Perceptual and Motor Skills, 1966, 23, 101 1-1033.

@ Southern Universities Press 1966 Monograph Supplement 6-V23

FUNCTIONAL SIMILARITY OF IMAGING TO PERCEIVING: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES I N VIVIDNESS OF IMAGERY1

PETER W I N S T O N SHEEHAN University of Sydney, Ausrralia2

Exp. I. Behavioral Correlates of Individual Differences in Imaging -. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1015 Exp. 11. Analysis of Instrucdons . . . . . . . 1025 Exp. 111. Vividness of Imagery as a Function of Familiarity with the Stimulus Imaged 1026 References . . 1032 Summary.-Ss vary in the degree of vividness of their imagery. It is hypothesized chat different degrees of correspondence between imaging and perceptual behavior are associated with individual differences in reported vividness of imagery. Results support the hypothesis of a functional similaricy becween imaging and perceiving. Vivid imagers behave in a way similar to the way they behave when they perceive; poor imagers behave in both a similar and dissimilar fashion. Vivid imagery reinstimtes the accuracy of the perceiving process. Differences in experience with the object imaged d o not account for the variation in vividness, although familiarity with the stimulus has some effect on the qualiry of imagery expressed. Familiariry with the object imaged makes for more vivid imagery only in those Ss who have the capacity to image vividly.

CONTENTS

In recent years there has been an increased study of subjective phenomena. The advent of brain research, sleep studies, and research in sensory - deprivation has drawn attention to the importance of hypnagogic imagery, dream imagery, hallucinations, and the like. It is an important fact that individuals differ in their capacity to image, but little is known a b o ~ ~ how t this cognitive ability . functions and what are the mechanisms of its operation. Many imagery phenomena do not lend themselves readily to systematic study and control. The experimenter, studying the elusive nature of hypnagogic and dream imagery, can rarely utilize knowledge of the experiences on which they are based to draw inferences about them, and imaging - Ss usually have differing experiences with the objects they image. Appeal can often only be made to the veracity of Ss' introspections. But if knowledge of past experience is available, waking imagery can be studied more closely. The studies reported below attempt to control past experience and investi-

'This smdy was conducted at the University of Sydney as part of a doctoral program of research on visual imagery. It was supported by US Public Health Service N l M H Grant M 3950. T h e author wishes to thank Dr. J. P. Sutcliffe, Principal Investigator for the above grant, for his help and assistance throughout the work, and Martin T. Orne, Emily Orne, Ulric Neisser, and Frederick J. Evans for their helpful comments while the paper was in preparation. W o w at Pennsylvania Hospiral, The Institute, Philadelphia, and University of Pennsylvania.

1012

P. W. SHEEHAN

gate individual differences in reported vividness of waking, memory imagery. They are defined as objective investigations of imagery which examine the relationship between imaging and perceptual behavior and the nature of this relationship for different ratings of vividness of imagery. Methods of studying imagery can be divided into objective and subjective, although there is no sure criterion for distinguishing between them. Distinctions of this kind have been made by Angel1 (1910), Fernald (1912), and Woodworth ( 1938). Complete reliance on the veracity of introspection can be distinguished from the correlation of an introspective report with objective or publicly observable behavior. A study is considered objective if it correlates variations in Ss' introspective reporting with variations in their behavior when imaging. A subjective study discusses only Ss' introspections about imaging. The distinction between the two types of studies can be applied more clearly to some experiments than to others. An important subjective study of imagery was the early investigation of Betts. Betts (1909) studied imagery in seven sensory modalities by asking Ss to image to suggested items and found that few Ss lacked the ability to evoke images when required. H e found marked individual differences in the degree of clarity and vividness of Ss' imagery. Some Ss had exceptionally vivid imagery while other Ss hardly any imagery at all. Betts' findings indicate that individual differences in reported vividness of imagery should be considered in imagery research. statements about what Ss do when they image should acknowledge the quality of the imagery expressed. The majority of studies which have correlated subjective reports of imagery with experimental behavior have used problem-solving tasks to evoke imagery (Barratt, 1953; Berg & Worchel, 1956; Fernald, 1912). Results with these tasks have been disparate. Barratt (1953) found that subjective report on the use and facility of imagery was related to success on specific spatial tasks. Berg and Worchel ( 1956), on the other hand, found great difficulty in setting up a performance task which indicated the presence of imagery in its solution. There is no evidence that problem-solving tasks validly and reliably indicate the type and quality of imagery used in their solution. A more fruitful method of studying imagery is suggested by instructing Ss to image and then relating individual differences in introspective reporting to objectively measurable features of Ss' imaging responses where the imaging behavor is defined by specifying the relationship between imagery and past perception. N o imagery can occur which is not composed of elements arising out of actual perceptual experience of some kind. Images must depend on previous perception and the nature of this dependence is open to investigation. The correspondence between imaging and perceiving can be conceptualized in a variety of ways. One way is to talk of the functional similarity of imaging to perceiving. An assertion of functional similarity between the two processes

IMAGING A N D PERCEIVING: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

1013

states only that a correspondence between sets of behavior exists, whatever the reason for that correspondence. The notion of function stresses how an S behaves when he images, as distinct from why he behaves. When an S images he can behave in a variety of ways; he may describe the stimulus features of his subjective presentation, or construct some copy of his image. These sets of behavior are behavioral products of the process of imaging. Likewise, there are behavioral products of the process of perceiving. An S's imaging behavior can be similar, or dissimilar to his perceptual behavior. A similarity between perceptual and imaging behavior demonstrates a functional correspondence between the two processes. Investigators in the field of imagery historically have placed emphasis on the stimulus accuracy of mental imagery rather than the dependence of imagery on previous perception. Philosophic thinkers in early sensationaliscic psychology (Titchener, 1919; Wundt, 1918) stressed the view of images as copies of earlier impressions or perceptions. They did not make clear what kind of copies they were, although they strongly implied they were good ones. Current theorizing about imagery stresses a poor correspondence between images and perceptions; images are characterized by inventiveness and originality. Moore ( 1919) talks of the spontaneous and uncontrolled nature of imagery. Hicks (1924) states that images are arbitrary and haphazard compared with the perceptions they depend on. McKellar says that "visual images tend to be creative rather than accurate in any photographic sense" (McKeUar, 1957, p. 23). Although the question of correspondence has not been studied explicitly, some investigations have cited relevant evidence (Bartlett, 1932; Kuhlmann, 1907; Zachariah, 1958). Imagers for Bartlett (1932) are people who confabulate; they add features that are not in the original stimulus perceived or change features that are there. Bartlett used the method of Repeated Reproduction where Ss were given a story or a picture which they subsequently reproduced a number of times. Although most confabulations occurred in the late stages of reproduction, they were often traced to the play of visual imagery. In the method of Description Ss were told to examine stimulus cards of human faces and were asked to describe them after a 30-min. rest interval. S with most importations was also the best visualizer; visualization was reported to favor the introduction of material from extraneous sources. Kuhlmann's study indirectly referred a variety of recall responses to properties of the perceived stimulus. Investigating memory consciousness, he asked Ss to memorize a group of achromatic pictures for a fixed time period. Each S recalled the piccures giving the order and nature of the imagery and associations. Confabulation, denoted by the number of color, or motion responses in Ss' imagery, constituted 10% of the responses and were classified legitimately as original responses.

