DISINI VS.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 203335
February 11, 2014

FACTS:

These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void. These provisions are:
a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;
b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;
c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;
d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;
e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;
g. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;
h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;
i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;
j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175;
l. Section 8 on Penalties;
m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;
n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;
o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;
p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;
q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;
s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;
t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and
u. Section 26(a) on CICC’s Powers and Functions.

Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the
RPC on the crime of libel.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the said provisions are unconstitutional

RULING:

I. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access – CONSTITUTIONAL

Section 4(a)(1) provides:

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime
punishable under this Act:

(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and
systems:

(1) Illegal Access. – The access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right.
 The strict scrutiny standard, an American constitutional construct, is useful in determining the
constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of things or persons. According to this standard, a
legislative classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. The
Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard since
no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act
– accessing the computer system of another without right. It is a universally condemnable act.

II. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference – CONSTITUTIONAL

Section 4(a)(3) provides:

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime
punishable under this Act:

(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and
systems:

xxxx

(3) Data Interference. – The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or

deterioration of computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message, without
right, including the introduction or transmission of viruses.

Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to

state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly,
thereby invading the area of protected freedoms.7 But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these
freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism,8 the act of willfully
destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic
document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There
is no freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems and private documents.

III. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting; - CONSTITUTIONAL

Section 4(a)(6) provides:

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime
punishable under this Act:

(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and
systems:

xxxx

(6) Cyber-squatting. – The acquisition of domain name over the internet in bad faith to profit,
mislead, destroy the reputation, and deprive others from registering the same, if such a
domain name is:

(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered with

the appropriate government agency at the time of the domain name registration;
 (ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the registrant,
in case of a personal name; and

(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.

But there is no real difference whether he uses "Julio Gandolfo" which happens to be his real
name or use it as a pseudo-name for it is the evil purpose for which he uses the name that the law
condemns. The law is reasonable in penalizing him for acquiring the domain name in bad faith to
profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful
opportunity of registering the same. The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) on
ground of denial of equal protection is baseless.

IV. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft- CONSTITUTIONAL

Section 4(b)(3) provides:

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime
punishable under this Act:

xxxx

b) Computer-related Offenses:

xxxx

(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. – The intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer,
possession, alteration, or deletion of identifying information belonging to another, whether
natural or juridical, without right: Provided: that if no damage has yet been caused, the
penalty imposable shall be one (1) degree lower.

Petitioners fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates
the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process. There is no fundamental
right to acquire another’s personal right.

V. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex – CONSTITUTIONAL

Section 4(c)(1) provides:

Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses.– The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime
punishable under this Act:

xxxx

(c) Content-related Offenses:

(1) Cybersex.– The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or

indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a
computer system, for favor or consideration.
 The subject of Section 4(c)(1)—lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity—is
not novel. Article 201 of the RPC punishes "obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent
shows." The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 penalizes those who "maintain or hire a person
to engage in prostitution or pornography."26 The law defines prostitution as any act, transaction,
scheme, or design involving the use of a person by another, for sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct in exchange for money, profit, or any other consideration.27

In any event, consenting adults are protected by the wealth of jurisprudence delineating the
bounds of obscenity.30The Court will not declare Section 4(c)(1) unconstitutional where it stands a
construction that makes it apply only to persons engaged in the business of maintaining, controlling,
or operating, directly or indirectly, the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity with the
aid of a computer system as Congress has intended.

VI. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography – CONSTITUTIONAL

Section 4(c)(2) provides:

Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime
punishable under this Act:

xxxx

(c) Content-related Offenses:

xxxx

(2) Child Pornography. — The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable by
Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009, committed through a
computer system: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be (1) one degree higher
than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775.

For now the Court must hold that the constitutionality of Section 4(c)(2) is not successfully
challenged. It seems that the above merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of
200931 (ACPA) to cover identical activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents the government
from invoking the ACPA when prosecuting persons who commit child pornography using a computer
system. Actually, ACPA’s definition of child pornography already embraces the use of "electronic,
mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means." Notably, no one has questioned this
ACPA provision.

Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in
cyberspace. But no one can complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative
prerogative and there is rational basis for such higher penalty.32 The potential for uncontrolled
proliferation of a particular piece of child pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is
incalculable.

