Mattia Janigro Philosophy 111 15 November 2012

The teleological argument for the existence of God, also referred to as the argument from design, is based on a supposed analogous relationship between God as an intelligent designer and the various designers we can observe in the world. Loosely stated, the argument proposes the following: the universe was designed by some being, which is God, because the universe exhibits certain elements of design. The argument follows inductive reasoning derived from observation. Objects, such as watches or cars, appear with such intricacy that we correctly conclude that they were designed. There are in fact watchmakers and engineers and mechanics that purposefully put parts together in such a way that the product is a perfectly humming machine. So can these observations be stretched to apply to God as the designer of the universe? Richard Swinburne, in an essay on the teleological argument, opens his reasoning by offering a more thoughtful definition of design (pg. 192). He proposes that design comes from the occurrence of general patterns as opposed to any specific events occurring. We can notice design when there exist some predictable patterns or in arrangement or sequence. This order can be divided into two kinds: regularity of co-presence and regularity of succession (192). Swinburne defines regularity of co-presence to be a spatial regularity that is, a logistical arrangement of parts, e.g. books arranged in alphabetical

order, the pieces of a watch put together, etc. This kind of regularity contrasts with the regularity of succession, which is defined as a temporal regularity. Temporal regularity includes the patterns that objects display in their behavior, such as obeying the laws of physics. With these terms stated, we can begin evaluating Swinburnes defense of the teleological argument. Regularity of any kind allows for the prediction of future events. Swinburne suggests that the predictability of the universe can only be attributed to Gods design (193). It may be true that regularity leads to prediction, but is it necessarily true that the absence of design is not also compatible with patterns and predictability? I believe that any state of affairs would over time form some sort of pattern, regardless of whether or not it was originally designed. It is just the nature of events that each one occurs with some probability, and over time some discernible pattern will likely appear. Can we not attribute our ability to understand and predict the universe to human ingenuity? With or without an intelligent designer, a state of affairs will generate some regularity, merely out of the nature of repetition. Consider a state of affairs, A, that was not designed. Then let A* be the state of affairs that was designed by some being, i.e. God. E and E* represent the set of events occurring in A and A*, respectively. By design, all events E* occur in a regular pattern as dictated by God. We can interpret these patterns as God would intend us to. However, I it does not follow from the non-existence of a designer that events E occur randomly and therefore unpredictably. Events e E

occur with some probability p. Therefore, from the repeated observation of e, we can deduce p and predict its occurrence. I believe that this notion of probability is compatible with the absence of design. In fact, probability is only compatible if there exists no design. Events in E* cannot occur with any probability, for they are prescribed behavior as defined by the designer of A*. Probability by definition therefore does not occur in A*, but it is possible that probability is compatible with A. Since events E occur with some probability, and not randomness, we can forecast the behavior of A just as we can understand and predict A*. The next level of regularity that Swinburne discusses is the fact that patterns by design have and will always continue to persist, despite any interference or by any alterations of initial conditions (193). Gravity, for example, is a fundamental rule that will exist tomorrow as it always has. Swinburne says that this is a function of design. Surely this condition of regularity is not unique to a designed universe. Returning to our comparison of different states of affairs, let R and R* be rules of regularity in A and A*, respectively. Clearly, in the designed case, R* will hold as long as it is designed to do so, which could be for all existence. But now consider the case of R. Assuming that A exists as a possible state of affairs, R exists in A. It seems just as likely that R persists through all existence, despite not having been designed. I do not find it incompatible with non-design that there exists some regularity that persists through any interference.

The claim I find even more troubling is Swinburnes statement that there is a great deal more order in the world than is necessary for the existence of humans (194). How can this be necessarily true? A statement such as this seems to require the benefit of possessing the complete knowledge of the universe. It seems much more reasonable to assume that the universe possesses exactly the right amount of order for our existence. What would excessive order even entail? The notion that the world could be too regular or too orderly seems illogical. It seems even more illogical that humans, as part of the universe, could recognize this excess. Further, even if it is true that there exists more order than required, I fail to see how this supports the idea of design. If a universe were purposefully designed, why would it include anything besides the exact right amount of regularity? It seems completely more feasible that excess order would occur only in a situation where the universe was not designed. Then, the excess would be naturally and unintentionally occurring. Swinburne defends the teleological argument to the objection that it is not possible for us to witness anything besides order, for if order did not exist, neither would we to witness the lack of it (194). While I do not necessarily endorse that specific objection, I find fault with the example he uses to defend against it (194). Swinburne describes a situation of a madman holding a hostage, threatening to kill him unless a particular drawing from ten decks of cards occurs. The objective of the example is to illustrate that it does not make sense to say that the specific draw of cards that saves the prisoners life is an obviously occurring event, just

