!"#$%&'()$*+*,%-.)/'!

"#$%%%&
KOMITET REDAKCYJNY
!"#$%&'(%)$*+*,%-.)/-0
Marek Mejor (redaktor naczelny)
Piotr Balcerowicz (z-ca redaktora naczelnego)
Monika Nowakowska
Anna Trynkowska
Malgorzata Wielinska
ADRES REDAKCJI
Uniwersytet Warszawski
Instytut Orientalistyczny
Krakowskie Przedmiescie 26/28
00-927 Warszawa
!"#$%&#'"(&)*$+"(,"-
./#!$%&)#012$1)&*
3).4&&(,"-*#./#$%&#5"$&)"+$,."+2#0."/&)&"4&
."#6+"*7),$#+"(#8&2+$&(#6$1(,&*#$.#0.99&9.)+$&
$%&#0&"$&"+):#./#$%&#;,)$%#./#6$+",*<+=#64%+:&)#>?@AAB?AC?D
E+)*+=#'",F&)*,$:G#3.2+"(G#!4$.H&)#IB?JG#?AAA
K(,$&(#H:
3,.$)#;+24&).=,4L#M#N+)&7#N&O.)
!"#$%&'()#%*&#&+&$
,'"*',)+%#-$"*#&.
,'"*',)/000
EDITORS
Piotr Balcerowicz & Marek Mejor
ASSISTANT EDITOR
Anna Trynkowska
Oriental Institute
Warsaw University
Krakowskie Przedmiescie 26/28
PL00-927 Warsaw, Poland
Copyright 2000 by Piotr Balcerowicz & Marek Mejor
All Rights Reserved
Cover design / Fonts: Piotr Balcerowicz
Typeset by: Piotr Balcerowicz
Devangar text typeset with
!"!"#$%&'(!%$)*+,*-#$.$%$/#0*12-*34$5*16,378$9#:;<*3=$)3<-3*>
Printed by
Zaklad GraIiczny Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego
Zam. /00
ISSN 12324663
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table oI Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
PreIace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
List oI Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Programme oI the ConIerence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
PROCEEDINGS
PIOTR BALCEROWICZ:
On the Date oI the Nyay!vatara . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
HORST BRINKHAUS:
The Mrkandeya-Episode in the Sanskrit Epics and Puranas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
JOHN BROCKINGTON:
The structure oI the Moksa-dharma-parvan oI the Maha-bharata . . . . . . . . . . . 71
MARY BROCKINGTON:
Jarsamdha and the magic mango: causes and consequences in
epic and oral tales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
RENATA CZEKALSKA:
Between Myth and Mystique: Thematic Spheres Shared by
Modern Hindi Poetry and Polish Avant-garde Poetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
RAHUL PETER DAS:
Indra and Siva

