THE BATTLE OF HATTIN.

I187

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General StaffCollege in partial fulfillment ofthe requirements for the degree MASTER O F MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by ERIC W. OLSON, LCDR. USN B.S., Georgetown Ilniversity, Washington, D.C., I983

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Lieutenant Commander Eric W. Olson, U.S. Navy

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US. Army Command and General Staff College ATIT: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-1352

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The study reviews the Battle of Hattin to determine why the arm!: of the Crusaders was decisively defeated. The Hattin was one of the most critical battles of the Middle Ages. The battle resulted in the virtual destruction of thi States and directly led to the Third Crusade. The study begins with a brief overview of the political, economic, a motivations behind the Cmades. A brief chronological history of si@icant events is provided to bridge the rou years from the foundation of the Crusader States until the Battle of Hattin. A description of the Crusader and Ma militaq organizations, equipment, swtegy, and tactics is provided to give a fnmework to examine the actions 01 prior to and during the Battle of Hattin. The study concludes with an examination of the Crusader decision to fig whellier that decision was in accordance with the stntcgic objectives of the C r u d e r States. The study presents I an example of poor suategic and tactical decision making.

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Crusades, Saladin, Hattin, Ternpeas, Hospitalities

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESlS APPROVAL PAGE Name of Candidate: Lieutenant Commander Eric W. Olson Thesis Title: The Battle of Hattin, 1 187

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those ofthe student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General StatTCollege or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

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A brief chronological history of significant events is prwided to bridge the roughl! ninety )ears from thc foundation ofthe Crusader States until the Bat~le o f Ilattin. . The study begins with a brief overview of the political. The study concludes with an examiiiillion o f the Crusader decision to tight and whether that decision was in accordance u i t h the strategic objectives ofthe Crusader States. I187 by LCDR Eric W . strategy. 'Ihe Battle o f Hattin was one of thc most critical battles ofthe Middle Ages. equipment..AHSTRACI TIIT: BATTLE O F IIATI'IN. The battle resulted in the virtual destruction o f the Crusader States and directly led to the Third Crusadc. Olson.. and tactics is provided to give a framework to examine the actions o f both partics prior to and during the Battle o f Hattin. A description o f the Crusader and Moslem military organizations. The study presents the battle a s an example o f poor strategic and tactical decision making. 111 . economic: and religious motivations behind the Crusades. l!SN: XY pages The study reviems the Battle of Haltin to determine why the arm! ofthe Cruwders was decisively defeated.

...................................................................................................................................... II ....................................................... LITERARYREVIEW BIBI...... BATTLE OF IiATTIN ................................. STRATEGY: AND TACTICS ......................................................... LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1....... 03 15 2............................ 01 .................. 111 V ABSTRACT ............................................................ MOSLEM MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS............ 4........................................................................................ ................................. CONCLUSION ... 31 43 53 78 6..................................................... ............................................................ EQUIPMENT.................. 5 .......IOGRA1’HY .. STRATEGY.....................................................................................................................................................TABLE OF CONTENTS @ APPROVAL PAGE .......................... 3...... EQUIPMENT.............................. 89 iv .......................... 82 86 .......................... A................. 1095 ....................................................... 1..... ..................................................................................................... CRUSADER MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS.......................... INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ................................................... ‘rtx DECLINE OF THE CRUSADER STATES.... I 174-1187 ............I174 .............. AND TACTICS ......... FOUNDATION AND GROWTH OF THE CRUSADER STATES................ APPENDIX ...................................

................................ afternoon ..............I..................-..... The Rattle of1 laitin.............. 71 ..... 67 5 Map of the Vicinity O f h t t i n .......... The Muslim Near East 1127-1 174 ..... The Battle of Hattin....... .....LIST OF II...~JSTRATIONS Page - -.................................................... Figure I...... 04 2..................................... . late morning to noon ..... 3.......................... 05 4....... I0 ............ Feudal Iloldings in the Kingdom ofJerusalem ........

Was the risk of battle worth the gain? Political questions will include: Did a politically divided leadership directly lead to the Crusaders' defeat? Did King Guy's experiences in a similar defensive action in I183 influence his decisions at Hattin'? And. under their great leader Saladin. The focus of this thesis will be on the strategic. Over the course of the battle. political. did King Guy have to be concerned with the political ramifications of not committing to battle? Tactically. As King of Jerusalem. Saladin destroyed the Crusader States with the exception of three major cities and a few isolated fortresses. what tactical decisions led to the Crusaders' defeat at Hattin? Was the decision to march from SalTuriya to Tiberias in one day feasible? Was the decision to halt the army and I . The battle was fought between the combined Crusader armies. the Crusader army was virtually eliminated. and a Moslem army. and tactical decisions that led to the decisive defeat of the Army of the Crusaders at the Battle of Ilattin.INTRODUCTION The Battle of Hattin (3-4 July I 1 87) was one of the most decisive battles of the Middle Ages. Strategic questions will include: What were the strategic objectives of the Crusader States? Why did the Army ofthe Crusaders commit to battle? Did the Crusaders have to commit to battle to achieve their strategic objectives? And. What the Crusaders had spent ninety years building was destroyed due to the Crusader leaderships' poor tactical and strategic decision making prior to the battle. Without a field army to oppose him. under the leadership of thc King of Jerusalem.

