Carino v Carino, 351 SCRA 127 SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent.

DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose death benefits is now the subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom he married. Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV [2] No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632. During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982. In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] [3] [4] Pag-ibig, while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS). On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as death benefits which she (petitioner) received from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig. Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default. Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license [5] number; and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage License number from the records of this archives. This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cario for whatever legal purpose it may serve. On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows: WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half of the amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit. IT IS SO ORDERED.
[7] [6] [1]

On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that: I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR. II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE. III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS [8] GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE.

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be [9] free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to [10] question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These [11] need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject death benefits of the deceased. Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized [12] [13] in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the [14] marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of [15] Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a m arriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand. It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio. It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the death benefits under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio. One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the [16] applicable property regime. Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage. Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliance s of the [17] same married man, ... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ... In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the coownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of [18] the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order. The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the

deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them. As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. xxx xxx xxx

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other [19] did not contribute thereto. Conformably, even if the disputed death benefits were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pe rtaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao. In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service [20] Insurance System, where the Court awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife, holding that: ... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership established by that m arriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husbands share in the property here in dispute.... And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, [t]he only just and equitable soluti on in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband, and [21] consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage. It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why in the said case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance with their existing property regime. In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void because the parties are not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage. However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved and proceed to [23] determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, the Court explained: [T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorney s fees in
[22]

the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur. Puno J., on official leave.

Tenebro v CA, 423 SCRA VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individuals criminal liability for bigamy . We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines penal laws are concerned. As such, an individua l who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit 1 with Villareyes. On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether 3 the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. The Information, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095L, reads: That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage. CONTRARY TO LAW. When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".
6 4 5

During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their 7 union. He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his 8 work as a seaman. He further testified that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any 9 marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage. On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2) 10 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors: I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.

II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND 11 VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT. After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed judgment. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are: (1) that the offender has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
12

Petitioners assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was 13 14 celebrated. Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal. Petitioners defense must fail on both counts. First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto 15 Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila; and (2) a handwritten letter from 16 Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married. To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification issued by the National Statistics Office dated 17 18 October 7, 1995; and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997. Both these documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the marriage contract, which in itself would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes. All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows: Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours). This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither document attests as a positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes. The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the 19 marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present. There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes letter, Ancajas testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of t he valid first marriage, and petitioners own conduct, whic h would all tend to indicate that the first marriage had all the requisites for validity. Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is significant to note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accuseds marriage to his second wife, private respondent in this case.

As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy. The second tier of petitioners defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial declaration marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
20

of the nullity of the second

Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, 21 he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not committed. This argument is not impressed with merit. Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned. As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage 22 to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The States penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an individuals deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done. Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the 23 solemnizing officer) and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties 24 personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses). Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in 25 26 27 Articles 37 and 38 may contract marriage. In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses. Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall 28 be considered legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deli berately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment. As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of the accuseds guilt for purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the States basic social institution, the States criminal laws on bigamy step in. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Azcuna, JJ., concur. Puno, J., join the opinion of J. Vitug. Vitug, J., see separate opinion. Quisumbing, J., join the dissent in view of void nuptia. Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion. Austria-Martinez, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio. Carpio-Morales, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio. Tinga, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio. Callejo, Sr., J., see separate dissent.

SEPARATE OPINION> VITUG, J.: Veronico Tenebro has been charged with bigamy for contracting, while still being married to Hilda Villareyes, a second marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas. Tenebro argues that since his second marriage with Ancajas has ultimately been declared void ab initio on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity, he should be acquitted for the crime of bigamy. The offense of bigamy is committed when one contracts "a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper 1 proceedings". Bigamy presupposes a valid prior marriage and a subsequent marriage, contracted during the subsistence of the prior union, which would have been binding were it not for its being bigamous. Would the absolute nullity of either the first or the second marriage, prior to its judicial declaration as being void, constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy? I believe that, except for a void marriage on account of the psychological incapacity of a party or both parties to the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code (as so hereinafter explained), the answer must be in the affirmative. Void marriages are inexistent from 2 3 the very beginning, and no judicial decree is required to establish their nullity. As early as the case of People vs. Aragon this Court has underscored the fact that the Revised Penal Code itself does not, unlike the rule then prevailing in Spain, require the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior void marriage before it can be raised by way of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy. Had the law contemplated otherwise, said the Court, " an express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in the law, (but that in) its absence, (the courts) are bound by (the) rule of strict interpretation" of penal statutes. In contrast to a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled (and, therefore, not a defense in a bigamy charge if the second marriage were contracted prior to the 4 decree of annulment) the complete nullity, however, of a previously contracted marriage, being void ab initio and legally inexistent, can outrightly be defense in an indictment of bigamy. It has been held that, by virtue of Article 40 of the Family Code, a person may be convicted of bigamy although the first marriage is ultimately adjudged void ab initio if, at the time the second marriage is contracted, there has as yet no judicial declaration of nullity of 5 the prior marriage. I maintain strong reservations to this ruling. Article 40 of the Family Code reads: "Article 40. The absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." It is only "for purpose of remarriage" that the law has expressed that the absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be invoked "on the basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." It may not be amiss to state that under the regime of the 6 Civil Code of 1950, the Supreme Court, in Wiegel vs. Judge Sempio-Diy, has held that a subsequent marriage of one of the spouses of a prior void marriage is itself (the subsequent marriage) void if it were contracted before a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous 7 marriage. Although this pronouncement has been abandoned in a later decision of the court in Yap vs. Court of Appeals, the Family Code, however has seen it fit to adopt the Wiegel rule but only for purpose of remarriage which is just to say that the subsequent marriage shall itself be considered void. There is no clear indication to conclude that the Family Code has amended or intended to 8 amend the Revised penal Code or to abandon the settled and prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. A void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is a class by itself. The provision has been from Canon law primarily to reconcile 9 the grounds for nullity of marriage under civil law with those of church laws. The "psychological incapacity to comply" with the essential marital obligations of the spouses is completely distinct from other grounds for nullity which are confined to the essential or formal requisites of a marriage, such as lack of legal capacity or disqualification of the contracting parties, want of consent, absence of a marriage license, or the like.

The effects of a marriage attended by psychological incapacity of a party or the parties thereto may be said to have the earmarks of a voidable, more than a void, marriage, remaining to be valid until it is judicially decreed to be a nullity. Thus, Article 54 of the Family Code considers children conceived or born of such a void marriage before its judicial declaration of nullity to be legitimate similar to the rule on a voidable marriage. It is expected, even as I believe it safe to assume, that the spouses rights and obligations, p roperty regime and successional rights would continue unaffected, as if it were a voidable marriage, unless and until the marriage is judicially declared void for basically two reasons: First, psychological incapacity, a newly-added ground for the nullity of a marriage under the Family 10 Code, breaches neither the essential nor the formal requisites of a valid marriages; and second, unlike the other grounds for nullity of marriage (i.e., relationship, minority of the parties, lack of license, mistake in the identity of the parties) which are capable of relatively 11 easy demonstration, psychological incapacity, however, being a mental state, may not so readily be as evident. It would have been logical for the Family Code to consider such a marriage explicitly voidable rather than void if it were not for apparent attempt to make it closely coincide with the Canon Law rules and nomenclature. Indeed, a void marriage due to psychological incapacity appears to merely differ from a voidable marriage in that, unlike the latter, it is not convalidated by either cohabitation or prescription. It might be recalled that prior to republic Act No. 8533, further amending the Family Code, an action or defense of absolute nullity of marriage falling under Article 36, celebrated before the effectivity of the Code, could prescribe in ten years following the effectivity of the Family Code. The initial provision of the ten-year period of prescription seems to betray a real consciousness by the framers that marriages falling under Article 36 are truly meant to be inexistent. Considerations, both logical and practical, would point to the fact that a "void" marriage due to psychological incapacity remains, for all intents and purposes, to be binding and efficacious until judicially declared otherwise. Without such marriage having first been declared a nullity (or otherwise dissolved), a subsequent marriage could constitute bigamy. Thus, a civil case questioning the validity of the first marriage would not be a prejudicial issue much in the same way that a civil case assailing a prior "voidable" marriage (being valid until annulled) would not be a prejudicial question to the prosecution of a criminal offense for bigamy. In cases where the second marriage is void on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage, this Court has declared in a line 12 of cases that no crime of bigamy is committed. The Court has explained that for a person to be held guilty of bigamy, it must, even as it needs only, be shown that the subsequent marriage has all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsisting first union. Hence, where it is established that the second marriage has been contracted without the necessary license and thus 13 14 void, or that the accused is merely forced to enter into the second (voidable) marriage, no criminal liability for the crime of bigamy can attach. In both and like instances, however, the lapses refers to the elements required for contracting a valid marriage. If, then, all the requisites for the perfection of the contract marriage, freely and voluntarily entered into, are shown to be extant, the criminal liability for bigamy can unassailably arise. Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does not relate to an infirmity in the elements, either essential or formal, in contacting a valid marriage, the declaration of nullity subsequent to the bigamous marriage due to that ground, without more, would be inconsequential in a criminal charge for bigamy. The judicial declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity merely nullifies the effects of the marriage but it does not negate the fact of perfection of the bigamous marriage. Its subsequent declaration of nullity dissolves the relationship of the spouses but, being alien to the requisite conditions for the perfection of the marriage, the judgment of the court is no defense on the part of the offender who had entered into it. Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition.

Antonio v Reyes

LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner, vs. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent. DECISION TINGA, J.: Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouses capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more. The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24 3 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court. Antecedent Facts Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year 4 after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church 5 6 wedding at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990. Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
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On 8 March 1993, petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondents incapacity existed at the time t heir marriage was celebrated and still subsists up 8 to the present. As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that r espondent persistently lied about herself, 9 the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things, to wit: (1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boys parentage when petitioner learned about it from other sources 11 after their marriage. (2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred. (3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she 13 graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither. (4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon 14 show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect but petitioner discovered per 15 certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place. (5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to 16 be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2 million. Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their 17 quarrels. He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when he discovered they 18 were not known in or connected with Blackgold. (6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher 19 income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer. She spent 20 lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts. (7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her 21 behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991. In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondents persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect. They further asserted that respondents extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was n o actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that 23 respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. 24 She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities. She presented her version, thus: (1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her husband.
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(2) She told petitioner about Davids attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent from Davids act of touch ing her 26 back and ogling her from head to foot. (3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) 27 years. (4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office 28 hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979. (5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of 29 the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares. (6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if 30 she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husbands whereabouts. (7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her monthly budget of P7,000.00.
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In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for a 32 finding of psychological incapacity on her part. In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her psychological 33 condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant, together with the screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not 34 elicited from respondent. In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted respondents psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS which 35 was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test. After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and held that respondents propensity to lying about almost anythingher occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among othershad been duly established. According to the trial court, respondents fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world o f make-believe. 36 This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic 37 marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties. During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunals ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate Matrim onial 38 Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion. Subsequently, the decision of the National 39 Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican. Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the RTCs judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondents psychological incapacity. It decl ared that the 40 requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals governing the application and interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied. Taking exception to the appellate courts pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondents psychological incapacity. In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC to the factual allegations 41 of petitioner. It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses 42 while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof. The Court is likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence 43 was not sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity of respondent. Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down in the Courts 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of 44 45 Appeals (also known as the Molina case ), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the 46 case at bar. Since Molinawas decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage 47 under Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of 48 Appeals, wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36. This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code is 49 hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned. Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance. Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36 Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes 50 manifest only after its solemnization." The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a marriage. The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of their reason at the 51 52 time of contracting marriage." Marriages with such persons were ordained as void, in the same class as marriages with underage parties and persons already married, among others. A partys mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce L aw of 53 1917, but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" 54 under the Marriage Law of 1929. Divorce on the ground of a spouses incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted

during the Japanese occupation. Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" 56 was classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage. The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse 57 was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab initio. Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 58 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind. Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity impinges on consent freely given which 59 is one of the essential requisites of a contract. The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and 60 obligations. Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological 61 incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage." There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) 62 of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only." At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations, because then this would 63 amount to lack of consent to the marriage." These concerns though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of 64 Appeals, wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed 65 and discharged by the parties to the marriage." The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere 66 inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing 67 them, could not have given valid assumption thereto." Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about 68 to assume." It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage." At the same time, it has been consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision ona case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law." We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:
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Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate 72 court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-tocase perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had bluntly 73 acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from canon law, and as one member admitted, enacted as a 74 solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law. It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not 75 controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived from canon law, its

incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological 76 incapacity are binding on lower courts. Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage. But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity. Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage. These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition. Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full: 1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. 2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. 3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. 4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. 5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root

causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. 6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. 7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides: "The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature." Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. 77 Ideallysubject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void. Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification stating his reasons for his agreement or 78 opposition to the petition. This requirement however was dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the 79 Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the pet ition for declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscals participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from the records of this case. As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines. We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina. First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondents claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered petitioners evidence as credible enough. Even the appel late court 80 acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with petitioner. As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public matter between private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs. Second. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complai nt, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, 81 educational attainment, and family background, among others. These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the 82 department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals, testified as follows: WITNESS: Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems ( sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of her marriage? A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of concern, the lack of love towards the person, and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is based on communication between individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect. Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage? xxx ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness) Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has been calling up the petitioners officemates and ask him ( sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr. witness? A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an affair with another woman and if she persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with different women, then that is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy. Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of the marriage? A- Yes, Maam.
83