/

Rudra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
TATIANA Y. ELIZARENKOVA:
Words and things` in the Rg-veda (Iieldmeadowpasture) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
CEZARY GALEWICZ:
Changing Canons: What did Syana think he commented upon . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
JONARDON GANERI:
Rationality as a Method oI Research into the Nyya System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
MINORU HARA:
Two notes on the word upanisad in the Maha-bharata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
MARZENNA JAKUBCZAK:
Living Liberation (fivan-mukti) in Smkhya and Yoga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
JOANNA JUREWICZ:
Prajpati, the Fire and the pac!gni-vidya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
KLAUS KARTTUNEN:
Sparrows in Love`The Display and Pairing oI Birds in
Sanskrit Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
SHORYU KATSURA:
Ngrjuna and the Trilemma or traikaly!siddhi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
PAOLO MAGNONE:
Floodlighting the Deluge: Traditions in Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
HALINA MARLEWICZ:
Vednta Exegesis oI Taittiriy!panisad 2.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
MAREK MEJOR:
Some Observations on the Date oI the Yukti-dipika
(Apropos oI a New Edition) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
KUNWAR NARAIN:
Modern Hindi Poetry: a Look at its Medieval Past . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
CLAUS OETKE:
The Meaning oI Verse 25 oI the Sambandha-samuddesa and its
Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
HIDEYO OGAWA:
Bhartrhari on pravrtti as the First karaka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345
ERNST PRETS:
Theories oI Debate, ProoI and Counter-ProoI in the Early Indian
Dialectical Tradition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371
SVEN SELLMER:
The Heart in the Rg-veda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385
FRANCESCO SFERRA:
Sanskrit Manuscripts and Photos oI Sanskrit Manuscripts in the
Giuseppe Tucci`s Collection. A Preliminary Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399
Appendix I. Giuseppe Tucci`s Collection: Index oI Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411
Appendix II. A Facsimile oI Sakyasrmitra`s Sarva-suddhi-visuddhi . . . . . . . . 417
Appendix III. A Facsimile oI Jitri`s Sah!palambha-prakarana . . . . . . . . . . . . 425
LIDIA SUDYKA:
What does the Bhatti-kavya teach? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451
SATYA VRAT SHASTRI:
Subhasitas in the Puranasa Cultural Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 463
DANUTA STASIK:
Saket: Maithilsaran Gupta`s Version oI Ram-katha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 473
ANNA TRYNKOWSKA:
The Structure and Function oI the First Sarga oI Mgha`s
Sisupala-vadha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 481
ALBRECHT WEZLER:
Some Remarks on the 135
th
Adhikarana oI the Kau[ilya`
Artha-sastra Entitled Policy towards Samghas` . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 491
On the Understanding of Other Cultures Proceedings, !!"#$%$&$%'"
Copyright (#)***#by Piotr Balcerowic: & Marek Mefor (eds.)
!"#"$%&!"'()*+",$&-!"#$%&'()*+.&"$&/01234*&*$5&6,%*
MARZENNA JAKUBCZAK
Among the natural needs oI each and every individual, one is to attain the perIect
condition oI human existence, which is commonly called happiness. Various
deIinitions oI such a perIect state can be Iound in many cultures and religions,
present and past. Generally, the concept oI ideal happiness, or bliss, is directly
derived Irom a deIinition oI human nature. The endeavour to reach Iull happiness
means a striving to actualise one`s own true nature.
A search Ior the European way oI being a man,` to cite Edmund Husserl, was
undertaken Irom two diIIerent perspectives: Irom the view-point oI Athens, where
the unlimited aspiration oI reason (ratio) predominated, and Irom the view-point oI
Jerusalem, delimited by inexhaustible need Ior Iaith. The philosophers sharing the
Iirst perspective tried to deIine the most desirable state oI worldly happiness
eudaemonia
1
which can be achieved through applying rationally motivated advice
or precepts. An equally important stream in European culture Ilowed Irom the
Judeo-Christian conception oI salvation, reached aIter death and only partly
dependent on the individual`s endeavour and deeds.
In the majority oI Indian philosophical schools, both in the orthodox Brahmanical
systems and in the Buddhist or Jaina tradition, every kind oI eudaemonism was
subordinated to soteriology. The only exception is the hedonist Crvka school
which encourages people to seek Ior every pleasure, and claims that it`s Ioolish to
give up eating rice simply because the grains come enIolded with husk.` Generally,
worldly happiness (bhadra, sukha, sri) is regarded in India as temporal and delusive
by nature and always lesser than eternal bliss (ananda), which accompanies the
realisation oI the ultimate religious aimdeliverance Irom the cycle oI suIIering

1
The Greek term !"#$%&'()$ (lit. having a good #$%&*(%'(,` that is happiness,
prosperity or success) was Iirst used in a technical meaning by Aristotle in his
Nichomachean Ethics. He characterises happiness as the best, the noblest and the most
pleasant thing under the sun, which we can achieve through the activity oI virtuous
psychic powers consistent with reason. The concept oI eudaemonia was also applied by
Pre-Socratic philosophers such as Democritus (!+,+&)$ !"#$%&'()$) and Heraclitus
(-,'. #$%&*(%'(), but Aristotle`s deIinition is commonly reIerred to as the classical one.
172 MARZENNA JAKUBCZAK