VII. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications - CONSTITUTIONAL

Section 4(c)(3) provides:

Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime
punishable under this Act:
 xxxx

(c) Content-related Offenses:

xxxx

(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. – The transmission of commercial electronic

communication with the use of computer system which seeks to advertise, sell, or offer for
sale products and services are prohibited unless:

(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or

(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative
announcements from the sender to its existing users, subscribers or customers; or

(iii) The following conditions are present:

(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and

reliable way for the recipient to reject receipt of further commercial electronic
messages (opt-out) from the same source;

(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise

the source of the electronic message; and

(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include

misleading information in any part of the message in order to induce the
recipients to read the message.

The constitutionality of Section 4(c)(3) is not successfully challenged. The law makes the
penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in cyberspace. But no one can complain
since the intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is a rational basis for
such higher penalty.

VIII. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel – UNCONSTITIONAL

Section 4(c)(4) reads:

Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. — The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime
punishable under this Act:

xxxx

(c) Content-related Offenses:

xxxx

(4) Libel. — The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, committed through a computer system or any other similar means
which may be devised in the future.
 To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his
emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate
category of speech which us not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other
constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. The State
cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
Thus, unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.

IX. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes -

UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Sec. 5. Other Offenses. — The following acts shall also constitute an offense:

(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. – Any person who willfully
abets or aids in the commission of any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall
be held liable.

(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. — Any person who willfully attempts to
commit any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.

Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises

apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of
expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace
front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as the petitioners point out, formal crimes such as libel are not
punishable unless consummated.71 In the absence of legislation tracing the interaction of netizens
and their level of responsibility such as in other countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on
Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child
Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.

But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes under Section 5 should be
permitted to apply to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception,
Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on
Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related
Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity
Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of these offenses borders on the exercise of the
freedom of expression.

X. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher - CONSTITUTIONAL

Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying
circumstance. As the Solicitor General points out, there exists a substantial distinction between
crimes committed through the use of information and communications technology and similar crimes
committed using other means. In using the technology in question, the offender often evades
identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater harm. The distinction, therefore,
creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes.

XI. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175 -
CONSTITUTIONAL

Section 7 provides:
 Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws. — A prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice
to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or
special laws.

Section 7 merely expresses the settled doctrine that a single set of acts may be prosecuted
and penalized simultaneously under two laws, a special law and the Revised Penal Code. When two
different laws define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one does not bar prosecution of the other
although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime involves some important act which is
not an essential element of the other.With the exception of the crimes of online libel and online child
pornography, the Court would rather leave the determination of the correct application of Section 7
to actual cases.

XII. Section 8 on Penalties - CONSTITUTIONAL

Section 8 provides:

Sec. 8. Penalties. — Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in
Sections 4(a) and 4(b) of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a
fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos (Ph₱200,000.00) up to a maximum amount
commensurate to the damage incurred or both.

Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Section 4(a)(5) shall be punished with
imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of not more than Five hundred thousand pesos
(Ph₱500,000.00) or both.

The courts should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body. The matter of
fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative. Here the
legislature prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what it regards as deleterious cybercrimes.
They appear proportionate to the evil sought to be punished. The power to determine penalties for
offenses is not diluted or improperly wielded simply because at some prior time the act or omission
was but an element of another offense or might just have been connected with another crime.
Judges and magistrates can only interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify or revise
their range as determined by the legislative department.

XIII. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data – UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Section 12 provides:

Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. — Law enforcement authorities, with due
cause, shall be authorized to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in
real-time associated with specified communications transmitted by means of a computer
system.

Traffic data refer only to the communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date, size,
duration, or type of underlying service, but not content, nor identities.

All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court warrant.

Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities in the
collection or recording of the above-stated information.
 The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or granted upon written
application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses
he may produce and the showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any
of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed, or is being committed, or is
about to be committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence that
will be obtained is essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the
prevention of, any such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for
obtaining such evidence.

The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks
restraint. While it says that traffic data collection should not disclose identities or content data, such
restraint is but an illusion. Admittedly, nothing can prevent law enforcement agencies holding these
data in their hands from looking into the identity of their sender or receiver and what the data
contains. This will unnecessarily expose the citizenry to leaked information or, worse, to extortion
from certain bad elements in these agencies.

Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those "associated with specified
communications." But this supposed limitation is no limitation at all since, evidently, it is the law
enforcement agencies that would specify the target communications. The power is virtually limitless,
enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in "fishing expedition," choosing whatever specified
communication they want. This evidently threatens the right of individuals to privacy.