a historical background and a description of the opposing armics will be provided. the establishment of the Crusader States. and thc rise ofsaladin. The historical background will provide B bricf description of the events that led to the First Crusade. the political divisions within the Crusader States. Could the Army of the Crusaders have reached a source of water on 3 July? To provide a framework for answering thse questions. tactics. strategy.camp in the open on 3 July 1187 a primary cause of the later defeat? And. and equipmcnt. . The description of the opposing armies will include a description of the army’s organization.

while explosive. was not stable. Jordan. the Byzantines lost thcir ability to protect Christian rights in the Iloly Lands. the Crusaders would reach the height of their power.. The Abbasid Caliphate existed in name only as its military power had been crushed by the Seljuks. first under Nur-ad-Din and later under Saladin. economic. and military growth. Up until the battle of Manzikert. Syria. The Seljuk Empirc's growth. and most of lsracl and Turkcy. Loyalties were still more to the tribe than to the empire. Iran. the great Seljuk Empirc includcd all of present day Iraq. the strategic balance of power in the region will begin to swing against them. Lebanon. the Byzantines. by the end ofthis period. I-lowcvcr. there was a political vacuum of power in the Near East. could influence the Moslcms who controlled Jerusalcm and the Holy Lands. During this period. without a strong military presence in Asia Minor. What started as an attempt to help the beleaguered Byzantine Empire and to reduce the fighting in Western Europe would be the start of a Christian military presence in the region for two hundred years. Only the strong rule of the Sultan Alp Arslan and his son Malik-Shah kept the empire together.I174 The period 1095-1 174 would see the foundation of the Crusader States in the Middle East and their dramatic political.CHAPTER I FOlJNDATION AND GROWTH OF THE CRUSADER STATES.' Also in the year 1095. due to their military strength. The Crusades would also serve as the catalyst for a reunification of the Moslem Near East. With Malik-Shah's 3 . 1095 . In the year 1095. Thc Seljuks also dcfcatcd the Byzantines at the battlc ofManzikcrt (1071). The two historic powers in thc region the Abbasid Caliphate and the Byzantine Empirc wcrc both severely weakened. which resulted in the Byzantine loss of most of Asia Minor. In 1095.

I . 4 . Rcprinted from: Jonathan Riley-Smith MI. (New York: Facts on File. 59.Fig. The Atlas of the Crusades. 1990). The Muslim Near East..

the Western Mediterranean. For his part. not firmly entrenched in the region when the First Crusade arriwd. therefore. the Fatamids did not initially view them as potential rivals but as a possible counterbalancc to the Seljuks. When the Crusaders conquered Antioch and Edcssa. ~ The other Moslcm major regional power was the Fatamid Caliphate based in Cairo. The currcnt emperor Alexius I Comncnus had appealed to Pope Urban I1 for assistance in raising troops to help reconquer a portion of Asia Minor. The other two parts. Prior to thc arrival of the First Crusade. Urban I I sought the emperor’s support in his continuing struggle against the anti-Pope Clement 111. thc Fatamids werc able to reconquer the ports along the coast as far north as Tyre and reconquered Jerusalem in 1098. The Fatamids were Shiites and. natural rivals to both the Sunni Seljuks and the Caliph in Baghdad. separate emiratcs were established at Antioch. were ruled by two separate Turkoman tribes. In Syria. to the north and east of present day Ankara. Alcppo. by the Slavs in the Balkans. The Byzantines were hard pressed by the Seljuks in Asia Minor. was attempting to rcbuild afier the disaster at Manzikcrt. The Byzantines had lost most of thcir traditional army’s recruiting grounds and were having difficulty raising troops to defend what was leA of thc cmpirc. and Sicily: and. The Fatamids wcrc. Asia Minor divided into three. Mesopotamia also divided into separate emirates with the strongest being based on M o s ~ l . As an incentive. the empirc began to break apart during a battle for succession. and in Greece by the Normans of southern Italy. Christians were fighting Moslems in Spain. and Damascus. Christian Western Europe in 1095 was in a period of both expansion and internal division. therefore. parts.’ The major Christian power in the region. the emperor had agreed to hclp rcconcile the Eastern (Orthodox) and Wcstcrn (Roman Catholic) churches that had officially split in 1054. the largest being the Sultanate of Rum ruled by Kilij Arslan. even for a 5 . the Byzantine Empire.assassination in 1095. The Fatamid Caliphate had lost most of its former territory in what is now Lebanon and Israel to Malik-Shah. Horns.

The new Moslcm rulcrs of the pilgrimage routes saw the pilgrims as either a source of revenuc or possible threat. Pope Urban II first proclaimed a holy Crusadc to frce thc Eastern churches from Moslem domination. one man Pope Ijrhan II started a chain of events that changed the face of Western Europe and the Near East for almost two hundred ymrs. The average Western European was very dcvoot. at the Council ofClermont. On 27 Novembcr 27 1095.4 Thc eleventh century was also a period of explosive growth of monasteries and religious orders. Urban l l saw a Crusade as a means to accomplish three primary goals: limit further Christian against Christian fighting in Europe by sending cxcess military manpower to thc 6 . Byzantine control ofthe Balkans and Asia Minor. for a short period of time. hospices were set up to receivc pilgrims in Egyptian controlled ports and along the major land routes in what is now 1. occupied Rome with German military assistance forcing Pope Urban I1 to find safe havcn with the Norman rulers of southern Italy. who. The Capetian King of France. The breakdown in the support structure for Christian pilgrims led to reports of abuse and death of pilgrims at the hands of M o ~ l e m s . A pilgrimage to Jerusalem and the Holy Lands became the goal for many Western Europeans. In the middle part ofthe century. The German Emperor Henry IV was supporting the anti-Pope Clement 111. the German Emperor I lenry IV. ~ In 1095. With the conversion ofthe Hungarians to Christianity.brief time: Normans from Sicily occupied Tunis. The pope was struggling against the major European monarchs for control of the Catholic Church. and control ofthe Western Mcditcrranean by the Italian City States. Excess military manpower and the law of primogeniture led to extensive fighting between Christians. pilgrimages to the Holy Lands bccamc possible even for Christians of modest means.and the English King William 11 were all attempting to form more centralizLd feudal states. This system of support for pilgrims broke down with the Byzantine loss of most of Asia Minor after the Battle of Manzikert and the Egyptian loss of control in most ofthe Holy Lands.ebanon and Israel.