and rebirth (samsara). However, unlike religious thinkers in many other cultures,
who Iocus on salvation aIter death, many Hindu and Buddhist philosophers
maintain that embodied liberation (fivan-mukti) is possible. This unique conception
oI liberation while living seems to combine the human desire oI perIection with the
longing Ior undisturbed bliss reached within a liIe-time.
In Indian philosophy, we can Iind many diverse expressions oI this highly
problematic conception,
2
as it provoked vivid disputes among Indian authors
themselves, even within one and the same school. The germ oI the idea oI fivan-
mukti can be traced in some Upanisads (8
th
6
th
centuries B.C.E.)
3
, but the Iirst
person to clearly articulate the view that the release Irom karman in a living state
(nirvana) is possible was the Buddha (6
th
5
th
century B.C.E.). An interesting
explanation oI this question is Iound in epic and the Purnic literature. It was also
Irequently undertaken in Vednta, Smkhya and Yoga schools as well as in the
Saiva tradition.
In the present paper I am going to investigate the question how the idea oI living
liberation is expressed in the oldest texts oI two Brahmanical schools, Smkhya and
Yoga. In doing that, I Iocus on two crucial questions: (1) who is the actual subject oI
the act oI discriminative cognition (viveka-khyati)? and (2) how does the cognition
oI a fivan-mukta work?
!"#$%&'%#()$&*$!"#$%&'()*$$+'$,-./"01
Isvarakrsna, the author oI the Samkhya-karika (c. IiIth century C.E.), argues that
the reason Ior suIIering, inseparable Irom every existence, lies in the contact or
union (samyoga) oI two opposed domains oI reality: the three-guna Nature (prakrti)
and the transcendent SelI (purusa) (SK 2, 20). The Iirst is characterised as
unconscious, objective, active and maniIested (vyakta), while the other one is
conscious, subjective and separate Irom the gunas (sattva, rafas and tamas).
Because oI this contact, the unconscious (acetana) apparently shows the Ieature oI
the conscious (cetana), and the non-active purusa seems to take on the characteristic

2
The individual who has managed to overcome all samsric limitations oI the
human condition is in various traditions also called fivan-mukta, kevalin, buddha, arhat,
fina, etc.
3
Despite the Iact that the term fivan-mukti` itselI does not appear in the Upanisads,
some phrases seem to clearly conIirm the possibility oI achieving the state oI living
liberation, e.g. Brhad-aranyaka 4.4.7 and 4.4.14; Kena 2.5; Mundaka 3.2.9; Maitri 6.20;
cI. RADHAKRISHNAN (1953: 273, 587, 692, 831832, etc.).
LIVING LIBERATION (JIJAN-MUKTI) IN SAMKHYA AND YOGA 173

oI the three gunas (SK 20). The only eIIicient remedy Ior suIIering caused by the
contact oI purusa and prakrti, who are compared by Isvarakrsna to the blind and the
lame condemned to each other (SK 21), is valid cognition (pramana). One can
attain it through knowledge Irom reliable authority (apta-vacana) or by inIerence
(anumana) or, best oI all, through direct perception (drsta), when the purusa and the
prakrti are recognised and discriminated (viveka) (SK 46).
The author oI the Samkhya-karika explicitly maintains in SK 67 the possibility oI
living one`s liIe aIter the liberating knowledge has been achieved. From this pivotal
karika we learn that due to the attainment oI knowledge we are released Irom the
inIluence oI the predispositions (bhavas) that are immanent in the empirical
consciousness (buddhi). According to SK 23 and 63, the only predisposition, out oI
eight, that leads to liberation is cognition (fana), while the remaining onesviz.
the three positive predispositions such as virtue (dharma), non-attachment (viraga)
and power (aisvarya), as well as the Iour negative ones: vice (adharma), ignorance
(afana), attachment (raga) and impotence (anaisvarya)lead to continued living
and suIIering. The positive predispositions, although they contribute to spiritual
progress, are not direct causes oI liberation. Since empirical consciousness (buddhi)
is not any longer inIluenced by desire and ignorance (which normally are the reason
Ior committing either wrong or virtuous deeds), the karman deposit loses its Iooting.
Yet, in karika 67 we read that the fivan-mukta continues his liIe due to the imprints
oI past deeds recorded in the Iorm oI samskaras. To illustrate this relationship,
Isvarakrsna uses the well known metaphor oI the potter`s wheel which keeps
turning Ior some time aIter the potter`s last movement.
Now, let us consider the question: how, according to Smkhya, does the cognition
oI the fivan-mukta work? The answer is oIIered in karikas 6466:
/64/ evam tattv!bhyasan n!smi na me n!ham ity aparisesam /
aviparyayad visuddham kevalam utpadyate fanam //
/65/ tena nivrtta-prasavam artha-vasat sapta-rupa-vinivrttam /
prakrtim pasyati purusah preksakavad avasthitah svasthah //
/66/ drsta may"ty upeksaka eko drst!ham ity uparamaty anya /
sati samyoge pi tayoh prayofanam n!sti sargasya //
In SK 64, we Iind out what the cognition oI the fivan-mukta precisely consists in:
as a result oI concentration on the twenty-Iive principles (tattvas), the fivan-mukta
gets rid oI delusive identity; namely, he rejects the identity oI purusa and prakrti,
ascertaining: n!smi, na me, n!ham. To interpret this crucial phrase, one must, Iirst
oI all, deIine the subject oI the sentence. Who states: n!smi, na me, n!ham? This is
either the empirical consciousness (buddhi) that still operates and discriminates, or
the SelI (purusa), who distinguishes himselI Irom the prakrti, regaining thus his true
174 MARZENNA JAKUBCZAK