because it is the only situation that the prisoner would be alive to witness. While I grant that Swinburne may be correct in this logic, the example itself seems flawed for other reasons. While the event that the random card machines draw the exactly correct cards is extremely unlikely, there still exists a slim possibility of chance. I understand that this is not the point Swinburne was moving towards with this example, but I believe it brings about an issue that is more deeply rooted in his argument. The argument from design would have you believe that an event or series of events that occur with almost negligible probability (in a universe without design) imply the existence of some designing force manipulating them into occurrence. For example, the probability that gravity exists to the perfect extent that it does, which allows the universe to presently exist, is perceived to be very low. So low that Swinburne and others insist that it cannot occur by chance that it must have been designed. However, it seems hasty to make this sort of inference. It is ignoring the fact that even an event that has so little probability will, in time, always happen. Any possible thing, such as the existence of gravity, will exist at some point despite how unlikely it is. So if you assume that the existence of gravity is possible, which I believe to be a reasonable assumption (even if you do not consider the obvious case where it exists in our universe) then you admit that it has a probability of existing that is greater than zero. Therefore, it can exist without being designed into existence. Even if you combine all aspects of our universe, each existing with small probability and each existing simultaneously with even smaller probability,

there is one situation in billions and billions where they align and are true. This chance is so minute that it would be easy to give it to design. However, you must consider the idea that there are infinitely many opportunities for that chance to become a success. Consider a bin of one trillion raffle tickets, each with a unique code on it. The chances of pulling any one ticket as a winner are exceedingly small. If you pulled them one at a time, it would take a very long time to reveal the ticket in question. But invariably the ticket would indeed be pulled. Now imagine the space of time before the universe existed as it currently does. This time actually seems to be timeless, in the sense that there is nothing for time to be moving towards. Picture, during this period, that something is drawing raffle tickets, one at a time, until the Universe card is selected. We would never be aware of the incorrect draws before the current universe. It would take no amount of perceivable time for this draw to occur. It seems just as likely that the universe exists based on a very small chance of everything eventually aligning as it does from a designer. One of Swinburnes philosophies is that a so-called simpler theory is a better one (191, 196). So a theory involving such random chance is poor in comparison to an explanation such as design. As an extension of this thinking, he contends that a theory of design involving one designer, God, is more plausible than a theory with multiple creators. However, I am not convinced by this way of evaluating theories. Why should a situation as complex as the existence of the universe be explained more compellingly by the theory that is

the simplest? This seems by default counterintuitive. You would not expect advanced scientific and mathematical facts and derivations to be explained by simple calculations and proofs. Complexities, by definition, require more complex explanations than basic facts. I defend that my proposed theory on the universe being a random chance occurrence is as likely as a design theory, despite it perhaps involving more complexity. Even if I were to concede that a simple theory is superior, I could then claim that an argument from design consists of the most complicated lines of reasoning possible. Gods existence is full of other questions and intricacies to be sorted out. Merely allowing His existence as the designer of the universe creates dozens of other dilemmas, e.g. the compatibility of divine characteristics, the problem of evil, etc. Swinburne defends the argument from design against a more scientifically based argument for the universe. He makes the following claim: that the very existence of the world is too big for science (194). This defense seems invalid, as it is making the assumption that God is stronger and more compelling than science. In a fair deliberation of the argument, science, as some sort of being, should be regarded as potentially possessing the same capacity and power as a divine creator. It is reasonable to allow that science has the same infinite ability to produce universes as God. If the task of design is too big for science, then it could also be said that it is too big for God. As an aside, allow us to consider the assumption that Swinburne and the argument from design are at least partially correct. That is, the universe is in fact

designed. He wishes to push this even further, insisting that the universe was designed by God. This is not a trivial step to take. I see nothing about the possibility of design that designates how many creators were involved. Swinburne contends that several creators would display different handiwork, and this discrepancy would be evident in the world (196). However, let us assume that all possible creators are ultimate beings (which is reasonable given the magnitude of being required to create a universe). Is it not likely that all ultimate beings would act in identical ways? How could there be different types of an ultimate being, which by definition is uniquely the best? If there were multiple designers, they would all share this ultimate quality, and therefore act the same and produce identical styles of the universe. Swinburne concludes his essay with a brief discussion of beauty. In truth, I find this part of his argument to be the most compelling. The existence of beauty does seem to me most easily explained by design, simply because it is not a requirement for anything. It serves no utility, has no purpose besides what Swinburne calls goodness (201). The concept of goodness is something that relies on conscious thought. Without sentient beings existing to perceive goodness, it disappears. Therefore only a conscious being would be capable of designing beauty. Scientific explanations of the universe would have a much harder time explaining why beauty arose in the world; it appears much more intentional than say, gravity, which serves a physical purpose. The teleological argument is what Swinburne labels a C-inductive argument (199). A C-inductive argument is one in which the premises only add to

the overall probability of the conclusion. In general, I find it difficult to accept this kind of reasoning. It seems like there should always exist some equal and opposite argument one that potentially lessens the probability of that same conclusion. Providing adequate evidence for the existence of God is perhaps an impossible task. Despite how much the argument from design can offer support for the notion of intelligent design, I do not find its evidence sufficient to make the possibility of a designer more probable than the non-existence of God or any other divine creator.

Works Cited: All citations refer to Richard Swinburnes essay, The Argument from Design, found in Part II of our textbook, Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology (6th Edition)