The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves to 84 fabricate about herself." These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial transcripts of respondents testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine respondent, 85 the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not required for the 86 spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated. We deem the methodology utilized by petitioners witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopezs common conclusion of respondents psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioners version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioners factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn ther efrom by petitioners expert witnesses. Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise: To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by 87 petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity. Third. Respondents psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at th e time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural childs real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage. Fourth. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligati ons of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondents psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable. It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioners witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondents inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathol ogic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondents inability to understand and perform the essential obl igations of

marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments. The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations. Respondents ability to even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at best. Consideri ng that the evidence convincingly disputes respondents ability to adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence. At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36. Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it 88 anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioners efforts to bring the matter to its attention. Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in 89 90 a Conclusion dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent. Such decree of nullity was affirmed 91 92 by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, and the Roman Rota of the Vatican. In fact, respondents psychological 93 incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunals consent. In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced: The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the marriage vows. The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the 94 Petitioner. Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioners allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondents version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court. Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, the appellate 95 court noting that it did not appear certain that respondents condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect. Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondents aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her ex cessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondents condition is incurable. From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondents condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondents psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioners expert

witnesses characterized respondents condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological incap acity was curable or incurable. But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts taciturnit y on this point. The petitioners expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. Th ese events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code. On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by first citing the deliberations of the 96 97 Family Code committee, then the opinion of canonical scholars, before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition of 98 psychological incapacity. Santos did refer to Justice Caguioas opinion expressed during the deliberations that "psychological 99 incapacity is incurable," and the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila 100 that psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a characteristic of 101 psychological incapacity. This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its own ruling that remained silent on whether respondents psychological incapacity was inc urable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial courts decision that required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence. We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,
102

the Court countered an argument that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively

with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date the 103 statute in enacted. Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical considerations. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondents psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level. We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondents psychological incapacity ha s been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted. All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court. There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondents avowed commitment to remain in t he marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Reyes v Reyes, GR 185286

MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, Petitioner, vs. RAMON REYES, Respondent. DECISION

NACHURA, J.: This case is, again, an instance of the all-too-familiar tale of a marriage in disarray. In this regard, we air the caveat that courts should be extra careful before making a finding of psychological incapacity or vicariously diagnosing personality disorders in spouses where there are none. On the other hand, blind adherence by the courts to the exhortation 1 in the Constitution and in our statutes that marriage is an inviolable social institution, and validating a marriage that is null and void despite convincing proof of psychological incapacity, trenches on the very reason why a marriage that is doomed from its inception should not be forcibly inflicted upon its hapless partners for life. At bar is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No. 89761 which reversed the 3 decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854. First, we unfurl the facts. Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old. They were simply classmates then in one university subject when respondent crossenrolled from the UP Los Baos campus. The casual acquaintanceship quickly developed into a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship. Petitioner was initially attracted to respondent who she thought was free spirited and bright, although he did not follow conventions and 4 traditions. Since both resided in Mandaluyong City, they saw each other every day and drove home together from the university. Easily impressed, petitioner enjoyed respondents style of courtshi p which included dining out, unlike other couples their age who were restricted by a university students budget. At that time, respondent held a job in the family business, the Aristocrat Resta urant. Petitioners good impression of the respondent was not diminished by the latters habit of cutting classes, not even by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana. Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a degree in AB Sociology from the UP. By 1974, respondent had dropped out of school on his third year, and just continued to work for the Aristocrat Restaurant. On December 5, 1976, the year following petitioners graduation and her fathers death, petitioner and respondent got married . At that time, petitioner was already five (5) months pregnant and employed at the Population Center Foundation. Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondents family in Mandaluyong City. All living expenses were shouldered by respondents parents, and the couples respective salaries were spent solely for their personal needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner a monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from his salary. When their first child was born on March 22, 1977, financial difficulties started. Rearing a child entailed expenses. A year into their marriage, the monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from respondent stopped. Further, respondent no longer handed his salary to petitioner. When petitioner mustered enough courage to ask the respondent about this, the latter told her that he had resigned due to slow advancement within the family business. Respondents game plan was to venture into trading seafood in the province, supplying hotels and restaurants, including the Aristocrat Restaurant. However, this new business took respondent away from his young family for days on end without any communication. Petitioner simply endured the set up, hoping that the situation will change. To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live separately from her in-laws. However, the new living arrangement engendered further financial difficulty. While petitioner struggled to make ends meet as the single-income earner of the household, respondents business floundered. Thereafter, another attempt at business, a fishpond in Mindoro, was similarly unsuccessful. Respondent gave money to petitioner sporadically. Compounding the familys financial woes and further straining the parties relationship was the indifferent attitude of respondent towards his family. That his busine ss took him away from his family did not seem to bother respondent; he did not exert any effort to remain in touch with them while he was away in Mindoro. After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this time, moved in with pe titioners mother. But the new set up did not end their marital difficulties. In fact, the parties became more estranged. Petitioner continued to carry the burden of supporting a family not just financially, but in most aspects as well. In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage, gave birth to their third son. At that time, respondent was in Mindoro and he did not even inquire on the health of either the petitioner or the newborn. A week later, respondent arrived in Manila, acting nonchalantly while playing with the baby, with nary an attempt to find out how the hospital bills were settled. In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondents fishpond business stopped operations. Although without any means to support his family, respondent refused to go back to work for the family business. Respondent came up with another business venture, engaging in scrap paper and carton trading. As with all of respondents business ventures, this did not succeed and added to the trail of debt which now hounded not only respondent, but petitioner as well. Not surprisingly, the relationship of the parties deteriorated.
2

Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair. She overheard respondent talking to his girlfriend, a former secretary, over the phone inquiring if the latter liked respondents gift to her. Petitioner soon realized that resp ondent was not only unable to provide financially for their family, but he was, more importantly, remiss in his obligation to remain faithful to her and their family. One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties marriage was a surgical operation on petitioner for the removal of a cyst. Although his wife was about to be operated on, respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her as she was wheeled into the operating room. After the operation, petitioner felt that she had had enough of respondents lack of concern, and asked her mother to order respondent to leave the recovery room. Still, petitioner made a string of "final" attempts to salvage what was left of their marriage. Petitioner approached respond ents siblings and asked them to intervene, confessing that she was near the end of her rope. Yet, even respondents siblings waved the white flag on respondent. Adolfo Reyes, respondents elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage encounter group, invited and spons ored the parties to join the group. The elder couple scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner and respondent, but these did not improve the parties relationship as respondent remained uncooperative. In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological assessment to "determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning." As with all other attempts to help him, respondent resisted and did not continue with the clinical psychologists recommendation to undergo psychotherapy. At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondents siblings, told respondent to move out of their house. Respondent acquiesced to give space to petitioner. With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not improve. Neither did respondents relationship with his chi ldren. Finally, in 2001, petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with the respondent, alleging the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioners allegations that he was psychologically incapacitated. Respondent mai ntained that he was not remiss in performing his obligations to his familyboth as a spouse to petitioner and father to their children. After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr. Estrella Magno, and a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, were presented in evidence), the RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage between the parties null and void on the ground of their psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled, thus: Wherefore, on the ground of psychological incapacity of both parties, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner MA. SOCORRO PERPETUA CAMACHO and respondent RAMON REYES contracted on December 4, 1976 at the Archbishops Chapel Villa San Miguel Mandaluyong, Rizal, is declared null and void u nder Art. 36 of the Family Code, as amended. Henceforth, their property relation is dissolved. Parties are restored to their single or unmarried status. Their children JESUS TEODORO CAMACHO REYES and JOSEPH MICHAEL CAMACHO REYES, who are already of age and have the full civil capacity and legal rights to decide for themselves having finished their studies, are free to decide for themselves. The Decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days from notice to the parties. Entry of Judgment shall be made if no Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial or Appeal is filed by any of the parties, the Public Prosecutor or the Solicitor General. Upon finality of this Decision, the Court shall forthwith issue the corresponding Decree if the parties have no properties[.] [O]therwise, the Court shall observe the procedure prescribed in Section 21 of AM 02-11-10 SC. The Decree of Nullity quoting the dispositive portion of the Decision (Sec. 22 AM 02-11-10 SC) shall be issued by the Court only after compliance with Articles 50 & 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rules on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Property (Sections 19 & 21, AM 02-11-10 SC) in a situation where the parties have properties. The Entry of Judgment of this Decision shall be registered in the Local Civil Registry of Mandaluyong and Quezon City. Let [a] copy of this Decision be furnished the parties, their counsel, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Public Prosecutor, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Mandaluyong City, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Quezon City and the Civil Registrar General at their respective office addresses.
5

SO ORDERED.

Finding no cogent reason to reverse its prior ruling, the trial court, on motion for reconsideration of the respondent, affirmed the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage. Taking exception to the trial courts rulings, respondent appealed to the Court of Ap peals, adamant on the validity of his marriage to petitioner. The appellate court, agreeing with the respondent, reversed the RTC and declared the parties marriage as valid a nd subsisting. Significantly, a special division of five (two members dissenting from the majority decision and voting to affirm the decision of the RTC) ruled, thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 23, 2007 and Order dated July 13, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Amended Petition 7 for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. Undaunted by the setback, petitioner now appeals to this Court positing the following issues: I THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE. II THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONER IS LIKEWISE PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE. III THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE TESTIMONIES OF THE EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED BY PETITIONER. IV THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE BINDING ON IT. V THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED DULY ESTABLISHED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE. VI THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE WERE ESTABLISHED, NOT MERELY BY A TOTALITY, BUT BY A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE. VII THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PARTIES MARRIAGE, WHICH IS UNDOUBTEDLY VOID AB INITIO UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, DOES NOT FURTHER THE INITIATIVES OF THE STATE CONCERNING MARRIAGE AND FAMILY AND THEREFORE, NOT COVERED BY THE MANTLE OF THE CONSTITUTION ON THE PROTECTION OF MARRIAGE. VIII THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE AMENDED PETITION WAS VALIDLY AMENDED TO CONFORM 8 TO EVIDENCE. Essentially, petitioner raises the singular issue of whether the marriage between the parties is void ab initio on the ground of both parties psychological incapacity, as provided in Article 36 of the Family Cod e.