1014

P. W. SHEEHAN

These two investigations raise several methodological points relevant to the investigation of the functional correspondence between imaging and perceiving. First, Ss' perceptions should be indicated precisely. The lack of definition of perception in Kuhlmann's study prevented a valid examination of original responses other than color and motion. Unless perceptions are defined in the first instance, no legitimate statement of comparison of imagery with perceived stimuli can be made. Specification of perception is highly relevant to the analysis of memory responses. For example, no valid inference about the accuracy of imagery can be offered without knowledge of whether Ss misperceived any parts of the stimulus on inspection. Second, the studies of Bartlett and Kuhlrnann employed instructions to recall and discussed the nature of imagery from the results. Yet inferences about the function of imagery should consider the possible behavioral differences between Ss asked to recall and Ss explicitly asked to image. The performance of those whose recall does not primarily depend on imagery may vary from the performance of those Ss whose recall depends heavily on imagery. Third, the quality of imagery should be indicated. Since Ss differ in their reports of the vividness of their imagery, it is important to determine whether differences in subjective experience are related to differences in behavioral correspondence. It is legitimate to ask whether the behavioral correspondence between the two processes is closer, when Ss image more vividly. If different statements about the vividness of imagery are associated with different behavioral correspondences between imaging and perceiving, then vividness reports can be indexed objectively by reference to behavior and made meaningful. Finally, a study of imagery should consider Ss' differing experiences with the imaged object. If variation in vividness of imagery is accounted for entirely by differences in familiarity with the stimulus imaged, then any statement of relationship of vividness to behavioral correspondence becomes indeterminant. There is scant evidence in the literature which bears directly on the issue of familiarity and vividness of imagery. In the studies carried out by Kuhlmann and Bartlett Ss were given practice in making a series of reproductions relating to a given event, but familiarity was not varied by repeating experience with the event itself. The above comments indicate the need for careful definition of imaging and perception behavior. Conclusions about the accuracy of imagery should be based on close analysis of both recall and initial perceptions. There should be also some regard to variations in introspective reports and the changes in behavior which accompany them. The following investigations aim to consider these criticisms. They attempt to define imaging and perceptual behavior so that the correspondence between them can be determined. A preliminary study by the author analyzed the verbal recall of picture material following the methods of reproduction reported by Bartlett (1932). Results highlighted some of the methodological problems raised in discussion above.

IMAGING A N D PERCEIVING: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

1015

A Prelimina~yStudy aimed to examine the relationship between descriptions of stimuThe sn~dy li when perceived and descriptions of the same stimuli when subsequently imaged, and the nature of the relationship between degrees of such correspondence and the ratings of vividness given to images of the stimuli. Eight Ss described six pictorial scenes varying in stimulus complexity which were presented for perception by slide projection. Ss later imaged the stimuli, described their images, and indicated the vividness of their imagery on a 7-point rating scale. Individual differences in vividness ratings bore no consistent relationship with degrees of correspondence between image and perception descriptions. Stimulus elements common to both descriptions were associated with imagery of varying vividness, and vivid ratings accompanied both positive and negative correlations of the serial orders of occurrence of the elements common to the two descriptions. Results were taken neither to confirm nor refute the hypothesis of a relationship between vividness of imagery and a correspondence between imaging and perceiving, since S's initial perceptions of the stimulus were defined inadequately. N o S reported the same number of s t i m u l ~ ~ elements s in his description of any given stimulus presented for inspection. The method of description failed to ensure that all elements actually perceived were indicated to E, and it did not identify misperception of elements in the complex stimuli. Ambiguity in the interpretation of the meaning of Ss' perceptual descriptions obscured the definition of imaging responses and their relationship to perception. The following series of experiments attempted more systematic control over the processes of imaging and perceiving so that the behavioral correspondence between them could be examined and related to vividness of imagery. They also examined the behavioral differences between Ss asked to recall and Ss asked explicitly to image, and Ss' readiness to vary their ratings of vividness of imagery. In summary, Exp. I studied the form of S's behavior when an image of a particular vividness was reported and the differences in behavior under instructions to image and recall; Exp. I1 attempted to validate results of the first study by investigating some demand characteristics implicit in the instructions to Ss; and Exp. I11 concerned the effect of stimul~~s familiarity on the vividness of imagery reported.

EXP. I: BEHAVIORAL CORRELATES OF I N D ~ V I D U A DIFFERENCES L IN IMAGING This study related behavior in an imagery and recall situation with behavior in a perceptual situation. The behavior was the manipulation of blocks. The stimuli were geometrical figures reproducible by combining blocks into patterns. Ss constructed the inspection stimulus by means of the blocks provided. The same set of blocks was used when Ss were asked to perceive, image, or recall the stimulus they had just seen.