000 and was one of the largest cities in thc Near East. Their first opponent was the strongest Seljuk state. Finally. it would increase the prestige of the papacy and strengthen Rome's control over the increasingly indepcndcnt bishops and monasteries. Dorylaeum. and Tarsus. were severely wcakcned and might not have been able to continue without the assistance of the Hyiantines.east. The Crusaders. a good estimate would be between 5. Supporting the Byzantine Emperor would ensure that the Emperor supported Urban I I against the anti-pope and also opcncd the door for a reuniting of the Eastern and Western churches under the papacy.' Aner stopping first at Constantinople. and strengthcn the papacy.000 to 45. thc First Crusade let1 for the Holy Lands in 1096. The Crusaders fought and won three major battles--Nicea.000 infantry. while victorious. Sending manpower east would ease military tension in Western Europe while hopefully expanding the Christian frontier. if the call for a Crusade was successful. The size of the army of the First Crusade is not known.000 to 7. Urban 11 never conceived how successful his call for a Crusade would be or how long its effects would l a x 6 With the Byzantine need for military assistance and the ~ X C C S Sof military manpower in Western Europe. The extensive preparation ensured that the announccd Crusade would not fail and at least a minimal amount of aid would reach the Byzantines. which had a garrison of 10.' Afier extensive preparation. The siege lasted nine months and only ended after the Crusaders dereated a Moslem 7 . provide support to the Byzantines who were attempting to recover territory lost after the Battle of Manzikert. a Crusade in support of the eastern Christians (Byzantines) would achieve all of Urban 11's goals. the Sultanate of Rum. Unable to take the city by storm. The First Crusade's next major challenge was Antioch. the Crusaders passed across the straits into Asia Minor in 1097. the Crusaders placed the city under siege in October 1097. The Council of Clermont was the culmination of months o f work by Urban I I to ensure that he had the support of several key nobles and the powerful Abbot o f Cluny.000 cavalry and 35.

Instead. having complctcd its mission. and no plan for how to administer the captured territory. when most of the Crusading army. lack of a logistics base once they lcft Byzantine territory. decided to remain in Antioch and attempt to establish an independent kingdom. Lack of ccntralizcd leadership led to a pcrmancnt division ofthe Crusader army after the successful siege of Antioch. thc Crusaders took thcir m i o r objective Jerusalem.000 troops. X . Another major leader. Even with these advantages. returned home. The Christians only held thcsc four major cities. Thc lack of a local logistics base madc it impcrativc for the remaining Crusaders to cnsure continued acccss to supplies from Western Europc.I’hc success of the First Crusadc was due to excellent and very fortunate timing. In 1099: the small Crusadcr army was sprcad from Antioch and Edessa in the north and northeast to Jcrusaleni and Jaffa in the south. One of the most powerful Crusadcr Icadcrs. estimated to consist of over 20. the backbone of Moslem strength in Syria the Turkoman tribes had withdrawn to fight in Mesopotamia and Iran. crucial for the long term survival ofthe Crusadcrs. One ofthe last acts of the Crusaders returning to Western Europe was thc fortification of Jaffa. the Crusaders faced rival Moslem rulers who had weakened thcmsclvcs in internecinc fighting. The requirement for access to the Mcditcrranean for resupply madc the capture of ports held by thc Fatamids. If MalikShah had not bccn assassinated. The army was further weakened after the capture of Jcrusalcm. the Crusaders were fortunate to capture Antioch and defeat the first of the Moslem counteroffcnsives under Kerbogha Governor of Mosul. In addition.rclicfarmy. especially Acre. One ywr later. Baldwin of Boulogne. . Bohemond of Taranto. Jafh bccamc thc lifcblood of the infant Kingdom ofJerusalcm. also broke offon his own to establish his own kingdom among the Armenians in the vicinity of Edessa. The Crusadcrs wcre successful dcspitc divided leadership. it is likcly thc Crusaders would not have made it past the first series of battles in Asia Minor.

and the areas immcdiatcly east of tlie Jordan River. For the next forty years: the Crusaders were able to expand their territories due to continued divisions in Moslem leadership and support from Western Europc. Tyre. the Crusader States would stabilize as four distinct political entities: the Kingdom of Jcrusalcm. the four states were referred to as tlie Kingdom ofthe Crusaders or thc Outremer. these states frequently acted independently and made their own treaties with ncighboring Moslem states. With the return of the bulk of the Crusader army to Western Europe. 0 t h to the detriment of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. and thc coastal plain north of Antioch to Alexandretta. Collwtively. The Kingdom of Jcrusalem includcd all of modern day Israel.Acquisition of ports. The Crusaders decided to form a kingdom with its capital at Jerusalem. Unity of command was now vital.000 to 2. the Principality of Antioch and the two countics wcre vassals ofthe King of Jerusalem: however. Gaia. provided not only for security but also for the tinancial well-heing ofthe Kingdom. 9 . Sidon and Ascalon. thcrcforc. the Principality of'Antioch and thc County of Tripoli were depcndcnt on the Kingdom of Jerusalem for military support and. such as Acre. all arcas west ofthe Orantes river south to the present Syrian-Lebanese border. nominally recognized thc authority of the King of Jerusalem. the West Bank. The Principality of Antioch included the city of Antioch. the Principality of Antioch. Evcntually. and the counties of Tripoli and Edessa. Officially.000 troops. During the period of this study. Thc County of Edcssa was based on the city of Edessa and included most of the then Armenian populatcd areas in what is now southcastern Turkey. The County of Tripoli included thc coastal areas of Lebanon north of Beirut to the current Syrian-Lebanese bordcr. those that remained had to determine how they were going to defend the captured territory. the coastal plain of Lebanon up to and including Hcirut. as the Crusader army by the year 1 100 nurnbercd only between 1.