In declaring the marriage null and void, the RTC relied heavily on the oral and documentary evidence obtained from the three (3) experts i.e., Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas. The RTC ratiocinated, thus: After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence presented, the Court finds merit in the petition. Article 36 of the Family Code reads: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization." and Art. 68 of the same Code provides: "The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." Similarly, Articles 69-71 further define the mutual obligations of a marital partner towards each other and Articles 220, 225 and 271 of the Family Code express the duties of parents toward their children. Article 36 does not define what psychological incapacity means. It left the determination of the same solely to the Court on a case to case basis. xxxx Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the determination of psychological incapacity in conjunction to the totality of the evidence presented, with emphasis on the pervasive pattern of behaviors of the respondent and outcome of the assessment/diagnos[is] of expert witnesses, Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra. Villegas on the psychological condition of the respondent, the Court finds that the marriage between the parties from its inception has a congenital infirmity termed "psychological incapacity" which pertains to the inability of the parties to effectively function emotionally, intellectually and socially towards each other in relation to their essential duties to mutually observe love, fidelity and respect as well as to mutually render help and support, (Art. 68 Family Code). In short, there was already a fixed niche in the psychological constellation of respondent which created the death of his marriage. There is no reason to entertain any slightest doubt on the truthfulness of the personality disorder of the respondent. The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were unanimous in their findings that respondent is suffering from personality disorder which psychologically incapacitated him to fulfill his basic duties to the marriage. Being professionals and hav[ing] solemn duties to their profession, the Court considered their assessment/diagnos[is] as credible or a product of an honest evaluation on the psychological status of the respondent. This psychological incapacity of the respondent, in the uniform words of said three (3) expert witnesses, is serious, incurable and exists before his marriage and renders him a helpless victim of his structural constellation. It is beyond the respondents impulse control. In short, he is weaponless or powerless to restrain himself from his consistent behaviors simpl y because he did not consider the same as wrongful. This is clearly manifested from his assertion that nothing was wrong in his marriage with the petitioner and considered their relationship as a normal one. In fact, with this belief, he lent deaf ears to counseling and efforts extended to them by his original family members to save his marriage. In short, he was blind and too insensitive to the reality of his marital atmosphere. He totally disregarded the feelings of petitioner who appeared to have been saturated already that she finally revealed her misfortunes to her sister-in-law and willingly submitted to counseling to save their marriage. However, the hard position of the respondent finally constrained her to ask respondent to leave the conjugal dwelling. Even the siblings of the respondent were unanimous that separation is the remedy to the seriously ailing marriage of the parties. Respondent confirmed this stand of his siblings. xxxx The process of an ideal atmosphere demands a give and take relationship and not a one sided one. It also requires surrender to the fulfillment of the essential duties to the marriage which must naturally be observed by the parties as a consequence of their marriage. Unfortunately, the more than 21 years of marriage between the parties did not create a monument of marital integrity, simply because the personality disorder of the respondent which renders him psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his basic duties to his marriage, is deeply entombed in his structural system and cure is not possible due to his belief that there is nothing wrong with them. The checkered life of the parties is not solely attributable to the respondent. Petitioner, too, is to be blamed. Dra. Villegas was firm that she, too, is afflicted with psychological incapacity as her personality cannot be harmonized with the personality of the respondent. They are poles apart. Petitioner is a well-organized person or a perfectionist while respondent is a free spirited or carefree person. Thus, the weakness of the respondent cannot be catered by the petitioner and vice-versa. Resultantly, the psychological incapacities of both parties constitute the thunder bolt or principal culprit on their inability to nurture and reward their marital life with meaning and significance. So much so that it is a pity that though their marriage is intact for 21 years, still it is an empty kingdom due to their psychological incapacity which is grave, incurable and has origin from unhealthy event in their growing years.

Both parties to the marriage are protected by the law. As human beings, they are entitled to live in a peaceful and orderly environment conducive to a healthy life. In fact, Article 72 of the Family Code provides remedy to any party aggrieved by their marital reality. The case of the parties is already a settled matter due to their psychological incapacity. In the words of Dra. Magno, their marriage, at the very inception, was already at the funeral parlor. Stated differently, there was no life at all in their marriage for it never existed at all. The Court finds that with this reality, both parties suffer in agony by continuously sustaining a marriage that exists in paper only. Hence, it could no longer chain or jail the parties whose marriage remains in its crib with its boots and diaper due to factors beyond the physical, 9 emotional, intellectual and social ability of the parties to sustain. In a complete turnaround, albeit disposing of the case through a divided decision, the appellate court diverged from the findings of the RTC in this wise: On the basis of the guidelines [in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina] vis--vis the totality of evidence presented by herein [petitioner], we find that the latter failed to sufficiently establish the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband, as well as of herself. There is thus no basis for declaring the nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. [Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to show that [respondent] is psychologically incapacitated. Clinical psychologist Dayan diagnosed [respondent] as purportedly suffering from Mixed Personality Disorder (Schizoid Narcissistic and Anti-Social Personality Disorder). Further, clinical psychologist Magno found [respondent] to be suffering from an Antisocial Personality Disorder with narcissistic and dependent features, while Dr. Villegas diagnosed [respondent] to be suffering from Personality Disorder of the antisocial type, associated with strong sense of Inadequacy especially along masculine strivings and narcissistic features. Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as conclusive, but as purely advisory in character. A court may place whatever weight it chooses upon such testimonies. It may even reject them, if it finds that they are inconsistent with the facts of the case or are otherwise unreasonable. In the instant case, neither clinical psychologist Magno nor psychiatrist Dr. Villegas conducted a psychological examination on the [respondent]. Undoubtedly, the assessment and conclusion made by Magno and Dr. Villegas are hearsay. They are "unscientific and unreliable" as they have no personal knowledge of the psychological condition of the [respondent] as they never personally examined the [respondent] himself. xxxx [I]t can be gleaned from the recommendation of Dayan that the purported psychological incapacity of [respondent] is not incurable as the [petitioner] would like this Court to think. It bears stressing that [respondent] was referred to Dayan for "psychological evaluation to determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning." The undeniable fact is that based on Dayans personal examination of the [respondent], the assessment procedures used, behavioral observations made, background information gathered and interpretation of psychological data, the conclusion arrived at is that there is a way to help the [respondent] through individual therapy and counseling sessions. Even granting arguendo that the charges cast by the [petitioner] on [respondent], such as his failure to give regular support, substance abuse, infidelity and "come and go" attitude are true, the totality of the evidence presented still falls short of establishing that [respondent] is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code. xxxx In the case at bar, we hold that the court a quos findings regarding the [respondents] alleged mixed personality disorder, his "come and go" attitude, failed business ventures, inadequate/delayed financial support to his family, sexual infidelity, insensitivity to [petitioners] feelings, irresponsibility, failure to consult [petitioner] on his business pursuits, unfulfilled promises, fa ilure to pay debts in connection with his failed business activities, taking of drugs, etc. are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but on serious marital difficulties/differences and mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. [Respondents] "defects" were not present at the inception of marriage. They were even able to live in harmony in the first few years of their marriage, which bore them two children xxx. In fact, [petitioner] admitted in her Amended Petition that initially they lived comfortably and [respondent] would give his salary in keeping with the tradition in most Filipino households, but the situation changed when [respondent] resigned from the family-owned Aristocrat Restaurant and thereafter, [respondent] failed in his business ventures. It appears, however, that [respondent] has been gainfully employed with Marigold Corporation, Inc. since 1998, which fact was stipulated upon by the [petitioner]. xxxx As regards the purported psychological incapacity of [petit ioner], Dr. Villegas Psychiatric Report states that [petitioner] "manifested inadequacies along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive to the emotional needs of her husband, who needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage.

However, a perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the complete facts showing that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of celebration [thereof] even if such incapacity became manifest only after its celebration xxx. In fact, what was merely prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment be rendered "declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976 to be void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent at the time of the celebration of marriage x x x. xxxx What is evident is that [petitioner] really encountered a lot of difficulties in their marriage. However, it is jurisprudentially settled that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal" or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. While [petitioners] marriage with [respondent] failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy, however, is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the State. Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. Article 36 should not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. x x x It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in 10 favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. After a thorough review of the records of the case, we cannot subscribe to the appellate courts ruling that the psychologica l incapacity of respondent was not sufficiently established. We disagree with its decision declaring the marriage between the parties as valid and subsisting. Accordingly, we grant the petition. Santos v. Court of Appeals solidified the jurisprudential foundation of the principle that the factors characterizing psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations are: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3) incurability. We explained: The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the 12 marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. As previously adverted to, the three experts were one in diagnosing respondent with a personality disorder, to wit: 1. Dra. Cecilia C. Villegas PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE [Petitioner] is the second among 6 siblings of educated parents. Belonging to an average social status, intellectual achievement is quite important to the family values (sic). All children were equipped with high intellectual potentials (sic) which made their parents proud of them. Father was disabled, but despite his handicap, he was able to assume his financial and emotional responsibilities to his family and to a limited extent, his social functions (sic). Despite this, he has been described as the unseen strength in the family. Mother [of petitioner] was [actively involved] in activities outside the home. Doing volunteer and community services, she was not the demonstrative, affectionate and the emotional mother (sic). Her love and concern came in the form of positive attitudes, advices ( sic) and encouragements (sic), but not the caressing, sensitive and soothing touches of an emotional reaction (sic). Psychological home environment did not permit one to nurture a hurt feeling or depression, but one has to stand up and to help himself ( sic). This trained her to subjugate (sic) emotions to reasons. Because of her high intellectual endowment, she has easy facilities for any undertakings ( sic). She is organized, planned (sic), reliable, dependable, systematic, prudent, loyal, competent and has a strong sense of duty ( sic). But emotionally, she is not as sensitive. Her analytical resources and strong sense of objectivity predisposed her to a superficial adjustments ( sic). She acts on the dictates of her mind and reason, and less of how she feels (sic). The above qualities are perfect for a leader, but less effective in a heterosexual relationship, especially to her husband, who has deep seated sense of inadequacy, insecurity, low self esteem and self-worth despite his intellectual assets (sic). Despite this, [petitioner] remained in her marriage for more than 20 years, trying to reach out and lending a hand for better understanding and relationship ( sic). She was hoping for the time when others, like her husband would make decision
11

for her (sic), instead of being depended upon. But the more [petitioner] tried to c ompensate for [respondents] shortcomings, the bigger was the discrepancy in their coping mechanisms ( sic). At the end, [petitioner] felt unloved, unappreciated, uncared for and she characterized their marriage as very much lacking in relationship ( sic). On the other hand, [respondent] is the 9th of 11 siblings and belonged to the second set of brood ( sic), where there were less bounds (sic) and limitations during his growing up stage. Additionally, he was acknowledged as the favorite of his mother, and was described to have a close relationship with her. At an early age, he manifested clinical behavior of conduct disorder and was on marijuana regularly. Despite his apparent high intellectual potentials (sic), he felt that he needed a "push" to keep him going. His being a "free spirit", attracted [petitioner], who adored him for being able to do what he wanted, without being bothered by untraditional, unacceptable norms and differing ideas from other people. He presented no guilt feelings, no remorse, no anxiety for whatever wrongdoings he has committed. His studies proved too much of a pressure for him, and quit at the middle of his course, despite his apparent high intellectual resources (sic). His marriage to [petitioner] became a bigger pressure. Trying to prove his worth, he quit work from his family employment and ventured on his own. With no much planning and project study, his businesses failed. This became the sources (sic) of their marital conflicts, the lack of relationships (sic) and consultations (sic) with each other, his negativistic attitudes (sic) and sarcasm, stubbornness and insults, his spitting at her face which impliedly meant "you are nothing as compared to me" were in reality, his defenses for a strong sense of inadequacy (sic). As described by [petitioner], he is intelligent and has bright ides. However, this seemed not coupled with emotional attributes such as perseverance, patience, maturity, direction, focus, adequacy, stability and confidence to make it work. He complained that he did not feel the support of his wife regarding his decision to go into his own business. But when he failed, the more he became negativistic and closed to suggestions especially from [petitioner]. He was too careful not to let go or make known his strong sense of inadequacy, ambivalence, doubts, lack of drive and motivation or even feelings of inferiority, for fear of rejection or loss of pride. When things did not work out according to his plans, he suppressed his hostilities in negative ways, such as stubbornness, sarcasm or drug intake. His decision making is characterized by poor impulse control, lack of insight and primitive drives. He seemed to feel more comfortable in being untraditional and different from others. Preoccupation is centered on himself, (sic) an unconscious wish for the continuance of the gratification of his dependency needs, (sic) in his mother-son relationship. From this stems his difficulties in heterosexual relationship with his wife, as pressures, stresses, (sic) demands and expectations filled up in (sic) up in their marital relationship. Strong masculine strivings is projected. For an intelligent person like [respondent], he may sincerely want to be able to assume his duties and responsibilities as a husband and father, but because of a severe psychological deficit, he was unable to do so. Based on the clinical data presented, it is the opinion of the examiner, that [petitioner] manifested inadequacies along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive to the emotional needs of her husband, who needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. [Respondent], on the other hand, has manifested strong clinical evidences (sic), that he is suffering from a Personality Disorder, of the antisocial type, associated with strong sense of Inadequacy along masculine strivings and narcissistic features that renders him psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. This is characterized by his inability to conform to the social norms that ordinarily govern many aspects of adolescent and adult behavior. His being a "free spirit" associated with no remorse, no guilt feelings and no anxiety, is distinctive of this clinical condition. His prolonged drug intake [marijuana] and maybe stronger drugs lately, are external factors to boost his ego. The root cause of the above clinical conditions is due to his underlying defense mechanisms, or the unconscious mental processes, that the ego uses to resolve conflicts. His prolonged and closed attachments to his mother encouraged cross identification and developed a severe sense of inadequacy specifically along masculine strivings. He therefore has to camouflage his weakness, in terms of authority, assertiveness, unilateral and forceful decision making, aloofness and indifference, even if it resulted to antisocial acts. His narcissistic supplies rendered by his mother was not resolved (sic). It existed before marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration, due to marital demands and stresses. It is considered as permanent in nature because it started early in his psychological development, and therefore became so engrained into his personality structures (sic). It is considered as severe in degree, because it hampered, interrupted and interfered with his normal functioning related 13 to heterosexual adjustments. (emphasis supplied) 2. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan Adolfo and Mandy[, respondent]s brothers, referred [respondent] to the clinic. According to them, respondent has not really taken care of his wife and children. He does not seem to have any direction in life. He seems to be full of bright ideas and good at starting things but he never gets to accomplish anything. His brothers are suspecting (sic) that until now [respondent] is still taking drugs. There are times when they see that [respondent] is not himself. He likes to bum around and just spends the day at home doing nothing. They wish that hed be more responsible and try to give priority to his family. [Petitioner,] his wife[,] is the breadwinner of the fam ily because she has a stable job. [Respondent]s brothers learned from friends that [petitioner] is really disappointed with him. She has discussed things with him but he always refused to listen. She does not know what to do with him anymore. She has grown tired of him.