1016

P. W. SHEEHAN

This approach minimized the occurrence of illusion since the geometrical elements of the percepcual stimuli were clearly definable. Ss were forced to perceive the elements of the design correctly in order to reproduce the design with the blocks during perception. The contrived absence of illusion eliminaced the recollection, forgetting, or reminiscence of illusory material in the recall stage. The possibilities of Ss recalling correctly perceived material they did not report (reminiscence) and of recalling stimulus elements not actually perceived were also eliminated, because Ss were made to indicate each of the stimulus elements in the experimental display. Assuming that a non-perceived element would not be indicated in the perceptual response, the procedure isolated three sets of elements for close study: the set of elements correctly perceived and indicated in both the perceptual and memory response (recollection) ; the set of elements correctly perceived and indicated in the perceptual response but not indicated in the memory response (forgetting) ; and confabulation. Since perceptual elements were fixed, confabulation was defined as the occurrence of an element, which S did not perceive in constructing the stimulus but which was contained in his reproduction from memory; it was the occurrence of a new element in reproduction from memory which was not contained in the perceived stimulus. The standardization of the stimulus situation and the way one perceives it minimizes irrelevant individual differences, but some variation in imaging behavior is needed to study the behavioral correlates of individual differences in vividness of imagery. If such differences do occur, the following experiment offers an experimental test of the relationship of vividness ratings to variation in correspondence between imaging and perceptual behavior. Particular attention is paid to the hypothesis that imaging is characterized by confabulation, in order to test the creativity notions of imagery (Bartlett, 1932; McKellar, 1957).
Materials and Affaratus Several displays were selected as inspection figures. Twelve judges previously rated these as showing some pattern in their arrangement of shapes and colors. Stimuli are shown in Fig. 1. All stimuli used four distinct geometric forms: triangle, circle, square, and diamond. A geometric form of a particular color was never duplicated in any design and different sets of colors were used with each display to emphasize differences among the three experimental patterns. Color transparencies were prepared for projection of either the display as a whole or any one element of it. Slides of individual elements of displays showed the geomecric element in correct spatial position relative to the ocher elements in the display. The dimensions on the slide were such that at a distance of 10 ft. from the screen a circle, diameter 3.5 in., was flashed onto the screen. S could duplicate each design by selecting colored geometric forms from four piles of blocks placed on a small table in front of him. Four sets of eight Matte black painted wooden cubes, 1 in. on a side, were used to represent sets of tri-

IMAGING A N D PERCEIVING: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

5TIMUI.I SHAPES COLORS

1017

PRACTICE

0 0 On0

R Y

B R

Y G

000 On0

on0
II

on0

El

0000
O n n O

0000
I11

n o 0 n 0000 0000 no 0 n
FIG. 1.

Stimulus display patterns

angles, squares, circles, and diamonds. Each block showed a particular geometric form in four different colors: red, green, yellow, and blue. Eight blocks exhibited only triangles, eight blocks only circles, and so on, and there was a different color on each of four faces of each block. S sat in an experimental room blacked out except for lamp illumination of the blocks. The physical image on the screen fell ahead and slightly to the right of S s line of vision. A 35-mm. slide projector was used with an interval timer and variable transformer. Instructions were delivered by a tape recorder. The Kohs Block Design Test (Kohs, 1927) was used to familiarize Ss with pattern construction and to provide a control task for the interval between perception and imaging, or recall. A shortened form of Betts' Questionnaire Upon Mental Imagery (Betts, 1909) assessed individual differences in rated vividness of imagery among Ss. This scale will subsequently be referred to as the Betts QMI.3 The Betts rating
T h e Betts QMI contains 35 items of the original Betts questionnaire (Bects, 1909). Five items wrtain to each of seven sensorv modalities: thev are visual. auditorv. cutaneous. kinaesbetic, gustatory, olfactory, and o&anic. In ;he vkual (audit&) mod~lity,e.g.,

~s

1018

P. W. SHEEHAN

scale (Betts, 1909) was used to record the vividness rating for imaging of stimuli. The scale ranged from a score of 7 (no image present at all), through 5 (vague and dim) to a score of 1 (perfectly clear and vivid). Sabjects Thirty eight male and 47 female Ss were drawn as volunteers from undergraduate classes in psychology at the University of Sydney. Six independent groups of Ss were used; these groups are as set out below. Before the main experiment Ss were each given the Betts QMI and the six groups were equated with respect to the total and the visual scores on the test. Uneven numbers of Ss were in the groups owing to the difficulty of matching groups on both imagery scores. E did not know the Betts scores until the experiment was near completion for the 85 Ss; then comparable groups were drawn up.
Procedure The experiment examined the effect of different instructions, specifically to "image" and to "recall." A control condition was introduced where S was given instructions to perceive the scimulus display for the second time. After the stimulus display was perceived twice Ss in the control condition were asked to image the pattern they had just perceived. Imaging after two perceptions, rather than one, provided a study of the effect of added experience on ratings of vividness of imagery. The contrast in this set of conditions specifies instructions to "image" versus "recall" versus "re-image" (imaging after two perceptions of the stimulus) and will be referred to as Conditions of Reproduction. Two conditions were introduced to study the effect of prior presentation of elements of the display, Prior Analysis and N o Prior Analysis. In the condicion of N o Prior Analysis the whole display was presented, at once, for perception. In the condicion of Prior Analysis S was presented with each of the individual elements of a display one at a time in a fixed serial order, before presentation of the whole pattern. In summary, six conditions arose from combination of Image, Recall, Reimage and Prior Analysis, N o Prior Analysis. Ss indicated perception of the display by constructing it with blocks under either Prior Analysis or N o Prior Analysis instructions. They then re-constructed the pattern under Image, Recall, or Re-image instructions. For all conditions of perception the whole display remained on the screen while S was constructing the pattern. The projector was switched off while S constructed the blocks under recall or image instructions. Individual elements
are asked to think of seeing (hearing) "the sun as it is sinking below the horizon" ("the whistle of a locomotive") and to consider carefully the image which comes to their mind's eye (ear). Extensive psychometric analysis of the scale (Sheehan, 1965) has indicated that a single factor accounts for a considerable part of the variance of test scores, with all items loading highly on the main component. The scale has been cross-validated on an independent sample.

