MMDA vs. Bel Air Village Association GR No. 135962 March 27, 2000 Puno, J.

Facts: On December 30, 1995, petitioner MMDA sent respondent Bel Air Village Association a notice requesting the respondent to open a private road owned by the latter to public vehicles supposedly by virtue of the states police power. On January 2, 1996, the respondent instituted a petition for injunction before the Regional Trial Court Makati Branch which was later on denied by the same court. The respondent questioned the lower courts decision and raised the issue before the Court of Appeals on January 23, 1996, and on January 27, 1997, the appellate court granted the respondents petition. After which, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied. Hence, this recourse. Issue: Whether or not MMDA has the authority to order the opening of a private road

Ruling: The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the appellate courts decision. The court held that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. It does not have the power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Therefore, it does not have the authority to order the opening of a private road to public vehicles.

Binay vs. Domingo GR No. 92389 September 11, 1991 Paras, J.

Facts: On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality, through its council, approved Resolution No. 60 also known as the Burial Assistance Program. The Metro Manila Commission approved the said resolution and referred it to respondent Commission on Audit for its expected allowance on audit. However, respondent disapproved the resolution. The petitioner, then, filed two letters for reconsideration which were also denied by the respondent. The respondent believes that the municipality failed to provide a perceptible connection between the objective sought to be attained by the resolution and the alleged public safety or general welfare of the inhabitants of Makati. Furthermore, the respondent believes that the fund allocated for the said program should benefit the whole or the majority of the inhabitants of the municipality and not only a limited few as pursuant to the police power of the state delegated to local government units by legislature. Bent on pursuing the program, petitioner passed Resolution 243, re-affirming Resolution 60. Nevertheless, the resolution was stopped by respondents Decision No. 1159. This forced the petitioner to file a special civil action for certiorari praying that the respondents decision be set aside as null and void.

Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of personsThe care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.

Beltran vs. Secretary of Health GR No. 133640 November 25, 2005 Azcuna, J:

Facts On April 2, 1994, Republic Act 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1997 was enacted. It was approved by President Ramos on May 15, 1994, published in the Official Gazette on August 18, 1994, and took effect on August 23, 1994. On April 28, 1995, respondent Secretary of Health promulgated its Implementing Rules and Regulation Administrative Order No. 9 Series of 1995. Both Act and its implementing rules and regulation contain a provision which phases out commercial blood banks in the country from the time the act took effect. On May 20, 1998, petitioner Rodolfo S. Beltran doing business under the name and style of Our Lady of Fatima Blood Bank filed a petition for certiorari with application for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the validity of RA 7719 and its IRR. Two days after, petitioner Doctors Blood Center filed a petition for mandamus with the prayer of issuance of temporary restraining order, preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction. The Court, then, issued a resolution directing the Department of Health to file a consolidated comment, and a Temporary Restraining Order for the respondent to cease and desist in implementing the act. On August 26, 1998, the Secretary of Health filed a consolidated comment explaining the reason and purpose behind the act. On May 5, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion for the Issuance of Extended Temporary Restraining Order to prevent the respondent from announcing the closure of commercial blood banks, compelling the public to source blood from voluntary blood donation and committing similar acts detrimental to petitioners. In response, respondent filed a consolidated comment/opposition to the motion on July 8, 1999. A few days after, petitioner filed a Petition to Show Why Public Respondent Should Not Be Held in Contempt which the respondent answered again in a consolidated comment. On July 29, 1999, concerned citizen and taxpayers filed a Petition-In-Intervention interjecting the same arguments and issues laid down by the petitioners which the court granted in a resolution dated September 27, 1999. The respondent reiterated in his comment to the petition-inintervention the purpose of and the reason behind the act.

Issues Whether or not Republic Act 7719 is a valid exercise of the States police power.

