Professional Documents
Culture Documents
the planters that. 1f a labourer declined to accept the contract
place.d before h1m, he could be treated under the existing
Spanish laws a rogue and a vagabond, offences punishable
by transportatiOn to a plantation for hard work. It is often
forgottyn Spain did not treat her own subjects better
aliens .who came to work as contract labourers in her
Th1s was . due to the kind of colonial regime
Impos:d on her colomes. The colonial system was of course a
reflectiOn of the way of thinking about Africans harboured
by those who shaped Spanish colonial policy.
COLONIAL POLICY
of the government was originally that of
assimllatl?n, a pobcy which was similar to that of France and
Portugal the1r African territories. This policy's premise was
1t was adopted in the beiief that Africans had no
CIVilizatiOn or. culture worth keeping, so it was thought
necessaty to out this inexistent or at best barbaric past
and be!?n to wnte a new civilization upon a cultural tabula
rasa, as It the policy was adopted in the belief
that CIVilization was the best. This cultural arrogance
typical of the latin countries of Europe in their relation
With non-Eu.ropean peoples. In the case of Spain in Fernando
Po, Afncans, because of their small number, did not
any on whatever Spain did, so that
changes Spamsh colonial administration were primarily
due changes in colonial personnel or changes in
Spanish at home. The assimilationist policies
by Sprun entailed the imposition on the colony of
mst1tut10ns of metropolitan Spain. By 1915 th s h
th ti
1
. , e panis
au on es c rumed that they were adopting a new policy of
32
"attraction" or association based on respect for native institu-
tions, but the fact was that in the case of Spanish Guinea the
aim of the Spanish government was solely domination for the
purpose of exploiting the territory by means of native labour.
Thus, for example, in spite of Spain's adherence to the forced
labour convention of 1930, forced labour (Prestacion
personal) continued until 1938. By 1938 Spain recognised in
Femando Po two categories of African subjects. There was a
class of "emancipated natives"; these were people who had
shown themselves in various ways to possess a fairly high
standard of "character and ability". These people were
subjected to the same system of justice as Europeans, i.e.
they were tried according to Spanish laws. A law further
defining the degrees of emancipation was passed on 30
December 1944 and by this law fully emancipated subjects
came under metropolitan Spanish law without prejudice to
such modifications that might be introduced by colonial
legislation.
"Unemancipated natives", i.e. other Africans who were
mostly illiterate, came under the protection of a Patronato of
natives. This was a council for the protection of "natives"
which came into existence in 1928 with the main task of
advising the Governor-General on African affairs. A further
revision of this system was made in 1938; consequently,
administration of "native justice" was based on 'native usage'.
Polygamy though countenanced was discouraged by a system
of fmes operating after the third espousal. There was a
hierarchy of native courts culminating in the Supreme Native
Tribunal consisting of groups of Africans nominated by the
Governor-General and sitting under the presidency of Spanish
officials, although the authorities claimed in 1939 that it was
their aim to exclude European officials from "native" court
administration.
The territorial administration was based on separate
administration for Fernando Po and another one for Rio
Muni and the remaining islands. The government took little
interest in African education though Catholic missionary
33
societies were allowed to operate in Spanish Guinea; Before
the Second World War then, one can conclude that Spain was
beginning to take more interest in Spanish Guinea not for
altruistic reasons but solely for purposes of exploitation.
Statements of the Spanish ''mission" in Africa were being
made that it began to seem that the " ... rod of the exploiter
has been so swathed in altruistic professions that it has come
to look almost like an umbrella. "18 It was, however, clear
that since Femando Po was dependent on migratory labour
which gave the island a transient nature, the full impact of
Spanish administration was never really felt and even up till
1940, "Pidgin English" continued to be the lingtUJ franca of
the island. This dependence on migratory labour made
Femando Po almost a no-man's island and made her future
not only economically19 doubtful but also politically
unsafe.20
REFERENCES
F.O. 371/26908. C.W. Michie, H.B.M. Vice Consul encl. in B.H.
Bourdillon to Rt. Hon. Lord lioyd of Dolobran, Secretazy of
state for the colonies. 4 Jan., 1941.
2 I.K. Sundiata op, cit. pp. 101-103.
3 . H.R. Rudin: Germans in the Cameroons 1884-1914: A case
study in Modern Imperialism: Yale Univ. Press 1938,
pp. 315-316.
4 I.K. Sundiata, op. cit. p. 100.
5 F.O. 371/26908 C.W. Michie Vice-Consul in Santa Isabei, enclo.
In B.H. Bourdillon to C.O. 4 Jan., 1941.
6 I.K. Sundiata. Op.cit. p. 103.
7 I.K. Sundiata. Op. cit. p. 104.
8 Ch. III of Spanish Guinea labour code issued in 1906 article 38
adjured Spanish administrative officers to meet labour needs
of Fernando Po by official recruiting.
34
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Jide Osuntokun: Anglo-Spanish Relations in West Africa during
the First World War 'JHSN. Vol. VII, No. 2, June 197 4
p. 292.
Jide Osuntokun.lbid. p. 296.
Jide Osuntokun.lbid. P 301.
Ibid. p. 299.
See J. Osuntokun. 'Nigeria-Femando Po Relation' Coming up in
A B Akinyemi Ed. Nigeria and the World. Papers read at
N:I.I.A. conference held in Lagos in Feb. 1976. See also
Akpan: liberia and the Universal Negro hnprovement Assocta
t
. The background to the abortion of Garvey scheme for
ton. Afi. Hi" tory XIV 1 1973
African colonisation. Journal of ncan zs
p. 121.
F.O. 371/26908. Op. cit.
Ibid.
Ibid.
F.O. 371/26908. C.W. Michie. Op. cit.
Ibid.
Value of exports from Femando Po.
1929 1930 1931
128,560 234,200 77,600
1933
56,360
These figures reflect declining labour supply'.
1931 figure reflects the stoppage oflabour recrmtment m li .
S F 0
371/49640. Research Dept. 1st Feb., 1945.
ee. . . th
C 0 583/248. Reporting the migration of Germans .from e
. . d B "tish Mandate to Femando Po m August
Cameroons un er n
1939.
