, ac c o rding t o
Fo uc aul t , is a s o c ial c o ns t ruc t , o ne whic h has be e n
de pl o ye d fo r t he e nds o f
po we r . "The iro ny o f t his de pl o yme nt ,"
Fo uc aul t writ e s in t he l as t l ine s o f
The His t o ry o fSe xual it y, "is in having us be l ie ve t hat o ur ` l ibe rat io n'
is in t he
bal anc e " (HS,159)
.
An e s s e nt ial is t po s it io n
c an o nl y pe rpe t uat e an o ppo s it io nal l o g ic
whic h many Fre nc h t he o ris t s -
mo s t no t abl yJac que s De rrida
-
have be e n
t rying t o undo . Suc h a po s it io n
po s it s a no t io n o f "diffe re nc e " as "abs o l ut e
o t he rne s s " rat he r t han as an
"al t e rit y" whic h c an be s ho wn t o be int e rnal t o
t he s ys t e m whic h
has e xc l ude d it . Tradit io nal l y, o ppo s it io ns l ike s pe e c h/
writ ing ,
pre s e nc e /abs e nc e , c ul t ure /nat ure , man/wo man, have impl ie d
a
hie rarc hy,
wit h privil e g e be ing g ive n t o t he firs t t e rm. Ano t io n o f
al t e rit y,
ho we ve r, dis pl ac e s t he hie rarc hy by s ho wing t he s e c o nd t e rm t o be t he
FRENCH
FANTASIES
necessary condition
of the first -not as absolute other,
but as a difference
at the very
heart of the privileged first term.
In Foucauldian terms,
hierarchized
oppositions can be seen as another
instance of the complicity
of
knowledge and power . Thus woman's
constitution as man's other -
passive rather than active, emotional rather
than rational, secondary rather
than primary -has served to solidify
male domination . The problem with
essentialist views which
emphasize the positive qualities
of "woman"
against the repressive
aspect of male-centred systems is that they
tend to
reverse the hierarchy
without displacing it -that is, they place
"woman" in
the privileged
position
-
and thus remain caught up in the
very logic they
are trying
to subvert, a logic which is complicit with the
systems ofpower
that
have traditionally silenced women .
Kristeva recognizes
the necessity of these first impulses of the
women's movement -both the
attempted insertion into the system and
the rejection of that system in the name
of absolute difference ; they may be
seen to correspond roughly to what
Foucault calls "that rigid assignation
and pinning-down to their sex which
women had initially in some sense
been politically obliged
to accept in order to make themselves heard. " But
Kristeva sees herself
as part of a "third generation" -existing in parallel
rather
than chronological relation to the other two -for whom
"the very
dichotomy
man/woman as an opposition between two rival entities may
be
understood
as belonging to metaphysics . What can 'identity,' even
'sexual
identity,'
mean in a new theoretical and scientific space where
the very
notion of identity
is challenged?" (WT,51-52). Here is the "movement
of
de-sexualisation"
which Foucault identifies as the most positive element
of
the women's movements,
the "displacement effected in relation to the
sexual centering of the
problem. " This displacement pushes the issue of
"woman" outside the restricted
logic ofmetaphysics and opens it up to the
question ofsocial construction, to questions
of knowledge and power. But
is this, then, the end of woman?9
IV: New Woman/Old
Stereotypes
The
Germans are like women . You can never fathom their
depths .
They have
none.
Friedrich Nietzsche'

. . . Nietzsche revives that barely

allegorical figure (of woman) in his
own
interest . For him, truth is a woman . It resembles
the veiled
movement of feminine modesty .
Jacques Derrida, Spurs"
We enter now
the new landscape, beyond sexual identity. How
have
17
NP. RICCI
things
changed? For one thing,
Nietzsche nowlooks like a
proto-feminist
- at least
in the treatment he receives
in Derrida's S pu rs, where he appears
to have
pre-figu red woman as the "u ntru th of
tru th, " as that which u nder-
mines tru th from within
(S pu rs, 51) . ' 2 Bu t after all it
is not b iological
women Derrida is talking ab ou t
here ; woman for Derrida is
the su pplement,
difference, the lack at the center
which displaces the center,
and if there is
any b ody
involved in all of this, as Alice
Jardine points ou t, it is the b ody
of
the text as
ecritu re . ' 3
Woman, then, has
not disappeared in the
poststru ctu ralist landscape,
thou gh she has apparently
changed her form . For one
thing, she has shed
her b ody ; for another, she is no
longer the ab solu te other
b u t precisely the
point of
alterity, the internal exclu sion
which u ndermines
the system.
S imply
speaking, woman has b ecome,
u nder several headings -
su pplement,
ecritu re,
feminine j ou issance, sedu ction, the
u nconsciou s, the vreel -
a trope,
a metaphor for
that which b u rsts throu gh
the b ou ndaries of traditional
codes .
Of cou rse, in this
new order of things, b iological
women have not
entirely
dropped ou t of the scene.
Precisely b ecau se they
have b een
traditionally marginalized, women
may have special access to
what has b een
nowcoded as
a "feminine operation, "
the act of su b version . For
Kristeva,
for instance,
women, b ecau se of their
incomplete accession into
the social
order, are always
"le su j et-en proces, " the su b j ect
in process/on trial, on
the
threshold b etween selfhood and its
dissolu tion ; they are
thu s in a privileged
position to qu estion the
social constru ction of
identity . Bu t it is not a
b iological
difference which thu s
distingu ishes women, only
a social one.
The case with someone
like Helene Cixou s is more
prob lematic. At
times she tends towards a b iological
essentialism, su ggesting
that women's
b odies are the b asis for a
su b versive practice : "women
mu st write throu gh
their b odies, they
mu st invent the impregnab le
langu age that will wreck
partitions, classes and
rhetorics, regu lations and
codes, they mu st su b merge,
cu t throu gh, get b eyond
the u ltimate reserve discou rse . . . . "
(NFF, 2 56) . Yet
she is
willing to allow that someone
like a Genet can write
from the
feminine (NFF, 2 55),
and she shows
an allegiance to a
Derridean de-
constru ction of opposites :
"sexu al opposition, which has
always worked
for man's
profit to the point of
redu cing writing, too, to his
laws, is only a
historico-cu ltu ral limit" (NFF, 2 53 ;
see also NFF, 90ff)
. Nonetheless, it
wou ld seem that women, that
is women with b odies,
are in a b etter position
to
take hold of feminine
writing than men . "More so
than men who are
coaxed toward social
su ccess, toward su b limation,
women are b ody.
More
b ody, hence more
writing" (NFF, 2 57) .
Bu t despite
the recoding of the feminine
as "the u ntru th of
tru th, " as
that which
b u rsts "partitions, classes
and rhetorics, regu lations
and codes, "
we
might ask, as Jardine has, in
what ways the NewWoman -
with or
FRENCHFANTASIES
without a body -is
s o different from the
old. "Though Derrida's woman,
for example, is ( as
one expects with Derrida) highly
problematic, there are
s entences in
Spurs which wrench as s harply as any of
the old s tereotypes . "A
woman s educes from
a dis tance," Derrida writes . "In
fact dis tance is the
very
element of her power . Yet one mus t
beware to keep one's own
dis tance
from her beguiling s ong of
enchantment" ( Spurs ,4 9 ) . Here,
certainly, is a depiction of woman
as old as Genes is : woman as s eductres s ,
woman as s orceres s . And again :
"Becaus e woman is ( her own) writing,
s tyle
mus t return to her . In other
words , it could be s aid that if s tyle were a
man
( much as the penis
accordingto Freud is the 'normal prototype
of fetis hes '),
then writingwould
be a woman" ( Spurs , 57) . The problem
with this equation
of woman with
text is that it exactly reiterates a
paradigm which has long
helped
keep women s ilent : woman is s he who
is written, not s he who
writes . "The
model of the pen-penis writing on the virgin
page," writes
Sus an Gubar, in
another context, "participates in a long
tradition identifying
the author as a male
who is primary and the female as his
pas s ive creation -
a s econdary object lacking
autonomy, endowed with often
contradictory
meaningbut denied
intentionality
. "'s
But finally Derrida
als o has a word or
two for the
feminis ts : "And in truth, they too are
men, thos e women
feminis ts
s o derided by Nietzs che . Feminis m
is nothing but the operation
of a woman who
as pires to be like a man . . . . Feminis m
too
s eeks
to cas trate"
( Spurs ,6 5)
.
We have to as k: does Derrida's
decons tructive intent jus tifycomments
that in
another context might be s een as blatant
chauvinis m? Granted it
may
be unfair to take Derrida's s tatements
out of context, but perhaps to
do s o
demons trates the potential danger of this
new appropriation of
woman .
To pos e a very Foucauldian ques tion,
to what old us es might thes e
"new"
repres entations of woman be put? Whos e
interes ts do they s erve?
What are the dangers
of a theory of woman that can elide
Nietzs che's
blatant mis ogyny?
Even if Derrida is not referring to "real"
women when
he us es that name in his
writing, Nietzs che ( des pite all
the theoretical
baggage that accrues around
a word like "real" nowadays ) certainly
was .
And for all the rigours
of Derrida's thought, the line between
decon-
s truction -the wearing away of old
ontological ground -and recon-
s titution
-the point at which s ubvers ive
concepts crys tallize into es s ences
-is
often rather thin . One need only look at
the American appropriation
of the Derridean
concept of mice en abyme to s ee how radical
concepts can be
us ed to jus tify old ins titutions
. "
Even Cixous 's depiction of the New
Woman s ounds s us picious ly like
an old
tale . For Cixous , woman is "a giver" : "She does n't
'know' what s he's
giving, s he does n't
meas ure it ; s he gives , though, neither a
counterfeit
impres s ion nor s omething
s he has n't got. She gives more, with
no as s urance
N.P. RICCI
that s he ' l l ge t back e ve n s ome
une xpe cte d profit from what s he
puts out"
(NFF,264). El s e whe re , woman is a
mothe r : "In wome n the re is
al ways more
or l e s s of the
mothe r who make s e ve rything
al l right, who nouris he s , and
who s tands up
agains t s e paration ; a force that
wil l not be cut off but wil l
knock the wind out of
code s " (NFF,252) . Woman as
give r, woman as
mothe r -Cixous might be
de s cribing a pos itive e thos ,
but what is
troubl ing is that s he doe s n' t
que s tion the s ocial cons truction of
the s e two
fairl y s tandard de pictions of woman, or
l ook at the m in te rms of what
rol e
the y have s e rve d in pe rpe tuating
wome n' s oppre s s ion . Pe rhaps it is
not
e nough s impl y to as s e rt that the mothe r
in wome n "wil l knock the
wind
out of code s ."
One of
the ironie s of this pos tructural is t
re appropriation of woman is
that mos t of the l e ading
the oris ts of the fe minine -apart
from De rrida,
the re is Lacan, Barthe s ,
Baudril l ard -are mal e ." Eve n
Kris te va and
Cixous take the ir bas ic frame work
from mal e the oris ts -Kris te va
from
Lacan
and Cixous from De rrida -
and both of the m, whe n invoking
paradigms of s ubve rs ive or
"fe minine " writing, re fe r back to a mal e
tradition (typical l y Mal l arme ,
Ge ne t and Joyce ) . If the s e facts
are not
s us picious , the y are ce rtainl y
curious . Whe re , in fact, are wome n
in the mids t
of al l this tal k about
woman? It s e e ms me n, on top of e ve rything
e l s e , are
e ve n
be tte r at be ing wome n than
wome n are . And what, for e xampl e ,
doe s
his tory l ook l ike whe n we
ge t be yond s e xual ide ntity, and
"woman"
be come s
an attitude rathe r than a
s ignature ?
V: Wome n and
His tory
What is
a woman? I as s ure you I do not
know. I do not be l ie ve you
know.
Virginia Wool f' 8
Fromthe
pe rs pe ctive of thos e who have
move d be yond s e xual ide ntity,
fe minis m, as
a wome n' s move me nt, cannot
he l p but s e e m outdate d, "nothing
but the
ope ration of a woman whoas pire s
to be l ike a man" -who, in othe r
words ,
re mains caught up in the s ys te ms
of powe r de fine d by the rul ing
(pre dominantl y mal e ) he ge mony
. Fe minis ts are thus face d, as Pe ggy
Kamuf
admits , with "the e ros ion of
the ve ry ground on which to take
a
s tand
." 1 1 If
fe minis m re s ts on a biol ogical
dis tinction, it re mains ope n to
charge s of
e s s e ntial is m : the
"fe minine ," write s De rrida, s houl d
not "be has til y
mis take n for a
woman' s fe mininity, for fe mal e
s e xual ity,
or
for any othe r of
thos e
e s s e ntial iz ing fe this he s which might
s til l tantal iz e the dogmatic
phil os ophe r,
the impote nt artis t or the ine xpe rie nce d
s e duce r who has not
ye t e s cape d his
fool is h hope s of capture " (Spurs ,55) .
But if fe minis m re s ts
on a
s ocial dis tinction, the n it be come s
ve ry difficul t to s ay who,
unde r what
FRENCHFANTASIES
circumstances, is a woman . Feminists
whotry
to
have it both ways wil l find
themsel ves tangl ed in thorny methodol ogical
probl ems
.
Totake one exampl e : in an articl e on the image of
Eve in Paradise L ost,
Chritine Froul a, al l uding to a passage from Wool fs Jacob's
Room, defines
"woman" as someone whodivines "the priest" of cul tural authority, and so
cal l s that authority into question .
This
definition identifies'woman'not by sex but by a compl ex rel ation
to the cul tural
authority whichhas traditional l y sil enced and excl uded
her . She resists the attitude of
bl ind submission which that authority
threatens to imprint upon her
; further, her resistance takes form not
as envy of the 'priest' and desire topossess his authority
hersel f but as a
debunking of the 'priestl y'
depl oyment of cul tural authority and a
refusal
to
adopt that stance hersel f. Women, under this l ocal rul e, can
be 'men,' and men can be 'women . "'
But one probl em with such "l ocal rul es," cl earl y, is that
they are sel f-
serving : if definitions of woman are up for grabs, there is l ittl e tostop one
from choosing a definition that is tail or- made to
fit
one's
own arguments
.
Another probl em, within the specific context of Paradise L ost, is that one
might conceivabl y make a case - though Froul a's definition does seem to
be trying to avoid this possibil ity - for Satan as a woman . And one coul d
certainl y make a case for the author of "On the NewForcers of Conscience
Under the L ong Parl iament" andAreopagitica - that is, for Mil ton
himseIf. 2 '
Perhaps, after al l , Mil ton was of woman's party without
knowing
it, and he
might take his pl ace next to Nietzsche as one of history's misogynists
recl aimed for the feminist ranks by new
definitions
of
woman .
L ittl e attempt has been made to show what a "history of
women"
woul d l ook l ike from beyond sexual identity . We have to ask, in fact,
whether such a history woul d be possibl e . If we take Foucaul t as
a model ,
then muchof the historical work whichhas been done by feminists to date
- the tracing of a women's heritage, the establ ishment of
a women's
"canon" - woul d have to be
regarded
as
caught up withan ol d, essential l y
sel f- defeating, historicism . Jeffrey Weeks has outl ined some
of
the
probl ems confronting a history of homosexual ity conducted within a
Foucaul dian frame ; 2 2 a history of women woul d face the same kinds of
probl ems. If "woman" is a social construction, then women can cl aim no
universal essence which has united them through the ages, no "tradition"
they can cl aim to fol l ow in the l ine of. And in fact, even any synchronic
movement based on a common sexual bond woul d have to be seen as
rooted in an outmoded concept of sexual identity . Hence the move among
some women in France today towards "anti- feminism," i . e . the rejection of
a stance which takes sexual sol idarity as its base . 2 3
N.P. RICCI
Yet i t i s Foucault
hi ms elf who has made us s en s i ti v e to the s ubtle
machi n ati on s of power, to
the way power almos t s eems to plan ahead for
the reappropri ati on of i ts own fai lures -as
Foucault demon s trates , for
example, i n hi s an alys i s i n Di s ci pli n e an d Pun i s h of
the " fai lure" of pri s on
reform : pri s on
reform has fai led, i n Foucault's v i ew, n ot
through an
i n effi ci en cy of power, but as
a s trategy of power, as a mean s of creati n g a
clas s of " deli n quen ts " whi ch power can
then us e for i ts own en ds . So i t
would be ti mely to as k what i n teres ts thi s " beyon di n g" of
s exual i den ti ty
mi ght s erv e. Why i s i t, for i n s tan ce, that s exual i den ti ty
i s bei n g eli ded at
the v ery poi n t
at whi ch women , after cen turi es of s ubjugati on ,
hav e been
emergi n g as a poten t
poli ti cal force? Certai n ly an y mov e whi ch
could
effecti v ely un dermi n e
women 's s oli dari ty could eas i ly be reappropri ated
by
the v ery s ys tems of power whi ch
hav e tradi ti on ally worked to oppres s
women . An d the " n ew" repres en tati on s
of woman whi ch hav e ari s en as a
res ult ( as a s ymptom?) of thi s eli di n g of
s exual i den ti ty s hould als o be
exami n ed
i n the li ght of a Foucauldi an cri ti que . We
mi ght as k of the n ew
di s cours e on
woman the ques ti on s whi ch Foucault pos es
at the en d of
" What i s an Author?" :
What are the modes of exi s ten ce of
thi s di s cours e?
Where does i t come from ; howi s i t ci rculated
; who con trols i t?
What placemen ts are determi n ed
for pos s i ble s ubjects ?
Who can fulfi ll thes e
di v ers e fun cti on s of the s ubject?"
There i s n o guaran tee that the n ew
di s cours e wi ll be " li berati n g" for
women . Foucault hi ms elf warn s that
di s cours es can " ci rculate wi thout
chan gi n g thei r form from on e s trategy
to an other, oppos i n g s trategy"
( HS, 102) -forexample, from a
s trategy
of
s ubv ers i on to on e of s uppres s i on
.
But thi s
logi c als o s ugges ts -an dFoucault's
own an alys es , des pi te hi s
call
for " de-s exuali s ati on ," s upport thi s argumen t -
that res i s tan ces can
als o operate
wi thi n a gi v en di s cours e. Thus Ros ali n d
Coward, for i n s tan ce,
i s n ot
qui te correct to s ay that Foucault's Hi s tory
ofSexuali ty, i n den yi n g that
there
has been an y s udden chan ge from
repres s i on to li berati on ov er the
pas t cen tury
i n the di s cours e on s exuali ty, i mpli es
als o a den i al of the
i mportan t chan ges i n repres en tati on s
of female s exuali ty whi ch
hav e
occurred duri n g recen t years ." " We
mus t make allowan ce," Foucault
wri tes , " for the complex an d un s table
proces s whereby di s cours e can be
both an i n s trumen t an dan effect of
power, but als o a hi n dran ce, a s tumbli n g
block, a poi n t of res i s tan ce an d a
s tarti n g poi n t for an oppos i n g s trategy."
Foucault agai n gi v es
the example of homos exuali ty, whi ch
" began to s peak
i n i ts own behalf, to
deman d that i ts legi ti macy or ` n aturali ty' be
ackn ow-
ledged, often i n the s ame
v ocabulary, us i n g the s ame categori es
by whi ch i t
was
medi cally di s quali fi ed" ( HS,101) . A s i mi lar
an alys i s would pertai n ,
FRENCHFANTASIES
c e r t a i n l y ,
t o t he wome n 's move me n t a n d i t s fi ght for
c ha n ge s i n t he
r e pr e se n t a t i on
of fe ma l e se xua l i t y .
On e ma t t e r I ha ve n ot y e t a ddr e sse d i s t he shi ft
whi c h oc c ur s i n
Fouc a ul t 's l a t e r wor k, whe n he
move s a wa y fr om t he c l a ssi c a l pe r i od i n
Fr a n c e t o c l a ssi c a l a n t i qui t y . In
t hi s l a t e r wor k, we fi n d a c on t i n ui n g
c on c e r n wi t h t he
que st i on of t he sub j e c t , b ut whi l e Fouc a ul t spe a ks
of
t he
sub j e c t i n r e l a t i on
t o t he Gr e e ks, spe a ks, for e xa mpl e , of "t he mode
of
sub j e c t i on "
b y whi c h "t he i n di vi dua l e st a b l i she s hi s r e l a t i on
t o
[ a ]
r ul e a n d
r e c ogn i ze s hi mse l f a s ob l i ge d t o put i t i n
pr a c t i c e , " of a Gr e e k b oy 's
a t t e mpt s t o t r a n sfor m hi mse l f fr om "ob j e c t
of pl e a sur e i n t o a sub j e c t who
wa s i n c on t r ol of hi s pl e a sur e s, " of Gr e e k
e t hi c s a s "t he e l a b or a t i on of a
for m of r e l a t i on t o t he se l f
t ha t e n a b l e s a n i n di vi dua l t o fa shi on hi mse l f i n t o
a sub j e c t of e t hi c a l
c on duc t , " i t se e ms he i s t a l ki n g he r e of a fun da me n t a l l y
di ffe r e n t phe n ome n on
t ha n t he sub j e c t he e a r l i e r de fi n e d a s a pr oduc t of
t he huma n sc i e n c e s.
"
"Be c a use
n o Gr e e k t hi n ke r e ve r foun d a de fi n i t i on of
t he sub j e c t a n d n e ve r se a r c he d for on e , "
Fouc a ul t ha s sa i d, "I woul d si mpl y
sa y t ha t t he r e i s n o sub j e c t . ' 2 ' The
Gr e e ks,
i n
Fouc a ul t 's vi e w, ha d de ve l ope d
wha t he c a l l s a n "a e st he t i c s of e xi st e n c e , " a
sy st e m of e t hi c s whi c h a l l owe d
mor e r oom for i n di vi dua l i t y a n d se l f- c r e a t i on
t ha n t he l a t e r j ur i di c a l e t hi c s
of Chr i st i a n i t y . It i s i n t he da wn i n g
of Chr i st i a n i t y t ha t Fouc a ul t se e s t he
fi r st move t owa r ds sub j e c t - hood,
wi t h t he b e gi n n i n gs of a c ode - or i e n t e d
mor a l i t y whi c h spe c i fi e d muc h
mor e di st i n c t l y t he l i mi t s of e t hi c a l b e ha vi our ,
wi t h t he i n t r oduc t i on of
c on fe ssi on a s a me a n s of sub j e c t i n g t he ve r y
soul
of a n i n di vi dua l t o t he
ga ze of a ut hor i t y , a n d wi t h t he de ve l opme n t
of
c on sc i e n c e a s a wa y of t ur n i n g
t ha t a ut hor i t a r i a n ga ze i n wa r d, of t ur n i n g
se l f a ga i n st se l f a s a
mode of sub j e c t i on .
But i f we fol l ow
Fouc a ul t i n t hi s for mul a t i on of t he sub j e c t 's
ge n e a l ogy ,
t he n some l i mi t s i n a fe mi n i st
a ppr opr i a t i on of hi s c r i t i que of t he sub j e c t
a s
a poi n t of e n t r y for a n a l y zi n g woma n 's
c on st r uc t i on a s "ot he r " b e c ome
a ppa r e n t . As Na n c y Mi l l e r poi n t s
out , "soc i e t y di d n ot wa i t for t he
i n ve n t i on of ma n t o r e pr e ss `woma n '
or oppr e ss wome n "" - di d n ot wa i t ,
i n
ot he r wor ds, un t i l t he sub j e c t wa s
c on st i t ut e d b y huma n i sm b e for e
c r e a t i n g t he
c a t e gor i e s of ge n de r opposi t i on whi c h ha ve
se r ve d t o sol i di fy
ma l e domi n a t i on .
Whi l e Fouc a ul t 's a n a l y si s of
homose xua l r e l a t i on s i n
a n c i e n t Gr e e c e , for
e xa mpl e , shows t he y we r e vi e we d
t he n i n a fun da me n t -
a l l y di ffe r e n t l i ght t ha n i n
t he mode r n e r a , hi s c on si de r a b l y
l e ss t hor ough
a n d l e ss sa t i sfy i n g a n a l y si s
of wome n i n t ha t soc i e t y r e ve a l s wha t
se e ms t o b e
a fun da me n t a l c on t i n ui t y : wome n
we r e vi e we d b y t he Gr e e ks a s i n fe r i or
b y
n a t ur e , t o b e r ul e d ove r a n d c on t r ol l e d,
muc h a s t he y we r e vi e we d l a t e r
b y
t he Chr i st i a n
c hur c h fa t he r s, a n d muc h a s t he y ha ve
b e e n vi e we d a l most up
t o t he pr e se n t da y . Fouc a ul t
doe s sugge st a poi n t a t whi c h
r e pr e se n t a t i on s
of ge n de r i de n t i t y ma y ha ve
un de r gon e a n i mpor t a n t shi ft ,
whe n t he
e mpha si s on t he r e l a t i on shi p
b e t we e n me n a n d b oy s a s "t he most
a c t i ve
N.P. RICCI
focus of
r e fl e ct i on an d e l abor at i on " i n cl assi cal Gr e e k t hought gave way, i n
t he
Roman an d e ar l y Chr i st i an e r a, t o t he e mphasi s on r e l at i on s be t we e n
me n an d
wome n ,
on
vi r gi n i t y, an d on "t he val ue at t r i but e d t o r e l at i on s of
symme t r y an d r e ci pr oci t y be t we e n husban d an d
wi fe "
(Use ,253) .
But e ve n
t aki n g i n t o accoun t such a shi ft , an i mpor t an t r e si due r e mai n s . If Gr e e k
wome n we r e n ot "subje ct s" i n Foucaul t 's se n se of t he wor d, t he y
we r e
ce r t ai n l y subje ct e d, an d t he mai n t e r ms of t hat subje ct i on -t hat i s, a
fun dame n t al
ge n de r spl i t , an d a hi e r ar chi cal or gan i zat i on of t hat spl i t -ar e
t he same on e s t hat fe mi n i st s
ar e de al i n g wi t h t oday . The hi st or y of wome n ,
t he n , mayi n some r e spe ct s be a con t i n uous on e ,
i n
t hat
bot h t he fact of t he i r
oppr e ssi on , an d t he t he or e t i cal t e r ms whi ch have be e n use d t o just i fy
t hat
oppr e ssi on , have de mon st r at e d a t r e me n dous st ayi n g powe r fr om e r a t o
e r a.
But Foucaul t 's t he or i e s do
n ot n e ce ssar i l y pr e cl ude t hi s ki n d of
con t i n ui t y . Foucaul t hi mse l f has be moan e d
t he e mphasi s whi ch comme n -
t at or s have pl ace d on hi s n ot i on of di scon t i n ui t y :
My pr obl e mwas n ot at al l t o say, 'V oi l d, l on g
l i ve di scon t i n ui t y, we ar e
i n t he di scon t i n uous an d a good t hi n g t oo,' but t o pose t he
q ue st i on ,
'How i s i t t hat at ce r t ai n mome n t s an d i n ce r t ai n or de r s of
kn owl e dge ,
t he r e ar e t he se sudde n t ake -offs,
t he se hast e n i n gs of e vol ut i on , t he se
t r an sfor mat i on s whi ch fai l t o cor r e spon d t o
t he cal m, con t i n ui st i mage
t hat i s n or mal l y accr e di t e d? (PIK,112)
.
Ye t on l y r e ce n t l y has t he st at us of wome n shown si gn s of be i n g i n t he
pr oce ss of afun dame n t al t r an sfor mat i on , on e whi ch i s shaki n g t he r oot s of
se xual di ffe r e n t i at i on an d di scr i mi n at i on . An d whi l e i t woul d be r e duct i ve
t o de n y t hat an y chan ge s have occur e d i n t he i mage of woman fr om e r a t o
e r a, man y of t he se chan ge s -for e xampl e , t he "me di cal i sat i on " of t he
fe mal e body whi ch Foucaul t has poi n t e d t o -have me r e l y se r ve d t o
r e affi r mwome n 's mar gi n al st at us . Thus whi l e r e l at i on s of powe r may
al t e r
accor di n g t o t he ki n ds of major t r an sfor mat i on whi ch Foucaul t has n ot e d,
ce r t ai n st r an ds i n e ach e r a's we b, spe ci fi cal l y t hose whi ch
have accr ue d
ar oun d ge n de r opposi t i on s, have
r e mai n e d st r on g t hr oughout t he l on g
hi st or y of wome n 's oppr e ssi on
.
The
for ce s whi ch have he l d t he se st r an ds i n
pl ace wi l l al so
have
t o
be l ooke d at be for e we have fi n i she d wi t h t he
q ue st i on of
woman .
V I: In t e l l e ct ual s an d Powe r
The i n t e l l e ct ual n o l on ge r has t o pl ay t he r ol e of advi sor . The pr oje ct ,
t act i cs an d goal s ar e a mat t e r for t hose
who
do
t he fi ght i n g. What t he
i n t e l l e ct ual can do i s pr ovi de t he
i n st r ume n t s of an al ysi s (PK,62) .
FRENCHFANTASIES
Foucault's "toolkit" view of theory should help put himin
perspective
for femin ists . While he seems to sympathise with the
move "beyon d"
sexual iden tity, his work still provides tools for those femin ists still fig htin g ,
as women , in the tren ches, where the battle is far from
over
.
As Biddy
Martin poin ts out with respect to the curren t elidin g of sexual
iden tity,
"the projects of male" (an d, Iwould add, some female)
"critics an d femin ist
critics are n ecessarily n on -syn chron ous
despite common alities . "
19
Femin ists
have on ly just beg un the work of reclamation an d
production n ecessary to
g uard ag ain st women 's bein g
eclipsed on ce ag ain at the very momen t of
their emerg en ce
in to
history .
Would a move away fromsexual opposition s
towards a more epistemolog ically "correct"
position imply, for in stan ce,
that women academics should
stop lobbyin g to g et more women 's work
in cluded on course
lists? That readin g Joyce (whose own views on women
are far from
trouble-free) may brin g on e closer to the "femin in e" than
readin g , say,
Virg in ia Woolf? Someon e like Derrida (after all a man ) may
rejoice in the subversive
poten tial of a woman who is "a n on -iden tity, a
n on -fig ure, a simulacrum"
(Spurs, 4 9) ; but such "n on -iden tity, " as coun tless
femin ist
an alyses have shown , has been precisely the status of women
sin ce
time immemorial,
an d this status - for all its supposedly subversive
poten tial -
has been the main source of their oppression .
I am n ot sug g estin g that femin ists reject
the n ew discourses on
"woman " out of han d, or that they ig n ore the
epistemolog ical con cern s
which have prompted those discourses . In stead
they should g et the lay of
the lan d, see what old faces lurk in the n ew lan dscape,
judg e what is
g erman e
to the political reality they face . Next
to
the
Marxist "always
historiciz e, " we mig ht
add the very post-modern "always
problematiz e . "
At
the en d of The Order of Thin g s, Foucault writes
that
if
the
arran g emen ts which
led to the birth of the human scien ces
were to
disappear, "then on e can
certain ly wag er that man would be erased, like a
face drawn in san d at the
edg e of the sea" (OT, 387) . But before that
happen s perhaps woman 's face will have
to be etched firmly beside it, if on ly
as a n etwork of scars on a on ce-smooth
surface .
Departmen t of En g lish
Con cordia Un iversity
Notes
1.