IMAGING A N D PERCEIVING: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

1019

of the display were presented for 0.5 sec. All images, both elements and total display, were projected onto the screen at a dim, si~prathresholdlevel of illumination. Ss were first shown the practice display and then the three experimental stimuli, the orders of presentation being 1-11-111, 111-1-11, and 11-111-1. A given order was allocated at random to a given S. The sequence of events for each S was: S tested on Betts QMI; S tested on Kohs block test; S constr~lcted pattern on screen under perception instructions; S again worked at Kohs test for 40 sec. and then reconstructed pattern under appropriate experimental instructions. Where S had received image instructions a vividness rating was obtained. S worked at the Kohs block test for 2 min. before the next display was flashed onto the screen. Instructions to groups are reported below.
General.-"Familiarize yourself with these blocks. There are four different setstriangles, circles, squares, and diamonds. There are four different colors-red, green, yellow, and b l u e - o n each block in each set." Prior analysis.--"I am going to present a series of figures on the screen in front of you. Watch carefully what comes onto the screen." ( E presented elements separately, then total pattern.) "Now I want you to indicate to me the pattern of the piccure on the screen. You are to indicate the pattern by means of the blocks. Put the blocks together according to the pattern on the screen. Each block represents a unit of the design, and if put together in a certain way they will make u p the design on the screen. The separate units making u p the design have just been shown to you one at a time. Now put the blocks together in accordance with your perception of the patterning of the image on the screen." No prior analysis.-"I am going to present a figure on the screen in front of you. Watch carefully what comes onto the screen . . . (instructions continue as for Prior Analysis insrructions omitting reference to prior presentation of units) . . . of the patterning of the image on the screen."

When Ss had constructed a pattern with the blocks to duplicate the pattern on the screen, E switched off the projector and directed them to work on the Kohs block tasks while he set up the apparatus for the next stage.
Image.-"Now I want you to call to mind and retain an i m a g e a mental picture in y f [he design you saw on the screen a minute ago. I want you to evoke your mind's e a mental piccure of the composite figure. When you have this mental picmre in your mind's eye, I want you to indicate to me the pattern of this picture by means of the blocks provided. Be sure to work with the mental picture in your mind's eye. Construct the pattern of your mental picture and nothing else. Rate the vividness of your image. If you have n o mental picture, then mark 7 on the scale i n front of you. Try to evoke some image of the design, and try to reconstruct its pattern with the blocks." Recall.-"Now I want you to recall the pattern of the design you saw on the screen a minute ago. Try to remember what the composite figure was like and reconstruct the pattern with the blocks provided. D o not try to evoke any mental image or picture of the pattern. Just indicate to me what you remember of it." Control.-Perception instructions were given a second time after a 40-sec. rime interval from the first reproduction under perception instructions. After an interval of 40 sec. S received image instructions, as above.

P. W. SHEEHAN

Measures Several categories were used for scoring Ss' responses. Original responses.Xonsidering a colored geometric form as an element of a display, this measure was the number of times S used blocks in his image or recall construction which he did not use in his perception construction. Errors of location.-These were the number of elements of a display in the image, or recall reproduction which were not in the same position in the stimulus pattern as when correctly perceived. This measure involves forgetting and confabulation. Forgetting refers to the elements which are contained in the stimulus and in the reproduction from memory but are mislocated in the latter. The remaining elements comprise the category of response, confabulation. I?zversions of order.-The stimulus display can be considered as a permutation of some arbitrary ordering of elements, or may depict an order of elements which is determined experimentally. Consider for example the ordering of blocks in a matrix given by rows and columns from top left to bottom right. Other patterns made up of the same color-form elements may be considered to be permutations obtainable from the ordering. The "distance" of any permutations from this ordering can be measured by counting the number of pairwise inversions of order needed to transform the permutation into the given order. This score is nor unambiguous since the same number of inversions may be required to transform quite different permutations into the same order. Nevertheless, small numbers of inversions indicate that a pattern is quite like the referent while large numbers of inversions indicate that a pattern is quite different. Vividness ratings.-Ratings indicated by S after he imaged each design, and given to items on the Betts QMI were also analyzed. Results Since image instr~~ctions do not apply to Ss lacking imagery, results were excluded for Ss giving vividness ratings of 7. Two Ss given image instructions used more blocks in their memorial reconstructions than they used in their perceptual constructions. Their performance indicated confabulation which made calculation of errors of location and inversions invalid. Consequently, where the number of memorial elements exceeded the number of perceptual elements for these two Ss, their results were included in analyses of original responses bur excluded from consideration of errors of location and inversion^.^ Analysis of original responses.Xonfabulation rarely occurred with stimulus 111. For stimuli I and I1 the presence-absence dichotomy yielded most information. Frequencies of original responses for the separate experimental conin Table 1. ditions are set O L I ~ Two multiple contingency analyses (Sutcliffe, 1957) were carried out on
'Results for one S were in the Prior Analysis condition for stimulus 11, and for the other S were in the N o Prioc Analysis condition for stimuli I and 11.

IMAGING AND PERCEIVING: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

1021

TABLE 1 OBSERVED FREQUENCY OF SS CONFABULATING (E) AND NOT CONFABULATING CONDITIONS OF REPRODUCTION AND PRIOR ANALYSIS (E') UNDER OF STIMULI I AND 11
Stimulus

Prior Analysis Image

E

Condition of Reproduction Re-image Recall E E' E E' E' 10 3 9 4

7 6
2

I
I1

Prior Analysis No Prior Analysis Prior Analysis No Prior Analysis

5 10 6 10

6
8

14
8 14

7 5

5 2

5
4

frequency data for stimuli I and 11. The three classifications were: condition of reproduction (image, recall, and re-image), prior analysis (present, absent), and confabulation (present, absent). Parameters were estimated from the data. The following findings were evident. There was a significant interaction between prior analysis and confabulation indicating that additional experience lowered the incidence of original responses (for stimuli I and 11, respectively, x2 =9.17,df = 1 , p < .01; a n d x S = 6.16,df = 1 , p < .02). Ss in therecall condition behaved differently from Ss in the two imaging conditions. The incidence of confabulacion for the three conditions of reproduction are set out in Table 2. TABLE 2

Stimulus

Confabulation
Error

Condluon

I1

No Error Error No Error

Image 15 13
16

13

of Reproduction Recall Re-image 21 14 8 12 22 14 7 9

The high incidence of confabulation for the recall Ss indicated that a poor correspondence between perceptual and memorial behavior is more characteristic of recall than it is of imaging. Analysis of errors of location.-Error scores were correlated with vividness ratings given by Ss to images of the display patterns. Over all image conditions for stimuli I, 1 1 , and I11 the product-moment correlations of error-of-location scores with vividness ratings were 0.61, 0.60, and 0.51, respectively. The regression, however, was non-linear. Ss who said they imaged vividly tended to make fewer errors than Ss who said they imaged poorly. But scores of Ss imaging poorly ranged from few to many errors.

