Sandia National Laboratories -- Patriots and Family Members Die Early From Cancer and Disease

By Dave McCoy, Executive Director, Citizen Action New Mexico September 25, 2009 Citizen Action obtained a September voicemail that Sandia National Laboratories Vice President Les Shepard sent to lab employees stating that last year, more than 5,700 Sandians and/or their immediate family members received treatment for cancer and that represents nearly 20 percent of the entire Sandia extended workforce family. Mr. Shephards calculation that 5,700 Sandians and their family members have cancer would require that there were 28,500 persons in the review. This would assume an average of 3 persons per family. If an employee and his/her spouse each have a 50% chance of having cancer, then employees alone would have 2,850 cancers. This would mean that at least one-third of Sandias 8,500 employees have cancer. If spousal cancers were a smaller number, then the work force cancer rate would be even higher, perhaps ranging as high as 60%. Citizen Action New Mexico calculated that the average age of Sandia worker deaths, as reported by the Sandia Daily News between 2001 and 2008, was 50 years of age with a 17% death rate due to cancer.1 Poor Data, Records Keeping and Denial of Sandia Worker Claims Unfortunately, Sandia has not kept adequate radiation dose records to aid its work force in gaining compensation for their cancers. A February 2009 independent review of the Sandia Site Profile, written by S. Cohen and Associates for the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker Health, makes clear that radiation doses to workers were poorly monitored and higher than employees knew. The review calls out the unscientific methods, unavailable and unreliable data used by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) for reconstructing worker radiation doses at Sandia. NIOSH began the site profile in 2005.2 A site profile is a collection of historic information about a specific Department of Energy or Atomic Weapons Employer site and gives details about work practices, how much radiation was received by workers (dosimetry), environmental monitoring, and medical X-ray programs at the site. Looking at those factors, NIOSH then makes a dose reconstruction for the Labor Department to determine worker claims. Incorrect NIOSH dose reconstructions undermine a workers claim for one of 22 types of cancer recognized for compensation. A lump-sum payment of $150,000, plus lifetime medical benefits is available to successful claimants. Nationwide, of more than 90,000 claims filed by victims of cancer or other illnesses, the Labor Department has denied nearly 56,000, or 62 percent. The denials of compensation are controversial.3 So far, $2.5 billion dollars have been paid out under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act. Due to secrecy, workers

and their families may have no knowledge of where, what and how much of various contaminants the worker was exposed to. Of 609 Sandia cancer cases that applied for compensation there were only 99 final decisions of approval. Of 359 Sandia cases referred to NIOSH for dose reconstruction, only 35 cases were approved on the basis of having 50% probability for causation being from employment.4 The NIOSH denials of Sandia claims run far higher percentage wise than the national denial rate. NIOSH ordered the Sandia Technical Library to provide thousands of documents for dose reconstruction. A Sandia employee informed Citizen Action that NIOSH never returned to review or pick up the documents. Although Sandia (Lockheed-Martin) refuses to reveal cancer rates for former or older retired workers, there is much cause for alarm. The actual radiation doses received by many Sandia workers were much higher than reported or doses were not reported at all. Sandia Management knew that reactor personnel at the Sandia Pulse Reactor received nearly double the annual allowable radiation dose from1962 through 1982. The reactor personnel records were not retroactively corrected by management. The badges worn on the Torso did not adequately measure the severe radiation to the head that could be as much as five times as great to the body during maintenance activities performed near the reactor vessel. Additional reactor workers needed to be recruited given the high burn rate. Many Sandians were not monitored by radiation badges (dosimeters) or bioassay, such as urine sampling.5 For the period from 1949 to 2007, there is a lack of information concerning the criteria for dosimeter badging of workers at Sandia. In addition to receiving contamination at poorly monitored or unmonitored work locations, workers were exposed to many other sources of external and internal body radiation at Sandia from stack emissions, waste dumps, explosive tests that volatilized uranium and handling radionuclides that were not monitored. The exposures of Sandia employees during operations at other sites such as the Nevada Tonopah Test Range were not adequately measured. Air sampling results from monitoring the breathing areas of Sandia workers were largely useless for workers potentially exposed to uranium, plutonium, tritium and other radionuclides. A DOE group, called the Tiger Team, identified that Sandia personnel worked in areas with airborne contaminants that were not monitored, that there were incorrect readings for Remote Area Monitors, and no readings were made during down time for instrument recalibration. Since the bioassay program was dependent on an ineffectual air monitoring program, the results from the bioassay program are also in doubt. Routine urine sampling was not a