When [respondent] was asked about his drug problem, he mentioned that he stopped taking it in 1993. His brothers think that he is not telling the truth. It is so hard for [respondent] to stop taking drugs when he had been hooked to it for the past 22 years. When [respondent] was also asked what his problems are at the moment, he mentioned that he feels lonely and distressed. He does not have anyone to talk to. He feels that he and his wife [have] drifted apart. He wants to be close to somebody and discuss things with this person but he is not given the chance. He also mentioned that one of his weak points is that he is very tolerant of people[,] that is why he is taken advantage of most of the time. He wants to avoid conflict so hed rather be submissive and compliant. He does not want to hurt anyone [or] to cause anymore pain. He wants to make other people happy. xxxx Interpretation of Psychological Data A. Intellectual / Cognitive Functioning xxxx B. Vocational Preference xxxx C. Socio Emotional Functioning xxxx In his relationships with people, [respondent] is apt to project a reserved, aloof and detached attitude. [Respondent] exhibits withdrawal patterns. He has deep feelings of inadequacy. Due to a low self-esteem, he tends to feel inferior and to exclude himself from association with others. He feels that he is "different" and as a result is prone to anticipate rejections. Because of the discomfort produced by these feelings, he is apt to avoid personal and social involvement, which increases his preoccupation with himself and accentuates his tendency to withdraw from interpersonal contact. [Respondent] is also apt to be the less dominant partner. He feels better when he has to follow than when he has to take the lead. A self-contained person[,] he does not really need to interact with others in order to enjoy life and to be able to move on. He has a small need of companionship and is most comfortable alone. He, too[,] feels uncomfortable in expressing his more tender feelings for fear of being hurt. Likewise, he maybe very angry within but he may choose to repress this feeling. [Respondents] strong need for social approval, which could have stemmed from some deep seate d insecurities makes him submissive and over [compliant]. He tends to make extra effort to please people. Although at times[, he] already feels victimized and taken advantage of, he still tolerates abusive behavior for fear of interpersonal conflicts. Despite his [dis]illusion with people, he seeks to minimize dangers of indifference and disapproval [of] others. Resentments are suppressed. This is likely to result in anger and frustrations which is likewise apt to be repressed. There are indications that [respondent] is[,] at the moment[,] experiencing considerable tension and anxiety. He is prone to fits of apprehension and nervousness. Likewise, he is also entertaining feelings of hopelessness and is preoccupied with negative thought. He feels that he is up in the air but with no sound foundation. He is striving [for] goals which he knows he will never be able to attain. Feeling discouraged and distressed, he has difficulty concentrating and focusing on things which he needs to prioritize. He has many plans but he cant accomplish anything because he is unable to see which path to take. This feeling of hopelessness is furthe r aggravated by the lack of support from significant others. Diagnostic Impression Axis I : Drug Dependence Axis II : Mixed Personality Disorder [Schizoid, Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder] Axis III : None Axis IV : Psychosocial and Environmental Problems: Severe He seems to be very good at planning and starting things but is unable to accomplish anything; unable to give priority to the needs of his family; in social relationships.

Axis V : Global Assessment of Functioning Fair (Emphasis supplied) 3. Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno Summary and Conclusion

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From the evidence available from [petitioners] case history and from her psychological assessment, and despite the non-cooperation of the respondent, it is possible to infer with certainty the nullity of this marriage. Based on the information available about the respondent, he suffers from [an] antisocial personality disorder with narcissistic and dependent features that renders him too immature and irresponsible to assume the normal obligations of a marriage. As for the petitioner, she is a good, sincere, and conscientious person and she has tried her best to provide for the needs of her children. Her achievements in this regard are praiseworthy. But she is emotionally immature and her comprehension of human situations is very shallow for a woman of her academic and professional competence. And this explains why she married RRR even when she knew he was a pothead, then despite the abuse, took so long to do something about her situation. Diagnosis for [petitioner]: Axis I Partner Relational Problem Axis II Obsessive Compulsive Personality Style with Self-Defeating features Axis III No diagnosis Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (spouses immaturity, drug abuse, and infidelity) Severity: 4-severe Diagnosis for [respondent] Axis I Partner Relational Problem Axis II Antisocial Personality Disorder with marked narcissistic, aggressive sadistic and dependent features Axis III No diagnosis Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (successful wife) Severity: 4 (severe) xxxx One has to go back to [respondents] early childhood in order to understand the root cause of his an tisocial personality disorder. [Respondent] grew up the ninth child in a brood of 11. His elder siblings were taken cared of by his grandmother. [Respondent s] father was kind, quiet and blind and [respondent] was [reared] by his mother. Unfortunately, [re spondents] mother grew up believing that she was not her mothers favorite child, so she felt "api, treated like poor relations." [Respondents] mothers reaction to her perceived rejection was to act outwith poor impulse control and poor mood regulation (spent money like water, had terrible temper tantrums, etc.). Unwittingly, his mother became [respondents] role model. However, because [respondent] had to get on with the business of living, he learned to use his good looks and his charms, and learned to size up the weaknesses of others, to lie convincingly and to say what people wanted to hear (esp. his deprived mother who liked admiration and attention, his siblings from whom he borrowed money, etc.). In the process, his ability to love and to empathize with others was impaired so that he cannot sustain a relationship with one person for a long time, which is devastating in a marriage. [Respondents] narcissistic personality features were manifested by his self -centeredness (e.g. moved to Mindoro and lived there for 10 years, leaving his family in Manila); his grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g. he would just "come and go," without telling his wife his whereabouts, etc.); his sense of entitlement (e.g. felt entitled to a mistress because [petitioner] deprived him of his marital rights, etc.); interpersonally exploitative (e.g. let his wife spend for all the maintenance needs of the family, etc.); and lack of empathy (e.g. when asked to choose between his mistress and his wife, he said he would think about it, etc.) The aggressive sadistic personality features were manifested whom he has physically, emotionally and verbally abusive [of] his wife when high on drugs; and his dependent personality features were manifested by his need for others to assume responsibility for most major areas of his life, and in his difficulty in doing things on his own.

[Respondent], diagnosed with an antisocial personality disorder with marked narcissistic features and aggressive sadistic and dependent features, is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage: to love, respect and render support for his spouse and children. A personality disorder is not curable as it is permanent and stable over time. From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there is evidence that the marriage of [petitioner] and [respondent is] null and void from the 15 very beginning. (emphasis supplied) Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale, the testimonies of Doctors Magno and Villegas for being hearsay since they never personally examined and interviewed the respondent. We do not agree with the CA. The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence. For one, marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. In this case, the experts testified on their individual assessment of the present state of the parties marriage from the perception of one of the parties, herein petitioner. Certai nly, petitioner, during their marriage, had occasion to interact with, and experience, respondents pattern of behavior which she could then vali dly relay to the clinical psychologists and the psychiatrist. For another, the clinical psychologists and psychiatrists assessment were not based solely on the narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as respondents own son, siblings and in -laws, and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified on their 17 own observations of respondents behavior and interactions with them, spanning the period of time they knew him. These were also used as the basis of the doctors assessments. The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim, citing The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM 19 IV), instructs us on the general diagnostic criteria for personality disorders: A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual's culture. This pattern is manifested in two (2) or more of the following areas: (1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other people, and events) (2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, liability, and appropriateness of emotional response) (3) interpersonal functioning (4) impulse control B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of personal and social situations. C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational or other important areas of functioning. D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back at least to adolescence or early adulthood. E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or a consequence of another mental disorder. F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (i.e., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., head trauma). Specifically, the DSM IV outlines the diagnostic criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder: A. There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others occurring since age 15 years, as indicated by three (or more) of the following: (1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest (2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for personal profit or pleasure
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(3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead (4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults (5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others (6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior or honor financial obligations (7) lack of remorse as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another B. The individual is at least 18 years. C. There is evidence of conduct disorder with onset before age 15 years. D. The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the course of schizophrenia or a manic episode.
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Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological make up of a person based on a number of factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted with a personality disorder will not necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this case, considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors separate diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the clinical finding s of experts. The CA declared that, based on Dr. Dayans findings and recommendation, the psychological incapacity of respondent is not incurable. The appellate court is mistaken. A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability. In general, recommendations for therapy are given by clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to manage behavior. In Kaplan and Saddocks textbook entitled Synopsis of 21 Psychiatry, treatment, ranging from psychotherapy to pharmacotherapy, for all the listed kinds of personality disorders are recommended. In short, Dr. Dayans recommendation that respondent should undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the find ing that respondents psychological incapacity is incurable. Moreover, Dr. Dayan, during her testimony, categorically declared that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the 22 essential marital obligations. As aptly stated by Justice Romero in her separate opinion in the ubiquitously cited case of Republic v. 23 Court of Appeals & Molina: [T]he professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the persons ent ire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professio nal opinions about a partys mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent. [Because] of advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes. In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the respective testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems; and (2) these problems include chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work towards providing the needs of his family; several failed business attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of unpaid money obligations. It is true that a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists diagnoses that a person has personality disorder is not automatic ally believed by the courts in cases of declaration of nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists finding of a personality disorder does not exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not beset by one of the parties or both parties psychological incapacity. On more than one occasion, we have rejected an experts opinion concerning the supposed psychological incapacity of a party. In Lim 25 26 v. Sta. Cruz-Lim, we ruled that, even without delving into the non-exclusive list found in Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina, the 27 stringent requisites provided in Santos v. Court of Appeals must be independently met by the party alleging the nullity of the marriage grounded on Article 36 of the Family Code. We declared, thus: It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and conclusions of Dr. Villegas with nary a link drawn between the "psychodynamics of the case" and the factors characterizing the psychological incapacity. Dr. Villegas' sparse testimony does not lead to the inevitable conclusion that the parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. Even on questioning from
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the trial court, Dr. Villegas' testimony did not illuminate on the parties' alleged personality disorders and their incapacitating effect on their marriage x x x. Curiously, Dr. Villegas' global conclusion of both parties' personality disorders was not supported by psychological tests properly administered by clinical psychologists specifically trained in the tests' use and interpretation. The supposed personality disorders of the parties, considering that such diagnoses were made, could have been fully established by psychometric and neurological tests which are designed to measure specific aspects of people's intelligence, thinking, or personality. xxxx The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own factual finding on what happened in this case. The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded. In the case at bar, however, even without the experts conclusions, the factual antecedents (narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. Article 68 of the Family Code provides: Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. In this connection, it is well to note that persons with antisocial personality disorder exhibit the following clinical features: Patients with antisocial personality disorder can often seem to be normal and even charming and ingratiating. Their histories, however, reveal many areas of disordered life functioning. Lying, truancy, running away from home, thefts, fights, substance abuse, and illegal activities are typical experiences that patients report as beginning in childhood. x x x Their own explanations of their antisocial behavior make it seem mindless, but their mental content reveals the complete absence of delusions and other signs of irrational thinking. In fact, they frequently have a heightened sense of reality testing and often impress observers as having good verbal intelligence. x x x Those with this disorder do not tell the truth and cannot be trusted to carry out any task or adhere to any conventional standard of 28 morality. x x x A notable finding is a lack of remorse for these actions; that is, they appear to lack a conscience. In the instant case, respondents pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa. On the issue of the petitioners purported psychological incapacity, we agree with the CAs ruli ng thereon: A perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the complete facts showing that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity became manifest only after its celebration x x x. In fact, what was merely prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment be rendered "declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976 to be void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent at the time of the celebration of the marriage x x x At any rate, even assuming arguendo that [petitioners] Amended Petition was inde ed amended to conform to the evidence, as provided under Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, Dr. Villegas finding that [petitioner] is supposedly suffering from an Inade quate Personality [Disorder] along the affectional area does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Such alleged condition of [petitioner] is not a debilitating psychological condition that incapacitates her from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage.1avvphi1 In fact, in the Psychological Evaluation Report of clinical psychologist Magno, [petitioner] was given a glowing evaluation as she was found to be a "good, sincere, and conscientious person and she has tried her best to provide for the needs of her children. Her achievements in this regard are praiseworthy." Even in Dr. Villegas psychiatric report, it was stated that [petitioner] was able to remain in their marriage for more than 20 years "trying to reach out and lending a hand for better understanding and relationship." With the foregoing evaluation made by no less than [petitioners] own expert witnesses, we find it hard to believe that 29 she is psychologically incapacitated within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code. All told, it is wise to be reminded of the caveat articulated by Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in his separate statement in Republic v. Court 30 of Appeals and Molina:

x x x Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court." In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing disquisition, we find ample basis to conclude that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations at the time of his marriage to the petitioner. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No. 89761 is REVERSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code is REINSTATED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, Petitioner, vs. ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, Respondent, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor. DECISION NACHURA, J.: Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity, since its incorporation in our laws, has become a clichd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treats this case, however, with much ado, it having realized that current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which psychological incapacity should be viewed, totally inconsistent with the way the concept was formulated free in form and devoid of any definition. For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the August 5, 2003 1 2 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867. The petition further assails the January 19, 2004 Resolution denying the motion for the reconsideration of the challenged decision. The relevant facts and proceedings follow. Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was then initially attrac ted to Rowenas close friend; but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena. That was in January 1996, when petitioner was a sophomore student and 3 respondent, a freshman. Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another and developed a certain degree of closeness towards each other. In March 1996, or around three months after their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that 4 month; he, providing their travel money and she, purchasing the boat ticket. However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house accommodation and daily sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncles house and Edward to his parents home. As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening him that she would commit suicid e, 5 Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncles place. On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years old, and she, 20. The two then continued to stay at her uncles place where Edward was treated like a prisonerhe was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her 7 uncle also showed Edward his guns and warned the latter not to leave Rowena. At one point, Edward was able to call home and talk to his brother who suggested that they should stay at their parents home and live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they could live on their own. Edward talked to his father about this, but 8 the patriarch got mad, told Edward that he would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go home. After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle, and stayed with his parents. His fam ily then hid him from Rowena 9 and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him. In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should live with his parents, she said that it 10 was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted ways.
6