Reprinted liorn: Jonathan Riley-Smith ed. (New York: Facts on Filc. I990). Feudal Holdings in the Kingdom or Jerusalem. 2.Fig.3 i .. The Atlas of the Crusades. .

The capture of Edessa elevated Zengi from a power hungry warlord to defender of the faith. Moslem Syria was no longer separated from Mesopotamia by a hostile Christian state. failed to strengthen the Crusaders' position in the Holy Lands. In I 144. and stronger Moslem resistance. the Governor of Mosul. Instead of a strong. was able to establish effective control over Aleppo. Access was also lost to a significant portion ofChristian Armenia and its Christian military resourccs. which was launched to help recapture the County of Edessa. 'The loss of Edessa denied the Crusader States their forward defense and opened up the Principality of Antioch and the County of Tripoli to attack. The Crusaders enjoyed spectacular success until the beginning of the I 130s.' The Second Crusade.erful Moslem provinces presented a direct threat to the Principality of Antioch and the County of Edessa. Zengi's reputation and relations with the caliph in Baghdad were restored. Between I 130 and I 144. the Crusaders had been able to retain possession of most of their northern holdings as Zengi was occupied in not only fighting the Crusaders but also his coreligionists in northern Syria and Mesopotamia. As a result. Zengi now received support from Baghdad. Count Joscelin of Edessa removed most of his Army from Edessa while fighting in support of a Moslem ally. attempts to separate and weaken the force by the Byzantine Emperor. In I 130. Zcngi was able to bring the bulk of his army against Edessa and capture it before the Crusaders could respond. the Crusaders were able to prevent the various Moslem Emirs in Syria and Iraq from uniting against the newly established Crusader States. The uniting of two of the most pow. which strengthened his hold of northern Mesopotamia. The loss of Edessa was quite possibly the culminating point for the Crusaders. united Christian army: 11 .had-ad-Din Zengi. Prior to I 130.. Control of the County of Edessa improved communication between Zengi's territories. The loss of Edessa sent a shockwave through Europe which directly led to thc Second Crusade. The Second Crusade failed due to a lack of coordination between the Crusading armics.

12 . The Crusaders never again threatened to capture the city hut. except for Fatamid Egypt and the territory of the Assassins in the Lebanese mountains. its objectives had also changed. Nur-ad-Din now controlled virtually all Moslem territory bordcring the Crusader States. it was reduced to one tenth its original size. In I 156 Nur-ad-Din was finally able to capture Damascus and unite Moslem Syria. attempted to keep the city independent. and prevent resupply of the Crusader army from Byzantine territory. unsure of the intent and reliability of the Crusaders. the army of the Second Crusade moved against Damascus: which. did everything he could to divide the Crusaders. was not openly hostile to the Crusader States. The original objective to recapture Edessa was abandoned. The Crusader assault on the city failed in part due to divisions in the Crusader Army and a relief force sent by Nur-ad-Din.the Second Crusade divided into two separate armies which were defeated piecemeal by the Seljuks . Damascus was the last major city in Syria not under the control of Zengi's successor.. even though under Moslem control. in Anatolia. and. The Byzantine Emperor. Nur-ad-Din was prevented from moving decisively against the Crusader States by a series of violent earthquakes which devastated northern Syria. After a delay to reconstitute. While Nur-ad-Din was attempting to restore his defenses in northern Syria he fell seriously ill. This was the first of two long term serious illnesscs which reduced Nur-ad-Din's ability to lead offensive operations over the next cight years. the Second Crusade actually strengthened his position by forcing Damascus to rely on him for military assistance. through a military alliance. For the next ten years the Crusaders and Nur-ad-Din would fight for control of Damascus. limit direct Byzantine assistance to the Crusaders. Instead of attacking Nur-adDin directly and possibly weakening his hold on northern Syria. When the army of the Second Crusade reached Antioch. By the time the army of the Second Crusade reached Antioch. Nurad-Din (Zengi was assassinated in I 146). instead of fighting to help secure the beleaguered Crusader States in the north. the Army marched to the relative security of Jerusalem.

