PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON PERFORMANCE MONITORING

RIGHT TO PUBLIC SERVICES ACTS

BALASUBRAMANYAM MURALIDHARAN, FEINBROTH CONSULTING

SEMINAR ON ADDRESSING CHALLENGES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RIGHT TO SERVICE ACTS PERFORMANCE MONITORING SOME PRELIMINARY IDEAS1

A. Objective of the Seminar: deliberations to focus on overcoming

challenges related to (i) raising awareness among beneficiaries, (iii) ensuring access to service delivery, (iii) performance monitoring and evaluation of RTS implementation, (iv) re-engineering back-end process to strengthen operations, and (v) establishing synergies between RTS and other public service reform initiatives. Point number (iii) on performance monitoring and evaluation in deed also relates to the other four points; more of this later. B. Background to Legislation on Public Services: The quintessence of the Right to Public Services Acts [by whatever nomenclature they may be called] by different states in India is provision of a legal basis for public service guarantee; the origin is a perceived failure of voluntarily following the Citizens Charter route adapted from the British mode. Madhya Pradesh was the pioneer and about 15 states have quickly adapted their original legislation. For details on origin and early assessments of the legislations please see Right to Public Services: A Comparative Perspective of Implementation of Guarantee of Public Services in Select States of India.2 C. CAVEATS for this Note: This is an extremely preliminary note put together for the purpose of provoking discussions, debates, and ideas for practical strengthening of ensuring access to and delivery of public services. Any interpretation of this note beyond this baby-step is at the peril of the interpreter. D. Key Features of RTPS Acts and their implications for monitoring: RTPS Acts essentially aim to guarantee public services through demystification of eligibility and access conditions, holding a nominated person responsible for service delivery and delineating an upper boundary for the time required within which the service would be delivered.

1. Transparency: Are the notified services and their delivery

mechanisms transparent; is it clear who is eligible and how an applicant should navigate the delivery mechanism? Is there a status update on an application and is the information conveyed to the applicant? 2. Accountability: Is it clear who is finally accountable to the applicant for the delivery of the service? Are procedures laid out and followed on what the accountable public servant should do in the event of delay or denial of a service? Are procedures for
1

This is the first cut of ideas for a presentation and are based on work done principally in monitoring & evaluating the MP Guarantee of Public Service Delivery Act 2010 and the Bihar Right to Public Services Act 2011
2

2012, Tina Mathur, Right to Public Services, A Comparative Perspective of Implementation of Guarantee of Public Services in Select States of India, Centre for Organization Development, Hyderabad, India http://www.codhyd.org/images/RightToPublicServices_TinaMathur.pdf

complaints/grievances laid out clearly and followed [appeals, reviews, etc]; what happens if the accountable person has not followed the provisions of the Act? 3. Time Dimension: are provisions in the notifications on services related to timelines being followed: delivery or denial? Are timelines followed in case of appeals or reviews? A simple process flow diagram of the service delivery mechanism is placed below. Most states have this as the basis for their MIS for monitoring implementation status of their RTS Acts. E: RIGHT TO SERVICE ACTS: BASIC PROCESS FLOW FOR SERVIC DELIVERY3

Samples of the way in which data are aggregated through the different MIS are shown in the following pages to highlight that basic monitoring of implementation is essentially linked to: 1. Services Delivered: a] on time; and b] beyond time 2. Services Pending: a] within the time limit; and b] beyond time limit 3. Services Denied: a] within time limit; and b] beyond time limit Caveat: This is by no means the only format on which monitoring is done by these states; they are the foundation on which further analyses are done. Data shown have been at random and with the specific purpose of only highlighting how monitoring is done to track compliance with the provisions of the laws. However, they are not the latest figures; they have
3

I would like to thank my colleague in the Governance Technical Assistance Support Team [GTAST] to the Government of Bihar on the DFID-supported Bihar Governance and Administrative Reforms Programme, Siddharth Kumar, Deloitte Touche Tomhatsu India for his support in my work in Bihar.

been shown here for an illustrative rather than an evaluative purpose.