After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity. This was docketed as Civil Case 11 No. Q-00-39720. As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to 12 investigate whether there was collusion between the parties. In the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General 13 (OSG) entered its appearance and deputized the OCP to appear on its behalf and assist it in the scheduled hearings. On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it could not determine if there was collusion between the 14 parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits. The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically incapacitated, and made the following findings and conclusions: BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY: EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born and baptized Born Again Christian at Manila. He finished two years in college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is currently unemployed. He is married to and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented himself at my office for a psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the grounds of psychological incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City. Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one deceased sister. Both his parents are also in the business world by whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and patient. This said virtues are said to be handed to each of the family member. He generally considers himself to be quiet and simple. He clearly remembers himself to be afraid of meeting people. After 1994, he tried his luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield International Incorporated. And because of job incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay long in the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a full servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself from his friends even during his childhood days as he only loves to read the Bible and hear its message. Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father and a disobedient wife. She is said to have not finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual moments with her boyfriend prior to that with petitioner. In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this became the foundation of their intimate relationship. After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is having problems with his family. Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her family and that she actually wanted to get out of their lives. From that [time on], respondent had insisted to petitioner that they should elope and live together. Petitioner hesitated because he is not prepared as they are both young and inexperienced, but she insisted that they would somehow manage because petitioner is rich. In the last week of March 1996, respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping and she already bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to the idea and so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the house of a friend of respondent, but they were not able to locate her, so petitioner was compelled to rent an apartment. The parties tried to look for a job but could not find any so it was suggested by respondent that they should go back and seek help from pet itioners parents. When the parties arrived at the house of petitioner, all of his whole family was all out of the country so respondent decided to go back to her home for the meantime while petitioner stayed behind at their home. After a few days of separation, respondent called petitioner by phone and said she wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded immediately and when he arrived at their house, respondent confronted petitioner as to why he appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally and even threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went home again. Respondent would call by phone every now and then and became angry as petitioner does not know what to do. Respondent went to the extent of threatening to file a case against petitioner and scandalize his family in the newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he would be able to make amends and at this point in time[,] respondent brought the idea of marriage. Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify her. And so on April 23, 1996, respondents uncle brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,] petitioner was made to sign the Marriage Contract before the Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for any Marriage License. Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after arrival of the parents of petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go home. Petitioner was threatened in so many ways with her uncle showing to him many guns. Respondent even threatened that if he should persist in going home, they will commission their military friends to harm his family. Respondent even made petitioner sign a declaration that if he should perish, the authorities should look for him at his parents[ ]and relatives[ ]houses. Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was able to escape and he went home. He told his parents about his predicament and they forgave him and supported him by giving him military escort. Petitioner, however, did not inform them that he signed a marriage contract with respondent. When they knew about it[,] petitioner was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner offered her to live instead to[sic] the home o f petitioners parents while they are still studying. Respondent refused the idea and claimed that she would only live with him if they will have a separate home of their own and be away from his parents. She also intimated to petitioner that he should already get his share of whatever he would inherit from his parents so they can start a new life. Respondent demanded these not knowing [that] the petitioner already settled his differences with his own family. When respondent refused to live with petitioner where he chose for them to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing the home of his parents. He told her already that he was disinherited and since he also does not have a job, he would not be able to support her. After knowing that petitioner does not have any money anymore, respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and informed petitioner that they should live separate lives.

The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up was caused by both parties[] unreadiness to commitment and their young age. He was still in the state of finding his fate and fi ghting boredom, while she was still egocentrically involved with herself. TESTS ADMINISTERED: Revised Beta Examination Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test Draw A Person Test Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test Sachs Sentence Completion Test MMPI TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION: Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive upon swearing to their marital vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on marriage. Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure and unready so as to commit himself to marriage. He is still founded to be on the search of what he wants in life. He is absconded as an introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a lack of interest in social interactions and mingling with other individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that he finds it boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship especially to that of respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and timid type of person, as he prefer to be religiously attached and spend a solemn time alone. ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the aggressive-rebellious type of woman. She is seen to be somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She is seen to take move on marriage as she thought that her marriage with petitioner will bring her good fortune because he is part of a rich family. In order to have her dreams realized, she used force and threats knowing that [her] husband is somehow weak-willed. Upon the realization that there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the relationship. REMARKS: Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and marry himself before submitting to marital vows. Marriage should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious institution solemnized by religious and law. In the case presented by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear that both parties have impulsively taken marriage for granted as they are still unaware of their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of weakening their relationship by his weak behavioral disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to be unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent that she is suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder that started since childhood and only manifested during marriage. Both parties display psychological incapacities that made 15 marriage a big mistake for them to take. The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision declaring the marriage of the parties null and void on the ground that both 17 parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Republic, represented by the OSG, 18 timely filed its notice of appeal. On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed and set aside the trial 20 courts ruling. It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements 21 stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family 22 Code. The CA faulted the lower court for rendering the decision without the required certification of the OSG briefly stating therein the 23 OSGs reasons for its agreement with or opposition to, as the case may be, the petition. The CA later denied petitioners motion for 24 reconsideration in the likewise assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari. On June 15, 2005, the Court gave due course 25 to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
19 16

In his memorandum, petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. He posits that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of respondents psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the actions of the OCP because the latter represented it during the trial; and it had been 27 furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial court orders and notices. For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum, that the annulment petition filed before the RTC contains no statement of the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply with. The root cause of the psychological incapacity was likewise not alleged in the petition; neither was it medically or clinically identified. The purported incapacity of both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the clinical psychologist did not personally examine the respondent. Thus, the OSG 29 30 concludes that the requirements in Molina were not satisfied. The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the parties is null 31 and void. I. We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the development of jurisprudence interpreting it. Article 36 of the Family Code
32 28

26

provides:

Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family Code, Article 36 was based on grounds 33 available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero elucidated in her separate opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals: However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code. "During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter. Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by law. With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and, instead, opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was, thus, requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:

(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficie nt use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest after the celebration. as well as the following implementing provisions: Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the ma rriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34. Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. xxxxxxxxx It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already be dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of "lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual 34 anomaly. In her separate opinion in Molina,
35

she expounded:

At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read: "(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration." The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised provision even before the session was over: "(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration." Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage." My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree. As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another. One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex." The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase "and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.

For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz.: 1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract; 2. reasons of public policy; 3. special cases and special situations. The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special situations," hence, its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted. Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature. Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation. On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning. With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law. Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing. Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships. It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Code and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally inexistent from the beginning. A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to be capable a ccording to law in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons be at least not ignorant of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment called lack of due discretion and lack of due competence. Lack of due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of t he wedding and, therefore, the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony." Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after 36 the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony. Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it might limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. The Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by

decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself 37 38 was taken from the Canon Law. The law is then so designed as to allow some resiliency in its application. Yet, as held in Santos, the phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that 40 concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability 41 to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This interpretation is, in fact, consistent with that in Canon Law, thus: 3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction must be made between the second and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave lack of discretionary judgment and the incapacity to assume the essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the difference by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a house to Carmela, and on the assumption that they are capable according to positive law to enter such contract, there remains the object of the contract, viz, the house. The house is located in a different locality, and prior to the conclusion of the contract, the house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of them. This is the hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of the canon. The third paragraph does not deal with the psychological process of giving consent because it has been established a priori that both have such a capacity to give consent, and they both know well the object of their consent [the house and its particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object of the consent/contract which does not exist. The contract is invalid because it lacks its formal object. The consent as a psychological act is both valid and sufficient. The psychological act, however, is directed towards an object which is not available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes this distinction: the third paragraph deals not with the positing of consent but with positing the object of consent. The person may be capable of positing a free act of consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling the responsibilities he assumes as a result of the consent he elicits. Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic incapacity with respect to marriage arising from pathological conditions, there has been an increasing trend to understand as ground of nullity different from others, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage, especially the incapacity which arises from sexual anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied under this rubric. The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies always and in every case imply a grave psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of intellect, discernment, and freedom; or are there sexual anomalies that are purely so that is to say, they arise from certain physiological dysfunction of the hormonal system, and they affect the sexual condition, leaving intact the higher faculties however, so that these persons are still capable of free human acts. The evidence from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are certain anomalies of a sexual nature which may impel a person towards sexual activities which are not normal, either with respect to its frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity itself [sadism, masochism, homosexuality]. However, these anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the higher faculties remain intact such that a person so afflicted continues to have an adequate understanding of what marriage is and of the gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose marriage freely. The question though is whether such a person can assume those responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although he may be able to understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage issues from the incapacity to posit the object of consent, rather than the incapacity to posit consent itself. Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in this regard. The initial steps taken by church courts were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit consent or incapacity to posit the object of consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion that the intellect, under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom. This line of reasoning supposes that the intellect, at the moment of consent, is under the influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable conclusion that such a decision, made as it was under these circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It would be incontrovertible that a decision made under duress, such as this irresistible impulse, would not be a free act. But this is precisely the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that the intellect is always and continuously under such an irresistible compulsion? It would seem entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to think that there are certain cases in which one who is sexually hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and evaluate quite maturely what marriage is and what it implies; his consent would be juridically ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit the object of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in a normal way and with usually regularity. It would seem more correct to say that the consent may indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective because the party is consenting to an object that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was gutted down by fire. 3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to have seen his way more clearly through this tangled mess, proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction between the inability to give consent on the one hand, and the inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is his opinion that nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of marriage, and they are usually able to evaluate its implications. They would have no difficulty with positing a free and intelligent consent. However, such persons, capable as they are of eliciting an intelligent and free consent, experience difficulty in another sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had likewise treated the difference between the act of consenting and the act of positing the object of consent from the point of view of a person afflicted with nymphomania. According to him, such an affliction usually leaves the process of knowing and understanding and evaluating intact. What it affects is the object of consent: the delivering of the goods. 3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the selected rotal jurisprudence cited, supra, it is possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus doctrine that the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal object of consent) can coexist in the same person with the ability to make a free decision, an intelligent judgment, and a mature evaluation and weighing of things. The decision coram Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed that such a spouse can have
39