and Byzantine fortifications. Having obtained control of Syria and Egypt. However. asked King Almaric of Jerusalem for military assistance against Shirkuh. Shavar. After receiving permission from Nur-ad-Din. Nur-ad-Din’s lieutenant was not to enjoy the final victory over the Fatamids: the final victory was left to his successor and nephew Saladin who in I 169 became the new governor of Egypt. fearing that he would lose control of Cairo to Shirkuh. Shirkuh was able to hold his master’s territory against renewed attacks by the Crusaders. As it appeared Nur-ad-Din was turning his full attention against the Crusaders: he died in Damascus in I 174. along with the reduction of isolated Crusader. Nur-ad-Din turned east instead of west. The Crusadcrs fought for twenty-three years. The Damascus-Fatamid relationship had important ramifications when Shavar. there was no smooth succession when I3 . was forced out of Cairo by his rival Dirgam.\\ During the time of his illnessq. Unlike whcn he took power. once again Moslem rivalries came to the Crusader’s aid. While the Crusader States prepared for a Moslem offensive. and other Moslem rulers. making him master o f virtually all Moslcm territory from the Euphrates to the Nilc. Shavar requested assistance from Shirkuh to regain control of Cairo. Shirkuh’s forces defeated Dirgam outside the gates of Cairo. During this period. Nur-ad-Din relied heavily on his primary lieutenant Shirkuh who was his Governor of Damascus. Shavar’s request for military assistance was the start of five years of fighting in Egypt which sapped the strength of the Crusaders while eventually adding Egypt to Nur-ad-Din’s growing empire and completing the encirclement of the Crusader States. Shirkuh had cooperated with the Fatamids in a series of raids against the Crusaders. Warfare against the Crusaders during this period eonsistcd mainly of raids and counter-raids. but finally failed to prevent Moslem reunification. He moved against Mosul and the Moslem rulers of Anatolia. the Assassins. rebellious Shiites. Armenian. the Fatamid military commander. Nur-adDin was able to capture Mosul in I 170. Shirkuh let) for Egypt with his nephew Saladin.

32-33. WI: University o f Wisconsin Press). WI: University of Wisconsin Press. the wealthiest and most populous Moslem state. 1969). “Western Europe on the Eve of the Crusades” in A Historv of the Crusades: Vol. . I The First Hundred Years: ed. ed. Kenneth M. 4 14 . cd. *Claude Cahan. ‘Sir Steven Runciman. Nur-ad-Din died. “The Caliphate and the Arab States“ in A History of the Crusades: Vol. Setton (Madison. Sidney Painter. 51. and ready to cany out his own Crusade. 1935). ’Sir Hamilton A. ed. The Kingdom of the Crusaders (Port Washington. Setton (Madison. Appendix 11. WI: University of Wisconsin Press. with one major exception--Saladin was now master of Egypt. 24-29. Kenneth M. 1 The First llundred b . I The First Hundred Years. Kenneth M. Nur-ad-Din’s empire collapsed once again into rival emirates. “The Pilgrimages to Palestine before 1095” in A Historv ofthc Crusades: Vol. WI: University of Wisconsin Press). Kenneth M. “The Pilgrimages to Palestine before 1095” in A llistorv ofthg Crusades: Vol. Gibb. ’Sir Hamilton A. 1969). 94-95. A History of the Crusades: I The First Crusade (Cambridge. WI: University of Wisconsin Press). Senon (Madison. NY: Kennikat Press. ed. WI: University of Wisconsin Press). 336-341.Kenneth M. I The First Hundred Years. “Zengi and the Fall of‘Edessa” in A Historv of the Crusades: Vol. 1951). ’Sir Steven Runciman. I The First Hundred Years. Setton (Madison. 162-165. ed. “The Turkish Invasion: The Selchukids” in A Historv of the Crusades: Vol. 461. ’lbid. Setton (Madison. ’ ‘Sir Steven Runciman. Gibb. 71-78. UK: Cambridge University Press. R.Kenneth M. 6Dana Munro. R.. 17-1 9. Setton (Madison. I The First Hundred Years.

Saladin acknowledged his allegiance to as-Salih. Saladin. one ofNur-ad-Din’s nephews Saif-ad-Din had taken control of Mosul and most ofNur-ad-Din’s former territory in Mesopotamia. and one of Nur-ad-Din‘s household.CHAPTEK 2 THE DECLINE OF THE CRUSADER STATES. al-Malik as-Salih. 15 . Meanwhile. while the Christians split into two major factions critically weakening the Crusader States. The Christian and Moslem worlds were both divided aner the deaths o f King Amalric ofJerusalem and Nur-ad-Din. the eunuch Gumushtigin seized as-Salih and Aleppo. Also during this period. On 15 May I 174. based in Egypt. Saladin was unable to move into Syria until October. rose to prominence and reunited Zengi’s former empire setting the stage for the decisive hattlc of Hattin. 1174-1 187 The year 1 174 was a watershed year in the history of the Holy Lands. while attempting to position himself as the boy’s guardian. From May to October 1174. Due 10 an attack on Alexandria by Sicily and an attack on Banyas by King Amalric. the Moslems strived for and achieved unity. in nominal control of a united empire. Between 1 174 and I 187. In addition. Christian disunity prevented unified opposition to Saladin and played a major part in the Crusader defeat at the battle ofl-lattin. the factional split ofthe Crusader nobility and rhe struggle over who would succeed Baldwin IV dominated the Crusader States. Nur-ad-Din died. the Crusaders attempted and failed to prevent Moslem reunification. His death len his underage son. the Emir of Damascus had made peace with King Amalric and agreed to pay reparations.

