aqhlsr

AI{ EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF

MMiITAL IIUAGERY

llt¡esis submltted in fulfilrnent of

the requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

PATRICIA AI.INE QUEALEY

I

(8.4. (Hons. ) U.N.S.W. J-9721

:

i-

Department of Psychology
University of Adelaide
South Australia

DaÈe subnitted: 29th ilanuary, l-980

Awatd¿ol rù ø Yì
 SUMMARY

lrt¡e research was concerned with providing information rerevant

to three aspects of imagery: Íts nature, function and

phenomenology. The two current viewpoints in the debate on

the nature of irnagery were discussed, that is, the notion

that imagery can be considered in pictorial terms, and the
arternative idea that irnagery is propositionar and abstract
in nature. Tt¡e research examined the extent to which an

image can be described in pictoríal terms and resembles a

percept. IL was also concerned with t̡e possibility of
irnagery as an epiphenomenon and with how much of the imagery
experience is available to int¡ospection.

The approach taken in the experiments was to determine

whether qualitative differences in the reported image were
related to differences in performance of an imaginal task.
It that qualitative differences, in contrast
I,Jas argued

to quantitative differences, would allow statements to be

made about the three aspects of Smagery of interest. If
qualitative differences, either in pictorial features of
the image or in inforrnation stored about the image,
in,Êruenced performance, then inferences courd be made about

the nature of imagery. rf such differences v¡ere associated

with differences in task performance, then it would be unlikery
that the image is an epiphenomenon. rt was expected tlat
descriptions of these features wourd provide information on

the extent to which the imaging process is accessibre for reporting.

 AI

six of the eight experiments in tìe seríes were based on a

task requiring a painted cube to be cut mentally. fhree
of these six experiments had two stimuri: a standard wooden
cube painted black and whiter and a second cube, with one
feature varied, to create the possibirity for quaritative
differences in imagery to occur. euantitative differences
in imagery were achieved by selecting subjects (aII of
whom were university students) from either extre¡ne on

imagery ability.

Ð<periment r factor anarytic study of the most frequentry

was a
used tests of imagery ability. Tr,'o independent factors
emerged: the experience of imagery as self-re¡nrted; and
the ability to manipurate imagery, as measured by objective
tests. Because the task in the ensuing experiments invorved
manipulating imagery, subjects were selected on their performance
on tests loading on Factor 2.

Ðxperiment 2 was concerned with the quaritative difference of

Ímage size. The alternative stimulus Ìvas a smarrer version
of the standard cube. The performance of high imaging subjects
was unaffected by stimuì-us size. Low imaging subjects, however,
made more errors when presented with the smalrer stimurus. A

negative rerationship was found to exist between reported image

size and error rate.

rn Experirnent 3, the arternative stimurus was a cube with task

irrerevant detairs painted on it. High imaging subjects made
 II]-

fewer errors when presented with the complex stimulus tl-an

when presented with the standard stimulus, which had only
task relevant information- TLre perfornance of low imaging
sulcjects was equívalent with simple and complex stimuli.

Experiment 4 exarnined tl.e effect of physical impossiJcility

on the performance of an imaginal.task by presenting a

sugar cube as the alternatíve stimulus to be mentally dissected.

Subjects of both high and.low imagery tevels made less errors
and took longer to do the task when presented witfi tJ:e sugar

cube as stimulus.

Experiment 5 was concerned'with establishíng tJ.at a visual

image was being used for tJ:e task. Sr:bjects who had taken
part in one of tJ.e prevíous experiments were required to

repeat the task during visual interference, au-litory

interference, or without interference. All subjects performed.

\^rorse with visual i-nterference ttran they had on a previous

non-interference trial. Aud.itory interference appeared to
disrupt the perforîËrnce of low imaging subjects only, which
suggested that auditory signals may have thwarted their attempts
at using alternative strategies for'the task. Despite the
average interval of one year between first and second trials,
subjects who repeated t̡e task without interference performed
better on the second trial.
 IV

Þrperiments 6 and 7 were concerned with various methods of

improving performance on an imaginal task. ft¡e effects of
practice on an easier task were compared wíth those of practÍce
on a difficult task. Practice on an easier task was found to
be as effective in ,funproving performance as rdas practice on a
difficult task, which suggested that subjects develop
appropriate strategies for solving t̡e task merely with
practice. Practice on the same task was then compared

with the effects of a combina.tión of practice and training.

Training consisted of recommending to subjects that t.l:ey a

employ techniques which had emerged in t.I:e previous experiments

as the most effective. Tt¡ese techniques consisted of using
an image of an undissected cube, keeping the image stilt
while counting, and working with two or more faces of the
eube at a time. Practice combined with training was found
to irnprove performance more than did practice alone.

ft¡e final experiment (Ð<periment 8) examined the relationship

between a physical and an imaginal task. A task with simple
physical components was found to be solved more often when

irnagery-based techniques ri/ere used. fhe finding that more

could be done witl¡ an image of the sti¡nulus than with the

stimulus itself suggested that an Ímage and a percept differed
with respect to the operations which could be applied to them.

ÍIhre experiment also tested the generality of findings from the

previous experiments to a different type of imagery task, by
varying sti¡nu1us size. Tt¡e overall consistency between
 v

results suggested that the findings from the previous experiments

were applicable to a wider range of imagery tasks.

One consistent finding from at1 experiments was that, as weII

as the expected. quantitative differences, there were quaritative
differences between high and low imagers in the ìmaging process
itself, whích were reflected in performance, One such
difference was in the type of errors made; high imagers erred
on the side of rrnder-estimation¡ low imag'ers \^¡ere more rikery
to over-estimate the nurnber of cubes. A further irlustration
was provided by an anarysis of the time=error rerationship: fot
high imagers, the relationship was negligible¡ for 1ow imagers,
there was a positive relationship between ti¡ne and errors,
The consístently different patterns in their performance
suggest that the image and imaging process may be guite different
in function and. nature for high and 1ow imaging subjects.

The results were generarry consistent with the rrmageryr position,

The image courd be described as pictorial Èo the pxtent that

differences in pictoriar quarities of an image were reflected
in task performance. This finding would. appear to have
implications for the epiphenomenal viewpoint. Furthermoïe,
it is suggesÈed that an image is distinguishable from a percept
in the processes which can be applied to it. Lastly, the
finding that information in the image modarity, but not reported
as being in the Ímage itself, affected performance, suggested
that not all of the problem solving process is open to
introspection.
 va

Authóf rs 'stäte¡nent

Itt¡is thesis contains no material whÍch has been

accepted for the award of any other degree or

cliplona at the Uníversity of Adelaide or any other
University. To ttre best of rny knowledge and belief ,
the thesis contains no ¡naterial prevÍous1y pubtlshed
or written by any otl¡er person except as due reference
is made, in the text of the thesis.

Signed:

(Patricia A. Quealey)
 vf-l .

ACKNOÌ4¡LÐGE{ENTS

I would like to express my sincere thanks to my

supervisot I Dr-. Peter Delin, for his interest and guidance¡

to Dr. ,fack l"letzer, Dr. Christopher cooPer and Ms. Marika

Tiggemann for ttreir interest and encouragement; to lliss
Judy Hatlet and Mr. Roger l"lcCarron for theÍr assístance
with graphlcal presentation, and to my mother, Lorna Quealey,
for her invaluable assistance in preparation of tl¡e manuscript
and typing.

I am also indebted to the rnany subjects who participated Ín

the research, especially to tt¡ose subjects of low inaging
ability who were taxed by the experience.
 TABLE OF CONÍENTS
Page
Sunmary a

Authorrs Statement vl-

Acknowledgements vra

CI{APTER 1. TTTEORETICÀL CONSIDERATIONS t

I. GBIXRÀL I
IT. fiIE NATTJRE OF II'4AGERY 5

IIT. T¡TE FUNCT]ON OF I}IAGERY 13

rV. THE ISSUE OF PHS{OMENOLOGY I6

CHÄPTER 2. REVIEW OF IMAGERY'RESEARCH t8

I RESEARCH ON NATURE OF I¡4AGERY I9
Its relation to other processes:
(i) Physiological 19

(ii) Perceptual 2L

(iii) Physical 23

IT. RESEARCH ON T'T'NCTION 24

(i) Inagery in Fantasy and Dreans 25

(ii¡ Imagery in Mental Practice 26

( iíi) Imagery in Learning and Recall 27

(iv) Imagery in Other Tasks 31

CHAPTB. 3. SOME PROBLTTUS IN IMAGERY RESEARCH 34

I NATT]RE 36

I1. FIJNCTTON 39

III. SUBJECTIVE REPORTING 4l

IV. THE PRESB{T RESEARCH TN TIIIS CONTÐ(T 42
 Page

CHAPTER, 4. METTIODOLOGY I: PREI,IMINARY CONSIDER-

ATIONS - IHE MEASI REIvIEttT OF IMAGERY 46

EXPER.IMENT I 51

Met̡od 52

Results 55

Discuss Íon 62

CHAPTER. 5. I{ETHODOLOGY II: THE EXPERIMETT PROPER

I Tt¡e Task 67

rI. TYpes of Data 69

TII. Procedure 70

(i) Selection of Subjects 70

(ii) Þ<perimental Arrangenent 70

(iii) Ð<periment Proper 7L

(iv) Scoring of Res¡nnses 73

CHAPTER 6. EI(PB.IMENT 2: IMAGE SIZE 74

l"letl¡od 77

Results 80

Discussion 84

CHAPTER 7. EXPERIMÐüT 3: IMAGE COTT{PLÐ(ITY 88

Method 96

Results 99

Discussion ro2
 Page
CHAPTER 8. 4: TIIE EFFECT OF
EJKPERII'IENT PHYSICAL
II{POSSIBILIT( ON AN IIUÀGINAL TASK I06

Method I09
Results rlt
Discuss íon 1r5

CHAPTER 9. EXPER]IVIENT 5; EFFECT OF INTERFERENCE tr8

The Present Experiment L2L

Preparation of Interference Material ]-2L

.Mett¡oil 123

SesuIts L25
Discuss ion t28

CHAPTER 10. TECHNIOUES USÐ TO SOLVE THE IMAGERY

TASK I30
Results 134

Discuss ion 137

CHÀPTER 11. UPERIMB{TS 6 AND 7: TIIE EFFECTS OF

PRACTICE ÃI\TD TRAINING ON .A}I IMAGINAL
TASK 14r

ft¡e Present Þ<periments 145

Ð(PERIIVTB'IT 6: 145

Method 145
Results and Discussion L47

Ð(PERllvlÐ{T 7 ¡ r50
-tt{ethod r50
Results and Discussion r52
General Comments 158
 Page

CHAPTER 12. STIJDY OF ERRORS r60

I. lypes of Errors 160

II. Tt¡e Relationsh ip between

Errors and Ti¡ne 165

rrr. General Conunent on the Study

of Errors 767

CHAPTER 13. Ð(PER.IMENT 8:

TTIE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A PHYSICAI,
AI{D IMAGINAL TASK 169

The Present Ð<periment r74

Mett¡od 175

Results L79

Discussion 183

CHAPTER 14. TMPLICATIONS OF TTIE RESEARCH 189

I Review of Þ<per imehts 193

rr. Discussion of Inagery in the

Ð<perimental Conte)<t
(i) Properties of an Image 193

Gi) Detenninants of Functionality ]-96

(iii) Accessibility to Introspection 200

(iv) Iligh and Low Imaging Sr:bjects 201

(v) Sex Differences 204

III A MORE SPECT]LATIVE DISCUSSION OF

IMAGERI. GENERALLY 205

ry. RECOMMENDATIONS 209

LIST OF APPENDICES 2'tL

BTBLIOGR.APHY 234
***
CHAPTER 1

THEORETICAL CONS IDERATIONS

r GENERAL

There has never been debate over the reality of the phenomenological

experience of ímagery. Ever since Galton in 1883 askeit hÍs

scientific colleagues to form images of their breakfast tables,
subjects have been describing and researchers analysing the experience.

The early writers seemed to assume that their readers were farniliar
witì imagery as a phenomenon. Th¡e hundred years since then has

seen a variety of approaches to imagery, with no agreement as to the

category of phenomenon to which imagery belongs. The quasi-
philosophical approach of the turn of the century vías rejected by
the stimurus-response advocates of the 20s to 50s. They considered
introspective reports of imagery worthless to a science of behaviour:
the reports courd not be validated, measured or compared. Because
of the lag which resulted, basic questions about the nature and function
of imagery are being asked only now.

The last ten years has brought a resurgence of enthusiasm for these
issues - enough to fill seven rnajor booksl and a quarterly journal
devoted entirely to imagery research and discuss i-on2, to justify

I RichardsoD, A. 1969. Mental Imagery.

Horowitz, !1.J. f970. Image Formation and Cognition.
Paivio, A. 1971. Imagery and Verbal Processes.
Piaget, J. & Inhelder, B. L97L. Mental Imagery in the Child.
Segal, S.iI . 197I.' Imagery: Current Cognitive Approaches .
Sheehan, P.W (edJ 1972. llt¡e Function and Nature of Imagery.
Nicholas, J.M. (ed.) L977. Images, Perception and Knowledge.
2 Journal of Mental Imagery, first published Spring L977.
 2

an annual imagery confer"r""1, and to warrant the establishment

of an rnternationar rmagery Association2. This trend has been
part of a renewed interest in cognitive and phenomenotogicar
processes generarly. one of its important consequences has
been a critical rook at tt¡e traditionar conceptuarisations
of imagery. Íhe metaphors of tmindrs eyesr and rmental
pictures I have been charlenged now that cognitive processes
are considered eligible for a more thorough analysis.

rt¡e forrowing historicar sequence of definitions irrustrates

h¡ays in which ideas on tl¡e nature of imagery have changed.
Tl¡e definitions might appear to revear onry a change in emphasis

over time, from the subjective experience, to the objective nature,

and now an appreciation of both aspects. rtrey also seern, at
least superficiarly, to suggest that there are a variety of
different types of imagery. Some are applicable only to
imagination imagery, others onry to memory imagery, others are
broad enough for a range of imagery types.

Galton (1883) described an image as "the most perfect form of

mentar representation wherever the shape, position, and rerations
of objects in space are concerned,' (p. 7g). James (Iggt)
characteristicarry considered imagery in physiological terms:
ttsensationsr once experienced, modify the nervous
organism,

I American Conference on The Fantasy and Imaging process,

held annually since 1977.
2. International Imagery Association, established 1979.
 3

so that copies of them arise again in the mind after the original
outward stímutus ís gonerr (p.44). To ,Jung (f923) an image was
nthe concentrated expression of the total psychic situatíon,

not merely, nor even pre-eminently, of unconscious contents

pure and simple .... the expression equally of the unconscious
as of the conscious situatÍon of the moment .... (not) a

conglomerate, but an integral product with its own autonomous

pur¡rose". (p. 555) .

Watson (J-924) adopted James' terms, but with a changed tone.

To him, and to his behaviourist colleagues, ímages were "the

ghosts" of sensations (p. 41. Roger Brownrs (1958) comment

on Watson epítomised the behaviourist attitude: I'In 1913

John Vlatson mercifully closed the blood-shot Ínner eye of

American psychologyr' (p. 93) . A similar attitude was expressed
by the Polish psychologist Kotarbins¡1 (1966): he consÍdered that
unless images existed as things, they could not exist at all.
Skinner (1953) clai¡ned to accept I'sup¡rosed non-ptrysical events"
(p. 2781 as having a place in scientific study. His description
of images, however, suggests an absence of total conviction:
funages are "psychic or mental events, occurring in a special
world of rconsciousness' where, although they occupy no space,
they can nevertheless often be seen". (p. 2761.

By the second half of this century, Ímagery was being described

in terms of information processing. Imagery was belng considered

Iess as an entity and more as a process. Ttris funaging process lvas

seen to have much in cqnmon wlth perception. Hebb (1966)

 4

considered funagery to be "the occurrence of perceptual processes

in the absence of the stimulation which normally gives rise to
ttre perceptionr' (p. 4I). His definition of imageryr âs

involving simllar cognitive processes to perceptíon, was

shared, by two prolific authors, Neisser (1970) and Bugelski

(1970). Richardson (1969) added to the above idea that of the
i:nportance of the subjectíve aspect of the experience. To

Píaget (L967), the ability to form an i:nage indicated the

attainment of a certain level of cognitive development: an

image is I'internalized imitation" (p. 90 ) .

The approach taken by Paivio in his research on distinguishing

between imagery and veËbar processes indicated that he accepted
the idea of imagery as conditioned sensations. He defined
imageryoperationally: concrete imagery is ',nonverbal memory
representations of concrete objects and events.or nonverbar
modes of thought (for example, imagination) in whÍch such

representations are activery generated and manÍpulated by the

individualr'. (Paivio, 197I, p. J-2').

l4ore recentry, however, some researchers have rejected both the

image-as-entity notion and the idea that the imaging process is
si¡nilar to perception. Sarbin (L972), for example, dismissed
the rrunwarranted belief that imagining is an interiorized
activity, carried on by a rnythical organr ând resembling the
seeing of spatial objects". (p. 339).
 5

It is interesting to note that the early idea of when images are

believed to occur has received recent ernpirical support. Betts

(f909) described images as "an army of helpers rushfng to the
mindrs assistance". (p. 53). Fox (1914) asked subjects to
reason through abstract propositions and to rePort what had
taken place between presentation of the probtem and tl¡eir ansv¡ers.
He too concluded that an inage appeared when there was a block in
thought processes: "It seems, then, that a mental irnage is due
to an obstruction in the free flow of ideas". (p. 426').' A

recent study by Sheehan and Lewis G9741 provided evidence which

supports their interpretation that inagery results from confusion
in consciousness.

rI. TIIE NATURE OF IMAGERY

The above selection of definitions provides an indication of the

diversity of ideas on imagery. While the term is used to refer

to a range of subjective phenomena, there would aPpear to be

agreement about the essentials of an image. 1[t¡e def initions

share an acceptance of imagery as having features in common with
perception. First1y, irnages and percepts are believed to utilize
the same processing rnechanisms. A further similarity is that
both images and percepts have limits to the amount of information
they can contain. Images and percepts would appear to be

distinguishable in that images, unlike percepts, result from

internal stimuli and have undergone more processing.

To the extent that images have features in conmon with percepts,

there is apparent agreement between imagery writers. There are

two distinct viewpoints, however, on the nature of the underlying

 6

representation. One view¡nlnt is that the image can be described

in pictorial terms. Ttris has come to be called the pictorial or

rlmageryr ¡losition, and is represented by researchers such as

Àlan Paivio at the University of Vt. Ontario, Roger Shepard and

his associates at Stanford University, and Stephen Kosslyn at
the Johns Hopkins University. lltrough each employs a different
approach to the irnagery problem, they share the basíc prernise

that imagery can be studied in pictorial terms, that it occupies

spâcê¡ has dimensionsr and can be manipulated. lltre approach

has definite advantages, according to Neisser (1972): it is

conpátiþIe with introspective reports and can be studied
operationally.

While advocates of tl¡e rlmageryr position believe that an image

resembles a percept in certain features (e.9. it occupies space,
has limits to amount of information it can contain), they consider
images and percepts to be distinguishable in others. Tt¡eir basic
belief is that it is appropriate to study inaging in terms of its
features. rPictorialr refers to its characteristics rather than
to the processes by which it was formed.

Ttre alternative rPropositionalr ¡rosition has among its protagonists

zenon $rlyshyn at the University of Vù. Ontario, Williarn Chase at
Carnegie-Mellon University, Herbert CIark and Gordon Bower at
Stanfordr âDd Stephen Reid at Case Western Reserve University,
Ohio. John Anderson at YaIe argued for the position in his early
wnitings (Anderson and Bower, (1973) but more recently (1978)
 7

v¡ould seem to support the rlmageryr víewpoint.. Tt¡eir argument

is that an l-mage is abstract and proposltional, rather than

pictorial. Itrey hold that an image does not function as a

picture, is not by nature similar to one, and that an under-

standing of imagery will not develop until t}re counter-productive
pictorial metaphor is dropped. ftrey claim that the intuitive
metaphor has been taken literally by imagery researchers as

well as by their subjects.

Itrey reject the pictoriat metaphor on a number of grounds: an

image is accessible by verbal labels; Iosing a meaningful part

of an image does not leave a space in the image; to store raw

materiar rat̡er than an anarysed product wourd be wastefur of

cognitive energy and of storage spacei it does not allow for
vague representation; and wrongly inplies that the same
processes can be performed on images as on pictures (Anderson,

Ie78).

Ttre propositionists argue that a propositional model is

necessary to represent meaning and to allow translatÍon
between pictorial and verbal codes. llt¡ey claim t]¡at a

propositional model facilitates explanation of inference-

making, since propositions are the raw material of logic.
(For thís reason, propositional models are used in almost
all programs for artificial intelligence). Because propositions

can represent information, irxespective of sensory mode, their

advocates consider them to be ¡nore powerful as an explanatory
construct. lvloreover, it Ís argued that such a model can exprain
alt the phenomena as can thå i¡nagery position mode1.
 I

The present research was not concerned wítl¡ deter¡nining which

of the two approaches to the nature of imagery constitutes a

better theory on ptrilosophical grounds. Rather, it was

concerned with providing empirical data relevant to t̡e debate.

Itris could not be done wit̡out some consideration of the issues

debated by tlre llmageryr and rPro¡rosítionalr theorists as the

debate forms a framework in which the present research is set,
as well as an appr[ciation of the atmosphere of current imagery
Iiter atur e.

One of the criticisms most often level-Ied against the rlmagery

positíon by propositionists is that it is counterproductive,

that it oversinptifies the inage and is concerned witå peripheral
aspects, such as image size. It could be argued that the
rPropositionalr approach is also counterproductive as

propositions, though perhaps easy to handle logically and to

theorise about' are not easy to have access to experimentally.
In logic, there are criteria agreed upon for a Proposition: it
is abstract, it has truth value and rules of formation. No such

criteria e><ist in cognitive psychology. "While there do exist

agreed-u¡ron criteria for a propositional representation, these

criteria lack the character of operational definitions".

(Anderson, L978, p. 250).

Unlike pictorial theorists (e.g. Paivio) who believe that imagery

and verbal information are processed differently, the propositionists
argue that both types of information are encoded as abstract

pro¡nsitíons. A furttrer'point on which they differ Ís that

 o

the imagery position advocates regard phenomenological reports

as informative of underlying psychological mechanism, while
the pro¡nsitionists consider the reports valuable only as an

indirect source of information about the underlying mechanism.

While it has been charged tl¡at imagists like Paivio have not
made it clear what tJ:ey do mean by imagery, it is also true
that pro¡nsítionists have not made it clear either. In abstract
logical terms, we know what a pro¡nsition is. We do not know

in quasi-physiological terms. Even in relation to materials

which can be handled by pro¡nsitionsr it is not known whether
an analogue of a proposition occurs in the human brain. It
rnay be the case that pro¡rcsitions do not exist as entities
which have a physiological basis. Propositions, like other
theoretical constructs (e.g. assumptions), may be abstract

creations arising out of t̡e interaction between behaviour and

analysts of bet¡aviour, rather than being a psychological entity

within the individual.

One way in which the view that inages are propositions could be
tested would be by determining whether images bel¡ave Ìike
propositions. For example, if images do bet¡ave like propositions,
then the one deep structure should permit different surface
structures. Moreover, irnage forrnation would be determined by
consonant rules. One would also want to know what types of
pro¡nsitions are images.

Advocates of the rlmagery,r position hold that some criticisms of

tleir approach are based wrongly on the assumption that they
 r0.

eçJuate perceptual with pictorial. As noted early, the rlmageryr

advocates distinguish between the¡n: they consider images to be

produced by processes whic̡ analyse and interpret (as in

perception); they also consider that the characteristics of
images can be described in pictorial terms.

{ztyshyn (L973) in his article "What the mindrs eye tells the
mindrs brain" rejected both the perceptuar and pictoriar notions
of imagery. As sree (1976) notes, arr imagery researchers would
agree with hi¡n about the inadequacy of a purely pictorial
conception of imagery, but $zlyshyn rejected the perceptual
idea for the same reasons as he rejected the pictorial idea,
without. dístinguishing between tl¡em.

One problem with the rlmageryt position is that there is no

agreernent anong its advocates on the extent to which imaging

and perception are similar. Paivio (1976) and Kosslyn and

Pomerantz (1977) claim that no one holds that imaging is actually

isomorphic with perception. Although this may apply to theír
own research, Shepardrs research on the mental rotation of
figures suggests a far closer link between ímaging and perception.

An article by Anderson (1978) weighed the arguments for and

against both pictorial and pro¡nsitional approaches and decided

in favour of the pictorial. "Tt¡us, it seems the picture metaphor
is the imagery theory" (p. 252). He sup¡nrted a dual-code model
of imagery, similar to Paivio's (197I), with visual and verbal
codes being distinct but inter-re1ated. He expressed a belief
that it is impossibte to distinguish behaviouratty between the two
 11.

approaches, clairning that the same resurts courd be taken as

evidence for either approach.

His belief in tt¡e non-deter¡ninacy of behaviourar data, which he

himsetf described as "pessirnisticr', was the focus of
a retort
by srlyshyn (L979'). Ðryshyn argued that there wirl
arways
be non-determinacy in any theory, as it is in the
nature of
inductÍve interference. He further argued that this
is no
more the case for theories on mental representations tJ'an for
any other in Psychology. ezlyshyn's objection
to Andersonrs
non-determi-nac¡¡ argurnent was shared by Hayes-Roth
(rg7g) for
different reasons. Hayes-Roth argued that, while it is not
possible for behaviourar data relating onry
to input-output
to distinguish between mentar representations, other
kinds of
behavioural data wourd perrnit finer distinctions
to be made.
such data wourd be in the form of quaritative differences in
aspects of behaviour, such as differences in reaction
times,
which would not rerate directry to the input-output
but to the
intervening process.

rn t̡e article, Qrlyshyn (rg7g) asserted that the issue in

same

tl¡e debate about the nature of the image, is ,,not simpry

what
causes the behaviour, but what an explanation
of the behaviour
would be l_iker'. (p.394). Anderson, Hayes_Roth and grlyshyn
(L979) appeared to be in agreement that the
criteria which a theory
of rnental representation, or in fact any theory of behaviour,
must
satisfy include parsirnonyr plausibitity, efficiency,
optimality.
 L2.

A limitation of the current debate on t̡e nature of imagery is

the apparent acceptance of picture-rike or proposition-rike as

the possibre alternatives for tl¡e representation of imagery.

There may be no need to assume that eit̡er alternative is
appropriate. Tt¡ere is much to be known about enpiricarly
determinabre properties of images, and about the rerationship
between these properties and behaviour. Tt¡e present research
htas an attempt to bring the lever of information croser to the
level of debate.

rf, as often turns out to be tl¡e case in psychologicar research,

neither approach is furty supported, then some combination wourd
have to be considered. This third possibility could be the
product of what was worth saving from the originar two, or
perhaps totally different from them. Anderson (r97g) , fox
instance, berieved that neither current moder is adequate for
the existing range of imagery resurts. rrproducing subh a
moder seems a more worthwhire endeavour than deciding among

the grand contrasts such as imaginaì- versus pro¡nsitionarrr.

(p. 270) .

fhe approach taken in t̡e present research is in rine with that

recommended by Kossryn and pomerantz (1977) z "TL¡e current
debate boils down to the question of whether or not irnages

have emergent properties not directry derivabre from properties

of pto¡nsitions. This issue wiII not be settled by taking an
 13.

overly reductionÍstic tack, but rather should be addressed

by concentrating on ansÌ{erable empirical guestions about the

properties of surface Ítnages",i (p. 74). It is interesting to
note that their description of the current debate gives
rather more currency to the im¡nrtance of the properties
of propositions than is evident in tl¡eir research, and in
the research reported here.

III. fiTE FT'NCTION OF I},IAGERY

Whether imagery serves a function is difficult to establish

as the data can only be correlational . llhere is an abundance
of research on the functional areas with which Ímagery is
associated, such as learning, menory, problern solvingr ând

spatial tasks. Tn desensitization therapies, it is accepted

that imaging is partly responsible for the improvement in

performance. Given this great number of claims for its use,

by people believing themselves to be using imagery, it is

strange that the question of its function should be raised at
aII. (Neisser, L976i Sheehan, 1978).

Rather than deal with imagery in its own terms (whatever they may

be), researchers have analysed irnagery in terms of other processes'

such as physiology and perception. Ihey have looked for, and

found, similarities in processes and processing. Ttrey have

produced re¡nrts of the presence of images at the sarne time
as changes in performance.
 L4.

The research has not provided evidence that Ít ís the

itserf whÍch is res¡nnsfbre for tl¡e differences in
imagery
performance. There 1s as yet no concrusive evidence that
the subjectÍve exper.ience carred ran irnager and the behaviour
which forlows are causatly rerated. ltre image may yet turn
out to be, as Neisser argues, an epiphenomenon.

some researchers, such as Anderson (1979), and palmer (192g)

believe that the evidence required for an elucidatÍon of both
the nature and function of irnagery is physiorogicar, which
Ís stillr ând may remain, technologicatly infeasibre. rt
may be that a furr understanding of Ímagery, and of cognitive
processes generarry, does require physiol0gical evidence.
ft¡is viewpoint courd be seen as subject to some phirosophÍca1
difficulties, however' as the evidence would stiII be correlational.

rt is too earry in the psychologicar study of the function of

imagery to decide whether this is ín fact the case. Ttre futl
extent of the information available from psychorogicar
experimentation has not been exhausted on this question.
Psychological exploration may be abre to provide evidence which
or the other argument more rikery: the pictorial
woul-d make one

or the propositional; the functionar or the epiphenomenar.

llhe present research was concerned with providing data relevant

to the issue of the function of imagery by examining both
quantitative and quaritative measures of perforrnance. rt
was expected that such.evidence wourd arrow more to be said
 t5

about the rerationship between imagery and perforJuance,

While guantitative differences permit only rlevel of
performancer interpretations, quaritative differences can
be Ínterpreted as suggesting differences in mechanisms.
Quantitative differences in reported imagery which are
associated with quantitative differences in performance
make neither the functionar nor the epiphenomenar view¡nint more
likely. Quaritative differences in the image which are found
to be associated with quaritative differences in performance,
however, invite the interpretation that the funage is contrib-
uting directry to performance, that it is functionar.
l1.¡us Derinrs (1969a) finding that subjects using imagery

mne¡nonics in a se¡ial learning task tended to make errors

of qnission whereas the control group made errors of
intrusion, is difficult to explain without assuming
differences in t}re underlying process.

Moreover, shourd it be found that guaritative differences in

imagery are associated wíth qualitative differences in
performance, the same result may occur in such a way as
to provide evidence for the pictoriar viewpoint. Th¡is
wourd occur if features, such as image size and texture,

v,rere associatedwith qualitative differences in performance.

Ttre lack of this evidence, that Ís if quaritative differences

in Ímagery do not infruence aspects of performance, wourd

suggest that irnagery is an epiphenomenon.
 16.

rV. THE ISSUE OF PHB{OI'IBTOLOGY

The thírd major concern of the present research was with

the ¡*renomenological limits of the imaging process.

Reservations have been expressed in various vJays about the
utility of subjective reports. HoIt (1964) and þzlyshyn
(1973) , for example, doubted that cognitive processes generally
are available for introspection. Andersonrs (1978) view was

that at times only protypes are stored, a fact of which

subjects may not be aware. lthe validity of subjective

re¡nrts of imagery has also been questioned, most recently

by White, Sheehan and Ashton (L977) z they found social

desirabiliþ' in the forrn of subjects I yielding to
perceived experirnenter expectation to be a contaminating
factor.

llandler (1975) considered that "peoplers reports about their

e><periences, their behaviour and their actions are veiy
frequently, and may always be, fictions or theories about
those events". (p. 2401. No doubt in many situations
where psychologists ask people to introspect, there is no

justification for believing that the functional parts of the

thinking processes are being accessed. It is generally
accepted that introspection provides a description of the end-
product of thinking, rather than of the thinking process
(Miller t 1-962¡ üandler, 1975). In such situations, Mandlerrs
statgnent would see¡n relatively neutral.
 L7.

llt¡ere would appear to be other situations, such as irnagery

Ín problern solving, where it is like1y that the thing being

accessed is ¡nrt of the thinking Process. In such a

case, Mandler rs view could be considered extreme.

While most writers on consciousness would aPPear to agree

with this idea of the special place of imagery in cognitive
processes, Dennett (1969) considered that imagery has no
place at all. According to his definition, an image must
be the raw material for perception. He rejected the
concept of imaging entirelY âsr in his view, what we normally call
'-imaging' retràtes molfê to conceiwing thart to perceiving-

The approach taken in the Present research was to determine

the extent to which an image is pictorial in its features
and perceptual in its function. It was confined to an

analysis of the interface between the phenomenological level,

insofar as it could be accessed, and the behavioural level.
ltre primary concern was with whether differences in pictorial
properties of imagery were related to qualitative differences
in behaviour. It was expected tt¡at this type of data would
provide information relevant to the three areas of interest:
the nature, function and phenomenology of imagery.
 18.

CHAPTER 2.
REVTEViI OF TMAGERY RESEARCH

Part of the inheritance from tl¡e behaviourist purge has been

a compulsíon on the part of imagery researchers to defend

the study of imagery. Unti1 recently, papers began

wíth refutations of possible arguments about beating dead

horses and attacking straw men. (Bugelski, L}TL).

one might suppose that art that needs to be said is that

imagery shoutd be studied simply because it is part of
cognitive activity which is not werl understood; an intrinsic
part of ongoing cognitive activity and of memoryi and a rear
part of subjective experience. perhaps even better is to
fo1low the refreshing arternative offered by Johnson-
Laird and wason (L977) in their introduction to a correction
of readings on cognitive science: "rhere are no overwhermingty
convincing arguments about the futirity of tl¡e exercise".
(p. r).

Despite tl.e apparent defensiveness of some writers, irnagery

has been the focus of much research. Ttre rast generation
of researchers h¡as concerned mostly with its function. rhe
present generation has been concerned equarty with its
nature. Itre major areas of imagery research will be
reviewed briefty in the chapter. some of the issues arising
from previous research have been examined in the experiments
 T9

which follow. A more thorough exanination of the relevant

llterature on these issues has been presented in the
appropriate chapter.

r RESEARCH'ON'NATI'RE OF IMAGB.Y.