difficulty not only with regard to the moment of consent but also, and especially, with regard to the matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes that a person in such a condition is incapable of assuming the conjugal obligation of fidelity, although she may have no difficulty in understanding what the obligations of marriage are, nor in the weighing and evaluating of those same obligations. Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not unusual to refer to this ground as moral impotence or psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific incapacity rooted in some anomalies and disorders in the personality. These anomalies leave intact the faculties of the will and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to distinguish it from the impotence that constitutes the impediment dealt with by C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject incapable of binding himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to the extent that the anomaly renders that person incapable of fulfilling the essential obligations. According to the principle affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology: nemo ad impossibile tenetur. xxxx 3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of the contractants are not capable of initiating or maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks of those cases where one of the parties is so self-centered [e.g., a narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how to begin a union with the other, let alone how to maintain and sustain such a relationship. A second incapacity could be due to the fact that the spouses are incapable of beginning or maintaining a heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very substance of matrimony. Another incapacity could arise when a spouse is unable to concretize the good of himself or of the other party. The canon speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum conjugum. A spouse who is capable only of realizing or contributing to the good of the other party qua persona rather than qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of contracting marriage. Such would be the case of a person who may be quite capable of procuring the economic good and the financial security of the other, but not capable of realizing the bonum conjugale of the other. These are general strokes and this is not the place for detained and individual description. A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances of the case concerns a person diagnosed to be suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the respondent may have understood, on the level of the intellect, the essential obligations of marriage, he was not capable of assuming them because of his "constitutional immorality." Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as regards the fulfillment of responsibilities is determined not only at the moment of decision but also and especially during the moment of execution of decision. And when this is applied to constitution of the marital consent, it means that the actual fulfillment of the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent consideration that must be factored into the question of whether a person was in a position to assume the obligations of marriage in the first place. When one speaks of the inability of the party to assume and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking at matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially at matrimonium in facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz collocated the incapacity of the respondent to assume the essential obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of the person, precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as regards money and his apathy as regards the rights of others that he had violated. Interpersonal relationships are invariably disturbed in the presence of this personality disorder. A lack of empathy (inability to recognize and experience how others feel) is common. A sense of entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially favorable treatment, is usually present. Likewise common is interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others are taken advantage of in order to achieve o nes ends. Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential matrimonial obligations. One of them is the right to the communio vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically centered around the good of the spouses and of the children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do not have to be necessarily incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to assume any, or several, or even all of these rights. There are some cases in which interpersonal relationship is impossible. Some characteristic features of inability for interpersonal relationships in marriage include affective immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial traits. Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what rubric homosexuality was understood to be invalidating of marriage that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating because of the inability to evaluate the responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its obligations. Progressively, however, rotal jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity to assume the obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella was able to consider, with charity, homosexuality as an autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say that a person so afflicted is said to be unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object of matrimonial consent is understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus but also the consortium totius vitae. The third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage] certainly seems to be the more adequate juridical structure to account for the complex phenomenon that homosexuality is. The homosexual is not necessarily impotent because, except in very few exceptional cases, such a person is usually capable of full sexual relations with the spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a person so afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a grave lack of due discretion because this sexual anomaly does not by itself affect the critical, volitive, and intellectual faculties. Rather, the homosexual person is unable to assume the responsibilities of marriage because he is unable to fulfill this object of the matrimonial contract. In other words, the invalidity lies, not so much in the defect of consent, as in the defect of the object of consent. 3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is the source of incapacity specified by the canon: causes of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the clause is a reference to the personality of the contractant. In other words, there must be a reference to the psychic part of the person. It is only when there is something in the psyche or in the psychic constitution of the person which impedes his capacity that one can then affirm that the person is incapable according to the hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is judged incapable in this juridical sense only to the extent that he is found to have something rooted in his psychic constitution which impedes the assum ption of these obligations. A bad habit deeply engrained in ones

consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a source of this invalidating incapacity. The difference being that there seems to be some freedom, however remote, in the development of the ha bit, while one accepts as given ones psychic constitution. It would seem 42 then that the law insists that the source of the incapacity must be one which is not the fruit of some degree of freedom. Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case -to-case basis, that should determine whether a party to a marriage is 43 psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower courts judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, ruled 44 that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts. Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, i n Tsoi v. Court 45 of Appeals, explained that when private respondent testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity. The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so 46 intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina, thus: From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature." Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void. This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while remaining independent, separate and apart from each othershall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor 47 vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts membership concurred in the ponencia of then Associate Justic e (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred "in the result" and another three including, as aforesaid, Justice Romerotook pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that "each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predelictions or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours with anothe r case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own 48 judgment for that of the trial court." Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the Court has applied the aforesaid standards, without too much regard for the laws clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as "courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals." In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, 50 and was sensitive to the OSGs exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on 51 account of the personality disorders of the said individuals. The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties 52 and/or fabrication of evidence. The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape. In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundatio n of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations 53 of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same 54 is void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage. The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose too much of a concern for the Court. First and foremost, because it is none of its business. And second, because the judicial declaration of psychological incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would have become vigilant, and never again marry a person with a personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of the psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the latters disorder recurring in their marriage. Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by 55 Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And,
49

to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. II. We now examine the instant case. The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondents, that of 56 the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder. By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, 57 must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties. Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows: Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent. The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes. During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent. Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be other oriented since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self -giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse. Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship: "The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc." Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage: "At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fall short of reasonable expectations. xxxx The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was 58 entered into." 1avvphi1 Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a partys 60 psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of 61 evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and indepth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of 62 psychological incapacity. Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of 63 Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, an option for the trial judge to refer the case to a courtappointed psychologist/expert for an independent assessment and evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will assist the courts, who are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious determination of the case. The rule, however, does not dispense with the parties prerogative to present their own expert witnesses. Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as adequate, produced the findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disorders to repeat, dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent. We note that The Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses personality disorders as follows A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a persons recent and long -term functioning. Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to isolated episodes but are deeply ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive and severe enough to cause the individual mental stress or anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal relationships and normal functioning. Personality disorders are often recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue through adulthood and become less obvious in middle or old age. An individual may have more than one personality disorder at a time. The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders, despite a variety of character traits, is the way in which the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and occupational adjustment. Some individuals with personality disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic, paranoid, obnoxious or even criminal, without an awareness of their behaviors. Such qualities may lead to trouble getting along with other people, as well as difficulties in other areas of life and often a tendency to blame others for their problems. Other individuals with personality disorders are not unpleasant or difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits can lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and dissatisfaction with life. Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints propose a variety of causes of personality disorders. These include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain wave activity. Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of development led to certain personality types. Thus, some disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and phallic character types. Demanding and dependent behavior (dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to derive from fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and emotional aloofness were thought to derive from fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage was thought to lead to shallowness and an inability to engage in intimate relationships. lawphil.net However, later researchers have found little evidence that early childhood events or fixation at certain stages of development lead to specific personality patterns. Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic factor involved in the etiology of antisocial and borderline personality disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of other personality disorders. Some family, adoption and twin studies suggest that schizotypal personality may be related to genetic factors. Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality, researchers have found that low cerebrospinal fluid 5hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with measures of aggression and a past history of suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated with low platelet monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit eye movement. Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have been reported in antisocial personality for many years; slow wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A study of borderline patients reported that 38 percent had at least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with 19 percent in a control group. Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric Associations Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders are categorized into three major clusters:
59

Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear to have odd or eccentric habits and traits. Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic. Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-aggressive personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear anxious or fearful. The DSM-III-R also lists another category, "personality disorder not otherwise specified," that can be used for other specific personality disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify as any of the specific personality disorders. Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term. Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others comments. At times they actually b ring about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection. Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and 65 are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by a society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years, disregard for the rights of others (either through exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite commonly, child or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to blame others. There is often a faade of charm and even sophistication that masks disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to control others. Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may befit some individuals who are prominent in business or politics whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard for the rights of others may be hidden prior to a public scandal. During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as moral insanity. The term described immoral, guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by impairments in reasoning.lawphil.net According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social 66 personality disorder is one of the four "dramatic" personality disorders, the others being borderline, histrionic and narcissistic. The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this case, finds as decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage of the parties is n ull and void on ground of both parties psychological incapacity. We further consider that the trial court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses deportment, arrived at the same conclusion. Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get 67 approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life. Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional 68 behavioral limitations imposed by society. Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide. Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
64

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.

Republic v Cabantug Baguio REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LYNNETTE CABANTUG-BAGUIO, respondent. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: From the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 24 nullifying the marriage of respondent, Lynnette Cabantug-Baguio (Lynnette), to Martini Dico Baguio (Martini), the Republic through the Office of the Solicitor General filed the present petition for review. Lynnette and Martini contracted marriage on August 12, 1997. Less than three years later or on October 12, 2000, Lynnette filed before 1 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB 25700, 2 on the ground of Martinis psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital duties a nd obligations under Articles 68-70 of the Family Code. Despite service of summons upon Martini, he never filed any responsive pleading to the complaint. No collusion was established 4 between the parties. Upon the authority of the Solicitor General, the provincial prosecutor of Cebu City appeared in the case under the 5 formers supervision and control. From the deposition of Lynnette taken before Branch Clerk of Court Atty. Monalila S. Tecson on January 10, 2001, the following are gathered: Lynnette and Martini, a seaman working overseas, became pen pals in 1995. In 1996, the two met in person during Martinis vacation after the expiration of his contract on board an ocean -going vessel. On August 12, 1997, Martini, then 32, and Lynnette, then 34, contracted marriage, following which they moved to the house of Lynnettes parents at 33-B La Guardia Extension, Lahug, Cebu City. Martini, however, stayed there only on weekends, and during weekdays he stayed with his parents in Looc, Lapu-lapu City. While Lynnette suggested that the two of them stay in the house of Martinis parents, Martini disagreed, claiming that there were many already living with his parents. Lynnette noticed that every time she conversed with Martini, he always mentioned his mother and his family, and she soon realized that he was a "mamas boy." And she noticed too that when she would call up Martini at his parents house and his mother was the o ne who answered the call, she would deny that he was around. In 1998, after Martini again returned following an almost 10-month contract overseas, he stayed with Lynnette. When in 1999 Martini again disembarked, he stayed with his parents. On the insistence of his mother, Martinis monetary allotment was shared equally between her and Lynnette. Lynnette had since January 1999 not heard from Martini. And since April 1999, Lynnette stopped receiving her share of the allotment, drawing her to inquire from Martinis employer who informed her that he had already disembarked on even month. She soon found out that Martini was in Alabang, Muntinlupa. When Lynnette and Martini finally met in Cebu City, he told her that they are not compatible and should just part ways. The last time the couple talked was on October 14, 1999 when Martini was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) about to depart for abroad. Since then, Martini never communicated with Lynnette. On investigation, Lynnette learned that Martini declared in his 9 employment records that he was "single" and named his mother as principal allottee. Hence, Lynnettes filing of the complaint for declaration of nullification of marriage. Aside from her deposition, Lynnette presented her Certificate of Marriage, Martinis undated Seafarer Information Sheet, the letter 13 of clinical psychologist Dr. Andres S. Gerong (Dr. Gerong) to Martini requesting for a personal interview, Dr. Gerongs 14 15 testimony, and the Psychological Evaluation Report prepared by Dr. Gerong after his interview of Lynnette and her sister Dr. 16 Rosemarie Sistoza. In the Psychological Evaluation Report, Dr. Gerong noted as follows:
10 11 12 8 7 6 3

1. The couples [sic] were married on August 12, 1997 in Danao City, Cebu[;] 2. After the wedding the couple stayed at the petitioners residence, but the defendant would always go home to his parents i n Looc, Lapu-lapu City; 3. Defendant did not show any directions to establish their home, [is] happy-go-lucky, and would just see the plaintiff for his physical and sexual needs; 4. Plaintiff felt being used, exploited, uncared for, taken for granted, abandoned; 5. Defendants parents appeared to control the son to the extent of meddling [with] the finances coming from the income as a seaman; 6. Defendant never showed respect for his parents-in-law; 7. Parents of the defendant insisted [on] a co-allot[ment without] any protestations from the plaintiff who has been generous all the time; 8. Defendant remained immature, could not stand by his wife and would still depend upon the decisions of his parents and without any personal directions as to what to do with his family; 9. Strictly speaking, the couple never really live[d] together as husband and wife like any ordinary couple (underscoring supplied), and concluded that Defendant shows immature personality disorder, dependency patterns, and self-centered motives. Th[ese are] the core personality dysfunctions noted and have been exaggeratedly expressed which are detrimental to the familial well-being; The situation is serious, grave, existing already during the adolescent period, and incurable because personality and character are stable whether or not it is normal and adaptive. xxxx The defendant is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations in marriage and family. supplied) Expounding on his findings, Dr. Gerong testified, thus: ATTY. SINGCO: (To witness) Q: In gist, what were your findings as to the psychological capacity or incapacity of defendant Martini Dico Baguio? A: x x x [T]o sum it up, the synopsis of the findings, the defendant husband appeared to be [a] dependent person to his family and unable to [sever . . .] the connection being a married man and to establish a domicile for his family and to support his family. xxxx ATTY. SINGCO: (To witness) Q: Dr. Gerong, how grave or serious is the psychological incapacity of the defendant? A: Being, I would say in our popular parlance, "mamas boy" as alleged, that will endanger the integrity of the marriage because instead of establishing a permanent conjugal relationship with the wife the husband-defendant would remain dependent on his family. xxxx ATTY. SINGCO: (To witness) Q: Okay, in terms of the chances that this incapacity will be cured, what are the chances, if any? A: As to curability, since I am using a clinical term ["]personality or character disorder or dysfunction["] and as I have said many times that the personality is stable and pervasive over time. And if it is established as early as adolescent period and up to the present it has remained persistent thru the years and therefore its a permanent trait of the defendant-husband, therefore its 19 incurable. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) By Decision of January 2, 2002, Branch 24 of the Cebu City RTC found Martini psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, and that the same incapacity existed "at the time the couple exchanged their marriage vows."
20 18 17