XIV. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data –CONSTITUTIONAL

Section 13 provides:

Sec. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. — The integrity of traffic data and subscriber
information relating to communication services provided by a service provider shall be
preserved for a minimum period of six (6) months from the date of the transaction. Content
data shall be similarly preserved for six (6) months from the date of receipt of the order from
law enforcement authorities requiring its preservation.

Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension for another six (6) months:
Provided, That once computer data preserved, transmitted or stored by a service provider is
used as evidence in a case, the mere furnishing to such service provider of the transmittal
document to the Office of the Prosecutor shall be deemed a notification to preserve the
computer data until the termination of the case.

The service provider ordered to preserve computer data shall keep confidential the order and
its compliance.

There was no undue deprivation of property since the data that service providers preserve
on orders of law enforcement authorities are not made accessible to users by reasons of the
issuance of such orders.

XV. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data – CONSTITUTIONAL

Section 14 provides:

Sec. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. — Law enforcement authorities, upon securing a
court warrant, shall issue an order requiring any person or service provider to disclose or
 submit subscriber’s information, traffic data or relevant data in his/its possession or control
within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of the order in relation to a valid complaint
officially docketed and assigned for investigation and the disclosure is necessary and
relevant for the purpose of investigation.

What Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant, a
function usually lodged in the hands of law enforcers to enable them to carry out their executive
functions. The prescribed procedure for disclosure would not constitute an unlawful search or
seizure nor would it violate the privacy of communications and correspondence. Disclosure can be
made only after judicial intervention.

XVI. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data – CONSTITUTIONAL

Section 15 provides:

Sec. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. — Where a search and
seizure warrant is properly issued, the law enforcement authorities shall likewise have the
following powers and duties.

Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct interception, as defined in this Act,
and:

(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium;

(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer data secured;

(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;

(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data storage

medium; and

(e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer
or computer and communications network.

On its face, Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of law enforcement authorities that
would ensure the proper collection, preservation, and use of computer system or data that have
been seized by virtue of a court warrant. The exercise of these duties do not pose any threat on the
rights of the person from whom they were taken. Section 15 does not appear to supersede existing
search and seizure rules but merely supplements them.

XVII. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data – CONSTITUTIONAL

Section 17 provides:

Sec. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. — Upon expiration of the periods as provided in
Sections 13 and 15, service providers and law enforcement authorities, as the case may be,
shall immediately and completely destroy the computer data subject of a preservation and
examination
XVIII. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data – UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Section 19 empowers the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to computer data:

Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data.— When a computer data is prima
facie found to be in violation of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to
restrict or block access to such computer data.

Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards
jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on speech. Restraints
on free speech are generally evaluated on one of or a combination of three tests: the dangerous
tendency doctrine, the balancing of interest test, and the clear and present danger rule. Section 19,
however, merely requires that the data to be blocked be found prima facie in violation of any
provision of the cybercrime law. Taking Section 6 into consideration, this can actually be made to
apply in relation to any penal provision. It does not take into consideration any of the three tests
mentioned above.

The Court is therefore compelled to strike down Section 19 for being violative of the
constitutional guarantees to freedom of expression and against unreasonable searches and
seizures.

XIX. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice – CONSTITUTIONAL

Section 20 provides:

Sec. 20. Noncompliance. — Failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter IV hereof
specifically the orders from law enforcement authorities shall be punished as a violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1829 with imprisonment of prision correctional in its maximum
period or a fine of One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) or both, for each and
every noncompliance with an order issued by law enforcement authorities.

Section 20 is valid insofar as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck
down by the Court.

XX. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) and Section 26(a) on
CICC’s Powers and Functions – both CONSTITUTIONAL

Sections 24 and 26(a) provide:

Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center.– There is hereby created, within
thirty (30) days from the effectivity of this Act, an inter-agency body to be known as the
Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC), under the administrative
supervision of the Office of the President, for policy coordination among concerned agencies
and for the formulation and enforcement of the national cybersecurity plan.

Sec. 26. Powers and Functions.– The CICC shall have the following powers and functions:

(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate assistance of real time
commission of cybercrime offenses through a computer emergency response team (CERT);
x x x.
GARCILLANO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
G.R. No. 170338
December 23, 2008

FACTS:
Garcillano filed a Petition for Prohibition to restrain the House Representatives Committees
from using the tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee
reports and for any other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any reference
thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees
directed to desist from further using the recordings in any of the House proceedings.

This case involves two petitions having two different objectives–the first is poised at
preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee
reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wire
tapped conversation.