selI-identity. In both cases there are several alternative translations that could be
proIIered. I present just two proposals within each perspective. II we assumed that
the !"##$% is the subject, the translation could be as Iollows:
1.1. I am not |the SelI|, |liberation is| not mine, |there is| no me (&'()`;
or
1.2. I am not |conscious|, |the conscious is| not mine, 'I is not
|conscious|.`
4
But iI we assume the )"*"+, to be the subject, the translation runs:
2.1. I am not |any oI the 24 -,--.,/ oI0)*,12-%|, |suIIering is| not mine,
not me |is who transmigrates in /,3/4*,|`;
or
2.2. I am not |oI three-'"5, nature|, nothing, |especially my body, is|
mine, no |object oI cognition is| me.`
The Iirst two translations present a description oI the last all-important act oI
knowledge perIormed by the empirical consciousness (!"##$%), considered as a
relative subject. In the act oI discrimination (.%.&1,), the !"##$% recognises its own
subjectivity as something relative, subordinated to and oI instrumental character in
relation to the SelI. The !"##$% operatesIor the sake oI the )"*"+,6/ releaseas
unconscious milk which Iunctions Ior the sake oI nourishment oI the calI` (SK 57).
And now, it realises that liberation oI the0 )"*"+, means the end, or its cessation,
because attaining the state oI perIection`, or oneness` (1,%.,78,) excludes the
coexistence oI the empirical subject.
Translation 1.2. emphasises, as LARSON (1979: 205) notes, that discrimination
separates out pure consciousness Irom everything which is not conscious. As a
result oI this intuitive discrimination which occurs in the !"##$%, consciousness
emptied oI all content (SK 37) becomes a kind oI translucent emptiness or
nothingness, which is a condition oI absolute Ireedom and liberation Irom all
suIIering. The empirical &'( that distinguishes )*,12-% Irom )"*"+, simply
disidentiIies` himselI Irom the absolute subject, saying: the SelI is not me.`
According to the third and Iourth versions, the state oI living liberation is a result
oI becoming oneselI`, which means identiIication with the real SelI, not with his
empirical counterpart. The phrase under discussion appears to be an expression oI

4
94*%14 64 is translated in this manner by Gerald J. LARSON (1979: 274): Thus,
Irom the study (or analysis) oI the principles (-,--.,/), the 'knowledge (or salvation-
knowledge) arises, I am not (conscious); (consciousness) does not belong to me; the 'I
is not (conscious) .`
LIVING LIBERATION (JIJAN-MUKTI) IN SAMKHYA AND YOGA 175