35
3
THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THE PREDOMINANCE
OF NIGERIAN LABOUR IN FERNANDO PO
It is generally accepted that when people move voluntarily
from one place to another, they must be doing so because the
recipient area must have something more than the losing area
to offer. This would be true not only with regard to itJ.temal
migration, either rural-urban, or urban-urban migration, but
also when international boundaries are involved. The
migratory phenomenon could be explained in the sense of
"push" d " 11" 1'. t "Pu h" th
an pu 1ac ors. s m e sense of unfavourable
conditions at home and "pull" in the sense of an assumed
condition in the receiving areas. Political oppres-
swn, lack of economic opportunities, shortage of land in
particular, could lead to exodus of a people to another more
favourable area. There is of course the "ethnic pull"; that is
people tentl to migrate to an area where representatives of
the parent ethnic group already existed.! These factors
applied in the case of labour migration to Femando Po from
Nigeria.
Right from 1828 to the eve of the Second World War
Nigerian labour had always played an important role in
economic well-being of Fernando Po. By 1941, for example
there were .1 0,000 Nigerians in Fernando Po.2 This labou;
came mainly from Owerri, Calabar, Qgoja, Onitsha and
Cameroons provinces in that order of importance. The
seven divisions showing the highest recruiting rates were
Owerri, Aba, Eket, Afikpo, Bende, Ikot-Ekpene and Uyo.
These areas are thickly populated to the extent that it would
be difficult to resist the argument that shortage,of land was
{)ne of the main factors causing emigration. The second factor
was the liberal payment made to recruiters by Spanish
36
authorities and employers for each man brought to Femando
Po.3 The third factor driving labourers to Fernando Po was
pressure of tax collection in Nigeria. This was borne out by
the fact that emigration was usually highest from August to
October which was also the period of tax collection. There
was also the fact that Nigerian labourers engaged in lucrative
contraband trade.
The above should not be interpreted as suggesting that
conditions in Fernando Po were so good that Nigerians were
streaming to the place in large numbers, for in 193 7 and 193 8
the Spaniards were faced with the perennial problem of
scarcity of labour. This was primarily due to ill-treatment of
Nigerian nationals there and the inconvertibility of Spanish
pesetas as a result of non-recognition of Francisco Franco's
regime by Great Britain. Even the presence of Nigerians in
Fernando Po was illegal as far as the British authorities were
concerned. Recruitment of labour to anywhere was forbidden
by the Nigerian Labour Ordinance No. 1 of 1929, and
emigration of labourers to Femando Po was specifically
forbidden by the same law. 4 Nevertheless, the Nigerian
government was quite aware of the fact that 'Nigerian' people
had been going to Fernando Po illegally from 1828 onwards.
Hence, in 1939 an administrative officer was sent to Femando
Po by the government of Nigeria, to investigate labour condi-
tions on the island and to evolve in collaboration with the
Spanish authorities 'measures which would ensure the welfare
of Nigerian labourers.s Thjs mission laid the foundation for
the Anglo.Spanish labour accord signed in 1942, but negotia-
tion of which began in 1940, which was designed to streamline
relations between Nigeria and Fernando Po.
Various reasons led to the signing of this agreement. The
British were too anxious about the threat of the possible use
of Fernamio Po against British territories by the Axis powers,
since it was even rumoured that Spanish territories were
und.er Nazi influence and that there was a group
(Fuehrer) for- the Qerrtian National Socialist Workers Party in
Fernlilldo Po,-. whose name was given as Dr. Joseph Worner.
6
37
'lhc Nigerian Fernando Po labour accord was therefore
negotiated in the spirit of Anglo-Spanish rapprochement
and in consideration of Great Britain's world wide interests. 7
At. the same time the British were prepared to consider
offensive action against Fernando Po if Spain went over
to the Axis powers, and the British Admiralty even
commented that a naval operation to capture Fernando Po
should not be a heavy commitment since the number of
troops on the island was not more than 200. As if to prove
this point, the British Naval Commander-in-Chief South of
the Atlantic, without reference to either the Foreign Office
or the Colonial Office, and to the two offices great embarrass-
ment and annoyance, ordered H.M.S. Dragon to proceed on
6 July 1940 to evacuate all British nationals with the
exception of the Vice-Consul.
8
The Spanish authorities were
not given prior information about this and they made the
right deduction by strengthening the defences of the island
by bringing Moroccan and Spanish troops to beef up
the 200 local nfles.
9
The action of the British did not
them to the Spaniards who were in any case sympathe-
tic to the German cause and discriminated against British
nationals in Fernando Po throughout the war. In spite of the
war, or perhaps because of it, the British went ahead to
negotiate a labour treaty with Spain concerning Fernando Po
and Nigeria from 1940 to 1942. The ostensible reason for
this agreement was to prevent illegal trafficking in labourers.
The British claimed that:
... the object of these negotiations with the Spanish gevernment
was to regularise what had become a large scale traffic in labour
and to endeavour to eliminate the unscrupulous native 'bl;1ck
?irder' who earned a lucrative livelihood by kidnapping the
Ignorant peasants from the Ibo and Ibibio areas .. .10
The question to ask is why the British had to wait until the
time of the war to use Nigerian labour to bait Spain out of
possible desertion to and militazy cooperation with the axis
powers against the allies. One can of course argue that the
British recognised that if they did not do anything at that
38
time the problem would get out of hand since the number of
Nigerians on the island was on the incn3ase.
11
In December 1942 a treaty was signed between Nigeria and
the Spanish authorities in P.o to obtain a regular
supply of healthy labourers. The agreement stipulated that
only labourers over the age of 16 could.be recruited. Records
and photographs of each labourer were kept at Calabar and
Santa Isabel. The labourer could be recruited to work in
agriculture, industzy or forestzy. The duration of the contract
was initially one year for bachelors and. two years for a
married man who went with his wife. The contract was
renewable for. the same number of years, but in the case of a
bachelor, he must first return to Nigeria before taking up
another contract. Adequate rations and shelter were to be
provided free. An agricultural labourer was to be paid 1 a
month and others earned 40 per cent more. Half of this
money was to be paid to labou,rer and the remaining half
was to be deposited at the office of the Curador cqlonial of
Fernando Po who held' the money in trust for the labourer
until the expiration or of the contt;act; money
accruing to the labourer was then to be paid by Direccion
de Hacienda or treasuzy. The're was even some provision .for
protestant and muslim !1;liSsionaries t; work with Nigerians in.
Fernando Po. Any illegal immigrants were to be repatriated at
Nigeria's expense. The most important clause in all the treaty
was clause XXVIII which stated inter alia" ... if the employer
fails to fulfil any of his afore-mentione<;l obligations in respect
of the repatriation of a worker. and/or his family, the said
obligation shall be performed by the government of Fernando
Po:"12 . .