ISSUE:

I. Can the respondent House Committee play the tape recordings and include the same in their
committee reports?

II. Can the Senate be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry
without duly published rules of procedure?

RULING:

I. Garcillano’s petition was dismissed for being MOOT and ACADEMIC. The Court notes that
the recordings were already played in the House and heard by its members. There is also the widely
publicized fact that the committee reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted
to the House in plenary by the respondent committees. Having been overtaken by these events, the
Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot and academic.

II. NO. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the
House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of
the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.

What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that
"[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official
Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."

The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form
available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication
either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even
provide that the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation," precluding any other form of publication. Publication in accordance
with Tañada is mandatory to comply with the due process requirement because the Rules of
Procedure put a person’s liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be
arrested and detained by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as
the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet
is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document
as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the
law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data
messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws,
rules and regulations.
NUEZ VS. CRUZ-APAO
A.M. NO. CA-05-18-P
April 12, 2005

FACTS:

This is an administrative case for Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct against Elvira Cruz-
Apao (Respondent). The complaint arose out of respondent's solicitation of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) from Zaldy Nuez (Complainant) in exchange for a speedy and favorable decision of
the latter's pending case in the Court of Appeals.

During their first telephone conversation and thereafter through a series of messages they
exchanged via SMS, complainant informed respondent of the particulars of his pending case.
However, a week after their first telephone conversation, respondent allegedly told complainant that
a favorable and speedy decision of his case was attainable but the person who was to draft the
decision was in return asking for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).

Complainant then asked for time to determine whether or not to pay the money in exchange
for the decision. Instead, in August of 2004, he sought the assistance of Imbestigador. The crew of
the TV program accompanied him to PAOCCF-SPG where he lodged a complaint against
respondent for extortion.

During the hearing of this case, the respondent was asked if she had sent the text messages
contained in complainant’s cellphone and which reflected her cellphone number. Respondent
admitted those that were not incriminating but claimed she did not remember those that clearly
showed she was transacting with complainant. Respondent thus stated that she met with
complainant only to tell the latter to stop calling and texting her, not to get the One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) as pre-arranged.

ISSUE:

Were the respondent’s text messages asking for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) properly
admitted as evidence by the Ad Hoc Committee?

RULING:

YES. The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now
covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence which provides:

"Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text messages . . .

and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or
retained."

Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "Ephemeral electronic

communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who
has personal knowledge thereof . . . ." In this case, complainant who was the recipient of said
messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import.
Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainant's cellphone from
which the messages originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the
admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and
attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant. It is also well to
remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied. We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in
determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.
PEOPLE vs. ENOJAS
G.R. No. 204894
March 10, 2014

FACTS:

PO2 Gregorio testified that he and PO2 Pangilinan spotted a taxi that was suspiciously
parked, approached it and asked the driver Enojas for his documents. Having doubts regarding the
veracity of documents shown them, they asked him to come with them to the police station for
further questioning.

On the way to the police station, an attempted robbery in a store ensued to which the officers
responded. PO2 Pangilinan shot it out with the suspected robbers, shot one suspect dead and hit
the other who still managed to escape. However, someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his
death. Suspecting that accused Enojas was involved in the attempted robbery, they searched the
abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone. P/Ins. Torred instructed PO3 Joel Cambi (PO3 Cambi) to
monitor its incoming messages.

PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they monitored the messages in accused Enojas’
mobile phone and, posing as Enojas, communicated with the other accused. The police then
conducted an entrapment operation that resulted in the arrest of accused Santos, Jalandoni. Enojas
and Gomez. The prosecution presented the transcripts of the mobile phone text messages between
Enojas and some of his co-accused.

Enojas, along with several other defendants, was charged with murder in 2006 before the
Las Pifias Regional Trial Court. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
conviction. The accused then appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the text messages are admissible?

RULING:

YES. The RTC admitted them in conformity with the Court’s earlier Resolution applying the
Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages are to be proved by the testimony
of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them.

Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other
accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to
the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and
was competent to testify on them.

The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest. But, assuming
1âw phi1

that this was so, it cannot be a ground for acquitting them of the crime charged but for rejecting any
evidence that may have been taken from them after an unauthorized search as an incident of an
unlawful arrest, a point that is not in issue here.