1. Bihar
Department Service(s) Total Applications Received A General Administration Residential certificate Income certificate Caste certificate Social Welfare Pensions Mukhyamantri Kanya Vivah Yojana Rashtriya Parivarik Labh Yojana All Services All Services Mutation Land Possession Certificate Declaration under CST Application under VAT Food & Consumer Protection Urban Development Home New Ration card 6788596 2401509 4125259 1367846 2895 537 524373 2453686 1604935 630780 17218 34414 77038 Disposal after timeline (as % of disposed applications) Pendency after timelines (as % of applications received) Pending within timelines (as % of applications received) Disposed Applications B 6703752 2347970 4051468 1235207 378 51 517938 2452120 1517398 623258 17149 34272 72305 Denial (as % of disposed application) Disposal (as % of application received)

Services Denied

Pendency (after timelines) C 25463 15829 24357 72349 767 0 3493 1536 48219 5524 69 3 4209

Disposal (after timelines) D 49691 26079 866365 629982 45 0 72345 114394 181318 15951 2231 237 28023

E 175386 71236 46972 263901 71 35 63853 63947 257047 33299 1627 1181 52889

(B/A) 98.75 % 97.77 % 98.21 % 90.30 % 13.06 % 9.50% 98.77 % 99.94 % 94.55 % 98.81 % 99.60 % 99.59 % 93.86 % 87.07 % 96.83 %

(C/A) 0.38 % 0.66 % 0.59 % 5.29 % 26.5 % 0.00 % 0.67 % 0.06 % 3.00 % 0.88 % 0.40 % 0.01 % 5.46 % 6.76 % 0.57 %

(A-BC)/A 0.87% 1.57% 1.20% 4.41% 60.45% 90.50% 0.56% 0.00% 2.45% 0.32% 0.00% 0.40% 0.68%

(E/B) 2.62% 3.03% 1.16% 21.36% 18.78% 68.63% 12.33% 2.61% 16.94% 5.34% 9.49% 3.45% 73.15%

D/B 0.74% 1.11% 21.38 % 51.00 % 11.90 % 0.00% 13.97 % 4.67% 11.95 % 2.56% 13.01 % 0.69% 38.76 % 17.52 % 9.47%

Transport Registration Revenue & Land Reforms Commercial Taxes

Determination of urban holding Character Verification Report All Services

10275

8946

695

1567

1578

6.17%

17.64%

593877

575060

3413

54441

12117

2.59%

2.11%

Education

Not captured by ADHIKAR software 20633238 20157272 205926 2042669 1045139 97.69 1.00 1.31% 5.18% 10.13

All Districts (All Services)

2. Karnataka

3. Madhya Pradesh
S.No Departmen Application t Received Applications Disposed Applications Disposed after Pending Applications within time limit time limit is over Service Service Total Service Service Total Beyon Whose Time limit will be Total delivered Application delivered Application d Time over Rejected Rejected limit Today In In after two Three three days days days (4)
195658 86 429133 4775 34 123398 20811 15443 438 340 98665 61487 9917 444 960629

Number of Incomplete Applications

(1)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Home

(2)
General Administration Revenue Transport Forest Energy Labour Urban Administration and Development Rural Development Tribal Welfare Social Justice Food, civil supplies and consumer Protection Public health engineering Women and child welfare Total

(3)
201682 146 437027 6915 94 131602 27877 18466 585 385 133144 68782 10418 2451 1039574

(5)
1374 0 542 73 0 2939 2581 574 18 19 10273 1080 52 1 19526

(6)
197032 86 429675 4848 34 126337 23392 16017 456 359 108938 62567 9969 445 980155

(7)
888 0 1703 0 5 597 115 23 0 0 467 263 19 0 4080

(8)
19 0 16 0 1 58 20 4 0 0 52 13 2 0 185

(9)
907 0 1719 0 6 655 135 27 0 0 519 276 21 0 4265

(10)
3267 27 4680 2047 26 3462 2837 1263 82 20 5197 3618 398 890 27814

(11) (12) (13)

0 0 0 0 2 28 110 113 0 1 286 167 0 1 708 0 0 0 0 0 4 7 7 0 0 109 32 0 59 218 0 3 2 0 0 12 91 89 0 0 257 141 0 146 741