Michel Foucault, The OrderofThin g s (New York :

Vin tag e Books, 1973), p . 387. Hereafter cited as
OT.
2 . Biddy Martin ,
"Femin ism, Criticism, an d Foucault, " New German Critique,
2 7 (1982 ), 17 .
Emphasis added .
N.P. RICCI
3 .

Michel Foucault,
Power/Knowledge: S elected Interv iews and Other W ritings ,
1972-1977,
trans . Colin
Gordon et al ., ed . Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books , 1980), p. 98. Hereafter
PIK .
4.

Michel Foucault, D is cipline and Punis h: The Birth ofthe Pris on, trans . Alan S heridan (New York:
Vintage Books , 1979), p. 192 . Hereafter D P.
5 .

Michel Foucault, The His tory of S ex uality, trans . Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books ,
1980), p. 43 . Hereafter HS .
6.

Michel Foucault, The Archaelogy ofKnowledge, trans .

A.
M.
S heridan S mith (New York: Harper &
Row, 1976), p. 12 . Hereafter AK .
7 .

Julia Kris tev a, "W omen's Time," trans . Alice Jardine and Harry Blake, in Feminis t Theory:
A
Critiq ue ofIdeology, ed . Nannerl O . Keohane et al . (Chicago: Univ ers ity of Chicago Pres s , 1982) .
Hereafter W T.
8.

S ee, for ex ample, Luce Irigaray, "This S ex W hich is Not One," trans . Claudia Reeder, in New
French Feminis ms , ed. Elaine Marks and Is abelle de Courtiv ron (New York: S chocken Books ,
1981), pp. 99-106 . Helene Cix ous , in "The Laugh of the Medus a," (trans . Keith Cohen and Paula
Cohen, New French
Feminis ms ,
pp
. 245 -264) als o
s ugges ts
a difference between male and female
s ens ibility grounded in differing s ex ual economies , but the cas e with Cix ous , as indicated below,
is problematic. (New French Feminis ms will hereafter be cited as NFF.)
9.

Among American critics , Peggy Kamuf has us ed a s pecifically Foucauldian framework to arriv e
at a pos ition s imilar to Kris tev a's . S ee her article, "Replacing Feminis t Criticis m," D iacritics , 12,
No . 2 (1982), 42-47 . Though Kamufdoes not acknowledge any debt to Kris tev a, s he als o s eems
to s ee hers elf as part of a "third generation"; s he is olates two feminis t s trategies , s trikingly
s imilar to the two "phas es " Kris tev a
identifies , which are doomed to perpetuate the s ys tem
women hav e been trying to s ubv ert : "on the one hand an ex pans ion of ins titutions to include at
their center what has been his torically ex cluded ; on the other hand, the ins talling of a counter-
ins titution bas ed on feminine centred cultural models " (Kamuf, p. 45 ) .
10 .

Quoted in The Great Quotations , comp. George S eldes (S ecaucus , NJ . : Cas tle
Books , 1960),
p. 5 3 0 .
11 .

Jacq ues D errida, S purs : Nietz s che's S tyles /Eperons : Les S tyles de Nietz s che, trans . Barbara Harlow
(Chicago : The Univ ers ity of Chicago Pres s ,
1979), p.
5 1 . Hereafter S purs .
12 .

D errida, anticipating objections to his rather "eccentric" reading of Nietz s che, s ummariz es his
own pos ition thus : "Mus t not thes e apparently feminis t propos itions be reconciled with the
ov erwhelming corpus of Nietz s che's v enomous anti-feminis m? Their congruence (a notion
which Ioppos e by conv ention to that of coherence), although
ineluctably enigmatic, is jus t as
rigorous ly neces s ary
.
S uch, in any cas e will be the thes is of the pres ent
communication" (S purs ,
5 7) . It is impos s ible to do jus tice to the rigours of D errida's
analys is here ; what concern me more
are the potential us es of that analys is
.
13 .

Alice
Jardine, "Gynes is ," D iacritics , 12, No . 2 (1982), 64. Jardine giv es a good ov erv iew of the
role of
"woman" in current French theory, though s he concentrates mainly on Lacan and his
followers . I take her article as a point of departure for what follows .
14 .

Jardine, p. 64.
15 .

S us an Gubar, "The Blank Page and the Is s ues of Female Creativ ity," in W riting and S ex ual
D ifference, ed . Eliz abeth Abel (Chicago : The Univ ers ity of Chicago Pres s , 1982), p. 77 .
16 .

For the bes t critiq ue of this appropriation, s ee Frank Lentricchia's chapter on

pos ts tructuralis m
inAfterthe NewCriticis m (Chicago : The Univ ers ity of Chicago Pres s , 1980), pp. 15 6-210 ;
als o his
chapter on Paul de Man, pp. 282-3 17 . Paul A. Bov e prov ides
a s imilar analys is in his es s ay
"Variations on Authority : S ome
D econs tructiv e Trans formations of the New Criticis m," in The
Yale Critics . D econs truction in America, ed . Jonathan Arac,
W lad Godz ich and W allace Martin
(Minneapolis : Univ ers ity of Minnes ota Pres s ,
1983 ), p.
2-19 . S ee als o W lad Godz ich, "The
D omes tication of D errida," in the s ame v olume, pp. 20-40 .
17 .

See Jacques Lacan, Encore ( P ari s

: Edi ti ons du Seui l , 1975) ; Rol and Barthes, Rol and Barthes
by
Rol and Barthes, trans . Ri chard
Howard ( New York : Hi l l and Wang, 1978) ; Jean Baudri l l ard De l a
sMucti on ( P ari s: G al i l ee, 1980) .
18.

Vi rgi ni a Wool f, "P rofessi ons for Women," i n The Norton Anthol ogy
ofEngl i shLi terature, Vol
.
2 , ed
.
M. H. Abrams
et
al .
( New York : W. W. Norton &Company, 1979), p. 2 047.
19 .

Kamuf, p. 42 .
FRENCH FANTASIES
2 0
.

Chri sti ne Froul a, "When Eve Reads Mi l ton : Undoi ng the Canoni cal Economy,"
Cri ti cal Inqui ry,
10 ( 1983), 32 1-347 . The Wool f passage al l uded
to i s
from.
Jacob's Room ( 192 2 ; NewYork, 1978),
pp. 40-41 .
2 1 .

Edward P echter, i n a response

to
Froul a
( "When P echter Reads Froul a P retendi ng She's Eve
Readi ngMi l ton ; or, New
Femi ni st Is But Ol d P ri est Wri t Large," Cri ti cal Inqui ry, 11, 1984,163-
170) notes the
fact of Mi l ton's own anti -authori tari ani sm, though he does not take speci fi c i ssue
wi th Froul a's defi ni ti on of woman .
2 2 .

Jeffrey Weeks, "Di scourse, desi re and sexual devi ance : some probl ems i n a
hi story of homo-
sexual i ty," i n The
Maki ngoftheModern
Homosexual ,
ed
.
Kenneth P l ummer ( Totowa, NJ . : Barnes
&
Nobl e Books, 1981), pp. 76-111 .
2 3.

Jardi ne di scusses French anti -femi ni sm i n "G ynesi s . "

2 4
.

Mi chel Foucaul t, "What i s an Author?" i n Language, Counter-Memory, P racti ce, trans

. Donal d F.
Bouchard and Sherry Si mon, ed . Donal d F. Bouchard ( Oxford : Basi l
Bl ackwel l , 1977),
p. 138.
2 5 .

Rosal i nd Coward, "Are Women's Novel s Femi ni st Novel s?" i n The

NewFemi ni st Cri ti ci sm, ed .
El ai ne Showal ter ( New York : P antheon
Books, 1985), p. 2 34
.
2 6.

Mi chel Foucaul t, The Use of P l easure, trans. Robert Hurl ey

( New York : P antheon Books, 1985),
pp. 2 7, 2 2 5, 2 51 . Hereafter Use.
2 7 .

Mi chel Foucaul t, "Fi nal Intervi ew," Rari tan, 5, No. 1 ( 1985), 1-13
.
2 8 .

Nancy Mi l l er, "The Texts Heroi ne : A Femi ni st Cri ti c and Her

Fi cti ons," Di acri ti cs, 12 , No. 2
( 1982 ), 49 .
Mi l l er's arti cl e i s a response to Kamufs "Repl aci ng Femi ni st
Cri ti ci sm," i n the same
i ssue .
2 9 .

Marti n,
p. 2 1 .
Canadianjournal ofP olit ic al
andSoc ial Theory /Revue c anadienne de t heorie polit ique et s oc iale,
Volume XI, No.
3
(1987) .
THEQUESTIONOF
THEMORALSUBJECT IN
FOUCAULT'S
ANALYTICS OFP OWER
Hwa YolJung
The es s enc e of
t rut h is freedom.
Mart in Heidegger
The ques t ion of et hic s has
preoc c upied Mic hel Fouc ault t hroughout
t he different s t ages of
his t hought . Et hic s and polit ic s are for him
ins eparable . In his early major
work, The Order of Things , he as s ert ed t hat
" [ t he] knowledge of man, unlike t he s c ienc es of
nat ure, is always linked,
even it s
vagues t form, t o et hic s or polit ic s . " 1 In his 1983
int erview in
Derkeley he reit erat ed
his int eres t in " polit ic s as an et hic s . " '
There is one phras e t hat marks t he dis t inguis hing
c harac t eris t ic of
Fouc ault 's t hought : t he ubiquit y of power
. " As oc iet y wit hout power
relat ions , " he dec lares , " c an only be an
abs t rac t ion. "
s
In Fouc ault 's t hought ,
power may be s aid t o be t he kingpin of
all s oc ial relat ions in c onnec t ing
everyt hing t o everyt hing els e . It
is embedded in all human event s and
ins t it ut ions , not jus t in what
has t radit ionally been c alled " government , "
t he " s t at e, " or polit ic al
ins t it ut ions . From beginning t o end, t he
t hemat ic s
of power have been t he leimot if of
Fouc ault 's inves t igat ion of differing
t opic s . By it s ubiquit y, power
at t ains an ont ologic al s t at us , as it were,
in
Fouc ault 's t hought . It is
everywhere and c omes from everywhere :
it is
" always already" here
and t here . The mos t s eminal ins ight ofFouc ault
is t he
idea t hat power ex is t s
as relat ions , and t his relat ional mode of
inves t igat ing
power is c alled by
him t he analyt ic s ofpower. For power is
regarded not as a
s t at ic s ubs t anc e
(res ) in t he Cart es ian t radit ion, but
as an ens emble of
dynamic
relat ions . Fouc ault writ es :
P ower in t he s ubs t ant ive s ens e, " le"
pouvoir, does n't ex is t . What I mean
is t his .
The idea t hat t here is eit her loc at ed at -or emanat ing from -
28
FRENCH
FANTASIES
agiven point something which
is a "power"seems to me to be based on
a misguided anal y sis, one which at al l events f ail s to account f or a
considerabl e number of phenomena. In real ity power means rel ations,
a more-or-l ess organized, hierarchical , co-ordinated duster of rel ations. '
In conf l uence with the French structural ism of Cl aude Levi-Strauss,
Rol and Barthes, Jacques Lacan, and Louis Al thusser, Foucaul t rejected the
notion of the subject . Whil e in The SavageMind, ' which
is a pol emic
against
Jean-Paul Sartre, Levi-Strauss enunciated the "dissol ution
of
man, "
Foucaul t wrote
the
f ol l owing requiem in the concl uding sentence of The
Order
of Things
: "man woul d be erased, l ike a f ace drawn in sand at the edge
of the sea. '
16
It is in his introductory remarks to The Archaeol ogy of Knowl edge
that we f ind the sharpest reaction to subjectivity which coul d be construed
narrowl y as phenomenol ogical or broadl y as post-Cartesian or post-
phenomenol ogical :
If
the
history of
thought coul d remain the l ocus of uninterrupted
continuities, if it coul d endl essl y f orge connexions that no anal y sis
coul d undo without abstraction, if it coul d weave, around every thing
that men say and do, obscure sy nthesis that anticipate f or him, prepare
him, and l ead him endl essl y towards his f uture, it woul d provide a
privil eged shel ter f or the sovereignty of consciousness. Continuous
history is the indispensabl e correl ative of the f ounding f unction of the
subject : the guarantee that every thing that has el uded him may be
restored to him; the certainty that time wil l disperse nothing without
restoring it in a reconstituted unity ; the promise that one day the
subject - in the f orm of historical consciousness -wil l once again be
abl e to appropriate, to bring back underhis sway , al l those things that
are
kept at
a
distance by dif f erence, and f ind in them what might be
cal l ed his abode. Making historical
anal y sis the discourse
of
the
continuous and making
human
consciousness
the original subject of al l
historical devel opment and al l action are the two sides of the same
sy stem of thought . In this sy stem, time is
conceived in
terms of
total ization and revol utions are never more than moments of
consciousness.
It seems that what is crucial in the context of our discussion on the moral
subject of power is not the question of whether Foucaul t is a phil osopherof
continuity
or
discontinuity
but of how the idea of continuity or discontinuity
f unds the movement of the historical subject . ' Here Foucaul t' s argument
concerning the necessary and suf f icient connection between the sovereignty
of consciousness and historical continuity f al ters and is short-circuited in
several way s.
HWAYOLJUNG
First of a l l , a critique of phenomenol ogica l subjectivity requires the
considera tion of
phenomenol ogy a s the constitution of mea ning -
incl uding, of course, the constitution of
interna l -time consciousness in
terms of "retension" a nd "protension" -
by the tra nscendenta l ego to
a tta in the a podicticity of knowl edge . In short, it needs a critique of
phenomenol ogy
a s a "meta physics of presence . "
Second,
Fouca ul t fa il s to ta ke into a ccount Ma urice Merl ea u-Ponty's
phenomenol ogica l idea of
the "instituting subject, " so a s to a void the
"egol ogica l " predica ment of the
"constituting subject . " To quote ful l y
Merl ea u-Ponty's own words :
If the subject were ta ken not a s a constituting but a n instituting
subject, it might be understood tha t the subject does not ex ist insta nt-
a neousl y a nd tha t the other person does not ex ist simpl y a s a nega tive
of
mysel f. Wha t I ha ve begun a t certa in decisive moments woul d ex ist
neither
fa r offin the pa st a s a n objective memory nor be present l ike a
memory
revived, but rea l l y between the two a s the fiel d of my
becoming during tha t period . Likewise my rel a tion to a nother person
woul d not be reducibl e to a disjunction : a n instituting subject coul d
coex ist with a nother beca use the one instituted is not the immedia te
refl ection of the a ctivity of the former a nd ca n be rega ined by himsel f
or by others without invol ving a nything l ike a tota l recrea tion. Thus
the instituted subject
ex ists between others a nd mysel f, between me
a nd mysel f, l ike a hinge,
the consequence a nd the gua ra ntee of our
bel onging to a common
worl d
.
In a ddition to
overcoming the impa sse ofconceptua l izing intersubjectivity
or coex istence a s the rel a tion between
the sel fa nd the other, the a dva nta ge
of this ontol ogica l hinge is a t
l ea st threefol d . (1) It overcomes both the
overdetermina tion
a nd the underdetermina tion of the sel f over the other
or,
ethica l l y spea king, the pol a riza tion of tota l power a nd tota l freedom, or
tota l submission a nd a bsol ute freedom. (2) It offers a judicious ba l a nce
between innova tion a nd tra dition a s sedimented mea nings . And (3 ), it
gives us the conception of huma n pl ura l ity a s a dia l ectica l compl icity of
distinction a nd equa l ity. Here we a re turning to the l a ngua ge of
Ha nna h
Arendt's The Huma n Condition, where huma n pl ura l ity a s the ba sic
condition
of both speech a nd a ction is conceived ofa s ha ving the twofol d cha ra cter of
equa l ity a nd distinction. Ifmen were not equa l , she
ex pl a ins, there woul d
be no common ground for communica ting or
a cting; if men were not
distinct, on the other ha nd,
there woul d a ga in be no need to communica te
or a ct . Distinction -individua l
differences
-
thickens the density of
huma n pl ura l ity . 10
Simil a rl y, Emma nuel Levina s ma inta ins tha t pl ura l ism is
not a mul tipl icity of numbers, it is predica ted upon "a ra dica l a l terity of the
other . ""
3 0
FPE:CFFA:TASIES
Tno ano
as , : ns v s ~.~o as m~
~s s cn n..s ,
F.ca.
m.s cv :ca n~c~s s v ~c:n.~ s m~ : m
: s .c]~c v as
s ~~:n na s , n~ nacs s n~ ~s n~
c ~:~o s a .s : cns c.s
n~s s I: , n n~ n~ nano, ns v s
~.~o as os cn n..s , n~ s
cmc~ ~o acanon n~
s ~~:n v : cns c.s n~s s Cn av
F.ca. `s .n a:.m~n ,
m~~, n~ s ~~:n v : cns c.s n~s s
c~cm~s n~c~cno n
: n~ n~s s na ns v s os cn n..s c~ca.s ~
ns v
cnan:~s , na s , c~cm~s os cn n..s n v cv .~
: n~
s ~~:n a:~ncv : cns c.s n~s s s ~ : In n~ ~no, n~ :.~s n
: .n~ n~
ns v s cn n..s os cn n..s .. o
c~ os s ~o cv s ~ : : .~
~n ~ an n~ o~a : ns ca ans : ma n
as " ans :~s s n, " n
C~:~s a a ~`s s ~ns ~, "o~s .c n, "
n F~o~::~`s s ~ns ~ Tn~n ano
n v n~n, cn n. v ano
os cn n. v a~ n~ . s o~s : n~ s am~
ns ca cc~s s F ans :~s s n
s n n v n~ ~s ~ccn: : .na s
cnc ~o c. s a s o~ n~a ~o cv .na
s cnc ~o cv ao n
Sm a v, cv "o~s .c n" F~o~::~ m~ans
"a c ca cc~s s n .ncn
n~ ao na cnc~c s , .ncn a : s m.s
n~c~s s a v c~ ~mc v~o, a~
o~cns .c ~o o.n n~ s .c~s : m
.ncn n~v .~~ oa.n "`.
In F.ca. `s
a ~ . n:s , n~ ~ ~a : n~ s .c]~c
n~ nac a n
: a "n~.
s .c]~c " ma.~s ns ~:acv . n cn~nm~n :v
~n..s , c~nacs
m~ ~nnancn:, ano a n~ m~
amca ~n W~ .. o c~ ~ms s : .~
: a ~o
n c~ ns ``. os c.s s n : "Tn~
S.c]~c : i.~" na a ~mc s
: "c~vno s .c .a s m" - n~ s .c .a s m
na os s ~s man` as
s .c]~c F~ n. a ~mcs nac a ~ s .c]~c v n
ns ana v cs : c.~,
.ncn
s n.~o a n~ s am~ m~ : ~~om
As n~ o~c a~s
n~ c ca , ~ nca , s ca , cn s cnca
cc ~m: . oavs s
n