the view-point oI the absolute subject. Now, the purusa seems to disidentiIy`
himselI Irom everything that could be an object oI his cognition. Both translations
2.1. and 2.2., which accept this perspective, reIlect the exhaustive gradual
elimination oI alternatives that demonstrates the impossibility oI identiIying the SelI
with anything empirical, and thereby indicates his transcendence.
Regardless oI which point oI viewthe buddhi`s or the purusa`swe assume the
knowledge oI the fivan-mukta to be, according to Smkhya, it has purely negative
character. This is a well-known pattern oI reasoning employed in early Upanisads in
the discussion oI the identity oI the SelI, who is n!ti n!ti (not this, not this`).
5
We
can ask, however, which oI these twoeither the relative or the absolute subject-
orientedperspectives is more compatible with the whole doctrine oI Smkhya.
Since the Iunctioning oI the buddhi enables all cognitive processes to go on, it
seems natural to admit that the act oI discrimination occurs within the empirical
consciousness. But the knowledge achieved by the buddhi is conIined to the
discovery: I am not the SelI,` which still is not the same as the regaining oI SelI-
identity. The above limitation seems to be easily avoided iI instead we assume the
purusa to be the subject oI discrimination. However, that being the case, we are
conIronted with another problem, namely with the non-intentional character oI the
purusa consciousness. How can the transcendent being, which is a non-active
subject, not involved in any empirical activity, make any discrimination, even the
liberating one? Despite this doctrinal diIIiculty, the denial that every object oI
cognition has the nature oI the SelI seems to be the logical and pervasive procedure
Ior the direct attainment oI the ultimate liberation.
It is proper to point out here that the buddhi-oriented perspective predominates in
contemporary interpretations oI Smkhya, probably due to the uncritical reliance on
Gaudapda and other later commentators. Gaudapda in his Bhasya interprets the
sentence I am not` in the sense oI I do not exist` (n"ham eva bhavami); naught is
mine` to mean this body is not mine since I am one thing and the body another` (na
me mama sariram tat, yato ham anyah sariram anyat). There is no I (ego),` he
tends to understand as I am Iree Irom ego` (aham-kara-rahitam aparisesam)
(MAINKAR (1972: 197)). The phrase under discussion has invariably been translated
thus since Thomas COLEBROOKE`s (1837) Iirst rendering oI SK.
6
DEUSSEN (1908:
462) and LARSON (1979: 274) clearly Iollow him. Among the supporters oI the

5
Brhad-aranyaka 2.3.6.
6
In COLEBROOKE`s (1887: 240) translation the karika runs as Iollows: So, through
study oI principles, the conclusive, incontrovertible, one only knowledge is attained, that
neither I AM, nor is aught mine, nor do I exist.` And in DEUSSEN`s (1920: 462): Das
bin ich nicht! das ist nicht mein! ich bin nicht!`
176 MARZENNA JAKUBCZAK

purusa-oriented perspective are Tuvia GELBLUM (1970: 7582), the author oI a
critical review oI LARSON`s Classical Samkhya, and W.T. DE BARRY (1958: 309),
who considers the eighth bhava, knowledge, the cause oI release, not as a Iorm oI
prakrti but as a reIlection oI the spirit (purusa). The other seven dispositions oI
mind, viz. virtue, vice, etc., which constitute bondage, both good and bad, are
understood as those Irom which the buddhi now withdraws.
Now, let us consider SK 65 and 66, where the state oI fivan-mukta is deIined in
positive terms. The author oI the Samkhya-karika, this time using a metaphorical
language, compares the liberated purusa to a passive, indiIIerent witness or
spectator who, comIortably situated, watches a perIormance oI the active and
unconscious prakrti. She, like a mysterious dancer (SK 59), having shown all her
beauty and having been seen through, Iinishes her play and ceases her activity.
Expanding this metaphor, one can say that the fivan-mukta is the one who applauds
the prakrti, the applause which is the inseparable part oI the perIormance and which
announces its deIinite and inevitable end.
Isvarakrsna makes an important remark regarding this Iinal stage oI the show oI
Nature (prakrti) in SK 68.
7
In this karika, the state oI isolation (kaivalya) and Iinal
cessation oI prakrti is considered not to be accomplished sooner than the purusa
attains separation Irom the body. Thus, it turns out that the completion oI Iull
liberation needs the deposit oI karman to be totally exhausted, which implies the
death oI the physical body oI the knower. The state oI being liberated while living is
not, thereIore, according to Smkhya, equal to the state oI ultimate bliss and
kaivalya. It reIers to the period oI liIe between the attainment oI the discriminative
knowledge and the end oI embodiment. The fivan-mukta plays a pedagogical role oI
an ideal spiritual master who, with his own presence, proves the eIIiciency oI the
Smkhya method.
!"#$%&'$()*+",$),"-"./)".)01/&
In the Yoga-sutras by Patanjali the term fivan-mukta does not appear even once.
Nevertheless, Vysa in his commentary (the seventh century C.E.) Yoga-sutra-
bhasya notes the possibility oI continuing one`s liIe aIter the abolishment oI the
aIIlicted Iluctuations in mind (klista) and oI the deposit oI karman. He twice uses
the phrase: having body Ior the last time` (carama-deha), which is the synonym oI
the fivan-mukta (YBH 2.4, 4.7).