P. W. SHEEHAN

TABLE 3 MEANERROR OF LOCATION IN ~ M O R I A L REPRODUCTION PAITERNS I, 11, AND 111 Stimulus

I

OF

STIMULUS

Prior Analysis Prior Analysis No Prior Analysis Prior Analysis No Prior Analysis Prior Analysis No Prior Analysis

Condition of Reproduction Image Recall Re-image 2.00 5.33 4.36 7. O O

11.27

I1 111

12.77

3.08 4.37 5.67 6.50 9.54 10.50

3.15 3.92 6.50 5.15 9.27 8.75

The mean error-of-location scores for the conditions of reproduction and prior analysis are reported for the three stimulus display patterns in Table 3. Multiple contingency analyses were carried out on frequencies of Ss scaring above or below the median error score calculated over all experimental conditions. The three classifications for the analyses were: condition of reproduction (image, recall, and re-image), prior analysis (present, absent), and error (present, absent). Parameters were estimated from the data and analyses 'were carried out separately for each of the three display patterns. For stimulus I there was a significant interaction between prior analysis conditions and error (x2 = 7.14, df = 1, p < .Ol), which indicated that added experience with elements of the display pattern made for less error in memorial reproduction. There was some tendency for recall behavior to be differentiated from imaging behavior. Error scores above the median occurred in 62% of Ss in the recall condition compared with 48% and 42%, respectively, for Ss in the image and re-image groups. Analysis of inversion scores.Scores were calculated by counting the number of pairwise inversions of order needed to transform S s ordering of elements in his pattern construction to the ordering of elements which S gave in perception. The order chosen for each S was determined experimentally and was the ordering of blocks S gave in his perceptual conscruction. Where omissions occurred, and there were empty cells in the pattern constructions, inversion scores were calculated by randomly allocating numbers to the empty cells. For the control conditions scores were based on the two perceptual constructions only, so data provided examination of behavioral differences involved in imaging, recalling, and re-perceiving. There was marked heterogeneity of variance of inversion scores in the experimental subgroups; the variance of scores in the control groups was very much smaller than in the image and recall groups. Six analyses were carried out by the Kruskal-Wallis rank method (Siegel, 1956). Differences among the three reproduction groups were investigated separately for each of the prior analysis and stimulus conditions. Table 4 contains the mean rank scores for

IMAGING AND PERCEIVING: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES TABLE 4

1023

MEANRANKVALUEFOR IMAGE, RECALL, A N D CONTROL GROUPS UNDER ANALYSIS CONDITIONS FOR STIMULI I, 11, AND 111 PRIOR

Prior
Analysis

Image
22.93

Stimulus I Re- Concall trol

Stimulus I1 Image Re- Concall trol

22.86 22.77 8.70 ( P .01) 17.65 30.22 14.62 (P .01)

Stimulus 111 Image Re- Concall trol

22.67 23.00 12.82 ( P .05) 23.93 20.97 19.38 (P .05)

Present
Absent

29.62 10.15 ( P .001) 25.04 24.69 12.73 (P .02)

<

<

<

<

<

>

the experimental groups and lists the probabilities associated with the tests of significance. Results indicated that imaging and recall behavior were distinct from perceptions. Where there were appreciable differences between image and recall groups, imaging was closer to re-perceiving than recall. Analysis of vivtdness ratings.-Table 5 sets out the mean vividness ratings for the prior analysis conditions and two conditions of reproduction (image, reimage). Ss giving a rating of 7 to any of the three stimulus patterns were excluded from the results. TABLE 5 MEANVIVIDNESS RATING OF IMAGES UNDER CONDITIONS OF IMAGEREPRODUCTION AND PRIOR ANALYSIS
~p

Stimulus

Prior Analysis Prior Analysis No Prior Analysis Prior Analysis No Prior Analysis Prior Analysis No Prior Analysis

Condition of Reproduction Image Re-image

3.33 4.69 4.00 4.77 4.67 4.15 3.33 3.58 3.78 3.50 4.00 3.83

I I1 I11

Tests of significance of the differences between means set out in Table 5 were made by Lindquist's Type I11 model (Lindquist, 1953) of analysis of variance, and yielded the following findings. The re-image group gave more vivid images than the image group ( F = 6.09, df = 1 / 3 2 , $ < .02), and images to more complex stimuli were rated as less vivid ( F = 3.34, df = 2/64, $ < .05). The effect of prior analysis on vividness of imagery was dependent on the complexity of the stimulus presented; imagery was more vivid for Prior Analysis than for N o Prior Analysis when images were given to the less complex stimuli ( F = 5.60, df = 2/64, $ < .01). Product-moment correlations were calculated to examine the relationship

P. W. SHEEHAN TABLE

CORRELATIONS OF VISUAL AND TOTAL SCORES ON THE BE'ITS QM1 WITH E X P E R I M E ~ RATINGS AL
Betts Score Visual All Items Prior Analysis Prior Analysis N o Prior Analysis Prior Analysis N o Prior Analysis Cond~rlon of Reproduction Image Re-image

.3 1
.45 .14 .52

.4 3 .57 .45 .37

between visual and total Betts QMI scores and the vividness ratings given to images of experimental stimuli. Experimental ratings were summed over all three display patterns. Correlations are listed in Table 6. Some tendency may be seen for the correlation between Betts QMI scores and experimental ratings to increase as experience is increased by repeated presentation of the stimulus, before imaging.