v
c~a ~ n~ noo.a : m n~ s a ~, ano
: m n~ s a ~`s
ns . ns ,
c. c~a ~ .s c n : m n~ s a ~ ano
: m n~ vc~ :
noo.a .a n
.ncns n.~o n~ s a ~ W~ na~
cm ~ n~.
: ms : s .c]~c v
n.:n n~ ~: .s a : ns .no :
noo.a v
.ncnnas c~~n mcs ~o
n .s : s ~~a c~n .~s Wn~nn~ o~: n~s
n~ ~x~cs ~ : c.~ as a mo~
: ac n .cn n~ ac ns : n~s ,
.n~n n~ cnaac ~.~s n~s ~ ac ns
cv n~ :~nm~n : m~n cv
n~
m~n -n n~ cao~s s ~ns ~ :
n~ ~m -n~ nc .o~s an
mc an
~ ~m~n : ~~om i.~s ~x~cs ~o
n v ~ : ~~ s .c]~c s ,
ano n v ns : a
as n~v a~ : ~~ v ns .~
m~an noo.a
c ~c ~ s .c]~c s .n
a~ : ac~o . n a : ~ o : cs s c ~s
n .ncn
s ~~a .avs : c~nan:,
s ~~a ~ac ns anoo~s ~ cmc m~n s
mav c~
~a .~o Wn~~ n~ o~ ~mnn:
: ac s s a .a ~ n~ .n ~,
n~~ s n ~ a ns nc
: c.~ s a~v s n ac.~
~ a ns nc
.n~n man s n cnans "
Fm n~ c~s c~c ~ :
cn~nm~n :v, F.ca. m.s
n :
.ncna ~n:~o ano .nans .~~o O.cmav
cn ~n n a:ans nm s na
`
HWAYOLJUNG
h i s a r c h i t e c t o n i c o f
po we r i s bui lt o n t h e s h a ky
gr o un di n g o f s o c i a l o n t o lo gy
wh o s e pi lla r s
i n di ffe r e n t s i z e s a n d s h a pe s a r e
fr e e , i n di vi dua l s ubje c t s . We
a r e r e mi n de d h e r e o f
He n r i k I bs e n ' s pla y Th e Ma s t e r Bui lde r , wh o s e
ma i n
plo t i s t h e s t o r y o f a ma n wh o ,
h a vi n g dr e a mt o f bui ldi n g a c h ur c h
t o we r
t h a t "po i n t s s t r a i gh t up i n t h e fr e e
a i r -wi t h t h e va n e a t a di z z y h e i gh t "
a n d "a
r e a l c a s t le -i n -t h e -a i r " o n a fi r m fo un da t i o n ,
plun ge s i n t h e e n d i n t o a
gh a s t ly
de a t h be c a us e h e h a s bui lt t o o t a ll a h o us e
o n t o o s h a llo w a
fo un da t i o n . " Th e
ph o bi a o f t h e s ubje c t i n Fo uc a ult ' s a n a lyt i c s o f
po we r i s ,
un fo r t un a t e ly,
li ke t e a c h i n g h o w t o s wi m by c o n t i n o us ly t e a c h i n g
a qua -
ph o bi a . " Ye t wo r s e ,
h i s la t e a dde n dum -"fr e e s ubje c t s " a n d "n e w
fo r ms
o f
s ubje c t i vi t y" -i s li ke ur gi n g s o me o n e
t o s wi m o n dr y la n d! Th e r e i s ,
h o we ve r , a wa y o f c o n s t r uc t i n g s o c i a l
o n t o lo gy wh i c h h a s a pla c e fo r t h e
s ubje c t but i s
n o t s ubje c t i ve , i . e . , t h e c o n c e pt i o n o ft h e
s ubje c t a s r e la t i o n a l.
Me r le a u-Po n t y c o n t e n de d t h a t "I n Sa r t r e
t h e r e i s a plur a li t y o f
s ubje c t s but n o
i n t e r s ubje c t i vi t y . . . Th e wo r ld a n d
h i s t o r y a r e n o lo n ge r a
s ys t e m wi t h s e ve r a l po i n t s o f
e n t r y but a s h e a fo f i r r e c o n c i la ble pe r s pe c t i ve s
wh i c h n e ve r c o e xi s t
a n d wh i c h a r e h e ld t o ge t h e r o n ly by
t h e h o pe le s s
h e r o i s m o f
t h e I . - To r e je c t t h e "h e r o i s m o f
t h e I " i s fo r Me r le a u-Po n t y t o
de c e n t e r
t h e s ubje c t t o wa r d t h e a ffi r ma t i o n o f
i n t e r s ubje c t i vi t y . I n t h e
a n a lys i s o f
la n gua ge , t h e a c t o f s pe a ki n g
( pa r o le ) a n d t h e s t r uc t ur e o fla n gua ge
( la n gue ) a r e
mut ua lly de pe n de n t . Fo r h i m, t h e r e fo r e ,
"la n gua ge ma ke s
t h o ugh t , a s
muc h a s i t i s ma de by t h o ugh t . " 1 '
Ac c o r di n g t o t h e li n gui s t
Emi le Be n ve n i s t e ,
"la n gua ge i s po s s i ble o n ly be c a us e
e a c h s pe a ke r s e t s
h i ms e lf up a s a s ubje c t by r e fe r r i n g t o
h i ms e lf a s I i n h i s di s c o ur s e . ""
Pa ul
Ri c o e ur , wh o s e
h e r me n e ut i c a l ph e n o me n o lo gy h a s be e n
i n flue n c e d by t h e
li n gui s t i c t h e o r y o f Be n ve n i s t e ,
fo r c e s t h e i s s ue a ga i n s t t h e
s t r uc t ur a li s t ,
s ubje c t le s s t h e o r y o f la n gua ge
by fo r mula t i n g c o n c i s e ly t h e
"h a bi t a t i o n o f
t h e wo r d" a s "a t r a de r
be t we e n t h e s ys t e m a n d t h e
e ve n t " a n d by a s s e r t i n g
t h a t t h e s pe a ki n g be i n g o f
ma n a n d t h e s po ke n be i n g o f t h e
wo r ld a r e t wo
i n t e r de pe n de n t c a t e go r i e s
. ' By t h e s a me t o ke n ,
a ll i n t e r pr e t a t i o n i s t h e
di a le c t i c a l mo ve me n t o f
t r a n s mi s s i o n a n d r e n e wa l . Th e
s t r uc t ur e wi t h o ut
t h e e ve n t i s us e le s s ,
wh i le t h e e ve n t wi t h o ut t h e s t r uc t ur e
i s po we r le s s . I n
t h e
e n d, t h e s ubje c t wh o i s c a pa ble o f
a s s e r t i n g I i s n e ve r a bs o lut e ly
s o ve r e i gn a n d
c o mple t e ly i s o la t e d : h e /s h e i s
a lwa ys a lr e a dy s o c i a l o r
i n t e r s ubi c c t i ve .
To c o n fi r m t h e
de s ubs t a n t i a li z e d, r a t i o n a l a n a lys i s o f po we r wi t h o ut
s ubje c t -ph o bi a a n d wi t h o ut
s a c r i fi c i n g t h e i de a o fn o ve lt y a n d "fr e e s ubje c t s , "
we s h o uld r e s o r t t o
a udi t o r y me t a ph o r s a n d mo de ls a ga i n s t
vi s ua l o n e s ,
wh o s e c h r o n o t o pi c a l
un i t y i s a r r a n ge d i n t e r ms o f t h e pr i ma c y o f
t i me o ve r
s pa c e o r t h e "ut o pi a "
( o u/t o po s ) o f t i me . " I n t h e fi r s t
pla c e , t h e a udi t o r y
"t ympa n i z e s " s o c i a l o n t o lo gy be c a us e t h e e a r i s , a s
Ja c que s De r r i da put s i t ,
"t h e
di s t i n c t , di ffe r e n t i a t e d, a r t i c ula t e d o r ga n t h a t
pr o duc e s t h e e ffe c t o f
pr o xi mi t y . "" I n t h e s e c o n d pla c e , i t
e n a ble s us t o di s pla c e a n d
c o n c e pt ua li z e
32
FRENCHFANTASIES
power as polyphonic
. Yet the conception of power as polyphonic relations
preserves
the "otonomy"
2z
of the self which arrests hermetically sealed
independence
at one extreme and totalistic subjugation at the other.
Musically speaking,
mood as di. r/ position is the attunement of an individual
existence to the world as a being-in-the-world . As Heidegger observes :
"Mood is never merely a way of being determined in our inner being for
ourselves . It is above all a way of being attuned, and letting ourselves be
attuned in this or that way in mood . Mood is precisely the basic way in
which we are outside ourselves . But that is the way we are essentially and
constantly. "
Zs
There
is,
moreover,
a further analogy to be drawn between the
ubiquity
of
power
and that of sound . There is a qualitative difference in
human experience between the visual and the acoustic . Color does not
separate itself from the object, whereas sound separates itself from its
source ( e. g . , voice or the sound of a musical instrument) . In other words,
color is a dependent attribute ofan object, sound is not. Whilethe color we
see is the property ofa thing itself and we confront color in space, the tone
we hear is not the property of anything and we encounter it out of or from
space. Color is locatable and localizable in one single position with the
object, whereas sound, once separated from its source, has
no
definite
topological property or determination although its source is locatable
.
Most importantly, sound travels in nooneparticulardirection, it travels in
all directions . Musical tones have no locatable places : they are everywhere
or
ubiquitous . " The ubiquity of sound does not imply, however, that the
language, message
or
meaning
of music as the organized movement of
sound in time is inexact and
imprecise . Its meaning or messageis played out,
just as speech is uttered
or
enunciated
.
Ethics or the
ethics of
power
must be grounded firmly in social
ontology - the ontology of social relations
. 21
To be specific, by the basic
model of social relations we mean the "neighborhood"
or "gathering" in
multiple forms of the I ( ipseity) and the
other ( alterity) as equiprimordial
in the shared field of time and space. We shall designate
as proximity this
chronotopically shared field of the self and the other as equiprimordial
in
which
the sense of "otonomy" is preserved . By proximity, therefore,
we
refer
to what the social phenomenologist Alfred Schutz calls the
conso-
ciational relationship ( Umwelt) orwe-relationship ( Wirbeziehung) in which
two ( or more)
persons share together or simultaneously both a section
of
time and a sector ofspace, that
is, chronotopical immediacy. It may becalled
the "paramount" relationship because
it is the basic modus by which all
other types of social relationship are determined and understood . 26
Foucault's ethics ofpower, however, lack an ethics of proximity
or, as
it were, an ethics with
a human face . 2' Toput it more forcefully, there cannot
be any ethics of proximity in it .
It cannot be otherwise because his thought
HWAYOLJUNG
i s allergi c to the s ubject, whi le
the bas i c condi ti on of proxi mi ty
demands
the confi rmati on of the s elf
and
the other
as two i nterdependent s ubjects . In
order to
avoi d both extremes ofi ndi vi duali zi ng
and totali zi ng tendenci es ,
we need
a thi rd term whi ch has pri macy over both
i ps ei ty and alteri ty but
does not exclude
them as the condi ti ons of i ts exi s tence
: di alogue, conver-
s ati on, communi cati on,
or communi ty - that i s , the we as
the uni on of
i ps ei ty and alteri ty governed by
the s ens e of mutual parti ci pati on
and
attunement . It works as the mai euti c
between the atomi zati on of the
i ndi vi dual and the depers onali zati on of
i ns ti tuti on .
The li terary theori s t Deni s Donoghue
defi nes convers ati on as the
bes t
form
of
verbal and res pons i ve
communi cati on i n a ci rcle of proxi mi ty .
It res embles a
theatri cal performance before a
s mall fri endly audi ence - a
s onorous s pace i n
whi ch the voi ce res onates the epi tome of
human pres ence .
Ideally, convers ati on i s
more than communi cati on: i t i s
"communi on"
becaus e what really matters
i n i t i s the pres ence of the des i re to
be wi th
others
and to s hare each other's experi ence
- the proces s ual ri te of
gi vi ng
and recei vi ng
rather than what i s s ai d, and the encodi ng
and decodi ng of i ts
mes s age
. Convers ati on as
communi on i s compens ated for
i ts open-
endednes s and i ncompleti on
: "The vali di ty of the words
i n a convers ati on
i s
thei r conti nuous parti ci pati on
i n communi cati on. In a convers ati on,
the
two
voi ces are maki ng a mus i c of
des i re, varyi ng i ts cadences ,
tones ,
i ntens i ti es . "
zI
The
ethi cs ofproxi mi ty i s an embodi ed
phenomenon whi ch Foucault's
"bi o-power,"
too, pres uppos es .
Whi le the Cartes i an body as "s ubs tance"
i s
the body-object,
the ethi cs of proxi mi ty
i s grounded i n the body-s ubject
.
The
i ncarcerated body as the object of the
Panopti con depi cted s o
forcefully
by Foucault
i n Di s ci pli ne and Puni s h
exempli fi es the body-object . 1 9
It i s the
object of di s ci pli ne and
puni s hment . In contras t, the
body-s ubject i s an
acti ve, li vi ng agent of
communi cati on wi th the world of
others (Mi twelt) :
"the body ans wers the
world by authori ng i t . ""'
Although the body s eems
di s ti ncti vely characteri s ti c
of Foucault's new
s ubjecti vi ty, parti cularly i n hi s
hi s tori cal
analys i s of human s exuali ty, he
s eems nonetheles s unaware of, i f
he does not reject,
the body as s ubject . At
any rate, he fai ls to deal wi th i t
s ys temati cally .
Thus , unfortunately, Foucault's
analyti cs ofpower can offer
no ethi cs of
proxi mi ty. It was i ndeed a
"defacement" or an "effacement" of
the body-s ubject
when he s poke poeti cally
of the eras ure of man as "a face
drawn i n s and at the edge of
the s ea . "
The ethi cs of
proxi mi ty as an embodi ed phenomenon
i s characteri s ti c
uni quely ofEmmanuel
Levi nas 's phenomenology of the face (vi s age)
whi ch
i s an ethi cs of the I who
i s capable offaci ng the other as "you
. " The face to
face wi th the other
may be called - followi ng Levi nas
hi ms elf - an
"i nterface . "" To
i ns ert the name of Levi nas i nto a
phenomenologi cal
cri ti que of
Foucault's ethi cs ofpower i s no acci dent
. For Levi nas i s the s oci al
FRENCHFANTASIES
ontologist (or
"meontologist") and ethicistparexcellence,
in whose thought
"Being"
and "value" are chiasmic twins
. We can go even further : the
primacy
of the ethical constitutes a
common tie between Levinas and
Foucault . For Levinas, the idea of
"totality" is purely theoretical, while
"infinity" is an ethical category. "
Foucault's analytics of power or power/
knowledge intertwinement,
with an accent on the formation of discursive
practices, may be
regarded as a consolidation in form, as it were,
of Levinas's
"theoretical" and
"ethical" concerns subsumed under
the category of
infinity
without totality.
In Levinas's social ontology, which
accentuates the primacy of the
ethical, subjectivity is affirmed never for
itself (i . e . , never monologic or
egocentric) but for another (pour
fautre) (i . e . , dialogic or heterocentric) .
Subjectivity comes into being as "heteronomic"
: "It is my inescapable and
incontrovertible answerability
to the other that makes me an individual
T. " 3 3 Thus the notion of responsibility
or answerability that coincides with
the ethical or the ethics of proximity
is,
first
and foremost, the confirmation
of the I which is what Levinas calls
the "meontological version of subject-
ivity," based on the face as its most basic
modus . He writes, therefore, that
responsibility is :
the essential, primary and
fundamental structure of subjectivity. For I
describe subjectivity in
ethical terms . Ethics, here, does not supplement
a preceding existential
base ; the very node of the subjective is knotted
in ethics understood as
responsibility. 3 '
Martin Buber, too, propounded the
ethics of responsibility . According to
him,
there are two primary words : the
"I-Thou" and the "I-It . " The subject
I
must be the I of either "I-Thou" or
"I-It," or else it is nothing at all :
"There
is no
I
taken in itself, but only the Iof the
primary word I-Thou and
the I
of
the
primary word I-It. "" In either case,
the I is always already
relational
or dialogical through and through ; where
there is reality, there is
sociality. In
responsibility lies the we as the midterm
between the isolated I
and the
No-body (das Man or the "anonymous Other,"
to use Heidegger's
word) . 1 6 Only in
reference to the we does responsibility
constitute the
ethical condition
of language itself. The question
of "who is speaking" is
never entirely
subjective . Nor is language totally a subjectless
structure for
the simple reason
that, as Edith Wyschogrod puts it tersely,
it "does not
float emptily in
social space . "
1 7
Now, for Levinas, the face
epitomizes the ethics of proximity .
It not
only
establishes the direct and immediate
contact with the other but also is
solicited by
and gravitated to the other. The
face to face is, Levinas tells us,
"the primordial
production of being on which all
the possible collocations
of the terms are
found. ""' The face is indeed an
ethic, a human ethic : "the
HWAYOLJUNG
epiphany of the face is ethical
.""
As the face s peaks (in s ilence), s peaks
uniquely fromand for
each
individual, it is
an ethical
dis cours e . By the s ame
token, its look is not and cannot be determined by the objective color of an
eye. In the final analys is , the face is an ethical hermeneutic ofthe bodyorthe
human as embodied.
What is the ultimate telos of human plurality or inters ubicctivity as
polyphonic? For Levinas , it is peace (or harmony) . With the idea of peace
the ques tion of the ethical merges with that of the political (res publica) . In
the tradition of phenomenology -
including
of
cours e the ethical
phenomenology of Levinas , Hannah Arendt"' has developed apublic philo-
s ophy with a focus on the s pecificity ofpower as political . Des pite their
differences , s ome of which s eparate them radically, there are parallels and
inters ections between Arendt's and Foucault's thought ."
Power is defined mos t generally by Foucault as "the multiplicity of
force
relations ,"" which
is
omnipres ent in and all-pervas ive to every level
and dimens ion
of
human relations hip.
This
view, however, produces a
mixed res ult becaus e it both dis mantles and obfus cates
the es tablis hed
notion ofpower as s pecifically political . On the one hand, poweris regarded
as not an exclus ively political concept . Rather, it -like Foucault's definition
of "government" -is extended
to
encompas s a variety of nonpolitical
human relations hips including knowledge-claims and s uch ins titutions as
the clinic, the as ylum, the pris on, the s chool, the church, and the family. As
poweris "decentered," everything we do is political or
contains
an
element
of politextuality . On the otherhand, Foucault's view obfus cates
the s pecifi-
city of poweras political, although the conceptual configuration of
power
as s uch denies no s pecificity.
The
ques tion of the s ubject is what puts
Foucault and Arendt a world
apart . Arendt offers an ans wer to Foucault's
enigmatic ques tion on the
s ubject
of
power: the primary s ubject ofpoweris the human, moral s ubject .
Her definition of action and power bas ed on the conception of human
plurality provides us with the midworld which avoids the Scylla of indivi-
dualizing and the Chrybdis of totalizing tendencies without abandoning
the human, moral s ubject . ForArendt, the faculty ofaction alone -not the
faculties of labor and work -makes man
a
political
animal . Human
plurality is the exis tential
and
ethical condition
of
both
power and action .
Above all, it is an as s ociation (koinonia) of equals as
humans who are all
capable
of
acting. Foremos t, however, it is an as s ociation ofs ubjects -that
is ,
in Arendt's language, "dis tinct and unique pers ons ." Human plurality
defined
as
s uch polyphonically defies the "antipolitical" thought ofuniting
many into one (homonoia) .
However, her defens e of the human, moral s ubject in the context of
human plurality and politics as polyphonic is not a s ubjectivis t one. For
action and is olation are antithetical or mutually exclus ive terms . For
FRENCH
FANTASIES
Arendt, power i s human potenti al "to act
i n concert" (for the common
good) and as s uch i t i s i mpos s i ble i n i s olati on
. Thus power i s not s omethi ng
i n the pos s es s i on of an i ndi vi dual, agroupof
i ndi vi duals , or an organi zati on.
True tothe exi s tenti al and phenomenologi cal
tradi ti on, on the other hand,
Arendt's
unwaveri ng defens e of the human, moral s ubject, as i s
li nked to
the ci vi li ty of power, i s
di rected agai ns t the undes i rable poli ti cal cons e-
quences of the anony mous , faceles s One
(das Man), of "ochlocracy " - to
us e her own phras e. " The exemplar of thi s
"anony mous One" i s Adolf
Ei chmann - the paragon of "thoughtles s nes s "
who appeared to be "terri -
fy i ngly normal
. " It i s i mportant to note that Arendt does not argue
for the
death penalty
for Ei chmann on the bas i s of the pres ence or abs ence of
hi s
i ntenti on to ki ll. Her
argument agai ns t the "banali ty of evi l" res ts on the
"de-
s ubjecti vi zed" ethi cs of cons equences ,
i . e . , on the ethi cs of res pons i bi li ty ,
rather than on the ethi cs of
pure i ntenti ons . As Arendt argues , poli ti cs i s
not the nurs ery , becaus e
i n
i t
obedi ence and s upport are one and the s ame;
and where
all
are deemed or
held gui lty , nobody i s . For her, i n bri ef, poli ti cal
ethi cs make s ens e
only when there i s the human s ubject, the s peci fi c
i ndi vi dual, who mus t be
held res pons i ble for the cons equences of hi s
"thoughtles s ," y et vi olent cri mes .
It was i n the name of the moral s oli dari ty
of human plurali ty that s he concluded i n the
las t paragraph of her own
,'verdi ct" on the Ei chmann tri al i nJerus alem
: " . . . jus t as y ous upported and
carri ed out apoli cy of not
wanti ng
to
s hare the earthwi th theJewi s hpeople
and the people of
a
number of other
nati ons - as though y ou and y our
s uperi ors had any ri ght to
determi ne who s hould and who s hould not
i nhabi t the world - we fi nd that noone,
that i s , no member of the human
race, can be expected to want to
s hare the earthwi thy ou. Thi s i s the reas on,
and the only reas on, y ou mus t hang
. ""
Arendt's "cons ens uali s t" concepti on of
power (and acti on) as human
potenti ali ty to act i n concert
for the common good i ncludes the exi s tenti al,
Ni etzs chean
i dea
of
i ni ti um (the i ni ti ati ve) or, tous e the phras e of Merleau
Ponty ,
the "i ns ti tuti ng s ubject" who embarks on s omethi ng newat hi s /her
bi rth.
Bei ng poli ti cal i s metaphori cally concei ved of as "a
s econd bi rth. " I
s ay
"metaphori cally " becaus e bi rth, as the i ni ti al i ns erti on of the s elf i nto
the world, i s alway s already adefacto, i f not dejure, poli ti cal act. To be born
and to act poli ti cally are two s teps i n the s ame act. What i s s o
i nteres ti ng
about Arendt's di s cus s i on i s the li nkage between natali ty
and (poli ti cal)
acti on . She wri tes that "Phi los ophi cally s peaki ng, to act i s
the human
ans wer to the condi ti on of natali ty . Si nce we
all
come i nto
the world by
vi rtue
of
bi rth, as newcomers and begi nni ngs , we are able tos tart s omethi ng
new; wi thout the fact of bi rth we would not even know what novelty i s , all
'acti on' would be ei ther mere behavi or or pres ervati on
. ""
For
Arendt,
natali ty , freedom, and acti on are the i nali enable bi rthri ghts of
men and
women as human. Natali ty i s the s acros anct occas i on
for a di s ti nct s ubject
HWAYOLJUNG
-each i n hi s or her own un i que way -to embark on s omethi n g n ewor
n ovel . By vi rtue of i t, human exi s ten ce i s i n verted as freedom ( to us e the
expres s i on of Levi n as who i mpli ci tly refutes S artre' s con cepti on of human
exi s ten ce as con demn ed to freedom) . For that matter, a n ati on , whi ch i s the
modern des i gn ati on of the ulti mate poli ti cal un i t, i s , etymologi cally
s peaki n g,
the
"bi rthplace"
of
a people an d as s uch i t s ymboli zes a common
s ys tem of i n s ti tuti on s . The i n ves ti ture of human exi s ten ce as
freedom,
however, can n ever be abs olute : there i s n o un con di ti on al freedom i n s ofar
as we, the i n di vi duals , i n habi t an d s hare the s ame poli ti cal aren a or un i vers e .
"P oli ti cal theory, " wri tes Levi n as , "deri ves j us ti ce from the un di s cus s ed
value
of
s pon tan ei ty; i ts problem i s to en s ure, by wayof kn owledge of the
world, the mos t complete exerci s e of s pon tan ei ty by
recon ci li n g my freedom
wi th the freedom of the other . "
16
Nor i s poli ti cs a zero-s um game between
power an d freedom. The di alecti cal compli ci ty of power an d freedom tells
us that freedom i s n ot the "en d of power, " an d power i s n ot the "en d of
freedom. "
Mos t s i gn i fi can tly, we s hould n ot los e s i ght of i n i ti um as the human
gi ft i n con s orti um wi th others to tran s form rather than j us t to pres erve .
The di recti on of tran s formati on , however, i s n ot
predetermi n ed or pre
ordai n ed . In other words , the future cours e of human acti on i s un predi ctable
or -as Aren dt put i t -"i n calculable . " The revers e s i de of un predi ctabi li ty
i s i rrevers i bi li ty. In terms of the human faculty, they are called
the capaci ty
of "promi s i n g" an d "forgi vi n g, " res pecti vely, whi ch marks off human
exi s ten ce from an i mal li fe . Aren dt goes out of her way to emphas i ze the
"un equaled clari ty" of Ni etzs che on "the con n ecti on between human
s overei gn ty an d the faculty of maki n g promi s es , " whos e relati on to
Ni etzs che' s "wi ll to power, " accordi n g to her, i s often overlooked by
Ni etzs che s cholars
. 4 '
Be that as i t may, Aren dt s hows the i n determi n acy of
power as poli ti cal acti on i n terms of i ts etymologi cal deri vati on
from
Greek, Lati n , an d German : dyn ami c, poten ti a, an d Macht -the "poten ti al"
character i n parci tular of Macht bei n g rooted i n mogen an d mogli ch . 18 The
followi n g pas s age
from The Human Con di ti on s ums up the quali ti es an d
attri butes of power as the es s en ce of
poli ti cal acti on : "P ower i s actuali zed
on ly where word
an d
deed
have
n ot
parted compan y, where words are n ot
empty
an d deeds n ot brutal, where words are n ot us ed to vei l i n ten ti on s but
to di s clos e reali ti es ,
an d deeds are n ot us ed to vi olate an d des troy but to
es tabli s h relati on s an d create n ew reali ti es . "
What i s s adly mi s s i n g from Foucault' s accoun t of power i s the i dea of
i n i ti um as freedom to tran s form old reali ti es an d create n ewon es by each
s ubj ect i n con cert wi th others . Bei n g "compatri oti c" to power,
Foucault' s
formulati on of res i s tan ce i s i ron i cally -I s ay "i ron i cally"
becaus e hi s
an alyti cs of power i n form an d ton e i s agon i s ti c -too
un di alecti cal to
fun cti on effecti vely as
the agen t
of
hi s tori cal an d s oci al chan ge . " To us e the
FRENCHFANTASIES
existentialist language of Simone de
Beauvoir, Foucault's formulation
allows no genuine "ethics ofambiguity,"
s'
that is,
the ambiguity particularly
between power and resistance .
By way ofconclusion it should be
emphasized that the primary subject
of power is the human, moral subject who is capable of
activating -and
activating anew -meaning and value in words and deeds
for
both
himself
and others . As human interexistence is the existential and axiological
condition
of
power, so is social ontology the presupposed ground for
the
analytics
of
power. There is the dialogical way of thinking human inter-
subjectivity which neither overdetermines
nor underdetermines the power
of the subject . Since we are concerned primarily with the
intelligibility of
power in history and society, there is no easy escape from the notion of
subjectivity .
Human subjects are called "self-interpreting animals," by
virtue of which, as Foucault himself readily acknowledges, the sciences of
man are differentiated from those of nature . " To paraphrase the
phenomenological
thought of Merleau-Ponty : to be reflective, to be self-
interpreting, philosophy must
interrogate the set of questions wherein he
who questions is
himself implicated by the question . Not only would
history remain
unintelligible and intransigent, but also historical change
would be, at best, enigmatic without the subject who
triggers it . Defaced
man at the edge of history and politics is
condemned
to
nihilism. " Once
power is left to itself without the subject, the
moral subject, it subverts or
even destroys the very ground and rationale of
what defines power as an
ensemble ofmultiple relations . " In the end, Foucault's
analytics
of
power is
fractured and scarred by the radical discontinuity
between the end and the
nascence ofthe (new) subject . In other words,
his idea ofnew subjectivity is
left
ungrafted to the analytics of power. And yet to give credence to the
idea
of
historical continuity is
to
harbor or shelter the sovereignty of
consciousness .
To translate the same issue into the problematical context of
literary theory today : in Foucault's thought, the author dies, without the
birth of the reader who is capable offusing the horizons ofthe past and the
future or mediating the continuity and discontinuity of the world and
history as text or intertext . 5 5 This, I submit, is the ultimate, unresolved
dilemma, if not blackhole, ofFoucault's analysis ofknowledge, politics, and
history. Yet as long as there are traces and tracks ofknowledge, politics,
and
history, it is premature to renounce, abandon, or write a requiem
for
the
moral subject .
Department of Political Science
Moravian College
1 .