(14)
0 30 241 0 4 20 604 645 40 4 12564 1137 0 753 16042

(15)
3267 60 4923 2047 32 3526 3649 2117 122 25 18413 5095 398 1849 45523

(16)
476 0 710 20 22 1084 701 305 7 1 5274 844 30 157 9631

F: Monitoring the Mandates of the Acts: The main purpose of monitoring of data from the field offices appears to be Dispose Applications within the respective time limits. For doing this, the unit of management is the District. Therefore, states like Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Karnataka have begun a process of ranking of districts according to this idiom where Performance=MAINLY Disposal of Applications within specified time limits G: Appeals and Reviews: Appeals and reviews in all states have been minimal. Initial reports seem to indicate that this could be because: 1. SERVICE DELIVERY EFFICIENCY WAS VERY HIGH : THANKS TO a. The seriousness of the political executive and bureaucracy to RTPS their emphasis on regular monitoring using MIS - and in the case of Bihar through the Chief Ministers interactions with citizens on RTPS during his Seva Yatras - has meant that at the service delivery points a large majority of staff have gone beyond the routine to ensure compliance to the law; b. Special measures were undertaken, thanks to learning from MPs and other early starters like Bihars experiences, that ensured better service delivery 2. PSYCHOLOGY: Many applicants interviewed in Bihar were of the view that, especially for delays, there was no point in going for appeals. They were glad if services were delivered even after a tolerable delay beyond mandated time limit 3. LACK OF AWARENESS: Many were not aware that they could go on appeal in case of delay or denial; this was, interestingly, even in cases where the details displaying the RTPS Act, in Bihar, were right behind the applicants back, so-to-speak. When queried, we were informed that the entire process listed was not worth going into as it was either an eye-wash, or confronting government officers was not a good idea given that they had to approach government for services on a continual basis; one confrontation can have long-term negative consequences to the individual. H. BEYOND MAIN MANDATES AND ENTERING THE REALMS OF EVALUATION: However, to the credit of state governments it must be mentioned that each has devised a method of going beyond this simple measure, however fundamental it may be in their calculus, to include other features/parameters of PERFORMANCE. See below examples from Bihar and Karnataka.

1.KARNATAKA

2. BIHAR

The Parameters and their respective weightage in brackets are: Disposal of applications [30%] ; Messages to Applicants Through SMS about Status of Delivery [40%]; Synchronization of Application and Service Delivery Data from the field to the district and HQ [10%]; RTPS Counters constructed [2.5%]; Full Information on RTPS Written/Printed on Wall/Board [2.5%]; Shelter/Shed available for People waiting in Queue [2.5%] and Waiting/Seating Place Available for People [2.5%]

As is clear from the above 2 examples states have gone beyond merely measuring performance according to parameters defined in the law, related rules and notifications of services. However preliminary and tentative these may be, it is worth noting that these are self-driven and important initiatives. To recap, some of the features that are being captured in the monitoring of performance are apart from disposal of applications: 1. Number of applications per 100,000 of population 2. SMS-based information sent to applicants on status of service delivery 3. Synchronization of local data with the district and state level monitoring system 4. Provision of information on RTPS Act at the Point-of-Service 5. Special counters for RTPS Services 6. Shelter and seating for applicants

A Block/Circle Office in Jehanabad District. Please note that apart from the shelter and seating arrangements, a token system with a LED Display of status of token is operational.

I: OTHER POINTERS FOR PERFORMANCE MONITORING 1. Awareness: Initial pointers from Bihar, MP and Karnataka indicate

2. 3.

4.

5.

6.

7. 8.

that modern methods- advertisements, TV and radio jingles, internet-based communication, and hoardings are grossly inadequate in raising awareness. Face-to-face communication in small group settings appears to be the best option- states will have to utilize the services of Gram Panchayats, Wards, and institutions like schools and colleges as in the case of Madhya Pradesh and Karnataka. Access: As shown above much improvements can be brought out in access, even though the laws may not state anything about quality of access at all. Are front-line service-delivering institutions adequately provisioned in terms of Infrastructure, Human Resources and Funds? Our preliminary, if unscientific, findings suggest that they are not in a large majority of cases. An audit of denial and delay of services should be mandated under the rules to the Acts. A preliminary pilot in Bihar suggests nuances in services: services like Pensions are more difficult to access [as proof of qualifying criteria require other public services to have been accessed before like age certificate, death certificate of husband, level of handicap certified by a government-approved medical officer, etc, and some like Ration Cards may have annual quotas] and therefore there are more cases of denial or delay. Evaluation of denials and delay will help streamline these other services too. One black box is the back end process for each service: are the sub-processes mapped and are there time limits and accountability for each? If there are, are they transparent to the public? As far as I know, even where such attempts have been made such as in Purnea District of Bihar, it is not clear if the back-end is monitored. Are existing processes the most rational ones: many determinants of the service delivery process in government are driven by rules and procedures that in some cases date back to several decades. Are they relevant today, or is there a case for process reengineering. A recent paper by a colleague of mine from GTAST suggests that a strong case exists for process engineering.4 Are provisions of 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution of India adequately addressed? There is a need for evidence collection on this aspect of RTPS Acts. Using the Laws of Unintended Consequences or LUC: Bihar decided to use ICT extensively in implementing the Bihar RTPS. This helped the government to have a large data base of applicants. 2 simple, but extremely important, improvements have about because of this. One, in 2012 the Bihar Government notified that those citizens who are applying for Caste, Income and Residence certificates and had applied before but after the implementation of the Act in August