Discussion Results show many soiuces of discrepancy between perceptual and memorial accounts: individual differences in imaging capacity, stimulus complexity, familiarity with the stimulus, and the nanire of the task itself. Vivid imagers accurately reproduced the stimulus as they perceived it. The close correspondence between imaging and perceptual behavior for these Ss does not support the notion that vivid imagers are characteristic confabulators and inventors. Previous studies generally have failed to specify individual differences in vividness ratings, but reports of inventiveness in imagery are usually meant to denote good imagers rather than poor ones. The present findings indicate that, when individual differences in vividness are considered, errors of reproduction actually accompany poor imagery and not vivid imagery. There were more original responses and more inversions for recall than for imaging instructions. Confabulation accompanied recall rather than image instructions; and when confabulation did occur in imagery, it tended to accompany poor rather than vivid imagery. Since Ss in the image and recall groups were equated with respect to their capacity to image, it appears that confabulation is more characteristic of recall than it is of imaging regardless of Ss' capacities to image. Original responses were given more often to stimuli I and I1 than to stimulus 111. This evidence suggests that confabulation should be considered both as a stimulus and a subject variable, since some stimuli favor original response more than others. There were fewer inversion scores for the control condition than for the memorial conditions; this indicated some reliability for the inversion measure

IMAGING A N D PERCEIVING: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

1025

since one would expect behavior while perceiving for the second time to be closer to the original perceptual behavior than behavior while imaging or recalling. Where there were appreciable differences in inversion scores for recall and image groups, imagery behavior was closer to behavior during re-perception than behavior during recall. This finding also conflicts with theorizing about imagery being divorced from the constraints of the perceived stimulus. Imaging Ss tended to behave more as they did when they were perceiving than did Ss who were asked to recall. Since the products of imaging differ from the products of recall, it is important to ask whether the increased accuracy for imaging relates to a different definiton of the reproductive task employed. Image instructions referred to the phrase "mental picture" which implies the notion of "clarity of detail" and perhaps accuracy. This implication would not be present in the recall instructions where Ss were asked not to image. Furthermore, if imaging is not subject to voluntary control, the instructions for recall would cause some difficulty for Ss who were vivid imagers. The following experiment provides a check needed for the instructions to recall and image. It examines some of the demand characteristics (Orne, 1959) implicit in the experimental instructions to Ss, and the issue of restraint on imaging. Two variations in recall instructions were used. The first variation emphasized accuracy in reproduction. The second variation deleted the reference to Ss "trying not to image" and emphasized recall alone.5

EXP. 11: ANALYSIS OF INSTRUCTIONS This study is reported in summary form below, but in detail e1sewhere.O Twenty-two male and 18 female volunteers from undergraduate classes in psychology at the University of Sydney served as Ss. Three independent groups of 10 Ss were equated with respect to Betts QMI mean scores, visual and total. One group was given standard image inscructions; the second group was given recall instructions with stress on accuracy; and the third group was given recall instructions with no constraint on imaging. Stimuli I and I1 (Fig. 1 ) were presented to Ss for inspection, and Ss constructed blocks to indicate perception and recall, as in the previous study. The order of presentation of the stimuli was alternated for successive Ss. Analysis of errors of location, original responses, and inversion scores showed significant differences among instructional groups. The trend for all measures was toward accurate performance for the imaging group. Reproductions under recall instructions were less accurate than those under image instructions despite the emphasis on accuracy and lack of constraint on
Varying instructions h a been shown previously to be an effective method for examining the expectations Ss have about what E wants (Singer & Sheehan, 1965). "Full description of this experiment and discussion of its results are reported with the American Documentation Institute, Auxiliary Publications Project, Photoduplication Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D . C. 20540. Order Document N o . 9111, remitting $1.25 for 35-mm. microfilm or 6- by 8-in. photocopies.

1026

P. W. SHEEHAN

imaging. Results replicated the findings of the previous study and allow one to set aside the possibility that they were artifacts of the instructions used. Exp. I indicated the importance of familiarity as a factor affecting imagery. u s for a decrease in vividResults indicated that prior analysis of the s t i m ~ ~ l made ness ratings (implying more vivid imagery) for the less complex stimuli. Where Ss had two perceptual experiences with the display pattern before imaging it, images were rated as more vivid than otherwise. Also, the relationship between Betts QMI scores and experimental ratings was more obvious as experience increased through repeated presentation of the perceived stimulus before imaging. (One can reasonably assume that Ss imaging items in the Betts test are familiar with what they image, since items relate to aspects of everyday experience.) If the experimental task is considered a learning task, more accurate reproductions would accompany increased familiarity with the stimulus. It remains to be seen, however, whether ratings of vividness of imagery are subject to change through experience with the stimulus imaged. It may be that individual differences in vividness of imagery are entirely accounted for by differences in familiarity with the stimulus. The following experiment permitted study of the range of alteration of vividness ratings and the association of this change with variations in amounts of experience with the object imaged.

Exp. I reported inter-individual variation; the present study considered intra-individual variation in vividness ratings. It was an investigation of the relationship of familiarity, through repeated experience with a stimulus, to ratings of vividness of imagery of the familiar object.
Method

The materials and apparatus were those described in Exp. I. Two senior psychology students and 14 graduates at the University of Sydney served as volunteer Ss. There were 9 females and 7 males. N o S had any previous experience with experiments of this kind. Each S was given the Betts QMI at the start of the experiment. S was asked to reconstruct a practice stimulus (Fig. 1) under N o Prior Analysis instructions. Ss then reconstructed this pattern under image instructions following Kohs block construction. This phase was taken as sufficient to familiarize Ss with the experimental procedure. Stimuli I, 11, and I11 were presented, one stimulus on each of three successive days according to varied orders set out in the procedure for Exp. I. In each experimental session Ss were given 10 trials with a particular stimulus. A trial consisted of the following sequence: stimulus reproduction under N o Prior Analysis instructions for perception, Kohs block construction for 40 sec., pattern con-

struction under image instructions and vividness report; Kohs block construction for 60 sec. Between trials S was denied the opporn~nityfor inspection of the pattern which he had just constructed. A limit of 10 trials was set in anticipation that after such experience the stimulus would be thoroughly learned and familiar.