7
SK 68: prapte sarira-bhede carit!rthatvat pradhana-vinivrttau, aikantikam
atyantikam ubhayam kaivalyam apnoti.
LIVING LIBERATION (JIJAN-MUKTI) IN SAMKHYA AND YOGA 177

While analysing the question oI living liberation in the system oI Patanjali, the
conception oI Isvara cannot be omitted. Isvara is regarded by the commentators as a
prototype oI the fivan-mukta. He possesses all the essential properties oI the
liberated while living, and the only diIIerence is that he has never ever been
involved in karman. Isvara, as the inner guru and the ideal oI sage, seems to Iill up
the same place as fivan-mukta in Smkhya.
In order to examine Patanjali`s views on living liberation, we should read
careIully his description oI the Iinal stages oI meditative practice. In sutra 4.29, we
Iind an interesting expression that may help us in grasping the uniqueness oI the
Yoga attitude towards that question. Indeed, says YS 4.29, in the state oI reIlection
(prasamkhyana), Ior the one who has discriminative discernment and always takes
no interest, there is the cloud oI dharma samadhi.
8
The key term oI this sutra is the cloud oI dharma (dharma-megha). Several
possible meanings oI this phrase emerge according to the reading oI the term
dharma as Ieature`, property`, duty` or virtue`. As a result oI comparison oI
these meanings, two alternative interpretations can be suggested:
1. Achieving the samadhi oI the dharma-megha` type (with the meaning oI
cloud oI virtue`)
9
, which Iollows discriminative knowledge (viveka-khyati), means
that Irom that moment all deeds oI the knower in Smkhya terms called the living
liberatedare soaked through` with virtue and can be classiIied only as good and
virtuous. In other words, the liberated (esp. sage or saint) is not able to commit any
wrong deed which is opposed to his own moral duty,
10
and the karman produced by
such a person is neither white nor black (asukl!krsna, YS 4.7).
11

8
I cite here CHAPPLE`s rendering (1990: 119120).
9
This interpretation is supported by, among others, Vcaspati Misra (ninth century
C.E.), the author oI a commentary on the Yoga-sutra and Vysa`s Bhasya, and by
Vijnna Bhiksu, who commented on the Yoga-sutra in the sixteenth century C.E.
Vcaspati Misra claims: Hence because by its light it rains |that is| pours down all
kinds oI knowable things, it is called the Rain-cloud oI |knowable| things` (Tattva-
vaisaradi 4.31); cI. WOODS (1988: 342343). Vijnna Bhiksu maintains that the man
who does not desire anything, even the state oI elevation`, is able to stay at all times in
the state oI discriminate-discernment, and due to the dwindling away oI the seeds oI
subliminal impressions, other thoughts do not arise. Then he attains the dharma-megha
samadhi which is the Iurthest limit oI samprafata-yoga. It is called dharma-megha
because it rains dharma which totally uproots or destroys aIIlictions (klesas) and deeds
(karman); cI. RUKMANI (1989: 121122).
10
Duty`, which is understood here in the same way as in the Bhagavad-gita, reIers
mainly to what is mentioned by Patanjali as the Iive Iundamental ethical precepts, or
restraints (yama): non-violence, trustIulness, non-stealing, sexual restraint, and non-
178 MARZENNA JAKUBCZAK

2. In the course oI dharma-megha concentration, with the meaning oI rinsing
out the properties,`
12
all latent traces oI the past activities, accumulated in the Iorm
oI vyutthana samskara, are totally abolished, or rinsed out. Among the samskaras
which are cleared out, there are both imprints oI true knowledge, which is non-
aIIlicted (aklista), and all the vasanas that determinate the category oI embodiment,
the length oI liIe and the type oI dominant experience (sukhaduhkha) that is a
reward Ior our past deeds. According to this interpretation, there is an essential
diIIerence between the state oI knowledge reached in the samprafata-samadhi, or
even the state oI asamprafata-samadhi, and the state oI Iull liberation oI kaivalya
achieved only aIter death. The knower who recognises his own true nature (svarupa,
YS 4.34)
13
should neither rely solely on the natural course oI liIe, nor await
passively and patiently the extinction oI the rest oI the karman traces. The path oI
Yoga, in contradistinction to the Smkhya teachings, recommends the active
approach. There is another act oI concentration which is to be realised, namely
dharma-megha-samadhi. As iI a rain cloud, this concentration is able to rinse out
the last, deepest germs oI empirical consciousness. The ultimate liberation oI the
SelI is not, according to Patanjali, a mere product oI the fivan-mukta`s death, but
rather a result oI concentration completed by the last act oI will.