. Under this agreement Nigerian labourers could be recruited
for in Fernando Po and Rio Muni and the other Spanish
Islands. The or' the agreement was supervised by a
labour officer at Calabar. At the request of the Spanish
government the firm of Messrs John Holt and Company was
appointed the agent for recruiting labour for Spanish
chamber of commerce in Fernando Po. John Holt did not
39
only directly; it also farmed out recruiting to Nigerian
sub-r:cruiters.
13
The Nigerian government allowed the
recnutment of numbers of labourers not exceeding 250 a
month. The authorities aimed at maintaining a labour
force of approxlffiately 14,000 men. As the normal duration
of a labour contract was eighteen months or two years about
6,000 or 7,000 recruits would be required each ;ear to
men whose contracts had expired. The number of
recruits fell below the number required, and in fact
only 1,430 men officially embarked from Calabar in
1944. ?n arri:al at Fernando Po, the recruits were usually
placed m transit camp and were distributed to their respective
after compliance with medical and police formal-
Ities. The papers from the police and medical authorities with
the copy of the contract would then be handed by the
_worker over to the employer for safe keeping. Without these
documents the labourer would not be able to leave the island
by means and the milita:ry control of the. island was
such that It. was impossible for him to leave by
canoe.
A!though immigration was controlled by the 1942 treaty
ye_t trafficking continued: Four pounds sterling was
pnce prud per labourer smuggled in. The welfare of
the was naturally connected with th ffi 'al
d
. . . . . . e 0 lCI
a mimstratwn of the colony which for most of th' ti . . Is me was
corrupt, venal and The ' chief scourge of the
labourer. was the Afncan Guardia colonial and police forc.e.
These were the cause of much unnecessazy suffering
t:he of it all was that many of them were
_Any employer could have any of his labourers
place_d m pnson for as long as he liked. with or without
flogging. .
. The . 1942 was . an unmitigated failure in all
resects. It satisfied_nobody. The Spanish authorities rightly
. that they did not get the adequate supply oflabour
promised them under the treaty. Members of the Fernando
P() Chamber. of Commerce had to visit Calabar in 1944 to
40
discuss what steps could be taken to i111prove the rate of
recruitment. The impression the Nigerian government got
from their visit was that while employers fully realised their
dependence on Nigeria for a more contented labour force,
there were unsatisfactory conditions for which the Spanish
government rather than the employer was responsible. The
Spanish government paid insufficient attention to complaints
made by the British labour officer and showed little interest
while repatriating labourers. No steps were ever taken to get
in touch with relations of men who fell sick or died and in
the case of labourers contracted before the treaty, the
relations of a deceased labourer could not receive his
property unless they claimed it in person. The postal service
between Femando Po and Nigeria was infrequent and very
expensive so that labourers felt very much cut off from their
homes during the period of their contract. It was matters
such as which were largely outside the control of the
employers which impeded. recruiting.
These unattractive conditions in Fernando . Po led to
scarcity of labour and consequently led to lucrativeness of
the smuggling trade. The long and indented coastline of
Nigeria made it physically impossible for the authorities to
prevent the clandestine smuggling of labour ac_ross to the
island by canoe. This was particularly the case in war-time
Nigeria, for although Nigeria had one patrol boat working in
the area, this was of course quite inadequate. Even this patrol
boat had to be withdrawn in 1944 following an order from
the Commissioner of Police that the practice of firing across
the bows of canoes to force them to stop was to cease.
These canoes engaged in the illicit traffic operated mostly
from the network of creeks in and around the estua:ry of the
Cross river. The villages of Oron and lkang were particularly
. . notorious for. this operation. About sixty ocean-going canoes
' . regcll\lrly .engaged)n 'the. traffic the Nigerian side.
\ canoes were propell:ed 'by 'ab.out tep paddlers and '
usl.uilly' carried U,p . t9 :thirty passengers and took fifteen to
twenty hours for Joilfliey from Santa Isabel.
.. ,. ..
41
Apart from labourers the canoes carried palm oil kernel
. . . ' '
yams, gari, motor-cycle tyres and drugs. The profits
on. all commodities were such as . to justifY the
risk. On the Spanish side the whole traffic was
with in an drganised and official basis. Canoes paid
harbour dues at Santa Isabel and cargoes were customed. On
arrival in the harbour the "Captains" of these canoes were met
by officials of the Junta de Abastos who bought the cargoes
and organised the distr;ibu tion of labourers. Smuggle_rs were
paid in Spanish currency and they had therefore to turn most
of _their earnings into Spanish goods which they thi:m
smuggled back to Nigeria. Brandy and perfumes appeared to
be the chief cargoes carried. In view of this smuggling, the
Nigerian government considered dertol,lncing t4e 1942 agree-
ment. it \Vas felt-that iei?udiati<?n. ofthe.agreeinent would
lead to a wJ.lolesale tosmuggling oflabour by canoe
alth9ugb.. continuing would greatly increase if
to-come to an end. Repudiation of the
would not cause any vezy serious incon-
veniimce.. to the Spaniards who would still be able to obtain
labour illegally._ Re:pudiation would on the other hand put an
end to any immediate hope of securing the improvement in
conditions; howeyer slight that may be, which the British
claimed the agreement was designed to secure. The British
realised that . they could therefore not repudiate the agree-
ment and that effective patrol of the coast would also have to
wait until the end of the war; the man in charge ruefully
commented " .... i(we can ultimately obtain that control, we
shall be able to threaten the whole basis of Fernando Po's
economy and we ought then to be able to make them do
what we like. "16 . .
More galling \yas the pro-Axis sympathy of the authorities
in Fernando Po durin-g the war especially of the Governor-
General, Don MarianoAlonso Alonso. ID-treatment of Nigerian
labourers was intimately related to pro-Axis feeling of the
.local administration. 1Jle:Union Jack was not respected and
the Consul's .car flying it was stopped " ... even by a
42
native sentry at the entrance to the village of San Carlos."