general practice. Adequate and accurate bioassay data is not available for many nuclides such as tritium (H-3), uranium (U-234, U-235, and U-238), fission and activation products (e.g., Sr-90, Cs-137, Zn-65, Co-60, Ta-182), plutonium (Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu240, and Pu-241), and americium (Am-241). Radiation exposure at Sandia accelerators was not well characterized. Citizen Action Interview of Sandia Office Worker Leslie Cumiford, Ph.D., a former Sandia worker, showed Citizen Action evidence for arsenic in her urine samples taken in 2006 by the Sandia clinic and then by her private physician 24 hours later. All samples were sent to Tricore laboratory, but the Sandia clinic showed low levels for arsenic and her private physicians results showed high arsenic levels. Dr. Cumiford says she was told by Dr. Larry R. Clevenger, MD, Director of Sandia National Laboratories Health, Benefits, and Employee Services, that the high arsenic levels were probably because she had eaten shell fish which she denies eating. Her private physician informed her that the arsenic contamination could only be coming from the workplace. After making a formal report for the arsenic contamination, Dr. Cumiford was moved out of Bldg 836 and spent several months in various lobbies although she was a program director. Dr. Cumiford was frequently in the basement of Bldg 807 that had neutron generator testing and the presence of tritium. She and employees in Bldg. 807 were not badged with dosimeters. The 3rd floor had Depleted uranium, Thorium and Tritium in use but no signs were present to warn workers. Similar to Karen Silkwood, Ms. Cumiford has compelling evidence that she was poisoned by special nuclear material put into a salt shaker in her home. Homeland Security, the FBI, the Albuquerque Police Department, the DOE Inspector General have all refused to pick up the salt shaker or investigate the circumstances of the nuclear contamination of Dr. Cumiford and her family. Dr. Cumiford was terminated by Sandia. Citizen Action Interview with a Sandia Security Guard According to the site profile review, security guards at Sandia recollected that they were never bioassayed except for an annual urine sample. Guards were required to stand guard where plutonium and enriched uranium were handled and where radiological components containing depleted uranium and thorium were being tested. They had to conduct routine surveillance of all Sandia facilities and were first responders to areas that were contaminated by dangerous spills. A retired Sandia security guard that is afraid to have his identity revealed, described to Citizen Action the work conditions he observed and experienced at Sandia during the 1980s to the mid-2000s. People didnt know what was in these buildings and security officers, secretaries and custodians would go in and out without knowing. When employees became sick they were afraid of management retaliation, poor evaluations and dismissal because Sandia wanted to protect its reputation and the DOE wouldnt help you out. He was told by co-workers not to go to the Sandia medical clinic or he could be threatened with firing. The head of the clinic, Dr. Clevenger, would tell nurses to give

him the reports of people that were sick in different buildings. Nurses told the guard not to trust Dr. Clevenger or give him names of sick employees. To prove that the monitoring badges didnt work, guards would put dosimeters near the reactors in Tech Area V and then send them in for testing. The dosimeters always came back without showing a reading. The dosimeter company was later changed out. Uniforms that could have been contaminated were worn home by guards. Protective gear was not available and guards didnt know what dangers they would be responding to. When his liver enzymes were found to be too high, he was accused of drinking alcohol although he was a non-drinker. No blood work or hair samples were taken by Dr. Clevenger. The urine test that went through the Sandia clinic came back with different result than from his private doctor. His private doctor was afraid to state that his illness was work related from contamination by heavy metals such as arsenic and manganese. He knows many Sandia security people that have lost hair, teeth and experience body numbness. Guards were exposed to tritium from night scopes and in buildings 805, 806 and 807. Exhaust fans were turned off in buildings at night and during holidays. Guards entering the buildings were exposed to a cocktail of toxic chemicals as were employees entering early in the morning before the air was cleared. In Tech Areas I and V, guards sat in pick up trucks watching glass tubes with plutonium glowing green in pools during the night at remote sites. Guards eventually had to move out of their station in Building 919 in Technical Area II where they had been during a period that hydrogen bombs were stored in the building next door. He observed persons shooting holes into the bottom of waste drums at the Chemical Waste Landfill so the wastes would drain into the ground. The ground smelled strange from chemicals mixing together. Ducting and other materials were ripped out of Buildings in Tech Area I at night and hauled off in a truck through gate 10 that spilled materials with high levels of radiation and mercury onto the road. People traveled to work over the road the next day. The road was later shut down and then repaved after workers without protective gear wiped the road down on their hands and knees. Custodians put containers of hazardous chemicals, empty beakers with unknown substances, and wipe towels into the regular trash. Hood exhaust circulated through buildings, chemicals were left with caps off. Guards had to respond to mercury spills in Bldgs. 805 and 807. He saw flooding in the basement of Bldg. 807 with weird colored liquids oozing from under the doors. A strange metallic taste was in his mouth, his hands were blistered and he had rashes from touching phones, cabinets and knobs and he