(Underscoring

The Solicitor General, via appeal,

21

challenged before the Court of Appeals the trial courts decision

. . . DECLARING THE PARTIES MARRIAGE NULL AND VOID, DEFENDANTS MARTINI DICO BAGUIOS 22 PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST. By Decision of January 13, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirme d the trial courts decision. Addressing the Solicitor Generals argument that Dr. Gerongs testimony failed to establish the cause of Martinis psychological incapacity and to show that it existed a t the inception 24 of the marriage, the Court of Appeals held: x x x [I]n contradiction of the Republics contention and its supporting above -cited doctrine, this Court cites the more recent 25 jurisprudence laid down in the case of Marcos v. Marcos, in which the High Tribunal has foregone with the requirement that the defendant should be examined by a physician or psychologist as aconditio sine qua non for declaration of nullity of marriage. It held thus: "The x x x guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated x x x [w]hat is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition, [f]or indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological 26 incapacity, then actual medical examination for the person concerned need not be resorted to." Therefore, the oral deposition [of Lynette] and the Psychological Evaluation Report by Dr. Andres S. Gerong, Ph.D. as Clinical Psychologist declaring the defendant psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations in marriage 27 and family life was sufficient for US to believe that undeniably the defendant suffers psychological incapacity. (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied) On the Solicitor Generals contention that Martinis abandonment of Lynnette is a ground for legal separation and not for dec laration of 28 nullity of marriage, and that Martinis alleged personality traits are not of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family 29 Code, the Court of Appeals declared: x x x WE note that it was not the abandonment which was the ground relied upon by the plaintiff-appellee but the defendants 30 being a mamas boy. xxxx Being a Mamas Boy, his uncaring attitude towards his wife, declaring himself single and naming his mother as the beneficiary, spending more time with his family and less with his wife and ultimately, abandoning her manifested defendants psychological incapacity. These, to sum it all, to US are manifestations of severe psychological disorder rather 31 than a mere obstinate refusal to comply with his marital obligations. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The Solicitor Generals Motion for Reconsideration faulting the appellate court to have gravely erred:
32 23

having been denied by the Court of Appeals, I

33

the present petition

34

was filed,

. . . IN RULING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION AND TESTIMONY OF DR. ANDRES GERONG THAT DEFENDANT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED HAVE LEGAL BASIS. II . . . IN FAILING TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT ABANDONMENT BY ONES SPOUSE IS ONLY A GROUND FOR LEGAL SEPARATION AND NOT FOR THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE. III . . . IN RULING THAT DEFENDANTS BEING A MAMAS BOY IS A MANIFESTATION OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL 35 DISORDER. (Italics in the original) The Solicitor Generals arguments persuade. The Solicitor General argued as follows: Dr. Gerong merely testified that defendants alleged psychological incapacity (being a mamas boy) began in his adolescent stage and has remained persistent through the years (p. 20, Brief). Dr. Gerong did not detail this finding. He made no effort to look into and testify on defendants past life, attitudes, habits and character to explain defendants alleged psychological incapacity as required by this Honorable Court in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1998). Again, while it is true that Dr. Gerong testified that defendants alleged defect is incurable, he failed to explain why it is clinically or medically permanent. His only basis for saying that it is incurable is his finding that defendant has been a mamas boy since his adolescence (p. 7, TSN, June 19, 2001). During the trial, Dr. Gerong also failed to explain in detail why the defendants alleged 36 psychological incapacity is grave and to discuss what kind of disorder defendant is suffering from. (Emphasis in the original; italics and underscoring supplied)

On the doctors findings in his Report, the Solicitor General argued: The said findings reveal nothing in defendants past life and acts that shows a behavior pattern that would prove his alleged psychological incapacity. Dr. Gerongs finding that defendants parents are too controlling because they were made co allottees of the remittances sent by their son does not prove the alleged psychological incapacity of defendant. The report likewise failed to explain the gravity of the alleged psychological incapacity of defendant and state whether or not it incapacitates defendant from carrying out the normal and ordinary duties of marriage and family. There is likewise no explanation by Dr. Gerong why he found defendants incapacity to be incurable . This Honorable Court has held that such illness must be shown to be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligation of the marriage. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable and grave [ Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra]. These Dr. Gerong failed to do. Even when the rules have been relaxed and the personal examination of the defendant by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, the totality of evidence presented during trial by private respondent must stillprove the gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability of the alleged psychological incapacity(Marcos v. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 [2000]; Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 [1995]). (Emphasis in the original; italics and underscoring supplied) In fine, the Solicitor General concluded that there was no showing that Martinis alleged personality traits are of the nature contemp lated 37 by Article 36 of the Family Code and the rulings of this Court in the cited cases, and that Martinis abandonment of Lynnette 38 constitutes only a ground for legal separation but not for declaration of nullity of marriage. Article 36 of the Family Code on which Lynnette anchors her complaint provides that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." Article 36 must be read in conjunction with the other articles in the Family Code, specifically Articles 35, 37, 38, and 41 which provide different grounds to render a marriage void ab initio, as well as Article 45 which dwell on voidable marriages, and Article 55 on legal 39 separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not to be applied indiscriminately as if the law were 40 indifferent on the matter. And Article 36 should not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves, nor with legal separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, 41 moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like. "Psychological incapacity" has been elucidated on as follows: The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly a doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. x x x [T]he root cause must be identified as a psychological illness, and its incapacitating 42 nature must be fully explained x x x. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" does not constitute psychological incapacity. failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons.
43

Nor does

It is essential that the parties to a marriage must be shown to be insensitive to or incapable of meeting their duties and responsibilities 44 due to some psychological (not physical) illness, which insensitivity or incapacity should have been existing at the time of the 45 celebration of the marriage even if it becomes manifest only after its solemnization. In fine, for psychological incapacity to render a marriage void ab initio, it must be characterized by (a) Gravity It must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) Incurability It must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
46

Dr. Gerong found that Martinis "personality disorders" including his being a "mamas boy" are "serious, grave, existing alre ady during the adolescent period and incurable" and concluded that Martini "appeared" to be dependent upon his family and unable "to establish a domicile for his family and to support his family." The doctors findings and conclusion were derived from his interview of Lynnette and her sister and Lynnettes deposition. From Lynnettes deposition, however, it is gathered that Martinis failure to establish a common life with her stems from his refu sal, not 47 incapacity, to do so. It is downright incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, which renders a marriage void on

the ground of psychological incapacity. In another vein, how the doctor arrived at the conclusion, after interviewing Lynnette and considering her deposition, that any such personality disorders of Martini have been existing since Martinis adolescent year s has not been explained. It bears recalling that Martini and Lynnette became pen pals in 1995 and contracted marriage in 1997 when Martini was already 32 years old, far removed from adolescent years. Dr. Gerongs citing of Martinis appointment of his mother as a beneficiary and his representing himself as single in his Sea farer Information Sheet, without more, as indications of Martinis dependence on his family amounting to his incapacity to fulfill his duties a s a 48 married man does not logically follow, especially given that the Seafarers Information Sheet is not even dated and, therefore, there is no certainty that it was prepared after Martini contracted marriage. While the examination by a physician of a person in order to declare him/her psychological incapacitated is not required, the root cause thereof must be "medically or clinically identified." There must thus be evidence to adequately establish the same. There is none such in the case at bar, however. The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social institution and marriage as the 49 50 51 foundation of the family. Marriage, an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In 52 petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies on the plaintiff. Any doubt 53 should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. As reflected above, Lynnette failed to discharge the onus probandi. While the Court sympathizes with her predicament, its first and 54 foremost duty is to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex. Lynnettes marriage with Martini may have failed then, but it cannot be declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity 55 in light of the insufficient evidence presented. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 13, 2005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. CEB 25700 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 24, is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Halili v Halili RESOLUTION CORONA, J.: This resolves the motion for reconsideration of the April 16, 2008 resolution of this Court denying petitioners petition for review on [1] certiorari (under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court). The petition sought to set aside the January 26, 2004 decision and September 24, [2] 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010. Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona M. Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 158. He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a joke. After the ceremonies, they never lived togeth er as husband and wife, but maintained the relationship. However, they started fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and started dating other women. Immediately thereafter, he received prank calls telling him to stop dating other women as he was already a married man. It was only upon making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not fake. Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed personality disorder, particularly dependent and selfdefeating personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan. The court a quo held that petitioners personality disorder was serious and incurable and directly affected his capacity to comply with his essential marital obligations to [3] respondent. It thus declared the marriage null and void. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court on the ground that the totality of the evidence presented failed to establish petitioners psychological incapacity. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. It was denied. The case was elevated to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45. We affirmed the CAs decision and resolution upholding the validity of the marriage. Petitioner then filed this motion for reconsideration reiterating his argument that his marriage to respondent ought to be declared null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity. He stressed that the evidence he presented, especially the testimony of his expert witness, was more than enough to sustain the findings and conclusions of the trial court that he was and still is psychologically incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage. We grant the motion for reconsideration.

In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines, this Court reiterated that courts should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity (as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage) on a case-to-case basis guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals. Accordingly, we emphasized that, by the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of [5] decision-making, must consider as essential the expert opinion on the psychological and mental disposition of the parties. In this case, the testimony disorder. Thus:
[6]

[4]

of petitioners expert witness revealed that petit ioner was suffering from dependent personality

Q. Dr. Dayan, going back to the examinations and interviews which you conducted, can you briefly tell this court your findings [and] conclusions? A. Well, the petitioner is suffering from a personality disorder. It is a mixed personality disorder from self-defeating personality disorder to [dependent] personality disorder and this is brought about by [a] dysfunctional family that petitioner had. He also suffered from partner relational problem during his marriage with Chona. There were lots of fights and it was not truly a marriage, sir. Q. Now, what made you conclude that Lester is suffering from psychological incapacity to handle the essential obligations of marriage? A. Sir, for the reason that his motivation for marriage was very questionable. It was a very impulsive decision. I dont think he understood what it meant to really be married and after the marriage, there was no consummation, there was no sexual intercourse, he never lived with the respondent. And after three months he refused to see or talk with the respondent and afterwards, I guess the relationship died a natural death, and he never thought it was a really serious matter at all. xx xx xx Q. Likewise, you stated here in your evaluation that Lester Halili and respondent suffered from a grave lack of discretionary judgment. Can you expound on this? A. xx xx I dont think they truly appreciate the civil [rites which] they had undergone. [It was] just a spur of the moment decision that they should get married xx xx I dont think they truly considered themselves married. xx xx xx Q. Now [from] what particular portion of their marriage were you able to conclude xx xx that petitioner and respondent are suffering from psychological incapacity? A. xx xx they never lived together[.] [T]hey never had a residence, they never consummated the marriage. During the very short relationship they had, there were frequent quarrels and so there might be a problem also of lack of respect [for] each other and afterwards there was abandonment. In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder
[7]

as

[a] personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection. Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. In her psychological report, Dr. Dayan stated that petitioners dependent personality disorder was evident [9] in the fact that petitioner was very much attached to his parents and depended on them for decisions. Petitioners mother even had to be the one to tell him to seek legal help when he felt confused on what action to take upon [10] learning that his marriage to respondent was for real. Dr. Dayan further observed that, as expected of persons suffering from a dependent personality disorder, petitioner typically acted in a self-denigrating manner and displayed a self-defeating attitude. This submissive attitude encouraged other people to take [11] advantage of him. This could be seen in the way petitioner allowed himself to be dominated, first, by his father who treated his family [12] [13] like robots and, later, by respondent who was as domineering as his father. When petitioner could no longer take respondents [14] domineering ways, he preferred to hide from her rather than confront her and tell her outright that he wanted to end their marriage. Dr. Dayan traced petitioners personality disorder to his dysfunctional family life, to wit:
[15] [8]

Q. And what might be the root cause of such psychological incapacity? A. Sir, I mentioned awhile ago that Lesters family is dysfunctional. The father was very abusive, very domineering. The mother has been very unhappy and the children never had affirmation. They might [have been] x x x given financial support because the father was [a] very affluent person but it was never an intact family. x x x The wife and the children were practically robots. And so, I would say Lester grew up, not having self-confidence, very immature and somehow not truly understand[ing] what [it] meant to be a husband, what [it] meant to have a real family life. Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioners personality disorder was grave and incurable and already existent [16] at the time of the celebration of his marriage to respondent. It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological condition that was grave and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause. This Court, in the same Te case, recognized that individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have [17] long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term. Particularly, personality disorders are long -standing, inflexible ways of behaving that are not so much severe mental disorders as dysfunctional styles of living.These disorders affect all areas of functioning [18] and, beginning in childhood or adolescence, create problems for those who display them and for others. From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological incapacity that effectively renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner and respondent is declared null and void. WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The April 16, 2008 resolution of this Court and the January 26, 2004 decision and September 24, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010 are SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 158 dated April 17, 1998 is hereby REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.