including the principle houses of Toron. the military ordcrs. The combination of the Crusader I6 . In addition to his control of onc of thc thrcc remaining Crusadcr States. Saladin quickly occupied Homs and Hamah and continued on to Alcppo. who hcld Aleppo in as-Salih's name. Therc was no recorded oppositioii to his assumption of duties as bailli. The initial question of who would be bailli for Baldwin IV was scttlcd when Raymond 111. Ibclin. he was able to occupied Damascus almost without opposition on 28 October. attempted to rally opposition against Saladin. He had the support of the Latin nobility. Specifically. King A m a h was succeedcd by his son Baldwin IV. Count of Tripoli. while the Moslem army from Mosul marched to the relicfol'Alcppo. as-Salih. Gumushtigin scnt rcqucsts for support to Saif-ad-Din in Mosul and to Count Raymond. In Octobcr 1 174. besieged Horns. Sidon. who was still a minor and suffered from leprosy. The Crusader army. He was the last king to enjoy unificd support from the three major power blocks in the Crusader States. and Ramlah. Saladin appointcd his hrother Tughtigin as Governor of Damascus and procccded north with his army toward Aleppo and Nurad-Din's heir. Much to the consternation of both the Crusadcrs and Saladin's Moslem rivals. Gumushtigin. Amalric had been a strong and very active King. which he laid under sicgc. His illncss and the fact that he was a minor led to a battle for control ofthe bailliage (regency) and who would succeed him as the next king. as King Amalric d i d on I 1 July I 174 at the age of thirty-eight. he was also the Prince of Galilee.The Crusader States'here not able to take advantage of Moslem disunity. Saladin was tinally able to move his army out of Egypt and into Syria. Raymond 111 was Baldwin 1v's closest male relative and one of the strongest and wealthiest nobles in the Kingdom o f Jerusalem. and the Church. Count Raymond had the support of most of the established nobility. declared himself bailli in late Autumn I 174. under Count Raymond. It was evident from the start that Baldwin IV would not live long past his majority.

With Saladin‘s withdrawal. the army 17 . While the Crusadcr States appcarcd to be building a stable foundation for the futurc. Saladin also received recognition of his conquests by the Caliph in Baghdad. had seized control of all of Moslem Syria. Having secured his foothold in Syria. In September I 176. The union of William Longsword and Sibyl would result in a son. Baldwin V: who would briefly bc King ofJcrusalcm. Saladin’s immediate objective was not to attack the Crusaders. The Crusader State leadership attempted to stabilize the line of succession by arranging thc marriage of Baldwin IV’s sistcr Sybil to William Longsword. Saladin’s final major action of 1 175 was thc signing of a trucc with the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Unfortunately. Gumushtigin signed a truce with Saladin and agreed to support Saladin’s army against the Crusaders. the combined armies of Aleppo and Mosul attempted to pressure Saladin into relinquishing control of Homs and Hamah. a powcrful French noble family. Saladin. the balance of power in the Year East shifted in favor of the Moslems. With the victory at Hamah. with thc cxccption of Aleppo. which provided legitimacy for his actions. Baldwin IV reached thc age of majority and Count Raymond relinquished the bailliagc. At the beginning of the campaign season of I 176. Saladin returned to the offensive and oncd again laid siege to Alcppo. William Longsword dicd lcss than a year later. with timely reinforccment from Egypt. was able to defeat the combined army at Hamah. Saladin.threat to Homs and the size ofthe reliefarmy caused Saladin to lift the siege and return to Damascus. The wcakness of Aleppo and the strengthening of his hold in Syria allowed Saladin to shitt his attention for the next three years against the Crusadcr States. In April 1175. The year I 176 was very significant for the Crusadcr States. in seven months. Saladin was once again in northern Syria facing the combined armies of Aleppo and Mosul. but to gain control of northern Syria. Saladin was victorious and the position o f Aleppo was further wcakcncd. the Crusadcr army left the field and dispersed. son of William of Montfcrrat. Without the military forcc to oppose Saladin.

. sent his army north to attack on one Saladin's lcsscr possessions the town of Harim. Philip of Flanders refused to participate. Whilc preparations were underway. Philip rcfuscd the bailliage and said hc would support whocvcr the King appointcd as hailli. the Byzantincs proposed a further joint Byzantine-Crusader attack on Saladin. was appointed bailli.' The last major opportunity for the Crusaders to decisively attack Saladin came in I 177. Philip of Flanders.000 troops. Philip was offered the bailliage ofthc Kingdom o f Jerusalem and eventual succession to the throne through marriage to Sibyl. The division ofthe Crusader army gave Saladin the opportunity to deploy the bulk of his army against the southern border of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. the By7mtines had provided substantial military support for the Crusader campaigns in Egypt. For years thc Byzantines had actcd as a major source of military and economic support to the Crusader States. During the reign of King Amalric. instcad. and preparations were made for an attack on Egypt. of Byzantine Empcror Manuai I was dkisively defeatcd at Myriokephalon by the Seljuk Turks of the Sultanate of Rum. Saladin waitcd in Egvpt to see where the Crusaders and Philip of Flanders would strike. Reginald of Chatillon. the rcccntly widowed sistcr ofthc King Baldwin IV. stating he would rather attack a target closer to Jerusalem. Philip's lime in the Holy Lands was a frustrating period for the Crusadcrs. which probably included most of his Egyptian Army. What little support remained from the Byzantine Empirc disappeared completely with Empcror Manual 1's death in 1 180. The presence of Philip momentarily checked Saladin's expansion. arrived in the Holy Lands. Philip also rcfuscd to attack Damascus and. Saladin's army was estimatcd to includc 26. accompanied by a large army (estimatcd at bctwcen seven to twelve thousand troops). The Byzantine losses wcrc so great that the Byzantines were removed as a major playcr in thc Holy Lands. The prcsence of a large and powcrful Byzantine army and navy had prcvcnted serious attacks on thc Principality of Antioch. Saladin was so 18 . Lord of Montreal and Kcrak. Even after King Amalric's death.