British news was banned from the local newspaper Ebano
which on the other hand gave prominent publicity to German
and Italian communiques relating tci the war. There was
almost complete "social boycott" of the British_Yice-Consulate
" ... There are few Spanish people in Isabel who would
accept an invitation to a private party at the British consulate
"17 All British nationals wishit:J,g to leave the zone 9f
Isabel were obliged to <?btain special permits each
occasion. This included the Vice-Consul of the Island
whereas Germans had freedom of movement evezywhen:
the island. Other anti-British actions o! the
included the arrest on 13 Februazy 1943 of
chaplain in his mission house in San Carlos
to the Spanish authorities mission house was a_mihtary
zone!' The Methodist mission had a heavy ta:catwn
on them in 1943 and back-dated t9 1932. Nigerians also
frequently arrested for spying for the British. 'I_he
suspected that Spanish and German agents were
into Nigeria under the guise that they
labourers. The British even claimed that the Wife _of
German Consul in Santa Isabel was once_ seen to be buymg
passages for agents posing as labourers to return to
N. a 18 The British were quite concerned about the
Igen . p Th'
security aspects of the pro-Axis stance of Fernando o. . _Is
was rightly so, since there was a small number of m
Fernando p0 including the German Consul who direct
cypher communication with Germany. The offiCials of the
administration of Fernando Po were falangists who were
unfriendly to Britain. There were resident in the island several
hundred Pro-German Africans many of them ex-German
Kamerun soldiers in the Spanish Guardia colonial. Some were
refugees and settlers from the Cameroons who had emigra!ed
there since 191619 and had been joined by others. These
people had formed a Pro-German called Kamerun
Eingebomen Deutsche Gesinnten Verem (Umon of Camero?ns
natives friendly to the Germans). The Germans were usmg
43
these people for espionage in Nigeria and German propaganda
was actually getting into Nigeria by 1944.20 It is of course
to. expected that the British were not objective in their
cnttctsm of pro-German feelings of the local administration.
Although relations were far from cordial, they were aggrava-
ted by the fact that some of the British Vice-Consul's
communications with the Governor-General of Spanish
Guinea wer couched in hardly courteous terms.
The British consoled themselves by believingthat the anti-
British policy of the Governor-General of Spanish Guinea was
a p.ersonal o?e though certainly aided and abetted in it by his
of Pohce who had spy-mania so badly that he saw a spy
m almost every disgruntled Nigerian labourer. At the same
their officials were no doubt sure of the devil they were
with. British Consul in Duala, for example, aptly
descnbed the situation when he wrote that in Fernando Po
the British Vice-Consul had to conduct business with " ... a
Governor-General who was at one time a house painter like a
certain Herr Adolph Hitler, and who has precisely the
of breeding and education one would expect from a Spanish
artisan . . . "
21
Some British officials blained the spineless-
ness . of their home government for the unsatisfactory
condition in Fernando Po. They argued that Fernando Po
which relied on Nigeria not only for labour but also for food
should never have been allowed to pose a security threat to
Nigeria. One British official declared:
it is only too apparent that the time has come for the mess
which is Fernando Po to be cleared up in our own interest and
those of the few decent and rational minded Spanish colonists
who remain, and it is obvious too that it is the British government
who have got to do the clearing, especially in view of the fact of
the strong position which Great Britain enjoys today ... 22
The h?stile attitude to the British, however, began to change
followmg the collapse of Mussolini's Italy, a sign which was
read as portents of things to come on the island. In fact, by
194.5. the administration on the island was not only
gmng publicity to British victories, but also co-operating with
44
Nigeria to stop the exportation of palm oil from the Niger
Delta to Fernando Po as well as commodity and labour
smuggling to Fernando Po. 23 In spite of the mutual
antagonism, the 1942 labour agreement remained in force
throughout the period of the war, but neither side really
enforced it, with the effect that all the aims for negotiating
and signing the agreement remained, as can be seen,
unfulfilled on both sides. Nevertheless, this agreement remain-
ed in force without any revision until 1950. The reasons for
this were quite apparent. Firstly, The tempo of nationalist
agitation after the Second World War in Nigeria. ':as
characterised by strikes, such as the one m 1945, orgamsahon
of nationwide nationalist parties and the emergence of a
politician like Nnamdi Azikiwe who possessed
charisma to attract national following. These gave the Bnhsh
administration much to think about. Emigration to Fernando
Po was seen as a valve. Secondly, the austerity
which was necessitated by the war had made many of
Nigeria's infrastructural needs so acute, the taken
cumulatively became so burdensome that all efforts of the
government were directed to solving these .and they
had no time for revision of the Fernando Po-Nigena labour
agreement untill950. . .
The revised agreement of 19 50 transferred the concessiOn
to recruit labour in Nigeria from the British firm of John Holt
and Company limited to the Anglo-Spanish employment
agency .. This agreement also contained a clause to repatriate
illegally recruited labour to Nigeria. This in fact was a clear
d t "kidn " indication that the Spaniards whose agents use o ap
people from the Cross River area of Nigeria and ship them to
Fernando Po were quite contented with the available
manpower on their island and were trying to avoid any cause
for friction with Nigerian authorities.; This 1950 agreement
was virtually the same as the imprl">perly enforced 1942
agreement. The 1950 agreement apart. from being more
generous in its monetary rewards for labourers, also
reiterated the fact that working conditions of the labourers
45
must with conventions of the international labour
orgamsahon.
. In .spite 'of this agreement, allegations of ill-treatment of
Ntgena.n workers c<;mtinued to bemade by returninglabout-
ers. Tius prompted a delegation led by the Central Minister of
Labour, Chief S. L. Akintola, to visit the island in 1953 to
make on-the-spot investigation: As can be expected the
delegatiOn was shown round Fernando Po by the Spanish
authoritie& who made sure only the good plantations were
seen by the visiting Nigerians. The result of this manoeuvre
was that the delegation reported that it found no evidence of
ill-treatment. The delegation, however, achieved some measure
of success since it was able to advise that salaries of the
labourers should be raised and that social and educational
services . for the labourers and their children should be
improved. This concerned provision of. educational and
religious . ..in English .. Finally, the delegation recom-
mended that a register ofall Nigerian workers in Fernando Po
should be properly kept. All these recommendations were
incqrporated into a- revised agreement in 1954 ... Another
delegation led by Chief f. S. Okotieboh went to Fernando Po
in 1956 on. the invitation of the island's authorities. The
result of this visit. was .a 25 cent pay rise for Nigerian
and the. payment of capitation fee of five pounds
sterling on each labourer to the Nigerian government 24
This money was then shared bet"ween the Federal and
government in lieu of the taxes payable by these
Ntgenan workers in Fernando Po. The agreement also made
provision for increased recruitment of Nigerian labour for
plantation agriculture in Fernando Po. Up to a maximum of
800 could be recruited monthly from Nigeria. It is of course
clear that Nigeria was not as wealthy as it is today when oil
revenue has made Nigeria a relatively affluent nation at least
in Africa, but the acceptance of this capitation fee by the
and Eastern regional governments in a way made the
government an accomplice in the degradation of
Ntgenan labourers in Fernando Po since it was big business
46
for the government to keep Nigerian labour in Fernando Po
no matter what the situation there was .