Buenaventura v CA, 454 SCRA

NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, respondents. DECISION AZCUNA, J.: These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed by petitioner Noel Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of court, amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed an amended answer [1] denying the allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated. On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1) 2) 3) 4) Declaring and decreeing the marriage entered into between plaintiff Noel A. Buenaventura and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura on July 4, 1979, null and void ab initio; Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages in the amount of 2.5 million pesos and exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest from the date of this decision plus attorneys fees of P100,000.00; Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant expenses of litigation of P50,000.00, plus costs; Ordering the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property[,] particularly the plaintiffs separation/retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank [and] Trust Company[,] by ceding, giving and paying to her fifty percent (50%) of the net amount of P3,675,335.79 or P1,837,667.89 together with 12% interest per annum from the date of this decision and one-half (1/2) of his outstanding shares of stock with Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies; Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of his son Javy Singh Buenaventura in the amount of P15,000.00 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises; Awarding the care and custody of the minor Javy Singh Buenaventura to his mother, the herein defendant; and

5) 6)

7)

Hereby authorizing the defendant to revert back to the use of her maiden family name Singh.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the appropriate civil registry and registries of properties. SO ORDERED.
[2]

Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in the appellate court, respondent filed a motion to increase theP15,000 monthly support pendente lite of their son Javy Singh Buenaventura. Petitioner filed an opposition [3] thereto, praying that it be denied or that such incident be set for oral argument. On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution increasing the support pendente lite to P20,000. [5] filed a motion for reconsideration questioning the said Resolution.
[4]

Petitioner

On October 8, 1996, the appellate cour t promulgated a Decision dismissing petitioners appeal for lack of merit and affirming in [6] toto the trial courts decision. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. From the abovementioned Decision, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari. On November 13, 1996, through another Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of th e [7] September 2, 1996 Resolution, which increased the monthly support for the son. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari to question these two Resolutions. On July 9, 1997, the Petition for Review on Certiorari
[8]

and the Petition for Certiorari

[9]

were ordered consolidated by this Court.

[10]

In the Petition for Review on Certiorari petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals decided the case not in accord with law and jurisprudence, thus: 1. WHEN IT AWARDED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P2.5 MILLION AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF P1 MILLION, WITH 6% INTEREST FROM THE DATE OF ITS DECISION, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL AND MORAL BASIS; 2. WHEN IT AWARDED P100,000.00 ATTORNEYS FEES AND P50,000.00 EXPENSES OF LITIGATION, PLUS COSTS, TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, WITHOUT FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS; 3. WHEN IT ORDERED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT NOEL TO PAY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OR P1,837,667.89 OUT OF HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM THE FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO., WITH 12% INTEREST THEREON FROM THE DATE OF ITS DECISION, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SAID RETIREMENT BENEFITS ARE GRATUITOUS AND EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF NOEL, AND ALSO TO DELIVER TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OF HIS SHARES OF STOCK WITH THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK AND THE PROVIDENT GROUP OF COMPANIES, ALTHOUGH SAID SHARES OF STOCK WERE ACQUIRED BY NOEL BEFORE HIS MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT ISABEL AND ARE, THEREFORE, AGAIN HIS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES; AND 4. WHEN IT AWARDED EXCLUSIVE CARE AND CUSTODY OVER THE PARTIES MINOR CHILD TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE WITHOUT ASKING THE CHILD (WHO WAS ALREADY 13 YEARS OLD AT THAT TIME) HIS CHOICE AS TO WHOM, BETWEEN [11] HIS TWO PARENTS, HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CUSTODY OVER HIS PERSON. In the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner advances the following contentions: THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO SET RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR [12] INCREASED SUPPORT FOR THE PARTIES SON FOR HEARING. THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO INCREASE JAVYS MONTHLY SUPPORT OF P15,000.00 BEING [13] GIVEN BY PETITIONER EVEN AT PRESENT PRICES. IN RESOLVING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR THE INCREASE OF JAVYS SUPPORT, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE EXAMINED THE LIST OF EXPENSES SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN THE LIGHT OF PETITIONERS OBJECTIONS THERETO, INSTEAD OF MERELY ASSUMING THAT JAVY IS ENTITLED TO A P5,000 INCREASE IN SUPPORT AS SAID [14] AMOUNT IS TOO MINIMAL. LIKEWISE, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GIVEN PETITIONER AN OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE HIS PRESENT [15] INCOME TO SHOW THAT HE CANNOT AFFORD TO INCREASE JAVYS SUPPORT. With regard to the first issue in the main case, the Court of Appeals articulated: On Assignment of Error C, the trial court, after findings of fact ascertained from the testimonies not only of the parties particularly the defendant-appellee but likewise, those of the two psychologists, awarded damages on the basis of Articles 21, 2217 and 2229 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Thus, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant deceived the defendant-appellee into marrying him by professing true love instead of revealing to her that he was under heavy parental pressure to marry and that because of pride he married defendant-appellee; that he was not ready to enter into marriage as in fact his career was and always would be his first priority; that he was unable to relate not

only to defendant-appellee as a husband but also to his son, Javy, as a father; that he had no inclination to make the marriage work such that in times of trouble, he chose the easiest way out, that of leaving defendant appellee and their son; that he had no desire to keep defendant-appellee and their son as proved by his reluctance and later, refusal to reconcile after their separation; that the aforementioned caused defendant-appellee to suffer mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights not only in those years the parties were together but also after and throughout their separation. Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial courts decision on the ground that unlike those arising from a breach in ordinary contracts, damages arising as a consequence of marriage may not be awarded. While it is correct that there is, as yet, no decided case by the Supreme Court where damages by reason of the performance or non-performance of marital obligations were awarded, it does not follow that no such award for damages may be made. Defendant-appellee, in her amended answer, specifically prayed for moral and exemplary damages in the total amount of 7 million pesos. The lower court, in the exercise of its discretion, found full justification of awarding at least half of what was originally prayed [16] for. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court. The award by the trial court of moral damages is based on Articles 2217 and 21 of the Civil Code, which read as follows: ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant s wrongful act or omission. ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article 2219 of the Civil Code enumerates the cases in which moral damages may be recovered and it mentions Article 21 as one of the instances. It must be noted that Article 21 states that the individual must willfully cause loss or injury to another. There is a need that the act is willful and hence done in complete freedom. In granting moral damages, therefore, the trial court and the Court of Appeals could not but have assumed that the acts on which the moral damages were based were done willfully and freely, otherwise the grant of moral damages would have no leg to stand on. On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and void based on Article 36 of the Family Code, due to psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura. Article 36 of the Family Code states: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus: . . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. . [18] .. The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds for granting moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case. For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. If the private respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages was without basis in law and in fact. Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant of exemplary damages cannot stand since the Civil [19] Code provides that exemplary damages are imposed in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. With respect to the grant of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation the trial court explained, thus: Regarding Attorneys fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code authorizes an award of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, when as in this case the plaintiffs act or omission has compelled the defendant to litigate and to incur exp enses of litigation to protect her interest (par. 2), and where the Court deems it just and equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation [20] should be recovered. (par. 11) The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:
[17]

On Assignment of Error D, as the award of moral and exemplary damages is fully justified, the award of attorneys fees and co sts of [21] litigation by the trial court is likewise fully justified. The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to deduce his psychological incapacity, and his act in filing the complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be considered as unduly compelling the private respondent to litigate, since both are grounded on petitioners psychological incapacity, which as explained above is a mental incapacity causing an utter inabi lity to comply with the obligations of marriage. Hence, neither can be a ground for attorneys fees and litigation expenses. Furthermore, since the award of moral and exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is l eft without basis. Anent the retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank and Trust Co. and the shares of stock in the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies, the trial court said: The third issue that must be resolved by the Court is what to do with the assets of the conjugal partnership in the event of declaration of annulment of the marriage. The Honorable Supreme Court has held that the declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a judgment for the liquidation of property (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 104818, Sept. 17, 1993, 226 SCRA, pp. 572 573, 586). Thus, speaking through Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, it was ruled in this case: When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the previous proceedings. The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and therefore, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved (Art. 116, New Family Code; Art. 160, Civil Code). Art. 117 of the Family Code enumerates what are conjugal partnership properties. Among others they are the following: 1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses; 2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the spouses; 3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the common property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse. . . . Applying the foregoing legal provisions, and without prejudice to requiring an inventory of what are the parties conjugal pr operties and what are the exclusive properties of each spouse, it was disclosed during the proceedings in this case that the plaintiff who worked first as Branch Manager and later as Vice-President of Far East Bank & Trust Co. received separation/retirement package from the said bank in the amount of P3,701,500.00 which after certain deductions amounting to P26,164.21 gave him a net amount of P3,675,335.79 and actually paid to him on January 9, 1995 (Exhs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11). Not having shown debts or obligations other than those deducted from the said retirement/separation pay, under Art. 129 of the Family Code The net remainder of the conjugal partnership pro perties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlement or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code. In this particular case, however, there had been no marriage settlement between the parties, nor had there been any voluntary waiver or valid forfeiture of the defendant wifes share in the conjugal partnership properties. The previous cession and transfer by the plaintiff of his one-half (1/2) share in their residential house and lot covered by T.C.T. No. S-35680 of the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque, Metro Manila, in favor of the defendant as stipulated in their Compromise Agreement dated July 12, 1993, and approved by the Court in its Partial Decision dated August 6, 1993, was actually intended to be in full settlement of any and all demands for past support. In reality, the defendant wife had allowed some concession in favor of the plaintiff husband, for were the law strictly to be followed, in the process of liquidation of the conjugal assets, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom their only child has chosen to remain (Art. 129, par. 9). Here, what was done was one-half (1/2) portion of the house was ceded to defendant so that she will not claim anymore for past unpaid support, while the other half was transferred to their only child as his presumptive legitime. Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the defendant wife by way of her share in the conjugal properties, and it is but just, lawful and fair, that she be given one-half (1/2) share of the separation/retirement benefits received by the plaintiff the same being part of their conjugal partnership properties having been obtained or derived from the labor, industry, work or profession of said defendant husband in accordance with Art. 117, par. 2 of the Family Code. For the same reason, she is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the outstanding shares [22] of stock of the plaintiff husband with the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies. The Court of Appeals articulated on this matter as follows: On Assignment of Error E, plaintiff-appellant assails the order of the trial court for him to give one-half of his separation/retirement benefits from Far East Bank & Trust Company and half of his outstanding shares in Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies to the defendant-appellee as the latters share in the conjugal partnership. On August 6, 1993, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision approving the Compromise Agreement entered into by the parties. In the same Compromise Agreement, the parties had agreed that henceforth, their conjugal partnership is dissolved. Thereafter, no steps were taken for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at least half of the separation/retirement benefits which plaintiff-appellant received from Far East Bank & Trust Company upon his retirement as Vice-President of said company for the reason that the benefits accrued from plaintiffappellants service for the bank for a number of years, most of which while he was married to defendant -appellee, the trial court adjudicated the same. The same is true with the outstanding shares of plaintiff-appellant in Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies. As these were acquired by the plaintiff-appellant at the time he was married to defendant-appellee, the latter is entitled [23] to one-half thereof as her share in the conjugal partnership. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court. Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership. In Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City , this Court expounded on the consequences of a void marriage on the property relations of the spouses and specified the applicable provisions of law: The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases; it provides: ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership. Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that (a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act[s] inter vivos [of] his or her share in co-ownership property, without the consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and (b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation or declaration of nullity of the marriage. In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which had jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent
[24]

marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the [25] property regime of the spouses. Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties owned in common by the parties herein as ordered by the court a quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on the basis of coownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only child, Javy Singh Buenaventura, it is now moot since he is about to turn [26] twenty-five years of age on May 27, 2005 and has, therefore, attained the age of majority. With regard to the issues on support raised in the Petition for Certiorari, these would also now be moot, owing to the fact that the son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, as previously stated, has attained the age of majority. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8, 1996 and its Resolution dated December 10, 1996 which are contested in the Petition for Review (G.R. No. 127449), are hereby MODIFIED, in that the award of moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, expenses of litigation and costs are deleted. The order giving respondent one-half of the retirement benefits of petitioner from Far East Bank and Trust Co. and one-half of petitioners shares of stock in Manila Memorial Park and in the Provident Group of Companies is sustained but on the basis of the liquidation, partition and distribution of the co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The rest of said Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 127358) contesting the Court of Appeals Resolutions of September 2, 1996 and November 13, 1996 which increased the support pendente lite in favor of the parties son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, is now MOOT and ACADEMIC and is, accordingly, DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concur.