Tt¡e research which has attempted to get at the nature of

Smagery has been concerned wit̡ tJ:e relationship between

imagery and otl¡er processes. ft began with PerkyJs (I9I0)

study of illusions. Her results, despite proving difficult
to replicate, suggested a nev, approach to the study of
imagery. Þ<periments fotlowed which exarnined imaging in
terms of physiological processesr then perceptual processes,
and most recently in terms of its similarity to actual
physical processes.

(i) Phys ioloq ical

lltre idea bet¡ind the physiological experiments was tìat
imagery must involve measurable physiological changes. While
subjects were performing tasks thought to involve imagery,
various physiological processes were recorded. IIL¡e reason

for the assumed connection between i:nagery and the processes

recorded in early experinents is not obvious. Action potentiats
were measured in various muscle groupings (Jacobson, 1930, 193I),
in upper and lower legs and arms (Shaw, 1938). With the
develo¡rnent of the encephalograph, there hras an outbreak of
experiments rneasuring alpha rhythms during imaging. (GoIIa,
Hutton and Grey Walter, L943¡ Short, 1953, Costello and
 20.

McGregor,- L957; Drever, 1955, 1958; -ùlundy-Castle, I95g;

Drewes, 1958; stewart and McFarrane s¡nith, 1959; slatter, 1960).
Ele movement was also recorded (singer and Àntrobus, 1965).
llhe layman could be forgiven for confusing this research
on irnagery with research on epileptíc seizures.

Tt¡e concrusions from these studies were disappointing:

there appeared to be no direct rerationship between arptra-

blocking and eit̡er visualisation or attention (Barratt,
1956; Mundy-Castle, f957). Other mental changes, such
as surprise, altered erectricar activity more ttran imaging
(walter and Yeager, 1956). The recommendation of penfield
and Roberts (1959) t̡at recordings should be made in the
tem¡rcral cortex rather than the occipitar region has not
led to nore striking resurts. positive resurts were
obtained, however, by Weinberg et al (1970) when they
recorded emitted ¡ntentials in orbitar, singurate, and superior
frontar cortical areas in response to presented and anticipated
(but unpresented) stinuri. The simirarity between potentiars
evokeclby anticipated and presented stimuri suggested to the
authors that imaging may resernble perception.

The ¡nss,ibility that there are specific neural areas for ìmagery,
the noisy brain and insufficiently sensitive measuring instruments
combine to make that line of research general_Iy still unproductive.
AIl that can be said is that the presence of irnagery is not
 2L.

associated wit]¡ neurological and ptrysiologÍcal changes which

dietinguish 1t from other psychologlcal processes.

( ii) PerceÞtuaI

It¡e main result of Perky,ls (19f0) experiment was that

subjects confused internally and externally produced images.
Brooks (1967, 1968) carried out experjments to test an

interpretation of this in ter¡ns of a direct link between

imaging and perceiving. (Tt¡e temporal gap between Perkyrs

and Brooksr work could reflect the influence of behaviourism).

He interfered with an imaging task by simultaneous perception
and concluded t̡at imaging and perceiving interfered most

with each other when they were in the same modality. His
conclusions hrere restricted to spatial representations,
which he held were only one form of visual inagery.

Ertensive work using this approach was carried out by Segal and

colleagues. In a series of experiments involving imaging and

perceiving, they consistently found that imagery reduced
signal detection, both visual and auditory (Segal and
Glicksnan I L967; Segal and Gordon, 1969; Sega1 and FuseIIa,
1969). Tt¡eir most cited experiment in tle series sought to
dispel the possible alternative explanation of the disruption
in performance in terms of instructional overloading. It
examined how imaged pictures and sounds influence the detection
of visual and auditory signals (Segal and Fusella, 1970).
They found that imaging reduced signal detection threshhold,
 22.

especiarry vJhen image and signat were in Èhe same modality,

and when the image was of sonething unf amiriar. llt¡eir
interpretation tl¡at visual images and perceptual irnages are
scanned in much the sa¡ne v¡ay was shared wÍth other researchers.
(Neisser , L967 ¡ Marks , L972) .

Kosslyn (1973) isorated features of the image by varying

the degree of focus on features. To hirn, the results
suggested that I'tÌ¡e features of an image are ín some ltray
isomorphic to tperceptual f eatures | .,' (p. 94) . His
interpretation presents some probrems which wirr be discussed
later in Chapters 6 and 7.

Arn experiment by Peterson (1975) comparing the retention of

imagined and seen spatiar matrices found that imaging had
more in with perceptuar processing t̡an with verbal
common

processing- when instructed to form images of a matrix

from numbers presented verbarry, subjects recarled more of
tl¡e contents of corner cerrs tÌ¡an of non-perimebrcerls.
Tt¡e same pattern of recarl occurred for a perceived matrix.
when no imagery instructions v¡ere given, and verbal processing
vras assumed, serial position effects ernerged. It¡e experiment
thus de¡nonstrated a furtÌ¡er simirarity between generated and
perceptuar images. fl¡e comprexity of the images reguired
(4 x 4 matrices) however, cast some doubt on the extent to
whích subjects could forrow instructions. The generated
and perceived Ímages may have been equivarent, but the possibre
inadequacy of the images wêakens petersonrd interpretation.
 23

lltre relationshÍp between funaging and perceiving was tÌ¡e topic

of a doctoral dissertation by SIee (1976). Àn interesting
result from her research was tl¡at an image could be formed

from stored information and reinterpreted in terms different

from those in which it was reported to have been stored
initialty. Her conclusion was t̡at, although imaging
and perceíving share some conmon processing mechanisms and

their products have features in conmon, they are distinguishable

in terrns of the amount of processing they trave undergone and in
the extent to which information represented in them can be usd.

The general fínding from tÌ¡is line of research is that imaging

and perceiving have much in common. lltrey appear to interfere
with each other reciprocally. ftrat interference is greatest
when perceiving and imaging occur in tl¡e same modality suggests
that it is not cognitive overload, but that some of the same
mechanisms are involved in both processes. trLre evidénce

that ímages and percepts have similarities and differences,

however. interesting, does not go far to promote an understanding
of the nature of imagery. Ihe nature of percepts is, afLer all,
stitl unclear.

( iii) Phys ical

The most recent line of research on the nature of imagery
has been concerned with the relationship between imaginal and

physical processes. Shepardrs interpretation of the results

of his experiments on mental rotation of figures was that the
 24.

mental and physicar processes invorved in rotation are anarogous.

some of the issues arising fron his research wilr be discussed
more fully in Chapter .13.

By concluding that the process perforned imagínal1y is

isonorphic to tl¡e ptrysÍcaI processr the approach equates the
image with the object it represents, shepard found a linear
relationship between the time taken to respond and tl¡e arnount
of rotation necessary to equate a mental irnage with a

projected stimutus. His resurts courd be considered as

support for the pictorial view of imagery in that they suggest

that the same processes can be performed on the image as on
a percept of the object, or on the object itself.

rt¡e idea of analogous imaginar and ¡*rysicat processes may have

some application for very simple imagery, which has had

minimal processing. rt wourd appear to conflict, however,

with the more abundant evidence that an image is the outcome
of processing. (e.g. de Groot, 1965; Chase and Simon, 1973).

II. RESEARCH ON F\JNCTION

Perhaps because of the accessibirity of behaviourar data, there

has been a great dear more research concerned wíth t]¡e
function of irnaging than with its nature. Most researchers
state their conclusions in terms of the imprications of the
resurts for the function of imagery. As noted in chapter r,
 25.

this type of research would be described more accurately

as concerned witt¡ functional areas with which ímagery
is associated. Ihe areas are presented in order of
decreas ing generality.

(i) Imagery irt Fantasy and DreäÍts

To the laynan, imagery means the visual com¡nnents of
imagination, of free thought, of fantasy and of dreams, the
type of Ínagery usually referred to as rprimaryr. lttle
controrled imagery of the chess prayer, the constructed image
as an aid to rearningr and the insight imagery of the morecular
scientist are less familiar. Tt¡e function of imagery as

syrnbors in dreams and fantasies was of interest to the ancient

Greek and Roman phirosophers. centuries rater, Freud and

Jung atternpted to interpret the meaning of images for the

individual and for the race. ftre study of this type of
imagery nov, appears to be concerned with the meaning of imagery
to the individual. ¡

According to Horowitz (1969), imagery is being used increasingry

in psychoanarysis, for exampre, as an arternative to free verbar
recall. One psychotherapeutic technique for recovering childhood
memories is to encourage the patient to think in images. Forms

of psychothera¡¡¿ which involve role play and fantasy require

the use of imagery. The much-used desensitization rnethod involves
the creation and control of specific imagery. Relaxation
technigues generarty depend on the patient being abre to forrow
 26.

guided imagery lnstructions. Because success in these

techniques wourd appear to reguire successfur use of imagery,
it night be argued that lmagery has been applied prematurery.
llhe application of imagery seems to have outstripped t̡e
theory. :ft¡e recentry instÍtuted annual conference on The
Fantasy and rrnaging Process may go some way towards correcting
the discrepancy.

However much some experts may have attempted previousry to

dismÍss the rearity of imagery or minimise its function,
irnages have continued to be part of subjective experience.
Tt¡e cur¡ent phenornenologicar trend i.n theory and therapy
has meant the end of the mute subject. vrt¡at the subject
thinks he is doing, how he structures his conscious experience,
is once agaín being considered rerevant for psychologicar study.
rn her presidential address to the psychotogy section of the
1979 Al.lzAAS conference, professor Jacquerine Goodnow spoke

on present and futu¡e trends in psychology. Her prediction

was tl¡at psychology in the future wourd increase its concern
viith conscious experience.

(ii) rmagery 1n ì4ental practi ce

Unlike the previous area, the study of the role of
imagery in mentar practice began this century (perhaps as an outcome
of the twentieth centuryrs interest in labour saving devices).
Richardson (19.72) lists the various alternative names under which

the ¡*renomenon of slnnbolic rehearsal of a ¡*rysicar activity

 27.

without gross muscular movements has appeared: they include

slrmbolic rehearsal (Sackett, Lg34ll imaginary practice (perry,
1939); impllcit practice (ltorrisett, 1956); nental rehearsal
(whiteley, L962)i and conceptuarizing practice (Egstrom, 1964).

under whatever name, it has been found consistentty that

rnental practice, in conjunctíon with physical practice, Ís
as effective as a greater amount of physicar practice atone.
In other words, mental practice is a quicker and easier
alternative to a nore extensive anount of ptrysicar practice.
Tt¡is was found to be the case for such diverse behaviours
as rearning the g1'mnastic movement known as the singre reg
upstart on the olynpic high bar (start and Richardson, 19641 ¡

for learning a list of commands (Lieberman and Artschur , L97L) ¡

for learning the vorreybarr pass (Johnston, LgTr); and for
rotary pursuit tracking task (Rawlings and Rawlings, Lg74).

(iii) 'Inagery in Leärninq and R ecall

Although research on tl¡is function of irnagery is

rerativery recent, the earriest and most abundant writings
on imagery hrere concerned with its advantages to memory.

rt began 2500 years ago, with cicerots rde oratorer, in which

he immortarised the rlocusr method of simonides. Tt¡e metìod
involved forming an image of the item to be remernbered, in a

famiriar prace, so that recalr of the faniriar prace brought

with it the new item as weII.
 28.

rrHe (Simonides) inferred that persons

desiring to train this faculty (of memory)
must select places and form mental images
of the ttríngs they wish to rsnember and
store those images in t̡e places, so that
tl¡e order of tÌ¡e places will preserve the
order of the things, and t}re images of tt¡e
things will denote the thíngs themselves,
and- ¡¡s shall emptoy the places and ìmages
respectively as a wax wrÍting-tablet and
the letters written on itr'.

(Cicero, de Oratore,
in Yates, 1966, p. 2'r.

Modern memory techniques stitr use the same basic idea as the
ancient orators. Ttrey form an image, emphasising the spatial
arrangement of its contents. Mne¡nonics such as rhylñing schemes

utilise visual and auditory imagery by creating schema by

which the new information is associated with old. Mnemonics,

as a technique, has more than survived tl¡e scrutiny of

experimental analysis as documented by yates (1966) and
demonstrated by Ross and Lar.i¡rence (1968) and Del_Ín (1969b).

Few researchers wourd share the opinion of Br.uner (1966) that

funagery is important in learning and recall only for children
under eight years of age. Reese and Rohwer, in a symposium
entitred "rmagery in childrenrs Learning'r (1970) consider imagery
important for learning at alr ages. The riterature is fulr of
studies showing that imagery as a technique, whether intentionar
or not, item imageability, and subjects t inagery level, are
associated with increased learning and recall.

lhe rine of research forrowed by paivio and his associates has

been to compare imagery as a learning technique with other

 29.

Iearning techniquesr principally by varying imageability of

stímuli. ft¡ey isolaÈed tÌ¡e circumstances under which lmagery
is superior. ltrus they found in recognition tasks and in
free recall, when order of iterrs is unirn¡nrtant (Faivio and Csapo,

1969) r and when information is to be recalled exactly,

imagery is less likely to produce synonyms (Paivio, 19701 .

Tt¡e advantage applied to concrete iter¡rs, when enough time

was allowed for an image to be formed. Ttre effect was

strongest when the first itsn in a paired-associate task was

concrete. It would appear that an image was formed of t̡e

first itern, and the second word beca¡ne attached to it.
For recognítion memory, non-verbal inages hrere sufficient. For

free verbal recall, however, the verbal code had to be stored

along with the image, or be retrievable fron it (Paivio, 1971).
Paivio developed a theory to accouht for this effect. He

pro¡nsed that images function as memory pegsr which he called

lconceptual pegs r.

Jablonski and -ùlueller (L9721 decided, however, that conceptual

pegs ¿lid not seem to operate in anagram solutions. They

studíed anagr¿ün solutions as a function of instructions,

prÍming and imagery and did not.find that high imagery items
were reliably easier to solve. The justification for the
authorst expectation of finding support for PaivÍors theory
is not apparent. Solving anagrams seems to be a quite
different task from learning and recall,
 30.

lltre research on imagery as a memory technigue has produced

interestíng findings on how its use changes over triars.
Subjects given rote instructions progress over trials
from rote to verbal technÍgues, to imagery technigues
(Paivio, 19ZI). Findings of this kind support the idea
of subjects as active agents: they seek out the technique
which they consider is most efficient for rearning the
mate¡i.ial, rather than use the technique as instructed.

Given that imagery is functionat in recognition t̡an in

more
free recarr, it is not surprising that imagery facilitates
incidentaL recarr- white high imaging subjects, in the
absence of speciar instructions, had no advantage over row
imaging subjects in intentional recarr, they did have access
to Ínformation which was not processed by the usual
me¡nory channels (Ernest and paivio, 1969a; Sheehan and
Neisser' 1969)rt woutd appear then that imagery makes
-
¡nssibre effortless rearning. The rare simpticity of the
above finding was destroyed rater tl¡e same year by an experiment
of Ernest and paivio (r969b): the better incidentar memory for
high imagers applÍed only to high imaging females.

After a series of experìrnents (196g , Lg69 t rg.o) | paivio

concluded:

"We have found that rated imagery or concreteness

of the Ítem is the best single predictor of
associative learning involving meaningful
¡naterial that we have been able to identify".
(1970, p. 389).
 31.

It has been reported consistently that the number of items

recalled increases from abstract words, to concrete words,

to pictures. Itern concrêteness, and therefore irnageabilÍty,

has been found in rnost studies to be more important than
meaningfulness. In spíte of the tack of information on

the causar direction of the rerationship between imageability

and memorability, many researchers have interpreted the
image as functional on this basis.

More than any other aspect of imagery, the research on the

importance of the level of imaging ability of subjects in
learning and recall has produced inconsistent results. This
would appear to be the result of confusion of criteria and

rneasuring instruments. The issue of measurement wiII be

considered in detail in Chapter 5.

It is interesting to compare Cicerors teaching with paiviors

concrusion, 2500 years later (197r). onry minor quarifications
need be made to the idea of the ancient orator: visual imagery

does aid recall, for concrete objects but not for words, only in
non-sequential tasksr and when items are presented slowly.

( iv) Imagery in Other Tasks

Imagery is generally regarded as having an integral role
in all forms of creative art. It may come as a surprise to many

that it is also credited with a contribution to scientific thought.

Watson and Crick credit imagery wit̡ the gestalt experience in
their sorution of the structure of the DNA morecure (watson, 1969)
as does Kekurl for his sorution of the structure of the benzene
ring in 1865.
 32.

Galton¡s famous euology to imagery (tgg3) lists the many

appearances of imagery in thinking and tJ:e ways in which

funagery ls an advantage to thinking.

It is of importance in every handicraft and

profession where design is required. Tt¡e
best workm€n are those who visualise tÌ¡e whole
of what they propose to do, before they take
a tool in their hands. Tt¡e village smith and
the carpenter who are employed on odd jobs
employ ít no less for their work tìan the
mechanician, the engineer, and the architect.
fhe J-ady rs maid who arranges a new dress
requires it for the same reason as the decorator
ernployed on a palace, or the agent who lays out
great estates. Strategists, artists of aII
denorninations, physicists who contrive new
experìrnents, and in short all who do not follow
routine, have need of itrr.
(pp. 78-791 .

His list rnight be seen as underrating the extent to which

imagery pervades thought processes as it is restricted to
visuar imagery. -t"lany researchers consider imagery äs vitar
to the performance of any task reguiring mentar organisation
anil manipulation of 3-dimensionar space. A wide range of

tasks, between reading a simpre map to understanding crystarr-

ography, could therefore be added to Gal_tonrs list.

Imagery also appears to convey an advantage where mental

performance is faster and 1ess cumbersome tl¡an physical
performance, such as mentar aritl¡metic or even arranging
furniture- Ttre chess prayers studied by de Groot (1965)

mentally prayed many games simurtaneousryr and reported the

feat as easier mentally than ptrysically.
 33.

Itre Japanese provide an excellent example of the apparent'

advantage of imagery over pLrysicat performance. llental
abacus users have been found to outperform both physical
abacus users and electronic calculators (Kojimar 1954).
llt¡eir advantage appeârs to be t}at ttrey are not impeded

by fingers which take time to res¡nnd and can be clumsy-

Itrough not.e><amined in a systematic way, the reports do

suggest that this may be an interesting demonstration of

the superiority of imaginal processes.

Imagery has been found to be advantageous in togical problem

solving (Huttenlocher, 1968), in elementary mathe¡natics

(Hayes' Lg73l and in second-Ianguage learning (Atkinson,

1975). Kuhlman (1960) fpund children with high irnaging

ability to be less stereotyped in their reproduction of

ambiguous drawings. Richardson (1969) found t̡at
"Visualisers were more idiosyncratic and the non-visualisers

more stereotyped" (p. 85) in t̡eir thinking-

Tt¡ere are times, however, when funagery is considered a disadvantage.

Holt (1971) agrees witlr Richardson (1969) that "Tt¡ere is even

evidence that extremely vivid thought imagery may be a

handicap .... since it is often not entirely controllable, is

of limited ftexibility, and may be distracting". (p. 13).
Shereshevskii, the mne¡nonist studied by Luria (1968) , 'provides an

example. Paiviors (1971) conclusion, after years of research

on mental imagery and verbal processes, is that imagery ís a

crucial mechanism in mernory, meaning, association, perception

and thought.
 34.

SHAPTER 3.

SOIqE PROB.LEMS IN IMAGERY RES'EARCH

Tt¡e llterature on l¡nagery can be su¡oroarised as follows:

imagery is an undlsputed phenomenological experience whlch
appears to affect performance on certain tasks, especially
Iearning and recall. ft would appear to share some processing

mechanisms witÌ¡ perceptíon and ttre end-products of the two

processes have similar representations.

Thre vagueness of the above state¡nents reflects the fact that

little of theoretical certainty has been established. Many

of t}re salient areas mentioned have yet to be researched.

Even in relation to areas where research has been carried out,
knowredge is sketchy. Barratt (1953) berieved the theoretical
gaps were partly because the study of psychology rejected
subjective processes for a long time, but more importantty
because the subject matter of imagery vras "too difficult".
(p. ls4) .

One general problem which imagery research has shared with

research into many other psychological topics has been that
artificiarity has been imposed on the circumstances in which
imagery occurs. For instance, subjects have been instructed
to use imagery, whether or not it is a suitable technique
for the task. The tasks themselves have often been of a

kind rarely rnet outside the laboratory: they have involved

paired-assocíate rists, and sometimes even nonsense sylrables.
 35.

It is not surprislng, tlerefore, that irnagery has ccsne to

be assoclated more wlttr memory tricks tt¡at can be attached
to mernoryr rather than considered as possibry an integrar
part of the memory process.

According to Anderson (1978), a further reaÞon why so rarge

an amount of data would appear to have produced little
knowredge, is that researchers tend to be too committed
to a partl.cular framework. As a result, their efforts
have not yielded unequÍvocal, unambiguous results.

Ànderson berieved there r{as a need to remind researchers

of the function of science: rllft¡e function of science
is to discover what is the case, not to prescribe what
shourd be the case. rf eguivarence and non-determinacy
seem to be tt¡e case, we should not be tinid about
acknowledging that possibility". .{p. 275).
 36.

NATT'BE

one basic ¡rroblernin the rlterature on the natu¡e of

lmagery, as docurnented in the previous chapter, ís that
research has attempted to study the nature of funagery in
termsof other processes whlch are t̡emserves not furry
unélerstood. It¡is is especially so with respect to
perception- ftre guestion of the nature of imagery shifts
to the questíon of the nature of a percept.

A further probreru is that rnany resurts from such studies

can be interpreted in ways other t̡an those the authors
propose. As sheehan (1978) notes wÍth reference to
Kosslynrs work on distance of imaged objects, such studies,
on closer examination, do not provide informatíon on tt¡e
natu¡e of imagery: "the research ... has sirnpry isorated
novel functionar correspondences between the processes of
imaging and perception that have hitherto gone unobserved".
(p. 6s).

Ttiis issue of non-determinacy h¡as discussed in chapter 1.

while -Andersonts (1978) betief that behaviourar data does
not permit discrirnination to be made between imaginar and
propositionar representations is not shared by arr writers
(Hayes=Roth, L979), it remains the case that such discrim-
inations have not yet been made.
 37.

A more encouraging exPlanatl-on would be t̡at more Parametric

ilata is reguired before tt is approprlate to begin serious
hypothesis-testing. lluch information is stlJ-l to be

galned about ttre representatl'on of imagery. Images have

Iong been describeil in terms of vívidness. If such a pictorial
term is appropriate, are others such as clarity, texture,
síze, colour, complexity also approPriate? ff they are'
such information.would further tt¡e understanding of the
ways in which imagery can vary, as well as suPPort the rlmageryr

viewpoint.

Sorne analysts of imagery research have lamented the

unwillingness of researchers in this area to work within
partícular paradigms (e.g. Sheehan, L9781. It could be

argued, however, that the area Ís not yeÈ sufficiently

developeil for standardized approaches.

Þlost researchers have a tidy theory before this parametric

data is available. Tt¡eir studies are often based on an

assumption, which is not tested. If one accepts t̡e

assumption, then the results contribute to an understanding

of tt¡e probtem. Shepard¡s work on mental rotation is an
example. If one accePts tJ:e assumption that an image is
eguivalent to the figure it represents, then the results
can be ínterpreted: the Processes of irnaginal and physical
 38.

rotation can be seen as analogous. Ttle sane condition

applies to Kosslynts work: the results are informative
if one accepts the assumption that subjects referred
to their images for answers they already knew, for

example, to a question concerning tl¡e ears on an imaged

Iízaxd., It may be that the research of both Shepard

anól Kosslyn is set withln a framework such tt¡at theír

resuLts cannot be interpreted.outside of it.

An associated restriction on the information value of

some research is that it includes assumptions about
the processes that can be applied to imagery, as rnuch

as about the representation' $zryshyn (1973) ' who

holils the rPropositionalr view of imageryr and Anderson
(1978) who now seems to favour the alternative view,
argue that representations cannot be tested in the
abstract, or in isolation, a point often overlooked
by researchers of both view¡nints. 1lhe research

carried out might have been more valuable had these

assumptions not been made. Research is needed which

involves a minimurn of assumptions, so that it can

provide evidence which loads more one way than another'

 39.

(ií) Function

Much of the research concerned witl" the function

of imagery has exarnined its role in learning and recaII,

where imagerlr has often been associated with superior
performance. One of the most popular alternative
explanations for this superiority is in terms of the
increased amount of cognitive processing involved in
forming an image, suggesting that the time and cognitive
effort involved in the processing could be more important
to recall than the result of the processing. Another is
that tJle use of imagery introduces other reinforcement
contingencies, such as novelty.

Ttre list of skills in which imagery is considered to be

an advantage poses a fundamental question. As none of

the skills involve ontry imagery, it is not known the
extent to whích the apparent benefit is due to imagery
itself and not to other skills involved. Imagery may be

present, and may even be necessarf¡, but there is nothing to

suggest that it is sufficient. Tühen so-called imagery ability
refers to ímagery manipulation ability, for example, it is
not clear how many abilities are involved. ftris was ttre
còncern of Downie (1966) who concluded that the al¡iIity to form
 40.

images, to rnanlpulate them, and to manipulate mental

space were three separate independent factors.

lltre research on the function of irnagery is beset by

problems as serious as those involved in research on

its nature. Ihe central problem is that the apparent

and reported presence of Ímagéry is insufficient as

evidence that t̡e image is functional. According to

Sheehan (I978):

"If a tr)erson executes a task weII

(e.g. accurately recalls a list of
concrete nouns) r wê cârìnot necessarily
assume that it is because he has been
imagingr €vêrr if he reports doing so".

P. 60

llhe problem can be stated even more sirnply: tJ:e data

rernain corr elational.
 4r.

IIT. SUBJECTIVE REPORTTNG

It could be argued tt¡at the data available from subjects I

introspections are less lnformative than t̡e correlational

data discussed above. As discussed at the end of
Chapter 1, íntrospectíons are consídered by some

authors (e.g. l{andler, L9751 to be of questionable

valiclíty. Ihere appear to be no independent criteria
for the occurrence of the phenomena being reported.
Evidence of a social desirability component in subjective
re¡nrts (such as that of White, Sheel¡an and Ashton, ]9771

suggests that the suspicion of validity is justified.

Moreover, the relÍability of introspections is diffícult

to establish as they do not lend themselves to
assessment in these terms: there is little basis for
clecicling what constitutes test-retest or inter-item
reliability. Furthermore, aspects of the imaging
process which may be accessible for reporting have to
pass through a highty individuaÌ, and possibly inadequate,
linguistic filter.
 42.

IV TIIE PRESÐIT'RESEARCH IN THTS CONTEXT

Ttre present research approached t̡ree aspects of the

irnagery problem: its nature, its function, and its
phenomenology. The aim of the research, as previously
outlined, was to examine the adequacy of the pictorial
and perceptual notions of imagery. Tt¡e rationale was

t]¡at if differences in clearl.y pictorial quatities of

the image, such as its details, are associated with
qualitative differences in performance, such a finding
would be consistent with the pictorial viewpoint of
jmagery. ft would also have implications for the
function of imagery. If these pictorial differences
were found to be associated with qualitative differences
in performance, t]¡en it would be unlikely that the image

serveól no function.

TL¡e research examined the extent to which an image is

analogous to a percept. It questioned whether the
same processes could be applied to an image as to a

percept. The research was also concerned with how

much of the imaging process is available to introspection.

It asked whether what a person thinks he is doing with an

image reflects how he performs with an image.

 43.

Lastly, ít was concerned witJ: qualitative differences

in irnagery, to examine the features of rgood and

rpoort irnagery. It afuned to determine whether

images have identÍfiable propertles which distÍnguish

good from poor images, whether a good image for one

person is IÍkely to be good for another, and whether

the criteria for tgoodr is the same for images as for

percepts.

Ttre imagery with which the present research was

concerned could be classified as memory imagery

(though it could be argued that it warrants a category
of its own as it is menory imagery used to solve
problems). Memory funagery was selected as it would
appear to be the most easily controlled experinehtally.
The experi¡nents were designed to produce differences
in irnagery, and thus provide infornation relevant to
the tt¡ree areas of interest (the function, nature and

experience of imagery). This was done by devising

a task which necessitated the use of an image of a

presented stimulus. Imagery differences were

produced by varying features of the stimulus, such as

size, details and texture.

 44.

llhe task chosen was sufficiently difficult to solve

by alternative means that the use of an image

seened very likely. (ftrís will be elaborated

on in Ctrapter 5). ülhile it could not be guaranteed
that subjects would use features of ttre stímu1us
as presented, tt¡is method provided tt¡em with tt¡e
opportunity,to do so. Variation in stimuli created
possibilities for qualitative differences in imagery

to odcur. 1lt¡ese qualitative diff erences could tt¡en

be eompared with the resulting perfornance. In

addition to quatitative dÍfferences produced by

the experimental design, it was expected tt¡at there

would be variation ,in how subjects used their
images.

At.ternpts were made to avoid incorporating into the

design assumptions about the nature of tl¡e image.

In this way, qualitative differences in imagery

could be compared with objective measures of

performance, producing results which night be

expected to favour one view of imagery more than the

other.

It was hoped that some of the problems of earlier research

could be avoided by qualitative and quantitative measures
 45.

of imagery and assoclated performance. ffie experÍmental

desf.gn created ¡nssibilities for lnages to vary ln both
tt¡e kind of information (such as texture) and tl¡e amount
,

of details)
I

I of information .(such as the number tt¡ey

I

contained. Subjectsr re¡nrtson their irnages, compared

I

with the information presented, would allow statements

to be made as to how much of the imaging process is

available, to introspection.
 46.

CHAPÎER 4

METHODOLOGY I: PRELIM INARY CONS IDERATTONS

TTTE MEASUREIVIENT OF IMAGERY

EXPERIMEI\]T I
Tt¡is research consisted of a series of exPeriments which were
concerned with the possible influence of qualitative and

quantitative differences in imagery on the performance of

a mental task. The experimental design varied features
of the stÍmuli, creating the possibility for qualitative
differences in imagery to ocqur. To maximise the likelihood
of producing quantitative differences in imagery, it was

necessary to select subjects at either extreme on imagery

abitity. This assigning of subjects to imagery levels was

an important part of the design. Tt¡e líterature offered a

generous choice of criteria for classifying imagery levels.

The search for an appropriate measuring instrument became
the focus of the first study.

The many approaches to inagery' as described in Chapter I,

had produced a variety of measuring techniques. Chapter 2

documented the unproductive atter¡npts to measure imagery in

terms of physiological and perceptual processes. A third
method, which developed from Galtonrd questÍonnaire of 1880,

offered most promise. Ga1ton asked people to introspect

about their inagery and assigned numbers and ranks on the
basis of their reported vividness of imagery. Galtonrs
approach dif,fered from that of.nost:other writers of his
 47.

generatlon in that they tended more towards a philosophical

analysis of their own introspectfons (James, I908;
Titchener, 1909; Pear, 19251. They were more concerned with
description than with measurement

Betts, in contrast, shared Galtonrs interest in measuring

imagery. Hís Questionnaire Upon Mental Imagery (1909)

contained 120 items covering seven sense modalíties (visual,
auditory, kinaesthetÍc, taste, touch, somaesthetic, .olfactory) .

Subjects were asked to inagine a particular event or object and

to rate the vivÍdness of the imagery aroused on a seven point
scale. He found a high correlation, in excess of .9, for
vividness across modes, as did Burt much later in 1949. No

evidence was forthcoming from Bettsr work, nor from a similar

study on cross-moda1 imagery by Griffitts (J-927), to support
the traditional idea of imagery types, such as visile, audile,
or motile. Some evidence was produced later by Roe (f95I, 1956)

who found a tendency for imagery types to be correlated with

different occupations. The most consistent finding from these
early attempts at measurement (MüIIer, 1838; Leaning t 1925¡

ÌvlcKellar , Lg57; Buck and Geers, 1967) was one of wide individual
differences in the reported vividness of imagery.

Another approach to quantifying behaviour, which developed

simultaneously and independently, merged with the mainstream
of i:nagery measurement. The testing movement, which got under

way in the United States during the First !{orld lalar, produced
measuring scales for most recognised behaviours. Fo1J-owing

Kelleyrs rdiscovery' of spatial factors in 1927, tests of

 48.

spatial ability began to appear in the U.S. and in Britain-

For some reason, perhaps national rivalry, a controversy
developed between researchers in these countries over whether

spatial abitity vùas accounted for by one (U.S.) or many

factors (sritain).1

Opinions differ on the relationship between imagery ability

and spatial ability. Barratt (I953) considered self-report
measures close to useless as indicators of spatial performance.

Stewart (1965) and Hollenberg (1970) considered spatial ability

as an objectively measurable indicator of imagery ability.
Richardsonrs (1969) objection to the latter viewpoint was that
it negtected the importance of control in imagery. Some studies
(e.g. Sheehan, 1967, L971-' L972) have classified subjects as

high or low imagers solely on the basis of their responses to

a self-report scale, while Paivio (1969, J-97r.') used both

spatial and self-report measures in conjunction.

Barratt (1953) examined the relationship between imagery ability

and spatial ability by factor analysing a range of spatial tests.
Tt¡o factors, Spatial Manipulation and Reasoning, emerged

clearly and a third, Shape Recognition, h¡as tentatively proposed.