The Spanish authorities for reasons better known to them-
selves again invited the Nigerian government to send yet
another delegation in 1957 led by Chief J. M. Johnson.
delegation reported widespread ill-treatment of Nigenan
labourers excessive hours of work, illegal deduction from
wages failure to supply food rations. The delegation
visited Rio Muni for the first time. (One thing that puzzles
one is why the Nigerian authorities never thought it fit to
invite the Fernando Po authorities to Nigeria so that it did
not appear as though Nigeria was the beggar-nation.) This
visit resulted in the extension of the existing agreement, firstly,
to include payment of compensation in cases of
or partial injury to non-treaty labourers; secondly, to prolubtt
long periods of detention without trial in where
labourers were accused of criminal offences; thudly, to
abolish the pass system for Nigerian workers.
25
The govern-
ment nevertheless agreed that the number of labourers
recruited for Fernando Po could in fact be increased. This
was in spite of the fact that some members of the delegation
had sharply criticised the inhuman conditions under which
some of the labourers worked in some of the plantations on
the island. In response the government sent a Nigerian labour
officer to the territory mainly to deal with labour problems
and to look after the welfare of the Nigerian labourers.
Throughout the 1950s the Nigerian government was always
careful to point out the official Spanish good neighbourliness
as contrasted with the constant contractual lapses of
individual planters some of who were in fact brought to book
by the Spanish authorities on the island. Furthermore, the
governments of Nigeria and Fernando Po were agreed that
the labour contracts were mutually beneficial if not to
individuals at least to the two contracting governments.
Nigerians who would have been unemployed at home were
gainfully employed in Fernando Po and both the Federal .and
East regional governments in addition derived pecumazy
47
benefits from this. On the other hand Fernando Po which had
remained staiVed of labour for a 1ong time was able to
embark on planned agricultural development. Even when
opposition to conditions on Fernando Po was aired it was
with the purpose of amelioration and none of the crltics of
the labour conditions on the island ever suggested a complete
halt to recruitment.
With the approach of independence in Nigeria following on 1
the wake of Ghana's independence in 1957 the labour
relations between Nigeria and Fernando Po began to assume
new dimensions. The transformation from a colonial state
into full sovereignty in Nigeria was bound to affect the
relations and what used to be a colonial problem became a
diplomatic problem. The signs of the future relationship
became evident, when on the eve of independence in Nigeria,
the West African Pilot, organ of the "National Council of
Nigeria and the Cameroons" and a junior partner in the
Federal Coalition Government, carried an editorial calling on
the Federal Government to open negotiation with Spain for
the purpose of annexing Fernando Po which the paper
claimed was geographically part of Nigeria.26 With Nigeria
becoming a sovereign state in October 1960 under the leader-
ship of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa advocates of annexation
of Fernando Po must have thought that they had a chance of
forcing their will on the Federal Government. The N.C.N.C.
which had advocated this course of action controlled the
foreign affairs department through its nominee Jaja
Wachukwu as foreign minister. But because of the nature of
the coalition government the N.C.N.C. never really enjoyed
absolute control since the Federal Prime Minister had the
control of and responsibility for foreign policy
decisions. One can see from recent studies on Nigeria's
policy at this time, that Nigeria followed a low profile
pohcy usually referred to as "self-effacement" or "functional
approach", in her relations with her neighbours. This policy
meant that there consciously no political
rather than do thts, attempts at regional cooperation
48
epitomised by the fonnation of such bodies Chad
Basin Commission and the Niger River CommiS.swn, ":ere
d
27 All attempts to instigate aggressive actwn agamst
ma e. d
Fernando p
0
by a combined parliamentary actwn an press
campaign28 for the annexation of ":hat one of the papers
referred to as the "Goa" of Africa failed for severa!
Nigeria was not united enough to pursue a dynamic
policy. One recognises the that policy could
fact be used to foster the spint of umty at home, but this
would have been a realistic policy if Fernando Po was a
sovereign and weak African country. The fact that
Fernando Po was still protected by the might of Spam and
Spanish authorities at this time were using the bogey of
possible Nigerian territorial covetousness of Fernando Po to
persuade nationalists there that the sovereignty of
p
0
would be threatened whenever the tts.elf
from the protective security umbrella of Spam. The Ntgenan
government was apparently convinced that reports of
ill-treatment were exaggerated since it was logtcally argued
that if conditions were as bad as they were made to be
Nigerians would not be going to Fernando Po e.tther as
contract labourers or as illegal labourers smuggled mto the
island by the hazardous means of manually canoes.
Finally, Nigeria was not the only interested Afncan
that could lay claim to Fernando Po. The
was nearer the island than Nigeria, was not unmterested 1f1t
became clear that the island was up for partition, purchase or
annexation. The campaign for annexation of Po
which began in 1961 and reached its crescendo m 1965 had
its affects on the government of the day. .1.961 four
Nigerians were shot in Rio Muni by the local militia (known
as the Juventuds). This forced the Federal not
only to lodge a strong protest but also to ask for to
send a high-ranking delegation led by the Federal of
Labour, Chief J. Modupe Johnson, to Equatonal Gumea.
The delegation investigated the complamts of the
and recommended revision of the 1957 agreement. The VISit
49
resulted in further amelioration of labour conditions on the
island. Among other accomplishments of the mission were
the permanent abolition of the Pass Law which made it
compulsory for all Nigerians to carry passes while-
about on the island, the prohibition oflong detention without
trial for Nigerian offenders and finally an agreement by the
Spanish authorities in Fernando Po to payment of compensa-
tion in cases of permanent or partial physical disability. The
Nigerian government warned its critics after signing this
agreement which was again reviewed in 1963, that further
criticisms of Fernando Po were in fact counter-productive, in
the sense that constant emphasis on the fact that Nigerians
outnumbered the indigenous Bubi five to one was alienating
the feelings of the indigenous people and bringing them into
physical friction with Nigerians. This agreement was due for
in 1 but the crisis in Nigeria and the subsequent
ClVll war which broke out in Nigeria in 1967 prevented any
further review as stipulated by the 1963 accord.