Michel Foucault, The Order ofThings (New York: Random House, 1 970), p . 328 .
2 .

Michel Foucault, " P olitics and Ethics : An Interview," in The Foucault Reader,
ed
.
P aul Rabinow
(NewYork: P antheon
Books,
1 984), p .
375 .
3 .

Michel Foucault, " Afterword : The Subject and P ower," in Hubert L. Dreyfus and P aul Rabinow,
Michel Foucault : Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd ed. (Chicago : University of Chicago
P ress, 1 983), p p . 222-23
.
4 .

Michel Foucault, P ower/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other W ritings,

1 972-1 977,
ed . Colin
Gordon and trans . Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mep ham, and Kate Sop er (New York:
P antheon Books, 1 980), p . 1 98.
5 .
Claude Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind, trans. George W eidenfeld (Chicago : University of
Chicago
P ress, 1 966) .
6 .

The Order of Things, p

.
387
.
HW A YOLJUNG
Notes
7 .

Michel Foucault, The Archaeology ofKnowledge, trans. A. M . Sheridan Smith (NewYork: Harp er
and Row, 1 972), p . 1 2 .
8.

Many, if not all, commentators on Foucault have

come to
view the idea
of
discontinuity as one of
the most radical features ofhis thought . Foucault himself addresses the question of continuity
and discontinuity in one of his interviews
:
" P ower and Truth"
(1 977) .
See P ower/Knowledge,
p p . 1 1 1 -1 3
.
According to P aul Rabinow, Foucault is a p hilosop her of both continuity and
discontinuity . Rabinow comments that " Indeed, Foucault has often mistakenly been seen as a
p hilosop her
of
discontinuity . The
fault is p artially his own ; works such as The Archaeology of
Knowledge and The Order of Things certainly do emp hasize abrup t changes in the structures of
discourse of the
human
sciences . But Foucault has also stressed, in other contexts, the
longer-
range continuities in cultural p ractices . The sharp lines
of
discursive discontinuity in the human
sciences and the longer lines of continuity
in
non-discursive p ractices p rovide Foucault
with
a
p owerful and flexible grid ofinterp retation with which to ap p roach relations ofknowledge and
p ower. It should be underlined, however, that this is not a p hilosop hy ofhistory which for some
mysterious reason glorifies discontinuity" (" Introduction," in The Foucault Reader, p . 9) .
9 .

Maurice Merleau-P onty, Themes from the Lectures at the College de France, 1 952-1 960, trans . John
O'Neill (Evanston : Northwestern University P ress, 1 970), p . 40.
1 0 . Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago : University of Chicago P ress, 1 958),
p p . 1 75-76
.
1 1 . Emmanuel Levinas,
Totality and Infinity, trans . Alp honso Lingis (P ittsburgh : Duquesne
University P ress,
1 969),
p assim.
1 2 .

Martin Heidegger, The Basic P roblems ofP henomenology, trans . Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington :
Indiana University P ress, 1 982), p .
23 .
This critical interchange ofcontinuity and discontinuity
is best worked out by Hans-Georg Gadamer in his p hilosop hical hermeneutics, in his notions of
historically effective consciousness (wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein), and the fusion of
horizons (Horizontverschmelzung) . Gadamer insists that " obedience" to tradition is " neither blind
nor slavish . " P hilosop hical Hermeneutics, trans. and ed. David E . Linge (Berkeley : University of
California P ress, 1 976), p .
34
. W hatever unbridgeable differences there may exist between
Jurgen Habermas and Gadamer, Habermas, who is critical of Gadamer s idea of tradition in
p articular and his hermeneutics in general as too conservative, also allows room for an inter-
change between continuity and discontinuity in language as well as communication when he
asserts that language is " inwardly as well as outwardly p orous . " See Jurgen Habermas, " A
Review ofGadamer's Truth andMethod," in Understanding andSocialInquiry, ed. Fred R. Dallmayr
and Thomas A
.
McCarthy (Notre Dame :
University
of
Notre Dame P ress,
1 977), p .
340 .
1 3 .

" Afterword : The Subject and P ower," p p . 21 6 and 21 2 . Interestingly, Sartre's tap ed dialogue
with P ierre Victor would be titled P owerandFreedom - a treatise on morality which is, according
FRENCHFANTASIES
to Sa r tr e , the fulfillme nt of his pr omis e in Be inga ndNothingne s s . Se e "Tr a ns la tor s
Intr oduction, "
in Fr a ncis Je a ns on, Sa r tr e a ndthe Pr oble m of Mor a lity, tr a ns . Robe r t V. Stone
(Bloomington :
India na Unive r s ity Pr e s s , 1980), p . xxv .
14.

Se e Six Pla ys by He nr ik Ibs e n, tr a ns . Eva Le Ga llie nne

(Ne w Yor k : Mode r n Libr a r y, 1957), pp . 458
a nd 498. Ibs e n's pla y is a ls o a llude d
to
in
Pa ul de Ma n, Blindne s s a ndIns ight (Ne wYor k : Oxfor d
Unive r s ity Pr e s s , 1971), p. 48 .
15 .

Se e Ma r tin He ide gge r , Sche lling's Tr e a tis e on the Es s e nce ofHuma n Fr e e dom, tr a ns . Joa n Sta mba ugh
(Athe ns : Ohio Unive r s ity Pr e s s , 1985), p . 17 .
16 .

Ma ur ice Me r le a u-Ponty, Adve ntur e s ofthe Dia le ctic, tr a ns . Jos e ph Bie n (Eva ns ton : Nor thwe s te r n
Unive r s ity Pr e s s , 1973), p. 205 .
17 .

Ma ur ice Me r le a u-Ponty, Cons cious ne s s a ndthe Acquis ition of La ngua ge , tr a ns . Hugh J. Silve r ma n
(Eva ns ton : Nor thwe s te r n Unive r s ity Pr e s s ,
1973), p.
102 .
18 .

Emile Be nve nis te , Pr oble ms in Ge ne r a l Linguis tics , tr a ns . Ma r y Eliza be th Me e k

(Cor a l Ga ble s :
Unive r s ity of Mia mi Pr e s s , 1971), p. 225
.
19 .

Pa ul Ricoe ur , The Conflict of Inte r pr e ta tions , e d.

Don Ihde (Eva ns ton : Nor thwe s te r n Unive r s ity
Pr e s s , 1974), pp . 92 a nd 26 1 .
20 .

Cf. Alfr e d Schutz, "Ma king Mus ic Toge the r , " Colle cte d Pa pe r s , II: Studie s in
Socia l
The or y,
e d.
Ar vid Br ode r s e n (The Ha gue : Ma r tinus Nijhoff, 196 4), pp.
159-6 0 : "a s tudy of the s ocia l
r e la tions hips conne cte d with the mus ica l pr oce s s ma y le a d to s ome ins ights va lid for ma ny
othe r
for ms of s ocia l inte r cour s e , pe r ha ps e ve n
to
illumina tion
of a ce r ta in a s pe ct of the s tr uctur e of
s ocia l inte r a ction a s s uch tha t ha s not
s o
fa r
a ttr a cte d fr om s ocia l s cie ntis ts the a tte ntion it
de s e r ve s . "
This ca r dina l ins ight
of Schutz ha s s till not be e n ta ppe d fully by the huma n s cie nce s . Ar guing
a ga ins t
cla s s ica l me cha nics cloa ke d a nd ma s ke d in vis ua l a nd s pa tia l mode ls , Milic Ca pe k
pr opos e s tha t a uditor y mode ls a r e be tte r s uite d to e xpla in the dyna mics of conte mpor a r y
qua ntum phys ics
. He wr ite s : "In the mus ica l e xpe r ie nce of me lody or polyphony, the s itua tion is
cons ide r a bly diffe r e nt . The qua lity of a ne w tone , in s pite of its ir r e ducible individua lity, is
tinge d by the whole a nte ce de nt mus ica l
conte xt
which, in
tur n, is r e tr oa ctive ly cha nge d by the
e me r ge nce of a ne w mus ica l qua lity. The individua l
tone s a r e not e xte r na lly r e la te d units of
which the me lody is a dditive ly built
; ne ithe r is the ir individua lity a bs or be d or dis s olve d in the
undiffe r e ntia te d unity
of the mus ica l whole . The mus ica l phr a s e is a s ucce s s ive diffe r e ntia te d whole
which r e ma ins a whole in s pite of its dyna mic
whole ne s s . Like e ve r y dyna mic whole it e xhibits a
s ynthe s is of unity a nd multiplicity,
of continuity a nd dis continuity
;
but it is not the unity of a n
undiffe r e ntia te d s imulta ne ous whole nor
is it the plur a lity of juxta pos e d units ; it is ne ithe r
continuity in the ma the ma tica l s e ns e of infinite divis ibility nor
is it the dis continuity of r igid
a tomic blocs . " Philos ophica l Impa ct of Conte mpor a r y Phys ics (Pr ince ton : Va n
Nos tr a nd, 196 1),
pp . 371-72 .
In
this conte xt, a t the r is k ofgoingbe yond his own inte nde d for mula tion, le t me e xtr a pola te
a nd
s pe cula te on the s e mina l ins ight of Fouca ult s a na lytics of powe r a s a clus te r
or
a n
e ns e mble of
dyna mic r e la tions
. For it tr a ns for ms politica l thinking fr om the a ge of cla s s ica l me cha nics
to
tha t
of qua ntum phys ics , fr om the clos e d, s ta tic wor ld to the infinite , dyna mic
unive r s e of powe r .
Fouca ult's is the qua ntum fie ld
of powe r whos e dyna mic qua lity de r ive s fr om the te mpor a liza tion
(dyna miza tion)
of ma tte r a nd motion, while cla s s ica l me cha nics wa s obs e s s e d with
"time le s s "
s pa tia liza tion . Powe r
a s s ocia te d with "fr e e s ubje cts " ma y be s a id to be a r e la tiona l fie ld of qua nta
gove r ne d by
the pr inciple of inde te r mina cy .
21 .

Ja cque s De r r ida , Ma r gins of

Philos ophy, tr a ns
.
Ala n Ba s s (Chica go : Unive r s ity of Chica go Pr e s s ,
1982), p . xvii.
22 .

The ne ologis m otonomy is pa tte r ne d a fte r Ja cque s De r r ida 's dis cus s ion
of Nie tzs che unde r the
pla yful
title "otobiogr a phie s " (oto/biogr a phie s ) in pla ce of "a utobiogr a phie s . " By 1. otonomy, "
I wis h
to pr e s e r ve the double me a ning of "a utonomy" without be ing s ubje ctive a nd
the
HWAYOLJUNG
s e n s i b i l i t y of t he "as s oci at i ve e ar " r at he r t han t he "col l e ct i n g e y e " -t o us e Er i c Have l ock's
phr as e s . Se e Jacque s De r r i da, "Ot ob i ogr aphi e s : The Te achi n g of Ni e t zs che an d t he P ol i t i cs of
t he P r ope r Name ," t r an s . Avi t al Ron e l l , i n The Ear oft he Ot he r , e d . Chr i s t i e V. McDon al d (Ne w
Yor k : Schocke n Books ,
1985), pp .
1-38. Of cour s e , we can n ot affor d t o i gn or e t he (mus i cal )
ae s t he t i ci s m of
Fr e ddr i ch Ni e t zs che i n The Bi r t h ofTr age dy , t r an s . Wal t e r Kaufman n (Ne wYor k:
Ran dom
Hous e , 1967) .
Mus i c
i s
for Ni e t zs che on e way
t o
make t he ae s t he t i c i n t e l l i gi b l e an d
gr as p i t di r e ct l y : "Qui t e ge n e r al l y ,
on l y
mus i c, pl ace d
b e s i de t he wor l d, can gi ve us an i de a of
what i s me an t b y t he j us t i fi cat i on of t he wor l d as an ae s t he t i c phe n ome n on " (i b i d. , p. 141) . Soci al
an d pol i t i cal phi l os ophy has y e t t o come t o t e r ms wi t h t he r adi cal , i mme n s e l y
i mpor t an t
i mpl i cat i on s of Ni e t zs che 's t r an s gr e s s i on of P l at on i s m, par t of whi ch i s t he oppos i t i on of
ae s t he s i s t o t he or i a .
2 3 .

Mar t i n He i de gge r , Ne i t zs che , vol . 1 : The Wi l l To P owe r as Ar t , t r an s . Davi d Far r e l l Kr e l l (Ne w

Yor k: Har pe r an d Row,
1979), p . 99 .
In P oe t i c Thi n ki n g : An Appr oach t o He i de gge r (Chi cago :
Un i ve r s i t y
of
Chi cago P r e s s , 1981), Davi d Hal l i b ur t on de s cr i b e s t he e n compas s i n g ci r cl e of a
mus i cal pe r for man ce t hat capt ur e s He i de gge r 's s e n s e of mood, at t un e me n t , an d pr oxi mi t y : "In
t he pe r for man ce of a
s y mphon y , for e xampl e , r e s pon s i b i l i t y may b e s e e n i n t he i n t e r con n e ct i n g
i n de b t e dn e s s of e ach con s t i t ue n t :
t he mus i ci an s ,
as
us e r s of e qui pme n t (i n s t r ume n t s , chai r s ,
mus i c s t an ds , an d t he l i ke ), t oge t he r wi t h t he i r s ki l l s ; t he ar t i s an s r e s pon s i b l e for t he
pr e par at i on
of t he e qui pme n t ; t he me mb e r s of t he audi e n ce , t oge t he r wi t h t he i r capaci t y t o
he ar an d
t o
s us t ai n at t e n t i on ; t he s cor e , a b e i n g wi t h a t hi n gl y char act e r t hat al l i e s i t wi t h e qui pme n t e ve n as
i t car r i e s an al r e ady con s t i t ut e d i n cl i n at i on (t he t ot al i t y of t he compos e r s n ot at i on s ) ; t he
compos e r , as on e who b r i n gs for t h wi t hi n t he s ame or de r as t he ar t i s an ; t hat ar t i s an who i s t he
pr i n t e r of t he s cor e ; t he man n e r (i n t he s e n s e of me l ody , t i mb r e ,
t on e )
of
t he s cor e as
pe r for me d ; t he s pace of t i me i n whi ch t hat man n e r e me r ge s t hr ough t he con ce r t e d compos ur e
of pe r for man ce ; t he s pace of t i me of t he t r adi t i on wi t hout whi ch t he mus i c coul d n ot move i n t o
i t s own ar t i cul at i on -wi t hout whi ch, as t he t e mpor al s t r uct ur e t hat pr e s e r ve s t he r e ci pr ocal
r e s pon s i b i l i t y of al l t he con s t i t ue n t s , i t woul d n ot b e mus i c; an d fi n al l y , t he s pace of t i me
whi ch
i s
t he wor l d pl ay 's man n e r of movi n g, t hr ough al l t hat i s t hus i n de b t e d, t o i t s own di s cl os ur e "
(p . 2 17) .
2 4 .