possession; and Iive observances (niyama): purity, contentment, austerity, selI-study,
and dedication to Isvara (YS 2.3032). Both the restraints and observances combine to
Iorm the Iamous eight limbs oI yoga (yog!nga).
11
Vysa in his commentary on YS 4.7 explains that there are Iour kinds oI karman:
(a) the black karman produced by mean, wicked people; (b) the white-and-black karman
is produced by people applying outer means-oI-attainment; (c) the white karman belongs
to those who practice austerity, selI-study and who cultivate contemplation; (d) the
neither-white-nor-black karman is Iound in the saints (sannyasin), whose hindrances
have dwindled away and whose actual bodies are their last; cI. WOODS (1988: 305).
12
Such an alternative rendering oI this term was suggested by a late Polish translator
oI YS, Leon CYBORAN (1986: 236) who, however, did not give any broader
interpretation oI this sutra.
13
YS IV.34: purus!rtha-sunyanam gunanam pratiprasavah kaivalyam svarupa-
pratistha va citi-saktir iti; CHAPPLE (1990: 122): The return to the origin oI the gunas
(pratiprasava), emptied oI their purpose Ior purusa, is kaivalyam, the steadIastness in
own Iorm, and power oI higher awareness.`
LIVING LIBERATION (JIJAN-MUKTI) IN SAMKHYA AND YOGA 179

!"!#"$%&'()*
DE BARRY 1958 Barry, W. T. de (trans. and comm.): Sources of Indian Tradition.
Vol. I. Cambridge University Press, New YorkLondon 1958:
303310.
CHAPPLE 1990 Chapple, Christopher K. (trans.): The Yoga Sutras of Patafali. Sri
Satguru Publications, Delhi 1990.
COLEBROOKE 1887 Colebrooke, Henry Thomas: The Sankhya Karika. Subodha-
Prakash Press, Bombay 1887 |First edition: OxIord 1837|.
CYBORAN 1986 Cyboran, Leon (trans. and comm.): Klasyc:na foga indyfska
|Polish translation oI YS and YBh|. PWN, Warszawa 1986.
DEUSSEN 1908 Deussen, Paul: Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie. Vol. 1, pt.
3, Leipzig 1920 |First edition: Leipzig 1908|.
GELBLUM 1970 Gelblum, Tuvia: Smkhya and Sartre.` Journal of Indian
Philosophy 1 (1970) 7582.
LARSON 1979 Larson, Gerald J.: Classical Samkhya An Interpretation of its
History and Meaning with The Samkhya-karika of Isvarakrsna
(romani:ed text with translation). Second revised ed., Motilal
Banarsidass, DelhiVaranasiPatna 1979.
MAINKAR 1972 Mainkar, T.G. (ed. and trans.): Samkhyakarika of Isvarakrsna with
Gaudapadabhasya. Poona Oriental Series 9, Poona 1972 |First
edition: 1964|.
RADHAKRISHNAN
1953
Radhakrishnan, Servepalli (ed. and trans.): The Principal
Upanisads. George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London 1953.
RUKMANI 1989 Rukmani, T.S. (trans. and comm.): Yogavarttika of Jifanabhiksu.
Text along with English Translation and Critical Notes along with
the Text and English Translation of the Patafala Yogasutras and
Jyasabhasya. Vol. 4: Kaivalyapada, Munshiram Manoharlal, New
Delhi 1989.
SK Isvarakrsna: Samkhya-karika. See: COLEBROOKE (1887).
WOODS 1988 Woods, James H. (trans.): The Yoga-System of Patafali or The
Ancient Hindu Doctrine of Concentration of Mind, Embracing
Yoga-Sutras, Yoga-Bhasya and Tattva-Jaisaradi. Motilal
Banarsidass, Delhi 1988 |First edition: Cambridge (Mass.) 1914|.
YBh Vysa: Yoga-sutra-bhasya. See: RUKMANI (1989).
YS Patanjali: Yoga-sutra. See: RUKMANI (1989).