2012, C K Ramachandran, Electronic Service Delivery: Are the Poor being Served? International Conference on Public Administration (ICPA 8th )

2011 would be delivered their services within 3 days [as opposed to 14 days for those who were applying for the first time]! Two, those who had provided a mobile number at the time of application would be notified their date of service delivery through SMS; they need not go to the respective offices to find out the status. Alternatively, applicants can use either mobile or internet technology to find out the status of their application.

J: SOME OTHER POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION 1. Chyris Argyris in his ladder of inference suggested that after a time even social scientists tend to select data based on beliefs, rather than constructing beliefs on data. There is, therefore, a constant need to reconsider and re-evaluate the frameworks on which MISs are built for monitoring and evaluation purposes of RTPS implementation. 2. Double-loop Learning: Standard Project Monitoring systems measure performance by pre-set criteria; they help in readjusting the Thermostat to get to a Desired Temperature that is PRE-SET: 25 degree Celsius. They do not ask the question Is 25 degrees the right temperature. Chris Argyris suggests what is called Double Loop Learning where this is question is asked: are the standards themselves the right ones for measuring performance? 3. Some theoretical points/cautionary remarks on Management by Metrics: There are at least three dangers of Management by Metrics that I know of. a. The first one is Measurement Mania: In most cases of management by metrics formats are provided where staff are asked to fill in the values for indicators/parameters based on verifiable data. This indeed, is an admirably rational approach. When these numbers are limited, complaints that they dont account for finer realities will appear; when the metrics management framework is enlarged to accommodate these finer nuances, the model becomes large and unwieldy at the individual and organisational levels. Demand will increase for parameters to be increased, for indicators to have a greater range of weightages, etc. Eventually, there is the dreadful possibility of the staff looking only at how to fulfill the measurement requirements rather than any other including actually providing better service. It then produces the additional problem of a larger set of data being verifiable and eventually leads to the Russell paradox of

Who shaves the barber, if nobody can shave themselves and only the barber is supposed to shave all members of the community! Who measures the measurer, who verifies the verifier, and who manages the manager! While in private sector these issues do not arise due to clarity on ownership, lie dormant or are brushed under the carpet, in government disposal of the problem/dilemma is not so easy. We may believe that this can be moderated by the citizen surveys and social audit. I have serious doubts on how much of verification for veracity is in reality possible given the number of institutions and the number of indicators. Clearly the smaller the number of measures, the more amenable the system is to management. Purity has to step aside in favour of practicality. b. The second is Mistaking the Messenger for the Message: this is a pernicious danger. In many cases that I have observed it is easy for superiors to castigate the Messenger of the bad news, rather than view the bad news as something that needs to be looked into independently of the messenger. c. This provokes what could be called the Margaret Mead Syndrome: there is a story, probably apocryphal, that a whole lot of social anthropology based on Margaret Meads method was ironically based on fluff and not solid substance. A researcher, it is said, who went to study the same community decades after Margaret Mead did, was delighted to find out that the tribes had hoodwinked Margaret by giving replies that would satisfy her rather than what were or should have been real responses. Those who have been in large organizations need no introduction to this; many have been producing replies that satisfy the bosses than reveal the truth. 4. Rationality as a principle of service delivery: Many believe that our systems should be rational, especially those related to public service delivery. There is inherent danger in using such a term as Rationality without defining operational boundaries. In fact one of the fundamental premise of rationality is axiom: if this is so, then that is so and so, etc. Moreover, the factors, variables, constants, etc., that are supposed to be used should be accepted by the entire lot of persons involved to be indisputably and unarguably standing for what they are supposed to stand for. This is hardly the case in realities dealing with people. There is also a second and more fundamental problem. Following Godels Incompleteness Theorem for axiomatic systems, you can have a rational system only with incompleteness built in. As along as rationality is tied so acutely with axioms, you cannot have both a complete and a rational

system. You can have bounded rationality, following Simon. But bounded rationality necessarily will raise the question Whose Rationality. The Service Delivery Acts are presumably and especially aimed at the poor and marginalized sections of society. So at least in a substantive manner, if not solely, the rationality for service provision has to be theirs not that of the power elite alone.