For a de t ai l e d di s cus s i on of t he n at ur e of
mus i c
as
t he or gan i ze d move me n t of s oun d i n t i me , s e e
Vi ct or Zucke r kan dl , Soun d an d Sy mb ol (P r i n ce t on
: P r i n ce t on Un i ve r s i t y P r e s s , 1956) . Cf.
Mar s hal l McLuhan an d Que n t i n
Fi or e , The Me di um Is t he Me s s age (Ne wYor k : Ban t am, 1967),
p . 111 : "The
e ar favor s
n o
par t i cul ar 'poi n t of vi e w. ' We ar e e n ve l ope d b y s oun d . It for ms a
s e aml e s s we b ar oun d us . We s ay , 'Mus i c
s hal l fi l l t he ai r . ' We n e ve r s ay , 'Mus i c s hal l fi l l a
par t i cul ar s e gme n t of t he ai r . ' We he ar s oun ds fr om e ve r y whe r e , wi t hout havi n g t o focus .
Soun ds come fr om'ab ove ,'
fr om'b e l ow,' fr om i n 'fr on t ofus , fr om'b e hi n d' us , fr om our 'r i ght ,'
fr om our 'l e ft . ' We can 't s hut out s oun d aut omat i cal l y . We s i mpl y ar e n ot e qui ppe d wi t h e ar l i ds .
Whe r e as a vi s ual s pace i s an
or gan i ze d con t i n uum of a un i for me d con n e ct e d ki n d, t he e ar wor l d
i s a wor l d of s i mul t an e ous r e l at i on s hi ps . "
2 5 .

For a cr i t i cal , e xt e n s i ve accoun t of s oci al on t ol ogy i n t he phe n ome n ol ogi cal move me n t , s e e
Mi chae l The un i s s e n , The Ot he r , t r an s . Chr i s t ophe r Macan n (Camb r i dge : MITP r e s s , 1984) .
2 6 .

Se e Al fr e d Schut z, The P he n ome n ol ogy of t he Soci al Wor l d,

t r an s
. Ge or ge
Wal s h an d Fr e de r i ck
Le hn e r t (Evan s t on : Nor t hwe s t e r n Un i ve r s i t y P r e s s , 1967) . For t he s oci al on t ol ogy
of Schut z,
s e e He l mut R. Wagn e r , "Towar d an An t hr opol ogy of t he Li fe -Wor l d
: Al fr e d Schut z's Que s t for
t he On t ol ogi cal Jus t i fi cat i on of t he P he n ome n ol ogi cal Un de r t aki n g," Human
St udi e s , 6 (1983)
:
2 39-46 ; an d "The
Li mi t at i on s
of
P he n ome n ol ogy : Al fr e d Schut z's Cr i t i cal Di al ogue wi t h
Edmun d Hus s e r l ," Hus s e r l St udi e s , 1 (1984)
:
157-78 .
In ci de n t al l y ,
n o
on e has t hus far e xami n e d
s e r i ous l y t he phi l os ophi cal
con s e que n ce s of Schut z's pr opos al i n hi s 1945 ar t i cl e on mul t i pl e
r e al i t i e s : t he i de a of what he cal l s t he e poche of
t he n at ur al at t i t ude whi ch, un l i ke t r an s ce n de n t al
r e duct i on whi ch s us pe n ds
our
b e l i e f
i n
t he
r e al i t y
of
t he wor l d, s us pe n ds doub t i t s e l f i n t he
e xi s t e n ce of t he e xt e r n al wor l d. In t he e poche of t he
n at ur al at t i t ude , t he r e for e , what we put i n
b r acke t s i s t he
doub t
t hat
t he wor l d an d i t s ob j e ct s mi ght b e ot he r wi s e t hat i t appe ar s t o us . " Se e
Al fr e d Schut z,
Col l e ct e d P ape r s , I : The P r ob l e m ofSoci al Re al i t y , e d . Maur i ce Nat an s on (The Hague :
Mar t i n us Ni j hoff, 1962 ), p . 2 2 9 .
FRENCHFANTASIES
27 .

Onthe i s s u e ofproxi mi ty i n recent

French i ntel l ectu a l thou ght, s eeJos eph Li berts on, Proxi mi ty :
Levi na s , Bl a nchot, Ba ta i l l e
a nd Commu ni ca ti on (The Ha gu e : Ma rti nu s Ni jhoff,
1982) . In the
tra di ti on ofphenomenol ogy,
there a re fou r phi l os ophi es ofproxi mi ty : (1)
cos mi c, (2) l i ngu i s ti c,
(3 )
ethi ca l , a nd (4 )
pol i ti ca l . Ea ch ha s beenworkedou t by, a nd i s cha ra cteri s ti c
of, Hei degger,
Ga da mer, Levi na s ,
a nd Arendt, res pecti vel y, a l thou gh there
i s
defi ni tel y
s ome overl a ppi ng of
ea ch over
the others . Hei deggers cos mi c proxi mi ty i s
typi fi ed i n hi s di s cu s s i onof the fou rfol d
u ni ty (da s Gevi ert) of ea rth, s ky, gods , a nd morta l s
. See pa rti cu l a rl y Poetry, La ngu a ge, Thou ght,
tra ns . Al bert Hofs ta dter (NewYork: Ha rper
a nd Row, 1971) . Ha ns -Georg Ga da mer s l i ngu i s ti c
proxi mi ty i s fou ndi n, for exa mpl e, Tru th a nd
Method, tra ns . Ga rrett Ba rdena ndJohnCu mmi ng
(New York: Sea bu ry Pres s , 1972)
a ndDi a l ogu e a ndDi a l ecti c, tra ns . P. Chri s topher Smi th (New
Ha ven: Ya l e Uni vers i ty Pres s , 1980)
.
For
Levi na s 's ethi ca l proxi mi ty, s ee Tota l i ty a ndInfi ni ty,
tra ns . Al phons o Li ngi s
(Pi tts bu rgh : Du qu es ne Uni vers i ty Pres s ,
1969) ;
a nd Otherwi s e Tha n
Bei ng
orBeyondEs s ence, tra ns . Al phons o
Li ngi s (The Ha gu e : Ma rti nu s Ni jhoff, 1981) . Andfor Arendt's
pol i ti ca l proxi mi ty,
s ee The Hu ma nCondi ti on.
28 .

Deni s Donoghu e,
Feroci ou s Al pha bets (Bos ton: Li ttl e, Brown, 1981), p .
4 5 .
29.

Mi chel Fou ca u l t,
Di s ci pl i ne a nd Pu ni s h, tra ns . Al a n Sheri da n
(New York: Pa ntheon Books ,
1977)
.
3 0 .

Ka teri na Cl a rk a nd Mi cha el
Hol qu i s t, Mi kha i l Ba khti n(Ca mbri dge : Ha rva rd
Uni vers i ty Pres s ,
1984 ),p . 175
.
Here I ca nnot
res i s t qu oti ng thi s pa s s a ge whi ch des cri bes the
rol e ofthe l i ved body
i n Ba khti n's di a l ogi ca l
phi l os ophy . For Ba khti n, di a l ogi s m i s to monol ogi s m
wha t Coperni ca n
hel i ocentri s m i s to
Ptol ema i c geocentri s m. Hi s s ens i ti vi ty to the l i ved
body, whi ch i s not u nl i ke
Merl ea u -Ponty's
ontol ogy of the fl es h, i s rooted deepl y i n Ru s s i a n
Orthodoxy's bel i ef i n the
corporea l i ty of Chri s t
a nd kenos i s or the potenti a l hol i nes s of
ma tter
. The
i mpl i ca ti ons of
Ba khti n's di a l ogi s m
for s oci a l , pol i ti ca l , a nd mora l phi l os ophy
i s enormou s s i nce i t, a ccordi ng to
Cl a rk
a nd Hol qu i s t, " i s not i ntended to be
merel y a nother theory ofl i tera tu re or evena nother
phi l os ophy
ofl a ngu a ge, bu t i s a na ccou nt ofrel a ti ons
betweenpeopl e a nd betweenpers ons a nd
thi ngs tha t
cu ts a cros s rel i gi ou s , pol i ti ca l , a nd a es theti c
bou nda ri es " (Mi kha i l Ba khti n, p. 3 4 8) .
3 1
.

See Emma nu el Levi na s

a nd Ri cha rd Kea rney, " Di a l ogu e wi th
Emma nu el Levi na s ," i nFa ce to Fa ce
wi th Levi na s , ed.
Ri cha rd A. Cohen (Al ba ny : Sta te Uni vers i ty
of New York Pres s , 1986) .
p. 20.
3 2 .

Tota l i ty a ndInfi ni ty, p.

83 . Thi s work ofLevi na s a s a trea ti s e onpol i ti ca l
phi l os ophy i s yet to be
expl ored.
3 3 .

" Di a l ogu e wi th Levi na s ," p.

27 .
3 4
.
Emma nu el Levi na s , Ethi cs a nd
Infi ni ty, tra ns . Ri cha rd A. Cohen (Pi tts bu rgh
: Du qu es ne
Uni vers i ty Pres s , 1982), p.
95 .
3 5 .

Ma rti nBu ber, Ia ndThou , tra ns . Rona l d

Gregor Smi th, 2nd ed. (New York: Scri bner's ,
1958),
p . 4 .
It s hou l d be notedhere tha t Levi na s
contends tha t Bu ber s " I-Thou " i s the rel a ti on of " a
s ymmetri ca l copres ence" (Levi na s a nd
Kea rney, " Di a l ogu e wi th Levi na s ," p . 3 1) . Levi na s 's
contenti on
s hou l d be cl a ri fi ed a nd ma y
be ca l l ed i nto qu es ti on.
3 6.

The Germa n
etymol ogy cl ea rl y s hows a fa mi l i a l ci rcl e
of" word" (Wort), " a ns wer" (Antwort), " to
a ns wer" (a ntworten),
a nd " to be res pons i bl e for' (vera ntworten)
. See Ma rti nBu ber, BetweenMa n
a ndMa n, tra ns . Rona l d
Gregor Smi th (New York: Ma cmi l l a n,
1965), p . 206, n. 2 . For the
phenomenol ogi ca l
ethi cs ofs pea ki ng a s di a l ogi ca l ,
s ee Georges Gu s dorf, Spea ki ng, tra ns . Pa u l T.
Brockel ma n(Eva ns ton:
Northwes tern Uni vers i ty Pres s , 1965)
.
One of the
mos t thorou ghgoi ng
di a l ogi s ms ha s been
devel oped by the Ru s s i a n l i tera ry theori s t
Mi kha i l Ba khti n (1895-1975) .
See pa rti cu l a rl y, The Di a l ogi c Ima gi na ti on,
ed
.
Mi cha el Hol qu i s t a nd tra ns . Ca ryl Emers on a nd
Mi cha el
Hol qu i s t (Au s ti n: Uni vers i ty ofTexa s
Pres s , 1981) a nd two works pu bl i s hed u nder the
na me V. N
. Vol os hi nov, Freu di a ni s m: AMa rxi s t Cri ti qu e, tra ns . I.
R. Ti tu ni k (New York:
Aca demi c
Pres s ,
1976)
a nd Ma rxi s m a ndthe Phi l os ophy of
La ngu a ge, tra ns . La di s l a v Ma tei ka a nd I. R
Ti tu ni k (Ca mbri dge
: Ha rva rd Uni vers i ty Pres s , 1986) . Tzveta n Todorov,
Mi kha i l Ba khti n: The
Di a l ogi ca l Pri nci pl e, tra ns . Wl a d
Godzi ch (Mi nnea pol i s : Uni vers i ty of Mi nnes ota
Pres s , 1984 )
focu s es on the i mpl i ca ti ons
of Ba khti n's di a l ogi s m on the phi l os ophy of the hu ma n
s ci ences .
37 .

Edith
Wyschogrod, S p irit in Ashes (New Haven : Yale University P ress, 1985) p . 207 .
38
.

Totality and Infinity, p. 395 .

39 .

Ibid. , p . 199 .
40 .

The subtitle of Elisabeth Young-Bruehl's

intellectual biograp hy of Arendt - "Love of the
World" - sums up , I think , Arendt s p olitical ethics of
p roximity
. S ee
Hannah Arendt: ForLoveof
the World (New Haven : Yale University P ress, 1982) .
41 .

For examp le, the triological thematics of Foucaults The Order of Things by way of life, labor, and
language and Arendts The Human Condition in the forms of labor, work ,
and
action go
beyond
the casual matchings of their k eywords . Foucaults Discip line andP unish and Arendts The Origins
of
Totalitarianism, new ed . (New York : Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966) p ay attention to the
totalitarian framework of
p ower and the p olitical evils of Western society p articularly by means
of the "instrumentalization" of
the world and humanity .
42 .

Michel Foucault, TheHistoryofS exuality, vol .

l : An Introduction, trans . Robert Hurley (NewYork :
P antheon Book s, 1978), p . 92 .
43 .

S oren Kierk egaard's TheP resent Age, trans . Alexander Dru (New
York : Harp er and Row, 1962),
set the tone for the existentialist concern for modern anonymity . The work in the same vein
which is most familiar to p olitical scientists is Jose Ortega y Gasser, TheRevolt oftheMasses (New
York : Norton, 1932), whose central thesis, I might add, has quite often been misunderstood
.
44 .

Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: ARep ort on the Banality of

Evil, rev. and enl. ed . (New
York : P enguin Book s, 1977), p . 279 .
45 .

Hannah Arendt, Crises of the Rep ublic (New

York : Harcourt BraceJovanovich, 1972), p . 179 .
HansJonas emp hasizes the imp ortance of Arendts notion of natality
because she introduced a
new category into the p hilosop hical doctrine of
man .
S ee
"Acting, Knowing, Think ing :
Gleanings from Hannah Arendts P hilosop hical Work ," S ocial
Research, 44 (S p ring 1977) :
30
.
46 .

Totality and Infinity, p . 83 .

47 .

The Human
Condition, p .
245,
n .
83 .
48.

Ibid. , p. 200 .
49 . Ibid.
HWA YOLJUNG
50
.

Cf
. Edward W. S aid, The World, the Text, and the Critic (Cambridge :
Harvard University P ress,
1983), p .
188: "P erhap s his interest in rules is p art of the reason
why Foucault is unable to deal
with, or p rovide an account of, historical change . "
51 .

S imone de Beauvoir s The Ethics ofAmbiguity,

trans
.
Bernard Frechtman (NewYork : Citadel
P ress, 1962) is a rare and classical treatise in the develop ment of
existentialist ethics . By
ambiguity, she means the existential
condition of choice. S he contends that "the existentialist
doctrine p ermits the elaboration of an ethics,
but
it
even ap p ears to us as the only p hilosop hy in
which an ethics has its p lace . For,
in a metap hysics of transcendence in the classical sense of the
term, evil is reduced to
error; and in humanistic p hilosop hies it is imp ossible to account for it,
man being defined as comp lete
in a comp lete world . . . Nothing is decided in advance, and it is
because man has something to lose
and because he can lose that he can also win" (ibid. ,
p . 34) .
In the context of
S chelling's p hilosop hy, Heidegger discusses the notion of freedom as the
cap acity of both good
and evil : as he writes, "Rather, freedom is freedom for good andevil . The
'and,' the p ossibility of this
ambiguity and everything hidden in it is what is decisive. That means
that the
whole concep t of freedom must change" (S chelling's Treatise, p . 97) .
52
. S ee Charles Taylor, "S elf-Interp reting Animals," P hilosop hical
P ap ers, 2 vols. (New York :
Cambridge University P ress, 1985), vol
. 2 : HumanAgency andLanguage, p p . 45-76 . Taylor writes
that "Human beings
are
self-interp reting
animals. This is a widely echoing theme of
FRENCH
FANTASIES
contemporary philosophy . It is central to a thesis about
the sciences of man, and what diffe-
rentiates them from the sciences of nature,
which passes through Dilthey and is very strong in
the late twentieth century . It is one ofthe basic ideas
ofHeideggets philosophy, early and late .
P artly through his influence, it has been
made the starting point for a new skein ofconnected
conceptions ofman, self- understanding and
history, of which the most prominent protagonist
has been Gadamer .
At the same time, this conception of man as self- interpreting
has been
incorporated into the work
ofHabermas, the most important successor ofthe post- Marxist line
of thought known
somewhat strangely as critical theory" (ibid. , p.
45) .
53.

Cf
. Maurice
Merlean- P olity, In P raise ofP hilosophy, trans . John Wild andJames
M . Edie (Evanston :
Northwestern University P ress,
1963), pp . 52- 53: "History has no meaning, if this meaning is
understood as that ofa river which, under the influence
ofall- powerful causes, flows towards an
ocean in which it disappears
. Every appeal to universal history cuts off the meaning
of
the
specific event, renders effective
history insignificant, and is a nihilism in disguise . "
54
.

Cf. P erry
Anderson, In the Tracks of Historical Materialism (London :
Verso, 1983), p. 54:
" . . . once structures were freed from any subject at all, delivered over totally
to their own play,
they would lose what defines them as structures
- that is, any objective coordinates of
organization at all . . . Structure therewith capsizes into its antithesis, and
post- structuralism
proper
is
born,
or what can be defined as a subjectivism without a subject. " In
Towards Deep
Subjectivity (New York : Harper
and Row, 1972), Roger P oole, too, contends, albeit in a different
context, that
"P ositivism in fact weakens the case of objectivity by refusing to consider
the
hidden structures
ofsubjectivity" (p . 75) . In Foucault, Marxism andHistory (Cambridge :
P olity
P ress, 1984), Mark
P oster raises some important questions concerning Foucaults notion
ofthe
subject . For a general
discussion ofthe subject in reference to literary theory, see David Carroll,
The Subject in
Question (Chicago : University of Chicago P ress, 1982) .
55.

It may be said that everything - everything scholarly at any

rate - becomes the matter of
reading. What Ihave in mind is the phenomenology
of reading or Rezeptionsdsthetik which has
been exemplified particularly in the following works : Wolfgang
Iser, The Implied Reader
(Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University P ress, 1974) and
The Act of Reading (Baltimore : Johns
Hopkins University P ress, 1978) ; Hans Robert Jauss, Toward
an Aesthetic ofReception, trans .
Timothy Bahti (Minneapolis : University of
Minnesota P ress, 1982) and AestheticExperience and
Literary Hermeneutics, trans. Michael Shaw (Minneapolis: University
ofMinnesota P ress, 1982) .
For a
classical text on the subject in American literary
theory today, see Stanley Fish, Is There a
Text in This Class? (Cambridge : Harvard University P ress, 1980).
Cf
.
the author's "The Edifi-
cation
ofOral Hermeneutics and the Ecology of the Text," in
P roceedings ofthe XthCongress ofthe
International Comparative Literature Association, vol. 2: Comparative P oetics,
ed . Claudio Guillen and
P eggy
Escher (New York : Garland, 1986), pp,
539- 50
; and Mary
Louise P ratt, "Interpretive
Strategies/Strategic Interpretations: On Anglo- American
Reader- Response Criticism," in
P ostmodernism and P olitics, ed . Jonathan Arac (Minneapolis
: University of Minnesota P ress,
1986), pp . 26- 54.
Canadian Journal of P olit ic al and S oc ial Theory /Revue c anadienne de t hforie p olit iq ue et s oc iale,
Volume X1, No.
3 (1987).
11