Barrattrs conclusions were that imagery was i:n¡rortant for

spatial manipulation, Iess so for shape recognition' and not at

alt for spatial reasoning. Although subjects who rated thernselves

I
Nowadays, controversies tend to be kept at home, someti¡nes
even within the same University department. Morning tea
conversations at the University of V[. Ontarío may educate
the eavesdropper as Paivio and {zlyshyn argue about the
nature of imagery.
 49.

high on imagery showed some consistent advantage in spatial

tests, this was not significant:

"the conclusion is that overall ímagery ratings

can yield litt1e that is of value beyond a very
tentative and general statement that there seems
to be a slight advantage in spatial-medium tests
in favour of the high i¡nagersrt.
(Barratt,1953, p.160)

Downie (1966) approacheil the same guestion of the relationship

between self-reported imagery and spatial ability using a

wÍder range of measures. His central hypothesis was that

inagery would load heavily on spatial ability. He adopted

Michael et alrs (1957) definition of three spatial factors

and included Èests of each: Spatial Orientation, defined as

"the ability to perceive spatial patterns or to maintain

orientation with respect to objects in space"; Visualisation,
"the ability to manipulate or transform the image of spatial
patterns into other visual arrangements"i and Flexibility
of Closure, "the ability to keep one or more definite
configurations in mind so as to make identificatíon in spite
of perceptual distractÍon". (Downie, 1966, pp. 36-37). HÍs

battery included part of Sheehanrs shortened version of Bettsr

QMI (L967 ), Dominance of Imagery Scaler a modification of

Gordonrs Control of Mental Imagery (1949), and a number of

other ability and personality measures.

The independence of the two main factors which emerged, Spatíal

Reasoning and General Imaging Ability, Ied Downie to conclude:

 50.

"Ihe only interpretation possible from these

results is that imagery and absence of imagery
are lnsufficient to explain performance on
spatial-type tests. Tt¡e capacity to image may
be of assistance to some individuals, but it is
just as likely to have the opposite effect wíth
others. It seems much more likely that spatial-
tlpe tests are measures of general intellectual
ability, and that capacity to form images is a
separate facultyr'.

þp. 7a-75)

Despite Downiers certainty, other interpretations were also

possible. His acceptance of the equivalence of self-reported
imagery and imaging ability is questíonable. His measures h¡ere
of the former, his conclusions in terms of the latter. A

possible alternative Ínterpretation of the results would be

that imagery could be one method by which spatial tasks are

performed. LogÍcal thinking, or general Íntellectuat ability,
could be another. Tt¡is alternative interpretation is consistent
with Penbertonrs (1952) conclusions about closure and its
relation to other cognitive processes. He arguerQ, that
spatial tests could be performed either by analytically
reasoning which \4ray a figure would face when turned in the
plane of the paper, or by imaging the rotation.

Downiers results are difficult to interpret for a number of

other reasons. firstly, all the tests were modified in some

way, mostly shortened, which distorted their validity. Another

cause for concern is the separation of spatial ability Ínto

three factors, two of which involved imagery. Visualisation
and Flexibility of Closure factors involved the manipulation
of an image in space. Even if the dominant ability tested
was spatial, the necessary image would confound the distinction
made between spatial and imagery abÍlities.
 5I

A more recent study by Di Vesta, Ingersoll and Sunshine (f971)

warrants mention, despite repeated failures to replicate their
results. In a factor analytic study of tests of imagery
abíIity, verbal ability, automatization, anxiety and social
desirabi.lity, they found serf-reported imagery to be saturated
on the Social Desirability factor. This result cast doubt
on the construct validity of introspective reports of imagery
and on the practice of substituting introspective and objectíve
tests of imagery for one another.

Most recently, Richardson (1977) in a paper on the meaning and

measurement of memory irnagery, returned to a view held by the
earliest Ímagery researchers and rejected for most of tÌ¡e time
since: I'Sèlf-report measures must necessarily serve as the
initial criterion against which other more objective
behavioural measures . and physiological measures
can be validatedr'. (p. 42).

THE PR.ESENT STUDY

The present study v/as concerned with determining what is measured

by so-called Imagery Tests. Unlike the studies previously
¡nentioned, it was not a theoreticarry rnotivated analysis of
the rerationship between imagery abitity and another variabre
so much as an analysis of the practical issue of measuring
imagery. rt examined the criteria for cl-assifying imagery levers,
on the basis of which statements about imagery courd be made.
 52.

METHOD

T'he imagery tests selected for analysis were those most

frequently mentioned in the literature. A second consideration

was that they represented a range of aspects of ímagery, such

as imagery formation, imagery use, imagery exPerience' 1[t¡e
finat consíderation was that the various methods of responding
be represented: for example, objective multiple choíce answers,
and self-report rating scales.

The battery consisted of four self-report scales concerned with

the sensory experience of imagery, with cognítive stylesr with
imagery responses to words, and with the importance of imagery

in an imagery manipulation task. T\fto were standardized

objective measures of imagery manipulation abil-ity'

The tirne taken for both tlpes of tests htas approximately

equivatent: of the self-rating scales took ten to fifteen

each

minutes to complete; the objective tests averaged thirty

minutes each. The greater number of self-report tests
included in the study reflected the greater number of these
tests available.

fhe following six tests were analysed:

1. QMI: Sheehan|s (1967) shortened version of the BETTS
QUESTIONNAIRE UPON MENTAL IMAGERY (1909) consisted of

thirty-five items asking subjects to rate the vividness

of t̡eir imagery in the seven sensory modalities of
sight, touch, smell, taste, hearing, organic and

kinaesthetÍc. (A¡¡Pendix I) .
 53.

2 IDQ: PaivioIS INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES OUESTIONNAIRE WAS

concerned with true-false responses to oners normal way

of thinking, studying and problem-solving. It had

two scales which were treated separately, one verbal,

the other itnagery. (Appendix 2) .

3 PIR: Paiviors WORD IMAGERY RATING SCALE measured

subjective responses to the inagery value of twenty nouns.

There were ten concrete, ten abstract nouns and seven points
on the rating sca1e. (Appendix 3).

4 .TTTPFB: MINNESOTA PÀPER FORM BOARD TEST TequiTed thc

subject to assemble mentally fragments of a figure
presented two-dimensionally, and to choose which of
five alternatives would be obtained. (Appendix 4).

5 Q}4PFB: QUESTIONNAIRE ON MINNESOTA PAPER FROM BOARD TEST

was designed by Barratt (1953). The subject rated on a

seven point scale the strength and clarity of his irnages,

the ease with which he could manipulate them, and how

important visualisation was in solving the Form Board

items. (Appendix 5).

6 SR: SPACE RELATIONS TEST r,ras a sub-test of the Differential

Aptitudes battery. The subjectrs task was mentally to fold
a drawn figure along specified lines, rotate it in space'
and choose which of the four alternatives was the correct

result. (Appendix 6).

 54'
The subjects were iS¿ at the University of AdelaÍde.
"tuA"nts
They included a random group of Psychology I students (56 males,
50 females) ¡ and the total group of Architecture I students
(40 males, I females). Architecture students were included
in the expectation that they would extend the upper range of
scoreE.

TestÍng took place duríng two one-hour sessions. QMI, MPFB

and QMPFB were administered in Session f; SR, IDQ and PIR
in Sessíon 2. The sessions were held in lecture theatres, as
part of the studentsr course of study. Tt¡e tests were scored
by hand. For each subject, the Matriculation Aggregate for
the best f ive subjects was obtained. llt¡is being the primary
criterion for University entrance, it pro,rided a basis for
comparison across facultÍes and an indication of the relationship
between imagery ability, spatial ability, and general intellectual
ability.
 55.

RESULTS

Scores on the tests were totalled across faculties. Pearson

correlations were calculated for the síx ;imagery measures, the

verbal scale of the IDQ, the total score for each subject on the
1
six irnagery measuresl and the Matriculation Aggregate. The

correlation matrix is presented in Tab1e 4.1.

TABLE 4.1

CORRELATION MATRIX FOR ]MAGERY TESTS

OMI IIDQ PIR MPFB QMPFB SR VIDQ TOT MAG

0ùlr

.3r9
]TDQ ***

.468 .252
PIR *** **

.0 34 .067 .079
MPFB

.260 .32L .30r .l-76

Q[4PF *** *** *** *

.027 .04s .068 .600 .034

SR ***
.r9r .070 .r22 -.L40 .099 -.146
VIDQ

.609 .586 .626 .557 .s99 .499 .06r

TOT *** *** *** *** *** ***

.266 -.186 -.176 .043 .239 .082 .L47 -.2L7

IqAG ** * * ** *

Significance levels * P<.05

** P<.OI
*** p a .001
I. Total imagery score was calculated by suruning each subject,s score
on QMI , PIR, MPFB, QMPFB, SR and the Imagery scale of the IDQ. It rvas
Íncluded tg províde 'a single neasurement for corl,oarison v¡ith non-irnagery
measures
 56.

1ll¡e four self'rated imagery scales were highly intercorrelated,

wit̡ an average correlation of r = .32- QMI correlated with
IIDQ, with PIR, and witJ: QMPFB; PIR correlated with IIDQ;
IIDQ correlated wittr QMPFts, and PIR correlated with QMPfts.

lfhe two objective tests of imagery ability SR and MPFB, had

a correlation of r = .600, which is the upper extreme of the

range (.5 to .6) found by Terman and McNemar (1966).

lltre lack of correlation between Matriculation Aggregate and

MPFts (r = .043) and SR (r =.0A2) is consistent with previous

findings, as presented in the test manuals, that spatial
and academic abilities are uncorrelated. If
Matriculation Aggregate is taken as some indicator of general
intellectual abitity, however, the finding of a significant
negative relationship between Matriculation AggregaÈe
and tJ:e total for imagery measures (r = -.2L7) contrasts

with Barratt's (1953) finding that high and low imagers

performed equally well on reasoning tests.

To exarnine furtlter the relationship between the tests, ttte

correlations r^/ere factor analysed, using the Principal
Factoring method with iterations. As it was not known
whether the factor axes were orthogonal, an oblique rotation
was applied. fLre factor loadings for the three factors which
emerged are presented in Tab1e 4.2.
 57.

TABLE 4.2

FACTOR LOADINGS FOR IMAGERY TESTS

TESTS FACTOR I FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3

QMI .679 * -.03r .0 73

IIDQ .484 * .0 33 -.046

PIR .603 * .045 .072

}fPFB .LL2 .779 * -. r07

QMPFts .509 * .084 -.073
SR .040 .755 * -.062
VIDQ .190 -. I88 .4gg *

MAG -.404 r, .L27 .469 *

* Significance level p < .01

Significance levels of factor loadings were determined using

the Burt-Bank5 formula. (Critical loading, ât P' .0I, for
Factor 1 was .2L, fot Factor 2 .223, for Factor 3 .24).

fhree factors emerged clearly. Each of the imagery tests

Ioaded on only one factor and were clearly independent.

Matriculation Aggregate loaded on two, one positively and

one negatÍvely

FACTOR li The @(perience of ltn-agç¡y

The variables loading only on Factor I were the Betts Questionnaire

on Mental Imagery (QMI), Paiviots Word Imagery Rating scale (PIR)
'
Questionnaire on l.Iinnesota Paper Form Board (QMPFB), and the Imagery
Scale of the Individual Differences Ouestionnaire (IIDQ).
 58.

Matriculation Aggregate had a negative loading on this factor

and a positive loading on Factor 3. It behaved differently
from the imagery measures in that it was the only measure
which loaded on more than one factor. Its double loading
suggested a fourth factor which was beyond the interest of
this study.

Factor I was measured by the self-report scales of imagery and

was concerned with imagery as experienced. llt¡e Betts QMI, in
which subjects rated their experience of imagery in dÍfferent
sense modalities, emerged as the purest measure of this factor.
The significant negative loading of Matriculation Aggregate

on this factor suggested that intellectual abitity may be

negatíve1y retated to the reporting of the experience of
imag ery.

:' Abili tó Man late e

The two objective tests of imagery rnanipulation ability' Space

RþIations (SR) and Minnesota Paper Form Board Test (MPFB)

'
separated clearly as Factor 2. Íhe self-rated imagery

scales had negligible loadings on this factor.

The independence of Factors I and 2 was striking. While most

subjects re¡rcrted that they exPerÍenced imagery, not all of

them could do anything with their imagery. The ability to
manipulate imagery was not a natural consequence of having an
image. Tt¡e result cast doubt on the frequent practice of
classifying a subjectrs imagery level on combined self-report
anil objective tests results.
 59.
FACTOR 3: Verbal/Intellectual Abilitv
Factor 3 emerged as a measure of verbal or intellectual ability.
Tt¡e verbal scale of the Individual Differences Questionnaire
and tvlatrlculation Aggregate loaded on this f actor. This

factor was of ínterest only insofar as it related to the other

two factors. Its inverse relationship with Factor I has

already been discussed. Its independence from Factor 2

strongly suggests that spatial manipulation tasks are not

solved by general reasoning techniques.

FACTOR SCORES

If factor scores are valid measures of inaging ability,

differences should exist between Architecture and other students.
It would be reasonable to expect that Architecture students
would have more irnaging ability than students from less imagery

prone courses.

Ihe following table presents the mean scores for Architecture

and Psychology students on the factors of ímagery experience
(Factor 1) and imagery manipulation ability (Factor 2).

TABLE 4.3

MEAIi FACTOR SCORES FOR ARCHITECTURE AND

PSYCHOLOGY STUDENTS ON FACTORS I AND 2

ARCHITECTURE PSYCHOLOGY

FACTOR I L2 -42 3.8r

FACTOR 2 s.06 -.40 *

* p<.05
 60.

While they did not differ in their rePorts of the experience

of imagery (L = L.24, 64 df.r P = .22, 2-tailed), Architecture
students were significantly better able to manipulate imagery'
as $ras predicted (t = 1.88, 47 dft p<.05, I-tailed).

Factor scores of males and females v¡ere also compared to

determine whether sex need be considered a factor in future
selection of subjects. Ttreir mean factor scores are presented
in Table 4.4.

TABLE 4.4

MEAN FÀCTOR SCORES FOR MALES AND FEMALES

MALES FE¡{ALES

FACTOR t 10.43 .O2 tt

FACTOR 2 2.33 .40

* p=.02

Males more often reported experiencing imagery (t = 2.4L,

96 dfr p = .02r 2-taited). Males and females did not differ
significantly in their ability to manipulate imagery

(t = I.83¡ 100 dfr p = .07, 2-tailed).

The final analysis was of the two tests of image manipulation

ability. The performance of Architecture and Psychology

students was compared on these tests as it vras considered

that Space Relations appeared to be a more pure test of the
abitity. MPFB, in contrast, could be solved by dealing with
parts of the pattern in piecemeal style, rather than
 61.

necessitating a totat image. Íhe performance of the two

groups of students on the two tests is presented in the

followíng table. (Table 4-5).

TABLE 4.5

MEAN SCORES FOR ARCHITECTURE AND PSYCHOLOGY

STT'DENTS ON TESTS OF I}'IAGERY MANIPULATION
ABTLIjÍY

ARCHITECTURE PSYCHOLOGY

SPACE RELATIONS 47 .O 37.4 *t*

M.P.F.B. , 39.8 36.2 r'*

*** p ¿, .001
** p<.01

Architecture students performed better than Psychology

students on both tests: the difference between their performances
ï\ras more marked on the space Relations Test (t = 5.52¡ 47 df',

p < .0005, l-tailed; for MPFB, t = 2.5Ir 47 df, P < '0I' I-tailed) '

Derived formula for factor scores were used initially to select

subjects for experiments. Subsequently, it was concluded that
extre¡ne scores on the space Relations and MPFB tests were as

efficient.
 62.

DISCUSSTON

lltre two objective tests of imagery, SR and MPFB, did not

correlate significantly with any of the self-report
imagery scales. A measure of the degree to which imagery
was the means of solution ín one of the tests was provided

by the sigrnificant, though low, correlation between

MPFts and Questionnaire on MPFts (r = .176, p = .03) .

Spatial ability tasks would appear to be a situation in

which imagery though not necessary is an ad.vantage, a

situation doubted by Neisser (1970): "it is genuine for the person

himself, but it does not endow him with aly special capacities".
(p. 176). Although Neisser's interpretation of his results
may differ, the results themselves are consistent witJl those
found in the present study. He too found a non-significant

relationship between SR and QMI (in this studyt T = -.O27,

p=.75).

The high positive relationship between the two spatial ability

tests and the total score for imagery measures (r = .499, r = .557).
compared witJl the negligible relationship between the spatial

ability tests and Matriculation Aggregate (r = .O43, r = .O82),

suggests tJ-at there is rrore association between spatial ability
and imagery ability than between spatial abitity and general

reasoning. Such a finding would appear to conflict with Downie's

(1966) conclusion that "spatial--type tests are measures of general
intellectual a-bility, and that capacity to form images is a
 63.

separate faculty (p. 751 , and with Pembertonrs (1952) opinion that
spatiat tasks can be done either by imagery or by reasoning.

lftre results of the factor analysis can be compared with those from
a study by Paivio, which te reported in his 1971 book. He found

two factors si¡n-ilar to Factors I and,2. The first factor, which

he labelled Spatial (or FÍq¡ural Transformational) ebility loaded

on Space Relations (.79) and on MPEB (.64). A second factor was

imagrery as defined by sr:bjective reports: it loaded on

QMPFB (.71), rrDQ (.65), QMr (.55) and also on MPFts (.48)-
Ttre sigrnificant loading on botJ: factors may well have been due to

his use of only part of the MPFts test. Four imagery factors
emerged in alt: Factor 3, which was unlabelled, involved PIR, IIDQ' VID
Factor 4, also rrnlabelled, involved PfR and IIDQ.

Perhaps the most important outcome of the present study was that it
confirmed the finding of previous research which had proven difficult
to replicate (Di Vesta, Ingersoll and Sr:nshine, '1I; Richardson, 77) t
that the e>çerience of imaging and imagery manipulation ability
were independent. lltris independence of Factors I and 2 is relevant
to tl¡e central issues of ttre nature and frrnction of imagery, which
were introduced in Chapter I. fhe ex¡rerience of imagery, Factor 1,
\^¡as reported by a1l subjects, which supports Doob's (1972) belief
that imagery appears universally among all peoples, and Marks'
(J-972) view that at least tJle potential for imagery is universal.
Ttre independence of the e>çerience of imagery and the ability to
use an image , Faciuor 2, implies that having an image is not
sufficient for successful performance at an imagery task. For

tasks such as spatial manipulation of an image, an image may be

passively nt.="na but not a fr¡nctional part of tÌ¡e process.
 64.

Ilee independence of the ability to manipulate imagery and general

reasoning ability, Factors 2 and 3, supports the interpretation of the
correlation results: spatial tasks are not a measure of general
intellectual ability, as earlier researchers had argued. Imagery

manipulation is not necessarily done by reasoning.

It may appear redundant to suggest that images are likely to be present

in a task which requires imagery manipulation. Given tJ.e independence
of Factor 2 from both other factors, one would have expected that the
correlation between MPFB and the Questionnaire on how imporÈant

visualization was ín solving the task to have been higher than it was

(r = .176, p = .03). TL¡e síze of the correlation begged t]le question

of imagery as arr epiphenomenon, which later e>rperiments attempted to examine

Tt¡e above findings suggested that the arousal of imagery \âras not a

sufficient condition for the effective us¿of imagery: the mere presence
of an image did not guarantee its useabitity. lllre findings also
indicated that, while people cannot be readily distinguished in their
experience of imageryr they can be distingrrished in their.success in
using imagery. FurtJrermore, although the e>çerience of imagery was not
accessible for objective measurement, ttre use of imagery did appear to
lend itself to experimental measurement.

Thre focus of the research was on the factors which influence the use of
imagery. Itre approach taken in the ensuing e>çeriments was e>çerimentally
to manipulate possible influential factors. As the e>çeriments were
based on a task requiring the use of an image, sr:bjects \^/ere selected on the

basis of their performance on the tests which loaded on Factor 2.

Subjects were classified as high or low imagers on their performance on

both Space Relations and MPFts tests. Thris method of selection was used,

not so that statements could be made about differences in performance of

subjects scoring high and low on these tests, but as a means of maxirnising
the probability that differences in imagery use would occur.
 65.

The comparison of performance of males and fernales produced

some surprising results. As noted earlier, self-reported
measures of imager.y have been found to have a large social
desirabílity component. (Di Vesta, Ingersoll and Sunshine,
L97L¡ White, Sheehan and Ashton, L977). It would be expected,
therefore, that females would score higher on Factor 1.

fndeed, most studies of self-reported imagery since Galtonrs

scale (1883) have found that femates report experiencing
imagery more often than do males. A comprehensive account of
this research is presented by Wtrite, Sheehan and Ashton, (L977).
One possible interpretatÍon of the higher scores for males on
this factor would be that the reporting of the experience of
imagery may not be of dubious vatidity.

very few studies concerned with male-fe¡nale differences in the

use of imagery have not found them. Most report a sex-imagery
lever interaction. The studies have tended to invorve.memory
tasks, requiring either intentionar or incidental recarl. The

general finding has been that high irnaging fernares performed

better than high imaging mares, and that poor visuarizing mares

performed worst of any group, in both types of rearning experiments

(Ernest and Paivio, L97L¡ Marks, L972¡ Sheehan, L9721. Contrary
findings were reported by Lindauer (L972): his high inaging
male subjects perforrned better than high irnaging females.
ìlarks (L972) found no sex differences whatsoever, where the
behaviour in question was a rmnemonic walkt.

It is difficult to discern what the findings from previous research

indicate about sex differ.rr"." in imagery ability, as the
 66.

experiments involved memory tasks, which are not pure tests

of imagery. It is to be expected that females, who are

generally found to have superior verbal abilities, may have

access to other non-imagery techniques in such tasks.
Given the likelihood that verbal as well as imagery techniques

may be helpfut in imagery tasks, it would not be surprising

that females who have the added advantage of high imaging

ability would excel at rnernory tasks

Tt¡e results of the present study cannot be compared on this

question wíth those of other factor analytic studies of a range
of imagery tests; Downiers study (1966) used only males¡ and

Paivio (1971) did not analyse the performance of males and

females separately. There is, howerler, a history of males

perforrning better than females on tests involving imagery

ability (for instance, Swineford, 1948; Adkins and LyerIy,
L952¡ MacFarlane Snith, 1964).

Although no differences were found between males and females

on measures of the ability to manipulate imagery in Ð<periment I,
the general inconclusiveness of the area suggested that a

conservative strategy would be to represent the sexes equally

in the subsequent selection of subjects.
 67.

CHAPTER 5

METHODOLOGY IT: THE EXPERTMENT PROPER

I. TTIE TASK

Traditionally, imagery researchers have a penchant for cutting cubes.

Cube cutting was chosen for this research because it is a mental task

simpre enough to be within the range of imagery abitity for most peopte.
Íhe task involved the use of a memory image, which made for maximum

experimental control in that the experimenter could control the stimulus

on which tJre image required for t̡e task was to be formed. Moreover,
as well as subjective reporting, the task provided objective data in
the form of error and time scores.

One of tl¡e earliest reports of a cube cutting task in imagery research

was by Griffitts (1927) who was seeking evidence of imagery t1pes.
ltlalterrs (1953) e>çeriment employed a simirar task as a means of
classifying subjects as visualisers or not. Subjects were required to
visualise a painted cube being cut into four smaller cubes and to report
how many faces were painted; Tlee simplicity of vilarter's cr-lbe task

probabry accounted for his finding that some subjects who performed
adequately on t-Jee task claimed to have used no visual imagery.
Arternative strategies, using logic or matÌrematics, were equally
available -

sarbin (1972) \iras concerned with the relationship between imaging

and role-p1aying. From an analysis of the derivation and

history of the term 'image', he predicted that imaging

skills would be associated with irnitating and role-playing
skills. His prediction was corifirmed.. The study examined
 68.

fourteen tasks thought to involve imagery, one of which was

a cube cutting task. He asked subjects to image a 3" cube
painted red, to mentally cut the cube into 1" cubesr and

then to decide how many cubes had three, two, one and no
red painted faces.

The early cube cutting experiments classified responses as

correct or incorrect, making the assurnption that subjects had
formed an image which corresponded to that of the experimenterrs'
yet the images involved were internally generated, not related
to external stimulí. It was considered preferable to use a
memory irnage, so that there could be some degree of control of
the image utilisedr at least in terms of stimulus input.

A cube cutting task was reguired which was simple enough to

remove motivation and intelligence as contaminatíng factors,
yet clifficult enough to avoid walterrs problem of alternative
strategies being used. It also had to be sufficiently
difficult to proiluce a range of performance. ft¡e requirements
of a task simple enough for poor imagers to persist with,
yet ilifficult enough to produce errors in most subjects' were

net by the use of a cube with faces painted different colours'

fhe basic stimulus used throughout the following experiments

was a 3r,wooded cuber painted black on two adjacent faces'
white on the other four, and with the inside unpainted (Fig' 5'1)'
IIt¡e task was to cut the cube mentally into 27 snaller cubes and
to answer questions on the number of cubes with particular
combinations of painted black and white faces.
 69.

FIG. 5.1
STANDARD SÎIMULUS

II. TYPES OF DATA

Quantitative data, in the form of objective measures of errors

and time taken vJere recorded. These quantitative data would
allow statements to be made about how successfully subjects
performed the task, and would enable comparisons to be made
between subjects.

Qualitative data took the form of subjects I reports on what their

images were like, how they used them, and what the inaging experience
was lÍke.

Ttre aim was to determine how the two types of data were associated,
and especialty how qualitative differences in imagery related to
performance.
 70.

III. PROCEDURE

(i) Selection of Subiects

Subjects were first, second and third year Psychology
students and first year Archítecture students at the
University of Adelaide. Males and females vJere equally

represented. Their ages ranged from seventeen to nid-forties.

They were selected on the basis of their performance on two

tests of imagery manipulation ability: the Space Rêlations

Test and the lvlinnesota Paper Form Board Test (as described
in Chapter 41.

For all but one experiment, the upper and lower quartiles were

selected to ensure a range of performance. For the experiment

on the effects of practice and traíning (Chapter 1I), aII levels
of imagery ability were included.

Selected students were sent a letter requesting them to

participate in an experiment on mental imagery. They were

free to decline to take part in it. Psychology I students,

however, were required to contribute a specified number of
experimental hours as part of their course. These two factors
resulted in an average response rate of 80E for the following
exper irnents .

(ii) gxperimental Arrangement

The experimental room was unifornly uninteresting: it

was 12 foot square, two levels underground, with a desk and two
chairs arranged on adjacent sides of the desk, no decoration on
 7t.

the warls and no windows to break the monotony. The desk had

a minimum of experfunental apparatus: a cube, scoring sheet,

questionnaire, pen and stopwatch. 1rt¡e key item of apparatus
was a 3" wooden cube, painted black on two adjacent faces,
white on the other fourrwíth the inside unpainted (as in
Ftg. 5.1). Th¡is was referred to as the standard cube and
was the basis for the ensuing experiments.

For each experiment in the serÍes, as werr as the standard

cube, a second cube refrecting the independent variabre was

incruded. For instance, in the experiment concerned with

image size, a smaller version of the standard cube was arso
used. other experiments in the series required additionar
apparatus which will be discussed in the rerevant chapters.
For example, in'the interference experiment, a tape recorder
was praced on the desk for auditory interference, and a sride
projector was placed on a second desk for visual interference.

scoring sheets were used to record responses and times (see

Appendix 7). Ihe other apparatus h¡as a questionnaire asking
subjects to report on their experience during the task, which
will be discussed in the next section (Àppendix g).

(iii) Tt¡e ExpeËiment proper

A double blind procedure was employed, in that the

experimenter did not know the subjectrs rever of imagery abitity
and the subject did not know what type of infornation was of
interest.
 72.

Thre initiaÌ phase enabled ttre subject to become fa¡niliar with

the experimental situation and with the task. He was handed

tJ:e cube a¡¡d asked how many cuts would be needed to cut the
cube into 27 smaller cubes of equal size. Vfhen it had been
established that two cuts in each dimension would be necessary,
and tJ'e subject professed abitity to visualise the dissected
cube, the cube \^ras removed from sight.

In the second phase, the subject was asked to form an image

of the cube. fhe task itself v/as concerned with how many

of the small cubes had certain properties (e.9. one black,

one white face; two white, no black; tlree white faces)
for every possible combination of faces, and some impossible
ones (e.g, three black, no white). In all there were 22
such items- Ttre items were of two tlpes: first were

more general questions about tJ:e properties of the dissected

cube; t.J:e second tlzpe of question asked how many cubes had
specific features or combination of features.

In the t]¡ird phase, the subject was asked a number of

standard.ised questions a,bout the properties of his image
and how he used it: whether the image was divided or had,

to be redivided each time, whether he kept it still or rotated

it while counting, how many faces he could see at any one time,
how many faces he could work with, and for any details he could

provide about what he did with the image during the.task.

(See Appendix 8).
 73.

Trhe above procedure was always followed. In each experiment,

a different independent variable was manipulated. The final

phase for each experiment involved questions releva-trt to tl- at

variable (such as questions about the texture of the image)

and will be presented in the relevant chapters.

The procedure was tested in a number of trial runs- As a

result, it was decided to assist subjects with the first

three items as it appeared that if they answered'-these
incorrectly, they either had not understood the task or
they were working with an incorrect image.

(iv) Scoring of Responses

Responses were recorded by the experimenter. Provision was

made on the scoring sheet (Appendix 7) for a subject to change

his answer (which occurred rarely). ÎIhe scoring sheet also

allowed for ttre noting of any comments by the subject or

observations by the experimenter during the task

Responses were scored as correct or incorrect and the number

of errors totalled. To deter¡nine the correct response to

each question, a cube painted black and white was sacrificed.

llhre time taken to the nearest second was also recofded by the
experimenter, using a stopwatch. The time \das recorded at two

intervals: after the general questions abouÈ the properties of the cut
cube, and ttre total time taken for the task. Because subjects tended

to be either consistently fast or consistently slow, and to

avoid an indigestible amount of data, total time was selectéd
as the dependent variable.
 74.

CHAPTER 6

EXPERIMENT 2 IDIAGE S I ZE

TÌre present experiment was the first of a series concerned

with determining the extent to which images do not behave as
pictures. As presented in Chapter I, the rationale for the

experiment was that if differences in clearly pictorial

qualities of the image are associated with differences in
performance, such a finding would be consistent with the
pictorial viewpoint of imagery and inconsistent with a

propositional one. 1lt¡e finding would also be consistent

with the functionality of imagery, and thus make the
epÍphenomenality case unlikely.

It is generally accepted by imagery researchers, and by some imagery

ttreorists, that images and percepts have similar representations. A

question which follows from ttris assumed-similarity is whether images,

Iike percepts, ,have limits - both spatial limits and linits to the arnount
of information t]:ey can çontain. Studies which have attempted
to deal with this question (e.g. Kosslyn, 1975) have generally
confounded size and complexity of the image as the two features
tend to be correlated. One of the aims of this research,
however, $¡as to consider them separately.

Tt¡e earliest experiments bearing on the question did not describe

their focus in terms of irnage size but in terms of imaged

distance. Kosslyn (1973) had subjects form images of elongated

objects and asked them to.focus either on an end or on the middle
of the inage. His finding of a linear relationship between
 75.

reaction time and distance from probe to focus indicated

that it took time to scan an irnage, as it does for a percept'
and that the greater the dÍstance to be scanned, the longer
tt¡e time needed. this evidence of mental distance was

interpreted as sup¡nrtíng the notion that images have

dimensions.

Lea (1975) combined the technique of chronometric analysis

used by Shepard and aêsociates with the line of inquiry
pursued by Kosslyn. Un1ike Kossllz4rhe did not find that
scanning mental distance took timer and interpreted
Kosslynrs finding as the result of a confusion of distance
with nr¡nber of items to be scanned.

Kosslyn adopted a novel approach to the question of image

size in 1975. He varied image size indirectly by asking

subjects to form an irnage of a fly or an elephant, then to
form a composite irnage of the first animal with another ani¡na1
in relatÍve size. The task required subjects to decide
whetl¡er a certain feature, such as the ears, were apPropriate
for the target animal. Kosslyn found that subjects reguired
more time to respond and made more errors when ttre target
animal was small, that is standing beside an elephant. By

ieversing the sizes of the standard stimuli, that Ís by instructing

subjects to form an irnage of a fty as large as an elephant, he
reduced t̡e likelihood that the size effect could be linked with
the particular stimulus. The possibility that the task was done

abstractly, for example,, by the subject knowing tt¡at it was

inappropriate for a tizard to have ears, was partly countered

 76.

by the fÍnding that true and false responses took the same

amount of time. Some subjects, however, did report

diffículty in consulting their ínage for an answer they
already knew.

Kosslynts explanation for the longer time taken to respond

to a small Ímage was that it had to be enlarged before the
decision could be made. This was suggested by some subjects
reporting that they "often experienced expanding the image,

or rzooming inr on the relevant part of the target animal".

(Kosstyn, 1975, p. 348). The process of enlargement may be
a plausible reason for the longer time taken with the small
stimulus, but it does not account for the larger number of
errors with the small stimulus. one might have expecteä

that the product of the expansion would have been an image

indistinguishable from the comparison one, in size, detail
or any other feature.

A further problem in Kosslynrs experiment was that the value

of errors as meaningfut data was questionable, primarily because

there was no way of ensuring that a subject's image of an animal

was veridical. A subject rnay have been responding accurately
to an inaccurate image.

One consistent finding throughout imagery research is that of wide

individuat differences. Kosslynrs task necessitated a hígh degree
of imagery control: subjects were required to keep both animals

in the image simultaneously, in their respective sizes - perhaps

a task too difficult for u fo* imager. A measure of subjects t

imagery ability would have been useful

 17.

Kosslynrs interpretatíon of his results was restricted by a

possible size-complexity interaction. He could not determine

from these results whether large images were inevitably more

detailed and therefore resulted in less time and less errors.

His attempts to disentangle these two factors witl be

discussed in the following chapter, which is concerned with

image cornplexity.

His finding, that more time was needed to respond to questions

about small images, v¡as explained by Neisser (1976) in terms of
an interference situation. Because largeness and closeness,

smallness and distance, are linked in a system of perceptual

constancies, requiring a subject to focus on something small
means asking him to image something far away and to focus on
it simultaneously - which are contradictory processes.

The experiment which follows was designed to isolate the

possible effect of image size. The difficulties discussed
above were avoided by using stimuli identical except for size,
a task which made the presence of an image very likely,
responses which could be judged objectively to be correct or
incorrectr and by knowing subjects' imagery levels.

}{ETTTOD

The stimuli were two wooden cubes, painted black and white, as

described in Chapter 5. They were identical in all features

except size: one was the standard (3"), the other measured
half an inch. (Fig. 6.I).
 79.