With the outbreak of the civil war the problem took a
and assumed geo-political dimensions involving
as m the Fust and Second World Wars, the strategic location
of Fernando Po in relation to Nigeria. Brigadier Bassey, one
of the first Nigerians to be commissioned as an officer in the
then British-led army, was appointed Consul to Santa Isabel
in November 1966, no doubt with the realisation that should
the crisis in Nigeria deteriorate to civil war, Fernando Po's
position would be crucial to its outcome. At this time there
were about 100,000 people on Fernando Po of whom about
85,000 were Nigerians and two-thirds of them were Igbo-
speaking.29 This of course meant that there was considerable
sympathy with the Eastern Nigerian cause not only within
the immigrant community but also within the official circle as
well.
With the attainment of independence by Equatorial Guinea
in October 1968 followed by the withdrawal of Spanish
and management, working conditions began to
detenorate on the island. Equatorial Gurnea's government
50
tried to wriggle out of this difficult position
repudiating the agreement concluded between
Spanish Guinea because Francisco Macias Nguemu, the
of government in Equatorial Guinea, said that the labour
agreement was not in line with his policl.es.
Meanwhile the civil war prevented any renegotiation. Durmg
the civil war, when Fernando Po was still a Spanish territory
the island was used by the International Red Cross and the
Catholic Relief Organisation "Caritas" to ferry food and, as
claimed by the Nigerian authorities, arms and war materiel to
"Biafra". Even when Equatorial Guinea attained sovereign
status international pressure by France and the Catholic
, .
World was mounted to force Fernando Po to grant concessiOn
to these foreign powers and organisations to enjoy extra-
territorial jurisdiction on the island with the sole purpose of
helping the secessionist forces in Nigeria. The government of
Equatorial, Guinea was however able to determine what was
in her best interest and in January 1969 the government of
Equatorial Guinea asked the Red Cross and "Caritas" to cease
their operations on the island.30 This was followed by t?e
establishment of a telex link between Nigeria and Equatonal
Guinea at the expense of Nigeria. A Federal Commissioner,
Al-haj Aminu Kano later visited the island in October on
behalf of the Federal Military Government and President
Francisco Macias Nguema was given a note from the N.igerian
head of state General Yakubu Gowon, inviting the former not
to recognise 'Biafra and to pay an official visit to Nigeria. The
Nigerian envoy in Santa Isabel felt the influence of the
Nigerian immigrant population on the island so very
important in foreign policy decision at least as It affe.cted
Nigeria, that he urged his home government to ask either
Anthony Asika the Administrator of the East Central State,
or Dr. Nnamdi, Azikiwe, the former head of state of Nigeria
who had just deserted the "Biafran" cause to join the Federal
cause to visit the island to convince the lgbo people that the
Government was not embarking on a genocidal
campaign against them.
51
President Francisco Macias Nguema cleverly waited until
August 1970 when the war was over before coming on a state
visit to Nigeria. By this time Nigerian labourers whose
contracts had expired numbered about 30,000 in Santa Isabel
which had been renamed Malabo by the nationalist govern-
ment. The Equatorial Guinea government had no boats to
repatriate them and the Federal Government of Nigeria was
compelled by the difficult situation in which the labourers
found themselves to make arrangement with the Nigerian
National Shipping Line to evacuate the stranded Nigerians.
The Nigerian government while paying part of the bill asked
the Equatorial Guinea's government to pay its share which
was put at Nl52,000,31 but this bill was never settled. While
this problem remained, Equatorial Guinea approached the
Nigerian government to review the 1963 agreement. Negotia-
tions were therefore commenced and as in 1963 representa-
tives of both governments met in Lagos in January 1971 to
discuss the details of a new agreement. This was signed on
January 1972. The new agreement raised the age of
workers from 18 to 21, eliminated corporal punishment,
increased wages and capitation fees, provided for a minimum
wage of Nl6 per month in addition to free housing, medical
care, fully paid sick leave, increased annual leave and
substantial daily food ration. The minimum age at which a
labourer could be recruited was raised from 18 to 21 years.
The labourers were not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest, or
detention for more than one month without trial. It was also
stated that when a Nigerian was sentenced to a term of
imprisonment for an offence under Equatorial Guinea law
not recognised by Nigerian law, the worker involved shall
immediately be repatriated to Nigeria at his own expense. 32
The new agreement provided for the setting up of a mixed
commission of four, two from each country, to deal with
breaches of the labour agreement. The Federal Government
also stated that the government of Equatorial Guinea should
accept the fact that they were not doing Nigeria a favour by
employing a large number of Nigerians as workers in their
52
country and that the government of Equatorial Guinea must
accept and it was accepted by them that they would bear full
responsibility for any contravention of the agreement reached
in Lagos on 29 April 1971. But the existence of these clauses
did not eliminate abuses, and the recruitment of labourers
was in fact suspended in 1973 because of breaches of the
1971 agreement.
33
.
The Federal Government sent a ministerial delegatwn to
Equatorial Guinea to carry out an on-the-spot investigation
of the problem facing Nigerians recruited for
those resident in the country. The report of the mm1stenal
delegation was no more than " ... a catalogue of and
inhuman treatment meted out to Nigerians by and
people of Equatorial Guinea ... "
34
The result war
a review of the agreement in 1974, but the sad thmg IS the
fact that starting from 194 2 to 19 7 4 agreements between
these two countries have not been more than
Papier only to be signed and broken at will by the authontles
at Santa Isabel (Malabo). By 1974 when the agreement was
reviewed wages of labourers remained unpaid for long
periods to six months or more on some occasions, contrary
to article XVI of the agreement which stipulated monthly
payments, military intervention on purely labour matters was
a constant occurrence contrary to Article XXXIX, Oause 2 of
the agreement. One such military intervention led to the death
of a Nigerian in Aprill974 and when the Nigerian
demanded to see his corpse he was prevented from domg so.
The authorities in Fernando Po seemed to have been
by what they regarded as Nigeria's meddlesomeness m their
internal affairs and they seemed determined to put an end to
this. The Nigerian community was subjected to all kinds of
abuses climaxing in the humiliation of the Labour Attache,
Mr. 0. Arnbah, and his family on 27 February 197 5.
35
The Labour Attache was ordered at gun point and without
previous notice to leave his house. On hearing this the
ambassador sent two of his senior members of staff, Mr.