had severe headaches from lab odors. After he began to carry chemical test paper to check chemicals that were spilled, management told him to stop checking. During office rounds, the guard observed many safes left open that held classified documents. In a glovebox area for handling dangerous radionuclides in Tech Area V, when high radiation alarms would go off, he was told not to worry, just reset the alarm. The guard knew that employee medical records were kept in Manzano mountain tunnels in cardboard boxes. The records were regularly purged. Three to four inches of his own medical files disappeared. His medical claim was then turned down for lack of evidence. Guards stood by and monitored open air burns at Sandia in open pits that used aviation fuel. In the Sled Track area there were accidental rocket explosions where security worked on the tracks for clean up and were required to turn in their boots and clothes but were not told to shower before going home. Exposure to radiation was not monitored at the animal areas the guards patrolled. Security guards monitored the fence line along the donkey farm on the east side of the Manzano mountains. Guards were posted at a large area where bulldozers buried delivery trucks filled with irradiated dead donkeys into pits. Donkeys in body armor were hoisted onto drop towers in Tech Area III where they were hit with explosives and fragmentation. Donkeys were burned with napalm. Donkeys were exposed to powerful magnets and would die two days later. The guard observed a sheep station at Sandia where experiments with body armor were performed on 20-30 sheep that were tied up. The guard opened a freezer door and saw sheep heads in a sort of autopsy lab where medical teams operated with instruments. In the lab where the sheep were analyzed, there were pictures of pigs with skin that appeared to be burned from radiation and other pigs pictures with skin grafts. The Sandia Site Profile review confirms that animal stations were not analyzed for contribution to dose reconstruction. Animal housing areas were particularly contaminated from the urine and feces excreted by the animals, which contributed to radionuclide exposure. According to the Site Profile review, Plutonium and Uranium stuck to the sides of urine sample collection bottles so that there was underestimation of uranium and plutonium uptakes by workers. The radiation doses to the lung from inhalation of tritium at Sandia may have been underestimated by orders of magnitude. Tritium urine sampling was only done quarterly instead of the recommended weekly sampling. High levels of tritium contamination were present in Buildings 642, 805 and 806 in air, on tools and floors. Tritium that is combined with metals and organics stays in the lungs for a longer period of time. The different types of doses from tritium combinations such as with water, metals, oils were not properly monitored.

The resuspension of contaminated soils from drainfields, evaporation ponds, waste landfills and reactors further contaminated Sandians but received no discussion by NIOSH. No stack monitoring data was reviewed by NIOSH. The Tiger Team identified the need to minimize and control fugitive emissions and conduct air monitoring at the point of emission. Even now, Sandia has only four ambient air stations for monitoring radionuclides compared to over one hundred stations at Los Alamos National Laboratories. Sandia and Kirtland Air Force Base plan to annually openly burn or detonate over 200,000 pounds of toxic waste that Sandians and the surrounding community will be breathing. In 2007, Kirtland AFB exceeded New Mexico levels for soil contaminants for Barium, Copper, Lead, Mercury, Nickel and Zinc.6 However, no regulatory sanctions have issued from the New Mexico Environment Department. Before 1992, Sandia did not conduct a routine bioassay program at Sandia. Unfortunately in 1994, the company, Controls for Environmental Pollution (CEP), that tested about 500 Sandia employee urine samples between 1992 and 1994, was raided by the FBI because the test results were falsified.7 Lockheed Martin and the DOE are well known for their destruction of employee medical records. At the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) the Centers for Disease Control disclosed that over 62 boxes of documents representing 310,000 pages relevant to the INL dose reconstruction had been destroyed.8 The DOE reportedly destroyed two tractor trailers of the Mound Plants records necessary for reconstructing employee exposure to radiation and chemicals. The records were buried in a radioactive waste dump at Los Alamos National Laboratory.9 NEXT ARTICLE: FAILURE TO PROTECT SANDIA WORKERS EQUALS FAILURE TO PROTECT THE ALBUQUERQUE COMMUNITY

http://www.radfreenm.org/pages/nr/pr-2008sep12a.pdf http://www.cdc.gov/Niosh/ocas/pdfs/abrwh/scarpts/sandiasca.pdf 3 http://projects.publicintegrity.org/shadow/report.aspx?aid=824 4 http://www.dol.gov/esa/owcp/energy/regs/compliance/statistics/webpages/SANDIA_NATL_LAB.htm 5 http://www.cdc.gov/Niosh/ocas/pdfs/abrwh/scarpts/sandiasca.pdf 6 Response by Kirtland AFB to Citizen Action Freedom of Information Request. Document on file with Citizen Action. 7 http://radlab.nl/radsafe/archives/9411/msg00083.html 8 Idaho National Laboratory Document Destruction, Environmental Defense Institute Newsletter, September 2009, p.8. 9 Former Mound Employees, Advocates Question Destruction of Records, Environmental Defense Institute Newsletter, September 2009, p.7.
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