FIG. 6.1
STII{ULI FOR EI(PERIMENT 2 (II'{AGE SIZE)
 79.

Subjects were 104 first year Psychology students. They were

selected frorn both extre¡nes on imagery manipulation ability

on the basis of their scores on the two imagery manipulation
tests, as detailed in Chapter 5 on Methodology. Males.and
females vrere approximately equally represented. HaIf of
the subjects at each imagery level v¡ere given the large
stimulus, half were given the small stj:nulus. There were
26 subjects in each condition.

ftre introduction and task, Phases I and fI, were as outlined

in Chapter 5. The results from Phase III, which was
concerned with techniques for using funagery, will be considered
separately Ín Chapter I0. After the experiment proper,
subjects were asked about their image and their use of it,
in particular the size of their image. Ttrey were asked
to give an indication of how large their image seemed to be.
this was with the help of a ruler, to the nearest
"*pr."""a,
half inch.
 80.

RESULTS

Quantitative differences in imagery IeveI were compared with

quantit.ative differences in performance. The mean error
and time scores for high and low imagers in both conditions
are presented in the following table (Table 6.I).

TABLE 6.1

MEAN ERROR AND TIME RESULTS FOR SUBJECTS OF BOTH

IMAGERY LEVELS IN BOTH STTMULUS CONDITIONS

STIMULUS SIZE LARGE SMALL

SUBJECTS

ERRORS 5.0 4.5

HIGH IMAGERS
TIME (secs. ) 388 343

ERRORS 6.9 8.9

LOW IMAGERS
TIME 560 st2

For fuII analysis of variance table, see Appendix 9: 6.I

Both error and time scores were first transformed to square

root values to satisfy the parametric requirement of the analysis
of variance. The transformed scores were then analysed

using a two-way analysis of variance.

Imagery leve1 emerged as a significant main effect for

errors (F = 37.76¡ I/Loo df , p = .00I) and for time (E = 22.23¡
I/LOO df, p = .00I). High imagers made fewer errors and in
a shorter time. Stimulus size influenced neither error
 8l_.

(F = 1.0I, VL00 df' P = .32) nor time rates (F = .01,

L/L00 df' P = .92).

There was, hoÌ^¡ever, an interaction between imagery level

and stimulus síze, for errors (F = 5.04¡ I/L00 df, p = .03)

but not for time (F = .01, L/rcO df , p = .921 . The perform-

ance of high imagers was unaffected by stímulus size. Low

imagers made more errors when presented wittr a small cube.

Data from the question about image size for the four conditions
are presented in Tabre 6.2. standard deviations are incruded
as there were differences between experimental groups.

TABLE 6.2

MEAN IMAGE SIZE (in inches)

STIMULUS

LARGE SMALL
HIGH 3.9u 3.5"
s = 2.0 s = 3.3
IMAGERY

LOW 3.1r1 2.2"

s = I.4 s = I.2

Tests for homogeneíty of variance indicated that an overall

parametric analysis could not be used to compare reported image

sizes under the two stimulus conditions. Vthile subjects of

both imagery levels reported using a smaller image when
presented with a smaller sti¡nulus (Z = 4.0, p< .00I), Iow

imagíng subjects reported using a sígnificantly smaller image

than did high imaging subjects (Z = 2.2t p< .03) .

 82

The following figure (Fig. 6.2) represents the distributions

of reported image sizes for subjects of high and low levels
of imagery.

HIGH IMAGING SUBJECTS

25
LOW IMAGING SUBJECTS
ll
I
20 I
I
U) I
o
l¡J I
.?
dl 15
f I
U,
I
lr
o I
ct
z 10 I

o 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
INCHES

FIG.6.2

REPORTED IMAGE SIZES FOR SUBJECTS OF HIGH AND LOI{ IMAGTNG ABILITY
 83.

The relationship between reported image size and performance

was examined by correlating image size with error and time

scores. scattergrams indicated that the relationship

between image size and the two dependent variables was

curvilinear. For this reason, a spearman correlation was

used for the ana1Ysis.

There was a significant negative correlation between image

size and errors (t" -.I9, p =.05, N = 104): smaller images

were associated with rnore errors. When high and low imaging
subjects vJere considered separately, it emerged that image

size did not affect the error rate for high imagers
(rs= -.06, p = .65, N = 52). For low imagers, small images

tended to be associated with more errors but the effect did

not reach conventional levels of significance (t" -'19,
p = .17' N = 52) -

Image size did not influence the time taken for the task for
the total group, nor for imagery levels considered separately.
(For fuII correlation results' see Appendix I0)'
 84.

DISCUSS ION

The first noteworthy finding was that the physical property of

stimulus size did not affect performance for the total group
of subjects. High imaging subjects considered separately
performed equally wetl with either size stimulus. Low

imaging subjects, however, performed worse when presented

with the small stimulus.' A feature of their performance

which differed in the two conditions was the reported size of

their images. Whereas subjects of high imaging abitity
appeared to use an equivalent sized image, regardless of
stimulus size, Iow ímagers reported using images which
resembled the stimuli in size.

fhe corretation between inage size and performance indicated

that more errors were made with a smaller image. Such a

finding suggested that the small image may have been Loo small
for the operations which the task demanded' as Kosslyn (1975)
predicted:

"It seems reasonable to suppose that the

criterial procedures associated with various
concepts need a minimal spatial extent upon
which to operate, and are less efficiently
applied to subjectively smaller stimuli".
(P. 343)

There are a number of important distinctions between the

findings of the present experiment and those of Kosslynrs.

Kosslyn interpreted the longer response time for processing
a small image as resulting from subjects needing to enlarge
an image formed sma1l before processÍng could occur. He

could not make any statements about whether a sma1l image

 85.

was more difficult to examine because his subjects did not

examine small images. The present experiment allowed for

such statements to be made because some subjects used a

sma1l image throughout the task. It emerged that a small

image did not take longer to evaluate, but that it was

associated with more errors.

Kosslynrs data were mostly in the form of response times

because of the non-veridical nature of error scores in his
experiment. The present finding, that small images were

associated with more errors but Lhat processing time was

equivalent for small and large images, is easier to interpret

than Kosslynrs result. His finding that more errors were

nade with the small image and that it took more time to
evaluate because the image had to be enlarged is internally
inconsistent in that the two factors of time and error should
have reflected, according to his explanation' a time-error
trade-off. Neither the present experiment nor Kosslynrs found
an inverse relationship between time and error scores.

Why small images should produce more errors, but not take
Ionger to process, is not clear. One possibility is that
successful performance is a matter of ability to use appropriate
techniques, and that investing longer time does not counteract
Iack of ability. This question of the relationship
between time and error will be discussed later in Chapter 12.
 86.

As expected, guantitative differences in imagery leveIs

\^¡ere associated with quantitative differences in performance:
subjects of high imaging ability made less errors and took
less time for the task. The results suggest that this may

have been due in part to the quaritative difference of image

size: when low imaging subjects reported using a larger

image' they made ress errors than when they reported a smarrer
one.

A further qualitative difference vras that there vras significantty

l-ess varíation ín the reported image sizes of low imaging
subjects' as compared with those of high imagers. The finding
suggests that low imaging subjects were using a memory image
of the stimulus, not an image constructed for the demands of
the task. It also indicates that high imaging subjects
could not be persuaded, by the choice offered as part of the
experimental design, to use a small image. Such a finding
supports Paiviors concrusion that subjects are active agents
who will select the most suitable technique for the task,
regardless of instructions. In the present experiment, no
instructions as to image size were given, which meant that
subjects did not have to contend with the possibre interference
of instructions.

The main finding of the experiment, that image size can affect
performance on an ímaginal task, could be considered as
support for the pictoriar view of imagery. rt wourd appear to
be inconsistent with the idea of imagery as an epiphenomenon:

if the image does not serve a function, there wourd be no reason

why a pictoriar feature, such as size, wourd infruence performance.
 81 .

As discussed earlier in the chapter, previous experiments

have tended to confound the effects of image size and
image complexity. The following experiment was concerned

with whether differences in image complexity were

associated with qualitative differences in performance.
 88.

CHAPTER 7.

EXPERIMENT 3: IMAGE COI{PLEXITY

Ttre way in which image complexity influences performance on

an imaginal task is far from clear. In fact, there would

appear to be contradictions Ín the information available

about the issue. For example, the consensus between imagery
researchers (as summarised by Marks I L97 2), is that good
imagers have imagery which is more detailed than that of
poor imagers. By definition, good irnagers have vivid imagery,
poor imagers have weak imagery. Pattern complexity research,
however, would suggest that simple patterns are rated as more
vivid than complex ones. ft would appear that the relation-
ship between the variables is itsetf complex.

This combination of results clearly presents some problems and,

indeed, the generally problematic nature of the area can be

illustrated by consideration of other recent studies. An

experiment by Sheehan (I967) bears directly on the present

research in that it compared the performance of different
imagery levels. It was concerned with the different coding
strategies adopted by high and low jrnagers in reconstructing
stimuli differing in tevel of patterning and complexity.
Sheehanrs prediction was that high imagers would perceive
IiteraIIy and hence recall more details than low imagers who

Iose details in coding. Subjects r^¡ere classif ied as vivid

 89.

or poor imagers on the basis of his shortened version of

Betts QMI (which is a self-rePort measure of the experience
of imageryr âs described in Chapter 4). The stimuli were

patterns of two levels of organisation (regular or random)

and three leve1s of complexity (colour only varied, colour

and shape varied, colour, shape and size varied).

Sheehanrs results, which are presented below, were in the

form of mean inversion scoresr which reflected the extent to

which features of the reproduced image were positioned
differently from the perceived pattern. A low inversion
score indicated that the imaged pattern was similar to the
sti¡nulus in ¡nsition of pattern featuresi a high inversion
score indicated that features in the imaged pattern were
inaccurately pos itioned.

TABLE 7.1

MEAIi INVERSION SCORE

VIVID IMAGERS POOR IMAGERS

LOW 7.2s 4.42

ST]MULUS
MEDIUM 4.50 8.75
CCI4PLEXITY
HIGH 7 .04 7.05

(Sheehan, L967, p. 249).

perhaps the clearest aspect of the results was the different patterns
whích ernerged for vivid and poor imagers. ft¡eir performance with
stimuli of low and medium levels of complexity are reversedr though

both performed badly with stimuli of high complexity.

 90.

sheehanrs interpretation, in keeping with his focus, was in

terms of what these results indicated about the coding
strategies of the two imagery groups: high imagers stored
a literal image; low imagers used a more symbolic encoding
and hence lost details. As Marks (1972) commented on the

above: "The relationship between imagery and complexity

does not aPPear to be a simpte onerr. (p'90)'

The relationship between image complexity and performance in

sheehanrs data emerges more clearly when the patterns for high
and low imagers are considered separately' As the stÍmuli
became more complex, the performance of low imagers declined
and an asymptote was reached. The asymptotic curve could be

taken as suggesting that Lhe relationship between image

complexity and performance was simpler for low imagers than
for high imagers. As the stimuli became more complex' the

task became more difficult, and low imagers performed worse'

thus producing a monotonic relationship. In contrast, the

u-shaped curve for high imagers could suggest that some degree
of complexity is necessary to make their imag.e interesting and
clear, and their performance distinguishable from that of low
imagers. Different coding strategies may operate at low and
medium levels of complexity, but a high degree of complexity

taxed both strategies.

An experiment by Shepard and Feng (L972) on mental paper

folding, though not focused directly on the complexity question,
produced an interesÈing result. Their stimuli were drawings
of flattened cubes, which had to be mentally constructed.
 9r.

IVo of the faces had arrows drawn on them. Subjects I task

was to determine whether the arrows would meet when the cube
was built. The faces which were not folded, but attached

to those which were folded, were referred to by the authors as

rextra baggager. Each item of extra baggage added on between

half and one second to processing time, which was less than
the 1.3 seconds added on for each relevant face. This result
was presented as an interesting side issue. The authors did

not offer an explanation.

One possible interpretation would be that the image used in

problem-solving is not refined to features necessary for the
task, but resembled a memory image. The non-relevant parts

of the image received some attention, though possibly only

enough to judge them as such. one problem in Shepard and

Fengrs design was that the stimuli were physically present

throughout the experiment. Subjects could have minimised
their use of imagery by using alternative methods to do the
task. They night, for instance, even have considered only
a part of the cube at any time, as suggested by the results
for three of their seven subjects.

A study by Neisser and Kerr (1973) raised interesting

possibilties. They compared vividness ratings and recall
for items imaged separately, pictorialty (that is with both
elements combined in one image) and concealed (that is with
one item hidden from view). The pictorial image was rated

as most vivid, tn/ith separate and concealed images receiving

equal ratings. This may be taken as suggestíng that the more

elements represented in an image, the more vivid it witl be.

 92.

A further finding was that recall for both pictorial and

conceafed images was higher than for separate images'

These two findings considered together suggest that images

with tess visible elements are less vivid, but that recall
is not so1ely a function of vividness. Concealed images

had the least number of elements represented in them' but

they had as much information stored about the image as did
the other two. Their experiment thus highlighted a

possible distinction between what is represented in the

image and what information about the image is stored'

Kosslynrs (1975) work, introduced in the previous chapter'

is again relevant here. His concern in later experiments
was to separate image size and complexity, which had been

confounded in his earlier experiments. He attempted to

vary complexity by instructing subjects to image a four ceII

or sÍxteen ceII matrix beside an animal about which questions
were asked. He predicted that, if conplexity of context image was
an important variable, response time would be greater when

evaluating an imaged animal beside a sixteen ceII matrix,

as compared with one beside a four ceII matrix.

This design was based on the notion of limited capacity

for representation. Kosslyn's procedure varied complexity
of total image space, not complexity of the image itself
which was to be evaluated. He found that more tíme was

needed to evaluate an animal imaged next to a complex matrix

(p < .00I) but that it resulted in less errors - a result which

Kosslyn found difficult to interpret: "Fortunately, a simple

 o2

t-test revealed that the difference between mean error rates

for trials with simple versus complex contexts cannot be
distinguished from more random variation (t < I)". (p.354).

Irrespective of this strange conception of the function of

statistical tests, the possibility remains that complex
images could produce less errors. Moreover, his analysis

is questionable in the light of the generally recognised

inappropriateness of t-tests as post-hoc tests following an

analysis of varíance.

Kosslynrs results raise interesting possibilities about whether

complex images do in fact produce less errors and whether this

result would still occur if the image itsetf were made complex,
rather than just having the image space crowded. The fact
that complex images took longer to evaluate indicates that some

processíng of the matrix occurred. It woutd be useful to know

whether subjects were aware of the matrix while answering

Çuestions about the imaged animal. cooper. and Podgorny (1976)

did, in fact, attempt to produce complexity in the image itself.

They varied stimulus complexity in an attempt to distinguish

between the simple propositional model and analogue explanation

of mental rotation task (which is discussed in chapter 13 on

the relationship between physical and mental processes). Their

results did not clarify the issue under ëonsideration.

Their rationale was that if stimulus complexity did not affect

the rate of rnental rotation, then one simple class of
propositional models for,image rotation would be discredited.
 94.

They used six subjects, of unknown imagery level, all of whom

had participated in a previous related experiment. Subjects

were instructed to rotate the stimuli in a clockwise direction.
The stimuli were drawn figures of 5 levels of complexity, in
that they had 6, I, L2,16 or 24 sides (as in Fig. 7.1).

6 8 12 16 24

STIMULI IN COOPER & PODGORNY'S (1976) EXPERIMENT

Fig. 7 .L

The authors found no evidence of a systematic relationship

between stimulus complexity and response times or èrror rates.
Tt¡eir results are presented in the following table. (Table 7.2).

TABLE 7.2

STIMULUSCOMPLEXITY PER CENT

(No. of sides per figure) ERRORS

6 11.58
8 5.62
L2 7.52
16 Lr.27
24 10.95

The interpretation of their resurts was hampered by at reast two

linitations. The first concerns the stirnuri, three of which
(those with 12' 16 and 24 sides) exceeded the known range of
perceptual storage, which made it untikely that images could be formed.
 95.

The authors, apparently aware of the limitations imposed by their

choice of stimuti, comnented on their unpreparedness to extend

their conclusions beyond the type and range of complexity of the
s timuli .

the other lirnit.ing factor in interpreting the results was their

choice of subjects. Subjects were few in number, famiJ-iar
with the type of experiment, and of unknown imagery Ievel.
In view of the consistent differences in performance which have
been found in most research between subjects of different imagery

ability, the absence of this information is unfortunate.

THE PRESE}IT EXPERIMENT

It is not surprising that the overall picture remains unclear when

one considers the many ways in which an image and the use of an

image could vary. Tt¡e amount of detail incor¡nrated in an image

is only one possibte difference. On the basis of some experimental

evídencer ê.9. Sheehan (L967), one could predict that high inagers would
have a detailed, quasi-photographic type of image. All the experiments
considered so far have required reproduction of the total image'
and have left it possibte for the subject to use alternative coding
strateg ies .

One could speculate on how images would differ in complexity in an

image task where the total stimulus was not necessary. One might

expect that high imagers would be in control of their images and

could choose how much of the information presented was relevant
for the task. Low imagers would be expected to have no such
 96.

choice and to have an image of the stimulus as presented.

If indeed high imagers are better than low imagers at discounting
irrefevant details, is this reflected in memory? Are details
not incorporated in the image stitl available for recall?
Do these irrelevant details influence performance on arl

imaginal task?

METHOD

Ttre third e>çeriment raised some of these possíbilities ' by

providing for choice between a simple and complex image.
It was hoped that the range of stimuli used would maxirn-ise

differences in meaningfulness, imageability and memorability,

by including as many different conceptuat and visual dimensionÈ
as was practicable. There were six different items: two
objects. a symbol, a pattern, a letter and a number, each of
which was painted in a different cofour. A greeny-gold
banana and a pink rabbit's face were painted on the þlack
faces of the cube- A red 2, bLack $ blue swastika, and five
brown dots as in a domino pattern \'¿ere each painted on a white
face. It was also thought that this range mighÈ present an

opportunity to discover whether certain types of distractor

stimuti were more likely to be recalled in this context.

Tkre addítional six features made the alternative stimulus most

comparable to stimuli described in previous studies as of medium

complexity. Ihe e>çeriment involved the same basic cube task,

with the stimulus being either the standard plain cube or one of the
same size, witl. the irrelevant features painted on its faces-
(See Fiq. 1.2) .
 96o-

{,ã

# # 4-!

-f94.

FIG. 7.2
STI}{ULI FOR EXPERIMENT 7 (IMAGE COMPLEXITY)
 97.

Subjects were 109 male and female Psychology students, selected

according to criteria previously out,lined. there were 57 high
imagers and 52 low imagers. The groups $rere as follows:
I

TABLE 7.3

NI]MBER OF SUBJECTS IN EACH EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION

STIMULUS SüUPLE COMPLEX TOTAL

SUBJECTS

HIGH
I}4AGERY 32 25 57

LOW
IMAGERY 28 24 52

TOTAL 60 49 I09

Phases I and ff were outlined in Chapter 5. fn Phase III,

subjects were asked whether they were aware of the figures
during the task, whether they tried to use them, and whether
the figures interfered with their performance on the task.
Tt-re! were also asked to recall details of the cube: the figure
on each face, its colour, and the associated background colour.
(Appendix tI) .

I
The slight unevenness in number of subjects per group invites
some explanation. The usual one of subjects being lost in
laboratory fires would be exciting reading, but untrue here.
It proved difficult to manage simultaneously a double-blind
procedure and equal numbers in the four groups. The data were
reanalysed using analysis of variance, randomly discarding excess
numbers to equalise the number of subjects per group, with no
alteration of results. For this reason, and because researchers
deplore wastage, the original numbers were kept.
 98.

Credit was given for each item recalled and for accuracy.
For example, a response that there were seven dots (instead
of 5) scored one point. It was decided to consider only
details recalled spontaneously, as prompting would
have made ít a recognition task, on which high and low

imagers have been found to be indistinguishable. (Slee

I
I L976').

I
Slee (L976) found no differences between high and low
imagers on pattern recognition but significant dÍfferences
on pattern recall, which suggests that 1ow imagers had in
storage quite accurate infornation on the visual features
of patterns. Low imagers did not--have a storage problem
but an alternative coding strategy which was less appropriate
for free recall of patterns. (p. I50).
 99.

RESULTS

Qr¡antitative data in the form of mean error and time rates

for imagery leve1s and stimulus types are Presented in the
following tab1e.

TABLE 7.4

MEAN ERROR AIID TIME RESULTS FOR HIGH AT{D LOW IMAGING
SUBJECTS GIVn{ SIMPLE AND COMPLÐ( ST]MULI

STIMULUS SIMPLE COMPLEX

SUB'fECTS
ERRORS 5.1 3.6
HIGH II4AGBY
TIME (secs. ) 363 374

ERRORS 6.8 6.8

LOW IMAGERY
TIME s49 s56

Thefull analysis of variance tables for error and time

results are presented in Appendix 12: 7,4.

As in the previous experj:nent, error and time scores v¡ere

transformed to reduce skewness in distribution shapes. A

two-way analysis of variance of t̡e transformed scores

showed irnagery level as a main effect for errors (F = 33.49'

I df, p = .O0I) and for time (F = 33'00, I df' P ='00I)'

stimulus comptexity energed as a significant main effect for

errors (F = 5.70' I df , P = '02)' but not for time (F = '17¡
 100.

I df, p = .68). The nain effect for errors, however, may

have been confounded by some degree of an interaction between

Ímagery leve1 and stimulus type (F = 3.03¡ I df , p = 0.09).

A post hoc test indicated that high irnagers made significantly
fewer errors with the complex cube as st'imulus (Student -
Newman-Keuls, p = .05) than they did with the sirnple stimulus.
Low imagers were unaffected by the type of stimulus.

The responses to questions asked in the final- Phase of the

experiment about whether subjects were atr¡are of details on

the cube during the task, whether they attempted to use the
details, and whether the details interfered with the task,
are presented in Table 7.5. Tf:ey are expressed in terms

of the frequency of subjects who answered in the affirmative

to the above guestions.

TABLE 7.5

NLI}4BER OF SUBJECTS üTI1H AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSES

AWARE USE INTER.FERE

HTGH
II\,IAGERS 6 2 0

LOW
IMAGER.S 7 I 2

Statistical analysis was unwarranted to interpret the above.

High and low imagers h¡ere indistinguishable in the frequency

with which they reported being ahrare of details on the cube during
the task. Neither group tried to use the details in solving the
task, nor did they report that the details interfered with task
performance.
 r01. z

il .", i.
:',...''
lhe error and time scores were compared for subjects aware of

the detaits during the task with those not aware. llt¡ere was
no difference betl^¡een them on errors (t = 0.6I' 47 df', P <.2O)
or on time (L = 0.24, 47 df., p < .20). Results vJere not
compared for the other two response categories as the frequencies
were too low.

The following table presents the mean number of det.ails recalled

for figure, colour of figure' colour of background, total
colour r ând total details.

TABLE 7.6

MEAN DETAILS OF COMPLEX STIMULUS RECALLÐ

COLOUR OF COLOUR OF TOTAI TOTAL

FIGURE FIGURE BACKGROUND COLOUR DETAILS

HIGH
IMAGERS 9.64 4.84 9 -L2 13.96 23. 80

LOVù
IMAGERS 9.04 4.46 6. 88 1I.33 20 .38

As the table shows, there were negligibte differences between

imagery levels on mean number of details recalled in the five
categories. The only difference whích could be regarded as

approaching conventional levels of significance was on recall

of background colour' h¡here high imagers recalled more

(t = L.92¡ 47 df, p = .06). For full results of analysis' see

Appendix 13: 7.6
 LO2.

DISCUSS ION

The most striking result is that high imagers made less errors
with a complex stimulus than they did with a simple one (Table
1.41. Tt¡is can be seen as consistent with sheehanrs finding
(:-967) that high imagers performed better with a stimulus of

medium complexity than with one of low complexity, given that

the alternative stimulus in this experiment was most closely
comparable with one of medium complexity. cooper and Podgorny
(:-g76) also reported better performance with a stimulus of

medium complexity (8 and 12 sides) than with simple (6 sides)

or more complex (16 and 24) stimuli. It is the same result
as Kosslyn found (1975) and dismissed as random variation.
The findings frorn Sheehanrs and the present exPeriment would

suggest that subjects in the above two experj¡nents were high

i:nagers.

Despite the surprising lack of corünent by authors on this

pattern, the results invite interpretation in terms of an

optimal level of complexity. As compared with poor imagers

whose performance deteriorated as the task became more complex'

good imagers performed better with a stimulus of medium

complexity than with one of low complexity. Ttris suggests
that an amount of detail may be necessary for an image to be

well-formed and robust. The amount required would be expected

to vary according Lo the task and imagery l-evel of the subject.

The finding that the figures on the cube in the present

experj¡nent enhanced performance, and that peak performance in

cooper and Podgornyrs experiment occurred with an eíght-sideo
figure, suggests that sufficient details to form a definite
 103.

perceptual image may be the optimal amount. It could

weII indicate a further similarity between image and percept.

An interesting distinction between the results of this

and Kosslynrs experiment was that he found that the complex

image took longer to evaluate, whereas no time difference

was found here. A possible explanation for his finding

of longer processing time is that his experiment involved
a crowded image space rather than a complex image. It is
possible that the 16 ceII matrix could have been a distraction
which interfered with image processing.

The finding in the present experiment that the performance

of low imagers was unaffected by stimulus complexity in either
error or time rates provides further support for the developing
case that the imaginal processes of high and low imagers are
qualitatively different. This difference is aII the more

impressive when one considers the equivalence of the two

imagery groups in their reports of subjective experiences
during the t,ask. Neither group reported being avrare of the
figures on the cube, of trying to use the fígures, or of the
figures interfering with task performance. According to
their accounts irunediately following the experiment, subjects
used an image with only task relevant details, that is, with
two black and four white faces.

.If this were in fact the case, the images of subjects in the

complex st.imulus condítion should have been indistinguishable

from the images of subjects in the simple stimulus condition.

 104.

Íhe equivalence of error and time results for both stimulus conditions
suggests that tfiis may have been so for low imagers. Tfhe equivalent

tíme taken by high imagers in processing simple and complex stimuli

further supports their reports. TLre significant difference in
errors for high imagers, however, suggests ttrat more may have been
involved in t̡e processes than subjects realised, or could report'

No major differences emerged between imagery groups in their recall of

details (Table 7.6) . They were equivalent on the number of figures

and colour of figures recalled. It is perhaps unfortunate that the

extraneous details chosen may not have been difficult enough to

display any differences between imagery levels in recall. The finding of

a difference in recall of background colour may be taken as suggesting

that it would have been profitable to have included more difficult

details.

ILre one difference found between the groups in recatl of colour is in

keeping with findings of early experiments by Kuhlmann (1907) and

Fracker (f9OB). fhese researchers also found that subjects with
high imagery ability had better recall for visual forms, which was

not found in t]1e present experiment. Carey's (I9I5) results were

different again: his high imaging subjects were superior neittrer in
their recall of figures nor of colour-

The research on incidental versus intentional recall would predict a

higher recall rate for high imagers on such details. Subjects could

have expected to be asked to recall the figures, and perhaps their

colour, but may not have attended to the background colour. The

results obtained here support Sheehan's finding ttrat high imagers store
a literal image whereas to* i..g.rs code more verbally and hence lose

details
 105 _

This set of results v¡ould suggest that the image in problem solving
tasks is not quite a memory image, nor a reconstructed perceptual image'
but something more like the product of a decision-making process on

which features are relevant to the task. Thris implies some degree

of control over what the image will be like, for both levels of imagery
ability. The finding that discarded informatíon is still available for

recall suggests that other kinds of processing may be taking place

simultaneously. Íhe extent to which these two processes inter-
relate cannot be inferred from tl.e data available'

Ttreonly influence stimulus complexity had on performance was that it

reduced the error rate for high imagers. Few subjects reported using

a complex image for tl.e task. The irrelevant details, while onritted

from the image and stored, appeared not to interfere wit]- perfolmance'
Threse findings suggest that high imaging subjects may be more motivated

by a complex stimulus to form a robust image, and that all subjects

refine their image to the requirements of the task'

In terms of the theoretical implications of these findings, the results

for low imaging subjects are 'simpler'. Low imaging subjects presented

with a complex stimulus formed a simple image. Task irrelevant details

were not included in the image, but were stored and were availal¡le for

recall. subjects presented with the complex stimulus had more information
stored about t].e image than did subjects presented with the simple
stimulus. Yet the performance of low imaging subjects in simple and
complex stimulus conditions \^7as ind.istinguishable in both performance

accuracy and time taken- Such a finding suggests support for the

pictorial view of imagery in that performance appears to be influenced

primarily by pictorial features of the image'
 ro5 (a)

Ttre irnplications of the results for high irnaging subjects are

ambiguous: they are open to interpretation as consistent with

either theoretical account of imagery. support for the propositional
account could be drawn from the finding tJeat, despite all subjects
reporting simple images, the performance of subjects in simple and

complex stimulus conditions was distinguishabte in accuracy. fhe

results of previous research, however, would Suggest that more complex

stimuli produce more robust images, and hence superior performance'
fhe superior performance of high ímaging sr:bjects in the complexity
condition could tllus be seen as the result of a more definite image

and, consequently, as consistent witl. the pictorial account of

imagery.
 106.

CHAPTER 8

EXPERIIvTENT 4 Z THE EFFECT OF PHYS ICAL IMPOSS IBILITY

ON AN IMAGINAL TASK

The previous experiment was concerned with the extent to

which physical details intruded i¡rto an imagínal task.
The finding that high imagers performed differently when

presented with a complex stimulus, despite their reports

of simple images, suggested that there may be parts of
the imaging process to which'they do not have access.
The stimulus in Experiment 3 contained details which were

irrelevant to the task but not antagonistic to the Processes

involved in the task. One could predict that, if the image

does represent the object, then associated properties of the

physical entity could be transferred into the irnage.

Alternatively, physical properties which are detrimental or

cumbersome could be avoided in the transition from perceptual

image to problem-solving image.

Experiment 4 pursued these two issues. It was concerned with

whether subjects could' at a conscious ]evel, monitor out of

their irnages antagonistic information, and if they could'
whether this information would stiII interfere with the task.

Gordon (1949) appears to have pioneered research on the control

of imagery by her test in which she asked people to imagine a

car enduring various mishaps and continuíng as though the

 107.

mishaps had not occurred. The test measured the extent to

which people could control their imagery and remove from it
features which would interfere with the task. rn Gordonrs
test, the car could not continue on its way unless the subject

could remove from his image damage incurred at various stages.

The importance of control as a key factor of imagery ability has

been greatly undervalued, according to Richardson (L9721. He

considered inadequate any measurement of imagery ability which

did not include a measure of imagery control.

there is evidence that high imagers tend to have not only

more vivid images, but more control over their images.

(Richardson, L972). One could expect that, because of this

control, they would be able to omit from their images any

feature which would increase the difficulty of the task.

As funplied in the results of the previous experiment, however,
omítting features from an image need not obviate their effects.

Studies of the possible transfer of physical difficulties into

an imaginal task are scarce. Neisser and Kerrrs (1973) study,
which was discussed in the previous chapter may have some

relevance. Their study of the difference in recall and

vividness ratings of separate, pictorial and concealed images

found that pictorial and concealed images were equivale4t in

recall and more tikely to be recalled than items irnaged

separately. A possible interpretation, which is consistent

with the finding of Experiment 3, was that images may have

contained more information than was represented in them.

The concealed image depicted what could have been seen, had
 I08.

the objects been physically presenL. The result may be of

interest here in that, while it was physically impossible to

perceive some of the items, the hidden information nonetheless
influenced performance.

The research of Shepard and associates on mental paPer folding

has some bearing on the guestion in that their approach

assumed the imaginal process to be analogous to the physical
process. Their work will be discussed in depth in a later
chapter, which is concerned with the relationship between

physical and imaginal tasks. (Chapter 13).

The following study was concerned with these two issues:

couLd subjects control out of their image antagonistic

information, and if they could, would such information still

influence performance. A sugar cube was chosen as suitable
stimulus to examine whether the difficulties involved in
physical maniputation would be transferred to mental manipulation.
A direct comparison could not be made with previous sÈudies, as

a thorough examination of the literature, full as it is of cut

cubes, found none which were made of sugar.

The experiment was concerned with whether the difficulty of

physically cutting a sugar cube into 27 smaller cubes would

be carried over into the imaginal task, or whether the

problem feature of the stimulus, its texture, would be

omitted from the task. On the basis of the results of

previous experiments in the seríes, it was expected that
high imagers would be able to select task relevant information
to incorporate into their image, while low imagers would be more
 I09.

incllned to use a memory inage of the sti¡nulue.

METTTOD,

Experi¡nent 4 was concerned with the extent to whlch the

qualitatlve difference of texture could fnfluence performance

of an irnaginat task. iftre apparatus was two small cubee, each

measuring half an ínch. One was woodenr painted black and

whíter ând ytas a s¡nal}er version of tt¡e standard cube. l[t¡e

other rùas a sugar cube, painted black on tYto adJacent faces

and red on the other four.

STIMULI FOR EXPERIMENT 4

Ftg . 8.1

Tt¡e ínslde of the Eugar cube was left white. lft¡e cubes

resembled each other ín size, ln havlng two black adjacent

faces, and in having the inside left the colour encountered
most frequently. They differed only in that the eugar

cube had red as tl¡e contrast,ing colour. llhere was nothfng

to euggesÈ that substituting red for white would have any
effect on the task.
 r10.

A total of 92 subjects were selected on the same basis as

for previous experiments. luenty three high and twenty three

Iow imagers were ptaced in each stimulus condition.

The procedure for Phases I and II was as prevíously outlined.

In Phase III of the experiment, each subject ín the sugar ,cube

condition was asked whether he considered it physically possible

to cut the cube ínEo 27 smaller cubes with an ordinary knife.
For the sake of would-be scientists among the subjects, ít was

emphasised that the sugar cube I4Ias being cut by a knife and

not using advanced equipment, such as a laser beam. He was

also asked whether the inage he used in the task was a sugar
cube.

RESULTS

llLre mea¡r error and time rates for the four groups are presented
in ttre following tabIe.