At any rate, a crime had been committed—the killing of PO2 Pangilinan—and the
investigating police officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the persons they were to
arrest had committed it. The text messages to and from the mobile phone left at the scene by
accused Enojas provided strong leads on the participation and identities of the accused. Indeed, the
police caught them in an entrapment using this knowledge.
BARTOLOME VS. MARANAN
AM No. P-11-2979
November 18, 2014

FACTS:

This administrative matter started through the sworn affidavit-complaint dated December 16,
2009, that Complainant Ella M. Bartolome filed against Respondent Rosalie B. Maranan, Court
Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, charging her with extortion,
graft and corruption, gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a court employee. The
complainant alleged that the respondent asked money from her in the amount of P200,000.00, which
was later reduced to P160,000.00, to facilitate the filing of her case for annulment of marriage.

The complainant decided to report the matter to the police authorities. During the entrapment
operation conducted by police officers of Imus Police Station, the respondent was apprehended
inside the premises of the RTC, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite.

In support of her allegations, the complainant attached to her affidavit-complaint the

transcribed electronic communications (text messages) between her and the respondent; a copy of
an Electronic Psychiatric History form given to her by the respondent for her to accomplish in filing
the petition for annulment of marriage; a copy of the Imus Police Station Blotter showing that the
respondent was apprehended during the entrapment operation conducted by police officers of Imus
Police Station on November 11, 2009 at 2:40 p.m.; and a versatile compact disc (VCD) containing
the video taken during the entrapment operation conducted against the respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the pieces of evidence on record establish the guilt of the respondent on the
charges?

RULING:

YES. The respondent’s actions from the time the complainant started communicating with
her on October 21, 2009 and thereafter through a series of messages they exchanged via SMS, until
the entrapment operation on November 11, 2009, showed that the complaint is indeed meritorious.
The respondent’s text messages sent to the complainant corroborate that she promised to expedite
– in exchange for a monetary consideration of ₱160,000.00 and that she would provide the lawyer
who would file the annulment case – the complainant’s annulment case once it is filed.

Ephemeral electronic communications are now admissible evidence, subject to certain

conditions. "Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text messages,
chatroom sessions, streaming audio, streaming video, and other electronic forms of communication
the evidence of which is not recorded or retained. It may be proven by the testimony of a person who
was a party to the communications or has personal knowledge thereof.

In the present case, we have no doubt regarding the probative value of the text messages
as evidence in considering the present case. The complainant, who was the recipient of the text
messages and who therefore has personal knowledge of these text messages, identified the
respondent as the sender through cellphone number 09175775982. The respondent herself
admitted that her conversations with the complainant had been thru SMS messaging and that the
cellphone number reflected in the complainant’s cellphone from which the text messages originated
was hers. She confirmed that it was her cellphone number during the entrapment operation the Imus
Cavite Police conducted.

The complainant also submitted two (2) copies of the VCD containing pictures taken during
the entrapment conducted by the Imus Cavite Police on November 11, 2009.

Under Section 1, Rule 11 of A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, audio, photographic and video evidence
of events, acts or transactions shall be admissible provided it shall be shown, presented or displayed
to the court and shall be identified, explained or authenticated by the person who made the
recording or by some other person competent to testify on the accuracy thereof.

We viewed the VCD and the video showed the actual entrapment operation. The
complainant herself certified that the video and text messages are evidence of her complaint against
the respondent, "Sapat at malinaw ang lahat ng ebidensya na kasama ng aking reklamo na
nagpapatunay na totoo lahat ang nakasaad sa aking reklamo. Kitang kita sa video at sa mga text
messages niya ang kanyang modus operandi at paggamit niya ng pwesto sa gobyerno upang
makapanghingi ng malaking pera sa mga inosenteng tao." It is also well to remember that in
administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. A.M. No.
01-7-01-SC specifically provides that these rules shall be liberally construed to assist the parties in
obtaining a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases.
MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION VS. SSANGYONG CORPORATION
G.R. No. 170633
October 17, 2007

FACTS:

Petitioner MCC Industrial Sales (MCC), a domestic corporation with office at Binondo,
Manila, is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its
suppliers is the Ssangyong Corporation (Ssangyong), an international trading company with head
office in Seoul, South Korea and regional headquarters in Makati City, Philippines.

The two corporations conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy
transmissions. Ssangyong would send the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel
product order to MCC; if the latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature on the
faxed copy and sends it back to Ssangyong, again by fax.

Respondent filed a civil action for damages due to breach of contract against petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. In its complaint, respondent alleged that defendants
breached their contract when they refused to open the letter of credit in the amount of
US$170,000.00 for the remaining 100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1
and ST2-POSTS0401-2.