04=0- 0- 4
THELIMIT OFHIS TORIES :
MICHELFOUCAULT'S NOTION OFP ARTAGE
Deborah Cook
The work of Mic hel Fouc ault is marked by muc h t he s ame rup t ures
and dis c ont inuit ies whic h Fouc ault c laimed c ons t it ut ed his t ory. Reading
t hrough his work from one end t o t he ot her leaves one wit h t he dis t inc t
imp res s ion t hat Fouc ault s imp ly failed t o find a s ingle met hod for t he
analys is of his t ory . On t he ot her hand, one might be led t o believe t hat
Fouc ault p rogres s ively modified his met hod and, "in t he end, " managed t o
unify his working hyp ot hes es . What ever one's c onc lus ions , however, it
might be of value t o analys e what eac h of Fouc ault 's works offers on it s own
in t erms
of
s uc h c onc erns
as
t he p roblem
of
met hod. That Fouc ault c ould
c ons t ant ly reint erp ret his working hyp ot hes es , es p ec ially t hos e in his
earlier work, indic at es p erhap s t hat t his work c ont ains more ins ight s t han
have been formulat ed in any of his ex p lic it s t at ement s on t he s ubjec t . In t his
p ap er, I wis h t o addres s one of t he more imp ort ant and met hodologic ally
int eres t ing not ions found in t he His t oire de la Folie d l'dge c las s iq ue : t hat of
t he p art age . I s hall als o c omment on t he broader out lines of t hat his t ory -
more p art ic ularily, on t he nat ure of t he divis ion bet ween reas on and
unreas on whic h res ult s from t he p art age . Only when t he s p ec ific c ont ex t s in
whic h t he p art age makes it s ap p earanc e are analys ed and c larified is it
p os s ible t o c ons ider t he broader met hodologic al s ignific anc e of t he p art age
in t he c orp us of Fouc ault 's work. At t he end of t he p ap er, I s hall addres s
s ome of t he met hodologic al is s ues rais ed by t his not ion .
Before I dis c us s t he not ion of p art age, a fewbrief c omment s ought t o
be
made about t he differenc es bet ween Folie et Derais on: His t oire de la Folie d
l'dge c las s iq ue - t he firs t edit ion of t he His t oire p ublis hed by P lon' - and
Gallimard's s ec ond edit ion: His t oire de la Folie d l'dge c las s iq ue . ' The c orp us
of t hes e works remains unc hanged wit h t he ex c ep t ion of s ome very minor
revis ions . The firs t edit ion, however, c ont ains a p refac e in whic h Fouc ault
FRENCH
FANTASIES
describes
the aim or intent of his history . This
preface, which Derrida has
criticised in "Cogito et Histoire de l a Fol ie,"
3
does not appear at al l in the
second edition . One can onl y specul ate
on the reasons that l ed Foucaul t to
suppress it . It is, for exampl e, entirel y
possibl e that Derrida's criticism of
Fol ie et Deraison, which focusses,
though not excl usiv el y, on some remarks
Foucaul t made in his
preface, so offended Foucaul t that he did not wish
to
see it publ ished in
the second edition . It is al so possibl e that Foucaul t's own
l ater criticism of this
work in terms of its intent indicates that
he bel iev ed
his first statement
of purpose to be inadequate . Because
the preface is
important for its description of the notion ofpartage,
I shal l make reference
to it here .
Asecond difference
between the two editions can be found in the
addition of an appendix
to the second edition . This appendix is entitl ed
"La
Fol ie,l 'absence d'oeuv re" and was original l y
publ ished in La Tabl e ronde in
May of 1964 . In it, Foucaul t extends
his anal ysis of madness in terms of the
form of excl usion pecul iar to the
cl assical age . Subsequent reprintings of
Histoire de l a Fol ie do not contain this
appendix . Once again, one may onl y
specul ate as to why this is the
case . Since, howev er, the appendix is not
crucial for an understanding of the
partage nor for the characterisation of
the particul ar form of excl usion
exercised in the cl assical age, it wil l not
be
quoted in this paper .
The notion
of partage which Foucaul t introduces to his historical
account of madness in
the cl assical age is qual ified by a number of different
terms in both the preface and
the corpus of Fol ie et Deraison . It is the degree
zero of history (FD, p . i) ,
constitutiv e of history (FD, p . i) , a caesura (FD,
p . ii) and it l ies on the confines
of history (FD, p . iv ) . Throughout the text
proper, it is used interchangeabl y with
the term "geste" (gesture) . Further,
the word ` partage" has, in French,
two distinct meanings or usages . Both of
these are
found in Foucaul t's history .
It
has
both the activ e sense of div ision
or
div iding
and the passiv e sense
of
share
or al l otment . Used inter-
changeabl y
with the notion of gesture, it is
the activ e sense that prev ail s .
The
history of the cl assical age can be said to
hav e begun with an anonymous
act which
separated the institutions, concepts and
l aws of the Renaissance
from those
of the cl assical age . The passiv e sense ofpartage
can be found in
the form of excl usion
which resul ts from the activ e
gesture and is en-
capsul ated in the
cl assical age in the distinction between reason
(raison) and
unreason (deraison) .
This v iew of history which
ascribes it to the effect of apartage l ying
on
the confines of history al ready assumes
a number of traits which may be
discov ered
in Foucaul t's l ater v iews of history .
I shal l briefl y comment on
them here,
al though Iwoul d al so point out that there are
differences in the
l ater formul ations
that must be respected . First, the idea
that history is
constituted by a partage,
or by an abrupt ev ent or experience, al ready
DEBORAHCOOK
anticipates Foucault s
later thesis that history is discontinuous .
"The
classical experience ofmadness is
born" (HF, p .
53)
. It emerges suddenly on
the scene preceded by the partage
which itself is preceded by nothing. An
anonymous act lies at the
origin
of
any historical period,
and that period is
not,
therefore, explicable with reference
to other events in previous
histories .
The anonymity ofthis gesture of
division in the Histoire de la Folie
is that gesture's
more perplexing attribute . One may be
able to describe the
effects ofthepartage
and have some, though not
unequivocable, sense ofits
historical significance
. Nevertheless, the partage
itself, apart from its
instantiation in the classical
age, is not defined . What it does,
however, is to
force a radical break with the
past .
The discontinuity which
characterises Foucault's idea of history
throughout his work is thus found
from the beginning in his notion of
partage .
While a particular epoch may
exhibit its own form ofcontinuity, it
is not part ofsome
larger and universal History which
would precede it and
explain it . Foucault's
histories begin with a discussion
of the limits or
partages that divide one
age from another .
One might write a history of
limits -of those obscure gestures,
necessarily forgotten as soon
as they are accomplished, by means of
which a culture rej ects
something that would be external to it ;
and all
throughout its history, this hollowed
void, this white space which
isolates it,
designates it as much as its values .
For it receives and
maintains its values
in the continuity ofhistory ; but in that
region of
which we wish to speak, it
exercises its essential choices, it creates
the
partage which
gives it the face of its positivity ; there one
can find the
originary
thickness where it is formed . To interrogate
a culture about
its limit
experiences, is to question it on the
confines of history, on a
rupture which is like the birth itself of
its history (FD, pp . iii-iv) .
Ruptures, confines, and limits lie at the
outer edges ofany age . History is,
in
Foucault's Histoire de la Folie
and elsewhere, constituted
in these limit
experiences or events . In his
later work, these limits become the
limits of
language and, later
still, those of power and desire .
Thus, the earlier
anonymity of the partage
gives way to a more positive
qualification .
Another idea entailed
by this notion ofpartage is that of
alea, chance or
accident . The P etit
Robert defines "alea" as an
unforseeable event, an
unforeseeable turn that
events might take -hasard .
The pa rtage is not
something that
can be predicted on the basis of
prior events which might,
otherwise, be assumed
to have led up to it .
It
is
neither determined nor the
result ofthe choice
ofsubj ects with free
will. Its emergence on the scene is
as
unpredictable as the roll ofa
dice . Thepartage is an event which
can never
be anticipated . Thus neither
reason nor unreason could appear such as
they
FRENCHFANTASIES
were without the entirely inexplicable gesture that constituted the classical
age. In question, then, is the rationality of history and a rational origin for
historical periods
.
It
is this
refusal to see the real as rational which plants
Foucault
squarely in the tradition
of
Nietzsche . Although the word
"chance" is not used in Histoire de la Folie, it is clear that Foucault's
later
description of it in "Nietzsche, Geneology, History" is applicable to that
earlier work. In this article on Nietzsche, Foucault
approvingly
quotes
Nietzsche's view in Die Morgenrote that sees history as " . . . the iron hand of
necessity shaking the dicebox of chance. "'
The final point
to be
made about the notion ofpartage, which links it
to Foucault's later work, concerns the problem of
origin . It is here that
Foucault's view of thepartage stands in
need
of
correctives ifone wishes
to
correlate it with Foucault's later ideas . In the preface ofFoucault's
history,
one reads :
What is constitutive
is
the
gesture that divides madness, and not the
science
which
is
established : this division [partage] which, once it is
made, returns to the calm
. What
is
originary is the caesura which
establishes the distance between reason and
unreason . . .
It will
therefore be necessary to speak of this primitive debate without
supposing a victory nor a right to victory, to speak of those gestures
regurgitated in history . . . . of these cutting gestures, of this distance
taken (FD, pp . i- ii) .
The problemwith this notion ofpartage as origin has been well formulated
by Jacques Derrida, who otherwise misreads Foucault. In "Cogito et
Histoire de
la Folie," Derrida writes
: " . . .
if
this- great
division is the
possibility itself
of
history, the historicity ofhistory, what does 'writing the
history of this partage' mean here?"
s
What is the nature of the origin
Foucault posits with his notion ofpartage? In L'Ordre du Discours, where he
links it with the will to truth and powerand desire 6 it is clear that Foucault
means something historical by it . In Histoire de la Folie, however, thepartage
appears at once to lie outside ofhistory as that which makes it possible and
to be the result or effect of a partage.
The
ambiguity of that word with
respect
to
its two
senses
is perhaps
no
more evident than here.
The ambiguity in Foucault's notion ofpartage as origin is a problem
that is not resolved in the Histoire de la Folie. Can something that is
constitutive of history itself be historical? If not, then one is confronted
with a gesture that shares much in common with the creative and uncaused
act ofa divine being. In the beginning was the
partage
. On one interpretation,
then, it would be the unmoved mover or uncaused cause of history. Apart
from
a
few vague remarks on the relationship
between
the partage
and
history,
Foucault does not
define
the status of
that gesture that initiates
DEBORAH
COOK
history . Only la te r, whe n he
links the pa rta ge to powe r a nd de sire , will one
find a cha ra cte risa tion of its sta tu s a s
a n historica l one . Comme nting on his
history
in L ' Arche ologie du S a v oir, Fou ca u lt sta te s tha t he ca me " . . .
close to
a dmitting a n a nonymou s
a ndge ne ra l su bje ct of history . "' This a tte mpt a t
se lf- criticism se e ms pa rticu la rly a pt
in light of the difficu ltie s with
Fou ca u lt' s ide a of history ske tche d he re .
Wha t the pa rta ge div ide s is, a s ha s a lre a dy be e n
note d, itse lf a pa rta ge .
In the
cla ssica l a ge , wha t is div ide d is the re a lm of re a son
from u nre a son .
Fou ca u lt
fu rthe r cla ims tha t the a ctiv e pa rta ge which cre a te s this
div ision is
a n e thica l one .
This philosophica l a ccou nt of the na tu re of the
pa rta ge a ndof
its e ffe cts is the ne xt topic
I sha ll tre a t in this pa pe r .
Fou ca u lt ope ns his discu ssion of
the cla ssica l a ge with a n inte rpre ta tion
of De sca rte s. In the sta ge of na tu ra l dou bt
- be fore he a dv a nce s the
possibility of tota l de ce ption with the e v il ge niu s hypothe sis
- De sca rte s
e xclu de s ma dne ss a s a sta ge in the proce ss of ra tiona l dou bt .
Dou bting the
se nse s is
ra tiona l be ca u se the se nse s some time s de ce iv e me . Dou bting
tha t I
a m
a wa ke is ra tiona l be ca u se I some time s dre a m tha t
I
a m
a wa ke whe n I a m
in fa ct a sle e p . bu t dou bting my sa nity is a n e xtra v a ga nce
which the proce ss
of ra tiona l dou bt ma ke s impossible . Along the
roa d to the tru th of the
cogito, ma dne ss mu st be e xclu de d. If one
we re to e nte rta in the hypothe sis
tha t one wa s ma d, the re wou ld be no grou nd
for a sse rting a ny tru th
wha tsoe v e r
. Ma dne ss is thu s e xclu de d de ov o from the ra tiona lity of
the
dou bting proce ss tha t
le a ds to tru th . It is simply pre su me d to be too
e xtra v a ga nt to wa rra nt
se riou s conside ra tion.
This su mma ry
e xclu sion of ma dne ss from ra tiona l dou bt in the sta ge
of na tu ra l dou bt is
not the only e xclu sion ma dne ss su ffe rs in De sca rte s'
work . At a
la te r sta ge in his a na lysis, Fou ca u lt comme nts on the e xclu sion
fou nd in De sca rte s' re je ction of the e v il ge niu s hypothe sis .
Fou ca u lt
inte rpre ts the holding of this hypothe sis a s a fina l a tte mpt
to inclu de
ma dne ss in the proce ss of ra tiona lity . tha t le a ds to
tru th . While I obje ct to
this inte rpre ta tion of the hype rbolic hypothe sis
a s a form of ma dne ss on the
grou nds tha t De sca rte s a dv a nce d re a sons
for e nte rta ining it, Fou ca u lt doe s
ma na ge to show tha t e v e n the
possibility of tota l de ce ption is e xclu de d
from the tru th of the cogito . His
inte rpre ta tion, howe v e r, doe s not u nde r-
e stima te the force of the
e v il ge niu s hypothe sis .
It is tru e
tha t the cogito is a n a bsolu te be ginning; bu t one mu st
not
forge t tha t the e v il ge niu s come s be fore it .
And
the
e v il ge niu s is not
the symbol in which a re re su me d
a nd syste ma tize d a ll the da nge rs of
those psychologica l e v e nts which a re
dre a m ima ge s a nd se nsible
e rror . Be twe e n God a nd ma n, the
e v il ge niu s ha s a n a bsolu te me a ning :
in a ll his rigor he is the
possibility of u nre a son a nd the tota lity of its
powe rs . . . And it is not
be ca u se the tru th which the cogito
illu mina te s
50
FRENCHFANTASIES
ends up masking t h e
sh adow of t h e ev il genius t h at one must forget h is
c ont inual l y dangerous
power ; t h is danger wil l underl ie D esc art es'
proc edure up unt il t h e
exist enc e and t h e t rut h of t h e ext ernal worl d
(HF, p .
175) .
Wit h t h e c ogit o,
t h e possibil it y of c ompl et e dec ept ion is el iminat ed
. Th e ev il
genius may
dec eiv e me as muc h as h e want s, h e wil l nev er
arrange it so t h at I
am
not h ing wh en I t h ink t h at I exist . Th e c ert it ude
of
my
own exist enc e
prot ec t s me from t h at danger t h at l urks in t h e
sh adow of t h e l umen nat ural e :
t h e possibil it y t h at I may be ut t erl y
dec eiv ed . Th e power of t h e ev il genius
does not ext end t o t h at
absol ut e beginning t h at assures me of my
own
exist enc e . It is in
t h e t rut h of t h e c ogit o al one t h at h is power
is dispel l ed .
Wh at Fouc aul t
h opes t o il l ust rat e wit h t h is ph il osoph ic al
ac c ount of
exc l usion is, first l y , t h e
nat ure of t h e part age it sel f and,
sec ondl y , t h e new
rel at ionsh ip wh ic h resul t s
from it bet ween reason and unreason
in t h e
c l assic al age . Wh at D esc art es'
spont aneous ac t of exc l uding madness from
t h e proc ess of rat ional doubt
exempl ifies is a wil l t o rat ional it y t h at may
not
be breac h ed by an appeal t o ext rav agant
or h y perbol ic h y pot h eses . Fouc aul t
writ es t h at " . . . t h e wil l t o doubt
h as al ready exc l uded t h e inv ol unt ary
enc h ant ment of unreason and
t h e Niet zsc h ean possibil it y of
bec oming
mad" (HF, p . 157) . Th e
gest ure t h at div ides reason from
unreason is
t h erefore an et h ic al
one . D oubt is assumed t o be t h e
ac t of a free subjec t
wh ic h , by v irt ue of being
rat ional -i. e. free -may l ead
t o t rut h . In t h e ac t
of wil l wh ic h impel s doubt
and sust ains it , one h as al ready
v ol unt aril y
exc l uded t h e possibil it y
of madness . Th e wil l t o doubt
al ready impl ies a
dec ision t o exc ommunic at e
madness.
If I doubt , I c annot be mad . If
I am mad, I do not exist . Th e
form of
exc l usion prac t ic ed in t h e c l assic al age
on t h e basis of it s et h ic al part age
is a
radic al one . Fac ing t h e Cart esian subjec t
-t h e ph il osoph ic al c ount erpart
of our c l assic al forebears -
is
a
worl d of unreason and madness wh ic h
t h is
subjec t rejec t s out of h and as l ac king
rat ional it y , and t h us
exist enc e
al t oget h er
.
Confront ing t h ose insensat e beings wh o imagined
t h emsel v es as
pit c h ers or as h av ing bodies of gl ass, D esc art es
knew immediat el y h e
was not
at
al l
l ike t h em . . . Th e inev it abl e rec ognit ion
of t h eir madness
arose spont aneousl y in
a rel at ion est abl ish ed bet ween t h em and
onesel f.
t h e subjec t wh o
perc eiv ed t h e differenc e measured it against
h imsel f
(HF, p . 19 9 ) .
Th e insane, and
t h ose grouped wit h t h em
under t h e rubric of unreason,
were immediat el y
perc eiv ed as et h ic al l y nul and v oid and
were t h us int erned
in h ouses of c orrec t ion
wh ere t h ey were punish ed for
t h eir moral t urpit ude .
DEBORAHCOOK
The et hi c a l di vi si on l ea ds, by t he forc e of t he ra t i ona l i t y i t spa wns, t o t he
posi t i ng of a rea l m of unrea son .
The mi d-sevent eent h c ent ury sa w t he sudden bi rt h of i nt ernment
t hroughout Europe a nd Grea t Bri t a i n . Thepl a c es i n whi c h t hei nsa ne were
housed weredesi gned for t hemora l c a st i ga t i on of mi sery a nd unrea son . " I f,
i n t hesevent eent h c ent ury, ma dness wa s vi rt ua l l y desa nc t i fi ed, i t i s bec a use
mi sery ha s undergone t hi s sort of fa l l whi c h mea ns t ha t i t i s now perc ei ved
on a mora l hori zon a l one" (HF, p . 74) . The i nsa ne a re not soc i a l l y useful ,
mora l subjec t s . I nsa ni t y ha s been c rea t ed a s a form of unrea son by vi rt ue of
t ha t et hi c a l di vi si on whi c hc rea t es bot h rea son a nd unrea son . Gi ven t hewi l l
t o doubt , a whol e c a t egory of peopl e i nc l udi ng t he i ndi gent , t he l i bert i nes,
t hose wi t h venerea l di sea ses, sodomi t es, t he deba uc hed a nd ot hers, a re
a brupt l y shut out of t he et hi c a l order . Thus i t i s not ma dness i t sel f, or a
ma dness t ha t woul d preexi st t he c l a ssi c a l a ge a nd persi st i n our own whi c h
i s exc l uded . Fouc a ul t ma kes t hi s poi nt qui t e expl i c i t l y . Ma dness, a nd t he
forms of unrea son a ssoc i a t ed wi t h i t , a re desi gna t ed a s et hi c a l l y voi d i n t he
c l a ssi c a l a ge a l one.
. . . one di d not i nt ern, i n a bout 1657, one one hundredt h of t he
popul a t i on of P a ri s t o sa ve onesel f from t he " a soc i a l
el ement
. "
The
gest ure undoubt edl y ha d a not her di mensi on : i t
di d
not
i sol a t e mi s-
underst ood st ra ngers who ha d been hi dden for t oo l ong under t he
ma sk of c ust om ; i t c rea t ed t hem, c ha ngi ng fa mi l i a r fa c es i n t he soc i a l
l a ndsc a pe t o ma ke of t hem bi za rre fa c es no one c oul d rec ogni se a ny
more . . . I n a word, one mi ght sa y t ha t t hi s gest ure wa s c rea t i ve of
a l i ena t i on (HF, p . 94) .
The c rea t i on of ma dness a s
a mora l fa ul t c a n
t hus be
a t t ri but ed t o t he
pa rt a ge
whi c h, i na smuc h a s i t i s et hi c a l , di vi des ma dness from t he c ogi t o,
rea son from unrea son a nd bei ng from not -bei ng . " [R]ea son i s born i n a n
et hi c a l spa c e" (HF, p . 157) . And unrea son i s born i n t hesa me spa c e. Rea son
resi des i n t he free wi l l a nd t he sense of responsi bi l i t y i t ent a i l s . Unrea son
resi des i n t hei nvol unt a ry beha vi our of a n a ni ma l whi c h l a c ks even t hemost
nomi na l senseof gui l t . Fouc a ul t goes on t o c l a i m t ha t rea son a nd unrea son
c onfront ea c h ot her i n t he c l a ssi c a l a ge a s bei ng c onfront s non-bei ng . I t i s
t hi s fi na l desc ri pt i on of t he pa ssi ve form of t he pa rt a ge whi c h I sha l l
c onsi der i n my c onc l udi ng rema rks .
Wha t di st i ngui shes t he c l a ssi c a l a gefrom
a ny
ot her i s t henew rel a t i on-
shi p
est a bl i shed i n
i t
by vi rt ue of i t s et hi c a l pa rt a ge t o wha t i t deemed
unrea son or i nsa ni t y . Fouc a ul t a ssert s t ha t no ot her a ge ha s experi enc ed t he
sort of di vi si on found i n t he c l a ssi c a l a ge bet ween rea son a nd unrea son .
Never ha s a n a ge so st ri ngent l y di st i ngui shed wha t
i t desi gna t es a s i nsa ni t y.
Wi t h t he bi rt h of houses of i nt ernment , t hose c onsi dered i nsa ne were
FRENCHFANTASIES
opposed t o t he et hi c a l a nd r a t i ona l subjec t of t he c l a ssi c a l a ge a s non-bei ng
( non-et r e) t o bei ng ( et r e) .
Desc a r t es " . . . ba ni shes ma dness i n t he na me of t he per son who
doubt s a nd who c a n no mor e be i r r a t i ona l t ha n not t hi nk or not be" ( HF,
p. 5 8 ) . The ma dma n wa s t hus desi gna t ed " . . . a br upt l y a nd wi t hout fur t her
a do by hi s pr esenc e a l one i n t he v i si bl e - l umi nous a nd noc t ur na l -
pa r t a ge of bei ng a nd non-bei ng" ( HF, p.
5 47) .
An et hi c a l , a nd
t her efor e,
r a t i ona l subjec t , who exer c i ses hi s
or
her
fr ee wi l l , ha s a l r ea dy, a nd by v i r t ue
of t hose a c t s, joi ned t he et hi c a l
c ommuni t y. An i nsa ne bei ng ha s fa i l ed t o
exer c i se t he r i ght
t o c hoose whi c h i s gi v en wi t h fr ee wi l l . As unfr ee a nd
i r r esponsi bl e,
t he i nsa ne must be exc l uded. They for m " . . . t he ot her si de of
a c hoi c e whi c h opens t o huma nki nd t he fr ee exer c i se of i t s r a t i ona l na t ur e"
( HF, p. 15 9) .
Tha t unr ea son i n t he c l a ssi c a l a ge does not pa r t a ke i n t he exi st enc e of
t he et hi c a l c ommuni t y
i s not , howev er , t o sa y t ha t i t does not exi st a t a l l . It
mea ns t ha t no t r ut h i s gua r a nt eed
t o t he exi st enc e of unr ea son . Thei nsa ne
do not ha v e a ny a ssur a nc e
of t hei r own exi st enc e. And t he et hi c a l or der
whi c h i mpl i c i t l y r ec ogni zes
t hei r exi st enc e i n t he pr a c t i c e of i nt er nment
does not v a l i da t e i t . The exi st enc e
of t he et hi c a l or der i s gua r a nt eed i n t he
t r ut h
of t he c ogi t o . The exi st enc e of unr ea son i s a ssur ed by t he et hi c a l
c ommuni t y
t ha t r ec ogni zes i t but r efuses t o a c c or d i t a ny st a t us i n t he r ea l m
of r a t i ona l i t y a nd
t her efor e of et hi c s . Thi nki ng, or t he r a t i ona l i t y gi v en i n
t he exer c i se
of fr ee wi l l , ma y wel l be t he ha l l -ma r k of exi st enc e, but
exi st enc e i t sel f ma y
t a ke ot her for ms whi c h a r e not r a t i ona l . It ma y, a nd i n
fa c t does, t a ke
t he for m of unr ea son i n t he c l a ssi c a l a ge.
In t he Hi st oi r e de
l a Fol i e, Fouc a ul t a t t empt s hi s fi r st desc r i pt i on of a n
a ge i n t er ms of a
not i on t ha t he wi l l pr ogr essi v el y r ev i se a s he c ont i nues hi s
st udi es of hi st or y . Thepa r t a ge i s c ent r a l
not onl y t o Fouc a ul t 's ea r l y wor k,
but i s c i t ed i n t he l a t er wor k a s wel l , a s a for m
of "exc l usi on, l i mi t a t i on,
a ppr opr i a t i on" ' whi c h must be st udi ed i n wha t he t er ms
a c r i t i c a l a na l ysi s
of hi st or y . It i s a n i nt egr a l pa r t of wha t
Fouc a ul t mea ns by a r c heol ogy .
Nev er t hel ess, a ft er we ha v e exa mi ned i t s r ol e i n
t he Hi st oi r e de l a Fol i e, t he
na t ur e of t he pa r t a ge, a pa r t fr om i t s spec i fi c ( et hi c a l )
i nst a nt i a t i on i n t he
c l a ssi c a l a ge, r ema i ns unc er t a i n. Tha t t he c l a ssi c a l a ge shoul d
ha v e been
c onst i t ut ed by a pa r t a ge whi c h di st i ngui shes i t fr om ot her a ges br i ngs
one
no c l oser t o under st a ndi ng wha t t hepa r t a ge i t sel f mi ght be.
Indeed, ev en
when
i t r ec ei v es
a
mor e posi t i v e q ua l i fi c a t i on i n t he l a t er wor k, i t i s
just i t s
pr ot ea n c a pa c i t y t o t a ke di ffer ent for ms i n di ffer ent a ges whi c h
i s
empha si zed
by Fouc a ul t .
One t hi ng i s c l ea r , howev er .
In Fouc a ul t 's v i ew, i t i s nec essa r y t ha t
hi st or i a ns r el a t e t he pr a c t i c es of a n a ge ba c k
t o t hei r "or i gi n" i n a pa r t a ge.
Thepa r t a ge r epr esent s a ki nd of hi st or i ogr a phi c i mper a t i v e
. If hi st or i es a r e
c onst i t ut ed by suc h r upt ur es, a nd i t i s c er t a i n t ha t Fouc a ul t
bel i ev es t hi s,
DEBORAHCOOK
then, i n order to wri te hi s tory ,
one mus t refer the p ra c ti c es , i ns ti tuti ons ,
l a ws ,
a nd di s c ours e of a n a ge ba c k to the
p a rta ge whi c h l i mi ts i t a nd
determi nes
i t . Yet, a nd onc e a ga i n, whi l e the
nec es s i ty of referri ng the
p ra c ti c es of a n a ge ba c k to
the p a rta ge i s a mp l y i l l us tra ted by Fouc a ul t's
enti re
c orp us , nei ther Fouc a ul t nor hi s c ommenta tors
ha ve c l a ri fi ed i ts s ta tus . I f
"[o]ne mus t
a c c ep t the i ntroduc ti on of the a l ea tory a s a c a tegory
i n the
p roduc ti on of events ,"" how
thi s s houl d be unders ta nd rema i ns a
my s tery .
Perha p s the p a rta ge i s
nothi ng a p a rt from i ts i ns ta nti a ti ons i n
p a rti c ul a r
a ges . I f thi s were the c a s e, one
woul d be obl i ged to vi ew the p a rta ge a s
hi s tori c a l . However, s uc h a n hi s tori c a l
i nterp reta ti on does not a gree wi th
Fouc a ul t's c ha ra c teri za ti on of the p a rta ge a s the
degree zero of hi s tory . On
the
other ha nd, i t mi ght be ea s i er to c a ri c a ture the
noti on, by c omp a ri ng i t
to the
Ada mi te theory of na mi ng . The c rea ti on of a n
enti rel y new worl d of
objec ts whi c h i s a ttri buted to
a p a rta ge res embl es nothi ng more tha n the
theory a c c ordi ng to
whi c h the worl d wa s c rea ted i n the word . I ndeed, i n
s uc h works a s The Arc heol ogy
of Knowl edge, the p a rta ge ha s a p ec ul i a rl y
l i ngui s ti c c ha ra c ter whi c h l ends i ts el f ea s i l y to s uc h
a c a ri c a ture . I n ei ther
c a s e, i t i s c l ea r tha t wha t Fouc a ul t dema nds of
hi s rea ders i s s i mp l y to a c c ep t
(or
rejec t) the noti on tha t hi s tory i s c ons ti tuted
i n a s eri es of rup tures or
p a rta ges . No
a rguments a re a dva nc ed to defend i t ;
we a re s i mp l y tol d (i n The
Arc heol ogy of Knowl edge, for exa mp l e) tha t
a new a na l y s i s of hi s tory whi c h
borrows muc h from
Georges Ca ngui l hem, ha s begun to
tra ns form
tra di ti ona l hi s tori ogra p hy
. The va l i di ty of thi s new form of
hi s tori ogra p hy
i s never demons tra ted
.
I ts
us eful nes s to hi s tori a ns i s onl y i l l us tra ted
by the
a c tua l hi s tori es p roduc ed
under the a egi s of the methodol ogi c a l
p ri nc i p l e
of referri ng the
"es s enti a l c hoi c es " of a n a ge ba c k to
the p a rta ge whi c h
c ons ti tuted them
. Tha t thi s methodol ogy a nd the noti on
i mp l i ed by i t
rema i n
unexa mi ned a nd undefended i s one of the
c entra l wea knes s es of
Fouc a ul t's
hi s tori ogra p hy .
I n one of hi s l a ter p rogra mma ti c
s ta tements , found i n L'Ordre du
Di s c ours , Fouc a ul t further a rti c ul a tes
the noti on of p a rta ge . Sy s tems of
exc l us i on a re gi ven a more deta i l ed
trea tment, a nd Fouc a ul t i s ol a tes three
whi c h were found i n a c onfus ed
form i n the Hi s toi re de l a Fol i e . Proc edures
of exc l us i on i nc l ude the
i nterdi c t (fi nterdi t) , rejec ti on, a nd the
wi l l
to
truth,
whi c h exc l udes fa l s i ty . Thes e
a re hi s tori c a l l y c ondi ti oned forms of
exc l us i on
whi c h ul ti ma tel y refer to
p ower a nd des i re, a nd to the i ns ti tuti ons ,
l a ws ,
etc . , whi c h a re ma i nta i ned by
p ower a nd des i re . I n order to a na l y s e
a s oc i ety ,
i t i s nec es s a ry to
refer i ts di s c ours e ba c k to thes e forms . As
i n the Hi s toi re,
then, the a na l y s i s of
hi s tory requi res tha t the exc l us i ona ry
events whi c h
c ons ti tute i t be i denti fi ed
a nd c ha ra c teri zed . Neverthel es s ,
onl y i f one
a c c ep ts the vi ew
tha t hi s tory i s di s c onti nuous , a nd tha t thi s
di s c onti nui ty i s
c ondi ti oned by
p a rta ges , wi l l Fouc a ul t's hi s tori ogra p hy be
p ra c ti c a bl e . Mere
acceptance w i l l not val i date i t how ever.
To defend Foucaul t, i t i s neces s ary
to fi nd not onl y i l l us trati ons , but arguments ,
to s upport thi s method-
ol ogi cal pri nci pl e .
1 .