Resuks Errors of location, original responses, and vividness ratings were recorded. Graphical representation best illustrated the pattern of results. Plots of errors of location and imagery ratings against trials showed marked individual differences. Ratings for some Ss rose from low to high over trials, while for other Ss ratings rose little, if at all. An independent method of classification for averaging curves over Ss was provided by the Betts QMI visual score. Ratings of "3" (moderately clear and vivid) and "4" (not clear and vivid, but recognizable) were used to differentiate good imagers from poor imagers on any given item. Mean ratings partitioned Ss into two groups: 10 Ss showing vivid imagery and 6 Ss showing poor imagery. Within each group Ss exhibited the pattern shown by the means described below. One exception was found among the vivid imagers and his results are described separately. Mean curves are given respectively in Fig. 2 for those groups with vivid imagery and with poor imagery for each of the stimulus patterns. Mean errors of reproduction are plotted against trial number. On the same graph are plotted the mean vividness ratings from trial to trial. Table 7 shows the frequency of occurrence of errors accompanying vivid and non-vivid ratings for the three experimental stimuli for the 15 Ss whose results are graphed above. Results of Ss giving a rating of 7 on one or more of the trials for a particular stimulus were excluded from consideration of the results for that stimulus. Ss giving ratings of 7 were included in the graphs above, since it was possible for Ss giving a rating of 7 on one trial to change that rating on another trial. The results of the previous studies again were replicated. Table 7 shows that, by comparison with poor imagery, vivid imagery was accompanied by fewer errors of location and fewer original responses. There was also an expected decrease in the incidence of error with increase in the number of practice trials. Discussion It is apparent from examination of the figure that repeated stimulus presentation over trials led to reduction in error. The effect of practice on error scores was much the same for the two imagery groups, but the effect of familiarity with the stimulus on the performance of the two imagery groups was markedly different. As familiaricy increased through repeated presentation of the stimulus, Ss characterized as vivid imagers on the Betts QMl altered their ratings toward the more vivid. Ratings given by Ss characterized by the Betts QMI as poor imagers

1028

P. W. SHEEHAN

remained poor and their results appeared to be independent of familiarity with the stimulus. This trend was apparent regardless of the complexity of the stimulus. There was only one exception to this result. One S, a vivid imager, did not change his ratings over trials. The main observation was a marked interaction
I b) POOR IMAGERS
E R

----..-1 ---RATINGS

- ERRORS
- -0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 TRLRLS PATINGS 8 9 1 0 7 8 9 1 0

------____0 1 2 3 4 5 6 TRIALS 7

(a1 VIVID IMAGERS

E
R

lbl POOR IMAGERS

E R

-UUIORS
----RATINGS

5 6 TRIALS

4 5 6 TRIALS

la) W
E

D IMRGERS
R

POOR IMAGERS

E
I2

I
- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - ---------

-ERRORS
5

----RATINGS

0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 TRLRLS 7 8 9 1 0

FIG.2. Mean error of reproduction and vividness rating for good and poor imagers o n individual trials with stimuli I ( t o p ) , I1 (center), and 111 (bottom)
between the kind of S a person is with respect to his imagery and the effect of familiarity upon vividness ratings. Table 7 highlights an important feature of performance of Ss who gave low ratings. Confabulation was associated with poor imagery. Over all stimuli there were 58 instances of confabulation in the 10 practice trials; and 52 of these accompanied poor vividness ratings. Absence of original responses was associated

TABLE 7 OBSERVED FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE OF ERROR OF LOCATION AND ORIGMAL RESPONSEASSOCIATEDWITH VNID AND NON-VIVID IMAGERY FOR STIMULI I, 11, AND 111 Rating Trial Stimulus I Location ConfabError ulation
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 11 7
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0

Stimulus I1 Location ConfabError ulation

0 2
1 0 0

Stimulus 111 Location ConfabError ulation

3
2 2
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0

Vivid*

1 2 3

4 5

6
7
8

0 0
0 0 0 10

9
10

0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

3
1 0 0 0 0 1

0 0 4 3
1

Not Vivid

1 2

3
4

5
1 0 0 0 0 0 0

5 3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0

5
3
2

5 3
2

7 6
4

5 6
7 8 9 10

2 2
1 1 1 1

2 2 1 1 1 0

3
2

0 0 1
0 0 1 0

1 1 1
1

"Vivid rating = 1,2, 3; not vivid, rating of 4, 5 , 6.

with vivid imagery rather than poor imagery. Confabulation did not characterize the imagery of the vivid imagers who showed errors in their imagery constructions. CONCLUSION The similarity between perceptual and imaging behavior indicates a functional correspondence between imaging and perceiving. Individual differences in imaging are related to individual differences in correspondence between the two sets of behavior. The relationship between vividness of imagery and correspondence in sets of behavior is a non-linear one; vivid imagers tend to behave as they do when they perceive but poor imagers behave similarly and dissimilarly. Findings run contrary to the theorizing of Bartlett (1932), McKellar (1957), and others that imagers are Ss who confabulate or import material not in the original perception. When memorial responses were unambiguously defined and initial perceptions controlled, the evidence strongly supported the position that the imager is not a confabulator but rather one who accurately repro-

1030

P. W. SHEEHAN

duces the original stimulus as perceived. All three studies demonstrated the close functional correspondence between vivid imagery and perception. Stimuli typically used in imagery experiments do not lend themselves to the perception of all significant features. Since imagery studies use pictorial material, one may argue that very meaningful and interesting stimuli were omitted in the present experiments, hence an important source of confabulation was excluded. On the other hand, if the imager is inventive and images in a haphazard and spontaneous fashion, he should demonstrate this with geometrical figures. The experimental stimuli used in the present studies do allow for confabulation and confabulation did occur but it accompanied poor imagery rather than vivid imagery. The question of accuracy of recall in imagery is an important one that focuses on the form in which experience is retrieved. The issue is relevant to the degree to which experience is registered and subsequently revived in detail. Availability of experience to recall is subject to processing of some kind by the organism. The end product of such processing can be termed a "representation." Bruner ( 1964) has discussed various modes of representation which reflect different ways in which individuals handle cognitive data. One way of representing experience is the "iconic representation" which "summarizes events by the organization of percepts and of images, by the spatial, temporal, and qualitative structures of the perceptual field and their transformed images" (Bruner, 1964, p. 2 ) . Imagery is an important vehicle of representation of past experience. It can stand for perceptual events in the way that a picture represents an object previously perceived. Considered in this way, the problem of storing experience becomes less important than how experience is retrieved and in what form. Results in the present set of experiments are relevant to these questions; they show that imaging Ss can retrieve the stimulus content offered for perception in a way which reflects the accuracy of the original material. Ss given imaging and recall instructions showed different memorial accounts of the perceptual stimulus. Imaging behavior was more akin to percepma1 behavior than recall behavior. This finding draws attention to the need for closer scrutiny of memorial accounts of introspecting Ss and the differentiation of imaging from non-imaging recall. Familiarity alone cannot account for individual differences in vividness ratings. Practice only increased the variance of individual differences already existing regardless of Ss' experience with the imaged object. With increasing familiarity with the experimental stimulus, the ratings of Ss with vivid imagery changed systematically in the direction of the more vivid. Ratings given by SS with poor imagery were relatively independent of practice. Vividness of imagery bears some relationship to the degree of complexity of the stimulus. More complex stimuli were not imaged as vividly as less complex stimuli. Other stimulus characteristics such as stimulus meaning need ex-