After respondent rested its case, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that
respondent failed to present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action
was based. Petitioner contends that the photocopies of the pro forma invoices presented by
respondent Ssangyong to prove the perfection of their supposed contract of sale are inadmissible in
evidence and do not fall within the ambit of R.A. No. 8792, because the law merely admits as the
best evidence the original fax transmittal. On the other hand, Respondent claims that the
photocopies of these fax transmittals (specifically ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2) are
admissible under the Rules on Evidence because the respondent sufficiently explained the non-
production of the original fax transmittals.

ISSUE:

Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and
admissible as such

RULING:

NO.

R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, considers an
electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written
document for evidentiary purposes. The Rules on Electronic Evidence regards an electronic
document as admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the
Rules of Court and related laws, and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the said Rules. An
electronic document is also the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, if
it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.68

Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the

functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must
foremost be an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document."
 The Rules on Electronic Evidence promulgated by this Court defines the said terms in the
following manner:

SECTION 1. Definition of Terms. – For purposes of these Rules, the following terms are
defined, as follows:

xxxx

(g) "Electronic data message" refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by
electronic, optical or similar means.

(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data,

figures, symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by
which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved
and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and print-out or output,
readable by sight or other means, which accurately reflects the electronic data message or
electronic document. For purposes of these Rules, the term "electronic document" may be
used interchangeably with "electronic data message."

Given these definitions, we go back to the original question: Is an original printout of

a facsimile transmission an electronic data message or electronic document?

There is no question then that when Congress formulated the term "electronic data
message," it intended the same meaning as the term "electronic record" in the Canada law. This
construction of the term "electronic data message," which excludes telexes or faxes, except
computer-generated faxes, is in harmony with the Electronic Commerce Law's focus on "paperless"
communications and the "functional equivalent approach"82 that it espouses. In fact, the deliberations
of the Legislature are replete with discussions on paperless and digital transactions.

Facsimile transmissions are not, in this sense, "paperless," but verily are paper-based.

Ineluctably, the law's definition of "electronic data message," which, as aforesaid, is

interchangeable with "electronic document," could not have included facsimile transmissions, which
have anoriginal paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two
copies are distinct from each other, and have different legal effects.

We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document,"
as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission.
Accordingly, a facsimile transmissioncannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the
functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic
evidence.

Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an "electronic

document," and cannot be considered as electronic evidence by the Court, with greater reason is a
photocopy of such a fax transmission not electronic evidence. In the present case, therefore, Pro
Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E" and "F"), which
are mere photocopies of the original fax transmittals, are not electronic evidence, contrary to the
position of both the trial and the appellate courts.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS CODILLA
G.R. No. 170491
April 4, 2007

FACTS:

On 20 April 1996, M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and operated by
private respondent Bangpai Shipping, Co., allegedly bumped and damaged petitioner’s Power Barge
209 which was then moored at the Cebu International Port. Thus, on 26 April 1996, petitioner filed
before the Cebu RTC a complaint for damages against private respondent Bangpai Shipping Co., for
the alleged damages caused on petitioner’s power barges.

During the presentation of evidence, the petitioner presented as pieces of evidence, to wit:

1. Exhibit "A" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by a certain Jose C. Troyo, with
"RECEIVED" stamped thereon, together with a handwritten date;

2. Exhibit "C" is a photocopy of a list of estimated cost of damages of petitioner’s power

barges 207 and 209 prepared by Hopewell Mobile Power Systems Corporation and manually
signed by Messrs. Rex Malaluan and Virgilio Asprer;

3. Exhibit "D" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by a certain Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr.,
with "RECEIVED" stamped thereon, together with a handwritten notation of the date it was
received;

4. Exhibit "E" is a photocopy of a Standard Marine Protest Form which was filled up and
accomplished by Rex Joel C. Malaluan in his own handwriting and signed by him. Portions of
the Jurat were handwritten, and manually signed by the Notary Public;

5. Exhibit "H" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr. with
"RECEIVED" stamped thereon, together with a handwritten notation of the date it was
received;

6. Exhibit "I" is a photocopy of a computation of the estimated energy loss allegedly suffered
by petitioner which was manually signed by Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr.;

7. Exhibit "J" is a photocopy of a letter containing the breakdown of the cost estimate,
manually signed by Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr., with "RECEIVED" stamped thereon,
together with a handwritten notation of the date it was received, and other handwritten
notations;

8. Exhibit "K" is a photocopy of the Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum written using
a manual typewriter, signed manually by Atty. Ofelia Polo-De Los Reyes, with a handwritten
notation when it was received by the party;