TABLE 8.

MEAN ERROR AND TIME SCORES FOR HIGH AND I.OVü

II"IA@RY SUBi]ECTS IN WOOD AND SUGAR CUBE CONDTTTONS

STIMT]LUS WOOD SUGAR

SUBJECTS

ERRORS 4.6 3.2

HIGH
IMA@RS
TI¡,IE ( secs) 337 381

ERRORS 9.r 8.0

LOVü
TMA@RS

TIME (secs) 548 726

 rt1.

As in the previous two experiments, scores were transformed to

meet tÌte requirements of the analysis of variance. For full

analysis of variance table' see Appendix 14.I:8'l'

A two-way analysis of variance sho\n¡ed that stimulus type and imagery

leve1 were main effects for both errors and time. Less errors were

made with the sugar cube (F = 5.79, I df , p¿.02) and longer time
was taken (F = 5.65' 1 df, p = 'o2)' As in the previous experiments'

high imagers made less errors (E = 52-23, I df, p = .001) in less

time (F = 38.52, 1df, P = .OOI)-

In contrast to the previous two experiments, there \¡¡as no interaction

between imagery level and stimulus type for errors. fh¡ere was

some interaction between them for time (F = 1.87' I df, p = .175)

which was further analysed using a student-Newman-Keuls post-hoc
test. Low imagers took significantly longer to do the task with
the sugar cube as stimulus than with the wooden stimulus (p 4.05) .

Ttrere was no difference in time taken by high imagers under the

truo conditions.

In phase III, subjects were asked whether they thought it physically

possiJcle to cut tl:Ie sugar cube into 27 smaller cubes with a knife'
AlI but one of each imagery level considered it inpossible-

Tfhe final question subjects were, asked was whether their image was

of a sugar cube. Ttris produced some variety of response, as shown

in the following table.

 tr2

TABLE 8.2

NUMBER OF SUBJECTS WHO REPORTED USING

A SUGAR CUBE IMAGE

SUGAR IMAGE YES NO

SUBJECTS

HIGH
IMAGERY 2 2L

LOW
IMAGERY 7 16

In spite of the small number of respondents in both groups

using an image of a sugar cube, the difference between high

and low imagers approach conventional leveIs of significance
on a Fisher Exact test (p = .067), which suggests that there
may be a greater tendency for low imagers' as compared with
hígh imagers, to have a sugar cube image.

The performance of subjects who reported using an image of a

sugar cube was compared with those who reported an image not
made of sugar. Table 8.3 presents the mean error and time
scores totalled across imagery leveIs.

TABLE 8.3

PERFORMANCE OF SUBJECTS USING SUGAR AND NON-

SUGAR CUBE IMÀGE

IIVIAGE SUGAR CUBE NON SUGAR CUBE

I\ÍEAN SCORES

ERRORS 6.9 5.3

TIME
(secs. ) 74L 5r0
 113.

Ihe difference in errors between sugar cube users and non-

sugar cube users dÍd not reach significance (! = 1.07, 44 df,
p> .20). The difference in time, however, in favour of
subjects not using sugar cube irnage' was significant
L = 2.16, 44 df' p < .05) .

Tt¡e final analysis compared performance of subjects who

claimed not to have used a sugar-cube image with that of

subjects in the wooden stimulus condition. According to
their reports, both groups of subjects used a textureless
'abst¡actr image. The performance of high and low imaging
subjects are considered separately. trable 8.4 presents the mean

error and time scores for subjects in both stimulus conditions

who reported using identicaL iL-.ages.
TABLE 8.4
OF SUBJECTS Ii{ BOTH CONDITIONS
PER¡'OR¡/JANCE

REPORTTNG IABSTRACTI IMAGE

STIMULUS wooD SUGAR

SUBJECTS

ERRORS 4.6 3.2 *

HIGH TMAGERY
TI¡48 (secs. ) 337 368

ERRORS 9.r 7.9

LOW IMAGERY
TIME 548 696

ERRORS 6.7 5.3 **

rOTAT
TIME 428 510 **

* p..05
** p<.02
 r14.

An analysis of variance on transformed scores showed imagery level,

once again, as a main effect for both errors 1p <"0O1) and time
(P < -oO1) - (APPendix 14 '2: 8'4)

Despite subjects reporting that they were using an abstract image '
the type of stimulus with which they had been presented also
influenced performance. subjects who had been presented with a

sugar cube stimulus made significantly fewer errors (p = .oz) and

took significantly lonqer to do the task (p = 'O3) '

fhere was no interaction between imagery level and stimulus type for
errors. There \^las some suggestion, however' of a possible inter-
action between imagery level and stimulus tlpe for time (p = .08) '
with low imaging subjects tending to be more hampered by the sugar
cube stimulus than were high imaging subjects'

DISCUSSION

subjects of bot]- high and. low imagery levels made less errors with
the sugar cube as stimulus and took longer for the task (ta¡te 8'I) '
In the two experiments previously reported' high and low imagers
tended to differ in ttre extent to which the stimulus influenced their
performance. Íhre pattern I^Ias that low imagers \^rere more likely to

beaffectedbystimulusproperties'sltggestingthat,unlikehigh
imagers, they could not choose the information content of their
images. In Experiment 4, the stimulus property which was varied
affected the error rates of high and low imaging subjects similarly.
Tlrere a tendency, however , for low imagers to be more adversely
r^¡as

affected than were high imagers in the time taken for the task'
 115.

Ttre check on subjects' acceptance of the task as physically

impossible indicated equivalence between the two irnagery levels -

Ttris was consistent witl the finding that, generally, the sugar
cube stimulus seemed to influence them similarly'

Hypotheses to account for the longer processing time produced by

the sugar cube stimulus are not hard to find. Factors such as

novelty and interference readily present themselves. Possible

explanations for the association of the sugar cube stimulus with
reduction in errors are not so apparent. Perhaps it is for the
Same reason aS in the previous experiment where the complex stimulus
was associated with less errors, ror high inagers at least. fLLe

interpreÈation suggested Èhere may also apply here: features over

and above ttre basic cube features necessary for the Èask may have

made the stimulus more interesting, the image more robust, and

concentration more intent. It is evident that further research

is needed on these Points.

Tlee sugar cube stimulus, according to reports, did not produce a

sugar cube image for most subjects. (Table 8.2) More low imagers

than high imagers, however, did employ a sugar cube image for the
task. fhese sr:bjects were trling to do with an imaginal replica
of the stimulus sometJring which they believed could not be done

with the physical stimulus. To realise that the sugar cube could

not be cut as explained was perhaps in itself a test of imagery

ability.

It is also worth noting that when the performance of those subjecÈs

who used a sugar cube im4ge was compared with the performance of

those who did not' t].Ie former group took longer time for the task'
 116.

though they did not make significantly more errors. (Table 8.3)

Such a finding bears directly on the question of the extent to

which differences in the pictorial qualities of an image affect

performance. All but two subjects understood the task to be

physicallyimpossible,whichsuggeststhatthedifferencebetween
tlresugarcubeimagersandthenon-sugarcubeimagerswasnot
their und.erstanding of the problem. Most subjects reported using
an image of a cube that was wit̡out texture, that was almost a'bstract'
The descriptions given by subjects of their images in both stimulus

groups \^/ere generally indistinguishable, as happened in the

previous experiment- Yet t]le performances of subjects reporting

similar images were distinguishable: in time tal<en (p = .03) and
in errors made (p = -O2). (Table 8'4)

It would appear that some a\^Tareness of the task as physicäIly

difficult was transferred into the imaginal task for all subjecÈs '

lfhrose who incorporated the sugar texture into their image performed
Ì¡rorse tJean subjects who had the information stored but not represented

in the image.

fhreresultsofthise>rperimentextendthoseoftheprevioustwo
in that they support the notion that information about the image,
thoughnotÏepresentedinit'caninfluenceperformanceonan
imaginaltask.Mostsubjectsclaimedtohaveusedanimagenot
made of sugar, yet their performance differed in
errors and time

from that of subjects presented with the wooclen stimulus'

Íhe results of tJris experiment, taken together with those of the

previoustwo,wouldsuggestthatsomefeatures,suchasimagesize
 117.

and irrelevant details, are more easily controlled than others.

lÍhrus, image size and irreLevant details appeared to be r¡¡¡der the

control of high imagers, \ô¡hereas E>çeriment 4 suggested that

texture is an intransigent feature.

The above finding could be interpreted as providing support for

both t-heoretical accounts of imagery. llhre pictorial stance coul-d

claim it as evidence that differences in pictorial qualities of an

image influence performance. Equally, it could be argued from the

same finding that, given an identical image, a subject's
appreciation of the demands of a task influence performance.

Because it could be further argued, however, that the task of

cutting a sugar cube presents difficulties physically and not

conceptually, it would follow that the propositionist account

would not necessarily predict a difference in performance between

the two stimulus conditÍons. It would appear, at this stage, to
be marginally easier to interpret the findings so f,ar in terms
of the pictorial account of imagery.
 118.

CHAPTER 9

EXPERIMENT 5 EFFECT OF INTERFERENCE

The experiments in the series so far have found that differences

in pictorial qualities of an image are associated with

quantitative and qualitative differences in performance of an

image task. Such findings invite interpretation in terms of

the functionality of an inage. The presence of these pictorÍaI

differences in the image would be expected to influence

performance only if the image per se were performing a function.
Moreover, the result that some of these associated differences
were qualitative supports the interpretation of the image as

functional. These findíngs could be taken as evidence against

Neisser ts view that imagery is a cognitive luxury, rather like an

illustration in a novel.

ft may weII be that for certain types of cognition, an image

accompanies the thinking process but does not contribute directly
towards that process. It is equally likely that there are

cognitive tasks which depend on imagery as the sole method,

or at least the most efficient method, of solution. Problem

solving tasks, such as the cube-cutting task in this research,

nright be an example.

Experiment 5 was concerned with providing direct evidence for

the functionality of imagery in this type of task. The

experiment was modelted on those concerned with the relationship

between ímaginal and perceptual processes, as reviewed in Chapter 2
 rl9 .

TlzpicalIy, these experiments involved simultaneous imaginal

and perceptual tasks, in compatible and incompatible modalities.

The first of the recent studies bearing on the question was by

Brooks (1967): he found that the act of reading interfered
with a task only when visualization appeared to be involved
in the task. In a later experiment (1968), he examined the
influence of response mode on spatiat and verbal memory tasks.

The spatial task required subjects to image a block letter'

e.9. F, and to indicate whether the successive corner points
of the letter were extreme, top or bottom, or whether they were
points mid-way. Tt¡e results indicated that the mode of
response did affect task performance: subjects performed

\,¡orse when required to indicate their resPonse by pointing

torYest or tNot on an answer sheet, than when required to
give a verbal response. Brooksr conclusion was that a visual
image task must utilize some of the same processing mechanisms

as are involved in perception. In contrast, he found that a

verbal response did not interfere with an imaging task which

he interpreted as indicating that different mechanisms were
involved.

A series of experiments on the relationship between irnaging

and perceiving vJas carried out by Segal and colleagues.
(SegaJ- and Glicksman, L967¡ Segal and Gordon, 1969); Segal

and Fusella, 1969, 1970). Theír consistent finding was that

imagery interfereit with signal detection, which they interpreted

as confirming Perkyrs result that imaging and perception share
some processing mechanisrns.
 I20.

An alternative interpretation of the results, in terms of

attentional overload, was tested in an experiment by SegaI
and FuseIIa (I9?0). They compared the effect of imaging in

a compatible modality with imaging in an incompatible

modality. Their results were that discrimination vJas poorer

during imaging, especially when perceiving and imaging were

in the same modality, and especiatly for less familiar items.

The finding that the signal detection sensitivity was reduced

during imaging, even when signal and image were not in the
same modalíty, suggested that attention was a contributing
factor. The explanation in terms of distraction, however,

could not account for the finding that the interference was

greatest when signal and image were in the same modality.

The authors accepted as a possible interpretation of their
results that signal and image compete for channel space,
which would be consistent with Broadbentrs model (1958) of
Iimited channel capacity. The explanation they preferred

was that the image is an internal signal which becomes

confused with the external signal.

Later experiments have extended these basic findings. Atwood

(I969), for instance, demonstrated selectÍve interference for

mnemonic imagery and more abstract conceptual mediation.
Salthouse (I974) found that the recall of nonverbal visual
stirnuli was inpeded by intervening spatial tasks but not by

intervening verbal tasks. Janssen (l-976) found the same

phenomenon occurring in paired-associate learning tasks.

 L2L.

An exception to the generally consistent resufts \^Ias an

experiment by Kosstyn, Holyoak and Huffman (1976) which

examined the effect of two types of interference on the

verbal and visual encoding of words. Vlhile tÌ.ey found

that acoustic interference reduced recall of verbally
encoded words, no reduction was found in recall of imaged

words, following visual interference.

TTTE PRESENT EXPERTMENT

The generally consistent finding from previous research has been

that imaging and perceiving are mutually disruptive, especially

when they oco]r in the same modality. It was predicted'

therefore, that if the cube-cutting task involved imagery, visual

interference would be more detrimental to performance than
interference in another modality-

Experiment 5 compared the effects of visual and auditory interference

on performance:of the cr:be-cutting task. Ttre rationale was that,

if visual interference resulted in more disruption of the imagery

task than did auditory perception, such a finding would also be
consistent with the pictorial account of imagery. It would' suggest

that the pictoriat features of the image \^tere necessary for task
performance. such a finding would be incompatible with the

epiphenomenal view of imagery-

Prepar ation of Interference Material

A possible difficulty in interpreting previous experiments on

t].is topic is that imaging in visual and auditory modalities

may not be equally receptive to interference. Paivio (L972)

holds that the superiority of imagery as a factor in memory

could suggest that images are generally less vulnerable to the

 r22.

effects of interference than are verbal processes, possibly

because of their distinctiveness as figural units. While

such an issue is not the concern of the present research, it

was necessary to select visual and auditory signals which

could be considered equally disruptive to an imaging task.

A task was needed which involved simultaneous visual- and

auditory imagery, against which both forrns of interference

could be made equivalent. A suitable choice was found to
be a task devised by Brooks (1968).1 Subjects were required
mentally to repeat the alphabet, and to indicate verbally which
Ietters had curves in their block-letter form. The task thus

involved auditory and visual j-mages.

In thís experiment, visual interference was provided by slides of

black and white perceptual illusions and soma cubes which were
projected onto a screen during the task. (Appendix 15). A

cassette tape of segments of radio talk-back shows, advertisements,

music and news flashes provided auditory interference. (Appendix 16).

Seventeen volunteers from among colleagues, other University staff

and students assisted in the calibration. While performing the

task, subjects adjusted the rate of slide presentation and the
volume of the tape to levels they considered egually disruptive to

the task. Th¡e rnoÇal rate of slide presentation and tape volume
was then utilized in Experiment 5. The calibration was thus set

in advance for all subjects.

I The task was referred .to in a paper presented at the 196g

Psychonomic Society Conference held at Niagara FaIIs.
 I23.

METHOD

Experiment 5 utilised the basic cube-cutting task. There

were three experimental conditions: two involved interference,

one visual, one auditory; and the third hras a control group.
The experimental design was to compare subjectsr performance on
an initial non-interference trial with their performance during
interference. Each interference group was thus attempting the

task for the second time. To allow for the effect of repeated

performance at the task, a control group was included. It was

expected that the control group would perform better on the

test tríal than on the initial trial because of some familiarity
with the task. It was also expected that the advantage of task
familiarity for the interference groups would be countered by
the disadvantage of the interference.

Subjects of high and low imagery level-s who had participated in

an earlier experíment at least ten months before were invited
back. They were assigned to experimental conditions Ín such

a way that the groups were equivalent on initial performance of

the task. Equivalence was established using one way analysis
of variance for errors (F = .0I0, df = 2, p =.990) and for
time (F = .055' df = 2, P = .947). (See Appendix 17).

There were 20 subjects in each group, I0 of each imagery level,

in each of the three conditions.

The standard procedure was followed for aII groups, with one

exception. Before Phase II began, subjects in both interference

conditions were instructed to attend to the slides or tape as they
 L24.

would be asked about them later. It was stressed that the

ongoing activity was an important part of the experiment and

that they must attend to it.

 125.

RESULTS

The performance of subjects on the initial (non-interference)

trial was compared with their performance on the test
(interference) triaf for errors and time. (Table 9.I).

TABLE 9.I
PER.EORMANCE ON TRIALS UNDER VTSUAL INTERFERENCE,
AUDITORY TNTERFERENCE AND CONTROL CONDITIONS FOR
HIGH AND LOW IMAGING SUBJECTS

MEA}I ERRORS

CONDTTION VISUAL INT. AUDITORY INT. CONTROL

TRIAL INITIAL TEST INITIAL TEST INITTAL TEST

SI'BJECTS
HIGH IMAGERY 3.5 3.8 4.L 3.0 3.5 2.5
LOVS IMAGERY 8.0 8.0 7.4 6.0 7.6 4.2
TOTAL 5.8 5.9 5.8 4.5 5.6 3.4

MEAN TIME (in secs. )

CONDlTION VISUAL INT. AUDITORY INT. CONTROL

TRlAL INITIAL TEST INTTTAL TEST TNITIAL TEST

STJBJECTS

HIGH I}4AGERY 345 324 422 268 326 268

LOW IMAGERY 604 607 s95 386 6s9 408

TOTAL 474 466 508 327 492 338

Tt¡e results were analysed using analysis of variance for three

factors, with repeated measures on one factor (trials), as

recommended by Wíner (L962'r.. For fuII analysis of variance

table, see Appendix 18: 9.I.
 l-26.

As occurred in each experiment of the Series, imagery level emerged

as a main effect for errors (F = 35.111-, I/54 df , p'-01) and for

time (F = 26.24'7, L/54 d.f, P (,0r) .

The difference in performance between trials was also significant:

on the test trial, subjects made less errors (r' : ro -544, L/54 d'f ,
p <.Ol) in less time (F = l,2-955, I/54 ð'f , P <.Ol) '

Ihere was no overall difference in performance between Visual

Interference, Auditory Interference and Control conditions. It \^/as

to be e>çected that condition would not emerge as a significant main

effect as subjects of each imagery level were matched on their
perfoÏTrlance on the initial trial . Despite the fact that such a
matching procedure coútd be expected to cl-oud any interaction effects,
however, there was some suggestion of a three-way interaction between
imagery level, trial and condítion-

To examine whether an interaction did exist, the performance of botlt

groups of subjects, under the three conditions, on both trial-s, was

analysed using a Student-Newman-Keuls post-hoc test'

It was found that, on the test trial, high imaging sr:bjects made

significantly more errors in the Visual Interference condition than

did high imaging subjects in either Auditory Interference or control

condítions. Low imaging subjects on the test trial also made signif-

icantly more errors in the Visual Interference condition than in

either Auditory Interference or control conditions. l,ow imaging

subjects, however, on the test trial performed significantly !'¡orse

under Auditory Interference than under controf conditions. fhre

 r2t.

performance of hígh imaging subjects under Auditory Interference,

in contrast, was indistingruishable from ttreir performance when merely

repeating the task under control conditions.

Ttris post-hoc analysis suggests that Auditory Interference l^zas more

disruptive to the accuracy of performance of low imaging subjects

than it was to high imaging subjects- Hígh and low imagíng subjects

took significantty longer to do tlre task during visual interference-

Thre time taken by each imagery level during auditory interference \^las

indistinguishable from the time taken when repeating the task under
control conditions. TLre above effects all reached .05 level 0f
significance.

TLrese results indicated ttrat both high and low imaging subjects
performed best when merely repeating the task, and worst when repeating
the task during visual interference- Thre performance accuracy of low

imaging subjects only was hampered by auditory interference.

 I28.

DISCUSS ION

A criticism of earlier interference experiments which Segal

and FuseIIa (1970) sought to dispel was that the results could

be accounted for equally well in terms of distraction as of

signal confusion. The present results support Segal arrd

Fusellars conclusion that distraction plays a less influentÍ-al

ro1e. Sega1 and Fusellars finding of a larger disruption for
isomodaf interference is consistent with that of the present
experíment. The finding frorn the present experiment that
auditory Ínterference influenced the performance only of low

imaging subjects provides further support for the signal

confus ion interpretation.

ft can be assumed from the results that visual imagery was

involved in the cube cutting task, as visual interference

caused ¡nore disruption to the task than did auditory interference.
This occurred for both levels of imagery, and apparently. to an

equivalent degree.

Once again, high and low imaging subjects were gualitatively

distinguishable in their performances. Auditory interference
influenced the performance of low imagers, but was ineffective
in influencing the performance of high imagers. This could
índicate that auditory interference made it difficult for low

imaging subjects to gain any assistance from non-imagery

techniques they may have tried to employ. If, as is likeLy,

the high imagers were solving the task using imagery, then
auditory verbal processing would not be expected to have involved
the same mechanisms.
 r29.

As for all the previous experiments in the series, the present

results provide further evidence that the imaging processes for
high and low imaging subjects are qualitativety different. The

previous inLerference experiments reviewed did not take into

account the level of imagery ability of the subjects. The

findings here reinforce the necessity of knowing the level of

subjects' imagery ability in all areas of imagery research.

The control group overall performed better on the test trial than
on the initial trial: they made less errors and took less time.
TL¡is was to be expected as the task would have had some familiarity.
this difference between trials was significant only for low imaging
subjects. For high imaging subjects the improvement was not
sufficiently large to reach conventional levels of significance.
Ttris may well have been because high imagers performed adoquately
on the initial trial, which meant less scope for improvement.

When the performance of high imaging subjects on the test trial

was compared with thaL of high imaging subjects in the other two

conditions, the tendency was for the control group to make less

errors.

In contrast, the low imagers performed badly on the initial run.

Íheir improved performance on the test run would suggest that
they may have developed some appropriate techniques for the task
during their first attempt. The nature of these rappropriate'
techniques is the concern of the followíng chapter.
 130.

CHAPTER ]- O

TECHNIQUE S USED TO SOLVE TTTE IMAGERY TASK

În the preceding experiments differences in imagery were

expected from three sources: the experimental stimuli,
subjects I level of imagery abilityr ând their choice of
techniques. The experiments were designed in such a way
as to increase the likelihood of differences energing in
the pictorial qualities of an image. This was done by

varying the size, details, and texture of the stimulus on

which the image could have been expected to be based.

The selection of subjects from extremes on imagery manipulation

ability made it Iike1y that quantitative differences in
performance, ín terrns Of time and error scores, would also Occur.

The final source of qualitative differences was expected to be

the way in which subjects chose to use their images. This

could include the properties of the Ímages, not suggested by

the experimental procedure, and the strategies used by subjects

in solving the task. Some of these choices could be variations
ín imaging techniques used by subjects to help them with the task'
while others couLd be differences in 'imaging styler. This

third possibte source of variation was examined to discover

whether it too was reflected in performance on the task.
 t3r.

One distinction tlat has been made about imagery has been on an

activation dimension. Paivio (1971) and Byrne (I9741, for

exarnple, distinguished two types of representational processes

as static and dynarnic. Their experiments, and therefore their

descriptions, were concerned with the processes involved in
generating and scanning images. The scanning process may not
compare with the evaluating process Ín the present experiments.

Other researchers, such as Anderson (f973) and Bugelski (L970'),

have argued that the idea of image as entity should be replaced
by the idea of image as process. WhíIe the concept of irnage

as process may not be applicable to aII forms of imagery, it

could be expected to be applicable to the type of imagery
involved in the task on which the present experi¡nents were
based.

It was to be expected that an imaging task would involve more

possibilities for variation than would a static image. In a

task reguiring imagery, the image is not only processed when

being formed, but is constantly undergoing processing, such as
anarysis and manipuration. rn some tasks, the image wourd have
to be constantry modified and reformed. The subject wouLd have
to do more with the image than keep it in existence.

fn each experiment of the series, when subjects had completed

the task, tl:ey were asked about their images and how they had

used their images during the task. This post-task interview

was referred to as Phase III of the experimental design (see
 I32.

Chapter 5). The idea was to determine whether some techniques

vìrere more successful than others. As errors had emerged as

the primary measure of performancer successr in this context,

meant an associatíon with less errors, and possibly with less

time.

Subjects were asked initially about their experience of the

task. This non-directed form of questioning often provided
information about the areas of interest. If the partícular
aspect of the image was not mentioned spontaneously by the
subject, he was asked more directly about it. Questions were
open-ended. Suggestions as to the range of answers people
gave were offered only if the subject appeared not to understand

the question. (See Appendix I ).

one question concerned whether the image was divided whenever

it was referred to, or had to be redivided each time, and where
there were divisions, what they were like. (Question l).

Another possible individual varíation concerned movement.

Subjects were asked whether they consÍdered that they were
rotating the image when counting the small cubes' or that they
were keeping the image still and moving around it themselves.
(Question 2).

AIso of interest was the amounL of the cube they could see and
most often worked with: did they work with individual cubes,

one face, or with two to three faces, as if the cube were

physicalþpresent? Alternatively, did their image have the

 133.

advantage of enabling them to see more than if it were

physically present, perhaps by seeing through it, or distorting

it, when conveníent? (Question 3).

They were also asked about the orientation of the image in

space: what part of the cube they could see, and whether
they could see particular faces of the cube more often than
others. A related question concerned the position of the
image in space. (Ouestion 4).

Subjects were asked finally whether there $rere asPects of

the imaging process which had not been covered in the prevíous
questions.
i

I
 134 .

RESULTS

The results from Experiments 2, 3 and 4 were coll-ated. Experiment

5 was not included in the analysis as the experimental conditions

were designed to interfere wÍth the imaging process. These

three experiments provided data from I99 subjects: I00 were

high irnaging subjects; 99 were low.

Their responses to the first three questions were grouped in

terms of the frequency of each resPonse. (Table I0.I). One

subject who could not answer Question I and two who could not
ans\^'e! the second question were omitted from that item.

Ouestion 4, on the orientation and position of the image in

space, did not warrant quantitative analysis. Almost all

subjects, regardless of imagery level, described their images

as appearing to be in front of their eyes (open or closed)

with the two black faces most often visible.

TABLE 10.I

¡R.EQUENCY OF TECHNIQUES USED FOR IMAGERY LEVELS

DIVIDED IMÀGE MOVBIENT AMOUNT USED

YES NO YES NO 0-1 2-3 4-6 faces

HIGH
IIv¡AGERY 85 15 rt 88 L2 69 19
SUBJECTS

LOV{
]MAGERY 66 32 35 63 34 55 IO
SUBJECTS

TOTAL tsr 47 46 rsl 46 L24 29

a
 r35.
The frequencies in the above table were anal-ysed using chi-

sguare tests, High and low imaging subjects differed in

the frequency with which they reported using a divided
)
image Of = 7.57, I df, p < .01) . Most hígh imaging subjects
reported using a divided image. About one-third of the
low imagers described their images as undivided.

Irnagery levels were also distinguishable in the frequency

with which subjects reported moving their images while
)
counting C\- = 15.31-, I dft p < .001). Low imagers reported
rotating the image while counting the smal-I cubes more often
than did high imagers.

Low imaging subjects al-so reported working with individual

cubes and one face of the cube more often than did high
imaging subjects (X2 = 14.89, 2 ð,f, p 4 .0OI).

The effect of these techniques on mean error and time rates

for imagery levels separateJ-y are presented in the following
tabIe. (Table I0.2).

TABLE 10.2

RELATIONSHIP BETI'IEEN TECHNIQUE, IMAGERY LEVEL

AND PERFORMANCE (MEANS)

DIVIDED IMAGE MO\rEMENT AMOUNT USED

YES NO YES NO 0-I 2-3 4-6 faces

ERRORS 4.2 3.7 4.9 4.0 5.4 20 4.2
HIGH
TIME 365 4I0 4L7 365 422 372 34r
(secs. )
ERRORS 7.8 7.0 9.1 6.9 9.8 6.9 4.4
LOW
TIME 582 578 6II 575 632 552 6l-7
(secs. )
 136.

The results were analysed, using two separate analyses of

variance for transformed error and ti¡ne scores; divisions
and movement were examined together, then the arnount of cube

used, in ter¡ns of imagery leve1 and performance. (See Appendíx 19:I0.2)

Less errors were made by high imaging subjects (F = 69.37 t L/L88 df'
p = .001) by subjects who used an undivided image (F = 5.55,
'
1/I88dfr p = .0I9), by subjects who kept their images still while
counting (¡ = 14.94¡ L/I88 df' p = .00I) r and by subjects who

worked with more than one face of the cube at a time (î = 17.77,
2/L93 df, P = .00I).

Tt¡e technique used did not influence time taken for the task.
Imagery levet was the only main effect for time. (In analysÍs I,
F = 47.'76, l/I88 df r p = .00I; ín analysís 2, î = 47.89t
L/L93 df, P = .001).
 137.

DISCUSSION

The techniques on which high and low irnaging subjects differed

were l4tith respect to image division, movement and the number

of faces with which they worked. Most high imaging subjects

reported using an image of a divided cube, keeping the image

still while counting, and working with the same number of

cube faces as'would be visible if the cube were physically
present. Low imaging subjects reported using an undivided

image, rotating it, and working with individual cubes or one

face of the cube' more often than did high imaging subjects.

The technigues reported by high imaging subjects vJere associated

with superior performance of the task, with one possible

exception. Subjects who reported using an undivided image
made less errors than did subjects who reported a divided image.
Most high imaging subjects, however' reported using a divided
image.

On this particular ite¡n of technique, in contrast to that

concerned with image movement, the more frequently employed

strategy was in fact less successful. It may be informative

that this item caused some difficutty for a number of subjects.
The difficulty seemed to be that they could comment only on

whether there were divisions in the area of the irnage with

which they were concerned, and not whether the total image
was divided.
 138.

There appears to be some parallel between the technique of

using a stationary image to keep track of the part of the
image already analysed and what is generally referred to
as rnental maps. Some researchers, such as Oatley (1974\,
have expressed surprise at the finding that people are as
proficient as birds at keeping track of the direction and

distance they travel. wordel (195I) found that blindfolded

subjects led along two sides of a triangular path, for as

much as fifty feet, could return to the starting-point,

wÍtt¡ a degree of error corresponding to about 15 per cent
of the total path length. They were equally successful

when led along the hypotenuse of the path and reguired to

return to the starting-point along two straight paths, making

a right-angled turn at the appropriate time.

More specifically, the technigue of keeping the image still and

imagining oneself rnoving around it has some similarity to a

navigational technique used by the Pacific Caroline Islanders,

reported by Oatley (]'974). They travel great oistances' through

a network of islands, reading only natural signs, such as star

paths, cloud patterns, deep phosphorescence and sea colours.
A key factor of their strategy is that they consider their
 I39 .

canoes to be stationary, with the islands moving past, under

the star paths.

The Caroline Islanders are adamant that one

would never know where one is at sea unless
the fundamental concept of the etak (reference)
island moving under the rising and setting
points of stars was grasped, though in the
same breath they say laughingly rOf course
we know that the islands stay in the same
placel ; "

(p.866)

The finding that these reported techniques were associated

with quantitative differences in performance has a number

of implications. Firstly, the consistency of patterns in

subjects I reports and observable behaviour suggests that
useful information may be available from introspection after
all. A second implication is that some strategies for
using imagery, in this type of task at least, would appear to
be generally rnore successful than are others. If this is
the case, the finding would be important to an understanding
of methods for developing imaging ability.

A further implication of the association between subjective

reports and performance, which is closest to the concern of
the present research, is that the association between performance
and qualitative differences in inage use Snints to the functionality
of Lhe image. Ivloreover, the techniques which emerged as successful
involved rnanipulation of a distinctly 'pictorial! image.
 I40.

oneaspectofthedataisthewayitgivesrisetoquestions
of introspection that are not easily answerable ' The

question concerning inage movement is perhaps the clearest

example. Movement involves a change in position relative
to something else. The nature of this rsomething else' with

respect to imagerY is uncertain.

Inability to answer these questions does not constitute a

particutarly cogent argument against the worth of the data.

Even if we cannot as yet ans$¡er all relevant questions, the

finding that certain variables statistically relate strongly

to other variables suggests the operation of some underlying
processes. This rrm of argument would appear to have some
affinity with HoIt (L972), who claimed:

"There is no better answer to the charge that

a topic is too subjective than a set of
stout retiability coeff icients".
(p. e)

An ever present factor in imagery research which requires note is

that the imagery experiment may represent a demand situation in

which subjects respond as they believe the situation requires.
There would appear to be nothing in the literature, however' to

suggesÈ that certain techniques for imagery use ¿re generally

more recommended tha¡ others for this type of task. Moreover'

if such evidence existed, it is unlikely that subjects would be

a\^7are of it. Furthermore, the use of a double blind procedure

in the e>çerimental desigrn avoided tJ:re possible contanr-ination of

experimenter exPectations ..
 r4t.
CHAPTER I1

EXPERIMENITS 6 ANd 7

THE EFFECTS OF PRACTICE AND TRAINING ON AN IMAGINAL TASK

fhere is strong evidence (for example by Roe, 1956) that people

engaged in long-term activities utilizing spatial visualization
are more developed in the ability than those who pursue non-
visualization activities. Tt¡e comParison between the spatial
visualization skills of students enrolled in Architecture and
Psychology courses reported in Experiment 1 provided further
suppor t.

The extent to which genetics and experience are contributing

factors to the of this skill is uncertain. In
develo¡xnent

Experi¡nent I, no statements could be made about their relative

importance: although Architecture students were at the beginning
of their courses, nothing vras known of their previous formal or

informal training. Some estimate of the influence of formal

training could be gained¡ perhaps, by a comparison of first with
final year Architecture students.

While sex differences in spatial visualization are not the nain

concern of this chapter, they relate closely to the guestion of
training and practice as it woutd appear that the sexes differ
in the potential they bring to the training situation. As
mentioned briefly in chapter 4, there is evidence that males
*
genetic advantqge. Research suggests that spatial
have a
* A comprehensi ve account of the influence of environmental, genetic
and neurological factors is provided by Harris (1976).
 t42.

visualizaLion ability is substantially influenced by a recessive

sex-línked gene of intermediate frequency (Bock and KoIako!"ski'
1973). Proficiency at spatial tasks is both X-linked and

testosterone influenced (Broverman, 1969). The relationship

between spatial abíIity and the Presence of androgens would

appear to be more complex: in males, spatial ability correlated

negatively with external signs of androgenicity (Maccobyr 1966);
in females, however, spatial ability correlated positively with
signs of masculinity. (Peterson' L976).