the Crusaders and Saladin agreed to a truce. King Baldwin IV gathered what military force he could. The effect of the drought was greater on the Moslems. The Crusaders were unable to convince Philip to stay in the Holy Lands. Due to the size ofthe King Baldwin IV’s forces and their own losses. Saladin’s army was routed. Saladin’s army was unable to form a battle line before the Crusader’s attacked. as the Crusaders controlled most of the regions water resources. King Baldwin IV was able to evade Saladin’s advance guard and surprised Saladin’s main body in a ravine near Montgisard. The Crusaders had. therefore.. one of thc main avenues of approach between Damascus and Jerusalem. The siege of Harim failed as Philip of Flanders lost intcrest. The Crusaders violatcd the treaty by building a fortress at Jacob’s Ford. failed to take advantage of one of their last military opportunitics to slow or stop Saladin’s growth prior to the battle of Hattin. and the proposed marriage to Sybil was canccled.’ With the departure of Philip of Flanders. The fortress controlled one of the last undefended access routes into the Kingdom of Jerusalem. The terms of the truce stated that no new Crusader fortifications could be built to the East of the Jordan River. which made campaigning very difticult. the King was unable to follow up on his victory. Saladin offercd to repay the Crusaders .’ The campaign season of 1 I77 ended with Saladin rebuilding his forces in Egypt but with no other appreciable gain for the Crusaders. estimated at between 375-500 knights (including eighty Knights Templar) and approximately thrce thousand infantry. The lack of success and the departure of Philip of Flanders at the end of the year rcncwcd the political conflict over who would succeed Baldwin IV. certain of his victory that he $spersed his force into columns to inflict the maximum amount of damage before the main Crusader Army could respond. . Syria was in the midst of a drought. and Saladin was able to escape with only his household guard. Minor raiding continued despite the truce.. which held until August 1 179.

The L~ainascusforce hecnmc cnga~c'd with and defeated an advancc guard of the Crusader army. Saladin could not use his entire military force against the Crusaders as he 20 . fnrccd hack.~ntlctl. Saladin rcccivcd no support from his inoiniiial v i ~ s s a . the Crusader cavalry lost en~rt~r~u~iicatinr~ with rlicir inliintr!.' With the defeat o f its .' During lhc campaign o f I 170.iId\vin IV refiiscd and both sides prepared fi)r battle. ifthc Crusaders would have i t dism. tlic Crusader army turncd . Saladin \\as able to move his iniiiii bod! against the Crusader \\.igainst Salndin's foragers. thcy had a standing military force equd to Saladin's (approuirnatcly six thousand ca\alry). King B. Aftcr SCVCII days of siege.ilry bctorc the Crusader inthnrr! could arrive.it King Ihldwin IV WBF barell able t n cscapc tn the fortress Ucaufort. causing Man> leaders of the Crusader .loslcin Syria. S a l d i n also sent a dctachrncrit of troops froin I h n a s c t ~ to s shado~rthe Crusader army and provide details o f its mnvcmcnt. arid Saladin ticcdcd to cibtain supplics frcm his fornscrs i n Crusader territory tn keep his army in the tield. \vhilc sending columns of hragcrs into the Kingdom o f Jcrusalcrri arid the Cnunt!.IS ca\. they were required to supply troops nor from Mosul. Thc cnlunins of tbragcrs were routed: honcvcr. in their pursuit. With the Crusader mi) now drivcii from the tield. Since hoth cities w r c potential cncmies. thc fnrtrcss was stormed and seven hundred Crusaders were taken prisoner. the Constable of the Kingdom ol'Jcrusalcrn and an :ill! of Count I<ayiriond o f Tripoli. Saladin bclicwd that bntli Alcppn and Mosul wcrc longtcrm threats tn his control o f bl. o f Tripoli. and . Uct\\cci~ the t w cities. Saladin gathcrcd his forces at 1)arnascus. Saladin tiirricd on the object o f his offci~si\c--thc fnrtrcss at Jacob's Ford. Moslem Syria was srill suffcring frnm drought.AIcppo l with both cities. 'The Crusadcr ca\alry a general rnutc nftlic Crusiider arm!.all costs nssociatcd with the construction ot'rtie fortress. Under rruce a~rccmcnrs whenever Saladin campaigned against the Crusaders. Most notable about tlic victory was the death of Humphrey of Toron.idvancc giiard.irm! were captured. Saladin then raised the castle to the ?round and disbandcd his army.