9. Exhibit "L" is a photocopy of a portion of the electricity supply and operation and
maintenance agreement between petitioner and Hopewell, containing handwritten notations
and every page containing three unidentified manually placed signatures;

10. Exhibit "M" is a photocopy of the Notice of Termination with attachments addressed to
Rex Joel C. Malaluan, manually signed by Jaime S. Patinio, with a handwritten notation of
 the date it was received. The sub-markings also contain manual signatures and/or
handwritten notations;

11. Exhibit "N" is a photocopy of a letter of termination with attachments addressed to VIrgilio
Asprer and manually signed by Jaime S. Patino. The sub-markings contain manual
signatures and/or handwritten notations;

12. Exhibit "O" is the same photocopied document marked as Annex C;

13. Exhibit "P" is a photocopy of an incident report manually signed by Messrs. Malaluan and
Bautista and by the Notary Public, with other handwritten notations;

14. Exhibit "Q" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by Virgilio Asprer and by a Notary
Public, together with other handwritten notations.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the photocopies are electronic documents as contemplated in Republic Act No. 8792
or the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Electronic Commerce Act, as well as the Rules on
Electronic Evidence

RULING:

A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal
that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the
documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a
person’s signature affixed manually be considered as information electronically received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner that since
these paper printouts were produced through an electronic process, then these photocopies are
electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if
not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus declared that the offered photocopies are not
tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may not be considered as the
functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.

Furthermore, no error can be ascribed to the court a quo in denying admission and excluding
from the records petitioner’s Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J" and its sub-
markings, "K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its sub-
markings, "Q" and its sub-markings, and "R". The trial court was correct in rejecting these
photocopies as they violate the best evidence rule and are therefore of no probative value being
incompetent pieces of evidence.

Moreover, as mandated under Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

"SECTION 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions. — There can be no evidence of

a writing the contents of which is the subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself,
except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court;

(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered,
and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
 (c) When the original is a record or other document in the custody of a public officer;

(d) When the original has been recorded in an existing record a certified copy of which is
made evidence by law;

(e) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them
is only the general result of the whole."

When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith
on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. The offeror of secondary evidence is
burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith
on the part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine
practices of destruction of documents; (b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of
evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it
must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the
document in the proper place or places.

However, in the case at bar, though petitioner insisted in offering the photocopies as
documentary evidence, it failed to establish that such offer was made in accordance with the
exceptions as enumerated under the abovequoted rule. Accordingly, we find no error in the Order of
the court a quo denying admissibility of the photocopies offered by petitioner as documentary
evidence.
NOGALES VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 191080
November 21, 2011

FACTS

Special Investigator Garry Meñez (SI Meñez) of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
applied for a search warrant to authorize him and his fellow NBI agents or any peace officer to
search the premises of petitioner Phil-Pacific Outsourcing Services Corporation (Phil-Pacific). A
Return of Search Warrant was submitted by SI Menez to the RTC manifesting that various material
used in the creation and selling of pornographic internet website were confiscated:

1. Ten (10) units of Central Processing Units (CPUs);

2. Ten (10) units of monitors;
3. Ten (10) units of keyboard;
4. Ten (10) units of mouse; and
5. Ten (10) units of AVRs.

Aggrieved by the issuance of the said order, the named persons in the search warrant filed a
Motion to Quash Search Warrant and Return Seized Properties, but were denied.

The Court of Appeals, in resolving the petition for certiorari filed with it against the RTC
judge, ordered the release of the seized CPUs and softwares with the condition that the hard disk be
removed from the CPUs and be destroyed, and if the softwares are determined to be unlicensed or
pirated copies, they shall be destroyed in the manner allowed by law.

Petitioners argue that there is no evidence showing that they were the source of
pornographic printouts presented by the NBI to the RTC or to the City Prosecutor of Manila. Since
the hard disks in their computers are not illegal per se unlike shabu, opium, counterfeit money, or
pornographic magazines, said merchandise are lawful as they are being used in the ordinary course
of business, the destruction of which would violate not only procedural, but substantive due process.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the removal and destruction of the hard disks containing the pornographic and
obscene materials violates the property rights of its owner, considering the criminal case for violation
of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code was dismissed

RULING:

The argument of petitioners that “...since the hard disks in their computers are not illegal per
se unlike shabu, opium, counterfeit money, or pornographic magazines, said merchandise are lawful
as they are being used in the ordinary course of business, the destruction of which would violate not
only procedural, but substantive due process” is totally misplaced

This is in light of the undisputed fact that the seized computer units contained obscene
materials or pornographic files. Had it been otherwise, then, petitioners' argument would have been
meritorious as there could be no basis for destroying the hard disks of petitioners' computer units.