Tt¡e Iink between spatial ability and visualization ability was

discussed in Chapter 4. Research on spatiat ability measures,

such as by Michael et al (1957) and Downie (1966), has suggested

that spatial ability depends to a large extent on visualization.

Evidence from genetics thus suggests that males begin life with
more aptitude for spatiat visualization than do females. This

initial difference due to genetic endovfinent would appear to

increase with agerbut only in male dominated cultures. (Singleton'

I978). Developmentalists report that this abitity develops faster

and more fully in boys than in girls (Maccoby and Jacklin, 1975)

and vocational counseIIOrS note that more men than women choose

enployment in areas that require this skill (for instance,

engineering, mechanics' architecture) - (Roe, 1956).

Despite the many areas in which imagery is seen as being of value,

as listed in Chapter 2, there would appear to have been little
research concerned with programs to develop this ability. A

training program carried out by Love (Lg77) with eight grade

students at a suburban Melbourne school found that boys irnproveÇ
 r43.
significantly more following training than did girls'
AstudybyMaxwellrCroakeandBiddle(1975)'however'suggested
that instruction may improve the spatial ability of girls'
There are abundant references to patients' use of imagery in the

clinical literature, without any reference to systematic ways

of developing the skill. (Sínger, l974¡ Klinger ' L977¡

Horowitz I Lg78; Leuner, 1978). Some clinicians appear to employ

early in treat¡nent ad hoc exercises which they have developed on

the basis of their exPerience.

clinicians give the impression of accepting that imagery skills

need only practice to develop. There would aPpear' however'

to be no evidence for thÍs. A program to develop such skills

may well be one of the results of the new interest in the

fantasy and imagery Process' as evident in the recently
established conference on the topic, and a special edition in
L979 of the Journal of Mental Imagery entitled "The Potential
of Fantasy and Imagination".

At least one of the areas mentioned previously does have an

associated training scheme. staff at the university of california
considered visualizing ability sufficiently relevant to competence
in various engineering skills that they developed a specific
training course. (Personal correspondence, I977 ' Professor
R. Brady-Williamson.)

The division of Structural Engineering, as a preliminary to a

course in Crystatlography, provides a programmed course of

instruction designed to develop spatial visualization skills'
fhe training Ís specific ,to crystatlography and involves practice
 r44.

at visualizing 3-dimensional structures and at recognising

the eguivalence of 2-dimensional and 3-dirnensional representations.
The programrne is currently in its fourth version.

Success is measured in terms of students I assessment of benefit

derived from the training course, and by comparing current
examination pass rates with those of previous years. llt¡e

program woul-d appear to be successful on both counts.

Students who score low on the initial testing (using the spatial
visualization subtest of the Primary Mental AbiIíties Test) are
counselled to transfer to engineering courses where spatial
ability is not so important, such as electrical or solid state
engineering. This nust reflect a belief on the part of the
staff that formal training is of restricted va1ue. The belief
would appear to be confirmed by the finding that initial tow

scorers irnproved less with the training than did studehts who

performed weII initially.

The Berkeley program and the clinical literature provide evidence

that imagery may be developed. They leave uncertain, however,
whether the benefit is derived from formal training, practice,
or some combination of the two.
 t4 5.

The Prêsent Experiments

The following two experiments were concerned with the relative

effectiveness of various techniques for developing imagery
skíÌIs. ftre two experiments will be discussed in turn.
They are presented in the same chapter as there was an overlap
between subjects. Tl¡e performance of one group of subjects
from Experiment 6 (Practice Group) was compared with that of
the Training Group in Experiment 7.

Both experiments employed the now famitiar cube cutting task.

fhe apparatus was the standard cube. For these two experiments,
subjects who scored in the second and thÍrd quartiles on the
selection tests were included. Ttris rmedium' imagery level was

added so that the implications of the findings would be more

reailily applicable to the majority of people.

EXPERIMENT 6

Experiment 6 compared practice on tasks of increasing difficulty

(Condition 1) with practice on a difficult task (Condition 21.
It was designed to investigate whether the sinpler task night
provide ra learning opportunity to develop techniques for using
irnagery, which could then be applied in a more difficutt task.

TT4ETHOD

There were 2I subjects in each condition, with high, rnedium and

low leve1s of imagery egually represented.

Ihe procedure for both conditions was the same, in all but one

respect. The initia trial for Condition I invol-ved cutting a

 146.

cube mentally into I small cubes, rather than 27 as in Condition 2.

The task thus involved only one cut in each dimension.

On the test trial, both groups were given the more difficult
task, i.e. the task requiring the cube to be cut inEo 27.
On the test trial, the procedure detailed in Chapter 5 was followed
for both groups. There was a break of five minutes between initial
and test trials for both groups. To minimise rehearsal of the
task during this interval, t̡e experimenter engaged subjects in
conversation on a range of topical issues, including recent
electíons and approaching exams.

Other strategies were also employed to reduce the likelihood

that subjects would try to memorise answers from the previous
trial. They were, for instance, not told that the task would

be repeated. TLre guestions included in the task did not in

fact invite rehearsal as each sma1l cube was referred to a

number of tirnes, as having various combinations of characteristics.

 l.47 .

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The mean results for errors and ti:ne on initial and test trials

for Condition t (Practice on an Easier Task) and Condition 2

(Practice on a Difficult Task) are presented in the

following table. (Table II.I).

TABLE II.I

MEAN ERRORS AND TIME FOR TWO PRACTICE

CO¡üDTTIONS ON INITIAL ÃND TEST TRIALS

CONDITTON PRACTICE ON PRACTICE ON

EASIER TASK DIFFICULT ÎASK

TRIÄL I 2 T 2

ERRORS 4 .0 4.2 5.6 4.r

TII{E (secs. ) 33s 430 523 356

ftre,performance of subjects in the two Practice conditions was

not compared on Tria1 I as they were given different tasks:

Condition I had an easy irnaging task, which involvéd only 8

cubes; condition 2 had the more difficult task, which i.nvolved

27 cubes.

The concern of the experiment was with the effect of the two

types of practice on performance, for the full range of, imagery

Ievels represented. One measure of interest, therefotrer was

the performance of both practice groups when they performed the

difficult task on Trial 2. They were indistinguishable in
errors (t =.18' df, P = .86) and in tj:ne taken (t = I.33¡
40

40 df, p = .I9), which suggests that both types of practice

improved performance.
 14 8.

When their first attempts at the difficult task was compared'

however, subjects who had practised on the easier task had an

advantage. Tl¡ey made less errors (t = I.75¡ 40 df' P <.05;

I-taited) and tended to take less time than did subjects

unfamiliar with the type of task (t = 1.33¡ 40 df' P <.I0;
1-tailed).

T\,ro anticipated diff iculties with the easier task appeared

not to have eventuated. one ¡nssible difficulty was that

tl¡e few ele¡nents in the easier imaging task may have been

sufficiently within subjects I imagíng competencies that

there was no need for imaging techniques to be developed.
Atternatively, it was possible that the few elements (eight)
involved in the si:npler task may have made it solvable by

non-imagery based strategies. The surprisingly high number

of errors made suggested that, even with the few elements

involved, the task was a measure of imaging skills.

Tt¡is interpretation is supported by the apparent benefit

derived from practice on the easier task¡ subjectsr
performance on the difficult task (trial 2) \^¡as superior to
that of subjects with no practice at aII (Condition 2, trial I),
and eguivalent to that of subjects who had practised on the
clifficult task (Condition 2, trial 2). rt could be noted
that the latter group tended to take less time when they
repeated the task than did subjects who had practised on
an easier task. Ttre effect, however, did not reach an

acceptable level of sighificance (p = .tg).

 I49.

The experirnent indicated that practice on an easier task

was as effective as practice on a difficult task in
irnproving perforrnance. Furthermore it indicated that
practice on an easier task offered considerabte advantage
over no practice at all. It suggested that practice on an
easier task provided an opportunity for the develo¡:ment of
imaging skirls which were then transferred to a more difficult
task.

one problem in this design was that there v¡as no check that
subjects assigned to the two groups would have performed
equivalently on the initial run. Subjects were assigned
to groups randomly, however, whích should have made non-
equivalence unlikely. It wou1d, of course, have been
impossible to give both groups t̡e same task without defeating
the pur¡nse of the experiment, which was to provide a.

comparison between practice on an easier task with practice

on a difficult one.
 150 .

EXPERII"IENT 7

Experiment 7 compared the effects of practice arone, hrith the

effects of a combination of practice and training. It was

concerned with determining whether subjects deveroped for

themselves appropriate technigues merely by practice, and

with comparing the effectiveness of individuar and suggested

technigues.

It not possible to emptoy a tighter design of tr aining

was

alone as subjects could not have been expected to unders tand

the training instructions without some experience of the task.
ì4oreover, practice was implicated, by definition, each time
performance was measured.

METTIOD

The performance of subjects who had practice on the same task

(condition 2 in the previous experiment) was compared in the
present experirnent with that of another group of subjects who

had both practice and training. The modal rsuccessfull

techniques, reported by subjects in t̡e previous experiments,
formed the substance of the techniques recommended in the
training períod. As concluded in Chapter 10, holding the
image stirr rather than rotating it, inagining it undissected,
and utilising three faces of the cube at a time, Ì¡¡ere associated

with superior performance. rt was arso suggested to subjects

that they use an image of approximatery the same size as the
stimurus (3"), as Experiment 2 had found a negative correration
between image size and er.rors.
 t5r.

Both Practice and Training groups followed the standard

procedure in the initiat trial. Between the initial and

test triars was an interval of five minutes. subjects in

the Practice only group vJere prevented from rehearsing their
ansvJersto the items by conversation with the experimenter
(as detailed in the method section for Experiment 6). As
for the Practice group in the previous experiment, subjects
in the Training group were not forewarned that they would
be asked to repeat the task. ALthough providing training
wourd have made it obvious to subjects that they wourd be

asked to repeat the task, the training itserf occupied the

intervening five minutes and so prevented rehearsal.

There were 2r subjects in both practice and Training groups,

with high, medium and 1ow imagery revers equalry represented.
 r52.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

error and tirne rates for subjects of all imagery

Itt¡e mean leve1s

in the Practice and Training groups are presented in the

following table. (Table II.2).

TABLE II.2

IqEAI{ ERROR AND TII\4E RATES FOR SUBJECTS OF THREE IMAGERY

LEVELS, IN PRACTICE AND TRAINING CONDITIONS' ON INITIAI
AND TEST TRIALS

CONDTTTON PRACTICE TRATNING

TRIALS INITIAL TEST INITTAL TEST

U\,IAGERY LEVEL
ERRORS

HIGH 2.7 2.r 4.3 2.3

MÐIUM 5.6 3.3 6.7 3.6
LChl 9.1 7.L 9.4 3.6

TOTAL 5.8 4.2 6.8 3.r

TIYIE (secs. )

HIGH 556 341 466 323

IqEDIUM 605 346 527 391

L$V 365 350 397 499

TOTAL 509 345 463 404

The results were analysed using analysis of variance for three

factors, with repeated measures on one factor (trials), following
winer (Lg62). For full analysis of variance table, see Appendix
20 ¡ LI.2 .
 1s3.

Imagery level emerged as a significant main effect for errors;

(F = 33.43, 2/36 dtt p < .00I). In contrast to prevrous

experiments in the series, the imagery level of subjects

did not influence the ti¡ne taken for the task.

Tt¡ere vJas no difference in either time or errors between

Practice and Training conditions. Ttre two groups v¡ere

equivalent on the initÍal trÍal (as this was tl¡e basis on

which they were matched), and both improved in performance

on the test trial.

There vtas a difference between the initial and test Lrials

for both errors (F = I2I .59, .L/36 df , P < .001) and time
(F = 20.23, Iß6 df.t p < .00I) . Less errors were made on
the test trial than on the initial trial. There was a

significant 3-v¡ay interaction between imagery Ievels,

conditions and trials for errors (F = 3-7, 2/36 d,f , p <.05)
which was analysed using a Student-Newman-Keuls post hoc
test.

Thre greatest reduction in error rates between trials I and 2

was by low imaging subjects folJ-owing training. They reduced

their error rates more than did any other group (p = .05).
Unlike subjects of high and medium imagery levels, however, who
took less time for the task on the test trial in both conditions,
Iow irnaging subjects took tonger to do the task following
training
 154 .

Subjects of rnedium imaging ability were found to improve

sígnificantly more following training than did high imaging

subjects in the practice only condition (p = .OS). High,

medium and low imaging subjects reduced error rates to the
same extent in the practice only .condition.

lhese changes in performance in the Practice and Training

conditions for subject-s of high, medium and low irnaging

ability are presented in the following table. (Tab1e I1.3).

lltrey are expressed in terms of the amount of irnprovement

between initial and test trials.

TABLE 11.3

MEAN IMPROVÐ{ENT IN PERFORMANCE T'NDER BOTH

COND]TIONS FOR ]MAGERY LEVELS SEPARATELY.

ERRORS TIME (secs. )

PRACTICE TRAINING PRACTICE TRAINING

HIGH
II\4AGERS 0.6 2.0 2L5 L44

MEDITM
IMAGERS 2.3 3.I 260 136

LOW *
IMAGERS 2-0 5.9 15 -L02

TOTAL r.6 3.5 r63 60

* performance deter iorated

 r55.

Figures 11.1 and Il.2 depict the changes in performance

more clearly. ltrey suggest that whereas practice alone
appeared to affect the performance of the three imagery

levels similarly, practÍce combined with training

influenced tt¡em to different degrees: Iow ímagery
subjects improved the mosti hígh imagery subjects improved

least; and subjects of medium imagery ability improved to

an intermediate degree.
 156 .
4 HIGH IMAGING SUBJECTS
MEDIUM IMAGING SUBJECTS
LOW IMAGING SUBJECTS
U)
3
()
ul
cl
fU,
2 I
l!
o I
/
ct I
I
1 I
AI
I
/ /
\
\ I
/\
/\ \

-2 o246 I 10

REDUCTION IN ERRORS

F'IG. II .I
CHANGE IN ERRORS FOLLOWING PRACTICE

4 {
,t
,l
t,
3 I
ct) I
o
l¡J
I
I I I
m t
-t I I
U) 2
I
l!
o x I

c;
rl
z 1 I \, /---t
/ \, \
I \
I
I
/ I
-2 o2468 10

REDUCTION IN ERRORS

FIG. TL.2
CHANGE IN ERRORS FOLLOWING TRATNTNG
 Is7 .

The above findings can be compared with those from the

Visualization Program at Berkeley. The Berkeley program

reported that high initiar scorers improved more than low

initiar scorers as a resurt of formal training. The present
experiment found that improvement vJas in the reverse order,
with low imaging subjects showing the greatest reduction
in errors. ft is interesting to note that low imagers
actually took longer to complete the task, following
instruction. rf the final assessment of students in the
aerkelày program was some forrn of speed test, then the resurts
of the two studies would be consistent.

ft is likely, however, that the performance of subjects of

different imagery levers in the two studies cannot be directly
compared. one could reasonably expect that tow scorers from a

population of Engineering sLudents wouLd not be low scorers

in a popuration of Psychorogy students, but perhaps more comparable
with Psychology students of medium imaging ability.

Ít¡e increased time taken by low imagers following training

suggests that it may have been difficult for them to follow
the recomrnended techniques. The finding that they took more time
in their attempts, with an associated reduction ín errors,
constitutes the sore example in the series of experiments of
a time-error trade-off, which wilr be discussed in t̡e forlowing
chapter.
 r58.

GСERÄL COMMEI\]TS

Þrperiment 6 found that practice on an easier imaging task

facilitated performance on a difficult imaging task as much

as díd practice on a difficult task for the total group of

subjects. Experiment 7 found that a combination of practice
and training produced significantly fewer errors for low

imaging subjects than did practice alone. ÍL¡e longer time

taken by 1ow imaging subjects in the Training condition

suggested that they were trying to employ the recommended

techniques. The associated reduction in error rates

suggested that those techniques could be adopted generally.

Ihe previous experiments have tended to find guite distinct

patterns emerging for subjects of high and low levels of
imagery ability. Tl¡e graph of their improvement Ín performance

following training (FiS. 11.2) revealed non-overlapping distrib-

utions. The distribution for subjects of medium irnaging ability,
lying between both extreme groups, testifies to the reliability
of the selection procedure.

Tt¡e most important result is perhaps that performance on an

imagery task appears to be easily developed by a minimum of

practice and training. The results of both experiments

suggest that subjects develop effective technigues for solving

imagery tasks purely with practice. They also suggest that

certain technigues are generally more successful than others

 159 .

and can be readity utitised by most subjects. It would

appear, then, that of the three procedures for improving

imaging ability a combination of practice and suggestions
as to appropriate strategies offers most advantage.
 160.

GIAE{TER 12

ST{IDY OF ERRORS

The previous experiments were concerned with various aspecÈs

of the imagíng process. Each experiment isolated the effect

of a particular variable on performance of an imaging task.
In addition to these specific results, there appeared to be

consistencies in the data across all experiments. one such

consistency was with respect to errors: there emerged
differences in the tlpes of errors made by subjects of
different imagery levels, and in the relationship between

tirne and error scores for the two groups. Ihese patterns
demanded further analysis as they seemed to provide evidence
of just the kind of qualitative differences in the imaging
process for high and low imagers whÍch might be informative.

The patterns appeared to be standard across all experiments.

Data was examined from Experiments 2, 3 and 4 as these
particular experiments measured performance, without any form
of interference or assistance. This selection provided data
from 199 subjects, I00 of whom were of high imaging ability,
99 were low. The sample had 95 males and I04 females.

I. TYPES OF ÐRRORS

The cube-cutting task involved cutting the cube twice ín eaeh

dimension, thereby producing 27 sma1l cubes. euestions were

asked about these 27 snall cubes in a variety of ways, such as

how many had only one white face, how many had one white and
 16I.

one black face. I the total number of cubes referred to in

the question was 65.

Ttre types of errors were studied by comparing the total number

of cubes reported by each subject with the number of cubes

about which questions were asked. A difference score v¡as

thus computed, reflecting the degree to which each subjectrs

responses differed from the true value. Positive scores

indicated that subjects had over-estimated the number of

cubes produced by the cuts. Negative scores indicated under-
estimation. The results are presented in the following table.
(Table L2.L) .

TABLE ].2.I

DÏFFERMICE BETT,VEEN REPORTED TOTAI AND TRUE

TOTAL FOR SUBJECTS OF BOTH IMAGM.Y LEVELS

HIGH IMAGERS LOW IMAGERS

MEAN 3.3 17.4

STA}¡DARD
DEVTATION 14 .5 29.I
RANGE -38 to +42 -34 to +I35

An analysis of the difference scores, using t-tests, indicated

that low imagers made more errors of over-estimation than did
high imagers (t = 4.30 ' I44 df r p = .00I) .

The distribution of difference scores for high and low imaging

subjects is depicted in Fig. L2.I. The extent of the range of
errors for low imagers is all the more re¡narkable when one

considers that 27 cubes'in aII were involved, and a sum total of 65.

I Each cube was referred to more than once.

 162.

50 HIGH IMAGING SUBJECTS

LOW IMAGING SUBJECTS

40

I
U) /
C)
ul
I
ìq¡ 30 I
Ð
U' I
\
I
l¡.
I \
o I
\
c; 20
z \
\

\
I \
10

-40 o 40 80 120 160

DIFFERENCE SCORES

Fig. 12.L

DISTR.TBUTTON OF DIFFERENCE SCORES FOR HIGH AND LOW IMAGING SUBJECTS

The figure revealed a further difference in the performance of

high and low imaging subjects. Ik¡e error scores for high imagers

formed an approximately slaurnetrical distribution on eitl¡er side of

zero. The errors of low imagers, however, formed a skewed

distr ibution.
 163.

This difference in distribution shape was examined by

comparing the freguencies with which subjects over- and

under-estimated the true number of cubes. (Tabte 12.2).

TABLE 12.2

FREQUENCY OF ERRORS OF OVER- A}ID I'NDER-ESTI}4ATION

FOR BOTH I}4AGERY LEVELS

HIGH I¡4ÄGERS LOW IMAGERS TOTAL

TJNDER-
ESTIMATTON 45 27 72

OVER-
ESTIMATION 5I 72 L23

TOTAL 96 99 195

Of the I99 subjects, four were,correct in their estimation

of the number of cubes. A chi-square analysis indicated
that high and low imaging subjects differed significantly
in the types of errors they made . (X2 = 7.22, I df, P = .007).
More high imagers than low imagers made errors of under-
estimation. Low ímagers, in contrast, were more likety to over-
estimate.

These results suggest that the differences in errors between

high and low imaging subjects were not merely quantitative:

high funaging subjects did not merely make less errors than

did Iow, but errors of a different kind. llhen a high imager

gave the wrong response, he was equally likely to over-estirnate
as to under-estjmate. In terms of the debated pictorial metaphor,
he was more likely than a low imager not to rseer some of the
relevant cubes.
 164.

A low imager, in contrastrwas not only more likely to produce

the wrong answer, but his errors had a greater probability

of being an overestimation, as if he could not control the
information represented in his image.

Piaget and Inhelder (1971) differentiated between the types

of errors made in imaging and in perceiving. They believed

that errors in imaging are more likely to be the result of

excessíve liberties with schematizing the representation,
whereas errors in perceiving result fron incomplete sampling

or scanning of an externat object. In Piaget and Inhelder's

terms, the errors made by high imaging subjects in the
experiments reported here would appear to resemble the
íncomplete sampling of perceptual errors more than the
schematízation errors of an image.

These qualitative differences in types of errors reflect the

differences in the experience which the task appeared to present

for the two imagery levels. In contrast to the calmness of
high imagers during the'task, low imagers indicated in a

variety of ways that the experience was an ordeal for them.

It was not uncommon for low imaging subjects to exPress horror

at the idea of having to count up what, for them, were so many
smalt cubes. This response occurred most freguently when

subjects were asked about the number of small cubes which had only
one white face. To guote one horrified subject - "Oh, there must be

thousands!rr There were in fact twelve.

 16 5.

The comments of low imagers while doing the task suggested

that their difficutty was not so much in having an unclear

image so much as one beyond their control. At times,
theír images seemed to them to expand to over-Iarge
proportÍons, a problem not experienced by high imagers.
Ttris reported difference in experience while doing the Èask

could be seen as reflected in the types of errors made.

So¡ne low imaging subjects conmunicated the quality of their

experience nonverbally. They sat throughout the experiment
with head in hand or on the desk. This qualitative difference
in the imaging experience of high and low imagers was not
measured, but it indicated a degree of distress on the part
of the latter which was difficult to ignore.

II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ERRORS AND TIME

Data from the same I99 subjects were used to examine the
relationshíp between error and time scores for performance

on the imaging task. The results from subjects of both

inagery leve1s were first combíned to provide an overall

indication of the relationshÍp. A correlation of .42 was

obtained (p < .001), indicating a sizeable positive

relationship between error and time. The more errors made,

the longer the time taken.

Data frorn the two imagery leveIs were then analysed separately.
For high imaging subjects, a correlation of .04 was obtained
(p = .68), as compared with a correlation of .28 (p = .004)
for low imagers. The correlation coefficíents for the Lwo

imagery levels were found to be significantly different,

 166.

using a Fisherrs z test (p < .02). This could be interpreted

as índicating that hÍgh imaging subjects performed adequately
at the task and that any variation in time scores v¡as a matter
of individual differences, and not reflected in performance

level. The absence of a relationship between tíme and

errors for high írnaging subjects could be considered as supporting

the impression created in the series of experiments generaIIy
that time scores tend not to be a measure of performance so

much as an indication of personal imaging style.

For low imaging subjects, however, time scores did appear to

provide some indication of the level of their capabilities.
Low ímaging subjects who took longer to do the task made more

errors. As for high imagers, there vJas no evidence of a trade-

off matríx operating: taking longer to do the task did not
enhance performance.

The results from this analysis can be compared' to some extent'

with those of Kosslyn (1975). In his experiment on image
size and complexity, he too reported a positive correlation
(but did not specify the value) between time and error, "belying
a speed-accuracy trade-offu (p.347). As noted in Chapter 6,
his experimental design presented some problems in that the value
of errors was questionable and his subjects were of unknown

imagery level. The present study found a significant positive

correlation between time and error for subjects considered
together anél for low imaging subjects considered separately.
This would suggest thaÈ KossJ-ynrs subjects represented a range
of imagery leve:s.
 L67 .

Irrespective of the imagery level of Kosslynrs subjects,

however, it would appear from the present study that his
concl-usion about no trading-off between time and error scores

applies to both levels of imagery.

A positive relationship between error and time scores was to

be expected overall, given the consistent pattern in the series

of experiments, of high imagers making fewer errors in less
time, and low imagers making more errors in longer time.
The analysis of the relationship between the scores provides
further evidence of the importance of considering the
performance of high and 1ow ability subjects separately.

rTI. GENERÀL COMMENT ON THE STUDY OF ERRORS

The analysis of errors revealed that there were differences

in the kinds of errors made by high and low imaging subjects.

Such a finding indicated that successful performance at an

imaging task was not only associated with less errors¡ but
with errors of a different kind. The finding makes it likeJ-y

that there are differences in the imaging process, in addition

to those isol-ated by experimental manipulation, which are
reflected ín performance.

Vühy successful performance on the imaging task should be

associated with errors of underestimation, and poor performance

with overestimation is also difficult to interpret without
acceptance of the image as functional. The same can be said

for the finding of qualitative differences in the relationship

between error and time scgres, for successful and poor performers.
 168.

The examination of errors, in both respects, provided further

support for the view that the image is functional.

 169.

CHAPTER 13.

EXPERTMENT 8: THE RELATTONSH]P BETWEEN A PHYSTCAL

AND AN IMAGTNAL TASK

rhe previous experiments in the series were based on a task

typical of those examined in imagery research. They required
the imaginar performance of a task which had a physicar counter-
part. By so doing, they raised the issue of the relationship
between an imaginar and a physicar task. The final experiment
to be re¡rcrted vras concerned with this rel_ationship.

As indicated by the review in the second chapter, the rerationship

between physicar and imaginal processes has received some

attention. A basic assumption implicit in much of t̡e

theoretical and empiricar literature on imagery has been that
the imaginal process is analogous to the physical one. some
writers, such as Piaget, rnherder and sarbin, consider that
to image is to imitate a physicar process. They pro¡nse that
the same steps occur mentarry as would occur were the process
to be carried our physicarry. The assumption of anaLogous
processes approached explicitness in the research on mental
practice, where the effects of mentally practising some behaviours

were found to be armost equivarent to those of physical

practice.

The definition of imagery proposed by Hebb, Neisser, Bug els k i

and Paivio, for instance, as conditioned sensations, is consistent
 170.

with this idea of imagery. Such opinions suggest that an

image is analogous to a percept. fhis line of argument

implies that an image is sufficiently exact a replica of the
object it represents that equivalent processes can be

perforrned on the image as on the object. If the image

allows more to be done with it than could be done with a

percept, then it, would follow that the image must be different
from a percept.

Evidence frorn the experiments reported above, in which it

appears that an imaginal task was more difficult to solve
than a physical task, Ímplies that an image may be a less
than perfect analog of a percept. fn the absence of a limiting
factor, such as manual dexterity, the physical process should be

easÍer to perform than the imaginal process. Ttris finding of

the physical task being easier to solve is consistent with
those of most imagery tasks, such as mental arithmetic and

mechanics. The nature of the difficutty would appear to be

to maintain the number of ele¡nents of the task in the image long

enough to perform the required process on the¡n. A task which

required manual skills would represent a different situation

as superior performance would be expected imaginally than
physically. The Japanese mental abacus users, referred to in
Chapter 2, who outperform the physical abacus users, provide an

example.
 t7r.

The research of Roger shepard and associates at stanford

University has been concerned with providing empirical

support for the direct relationship between physical and

imaginal processes (Shepard and Chi¡man, L970; Shepard

and Metz1er, !97J-i Shepard and Feng , L972, Shepard, 1975,

Shepard and Podgorny, 1978). They selected the mental

rotation of 2-dimensional and 3-djmensional figures as the

process by which to study the relationship. Their data
$¡as mostly in the form of correlations between the degree
of manipulation necessary for the task and the time taken
to res¡nnd. They interpreted their finding of a linear

relationship between time required to decide whether two

figures were the same and the degree of rotation necessary
as indicating tlat the imaginal and physical processes h¡ere

analogous:

rr ft¡e compariscn in shape was accomplished by

first carry :' out some sort of purely
mental ana-l of an actual physical rotation".

(Shepard and Feng, L972, P. 228)

Research in the ârr r¡ however, has been inconclusive. An

experiment by skinner and stretch (1976) entitled rlmagining

Rotation of Objects: Comrent on Shepard and Metzlerr did
produce some consistent results in that response time increased

Iinearly with increase in degree of rotation necessary for the

comparison. But, whereas Shepard and Metzler had found no

difference between 2- and 3-dirnensional rotations, Skinner
and stretch concluded thãt 2-dimensional rotations were
 r72.

considered to be less rotated. A possibte explanation

was provided by subjects in Shepardrs experiment, who

reported that they had to transform 2-dimensional figures

into 3-dimensional ones before rotation r¡¡as possibte.

In some studies in tl¡e series, the object which had to

be imaged was physically present (e.g. Cooper, L975).
The only effect its presence appeared to have was to
reduce reaction time.

According to Shepard and Podgorny (1978)

It
the functions are surprisingly alike
and equalJ-y linear in both cases
It¡ese various results strongly
suggest that the mentally transformed
internal representation is acting as.
a kind of holistic templatç that can
be matched against the test stimulus
about as effectively as can an untransformed
perceptual-memory image " .
pp.223-224

5he experiments on mental rotation, while acceptable in their

generar findings, have surprised some researchers when considered
individually. Winstonrs comment (1973) on the results of
Shepard rs I97l experìment was that: "I would never have

expected that kind of result ... (It) seems to indicate that,

at least some of the time, the human mind works with very low-
 r73.

level descriptions, performing incremental operations on them".

(p.I85) . His view r^¡as shared by Weissten (1973) . Her

explanation for the apparent cognÍtive regression of

Shepardrs subjects was the high level of difficulty
which the task involved.

Posner (L973), however, believed that subsequent research in

the areas of natural and artificial intelligence had suggested
that Shepardrs explanatÍon was probably correct. The process

of mental rotation did appear to be analogous to the process

of physical rotation, in that both proceeded incrementally.

An experirnent by Griffiths (1975), based on the research of

Shepard and Metzler, is of interest in that it was concerned
with the relationship between imaging ability and mental
rotation. He found that the speed of performance was not
related to imagery ability, which suggested to him that the
rmental rotation I task could be solved by techniques other

than by purely mental rotation.

Later research by Marmor and Zaback (1976) supported his

interpretation. They studied mental rotation in blinded
subjects, usirrg congenitally bIind, adventitiously bIind,
and blindfolded sighted subjects. The congenitally blind
\4¡ere significantly slower and made more errors than the otler
two groups, which implied that visual imagery nay have made

It¡e mental rotation task eas ier . No evidence emerged, however ,

to support the notion that visual imagery was necessary for

 L74.

solution of the task. fhe autl¡orsr conclusion was consistent

with Griffiths' that the rmental rotationt task could be solved
by techniques which did not involve rotating an image.

THE PRESn{T EXPERIMENT

itre approach adopted in the experi¡nents reviewed above was to

measure features of the imaginal process (such as the time taken
to compare a rotated image with a presented stirnulus) and to
correlate them with assumed physical counterparts. It was

hoped that a more productive approach would be to measure

features of the physical process, and to determine whether they

vrere associated with imaginal processes, as reported by subjects.
By providing data on both physical and imaginal aspects of the

task, such an approach could be expected to reduce tt¡e nunber

of assumptions involved about the manner in which the two processes

are inter-related.

A physical task was sought which would be sufficiently difficult

to be challenging, yet sufficiently sfunple so as not to require
manual dexterity. Shepard's research on the relationship
would lead to the prediction that a task with simple physical
components should be solved equally welJ., physically as

imaginally. If his interpretation of his results is correct,

processes analogous to the physical manipulation should occur

mentally. Such an interpretation assumes, however, that the

two processes can be perforrned egually well.

The present experiment similarly predicted that, if tJl.e image is

a surrogate percept, then'a process with physically simple

 17 5.

components should be simple to perform imaginal-Iy. The level

of imaging ability of subjects would not be expected to inffuence

performance in the way that it had in previous experiments in
the series. One might even predict that a ptrysically simple
task might favour low imaging subjects as they would be

expected not to spend time considering imagery-based methods

of solution.

In addition, it was expected that a task meeting the above requirements

would be sufficiently different from the typical imagery task to
provide some indication of the extent of the generality of
findings from previous research.

Tt¡e task selected as fitting these reguirements was to construct

a tetrahedron from two identical pieces. The task was simple
in its components parts, did not require manual dexterity'
and seemed to be sufficiently difficult to maintain i¡rterest.
By allowing for ùnmediate feedback of performance accuracy,
it was expected t̡at such a task could provide some indication

of the inter-relation between physical and imaginal processes.

To test for the generalizability of previous findings, one

feature of the task, the size of the material, was varied.

M.ETHOD

Ttre task was to construct a tetrahedron from two identical

pieces, which are shown from differenL perspectives in Fig. 13.1.
llhe manner in which they fitted together to form a tet¡ahedron is
depicted in Fig. 13.2.
 L7 6.

FrG. t3 . I
STIMULT FOR TETRAHEDRON TASK
 Ltl .

FTG. T3 .2
SOLUTTON OF TETRAHEDRON TASK
 178.

The two versions of the stimulus differed only in dimensions;

the large tetrahedron, when constructed measured approximately

3" along each side; the small one measured half an inch. ft¡e

dimensions were chosen to be comparable wÍth the sizes of the

cube stimulus in Experiment 2. Both versions of tϡe stimulus
were made of reddish plastie.