IMAGING AND PERCEIVING : INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

1031

plicit study. Since experimental stimuli were perceived by Ss as having some patterning, in one sense they may be called meaningful. In another sense material is meaningful if it has ego reference for Ss perceiving it. The problem of recall of ego reference material is of special importance in the study of dream imagery and hypnagogic imagery where primary process and drive organized activity is aroused. Future study may show thac confabulation accompanies vivid imagery only when stimuli are particularly relevant to Ss' motivational structures. Results from the present studies indicate that an investigation of this question needs to consider carefully all the possibilities of perception. Under motivational infloence perception may be selective or illusory. In these instances inferences about the stimulus accuracy of imagery can be made only with caution. The present set of investigations do not account for the correspondence bew e e n imaging and perceiving; they assert only that a behavioral correspondence exists and state something about the form it takes. The causative mechanisms behind the behavioral differences between good and poor imagers are a separate, but important issue. The hypothesis that similar mechanisms underly the processes of imaging and perceiving may explain the close correspondence between imaging and perceptual behavior. Since similarity between imaging and perceptual behavior does not necessarily warrant the conclusion thac perceiving is thus like imaging in process, one must have other grounds for inferring that the functional correspondence is due to an identity of process. Proper study of the hypothesis of process similarity requires that the imaging response be critically selected; it must be a response which is typically an effect of perception. Silch responses are those which indicate the aftereffeccs of prolonged perceptual stimulation: negative afterimages, illusions, and figural aftereffeccs. Studies supporting a similarity of mechanism underlying imaging and perceiving (Barber, 1959; Malhotra, 1958; Sarbin & Andersen, 1963) have been methodologically unsound. They have not determined whether, or not, results are explicable in terms of S's knowing the expected response and giving the response which E wanted. In an attempt to investigate explicitly the genuineness of the imaging response a study by Singer and Sheehan (1965) failed to support the process similarity hypothesis. It appears that the behavioral similaricy between imaging and perceiving cannot be accounted for in terms of a similarity of process. Aftereffects of imaging are observed only when S expects that they should occur. An alternative explanation of results lies in the exploration of individual differences in modes of representation of experience. Poor imagers may process their experience differently from vivid imagers, employing more symbolic levels of representation such as coding. Symbolic devices used to code material could lead poor imagers into error when they attempt to reproduce complex visu-

1032

P. W. SHEEHAN

a1 arrays. The vivid imager builds his representation upon perceptual organization which records initial experience step by step; he is tied to the immediacy of his experience while the poor imager can represent his experience symbolically in a way that takes him beyond what Brunet (1964) calls the "point-at-able" or immediate present. I n this sense confabulation, or the introduction of new material into the memorial response, may be expected to accompany poor rather than vivid imagery. In conclusion, individual differences in vividness of imagery are related to differences in correspondence between imaging and perceptual behavior. This demonstrates a functional similarity between imaging and perceiving. Vivid imagery is not typically characterized by confabulation but tends to reinstitute the accuracy of the perceiving process. The most plausible explanation of res ~ ~ lseems ts to lie with the variables underlying individual differences in modes of representation rather than with the study of identity of the mechanism underlying the two processes.
REFERENCES ANGELL,J. R. Methods for the determination of menral imagery. Psychological Monographs, 1910, 13, 61-107. BARBER, T. X. The after images of "hallucinated" and "imagined" colors. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1959, 59, 136-139. BARRATT,P. E. Imagery and rhinking. Australian Journal of Psychology, 1953, 5, 154164. BARTLETT,F. C. Remembering. London: Cambridge Univer. Press, 1932. BERG,J., & WORCHEL, P. Sensory contributions to human maze learning: a comparison of matched blind, deaf and normals. Journal of General Psychology, 1956, 54, 81-93. BETTS, G . H. The distribution and functions of mental imagery. New York: Columbia Univer. Teachers' College, 1909. (Contributions to Education Series, No. 26) BRUNER,J. S. The course of cognitive growth. American Psychologist, 1964, 19, 1-15. FERNALD, M. R. The diagnosis of mental imagery. Psychological Monographs, 1912, 14, 1-169. HICKS, D. On the nature of images. British Journal of Psychology, 1924, 15, 121-148. KOHS,S. C. Intelligence measurement. New York: MacMillan, 1927. KUHLMANN, F. On the analysis of the memory consciousness for pictures of familiar objects. American Journal of Psychology, 1907, 18, 389-420. LINDQUIST, E. F. Design and analysis of experiments in psychology and education. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953. MALHOTRA, M. K. Figural after-effects: an explanation of Koehler's theory. Acta Psychologica, 1958, 14, 161-199. MCKELLAR, P. Imagination and thinking. New York: Basic Books, 1957. MOORE,T. V. Image and meaning in memory and perception. Psychological Monographs, 1919, 27, 67-296. ORNE, M. T. The nature of hypnosis: artifact and essence? Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1959, 58, 277-299. SARBIN, T. R., & ANDERSEN, M. L. Base rare expectancies and perceptual alterations in hypnosis. British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 1963, 2, 112-121. SHEEHAN, P. W. The investigation of visual imagery and some of its correlates. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Univer. of Sydney, Australia, 1965.

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SIEGEL,S. Non-parametric sratirticr for the behavioral sciences. New York: McGrawHill, 1956. SINGER, G., & SHEEHAN, P. W. The effect of demand characteristics on the figural aftereffect with real and imaged inducing figures. American Jousnal of Psychology, 1965, 78, 96-101. SUTCLIFFE,J. P. A general merhod of analysis of frequency data for multiple classification designs. Psychological Balletin, 1957, 54, 134-137. TITCHENER, E. B. A textbook o f psychology. New York: MacMillan, 1919. WOODWORTH, R. R. Expwimental psychology. New York: Holt, 1938. WUNDT,W. M. Grundriss der Psychologie. Leipzig: Kroener, 1918. ZACHARIAH, E. A study of accuracy of reproduction of visual images at various age levels. Journal of Psychological Research, 1958, 2 , 42-49.

Accepted September 30, 1966.