Ruling In sum, the Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the questioned provisions of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.[56] Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis therefore. Otherwise, the petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the law. As to whether the Act constitutes a wise legislation, considering the issues being raised by petitioners, is for Congress to determine

ABS-CBN vs. PMSI GR No. 175769-70 January 19, 2009 Ynares-Santiago, J:

Facts On April 25, 2001, petitioner demanded for respondent to cease and desist from rebroadcasting Channels 2 and 23. Two days after, respondent replied that the rebroadcasting was in accordance with the must carry rule stated in NTC Memorandum Circular 4-8-88. Negotiations ensued between the parties in an effort to settle the matter; however, it was terminated due to respondents inability to ensure the prevention of the illegal transmission. Petitioner filed a complaint with the Bureau of Legal Affairs (BLA) of the IPO against the respondent for allegedly violating the Property Rights Law, and applied for a temporary restraining order. IPO granted the application and ordered respondent to suspend the transmission of said channels. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, and a Manifestation, reiterating its duty to comply with the must-carry rule, with the BLA. Respondent also submitted a letter dated December 20, 2002 to then NTC Commissioner Borje requesting the latter to provide regulating guidelines for application and coverage of Memorandum Circular 048-88. On August 26, 2003, respondent filed another Manifestation with the BLA informing the latter that it has received a letter from the NTC enjoining it to strictly and immediately comply with the Memorandum. On December 22, 2003, BLA rendered a decision in favor of petitioner ABS-CBN. Respondent filed an appeal with the Office of the Director-General of the IPO on February 6, 2004. On December 20, 2004, the Director-General of IPO rendered its decision in favor of PMSI. Then, respondent filed with the CA a Motion to Withdraw Petition; Alternatively, Memorandum of the Petition for Certiorari which was later granted in a resolution dated February 17, 2005. Petitioner filed a petition for review with certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals. On July, 18, 2005, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order. Afterwards, petitioner filed a Petition for Contempt against PMSI for its continued transmission of the channels mentioned above. On July 12, 2006, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petitions of ABS-CBN. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was still denied by the same court; hence, this petition.

Issue Whether or not PSMIs transmission of ABS-CBNs channels is a violation of Section 9, Article 3 of the Constitution.

Ruling After a careful review of the facts and records of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the Director-General of the IPO and the Court of Appeals. The SC sees no merit in ABS-CBNs contention that PMSI violated its broadcasters rights under Section 211 of the IP Code. ABS-CBN and PSMI were granted a legislative franchise under Republic Act 7966 and Republic Act 8630 respectively, which requires both to provide public service time to enable the government, through the said broadcasting stations, to reach the population on important public issues; provide at all times sound and balanced programming; promote public participation such as in community programming; assist in the functions of public information and educationA franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amendment by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires.

Chavez vs. Gonzalez GR No. 168388 February 15, 2008 Puno, C.J:

Facts On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye revealed the oppositions plan of destabilizing the government by releasing a recording between then President Arroyo and a commissioner of the COMELEC. Two days after, he produced two versions of the taped conversation. However, he later on retracted his statements. On June 8, 2005, DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales warned the media of a possible violation of the Anti Wire-tapping Law if they were in found possession of copies of said recording and if they continue to publish such. He even ordered the NBI to go after media organization that would ignore his warning. On June 11, 2005, NTC issued a press release giving the media fair warning to observe the Anti Wire-tapping Law. In their press release, NTC clearly stated that those who disregard such warning will be subject to suspension, or revocation/cancellation of their license. On June 14, 2005, NTC held a dialogue with KBP, and, afterwards, issued a Joint Press Statement emphasizing to media organizations the warning previously given.

Issue Whether or not respondents action was a violation of the freedom of speech, of expression and of the press.

Ruling The Supreme Court granted the petition. We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. Our laws are of different kinds and doubtless, some of them provide norms of conduct which even if violated have only an adverse effect on a persons private comfort but does not endanger national security. There are laws of great significance but their violation, by itself and without more, cannot support suppression of free speech and free

press. In fine, violation of law is just a factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be weighed in adjudging whether to restrain freedom of speech and of the press. The totality of the injurious effects of the violation to private and public interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded by the Constitution and by related international covenants protecting freedom of speech and of the press. In calling for a careful and calibrated measurement of the circumference of all these factors to determine compliance with the clear and present danger test, the Court should not be misinterpreted as devaluing violations of law . By all means, violations of law should be vigorously prosecuted by the State for they breed their own evil consequence. But to repeat, the need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.