Subjects were I07 Psychology I students, selected as high or low

imagers, as in the previous experjments. ApproximateJ-y half
the subjects frorn each imagery level were given large and

small stimuli" Ttre groups were as follows:

TABLE 13.I

Ð(PERIMM{TA], GROUPS

STIMULUS LARGE sMAr_{L TOTAL

HIGH
IMAGER.S 27 28 55

LOVt
IMAGERS 25 27 52

TOTAL 52 55 r-0 7

Subjects were told that the two identical pieces fitted together
to form a tetrahedron, which was described as an object consisting
of four equilateral triangles, one on each of three sides and one
on the base. It was also described as rese¡nbling a p1'ramid, the
only difference being that a ¡¡¡ranid has a square base, whereas a

tetrahedron has a triangular base. The experiment did not

 179.

begin until it had been established tt¡at the subject knew

what shape he was trying to make.

Th¡e two pieces were placed flat in the subjectrs hand. No

restrictions were set on where he courd work with the task -

on the table, his lap or in his hands. A pilot study had
previously established that subjects who did not complete
the task in five minutes tended not to complete it att all.
An interval of five minutes was thus selected as a suitabre
time limit. rf the subject succeeded within five minutes,
the time taken r^ras recorded. When success or the tÍme limít
was reacheil, the subject, was asked how he had attempted to

solve the puzzle, and.what method, if any, he had used.

 180 .

RESULTS

ltre performance of subjects was compared across imagery levels

and stimulus sizes. (Table I3.2).

TABLE 13.2

PERFORMAIiCE ON TASK FOR IMAGERY LEVELS

AND STITUULUS SIZES

HIGH IMAGERS LOW IMAGffi.S TOTAL

STII\4ULUS LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL

SUCCEÐÐ 23 20 11 I8 72

FAfLED 4 I I4 9 35

TOTAL 27 28 25 27 107

Subjects of high inaging ability succeeded in the task more

often than did low imaging subjects ({2 = 5.I2, 1df, p( .05).
Stimulus size, however, did not influence the frequency of
success for imagery levels considered together (?(2 = .04).

Inagery levels were compared separately, using Fishers Ð<act

Test. There was some interactíon between imagery level and

stimulus size though not sufficient to reach conventional

Ievels of significance (p = .08). Low imagers tended to

succeed more often when the stinulus was smaII. High imaging
subjects, however, were unaffected by stimulus size.
 t8I.

Subjects I responses to the question concerning how they had

proceeded in the task indicated that three approaches had

been used. AII subjects began the task with an inage of

a tetrahedron. Some subjects re¡nrted trying to match
the sti:nuli with their irnage of the end-product; others
reported approaching the task logically and systematically;
they decided which parts of the objects should be hidden
(such as the sguare faces), and then proceeded through
every possible cornbination of unwanted faces; others still
had put the pieces together randomly, in the hope that a

solution would eventually emerge.

The performance of subjects who reported referring to their

image throughout the task (technique I) was compared with
those who did not (techniques 2 and 3) for both imagery levels.
(Table 13.3) .
 L82.

TABLE 13.3

PERFORI{A}¡CE ON TASK AS FUNCTION OF TECHNIQUE

USÐ FOR BOTTT IMAGERY LEVELS

TECHNIQUE USÐ IMAGE WITTTOUT I¡{AGE TOTAL

HIGH IMAGERS

Succeeded 3I L2 43

FaiIed 2 10 12

LOW IMAGERS

Succeeded L4 I5 29

FaiIed 2 2l 23

TOTAL 49 58 107

Subjects who were successful at the task more frequently

reported using an imagery-based technique to solve the task.
2
({,- = 19.92, I df , P 1.001-). The analysis of results
indicated that solution of the task vlas more likely when

imagery was involved. Without imagery, that Ís by logic

or luck, failure vlas as likely as success.

llt¡e final analysis was to examine the performance of subjects who

succeeded at the task within the time limit. lltre time taken to

solve the task was examined in terms of subjects I imagery level

and the technique used. (Table 13.4).
 183.

TABLE 13.4

IUEA¡¡ TIME TAKÐ{ (in secs.) TO SOLVE TASK USING I}{AGERY

AIID NON.TMAGB.Y TECHNIQUES FOR HIGH AI¡D LOW IMAGING SUB.TECTS

}4ETHOD USED II"IAGERY VüITTIOUT II{AGER.Y

SUBJECTS

HIGH IMAGB.Y 78 L4s

LOW IMAGERY r20 135

The time taken by subjects who succeeded at the task was

examined in terms of imagery level and nethod, using an

analysis of variance (See Appendix 21:I3.4). Method emerged

as the only significant ¡nain effect (F = 4.L7, L df , p = .05).

Subjects who used an imagery-based technique solved t̡e task
in less time. In this group of successful subjects, imagery

level per se did not influence the time taken.

 r84.

DISCUSSION

1lt¡e results indicated that, although the task involved

physicaLly simple components, the use of imagery facilitated
performance: more high imaging subjects solved t̡e task,
and subjects who used an imagery-based technique were

successful. Because the task appeared to involve both

physical and imaginal processes, the results can be compared
with those of the irnaging task in the earlier experi¡nents.

The findings from the experiment in terms of generaliþz will

be considered first, as the results are more readily inter-
preted on this question. l1¡ey are generalizable to the
extent that, as in the cube-cutting experiment, stimulus
size did not influence performance overall. (Table 13.2).
There was some suggestion of a furtl¡er sjmilarity in that the
interaction between stimulus size and imagery level for
subjects of low imagery ability approached significance.
lltris ¡rcssible interaction was in the opposite direction to
tt¡at in the cube experiment: in tl¡e tetrahedron experiment,
low irnaging subjects tended to perform better with the small
stimulust in the cube experiment, they performed better with
the large stimulus. The results of the two exper jments are
consistent in that they suggest that stimulus size does not
affect performance overall, but could affect that of lou¡

irnaging subjects. It would appear, then, that the findings

from the conventional type of image task may be appticable to
a wider range of Ímagery tasks.
 185.

it courd reasona-bry be assumed that prediction can be made

about relevant factors in imagery tasks where imagery is

actually involved., as in the performance of high imaging
subjects. Such predictions could not be made about the

performance of row imaging subjects on imagery tasks, however,

as imagery woul-d appear to be less a feature of their performance.

The finding that low imaging subjects tended to be more successful

when working wittr the smarl stimulus could be interpreted as

adding to the evidence that 1ow imaging subjects, unlike high,

are restricted to the properties of a stimul-us as presented in
forming theír image. TL¡e interaction could also impry that
because low imagers did not use imagery effectivery in the task,
then physical properties became determining factors in success.
in which case it would appear that the smarler stimulus may have
made the task easier.

Despite ttre physical simplicity of its components, the success

of the imagery-based technique suggested that t̡e task may

have been easier to solve mentally than physically. The

possibility tJ:at such tasks may exist bears directly on the

conclusion of shepard, and podgorny that physicar and imaginal
processes of rotation are analogous. Had physical and imaginar
performance on the task been indistinguishabre, the resurts
would have supported their interpretation.
 r86.

Ttre present finding suggests that their conclusions may

apply to imagery only in limited circumstances. Both

the tetrahedron task and the task on which Shepardrs

research was based reguired mental rotation. fhe high
failure rate for the tetrahedron task indicated tt¡at the task
was difficult to solve by any method, which distinguished
it from Shepardrs task. In the present experiment, the
task involved rnore than the rotation of an image. The

results suggested that tJre same processes may not always be

applicable to an image as to a percépt.

A further contributing factor to the discrepancy in the

results of this and Shepardrs experjment could have been

the subjects involved. Ttre exper jment of Shepard and

Feng (L972), fox instance, began with ten subjects,

discariled three because of excessively high error rates,
and based the interpretation of analogous processes on

the finiling of a linear relationship between ti¡ne and

degree of rotation for four of the renaining seven subjects.

Most of Shepardrs experiments used subjects described as

bxperiencedr
'which
might imply that they were of high
imaging ability. It might also imply .that for subjects
of high imaging ability, performing the relatively simple

task of mental rotation, the image might function as an

analogue of a percept. The present experiment suggests

 IA7

that this may not be the case where the task involves more than rotation.
It suggests that the relationship between imagery and other aspects of
problem-solving is a more complex one.

Subjects' reports in the present e>çeriment implied that they were not
trying to solve the task mentally in the same \^¡ay as physically.
Notwittrstanding the possibfe demand situation, it would appear from
subjects I reports that quite different techniques were used to solve
the task physicatly and mentally. T'he sequence in tJ-e physical
attempt was more random than the more considered imaginal sequence.
as reported. lllre apparent discrepancy between observed physical
strategies and reported imaginal ones offers some support to the
concern of other researchers (e.9. Vüinston, 19'73; Weisstein, I973)
that physical and imaginal sequences may not bottr proceed incrementally.

Íhe experiment raised the question of the function of imagery in üris

tlpe of task. óne could assume that the imagery of subjects who

reported using an imagery-based technique to solve the task was more

than a representation of the end-product of the task, that is, of a

tetrahedron. Before the experiment proper began, aII subjects

asserted that they could form an image of a tetrahedron. The results

suggested that not all subjects could produce an image version of the
manipulations of tlre stimuli. Thre performance of subjects in tl-is

respect supported the findings of Experiment I: whereas all sr:bjects

could produce an image, they could not all manipulate their i^tg"=.1

I. The difference in ability to use imagery which emerged between

subjects classified as high and low imagers attested the validity
of the classification criterion.
 I88.

The present results do not appear consistent with the

conclusion of Shepard and podgorny (I97S) that an image

and a percept of an object Ín a mental rotation task

are analogous, and that equivalent matching processes
can be performed on them. It is suggested that Shepard
and Podgornyrs Ínterpretation may be inapplicable where
more than simple rotation is involved.

TL¡e results of the present experiment are consistent,

however, with those of Experiment 4, which examined the
effect of physical im¡nssibility on an inaginal task.
Both experiments produced results which suggest that an

image which is manipulated in a problem-solving task

functions differentry from a percept. rheir combined
results suggest that an image is an active construction,
which has properties of its own, and which allows for
distinct. processes to be performed on it.
 I89.
CHAPTER l.4.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

r: REVIEW OF EXPERII"IENTS

Before considering the implications of the research, it would

be useful at this point to review briefly the findings from
the series of experiments.

Experiment 1 examined a ran ge of imagery measures and found

that the experience of imagery and the abiliÈy to use imagery
were independent factors. While all subjecÈs reported experiencing
ímagery, not at] could use their images to solve spatial problems.
As the following experiments involved a task requiring the use
of imagery, subjects v,tere selected according to their performance
on measures of the second of these factors.

Experiment 2 found thaÈ the size of the stimulus ín an imaginal

task did not influence the performance of high imaging sqbjects.
Low imaging sr:bjects, however, made more errors \^7hen presented

with a small sÈimulus. Low imaging sr:bjects also reported using

a smaller image than did high imaging sr:bjects. The correlation

for aII subjects between reported irnage size and errors was found'
to be negative: subjects who reported using small images made
more errors. The central finding, that differences in pictorial
qualities of the imagPwere reflected in performance, suggested'
support for the pictorial view of imagery.
 l-90.

Experiment 3 examined the effect of stimulus complexity

on the performance of an imaginal task. Vühen presented

with a more complex stimulus, high imaging subjects made

less errors than when presented with a stimulus containing

only task relevant information. Low imaging subjects

performed equivalently with simple or complex stimuli.

subjects of high and low imaging a_bility were indistinguishable

in their recall of the shapes painted on the cube. High
imaging subjects, hov/ever, tended to recall more details
concerning colour of the figures. The results suggested

that a certain arìount of detail enhanced the performance

of subjects who were skilled at using imagery. Both high
and low imaging sr:lcjects reported using ímages which were

identical in both stimulus cond.itions, The performance of

low imaging subjects reflected this reported equivalence-
High irnaging subjects, however, performed differently in the
two conditions.

In Experiment 4 , sújects were required to perform imaginally

a task which they consid.ered physically impossible, that is,
to cut a sugar cube into 27 smaller cubes. Both high and
tow imaging subjects made less errors and took longer tíme
when the stimulus was made of sugar than when it was made

of wood. Almost aII of the subjects described their images

as being without texture, and not made of sugar. The
difference in performance of subjects presented with wooden

and sugar cubes, however, suggested that information not

depicted in the image can nevertheless influence performance.
 r91.

Some subjects who had taken part in any of tJre preceding three
expe riments were invited back for Experiment 5. lllrey were
required to do the task either with visual interference, or
with auditory interference, or merely to repeat tl¡e task
under the same conditions as on the initial triaI. Visual
interference disrupted the perfornance of subjects of both
imagery leveIs, which suggested that imagery was necessary
for the task. Low imagers, unlike high imagers, tended to

make more errors during auditory interference than when

repeating the task under control conditions. Tlris could

indicate that auditory interference disrupted their attempts
to gain assistance from non-imagery based techniques.
Despite the average interval of one year between first and

second trials, subjects repeating the task performed better

in both error and time scores on the second trial.

Ttre effect of practice on performance of an imaginal task

was exarnined more closely ín Experiment 6, which compared

practice on an easier task with practice on a more difficult
task. Both forms of practice enhanced performance. as

measured by the number of errors made. Practice on a

difficult task, however, was associated with a greater
reduction in ttre time taken for the task. The results

suggested that practice at an easier imaging task did

provide the opportr:nity for techniques to develop which
could be applied to more difficult tasks.
 I92.

It was found in Experiment 7 that a combination of practice

and training produced significantly more improvement in

accurasy than did practice alone. This finding suggested

that, although sr:bjects develop effective techniques for the
imaginal task simply with practice, the improvement in
performance could be íncreased by recommending to subjects
appropriate techniques .

Experiment 8 was concerned with the relationship between a

physical and an imagínal task. It involved a task which

consisted of physically simple component parts, but turned
out to be easier to solve imaginally than physically' The

finding that more could be done with an image of the

stimulus than with the stirnulus itself had implications for

the idea that images and percepts are analogous in the

processes which can be applied to them. It suggested that
processes which were inapplica-ble to percepts could be
apptied to images. The experiment also tested the generality
of one aspect of tl.e findings from previous experiments in
the series by varying stimulus size- The consistency in

results suggested. that the findings from the cube-cutting

task would appear to be appl-icable to a wider range of
imagery tasks.
 J_93.

TI; DISCUSSION OF IMAGERY TN THE EXPERIMENTAL CONTEXT

When the findings frorn the series of experirnents are considered

together, a total picture of the role of the image in this context
begins to emerge. The findings allow statements to be made a-bout
the properties of the image itself, the d.eterminants of functionality,
and the accessibility of the imaging pïocess to introspection. These

areas cannot be discussed without reference to the differences between

high and low imaging subjects. fhe patterns of performance between
the two types of subjects were so consistent and striking, however,
that it was considered worthwhile, at the risk of some repetition,
to draw together these findings in a separate section at the end,
The findings from the experiments on the effect of sex differences

will also be discussed.

J-. P.roperties of an Imaqe

The experiments forming this research were based on a task which

favoured. the formation of a pictorial image, subjects reported.
using an image of a cube which was pictorial in its features.
Subjects did not report their images as defying descriptíon, nor
did they report them as having features which would be physicatry

impossible. The image reported by subjects, without exception,

wasof a cube with features corresponding to those of one
physically present.

The sugar cube o<periment, by reguiring the imaginal performance of

à physicarty- impossibre task, provided a test of the propositional
accounL of imagery, As rsugarnessr was a critical factor in the
taskr the propositional account would, have preclicted that rsugarnessl
 194,

would have been incorporated into the image. ft was found, however,
that the reported image did not contain such information, though
there was evidence from performance measures that the information was

present in some other form. The finding from this experiment suggests
that pictorial descriptions are appropriate for the representation of
the image,

A recent statement by Kosslyn and Pomerantz (1977) on this question

is as follows;
"An image is a spatial representation like that
underlying the experience of seeing an object
during visual perception. These images may be
generated. from underlying abstract representations
., but the contents of these r:nderlying
representations are accessible only via generation
of a surface (experienced) imagie.tl
(p. 6s)

Ìlhile supporting the tlmagery! position, they appear to be

ambiguous as to whether they would regard as part of the image

other more abstract information which is not depicted in the image,

Threir statement leads to two possible interpretations of the results
from the sugar cube experiments because of its non-representation,
rsugarness! could be consiclered either as non-imagery information,

or as a part of the image which is not experienced. It is

suggested that evidence from the present research would favour

the former interpretation and that information regarding 'sugarness!

was not present in the image modality.

ft is worth noting on this issue, that while subjective reports

relevant to Èhe nature of the image \^¡ere generally consistent with
the pictorial view, this occuireil more often for high imaging subjects
tha¡ for low imaging subjects. For example, in the sugar cube
 l-95,

experÍnent, about one third of low irnaging suhjects did incorporate

the sugar quality into their images, which suggests that their
images may have had more of a propositional component than was the

case for high inaging subjects.

The results from the interference experiment offer some support for

this interpretation. Despite the difficulty of making precise

predictions based on a propositional accorrnt of imagery, it would
follow from that account that imagery should be either of no

specifiable modality, or of mixed modality. The finding that low

imaging subjects were influenced by both visual and auditory

interference could be regarded as further support for the idea that

thej-r images had more of a propositional component than those of
high imaging subjects, whose performance was disrupted only by
interference in the visual modality.

A consideration of the features of the stimulus which influenced the

performance of both groups of subjects provided further süpporÈ.for
thís interpretatìon. Low imaging subjecÈs were affected also by

the size of the stìmulus. One possibility is that a feature such

as size involved more than pictorial information, as the smallness
of the cube would have increased the difficulty of dissecting it into
27 smaller cubes. It is suggested that the irnagery of low imaging
subjects, was of necessity multi-modal as it was a literal memory

imagery of the stimuluè. High imaging subjects, in this particular

task, were influenced by information which added to the pictorial
details (e.g. they performed, better when there were extraneous details
painted on the stimulus) . ft is sugges'ted that high jnaging subjects
 196 -

vrere betÈer at selectlng task relevant features and could construct

an image suited to the task.

This difference between their images could be described alternatively

in terms of an activation dimension. fhe imagery of low imaging
subjects resembled a passive memory image evoked by their internal
model of the task. This would account for their altered performance
when the stimulus was small or made of sugar. It is possible that
the detaìIs on the complex cube may have made excessive demands on
their imaging skitls and so \^Iere omitted from their images,

Ttre imagery of high imaging subjects, howeyerf had features which

suggested that it \^Ias more like an active construction designed to

meet the requirer :nts of the task. Ttre degree to which an image
resembled Èhe stimulus appeared to depend on how adequate Èhe

stimulus \^ras for the task. Such an interpretation would account for
the equivalent performance of high imaging subjects with large and

small stimuli.

2. Dete ts of Functionalitv

The findings from each experiment in the series have relevance to

the question of the functionality of imagery, Before these findings

can be interpreted, however, it is necessary to distinguish between
functionality and effectiveness. In the particular task employed in
this research, an image appeared to influence performance. AII
subjects reported the presence and use of an image for ttrc task'
tfhen required to do the task during visual interference, aII subjects
performed \^rorse which suggested. that visual signals interfered with

the processing mechanisms being employed for the task. While there
 r97.

is eyidence w.hich suggests that ¡rerceptÌ.on ¿nd irnagery utilise

the same processing channels, there is none to suggest that these
channels are shared by a third process. The above findings would
appear to be consistent therefore with the idea that a:r imaget

wheneyer presentf was functional.

Not atl subjects, however, could use their images effectively. The

research. provided consistent evidence that high imaging subjects

were more successful ín their use of imagery than were low imaging

subjects. As noted above, the images of high imaging subjects

differed from those of low imaging subjects in that' as reportedt
they appeared to be refined to the needs of the task. fhe

associ.ated superior performance Suggested that the most effective

images were those which had been constructed for a purposer rather

than those which reSembled memory ìmages of the stimulus' Moreover,

it was found that the techniques reported by high imaging subjects

(suctr as keeping the image still) were more often associated with

Successful performance. Tkrese findings suggeSt that successful

performance ÍIay be related more to the presence of an image of a

particular kind and the processes which are applied to it, rather than
to the generally accepted notion of !good.' and tpoor' images,

It is suggested that all sr:bjects performed more accurately in the

sugar cr:be experiment because the task represented a more obvious
example of a problem solving task. All but two subjects had
acknowledged that the sugar cube could. not be cut :-'ntuo 27 smaller

cuhes phys:icallyr as descrihed.. It would apPear to have been

sufficiently a problem that a memory image r¡Ias considered inadeguate,

even by low imaging subjects;
 I98.

Thus about two:thirds of low imaging subjects. as well as nearly

aJ-I high imaging subjects, constructed a non-sugar cube image,

Both high and l-ow imaging subjects made less errors with the sugar
cube stimulus than with the wooden stimulus and took longer to do
the task. The question could be raised as to whether the exÈra

time taken hras to construct an image or whether, }raving constructed

an image, the task required more time. Previous research would
suggest that constructing an image takes so l-itt1e time that the
second alternative is the more likely. This particular experiment
was the only occasion when there hrere time changes for high and low

imaging subjects in the same direction, There woufd be no reason to

suppose that high imaging subjects lost the ability to use active
images in this task. It is more likely that 1ow imaging subjects
also took longer because they were using a different tlpe of image.

One could speculate as to why high imaging sr:bjects performed better

when presented with a complex stimulus. It is possibl-e that the
presence of additional informaÈion in Èhe stimulus may have
heightened the probability that high imaging subjects would construct
a more directly task relevant image. Alt-ernatively, iÈ may have been
easier for an individual subject to form an image when he had a rich
field of detail from wTrich to select,

The ease with which even low imaging subjects in the training

experiment adopted the recommended technigues suggests Èhat their

earlier poor performance at the task may have refLected a lack of
experience with imaging tasks, rather than lack of imaging potential.
As noted in Chapter 2, Doob (l-972) and Marks (1972) considered that
at least the potential for imãging Ìs universal, The improvement in
 199.

perfornance which was found to follow a mini¡num of experience with

the task would support their view. Itre longer time taken by low
imaging subjects following training implied that they were trying
to implement the techniques, Ttreir reduction in error scores irnplied
that they were doing so successfully,

It could be considered surprising that many people avoid developing

irnaging abitity, when it would appear to be readily improved by a

¡nini¡num of pracÈice. Íhe link between imagery and concrete operational

thinking, in Piagetian terms, fiây offer a partial account, in Èhat
imaging as a form of thinking is of restricted usefulness and tends
not to be encouraged in conventional education. Íhe negative, though
Iow, relationship between measures of irnaging experience and

intellectual a-bility Cas díscussed in Chapter 4) is consisÈent with

this interpretation.

The interpretation hras supporÈed by evidence from the interference

oçeriment that low imaging subjects were trying to use techniques
with which they !{ere more faniliar, that is, non-imaginal techniques,
Unlike that of low imaging subjects, the performance of high imagers
r^ras not disrupted by auditory interference as they appeared, by their
overall successful performance, to be using imaginal techniques,
This finding is consistent with Paiviors (1971) view that subjects
are active agents who will select the strategy which appears to them
to be the most appropriate for the task, regardless of instructions,
 200.

3. Accessibilitv to Intros'pection
Subjects t reports were concerned with the techniques they used for

solving the image task and with the properties of their images.
The reports of how they used their images related directly to the
degree of success in terms of error and time rates. To the extent
that subjects r reports of how they used their images were associated
with distinct patterns in performance, it would appear that some of
the functional aspects of the imagíng process are accessible to
introspection.

The descriptions provided by high and low imaging subjects of the

properties of the images themselves, however, revealed a clear

distinction: \^rhen low imaging subjects in the complexity experiment
described their images as simple, their performances reflected the
equivalence for them between the simple and the complex stimulus
conditions, Similar1y, in the experiment concerned with image sj-zel
when low imagers reported using a smaller image, they performed

differently from when they reported usÌng a larger image.

This consistency between reported image and measured performance did

not occur for high imaging subjects. When they reported equivalent
images in both cond.itions (e.g, a simple ìmage in the complexity

experiment), their performances differed. It is perhaps surprising

that those subjects who appeared to be most in control of their
images, who extracted relevant pictorial features, and accordingly
performed better, \^rere less able to report accurately the processes
relevant to the solution of the task, Their performance was less
predictable from Èheir descriptions than occurred for low imaging
subjects.
 , ,201-,

The apparent paradox could be interpfeted as indicating that low

imagers haye more insight into theír cognitive processes and are

better at monitoring them. An interpretation which is more in

keeping with the emerging picture, however, is that there may be
less for low irnaging subjects to report about their use of imagery.
The predominantly memory nature of their images (as hypothesized)

may be more open to description than the more complex imaging process
for high imaging subjects. It may be, as with skills generally,
that the image construction process had become automatic for high
inaging subjects and thus less arai.lable for reporting,

!,lhile both groups of subjects could report on their images, the

experiments provided evidence that the problem solying process
involved more than their i:nages. Low imaging subjects appeared to
try to utilize non-imagery technigues [hence the disruption caused

by auditory interference). For high irnaging subjects, the findings

suggest that imageqr was more dÍrectry invorved. fhese additional
processes were not reported, by either group of sr:bjects,

4. Difference in Performarce of Hiqh and Low Imaging Subjects

The most staþIe result throughout the experiments was the consistently

different patterns of perforrnance for high and low imaging subjects,

On almost every aspect of performance measured, there were
significant differences between them.

The differences were not merely quanÈitative, As discussed earlier,

high anil 1ow imaging sr:bjects were affected differently by experimental
manipulation, such as stimuh¡s sizer stimulus complexity, and
 202.

auditory interference, Furthermore, they made different types of

errors¡ high imagers were more lìkely to underestimate than to
overestimate the nu¡¡ber of cubes in the image; Iow imagers more
often overestimated. They were also distinguishable in the relation-
ship between their time and error scores 3 for high imagers, there
vfas no relationship; for low imagers, the relationship was positive'

The emergence of these distinct patterns suggests that the degree to

which imagery can be effectively used in problem solving tasks may

be quite different for the tvro groups of subjects. As noted above,

high imagers performed better when the demands of the task in terms
of imagery htere higher. The performance of low imagers, however,

reflected the influence of arry stimulus feature which would have made

the Èask more difficult to perform physically.

It is suggested that the image of low imaging subjects is under the

control of the nature of the task. Properties of the stimulus which
influenced the task, irrespective of modality, were carried over ínto
their images, which in turn influenced their performance. In this
way, the performance of tow imaging subjects was determined by the
image they happened to form. The disruption to performance under

visual interference condition suggested. that, even for low imaging

subjects, the image was functional. The disruption to perfor*ance

associated with auditory interference suggested that their images

were not sufficient for the task and. that they attempted to utilise
other techniques.

uigh inaging subjects, in contrast, carried gver into their images

only task relevant vìsual information. They appeared to be in control

 203.

of the content of their images. The finding that subjective reports

of their images did not fully account for their performance (e.9. in
the complexity experiment) suggests that other types of processes
associated with the solution of the task were occurríng, These

other processes, unlike those of low imaging subjects, were not

affected. by auditory interference, It is possible' therefore' that
these other processes involved in solving the problem were imagery
based, The finclings thus support Richardsonrs view (1969) r as

discussed in Chapter 1, that control is a vital factor in imagery

ability.

The interpretation of the results from the experiments in terms of

qualitatively different processes involved in the imaging of high
and low imagery subjects Ís consistent with Sheehan"s (1967)
interpreÈation of his experiment on cognitive styles fas discussed
in Chapter 7). He interpreted his findings as suggesting that the
imaging process for low imaging subjects was simplerr in his task,
the more compJ-ex the stimuli became, the more the perforrnance of

low imagers deteriorated. For high imaging subjects, however, there

was evidence of a mcre complex relationship: with a medium level of
stimulus complexity, their performance improved. The relationship
between complexity of the task and, performance, in his experiment,
appeared to be curvilinear and nonmonotonic. Similarly. the findings
frorn the present research suggests that the imagery of high imaging

subjects was inyolved in the solutìon of the task in a less predictable

fashion than was the case for low imaging subjects.
 204.

5. Sex Differences

Although the present research had not set out to investigate sex
differences in,ìmaging abitity, it did provide some information
releyant Èo the issue. As discussed in Chapter 4, previous research
on the relationship had been inconclusive. Attempts were made in
this research to counteract its possibte contamination by selecting
an equal nunber of high and low imaging alrility subjects from both
sexes.

It had been found in Experiment ,1 that males reported experiencing

inagery more often than did females. on the abitity to manipulate
imagery, however, the difference between the sexes did not reach
an acceptaþIe level of significance, but was sufficient to suggest
the possibility that males may be superior in the ability'
(p = .Q7,2-tailed)

Sex was taken out as a covariant in the analysis of the three

experiments in which the experímental design offered no interference
or assistance (image si,ze, image complexity, and physical irnpossibility) '

Sex was a significant variable in all three experiments for errorst

which had emerged as the more unambiguous measure of performance!
(See Appendices , 9, 12, J4)

Generally, the results indicated that males performed the task more

successfully. Some female subjects, however, performed exceptionally

wetl. For exarnple, of the four subjects throughout the experiments

who made no errors, two were females, CIearIy, further research is

needed to determine how images and the iroagi.ng process differ for
males and females.
 205,

III: A MORE SPECULATTYE DISCUSS]ON OF IMAGERY GENERALLY

The research consisted of an experimental analysis of the nature,

function and subjective experience of imagery, The previous section

attempted to integrate the findings from the experiments into
statements relevant to these three areas, within the safety of the
experimental context. The following discussion is a¡r attempt to
extend their ímplications beyond. those confines.

The present research required the use of an image, not merely the

presence of an image. Vühile purely pictorial terms appeared

adequate to describe the static image, they were inadequate to

account for the processes applied to the image in the task. It

is suggested that the choice offered by the two alternatives Èo

the nature of imagery, the pictorial and the propositional, is

inadequate where the concern is with more than the presence of a

passive irnage.

As d.iscussed in Chapter J-, the pictorial approach is accepted by

many imagery critics (e.g. Hayes-Roth, 1,979\ as having an advantage
in that it is readily testable. It makes predictions of positive
outcomes, rather than offering an account of their a_bsence. It is

believed, however, that findings which do not support the pictorial

viewpoint do not necessarily constitute support for the propositional
viewpoint. Vfhile philosophÌcally the proposition is a thoroughly
researched concept, from a psychological poínt of view it is

virtually an unknown quantity. It is difficult to speculate what

would constitute empirical support for the notion that images are
p,ropositional in general. It is even more difficult in this type of
experÌment where the object to ¡e manìpulated, mentally is so readily
 206.

imaged. One coul-d suggest, that a possible task would be one involving
an image too complex to represent pictorially, such as those reported
by de Grootts chess masters (J.965),

The present research allowed statements to be macle about the

relationship between images and percepts. The images which emerged

in the experiments, however, were of two distinct types: some were

memory images of the stimuli; others were images refined to the

requirements of the task. tt is suggested that percepts, memory

images and problem solVing images have in corrunon that they are the

s¡¿-products of a process. They appear to represent an íncreasing

level of processing, which has been described here as an activation
dimension.

The information in a percept, and perhaps that depicted in a memory

image, consists of that information from outside which has been

selected as a gestalt on the basis of previously stored categorisations.
Information depicted in a memory image is perhaps all of. this previous
information retained in an accessible form, as well as some elements
of association, A constructed image would appear to contain only
such elements of information as have been considered relevant to the
task at hand. The experiments also provided evidence, however, that
informatÍon rejected from the process of constructing a problem
solving image may nevertheless be present in some other form and

may become involved in the problem solving situation,

Each of the experiments provided evidence that it is not the presence

of an image, but the type of image prresent and the techniques apptied
to ìt which deter¡nine success'Ìn the irnaging task, The key findings
which supported this interpretation \,\'ere the superior performance of
 207.

subjects classified as being unable to ¡se their irnagery when the

task was sufficiently demandÌng of problem solving skilIs, and

the amenability of this ability to improvement. This suggestion that

imaging skilr is readily changed would need to be fitted in, however,
with the variety of findings that ímaging a-bility has a physiological
basisf and is therefore less avaitaJ¡Ie for change.

There is little doubt that the experience of imagery is availabre

for introspection. The present research suggests that part of the

functional aspects of tbe irnaging process can also be reported.

The fact that elenents in the image which subjects reported as being

functional were found to be related to perfo:mance provid.ed an index

of the extent to which these functional aspe,:ts of the ímage are
accessible.

rt is equally evid.ent that some of the processes involved in solving

the problem \^rere not open to introspection. Subjects could describe
the properties of their images and t.he techniques they used. fhreir
reports were described in conventional terms, in keeping with the
pictorial metaphor. Non-imagery elements which were present, however,
were not reported, nor was anything of the image formation process.

In spite of the finding that much of the solution process was not
available to introspection, there would appear to be no justification
for accepting this as inevitably so. IÈ is possible, for instance,
that subjects appropriately trained may be able to report more,

The present resea,rch yielded evid.ence ìn support of tJre idea, as

discussed ìn the first chapter, that there are many types of imagery,
The two which were examined, îemory imagery and problern solving imagery,
 208.

aPPeared to have more in consnon with each ottrer than with the more
perceptually based imagery þerceptual, iconic, eidetic) or with
prirnary imagery (imagination, hypnagogic, hypnoponpic). !'or
instance, both memory and problem solvíng imagery involve retríeval
processes and would appear Èo be more readily controlled than are
other forms of imagery. Ttrough more open to control ttran other
forms¡ they emezged. as being distinguishable on this dimension.
Memory irnages are more likely to arrive unbidden, are quasi-
perceptual in nature, and can be more easily reinterpreted. It is
suggested that a problem solving image is constructed anew each time

it is required, and contains as littte irrelevanÈ informaÈion as

can be achieyed.

The range of phenomena to r¿hich the title of imagery has been

applied is vast. Milterrs request (J962) that the term rconsciousnesst
be banned till more precise terms for its several uses are developed

could be exteniled equally to the ter:n I image t , Vfhile it is like1y

that a factor in Miller's recommendation derived from doubts raised.
about the very existence of some of the phenomena to which ttre term
rconsciousnesst trad been applíed, no such doubts would appear to apply

to the term ri4ag"t. The only doubt might concern the appropriateness

of applying the same term to all of them.