Mi chel Foucaul t, Fol i e et Derai s on: Hi s toi re de l a Fol i e a ldge cl as s i que ( P ari s : P i on,1 961 ) . Henceforth
quoted i n the text
as
FD .
2 .

Mi chel Foucaul t, Hi s toi re de l a Fol i c d 1 ' dge cl as s i que ( P ari s : Gal l i mard, 1 972 ) . Henceforth quoted
i n
the text as HF.
3 .
Jacques Derri da, "Cogi to et Hi s toi re de l a Fol i c
; "
i n L' Ecri ture et l a
Di fference
( P ari s
: Edi ti ons du
S eui l , 1 967), pp . 51 -97 .
4 .

Fri edri ch Ni etzs che, The Daw n ofthe Day ( n . p. ) p . 1 3 0 , quoted i n Mi chel Foucaul t, "Ni etzs che,
Geneol ogy, Hi s tory," i n Language, Counter-Memory, P racti ce, ed . Donal d Bouchard,
trans . , Donal d
Bouchard and S herry S i mon ( I thaca, New York: Cornel l Uni vers i ty P res s ,
1 967) p. 1 55 .
5 .

"Cogi to et Hi s toi re de l a Fol i e," p . 68 .

6 .

Mi chel Foucaul t, L' Ordre du Di s cours ( P ari s : Gal l i mard, 1 971 ), pp . 1 0 -2 3 .

7 .

Mi chel Foucaul t,
L
Archeol ogi e du
S avoi r ( P ari s : Gal l i mard, 1 969), p . 2 7 .
8.

Al though Jacques Derri da has advanced a pow erful argument agai ns t Foucaul t s i nterpretati on
of Des cartes i n "Cogi to et Hi s toi re de l a Fol i c," I s hal l treat Foucaul ts i nterpretati on as
unprobl emati c i n thi s paper . I n fact, i t can be s how n that Derri da compl etel y negl ects to take
i nto account the rati onal character of Des cartes ' doubt
.
Thi s
overs i ght, al ong w i th a ques ti onabl e
i nterpretati on of the evi l geni us hypothes i s , fl aw s hi s cri ti ci s m, and thus Foucaul ts account
remai ns the more acceptabl e
one.
9
. Another s tandard i nterpretati on
of
Foucaul t
that
appears
i n Derri da' s w ork and others s ugges ts
that Foucaul t i s attempti ng an
ontol ogy of madnes s
.
As I hope to s how i n thi s paper, how ever,
madnes s i n the Hi s toi re de l a Fol i e i s an hi s tori cal phenomenon
cons ti tuted by a partage w hos e
nature i s ethi cal but w hos e s tatus i n terms of hi s tory i s uncertai n .
1 0 .

L' Ordre du Di s cours , p. 62 .

1 1 .

I bi d . , p. 61 .
FRENCH FANTAS I ES
Notes
Department of P hi l os ophy
Queens Uni vers i ty
1
1 , 8 0
HEORY
CULTURE&
SOCIETY
F ~plur, , iL, n~ in(

iii, al Su, iaI S, i, " n, e

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Canadian Journal of P olit ic al and S oc ial Theory /Revue c anadienne de t heorie p olit iq ue et s oc iale,
Volume XI, No . 3 (1987) .
WHEN
BATAILLE
ATTACKEDTHEMETAP HYS ICAL
P RINCIP LEOFECONOMY
Jean
Baudrillard
Trans lat or's
Not e
Int eres t in t he work of Jean Baudrillard has c ont inued
t o grow
:
t he
imp res s ive c rit ic al analys es
of t he early work, s uc h as For a Crit iq ue of t he
P olit ic al Ec onomy
of t he S ign (Telos , 1981 ; orig. 1972) ; t he middle p olemic s ,
s uc h as
Forget t ing
Fouc ault (Humanit ies in S oc iet y, Wint er, 1980; orig. 1977) ;
t he Mc Luhanes q ue fat al s t rat egies of lat e, s uc h as In t he S hadow oft he S ilent
Majorit ies (S emiot ext e, 1983; orig. 1982) . The name Baudrillard, as wit h
t hat of Deleuze and Lyot ard, has gained c urrenc y -or 's ign-value' t o us e
Baudrillard's ap p ellat ion -in t he exc hange t hat is c oming t o be referred t o
as t he
modernis t -p os t modernis t debat e .
At t he s ame t ime,
int eres t in t he work of Georges Bat aille (a name
long known in Franc e and in Frenc h
s t udies ) is gaining moment um out s ide
t hes e geo-p olit ic al and int ellec t ual
boundaries . Even t hat zealous defender
of modernit y, Jurgen Habermas -in his
rec ent ly p ublis hed c ollec t ion of
int erviews Aut onomy and S olidarit y (New Left Books , 1986)
-
makes
a
p oint , in p as s ing, of c rit ic izing Bat aille . In Nort h Americ a,
t his gat hering
int eres t has been fac ilit at ed by t he rec ent Englis h-language p ublic at ions
of
s elec t ions of Bat aille's work in Vis ions ofExc es s (Minnes ot a, 1985) and more
rec ent ly in t he journal Oc t ober (S p ring, 1986) .
It s eems ap rop os , in light of t his uniq ue junc t ure of int eres t s , t o make
available
t he following t rans lat ion of Jean Baudrillard's review of t he
s event h volume of t he Oeuvres c omp let es -t he c ollec t ed works -of Georges
Bat aille (Gallimard, 1976) . The review is of p art ic ular
int eres t at t his
junc t ure for t he light it s heds on t he role p layed by
Bat aille's works in t he
c ont inuing develop ment (or develop ment s ) of Baudrillard's t hought
. It is
of furt her int eres t in t hat it help s c larify Baudrillard's elus ive not ion
of
JEANBAUDRILLARD
symbolic exchange,
a notion derived in large part from Marcel Mauss's
The
Gift (Norton, 1967;
orig .
1925),
as well as from Bataille's reflections
on,
and appropriation of that work. I
might also note that Baudrillard's
` criticism' here of Bataille's naturalizing
the gift-exchange is of particular
interest
in light of what appears to be his own
naturalizing of it, under the
guise of
"seduction," in the "prodigious metaphysical
spiral" that charac-
terizes
his own later work (see, for example, his comments
in "Game with
Vestiges" in On the Beach
[Winter, 1984]) .
David James Miller
Purdue University
FRENCHFANTASIES
WHENBATAILLE
ATTACKEDTHE
METAPHYSICAL
PRINCIPLEOF
ECONOMY'
Jean
Baudrillard
Georges
Bat aille, Oeuvre Complet es : vol. VII. Paris : Gallimard. 618 pp . 2
Cont inuit y, sovereignt y,
int imacy, immanent immensit y : a
single
t hought in t he work
of Bat aille, a single myt hic t hought behind
t hese
mult iple t erms
: " I am of t hose who dest ine ment o t hings
ot hert hant he incessant
growt h
ofproduct ion, who incit e t hem t o t he sacred
horror. "
The
sacredisparexcellence t hesphereof " La
part maudit e" [ t he accursed
share] (t hecent ral
essay of t his sevent h volumeof Bat aille's
works), sphere
of sacrificial
expendit ure, of wealt h [ luxe] and of
deat h; sphere of a
" general" economy
which refut es all t heaxioms of economy
as it is usually
underst ood (an
economy which, in generalizing it self,
overruns [ brine] it s
boundaries and t ruly
passes beyondpolit ical economy,
somet hing t hat t he
lat t er,
andallMarxist t hought , arepowerless
t o do inaccordancewit h t he
int ernal
logic of value) . It is also t he
sphere of non-knowledge [ non-
savoir] .
Paradoxically, t heworks collect ed
here are in away Bat aille's " Book
of Knowledge, "
t he onewherehe t ries t o erect
t he but t resses of avision
which, at
bot t om, doesn't need t hem ; indeed,
t he drive [ pulsion] t oward
t he sacred
ought , in it s dest ruct ive incandescence,
t o deny t he kind of
apology and discursive
rendit ion cont ained in " LaPart
Maudit e" and " La
Theorie de Religion. .. .
. My philosophic posit ion is based on
non-knowledge of t he
whole, onknowledge concerned
only wit h det ails . " It is necessary,
t herefore, t o
read t hesedefensivefragment s
from t het wo ant it het ical
perspect ives [ sur
le double versant ] of
knowledge and non-knowledge.
The
Fundament alPrinciple
The
cent ral idea is t hat t he economy
which governs our societ ies
result s
from a misappropriat ion of t he
fundament al human principle,
which is a solar
principle of expendit ure. Bat aille's
t hought goes, beyond
properpolit ical
economy (which in essenceis regulat ed
t hrough exchange
value), st raight t o t hemet aphysical
principleof economy. Bat aille's
t arget is
ut ilit y,
in it s root . U t ilit y is, of course, an
apparent ly posit ive principleof
capit al
: accumulat ion, invest ment , depreciat ion,
et c . But in fact it is, on
Bat aille's
account , aprincipleof powerlessness, an
ut t erinabilit y t o expend.
Givent hat allprevious
societ ies knew how t o expend, t his
is, anunbeliev-
JEAN
BAUDRILLARD
able deficiency
: it cut s t he human being
off from all possible sovereignt y .
All economics is
founded on t hat which no longer
can, no longer knows
how t o expend it self
[ se depenser] , on t hat which is
incapable of becoming
t he st ake of a sacrifice . It is
t herefore ent irely residual, it is a
limit ed social
fact ; and it is against economy as
a limit ed social fact t hat Bat aille want s t o
raise
expendit ure, deat h and sacrifice as
t ot al social fact s -such is t he
principle of
general economy .
The principle of
ut ilit y (use value) blends wit h t he
bourgeoisie, wit h
t his capit alist class whose
definit ion for Bat aille (cont rary t o
Marx) is
negat ive : it no longer knows how t o
expend . S imilarly, t he crisis of capit al,
it s increasing
mort alit y and it s immanent deat h
t hroes, are not bound, as in
t he workof
Marx, t o a hist ory, t o dialect ical reversals
[ peripet ies] , but t o t his
fundament al law of t he
inabilit y t o expend, which gives capit al
over t o t he
cancer of product ion and
unlimit ed reproduct ion . There is no
principle of
revolut ion in Bat aille' s work: "The
t error of revolut ions has only done more
and
more
[ de mieux en mieux] t o subordinat e human energy
t o indust ry . " There is only a
principle
of
sacrifice -t he principle of
sovereignt y, whose diversion by
t he bourgeoisie and capit al causes
all human hist ory t o pass from
sacred
t ragedy t o t he comedy of
ut ilit y .
This crit iq ue is a non
marxist crit iq ue, an arist ocrat ic crit iq ue,
because
it aims at ut ilit y, at economic finalit y
as t he axiomof capit alist societ y.
The
Marxist crit iq ue is
only a crit iq ue of capit al, a crit iq ue
coming from t he
heart of t he middle and pet it
bourgeois classes, for which
Marxism has
served
for a cent ury as a lat ent ideology : a
crit iq ue of exchange value, but an
walt at ion ofuse value -and t hus a
crit iq ue, at t he same t ime, of what made
t he almost
delirious great ness of capit al, t he
secular remains of it s religious
q ualit y : I invest ment at any price, even at
t he cost of use value . The marxist
seeks
a good use of economy . Marxism is
t herefore only a limit ed
pet it
bourgeois crit iq ue, one more st ep
in t he banalizat ion of life t oward
t he
"good use" of t he social!
Bat aille, t o t he cont rary, sweeps away all t his
slave
dialect ic from an arist ocrat ic
point of view, t hat of t he mast er
st ruggling
wit h his deat h . One can
accuse t his perspect ive of being
pre-
or
post -
Marxist . At any rat e,
Marxism is only t he disenchant ed
horizon of capit al
-all t hat precedes or
follows it is more radical t han it is .
What
remains uncert ain in t he work of
Bat aille (but wit hout a doubt
t his
uncert aint y can not be alleviat ed), is t o
know whet her t he economy
(capit al),
which is count erbalanced on
absurd, but never useless, never
sacrificial expendit ures (wars,
wast e . . . ), is nevert heless shot
t hrough wit h
a sacrificial dynamic . Is
polit ical economy at bot t om only a
frust rat ed avat ar
of t he single great
cosmic law of expendit ure? Is t he ent ire
hist ory of capit al
only an immense
det our t oward it s own cat ast rophe,
t oward it s own
sacrificial end?
If t his is so, it is because, in t he
end, one cannot not expend .
Alonger
spiral perhaps drags capit al beyond economy,
t oward a dest ruct ion
60
FRENCHFANTASIES
of
i t s own
values ; t he alt ernat i ve i s t hat we are s t uck forever i n t hi s deni al of
t he s acred, i n t he vert i go of s upply, whi ch s i gni fi es t he rupt ure of alli ance
(of s ymboli c exchange i n pri mi t i ve s oci et i es ) and of s overei gnt y .
Bat ai lle would have been i mpas s i oned by t he pres ent evolut i on of
capi t al i n t hi s era of float i ng currenci es , of values s eeki ng t hei r own level
(whi ch i s not t hei r t rans mut at i on), and t he dri ft of fi nali t i es [ la deri ve des
fi nali t es ] (whi ch i s nei t her s overei gn us eles s nes s nor t he abs urd grat ui t ous -
nes s of laught er and deat h) . But hi s concept of expendi t ure would have
permi t t ed only a li mi t ed analys i s : i t i s s t i ll t oo economi c, t oo much t he fli p
s i de of accumulat i on, as t rans gres s i on i s t oo clos e t o t he i nvers e fi gure of
prohi bi t i on. ' In an order whi ch i s no longer t hat of ut i li t y, but an aleat ory
order of value, pure expendi t ure, whi le ret ai ni ng t he romant i c charm of
t urni ng t he economi c i ns i de out , i s no longer s uffi ci ent for radi cal defi ance
[ au defi radi cal] - i t s hat t ers t he mi rror of market value, but i s powerles s
agai ns t t he s hi ft i ng mi rror [ le mi roi r en deri ve] of s t ruct ural value .
Bat ai lle founds hi s general economy on a "s olar economy" wi t hout
reci procal exchange,
ont he uni lat eral gi ft t hat t he s unmakes of i t s energy :
a cos mogony of expendi t ure, whi ch he deploys i n a reli gi ous and poli t i cal
ant hropology . But Bat ai lle has mi s read Maus s : t he uni lat eral gi ft does not
exi s t . ' Thi s i s not t he law of t he uni vers e . He who has s o well explored t he
humans acri fi ce of t he Azt ecs s hould have knownas t hey di d t hat t he s un
gi ves not hi ng, i t i s neces s ary t o nouri s h i t cont i nually wi t h humanblood i n
order t hat i t s hi ne . It i s neces s ary t o challenge [ defrer] t he gods t hrough
s acri fi ce i n order t hat t hey res pond wi t h profus i on. In ot her words , t he
root of s acri fi ce and of general economy i s never pure and s i mple
expendi t ure - or what ever dri ve [ puls i on] of exces s t hat s uppos edly comes
t o us
from
nat ure - but i s an i nces s ant proces s of challenge [ d,~ i ] .
Bat ai lle has "nat urali zed" Maus s
The "exces s of energy" does not come from
t he
s un (from nat ure)
but
from a cont i nual hi gher bi ddi ng i n exchange - t he s ymboli c proces s t hat
canbe found i n t he work of Maus s , not t hat of t he gi ft (t hat i s t he nat urali s t
mys t i que i nt o whi ch Bat ai lle falls ), but t hat of t he count er-gi ft . Thi s i s t he
s i ngle t ruly s ymboli c proces s , whi ch i n fact i mpli es deat h as a ki nd of
maxi mal exces s - but not as i ndi vi dual es ct as y, always as t he maxi mal
pri nci ple of s oci al exchange . In t hi s s ens e, one can reproach Bat ai lle for
havi ng "nat urali zed" Maus s (but i na met aphys i cal s pi ral s o prodi gi ous t hat
t he reproach
i s not
really
one), and for havi ng made s ymboli c exchange
a
ki nd of nat ural funct i on of prodi gali t y, at once hyper-reli gi ous i n i t s
grat ui t ous nes s and much t oo clos e s t i ll, a cont rari o, t o t he pri nci ple of ut i li t y
and t o t he economi c order t hat i t exhaus t s i n t rans gres s i on wi t hout ever
leavi ng behi nd .
JEANBAUDRILLARD
It
i s
"i n t he glory of deat h" [ d haut eur de mort ] t hat one
redi s covers
Bat ai lle,
and t he real ques t i on pos ed remai ns : "How i s i t t hat
all men have
encount ered t he need
andfelt t he ob li gat i on t o k i ll li vi ng b ei ngs ri t ually? For lack of
havi ng k nown howt o
res pond, all men have remai ned i n i gnorance oft hat whi ch t hey
are . " There i s an ans wer t o t hi s ques t i on b eneat h
t he t ex t , i n all t he i nt ers t i ces
of
Bat ai lle' s t ex t , b ut i n my opi ni on not i n t he not i on of
ex pendi t ure, nor i n
t hi s
k i nd of ant hropologi cal recons t ruct i on t hat he t ri es t o
es t ab li s h from
t he "ob ject i ve"
dat a of hi s day : Marx i s m, b i ology, s oci ology, et hnology,
poli t i cal economy,
t he ob ject i ve pot ent i al of whi ch he t ri es t o b ri ng
t oget her nevert heles s , i n a pers pect i ve
whi ch i s nei t her ex act ly a genealogy,
nor a nat ural hi s t ory, nor a hegeli an t ot ali t y, b ut a b i t of
all t hat .
But t he s acred i mperat i ve i s flawles s i n i t s myt hi c as s ert i on,
and t he wi ll
t o t each i s
cont i nually b reached b y Bat ai lle' s dazzli ng vi s i on, b y a "s ub ject
of
k nowledge"
always "at t he b oi li ng poi nt . " The cons equence of t hi s i s t hat
even analyt i c or
document ary cons i derat i ons have t hat myt hi c force whi ch
cons t i t ut es t he s ole -
s acri fi ci al -force
of
wri t i ng .
' Not es
1 .

Jean
Baud
ri llard, "Le Li vre de la qui nzai ne : Quand Bat ai lle at t aquai t le Pri nci pe met aphys i que
de
1 ' economi e, " La Qui nzai ne li t t erai re 234 (1 -1 5 jui n 1 976): 4-5.
2.

Edi t ors not e : Only t wo pi eces from t hi s s event h volume have b een t rans lat ed
i nt o Engli s h -
-Le s acri fi ce" (dat ed
1 939-1 940), a port i on of La Li mi t e de lut i le (an ab andoned vers i on of La
Part Maudi t e) ; and "Not i ce
aut ob i ographi que" (dat ed 1 958) . Bot h pi eces have b een t rans lat ed
b y Annet t e Mi chels on
and appear i n Oct ob er (Spri ng, 1 986) res pect i vely as "Sacri fi ce (pp . 61 -74)
and "Aut ob i ographi cal Not e" (pp .
1 07-1 1 0).
Anumb er of Bat ai lle' s work s have
b een t rans lat ed i nt o Engli s h . In addi t i on t o Vi s i ons ofEx ces s
(Mi nnes ot a 1 985),
t rans lat ed b y Alan St oek l, t hes e i nclude : Li t erat ure and Evi l (Uri zen Book s
1 985 ; ori g
.
1 957), t rans lat ed
b y Alas t ai r Hami lt on, and Deat h and Sens uali t y . ASt udy ofErot i ci s m
and t he Tab oo (Arno Pres s , 1 977;
ori g .
1 957)-
3.

The "Puri t an mani a of b us i nes s " (money earned i s earned i n order t o b e i nves t ed . . . havi ng
value
or
meani ng only i n t he endles s wealt h i t ent ai ls ), i n t hat i t s t i ll ent ai ls a s ort of
madnes s ,
challenge, and cat as t rophi c compuls i on -a s ort of as cet i c mani a -i s oppos ed t o
work ,
t o
t he
good us e of energy i n work and us ufruct .
4.