Anjorin, the Principal Labour Officer, and Mr. Odumosu,
53
Head of Chancery, to investigate the cause of eviction and
arrest of the Labour Attache. The response of the Malabo
government was the arrest ofboth men and detention by the
police, although they were later released. A Nigerian embassy
car was seized on 23 March 1975 and the car was never found
in spite of strong protests by the ambassador.
What one can make of these events is that law and order
seemed to have broken down in Fernando Po. But in fairness
one must point out that the plight of Nigerians as well as that
of the Bubi has become worse since independence. It is one
of the ironies of history that Africans, both native and
expatriate, received relatively more humane treatment at the
hands of Spanish authorities than at the hands of fellow
Africans. The regime of Francisco Macias Nguema has been
characterised by brutality and police terror of which Nigerians
have been among the victims. With a deteriorating economy
it is clear that even the normal administrative functions of
government are becoming difficult to carry out and the law
enforcing agencies have become laws unto themselves. It is
obvious therefore that Nigerians are no longer safe in
Fernando Po. With the planned withdrawal of Nigerians from
Fernando Po which ended early in February 197 6 Nigeria
decided to cut economic ties with Equatorial Guinea. During
the evacuation the government used not only her merchant
navy but also gun-boats and air force planes apparently to
demonstrate that any overt act of brutality against departing
Nigerians would not be tolerated. The combined air and sea
operation to evacuate abour 25,000 Nigerians remaining on
the island and the amount invovled in resettlement cost the
government about three hundred million Naira. 36
The reaction of the Nigerian Press was predictable. One
newspaper commentator advocated military action or
economic strangulation or both. It went on that all Nigerians
in prison must be released along with others for the purpose
of evacuation and that all the entitlements of Nigerians must
be calculated and paid at once and their movable property
released and that the exodus must be supetvised by highly
54
placed Nigerian diplomatic officers sent from Laaoa and
if Equatorial Guinea Gendarmes molested those
". . . then the exodus should be supetvised by """'-""' ..
teams of Nigerian army ... " The paper also called for public
apology by Equatorial Guinea and the payment of adequate
compensation to the families of those who had been
murdered in Equatorial Guinea. Other editorial opinions said
the time for reprisals had at last come, and that " ... no
government would allow its citizenry or part thereof to be
subjected for too long to a situation which borders on
slavery. It is therefore time for drastic reprisals. "
3
8
While most of the Nigerian dailies called for military action
against "this Hitler of Equatorial Guinea",39 other news-
papers put the whole question of Nigerian migrant labour in
wider perspective. They referred to the series of humiliations
meted to Nigerians in Ghana, Zaire, Gabon, Cameroon,
Dahomey, Sudan and Saudi Arabia, and called on the govern-
ment to repatriate these people back to Nigeria, as one of the
editorials put it, " ... In these countries they constitute l!
potential target for possible future abuse . . ."
4
0 The
government was quick to point out that the position of
Nigerians in each of the countries cited above was different
from that of Equatorial Guinea, that there was no cause for
alarm, that many of the so-called Nigerians in these countries
had acquired foreign citizenship and that should they want or
be forced to come home normal consular setvices would be
provided; but that in the case of Equatorial Guinea Nigerians
were faced with possible physical liquidation which the
government was not going to allow.
Many people in Nigeria were dissatisfied with the failure of
the military government to deal with Fernando Po militarily.
But it seems the government was using the economic weapon
to achieve the same end. The government was aware of the
fact that with the last plane or ship-load of Nigerians le!lving
Fernando Po, begins the process of economic decline and
imminent backruptcy. Shortage oflabour is bound to lead to
the cocoa, coffee and banana plantations reverting back to
55
bush. This would put Fernando Po back into the stagnant
situation of 1900s when all developmental schemes were
hampered by lack of labour. The prospects are even worse
now for with prosperity at home in Nigeria arising from the
oil boom and the massive development and reconstruction
schemes at home the incentive to seek employment in
Fernando Po or elsewhere is no longer there. In fact rather
than be a source of emigration, other West Africans have been
coming to Nigeria in large numbers these days; the pull is now
from us and the push factor is from other impoverished
neighbours including Fernando Po itself. Fernando Po is going
to find it difficult to attract labour from other West African
countries especially since the brutality against Nigerians was
widely published; and also, Nigeria is now strong enough to
use her influence to prevent labourers from West African
countries from going to work in Fernando Po. The result of
this would be decline in Fernando Po and the revenue
accruing to her from the plantations would no longer be
available to meet the day-to-day requirements of government.
This eventuality is bound to lead to political upheaval on the
island. There is already growing opposition to the sadistic
Francisco Macias Nguema regime and the remnants of the
indigenous Bubi population of the island are demanding
dissolution of the Union with Rio Muni where the President
comes from. The Fang from the Mainland seem to have
taken over power and the Fernandinos are not likely to
accept this indefinitely. If they did, they would be the first in
histozy to accept permanent subjection to an alien elite ruling
group. If the Fernandinos succeed in dissolving the Union,
then a scramble for Equatorial Guinea might ensue. The
Mainland is ethnically related to the Cameroons and Gabon,
with which Macias Nguema has been conducting a running
propaganda campaign. It would be in the interest of Nigeria
to be in touch with these two governments in case this
unnatural union called Equatorial Guinea dissolves into its
natural and separate geographical entities. In this case Nigeria,
knowing fully well that Fernando Po would need her labour,
56
technical know-how and. above all economic aid, should be in
a strong position to edge Fernando Po into union with
Nigeria. The force of strategy demands no less an action. if
Nigeria must play a role in this sub-region commensurate wtth
her size, population, economic resources and power. One
thing that is certain is that Nigeria cannot for long allow this
floating dock of an island, strategically positioned, to fall
into the hands of enemies of Africa. The recent transfer of
the Voice of America transmitters from Kaduna from where
they were expelled by the Murtala Muhammed/Obasanjo
government to Fernando Po raises the question about the
potential danger this island poses to Nigeria. There is also
evidence of increasing Chinese presence
41
on the island, but
it is not going to be difficult for Nigeria to deal with either
China the Soviet Union or the United States firmly over
Po. There might come a time when America's
dependence on oil exports from Nigeria might be used as
quid pro quo to their withdrawing from Fernando Po.