 209.

rV: RECOMMENDATIONS

The clear distinction which emerged in the present research

between the images and their use for high and 1ow imaging subjects

makes it imperative that future research takes into account the

level of imaging ability of subjects. It would appear to be

equally necessary for future research to consider the imaging

process for high, 1ow and medium levels of imagery. While
subjects' performance on measures of imagery ability indicated
a contínuum, there was nothing to suggest that the processes
involved in the use of imagery operated on a continuum.

For example, in tfie complexity experiment, \^Ihere high imaging

subjects ignored the irrelevant details, and low imaging subjects
could not incorporate them into their images, it may have
happened that suJcjects of medium imaging ability would have been
infl-uenced differentty. One possibility is thaÈ their 'imagery
skilts may have been adequate to include the extra details, but
inadequate to discor:nt them as irrelevant to the task.

One problem ofÈen encountered in previous research on imageryt

as discussed in Chapter 3, was that the design of the experiments
was such that the results were inÈerpretable only within the

framework of the experiments. ft would appear that a more

productive approach would be to employ a less structr¡red framework
ln such a case, there would be little room to guestion whether Èhe

results were merely the product of the particular experimental

design
 2-10.

Às a research strategy¡ it is suggested that experiments provide

situations in whÌch subjects can choose their method of using
imagery' rt has been õlemonstrated repeatedly that subjecÈs do

choose their own techniques for perforrning â task. Furthermore,

the present research found that variation in subjecÈs' choice
provided a valuable source of information. rt is suggested that
a more appropriate research strategy, given these two consid.erations,
would be to examine the techniques subjects choose, rather than to
instruct them to use particular techniques.

Finally, it is hoped that a less structured approach would extend

the areas of imagery which can be ínvestigated more furry. The
rore of imagery in memory has been werl researched, Little is
knov¡n of the creative rore of imagery in more flexíbre areas, such
as problern sorvr'ng and imagination. rt is hoped that persevering
with these more erusive areas of imagery wourd further the
understanding of valued aspects of human experience,

***
 2LT.

LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix No. Page

I EXPERIMENT I: l1l:e Betts QMI Vividness of Inagery

Scale. (Sheehan version I 1967). 2l-3

2 EXPERIMENT I: QuestionnaÍre on Individual Differences.

214

3 EXPERIMENT 1:Vividness of Imagery. Paivio I

s
I'tord Imagery Rating Scale. 2l-5

4 EXPERIMÐ{T 1: Minnesota Paper Form Board Test. 2J.6

5 EXPERIMENT l: Questionnaire on Minnesota Paper

Form Board Test. 2L7

6 EXPB,IMENT 1: Space Relations Test. 2r8

7 EXPERIMM{TS 2-7 z Scoring Sheet for Cube-Cutting

experiments. 2l-9

I EXPERII{EIITS 2-4: QuestionnaÍre on Techniques

used to solve test. 220

9 EXPERII4II{T 2: Ânalysis of Variance Table for

221
funage size results.

10 EXPB.IMENT 2: Spearman Correlations between

reported image size and errors, time. 222

11. EXPERIMÐ{T 3: Questionnaire on details recalled. 223

t2. Ð(PB.IMENT 3: Analysis of Variance Table for

image complexity results. 224

I3 EXPERIIvIENT 3: t-tests for details recalled. 225

I4.I EXPERIMENT 4: Analysis of Variance Tab1e for

effect of plysical impossibility on imaginal task. 226
l4.2 226a
 272.

Appendix No.
P.ge

15. Contents of Visual Interference slides. 227

16. Contents of Auditory Interference tape. 228

L7. Ð(PERWENT 5: Analysis of Variance Tab1e to

establish equivalence of groups on initial trial. 229

18. EXPERIII{Ð{T 5: Analysis of Variance Tab1e for

230
effect of interference.

19. Analysis of Variance Table for techniques used

in inagery task. 23L

20. EXPERIMB{T 7: Analysis of Variance Table for

Effect of Practice and Training on an Imaginal 232
Task.

2L. EXPERIMEIT 8: Analysis of Variance Tab1e for

tine taken to solve physical task. 233
 213.

APPENDIX I

THE BETTS QMI VIVIDNESS OF TMAGERY SCALE

(Sheehan version, 1967)
INSTRUCTIONS
The aim of this test is to determine the vividness of your Ímagery.
The items of the test wiII bring certain images to'your mind.
You are to rate the vividness of each image by reference to the
accompanying rating scale, which ís shown at the bottom of the
page. For example, if your image is t'vague and dimtt, you give
it a rating of 5. Record your answer on the answer sheet
prov ided. Just write the apþropriate rating in the brackets
after each item number.

Before you turn to the items on the next page, familiarize

yourself with the different categories on the rating scale.
Throughout the test, refer to the rating scale when judging
the vividness of each image. A copy of the rating scale will
be printed on each page.

Please do not Lurn to the next page until you have completed
the items on the page you are doing, and do not turn back to
check on other items you have done. Complete each page before
moving on to the next page. Try to do each iLem separately'
indepent of how you may have done other items.

RATING SCALE
The image aroused by an item of this test may be -
Perfectly clear and as vivid as the actual experience .. Rating I
Very clear and comparable in vividness to the actual
experience ... ..... Rating 2
Moderately clear and vivid Rating 3
Not clear or vivid, but recognizable Rating 4
Vague and dim ..... ..... Rating 5
So vague and dim as to be hardly discernibl-e Rating 6
No image present at allr vou only "knowing" that
you are thinking of the object Rating 7
 L.2

EXÀMPLE

An example of an item on the test would be one which asked you

to consider an image which comes to your mindrs eye of a red
apple. If your visual image was moderately clear and vivid
you would check the rating scale and mark "3" in the brackets
as follows.

Item Number Rating

5 (3)

No\^rturn to the next page when you have understood these

instructions and begin.

Think of some relative or friend whom you frequently see,

considering carefully the picture that rises before your mindrs
eye. Classify the images suggested by each of the following
questions as indicated by the degrees of clearness and vividness
specified on the Rating Sca1e.
ILem
I. The exact contour of face, head. shoulders and body.
2. Characteristic poses of head, attitudes of body, etc.
3. The precise carriage, length of step, etc. in walking.
4. The different colours h'orn in some familiar costume.
Think of seeing each of the following, considering carefully the
picture which comes before your mind's eye; and classify the
image suggested by each of the following questions as indicated
by the degrees of clearness and vividness specified on the Rating
Scale.

5 The sun as it is sinking below the horizon.

Think of each of the following sounds, considering carefully the

image which comes to your mindrs ear, and classify the images
suggested by each of the following questions as indicated by the
degrees of clearness and vividness specified on the Rating Sca1e.

6. The whistle of a locomotive.

7 The honk of an automobile.
 1.3

8. The meowing of a cat.

o The sound of escaping steam.
10. The clapping of hands in applause.

Think of "feeling" or touching each of the following,

considering carefully the image which comes to your mindrs
touch, and classify the images suggested by each of the
following questions as indicated by the degrees of clearness
and vividness specífied on the Rating Scale.

1r. Sand
L2. Linen
13. Fur
L4. The prick of a pin
15. The warmth of a tepid bath

Think of performing each of the following acts, considering

carefully the image which comes to your mindrs arms, Iegs, Iips,
etc. ¡ and classify the images suggested as indicated by the degree
of clearness and vividness specified on the Rating Scale.

16. Running upstairs

17. Springing across a gutter
18. Drawing a circle on paper
19. Reaching up to a high shelf
20. Kicking something out of your vray.

Think of tasting each of the following, considering carefully the

image which comes to your mindrs mouth, and classify the images
suggested by each of the following questions as indicated by the
degrees of clearness and vividness specified on the Rating Scale.

2L. Salt
22. Granulated (white) sugar
23. Oranges
24. JeIly
25. Your favourite.soup.
 1.4

Think of smelling each of the following, considering carefully

the inage which comes Lo your mindrs nose and classify the
inages suggested by each of the following questions as
indicated by the degrees of clearness and vividness specified
on the Rating Scale.

26. An ill-ventilated room

27. Cooking cabbage
28. Roast Beef
29. Fresh paint
30. New leather.

Think of each of the following sensations, considering

carefully the image which comes before your mind, and classify
the images suggested as indicated by the degrees of clearness
and vividness specified on the Rating Scale.

3r. Fatigue
32. Hunger
33. A sore throat
34. Drowsiness
35. Repletion as from a very full meal.
 2I4.

APPENDIX 2

QUESTIONNAIRE ON INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

INSTRUCTIONS:

The statenents on the following pages represent ways of thinking,

studying anC problem solving, which are true for some tr,eople
and not for othe,rs. Read each statenent and decide whether or
not it is true with respect to yourself. Then indicate your
answer on the separate ansv¡er sheet.

If you agree with the statement or decide that it does descríbe

your ansl^¡er TRUE. If you disagree with the statenrent cr fee]
that it is not descriptive of ycu, anshrer FALSE. Answer the
statements as carefully and honestly as you can. The statements
are not designed to assess the goodness or badness of the way you
think. They are attempts to discover the methods of thinking
you ccnsistently use in various situaticns. There are no right
or r{rong answers.

In marking the answérs on the answer sheet, be sure that the

number you are answering is the same as the number on the answer
sheet.

every statement either true (T), or false (F), even

¡-nshrer
if you are not cornpletely sure of your enswer. Please turn c'ver
and begin.
 2.2

I f have no difficulty in expressing myself verbally.

2. Listening to someone recount his experiences does not
usually arouse mental pictures of the incidents being
described.
3. When reading fiction I usually form a mental picture
of a scene or room that has been described.
4 Essay writing is difficult for me.

5. By using mental pictures of the elements of a problem,

I am often able to arrive at a solution.
6. I enjoy being able to rephrase my thoughts in many \¡rays
for varietyrs sake when both writing and speaking.
7 I enjoy vísual arts, such as painting, more than reading.

I I teII jokes and stories poorer than most people.

o I enjoy doing work that requires the use of words.

10. My day dreams are sometimes so vivid f feel as though f

actually experience the scene.
rt. I often use mental pictures to solve problems.
L2. I enjoy reading an interesting story even if it is not'
particularly well written.
13. f find it difficult to find enough synonyms or alternate
forms of a word when writing.
L4. I have difficulty expressing n¡-self in writing.
15. My knowledge and use of granmar needs improvement.

16. I would rather work with ideas than words.

L7. f memorize material largely by the use of verbal repetition.

18. I enjoy learning new words and incorporating them into my
vocabulary.
19. I do not have a vivid imagination.
20. f can easily picture moving objects in ny mind.

2L. Most of the time my thinking is verbal, as though talking

to nyself.
22. ff given the choice, I would rather listen to a good speaker
than visit an art gallery.
 2.3

23. I find that f am more critical of writing style than

content when reading literature.
24. I can form mental pictures to almost any word.
25. I have only vague visual impressions of scenes f have
exper ienced.

26. My vocabulary is not as large as I would tike

27. When doing mental arithmetic, such as addition, I think

in abstract terms rather than actually picturing the
numbers.

28. I can easily think of slmonyms for words.

29. I think that most people think in terms of mental
pictures whether they are completely ar,^¡are of it or not.
30. I am able to express my thoughts clearly.
31. I remember things I have done myself, much better than
things I have read.
32. My powers of imagination are higher than average.

33. f consider myself a fast reader.

34. I have a large vocabulary.
35. I find it easy to visualize the faces of people I know.

36. My marks have been hampered by inefficient reading.

37. It bothers me when I see a word used improperly.
38. I donrt believe that anyone can think in terms of mental
pictures.
39. I can easily form a mental picture of Prime Minister lrlhitlam.
40. I am fluent at writing essays and reports.
41. I would rather have a verbal description of an object or
person, than a picLure.
42. f can close my eyes and easily picture a scene f have
exper ienced.

43. I have a photographic memory.

44. I feel a picture is worth a thousand words.

45. I cannot generate a mental picture of a friendrs face when
I close my eyes.
 2.4

46. When someone describes somethÍng that happens to him, I

sometimes find myself vividly imagining the event that
happened.

47. f can add numbers by imagining thern to be written on a

blackboard.
48. I have found it easy in the past to learn a second
Ianguage.

49. VlhenI hear or read a word, a stream of other words

often comes to mind.
50. I seldom dream.
5I. I read rather slowly.
52. I am usually able to say what I mean in my first draft
of an essay or letter.
53. I am good at thinking up puns.
54. f never use mental pictures or images when trying to
solve problems.
55. Vlhile I have often seen pictures of him, I cannot remember
exactly what President Nixon looks Iike.
56. I ofÈen remember work I have studied by imagining the page
on which it is written.
57. Studying the use and meaning of words has become a habit
with me.
58. I speak or write what comes into my head without worrying
greatly about my choice of words.
59. Not enough people pay attention to the manner in which they
express themselves.
60. I enjoy solving crossword puzzles and other word games.

6I I find it difficult to form a mental picture of anything.

62. Memorizing by verbal repetition is time consuming and
inefficient.
63. ùIy dreams are extremely vivid.
64. f have better than average fluency in using words.
65. I read a great deal.
66. f am continually aware of sentence structure.
67. My thinking often consists of mental pictures or images.
 2.5

68. I do not form a mental picture of people or places when

reading of them.
69. f often have difficulty in explaining things to others.
70. My day dreams are rather indistinct and hazy.
7I. I find it easier to learn from a demonstration than from
writt.en Ínstructions.
72. f often enjoy the use of rnental pictures to reminisce.
73. I often use mental images or pictures to help me
remember things.

74. When remembering a scene f use verbal descriptions rather

than mental pictures.
75. I take great pains to express myself with precision and
accuracy in both verbal speech and written work.
76. f have never done well in learning Ianguages.
77. The proper use of words is secondary to the ideas and
content of speech and writing.
78. I have a better memory for things I have read, rather
than things f have experienced.
79. I am disturbed by people who quibble about word usage.

80. f have difficulty producing associations for words.

81. I often have ideas that I have troubte expressing in words.

82. I think that puns are the lowest form of humour.

83. Just before falling asleep I often find myself picturing

events that have happened.
84. I prefer to read instructions about how to do something,
rather than have someone show me.
85. f am a good story te1ler.
86. I spend very little time attempting to increase my
vocabulary.

***
 2I5.
APPENDIX 3

RATING SCALE
Vividness of Imaqery

Nouns differ in their capacity to arouse "mental images" of

things or events. Some words arouse a Sensory experience, such
as a mental picture or sound, very quickly and easily' whereas
others may do so o:-ìy v¡ith difficulty (that is, after a long
delay) or not at aII. The purpose of this questionnaire is
to rate a list of words as to the ease or difficulty with which
they arouse mental images. Any word which, in your estimation'
arouses a mental image (i.e. a mental picture, or sourd, or other
sensory experience) very quickly and easily should be given a
hiqh imagery rating; any word that arouses a mental image with
difficulty or not at all should be given a low imagery rating.
t'App1e" would probably
Think of the words "apple" and "fact".
arouse an image relatively easily and would be rated as high
imagery; ',fact,' would probably do so with difficulty and would
be rated as fow imagery. since words tend to make you think
of other words as associates, for exampJ-e, knife-fork, it is
important that you note only the ease of getting a mental image
of an object or an event to the word-

your ratings will- be made on a seven-point scale, where one is

the Low Imagery end of the scale and seven is the High Imagery
end of the scale. Make your rating by putting a circle around
the number from I to 7 that best indicates your judgnent of the
ease or difficulty with which the word arouses imagery. The
words that arouse images with the greatest difficulty or not
at all should be raÈed I; words that are intermediate in
ease or difficulty of imagery, of course, should be rated
appropriately between the two extremes. FeeI free to use the
entire ranc¡e of numbers, from I Lo 7; at the same time, don't
be concerned about how often you use a particular number as long
as it is vour true ludqment. work fairly quickly but do not be
careless in your ratings.

Below are four examples. Indicate the ease of getting an image

by circling the appropriate number.

 3.2

AUTOMOBTLB L23456 7
Low imagery High imagery
WRITER L23 456 7
Low imagery High imagery
DEMOCRACY 123 4s6 7
Low imagery High imagery
VAPOUR l-23 456 7
Low imagery High imagery

If necessary, refer back to these instructions when rating the

words on the following page.

AIR L23 456 7

Low imagery High imagery
MET,IORY L23 4 5 6 7
Low imagery High imagery
SAUCE I23 456 7
Low imagery High imagery
PRESENT l-23 4s6 7
Low imagery High imagery
DREAM 123 456 7
Low imagery High imagery
LORD L23 456 7
Low imagery High imagery
TTMEPIECE 123 456 7
Low imagery High imagery
MONTH 123 456 7
Low imagery High imagery
HOUR L23 456 7
Low imagery High imagery
COIN r23 456 ,7

Low imagery High imagery

HEAVEN L23 456 7
Low imagery High imagery
COST L23 456 7
L,ow imagery High imagery
 3.3

FUR L23 456 7

Low imagery High imagery
PRESSURB L23 456 7
Low imagery High imagery
LIFE ]-23 456 7
Low irnagery High imagery
THOUGHT l-23 456
Low imagery High imagery
CRII\,IE L23 456 7
Low imagery High imagery
HIDE L23 456 7
Low imagery High imagery
GENIUS L23 4s6 7
Low imagery High imagery
ORIGIN l-23 4s6 7
Low imagery High imagery
 PRACTICE PROBLEMS
A ¿ L 4

B M R -s-
_l
__-l---
E o --T P

I
1

5 v 6 A 7 F I L

w B G M N

L
Y D ) K o P

è
lo
 217

APPENDIX 5

QUESTIONNAIRE ON M.P.F.B. TEST

TNSTRUCTIONS

Circle the letter which best describes your answer.

1. STRENGTH AND CLEARNESS OF IMAGES VISUALIZED.

In solving the problems of this test, did you visualize

the figures and/or component parts, holding them as a sort of
rpicture in the headr during the solution process? Or, at the
moment of solution did you rsee! the result, e.g. the completed
figure, the figure in a new position, the assembled parts, etc.
as a whole. In any of these cases were your visualizations
(a) Almost photographic in strength and clearness of detail.
(b) Strong and clear with shape and form defined.
(c) Clearly present, rich in essential detail.
(d) Moderately clear with some detail.
(e) Present as a general impression only.
(f) Vague and ill-defined.
(s) Absent altogether.

2. TMPORTANCE AND USE OF VISUALIZATION TN SOLUTION.

fn solving the problems of this test did you MAKE USE of whatever
visualizing was present in getting the relations between the
shapes, forms, spaces. Were visual images an essential part of
the process? Did they help you? Did you feel, rThis would be
easy if I could get a clear picture of it and hold it in my head'?
Did you try deliberatel-y to get images as your method of approach?
How important were they?

(a The most important factor in solution.

(b A major factor in solution.
(C Ðefinitely used, along with other important factors.
(d Of some use in solution.
(e Of minor importance in incidental way.
( f Of no use at all, purely incidental if present.
(g A hindrance to solution - just 'got in the wayr.

3 FACILTTY AND MANIPULATION OF VTSUALTZATIONS.

In the solution of the problems of this test, did you

find yourself manipulating the figures and/or parts in visual
imagery, jugglíng them into various positions, turning them
a-round and over, forging new combirrations, Ímaging how they
would look in such and such a position, in a kind of mental
trial and error? I,üith what facility was this manipulation
effected? Try to consider this apart from the inherent difficulty
of the item.
 5.2

(a) Manipulation of images almost as easy as that of real

objects.
(b Manipulation easy and effortless.
(c Manipulation not difficult but required some effort.
(d Manipulation only effected with some diffícu1ty.
(e Manipulation difficult to point of creating tension.
( f Manipulation scarcely possible. Feelings of frustration?
(s Manipulation impossible.

***
 APPB\DIX 6
2r8.
SPACE IìELATIONS

DIIIECl'IONS
Iri'd Lhe place for Space lìelaLio's on the Answer sheet.

'l'his test consists of 60 patterns which

can be folc.led into fìgures. For each pattern, four figures are showr.l,
You are to decide which one of these flgures can be mac.le from the pattcrn show¡. 1'¡e palern
always s¡ows
the outside of the figure. I-Iere is an example:

Example X.

B c D

Which one of these four figures A, B, C, D,

- the
certainly canllot be made;they are not - can be made from the pattern in Example X? A anct ts
right shape. C is correct both in shape and size. you cannot make D
from this pattern. Therefore, on the Sample of the Answer Sheet on the ¡ext page, C has beer markecl for
Example X.

In the test there will always be a row of four ñgures follorving each pattern
-
In every row there is only one correct figure
-
Now look at the pattern for Example Y and the four choices for it. Note that when the patter¡ is folded,
the frgure must have three gray surfaces. Two of these rvi]l be large surlaces either of which could be the top
or the bottom of a box. The olher is a small surlace which rvould be one end of the box.

Example Y

A B
D

20
 o ) € V
I
C )
Þ
o I
t
0 f I V
¿
0 l s
t
z'9
 2]-9 -

APPENDIX 7

CUBE CTJTII}JG E)(PERTME}üI

SCORTNG SHEHT'

How many cuts are needed to cut the cube inEo 27 small cubes?
Vlhere will they be?

Rernembering that the cube is unpainted on the inside, how

many of the small cubes have
Ist ans. 2nd ans. Comment

I I black painted face

2 2 black
3 3 black
4 more than 3 black painted
5 I white painted face
6 2 white painted faces
7 3 white
I more than 3 white
9 no painted faces

time:
10. 1 black, I white
11. 2 black, I white
12. 3 bIack, 1 white
13. I b1ack, no white
14. 2 black, no white
15. 3 black, no white
16. 2 black, 2 white
]-7. 2 white, 1 black
18. 3 white, I black
19. I white, no black
20. 2 white, no black
2I. 3 white, no black
4 white, no black

ERRORS:

TIME:
 220.

APPENDIX 8

OUESTIONNAIRE - PHASE TII

I. Was your image divided, i.e. was it cut, dÍd Ít have

linesr or did it have no divisions at aII?

2 When you vrerecounting the cubes, did you mentally

rotate the cube, or did you hold the cube in a fixed
position and move around it yourseLf., or díd you
feel you were doÍng somethíng else?

3 Did you see Èhe cube from a particular angle more

often than from others?

4. When you were doing the task, did you consider the
whole cube intact, or did you work with faces, or
with indivÍdual cubes?

5. Is there anything else you were doÍng with the cube

that I havenft asked you about?

****
 22I.

APPÐ{DIX 9: TABLE 6 1

EXPERIMB'IT 2: IMAGE SIZE

ANATYSTS OF VARIANCE RESULTS

(on scores transformed to square root value)

ERRORS

SOI'RCE df MS F

Maln Effects
Imagery Level- 1 9.2 37. I ***
Condition I 0.2 I 0

Interactións
Imagery Leval x Condition I t.2 5.0
Côvariate
Sex t 3.9 15.9 ***

Residual I00 0.2

TTME

SOI'RCE df MS F

Main Effects
ûnagery Leve1 I 4I0.7 22.2 ***
Condition I 25.2 I.4

Interactions
ïmagery Level x Condition 1 0.2 0.0

Covariate
Sex t s3 .8 2.9

Residual r00 18.5

* p< .05
** p< .0r
*** p< .001
 222

APPENDIX IO

Ð(PERIMENT I: IMAGE SIZE

SPEARMAN CORRELATIONS BEfifEÐ{ REPORTÐ IMAGE SIZE AÌ{D ERRORS, TrME.

IMAGE SIZE WITH

ERORS

TOTAL SUBJECTS r = -.I9

e
(P =.05)
N=104

HTGH IMAGB.S r s = -.06 (p = .65)

N=52

LOW II\4AGERS r S = -.19 (p = .t7)

N=52

TTME

TOTAL SUBJECTS r=.05

s
(p = .60)
N = l-04

HIGH ilUAGER,S r=.15

s
(p = .291
N=52

LOW IIIIAGERS t
s
.15 (p = .28')
N=52

***
 223.

APPB{DIX 11

EXPERIMÐ{T 3: IMAGE CON{PLEXIT:T

OUESTIONNATRE ON DETATLS

I I¡lhat can you tell me about the cube?

2 What was painted on the cube? Colours?

3 Was there anything about the colours and the symbols

that you noticed?

4 Were you aware of the figures painted on the cube

during the ta5k?

5 Did you try to use the details during tlre tAsk?

6. Did they get in the way during the task?

 224.

APPENDIX 12: TABLE 7.4

Ð(PERI!4ENT 3: ]MAGE COMPLE (ITY

ANALYSTS OF VARIA¡JCE RESULTS

(on scores transformed to square root value)

ERRORS

SOURCE df MS F

Mai-n Effects
Imagery Level I 7.2 33.5 ***
Condition I t.2 5.7 *

fnteractlons
Irnagery Level x Condition I .7 3.0

Cóvar iate
Sex I 4.3 19.6 ***

Residual 104 -2

TIME

SOURCE df MS F

Main Effects
Imagery Level I 496.2 33.0 ***
Condition I 2.5 o.2

Interactions
Imagery Level x Condition l_ 0.0 0.0

Covariate
Sex I 1.I 0.1

Residual 104 15.0

* p <.05
** p <.01
*** p < .001
 p P
SUBJECÐS

D L

HIGH 9.64 2.L6 .43

FIGURE r. 50 .328 .87 47 .389

LOW 9.04 2.65 54

ll
HIGH 4.84 3.87 .77 X
rd
ll
COLOUR OF I .16 .7L9 .36 47 .722
E Þ
H
FIGURE E td
LOVü 4.46 3.59 .73 È lrl
z(,
(,
H
X
ts
HIGH 9.L2 3.37 .67 L^J

COLOUR OF 1.9 5 .110 r.92 47 .0 60

H
3
Þ rJ
BACKGROUND
6) Þ
r¡J td
LOW 6.88 4.7L .96 l)
rr
rd
o
B
rd -J
Ei ol
trl
HIGH 13.96 6.22 L.24 X
H
TOTAT E
L.46 .364 1.33 47 .188
COLOUR
LOW II 33 7 .52 1.53

HIGH 23 .80 7 .85 1.57

TOTAI 1.41 .407 1.39 47 .170
DETAILS N
t\J

LOVü 20 .38 9 .32 r.90 L¡

 226.

APPS{DIX 14.1: TABLE 8.I

EXPERIMENT 4: EFFECT OF PHYSICAL POSSIBILINT ON AN IMAGINAL TASK

ANALYSTS OF VARIA¡¡CE RESULTS

(on scores transformed to square root value)

ERRORS

SOURCE df MS F

Main Effects
Imagery Leve1 t 19.s 52.2 ***
Condition I 2.2 5.8 *

Interactions
Imagery Level x
Condition I 0.2 0.6

Covar iate
Sex I 2.7 'r)**

Residual 87 0.4

TII\,IE

SOURCE ¡{f MS F
lvtain Effects

Imagery Level 1 839.6 38.5 ***

Condition I L23.L 5.6 *

Interactions
Inagery Level x
Condition I 40.7 1.9

Covariate
Sex I 0.5 0.0

Residual 87 2I.8
* p¿ .05
** p¿ .0r
*** p¿- .00r
 226a.
APPENDIX 14.22 TABLE 8.4
EXPERT¡4ENT 4: EFFECT OF PHYSICAL POSSTBILITY ON AN IMAGINAL TASK

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS

(on scores transformed to square root values)

PERFORMANCES OF SI'B,]ECTS TN BOTH CONDITIONS REPORTING IABSTRACTI IMAGES

ERRORS

SOURCE df MS F

Main Effects
Imagery level t L9.4 53.6***
Condition 1 2-O 5.6*
Interactions
Imagery level x 1 0.1 o.4
'Condiùion

Residual 85 o.4

TIME

SOURCE df MS F

Main Effects
Imagery level I 579 -A 29.2***
Condition 1 92.O 4.6*
Interactions
Imagery level x 1 62.7 3.2
Condition
Residual 85 19.9

* p<.05
** p<.01
*** p <.001
 227 .

APPENDIX 15
 trffi
fiíl il
z'sT
E'9T
 ì
v'9f
 r5.5

f
I

ffi

\
R
 Effi
ffi
I
I
9'9r
 228.

APPENDIX 16

CCNTIENTS OF AT'DITORY I}ITERFERMICE TAPE

SIDE 1

Nerrts 4 nins 35 secs

Advertisements t 24
News I 43
Advertisements I 26
News 3 22
Advertisements I 5
Item I 5
Music 0 30
News 2 40
Advertisements 0 5
Discussion I 39
Music 0 4
TaIk-back 2 27
Jargon 0 44
Advertisements 1 30
Mystery Prize 2 55

SIDE 2

Advertisements I 0

MusÍc 0 14
News I 6

Music 0 31
Discussion 11 t6
Advertisements t 40
Discussion 2 18
Advertisements 0 39
Discussion 9 40
Advertisements I 25
Discuss ion I I3
 229

APPM¡DIX 17

Ð(PERIMENT 5: EFFECT OF INTB.FERED{CE

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS '¿Ð ESTABLISH EQUTVATEI¡CE ON INITIAL TRIAI

(on scores transformed to square root value)

ERRORS

SOURCE df MS F

Main Effects
Imagery Level 1 9.1 t9 .3 ***
Condition 2 0.2 0.5
fnteractions
Imagery level x Conditíon 2 0.2 0.5
Covariate
Sex t 0.2 0.5

Residual s6 0.5

TIIUE

SOURCE df IVIS F

Main Effects
Tmagery Level I 548.5 29.2 ***
Condition 2 10 .0 0.5
Interactions
Inagery level x Condition 2 r3 .0 o.7

CovarLate
Sex I 72.L 3.8

Residual 56 18 .8

* p< .05
** P< .01
*** p< .001
 230.
APPE.iDIX I8: TABLE 9 .I

Ð(PER]MENT 5: TTTE EFFECT OF INTERT'ERBJCE

AITALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS

(on scores transformed to square root value)
ERRORS

SOURCE df MS F

Main Effects
Inagery Level I 360.5 35.1 ***
Condition 2 r8.9 1.8
Tr ials I 36.3 10 .5 **
Interactions
lmag. Level x Cond. 2 6.0 0.6
Imag. Level x Trials I 7.5 2.2
Cond. x Trials 2 14 .0 4.L *
ûnag. Level x Cond.
x Trials 2 3.7 1.1
Residual
(inag. level,
cond. stratum) 54 10. 3 3.0

Residual
( i¡nag . level , cond . , 54 L5.T2 3.4
trials stratum)

TIME

SOURCE df MS F

Main Effects
Inagery Level I 14,19.0 26.2 ***
Condition 2 38 .5 0.7
Tr ials I 395.5 13.0 **
Interactions
lnag. Level x Cond. 2 42.0 0.8
I¡nag. Level x Trials I 4L.9 r.4
Cond. x Trials 2 86. 5 2.8
Imag. Level x Cond.
x Trials 2 30.2 1.0

Residual
(imag. level, cond., s4 54. r I.8
stratum)
Residual
(inaS. 1evel, cond., 54 30 .5
trials straturn)
* P< .05
** p< .01
*** p< .001
 23I.
APPENDIX 19: TABLE IO 2

CH. IO : TECHNIQUES USED TO SOLVE ÎÍIE IMAGERY TASK

AT,¡ALYSIS OF VARTAI{CE REST]LTS

(on scores transformed to square root vatue)

ERRORS

SOURCE df MS F

Main Effects
Imagery Level I 19 .9 69.4 ***
Divis ions I r.6 5.6 *
Movenent I 4.3 1s .0 ***

fnteractions
Imagery Level x Divisions I 0.r 0.2
Imagery Level x Movement I 0.3 0.1
Divísions x Movement I 0.0 0.0
ûnagery Level x Divisions
x Movement I 0.4 1.5

Residual I88 0.3

TÏME

SOURCE df MS F

Main Effects
Imagery Level I 896. 4 47 .8 ***
Divis ions I 1. I 0.r
Movement I 14. 4 0.8

fnteractions
Imagery Level x Divisions I 2 .5 0.1
Imagery Level x l"lovement I 4 .5 0.2
Divisions x Movement I 3 7 0.2
Imagery Level x Divisions
x Movement I 4.9 0.3

Residual r88 18.8

* p< .05
** p< .01
*** p< .001
 232.
APPBIDIX 2.O ^ TABLE 11.2

EXPERIMFiT 7: EFFECT OF PRACTICE AND TRAINTNG ON AN IMAGTNAL TASK

AI{ALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS

(on scores transformed¡e square root value)

ERRORS

SOI'RCE df MS F

Main Effects
Imagery Level 2 I40.4 33.4 ***
Condition I 0.0 0.0
Tr ials I L46.7 L2L.6 ***
Intefactions
Inag. Leve1 x Cond. 2 13 .8 3.3 *
Imag. Level x Tria1s 2 12.3 L0.2 **
Cond. x Trials I 22.0 L8.2 **
Inag. Leve1 x Cond.
x Trials 2 4 4 3.7 'r

Residual 36 4.2 3.5

(imag" level,
cond. stratum)
Residual 36 L.2
( i¡nag" level, cond . ,
trials stratun)

TIME

SOURCE df MS F

Main Effects
Imagery Leve1 2 31 I 0.5
Condition I 1. 0 0.0
Trials I 259. 7 20.2 ***
Interactions
Inag. Level x Cond. 2 39 .3 0.6
Imag. Level x Trials 2 L26.2 9.8 **
Cond. x Trials 1 56.9 4.4 *
Imag. Level x Cond.
x Tria1s 2 I 4 0.1
Residual 36 66.7 5.2 *
( irnag . level , cond.
stratum
Residual 36 L2.8
(inag. levelr cond.¡
trials stratum)
* p<.05
** P<.01
*** p < .001
 233.

APPENDIX 2I: TABLE 13.4

Ð(PERIMENT 8: TITE RELATIONSHTP BHTWEB{ A PHYSICAL AND A¡{

IMAGINAI, TASK.

AI{ALYSIS OF VARIA}ICE RESULTS

FOR TIME TAKEbI.

SOURCE df MS F

I"lairr Effects
Imagery Level I 6677 .3 0.9
Method I 30245.r 4.2 *

Interactions
Imagery Level x
Ivlethod I L0672.5 r.5

Residual 68 7257.5

* p<.05
 234.

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