Des t ruct i on (even grat ui t ous ) i s always amb i guous , s i nce i t i s t he i nvers e
fi gure of product i on,
and falls under t he ob ject i on t hat i n order t o des t roy i t i s
fi rs t neces s ary t o have produced, t o
whi ch Bat ai lle i s ab le t o oppos e
only
t he
s un.
5.

Marcel Maus s , The Gi ft : Forms and Funct i ons ofEx change

i n Archai c Soci et i es , t rans . Ian Cunni s on
(London : RKP, 1 954)
.
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The
Renaissance
JEANBAUDRILLARD
expresses it
in an ambiguous f ashion, in a cont inual f light bef ore it . It act s as
an ideat ional f orce and principal ideology,
sublimat ing
t he
cont radict ions
of hist ory in t he ef f ect s of civ iliz at ion . It makes crisis a v alue, a cont radict ory
moralit y . Thus, as an idea in which a whole civ iliz at ion recogniz es it self ,
modernit y assumes a regulat ory cult ural f unct ion and t hereby surrept i-
t iously rej oins t radit ion.
Genesis of Modernit y
Thehist ory of t he adj ect iv e
'modern'
is
longer t han t hat
of
`modernit y .
In any cult ural cont ext , t he 'ancient ' and t he 'modern'
alt ernat e signi-
f icant ly . But t here does not exist a univ ersal 'modernit y, ' t hat is t o
say, a
hist orical and polemic st ruct ure of change and of crisis. The lat t er can only
be spot t ed in Europe f rom t he 16t h cent ury, and only acquires it s f ull
meaning in
t he
19t h cent ury .
School t ext books make modern t imes [ les Temps modernes] f ollow upon
t he Middle Ages, f rom t he dat e of t he discov ery of America by Christ opher
Columbus (1492) . Theinv ent ion of print ing and t he discov eries of Galileo
inaugurat e modern Renaissance humanism. On t he lev el of t he art s, and
part icularly of lit erat ure, t he
quarrel
of
t he Ancient s and t he Moderns
dev elops and culminat es
in t he 17t h and 18t h cent uries . Prof ound echoes of
t he div ision of modernit y
are
also
heard in t he religious domain : t he
Ref ormat ion (in Wit t enberg, on
Oct ober 3 1,
1517,
Lut her post s his
95
t heses opposing
t he indulgences) and t he rupt ure it inaugurat es f or t he
Prot est ant
count ries, but also t he repercussions of t his on t he Cat holic
world (Council of Trent , 1545- 1549, 1551- 1552, 1562- 1563 ) . TheCat holic
Church is already undert aking an updat ing, making it self , wit h t he Societ y
of
Jesus, modern, worldly and missionary ; perhaps t his explains why t he
t erm modernit y will hav e a more current , more signif icant recept ion
in t he
count ries which hav e kept t he Roman t radit ions, rit es and cust oms, ev en
while progressiv ely renov at ing t hem. In f act , t he t erm only t akes on
st rengt h in count ries wit h a long t radit ion . To speak of modernit y scarcely
has meaning in a count ry wit hout t radit ion or Middle Ages, like t he Unit ed
St at es . Inv ersely, moderniz at ion has a v ery st rong
impact in Third World
count ries wit h st rong t radit ional cult ures .
In count ries t ouched by t he Cat holic
Renaissance, t he conj unct ion of
lay and secular humanism
wit h t he more worldly rit ualism of t radit ional
Cat holic f orms and cust oms
lends it self bet t er t o all t he complexit y of
social and art ist ic
lif e which t he dev elopment of modernit y implies t han
does
t he st rict alliance of rat ionalism and moralism in Prot est ant cult ure.
64
The 17th and 18th Centuries
FRENCHFANTASIES
Modernity is not just the reality
of
technical, scientific and political
upheavals since the 16th century; it
is also
the play
of
sig ns, customs, and
culture
which
translates these structural chang es at the
level
of
ritual and
social habitus .
During the 17th and 18th centuries, the philosophical and political
fundamentals of modernity are set in place : individualistic and modern
rationalist thoug ht, of which Descartes and the philosophy of the Enlig ht
enment are representative ; the centralized
monarchical
State,
with
its
administrative techniques succeeding the feudal system ; the foundations of
a physical and natural science, which lead to the first effects of an applied
technolog y (Diderot's Encyclopedie) . Culturally, it is the period of the total
secularization of the arts and of the sciences . The quarrel of the Ancients
and ofthe Moderns traverses this whole period, from Perraut (Parallde des
Anciens et des Modernes, 1688) and Fontenelle (Dig ression sur les
Anciens
et les
Modernes, 1688), who derived a law of prog ress of the human spirit, up to
Rousseau (Dissertation sur la musique moderne, 1750) and Stendhal (Racine et
Shakespeare, 1823), who conceived of 'romanticism' as a radical modernism,
taking as his theme daily customs and subjects borrowed from national
history. This quarrel defines an autonomous movement, free from any
'Renaissance' or imitation. Modernity is not yet a way oflife (the term does
not then exist) . But it has become an idea (linked to that ofprog ress) . It has
taken on a liberal bourg eois tonality which will continue to mark it
ideolog ically.
The Industrial Revolution and
the 20th Century
The Revolution
of
1789
established the modern, centralized and
democratic, bourg eois State, the nation with
its constitutional system, its
political and bureaucratic org anization.
The continual prog ress of the sciences and of techniques, the rational
division of industrial work, introduce into social life a dimension of
permanent chang e, of destruction of customs and traditional culture .
Simultaneously, the social division of work introduced some profound
political cleavag es, a dimension of social strug g les and of conflicts which
will echo throug h the 19th and 20th Century.
These two major aspects, which will add
to
demog raphic
development,
urban concentration, and the g ig antic development of the means of
communication and information, will mark modernity, in decisive fashion,
as a social practice and way of life articulated on chang e and innovation -
but also on anxiety, instability, continual mobilization, shifting subjectivity,
tension, c r isis -
and as an ideal r epr esentation or mythol ogy. I n this
c ontext, the date of the
appear anc e of the wor d itsel f (Theophil e Gautier ,
Baudel air e, 1850 or so) is
signific ant : it is the moment when moder n soc iety
r eal iz es itsel f as suc h, thinks itsel f
in ter ms of moder nity. The l atter
bec omes a tr ansc endent v al ue, a c ul tur al model , a
mor al ity -a myth of
r efer enc e pr esent ev er ywher e, and c onc eal ing in par t the
histor ic al
str uc tur es
and c ontr adic tions whic h gav e bir th to it .
Tec hno-sc ientific Conc ept
The pr odigious expansion, par tic ul ar l y for the l ast
100 year s, of
sc ienc e
and tec hnique, the r ational and systematic dev el opment of the
means ofpr oduc tion, their management
and or ganiz ation, mar ks moder nity
as the er a of pr oduc tiv ity : an
intensific ation of human l abour and of human
domination ov er natur e, both r educ ed to the status of
pr oduc tiv e for c es
and
to
the sc hemas of effic ac y and maximal output . This is the c ommon
denominator
of
al l moder n nations . I f this `r ev ol ution' ofpr oduc tiv e for c es
has not
c hanged l ife, bec ause it l eav es the r el ations of pr oduc tion and soc ial
r el ations r el ativ el y unc hanged, at l east it modifies the c onditions of l ife
fr om
one gener ation to the other . I t institutes today a pr ofound mutation
in moder nity: the passage fr om a
c iv il iz ation
of
wor k and pr ogr ess to a
c iv il iz ation of c onsumption and l eisur e . But the
mutation is not r adic al : it
does not c hange the pr oduc tiv ity
final ity, the c hr onometr ic c utting up of
time, the for war d-l ooking
and oper ational imper ativ es whic h r emain the
fundamental c oor dinates of
the moder n ethic of the pr oduc tiv e soc iety.
P ol itic al Conc ept
JEANBAUDRI LLARD
The
Logic
of Moder nity
"The abstr ac tion of the pol itic al State as suc h bel ongs onl y to
moder n
times [Temps moder nes], bec ause the abstr ac tion of pr iv ate
l ife bel ongs onl y
to moder n times [Temps moder nes] . . . I n the Middl e Ages, the
l ife of the
peopl e and the l ife of the State ar e identic al
: man is the r eal pr inc ipl e of the
State . . . . moder n times [Temps moder nes] ar e the
abstr ac t dual ism, the
abstr ac t r efl ec ted opposition" (Mar x,
Cr itique de l a phil osophie de l 'Etat de
Hegel ) .
I t is in fac t the
abstr ac t tr ansc endenc e of the State, under the sign of
the Constitution,
and the for mal status of the indiv idual , under the sign of
pr iv ate pr oper ty,
whic h defines the pol itic al str uc tur e of moder nity. The
(bur eauc r atic ) r ational ity of the State and that of pr iv ate inter est
and
of
pr iv ate c onsc iousness c onv er ge in the same abstr ac tion
. This dual ity mar ks
the end of al l anter ior systems, wher e pol itic al
l ife was defined as an
FRENCHFANTASIES
integrated hierarchy of personal relations . The hegemony of the bureau-
cratic State has only grown with the progress of modernity . Linked to the
extension of the field of political economy and other organizational
systems, it invests all sectors of life, mobilizing them to its own advantage,
rationalizing them in its image . What sometimes obstinately resists these
tendencies ( affective life, traditional languages and cultures) , may now be
deemed residual
.
However, one of the essential dimensions
( if
not the
essential dimension) of modernity, the abstract centralized State, is perhaps
also in the process of faltering . The hegemonic constraint of the State, the
bureaucratic saturation of social and individual life, are no doubt preparing
great crises in this domain .
Psychological Concept
In contrast to the magic, religious, symbolic consensus of traditional
( communal) society, the modern era is marked by the emergence of the
individual, with his status of autonomous consciousness, his psychology
and personal conflicts, his private interest - indeed, his unconsciousness ;
the individual is drawn increasingly into the network of media, organi-
zations, and institutions, which give rise to his modern alienation,
abstraction, loss of identity in work and leisure, incommunicability, etc . ,
which a whole system of personalization through objects and signs is
intended to compensate .
Modernity and Time
In all
its dimensions, modern temporality is specific .
The chronometric dimension :
this is time which is measured, and by
which one measures
ones activities ; as that which highlights the division of
labor and social life, this
abstract time belongs to the imperative of
productivity, and is substituted for the rhythms
of
work and
celebration
.
Bureaucratic temporality regulates even
"free" time
and
leisure .
The linear dimension : "modern"
time is no
longer
cyclical, it develops
according to a past-present-future line, according to a supposed origin and
end . Tradition seems centered on the past, modernity on the future, but, in
fact, only modernity projects a past ( time gone by) , at the same time that it
projects a future, according to a dialectic which is proper to it .
The historic dimension : especially since Hegel, history has become the
dominant instance
of modernity. At the same time as the real becoming of
society and as transcendent reference allowing a glimpse
of
its final
accomplishment .
As measurable, irreversible, chronometric succession or dialectical
becoming, modernity has secreted an entirely new temporality . This is a
JEAN
BAUDRILLARD
crucial feature of modernity -an image of its contradictions . But at the
interior of this time, which
is
indefinite, and
no longer knows any eternity,
one thing dis tinguis hes
modernity: it always wants to be 'contemporary,'
i . e . , it s eeks global s imultaneity. After firs t privileging the dimens ion of
progres s and the future, it s eems to confound its elf more and more today
with the pres ent, the immediate, the everyday -the revers e, pure and
s imple, of his torical duration [ duree] .
Innovation and
Avant-Garde
The
Rhetoric of Modernity
In the s phere of culture and cus tom, modernity is trans lated, in formal
oppos ition, but als o in fundamental relation
to
bureaucratic and
political
centralization, the
homogenization of forms of s ocial life, through an
exaltation
of depth s ubjectivity, pas s ion, s ingularity, authenticity, the
ephemeral and the ineffable -in s hort, through breach of rules and
irruption
of
pers onality,
cons cious or not .
Baudelaire's
"painter of modern life," the bridge between romanticis m
and
contemporary modernity, marks the departure of this ques t for the
new,
this drifting of the s ubjective : "There he goes : he runs , he s eeks . What
is he looking for? Surely this man, s uch as I have depicted him, this reclus e
with an active imagination, travelling acros s the great des ert of men . . .
s eeks that s omething we can call modernity. "
At all levels , modernity gives ris e to an aes thetic of rupture, of
individual creativity, of innovation marked by the s ociological phenomena
of the avant-garde (whether in the domain of culture or in that of fas hion)
and by the always
more extens ive des truction of traditional forms (genres
in literature, rules of harmony in mus ic, laws
of pers pective
and
of
repres entation in painting, academicis m and,
more
generally,
the authority
and legitimacy of the received models of fas hion, s exuality, and
s ocial
conduct) .
Mas s Media, Fas hion and Mas s Culture
This fundamental tendency has been es pecially active s ince the 20th
century, through the indus trial diffus ion of cultural means , the extens ion
of mas s culture, and the gigantic intervention of the media (pres s , cinema,
radio,
televis ion, advertis ing)
.
The ephemeral character of form and content
has been accentuated, one
los es
count
of the revolutions of s tyle, fas hion,
writing, cus tom. In radicalizing its elf thus in a change
of pers pective,
in
a
continual dolly-s hot, modernity changes meaning. Bit by bit, it los es all the
s ubs tantial value of progres s which underlay it at the beginning, in order to
become an aesthetic of change for change's sake. I t abstracts itsel f
and
depl oys itsel f in a new rhetoric, it inscribes itsel f in the pl ay of one or
mul tipl e systems of signs . At the l imit, it merges purel y and simpl y
with
fashion, which is at the same time the end/aim [ l a fin] of modernity .
The reason for this is that modernity enters into a cycl ical process of
change, whereal l the forms of the past ( archaic, fol kl oric, rustic, traditional )
are dredged up, drained of their substance, but ideal ized as signs in a code
where tradition and neo, ancient and modern, become equival ent and
function as al ternates . Modernity no l onger
has the val ue
of
rupture at al l :
it nourishes itsel f on the vestiges of al l cul tures in the same way that it does
from its technical gadgets or from the ambiguity of al l val ues .
Destruction and Change
The distinctive traits, the ferments, the probl ematic and the contra-
dictions of modernity reveal themsel ves with the most force where its
historical and
pol itical impact
is the most
brutal : in col onized tribal
or
traditional societies . Apter sees in col onial ism a "modernizing force, " a
"model by which modernization has been universal ized. "'
Ol der systems of exchange are dismantl ed by the rise of money and
the spread of the market economy . Traditional systems of power are swept
aside
under the pressure of col onial administrations or the newindigenous
bureaucracies .
However, in the absence
of
a pol itical and industrial
revol ution
in
depth, it is often the most technical , the most exportabl e
features of
modernity which touch the devel oping societies : the objects of industrial
production and consumption, the mass media . I t is in its technical materia-
l ity, and as spectacl e, that modernity first invests these societies, and not
through the l ong process of economic and pol itical rational ization pecul iar
to the West . However, the fal l out of modernity has its own characteristic
pol itical repercussion : it accel erates the destruction of the indigenous way
of l ife and precipitates social demands for change.
Resistance and Amal gamation
FRENCH FANTASI ES
Tradition and Modernity
in Third Worl d
Societies
I f, therefore, modernity appears here al so as rupture, the more precise
anal ysis begun since the Second Worl d War by pol itical
anthropol ogy
( Bal andier, Leach, Apter, Al thabe) shows that things are more
compl ex. '
The traditional system ( tribal , cl anic, l ineal [ l ignager] ) offers the strongest
resistance to change, and the modern structures ( administrative, moral ,
r e l i g i o u s )
i nte r twi ne wi th the s e fo r ce s thr o u g h the mo s t cu r i o u s
co mpr o mi s e s . Mo de r ni ty al ways e me r g e s i n thi s co nte xt thr o u g h a
r e s u r g e nce o f tr adi ti o n, tho u g h the l atte r wi l l have l o s t i ts co ns e r vati ve
me ani ng . Favr e t e ve n de s cr i be s ho w the pe as ants o f the Au r e s r e acti vate d
tr adi ti o nal po l i ti cal
me chani s ms as a de mand fo r pr o g r e s s , i n o r de r to
pr o te s t the l ag g i ng s pr e ad, i n the i r r e g i o n, o f the
i ns tr u me nts and s i g ns o f
mo de r ni ty. '
Thi s i s i mpo r tant : the te r r ai n o f anthr o po l o g y s ho ws ,
mo r e cl e ar l y
than Eu r o pe an hi s to r y, the tr u th o f mo de r ni ty, name l y, that i t i s
ne ve r
r adi cal chang e o r r e vo l u ti o n, bu t al ways ar i s e s i n i mpl i cati o n wi th tr adi ti o n
i n a s u btl e cu l tu r al pl ay, i n a de bate whe r e the two ar e hand i n g l o ve , i n a
pr o ce s s o f
amal g amati o n and adaptati o n . Thu s , anal ys e s bas e d o n a di al e cti c
o f r u ptu r e mu s t g i ve
way
to
an appr o ach whi ch r e co g ni ze s the dynami c o f
amal g amati o n .
I de o l o g i e s as Si g ns o fMo de r ni ty
The anal ys i s o f de co l o ni ze d s o ci e ti e s u nco ve r s ano the r s pe ci fi c
e xpr e s s i o n o f mo de r ni ty: i de o l o g y. I de o l o g i e s ( nati o nal , cu l tu r al ,
po l i ti cal )
ar e co nte mpo r ar i e s o f de tr i bal i zati o n and o f mo de r ni zati o n . I mpo r te d
fr o m the We s t and i mpr e g nate d wi th r i tu al s and wi th tr adi ti o nal be l i e fs ,
the y ne ve r the l e s s co ns ti tu te , mo r e than the e co no mi c i nfr as tr u ctu r e , the
l o cu s
o f
chang e and co nfl i ct, o f the u phe aval o f val u e s and o f atti tu de s .
He r e i t i s e ve n mo r e a matte r o f the r he to r i c o f mo de r ni ty, de pl o ye d i n al l
i ts ambi g u i ty i n s o ci e ti e s
whe r e
i t
co mpe ns ate s fo r r e al backwar dne s s and
no n-de ve l o pme nt .
Su ch o bs e r vati o ns
he l p de fi ne the par ado x o f mo de r ni ty. De s tr u cti o n
and chang e , bu t al s o ambi g u i ty, co mpr o mi s e , amal g amati o n : mo de r ni ty i s
par ado xi cal , r athe r than di al e cti cal. I f i de o l o g y i s a typi cal l y `mo de r n'
co nce pt, i f i de o l o g i e s ar e the e xpr e s s i o n o f mo de r ni ty, no do u bt mo de r ni ty i s
i ts e l f o nl y a vas t i de o l o g i cal pr o ce s s .
Co ns e r vati s m thr o u g h Chang e
JEANBAUDRI LLARD
I de o l o g y and Mo de r ni ty
Thu s the dynami c o f mo de r ni ty
r e ve al s i ts e l f, i n the We s t as we l l as the
Thi r d Wo r l d, as bo th the l o cu s o f
e me r g e nce
o f
facto r s o f r u ptu r e and as a
co mpr o mi s e s o l u ti o n wi th r e s pe ct to
facto r s
o f
o r de r and tr adi ti o n . The
mo bi l i ty that i t i mpl i e s at
al l l e ve l s ( s o ci al , pr o fe s s i o nal , g e o g r aphi c ;
mar r i ag e , fas hi o n, s e xu al l i be r ati o n)
o nl y de fi ne s the po r ti o n o fchang e to l e r abl e
by the s ys te m, wi tho u t e s s e nti al l y
chang i ng
i t .
Bal andi e r s ays o f the co u ntr i e s
o f Bl ack Afr i ca : " po l i ti cal
co nfr o ntati o ns e xpr e s s the ms e l ve s i n a l ar g e
me as u r e , bu t no t e xcl u s i ve l y, thr o u g h the de bate o n the tr adi ti o nal and the
FRENCHFANTASIES
modern: the latter appears especially as their means and
not as
their
principle
cause. " ' Similarly, one can say that in developed countries,
modernity is not a force that retraces social structure or history : it is rather
( in its play with tradition), the place where the social rises to the surfacein
order to be masked, the place where the dialectic of social meaning is
blurred in the rhetorical and mythical code of modernity .
ASpectacular Ambiguity
Changes of political, economic, technological, and psychological
structures are the
objective
historical factors
of
modernity
.
They do not
constitute modernity in
themselves.
Thelatterwould
be
defined rather as
the
denial
of these structural changes, at least as their reinterpretation in
terms of cultural style, mentality, way of life, everydayness .
Modernity is not technologic and scientific revolution, it is the play
andtheimplication of thelatterin the spectacle of private and social life, in
the everyday dimensionof the media, of gadgets, of domestic well-being or
the conquest of space. Neither science nor technology are themselves
" modern," but the effects of science and technology are. Though founded
on thehistoric emergenceof science, modernity lives only at thelevel of the
myth of science.
Modernity is neither the rationality nor the autonomy of individual
consciousness, which however found it . It is, after the phase of the
triumphant ascension of liberties and individual rights, the reactionary
exaltation of a subjectivity threatened everywhere by the homogenization
of social life. It is the recycling of this subjectivity lost in a system of
,, personalization," in the effects of fashion and controlled aspiration.
Modernity is not a dialectic of history : it is the eventness, the
permanent play of the present moment, the universality of news blurbs
through
the
media
.
Modernity
is not the transmutation of all values, it is the destruction
of
all former
values without surpassing them, it is the ambiguity of all
values under the sign
of
a generalized
combinatory . There is no longer
either good or evil, but we are not for all
that " beyond good and evil" ( cf.
Nietzsche' s critique of modernity) .
Modernity is not revolution, even if it hinges
on
revolutions
( industrial, political, computer revolution, revolution of well-being, etc . ) .
It is, as Lefebvresays, " the shadow of the failed revolution, its parody
. . . .
Situated in the interiorof the inverted world and not put back
on
its feet,
modernity accomplishes the tasks of the revolution: the surpassing of art,
of morality, of ideologies
. . . . " ' One could add: mobility, abundance,
liberations of all sorts . But it accomplishes
them by means of a permanent
revolution offorms, in theplay of change, finally in a cycle where the
open
breach in the world of tradition closes up.
ACulture of th e Everyday
JEANBAUDRILLARD
Tradition was
nourish ed by continuity and real transcendence .
Modernity, h aving inaugurated rupture and discontinuity, is now closed
into a newcycle . It h as lost th e ideological drive of reason and progress, and
confounds itself more and more with th e formal play
of
ch ange . Even its
myth s turn against it (tech nology,
once
triumph ant,
is today full of menace) .
Its ideals and h uman values h ave
escaped it . Modernity is ch aracterized
more and more by th e abstract transcendence
ofall powers. Liberty is formal,
people become masses, culture becomes fash ion . Once a dynamic of
progress, modernity is slowly becoming an activism of well-being. Its myth
covers over th e growing abstraction of social and political life, under wh ich
it boils down bit by bit into a culture ofdaily events .
Notes
1 .

D. Apter, Th e P olitics of Modernization (Ch icago : University of Ch icago P ress, 1 965)

.
2 .

See George Balandier, P olitical Anth ropology, trans . A. M. Sh eridan-Smith (New York: Random
House, 1 970) ; Edmund Leach , P olitical Systems of High land Burma (London :
G.
Bell
&Sons,
1 954) ; D. Apter,
op. cit .
3 . J. Favret, "Le Traditionalisme
par exces de modernite," Arch ives europfennes de Sociologie, 8
(1 967) .
4 .

Balandier, ch .
7 .
5 .

Henri Lefebvre, Introduciton d

la
modernitf
(P aris : Editions de Minuit) .