Chinese and the Soviets are quite aware of the potential
influence of Nigeria in Africa and they are not going to forfeit
their friendship with Nigeria in order to win that of a transient
state like Equatorial Guinea. What is clear is that Nigeria has
a role to play in the future of Fernando Po, but the question
to ask is whether Nigeria has the will, the skill and the men to
make sure that the fate of Fernando Po is not decided in
Washington, Mosco or Peking, but in Lagos.
1
2
REFERENCES
For full of this see Samir Amin: Modem Migration in
West Africa o.v.p. Lon. 1974, pp. 68-69.
F.O. 371/26908. C.W. Michie Op. cit. out of 10,000 Nigerians
Owerri province contributed 50%
Calabar 38%
Ogoja 10%
Cameroons (British) 1%
Onitsha
1
%
57
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Ibid. The Spanish labour officer pays 1 sterling and 150 Pesetas.
In addition the employer contributes another 150 to 450
Pesetas for a labourer safely delivered at Fernando Po (The
Pound sterling's official rate was 1 = 45 Pesetas).
Section 14 of Nigerian Labour Ordinance of 1929 No. 1 specifi-
cally prohibits labour recruiting into Femando Po from
Nigeria.
Nigerian Sessional Paper No. 38 of 1939. See also Budget Address
by B. H. Bourdillon 4th March, 1940. (Government Printers
Lagos).
C.O. 583/240 W.A.F.F. intelligence report for half year ending
31 Dec., 1938.
F.O. 371/24510. Viscount Halifax, Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs. to Sir M. Peterson, British ambassador to Mad'rid
7 Feb., 1940.
F.O. 371/24526. Cypher telegram from Governor of Nigeria to
Secretary of State for the Colonies, 9 July, 1940.
F.O. 371/34771. R Pleven (Cornite National Francais to F.O.
22 Jan., 1943.
C.O. 657/53: Annual Report of the Dept. of Labour for the year
1944.
Total population of the Island in 1942 was 23,000 composed as
follows:
European
Spanish 1 ,000
Portuguese 500
Germans 25
English 4
1,529
African
Nigerian
French Cameroonians
Bubi (indigenous Africans)
17,000
2,000
2,500
21,500
see F.O. 371/34771. British Consul-General in Duala to F.O.
30 June, 1943.
Anglo-Spanish Labour agreement concerning Nigeria and
Equatorial Guinea. Dec. 1942. Clause XXVIII.
58
13: , - ' Name ofRecruiter.: ' Area of Recruiting
j '.''' .,_;.,
30
20
; ..
_,..,.
':;;;
14_.
15
J6
17
2. Bassey Okon Udo
3:A. I; William ;
4. B. A. Efiom Eyamba
5. Bryson Ufot Etukudo
6. J. S. Uranta
7. G:'i1. Allige_' .-
. . . ' ' . . . . . ' .
8. '
</' T'. ;o. ..
16. Emmanueldno Oji_
11. J. C. Sosoo
:12. Mi.chael .Ailyanwu '
iJ.'Uka'OgbuUka'
14. Peter Obonnaya
Ef.iong Nko.p. Nruk
sedC.O. 657/53: Op: Cit.
Uyo Division
Eket/Etinan -'
Abak Division
Oppb() I)ivision-
. Opobo))ivision .. , .
ARO/
-' ITV
Ikot-Ekpene/ ' , '
. Bnyohg_
A ha
Owerri Division
Betide bivisiori
Be'nde Division
Okigwi Division :
Qrlu Th,strict of,_ .
Okigwi Division_
. . ' . ', .
'30
50
AO
40
;_:,;,:.
50
30
30
30
30
-.-._ 25
25
50
25
. . . . ' . .,_,_-<
C.O. 657/53. Labour Report for 1944.
".--:
-.
..:
. ' ---
- F.O. 371/34771. British Consul-Gehi:m:il m:Dualato _F.O. 30 June,
.: 1943. ';-- . ,-
18 Ibid.
19 See Jide Osuntokun. 'Anglo-Spanish relati?ns_ First
World War' op Cit: See also Jide Nzgena zn the
First World War Longman (irtPress)
20 - F.O. 371/39.601. Governor of Nigeria to -F.Q,17 May; 1944. ..
21 F.O. 371/34771. British Consul-General in Duala to F;O. 30
1943. -' '
22 F;O, ..371/3.4772; Resident mi_nister in .Accr_a to F.?. 12' July'
1943.
23 - .. F.O: 371/49598. British Vice-Consul'in Fernartdo Po to F.O.
31 March, 194S; . .
.
24 Bolaji Akinyemi "Nigeria and Femando Po 1958-1966: The
Politics of Irredentism: African Affairs: the Quarterly Journal
of the Royal African Society Vol. 69, No. 276, July 1970
p. 238.
25 Federal Ministry of Information News Release No. 180, Feb.6,
1976.
26 West African Pilot, 7 Jan, 1958.
27 Supo Ojedokun: 'The Anglo-Nigerian entente and its demise
1960-1962' Staff Seminar Papers School of African and Asian
studies 1970-71, at Lagos University library, see also
Mahmud Tukur: Nigeria's External Relations: The U.N. as a
forum and policy medium in the conduct of foreign policy
Oct. 1960-Dec. 1965. A.B.U. Zaria. Institute of Administra-
tion publication.
28 See Daily Telegraph 28 Jan. 1963 and 7 Aug. 1963. West African
Pilot 9 Feb. 1962, Sunday Times 18 Feb. 1962 and 25 Feb.
1962 Sunday Post 1 April 1962 and 11 March 1962.
29 Nigerian Observer. Brigadier Bassey's interview: 24 Nov. 1969.
30 New Nigerian 24 Jan. 1969 also Nigerian Morning Post 14 Oct.
1969.
31 Federal Ministry of Information News Release No. 142. Lagos
31, 1976.
32 Text of agreement: Federal Ministry of Information Release
No. 94, Jan. 28, 1971.
33 Federal Ministry of Information Release No. 80, Feb. 6, 1976.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Federal government statement on 21 Jan. 1976.
37 Business Times Jan. 13, 1976 p. 3.
38 Nigerian Chronicle 12 Jan. 1976, see also Daily Sketch 14 Jan.
1976
39 Nigerian Standard 14 Jan. 1976.
40 See New Nigerian Jan. 24, 1976 also Nigerian Standard 14 Jan.
1976.
41 Information supplied by Mr. A. Anjorin, former Principal Labour
0fficer in Femando Po's Nigerian Embassy.
60