While it may be true that the criminal case for violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal
Code was dismissed as there was no concrete and strong evidence pointing to them as the direct
source of the subject pornographic materials, it cannot be used as basis to recover the confiscated
hard disks. At the risk of being repetitious, it appears undisputed that the seized computer units
belonging to them contained obscene materials or pornographic files. Clearly, petitioners had no
legitimate expectation of protection of their supposed property rights.

Significantly, Presidential Decree (PD) No. 969 is explicit. Thus:

Sec. 2. Disposition of the Prohibited Articles. The disposition of the literature, films, prints,
engravings, sculptures, paintings, or other materials involved in the violation referred to in
Section 1 hereof shall be governed by the following rules:

a. Upon conviction of the offender, to be forfeited in favor of the government to be

destroyed.

b. Where the criminal case against any violator of this decree results in an acquittal,
the obscene/immoral literature, films, prints, engravings, sculpture, paintings or other
materials and other articles involved in the violation referred to in Section 1 hereof
shall nevertheless be forfeited in favor of the government to be destroyed, after
forfeiture proceedings conducted by the Chief of Constabulary. [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied]

To stress, P.D. No. 969 mandates the forfeiture and destruction of pornographic materials
involved in the violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, even if the accused was acquitted.

Taking into account all the circumstances of this case, the Court holds that the destruction of
the hard disks and the softwares used in any way in the violation of the subject law addresses the
purpose of minimizing if not totally eradicating pornography. This will serve as a lesson for those
engaged in any way in the proliferation of pornography or obscenity in this country. The Court is not
unmindful of the concerns of petitioners but their supposed property rights must be balanced with the
welfare of the public in general.
AZNAR VS. CITIBANK
G.R. No. 164273
March 28, 2007

FACTS:

Emmanuel B. Aznar (Aznar), is a holder of a Preferred Master Credit Card (Mastercard)

issued by Citibank with a credit limit of P150,000.00. Aznar claims that when he presented his
Mastercard in some establishments in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, Ingtan Tour and Travel
Agency in Indonesia, the credit card was not honoured for the reason that his card was blacklisted
by Citibank. Such dishonor forced him to buy the tickets in cash.

Aznar filed a complaint for damages against Citibank, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
16474 and raffled to RTC Branch 20, Cebu City, claiming that Citibank fraudulently or with gross
negligence blacklisted his Mastercard which forced him, his wife and grandchildren to abort
important tour destinations and prevented them from buying certain items in their tour. To prove that
Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard, Aznar presented a computer print-out, denominated as ON-LINE
AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan Agency
(Exh. "G") with the signature of one Victrina Elnado Nubi (Nubi) which shows that his card in
question was "DECL OVERLIMIT" or declared over the limit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Exh. "G" qualifies as electronic evidence following the Rules on Electronic Evidence
which provides that print-outs are also originals for purposes of the Best Evidence Rule

RULING:

NO. As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, however, such exhibit cannot be
considered admissible as its authenticity and due execution were not sufficiently established by
petitioner.

The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of the RTC Decision is Section 20 of Rule
132 of the Rules of Court. It provides that whenever any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone who
saw the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.

Aznar, who testified on the authenticity of Exh. "G," did not actually see the document
executed or written, neither was he able to provide evidence on the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of Nubi, who handed to him said computer print-out.

Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which took effect on August 1,
2001, and which is being invoked by Aznar in this case, the authentication of Exh. "G" would still be
found wanting.

Pertinent sections of Rule 5 read:

 Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. – The person seeking to introduce an
electronic document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity
in the manner provided in this Rule.

Section 2. Manner of authentication. – Before any private electronic document offered

as authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the
following means:

(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the
same;

(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be

authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents
were applied to the document; or

(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.

Aznar’s testimony that the person from Ingtan Agency merely handed him the computer
print-out and that he thereafter asked said person to sign the same cannot be considered as
sufficient to show said print-out’s integrity and reliability. As correctly pointed out by Judge Marcos in
his May 29, 1998 Decision, Exh. "G" does not show on its face that it was issued by Ingtan Agency
as Aznar merely mentioned in passing how he was able to secure the print-out from the agency;
Aznar also failed to show the specific business address of the source of the computer print-out
because while the name of Ingtan Agency was mentioned by Aznar, its business address was not
reflected in the print-out.