ildniii IV's medical condition declined and his inothcr. the Constable trf'thc Kingdom o f . Saladin \\.in Jcrusalcm Hurnphrey of . wliilc Salxlin \vas campaigning against Mosul.I'oron was killed.. King I3.3. n rclntivcl! n e n i i r r i b i i l constablc.N to tlie IId! l m i c l s .ctual raids and capture ininor villages. t~scd h e i r influcncc to appoint their supporters to key positioiis iii the govcrttment. while they knock down villagcs \\c arc taking cities. During the period I 17% I I YO. Humphrey was ally ol'Coiint Ila! itlorid and the powerfill noble tirnilics that had existed in the Kingtlotn since its foiindiition." l r o t n tlie end of 1 I 7 0 through the cleveiitli ofJunc I 18. mhich \bill hc rcfcrrcd to as the old nobility. 111 I 179. "let them (raid). Saladin dcvcitcd the illajorit! of his attention to reducing Mow1 and Alcppo. This tiction. supported pc. Saladin disagreed and stated.icc \\it11 Saladin and a defensive strategy. hcir to the lost County o f Edcssa. Count Ilaymontl Ill \bas no longer hiiilli niid had withdrawn to itttcnd to the affairs oi'the Count> o f l r i p o l i . a s the l i e u .id\ isors suggested that he Crusaders raided to the w r y outskirts of Damascus.~ould open liirnsclfup to attack from the ~ H cities. Josccliri 111."' . In I IX?. Agnes. Instead oftaking advantage ofthe absence of most of Saladin's army. Ihc old nohilit! \titlioiit tlic prcscncc of heir Icadcr Count lla>inond were unable to prevent the appointment of Amalric de Lu5ipian. I'liis statement very iiptl! sums up h e change iii the stratesic en\ ironnicnt.is strcngthciiing his cmpirc b ! [tic capture o f major cities i n Mcsopotaniia. the f~icti~~ttalizarion o t t l t c C'rusadcr Starc>' nobility bcg:itl. O Saladin decided that lie had to remove the tlirciit these two cities poscd hcliirz tic could decisively engage the Crusaders. and tiis matcriial uncle.iditi's . the of Sal. and tlic Crusaders were onl> able t o mottilt inetfi. the Crusader States limited their military actions to a series of raids against Damascus :ind Moslem Syria. SOIIIC should retiirn to S! ria to defend against the Crusader raids.

thc quccn mother.Thc appointrricnt of Amalric dc 1. Count Kaymond \wuld stay out o f t h c Kingdom for two years. which will he referred to . The old nobility convinced tlie king that he wulJ not itlictiatc one ol'tlic strongest tioblc> i i t . Count llaymond attempted to return to tlic kingdoni to visit his ticfof(. 1'110 cnttrt party pcrsuadcd tlic King to dcny him entrance.usignan was signiiicnnt hccausc the othcr m i o r Piction. Sibyl. marched into the Kingtloni ofJcrusalcni with a substantial military forcc.I$ the court party. to Guy. Prince o f h t i o c h . The cnurt party's control of the Kingdorn of Jerusalem was further strcngthcncd when thcy w r c ahlo to appoint one ofthcir party a s Patriarch of Jcrusalcm. The quccii mother convinccd King Dnldwin tliiit Count Kayniond plarined to scizc tlic throne. Guy had no significant military cxpcricncc and did not bring any additional military strength to the kingdom. I0 'The court party as now in ascendancc. so Daldwin ordered the immcdiatc triarriagc o f his sister. and if a I'avorahle suitor coulrl not be hunt1 in Western Europe. ngnes." 'lhc opposition ofthc old nohility came to a head in March I IXO tvhen Count Rnynond and his ally Rohcmond. The prnposcd marriage \bas opposcd by the old nobility \vho fclt that Sibyl's marriage should bc uscd to strengthen the kingdom. now controllcd the twn major ofticcs ill the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Joscelin Ill was tlic Kiiigdom's Seneschal (responsible for the Kingdom's finances and administering r o y l territopi. l l i c marriage was iicrfortiicii hcforc Raymond and Bohcmond rcxhcd . In I 18'. lnstcad of usins thcir ncn position to strcngtltcn the kingdom. Guy dc Lusignan was also a nen arrival to the kingdom. thc court piirty continued i t s attempts tn wcakcn the old nobility. the! ttiriicd their t'orccs around and lcft the kingdom. The next move hy the court party \\as to control tlic succession after Baldwin IV's death.Icrusalcrn. The old nobility used tlie incidcnt to counterattack against the coiirt party.iaIilcc. In addition to the Constable's position. then she should marry into one ofthc old cstahlishcd nohlc families. proposed that Sihyl marry Amalric dc Lusignan's hrothcr G u y . Whrtl news of the wedding rcachcd Count Kaymond and Prince Bohcmond.

Kcginald's llcct of raiding ships \bas destroyed hcforc it could scrioiisl! thrcntcn Mecca. the PLitriarch of Jerusalcin. Tlic net rcsiilt o f t l i c raid w a s to strciigtlicn Saladiii's position and reputation as defender oft~ic tiitIi. . Ra! rnond was nllowcd to cntc'r tlie Kiiipdoin: houcvcr. I<uginald iti bclicvcd that the Kg! ptiari fleet was not present: Iiowcvcr.l . Tlic Crusaders never had a n a n l prcsc'ncc mi the Red Sci.:. Saladiii signed ii truce with the Principalit! d. tlie rcrnainin~ t i ) r r r c w x iii iiortlicrti Syria iiot ulrcad! under Saladin's control surrcndcrcd. arid Prince Bdiciiiond of Aiitioch. rhc only major military ! the Crosadcrs occurred in January I 183. attcinptcd to disrupt kloslcni trade in rhc l<td Sea atid to raid rlic Moslciii !iol> city of Mecca. I.tlic Crusndcr States. Alcppo tinall! surrcndcrcd to Saladin.il and Kcrak. Rcpincild dc Chatillon. tlic coiitlict over thc issue clcarl> dcliiicatcd taction rncmbcrship. H e iiscd tlic ships to plunder do\vn thc . I<c:inald ot'Sidon. After first strengthening his position in northern blcsopotaniia.. mid llcginald dc ~ l i a t i l l o ~ i . 10 liclp scciirc tiis ncu pc>sscssicvis. both thc Ilospitallcrs atid the Tcrriplars wcrc able to reiiiaiti above the frictional tighting. On I I Juiic I IX. 'The court part! n w v consisted ot'tlic qiiccn rnothcr.usigian. thc Egyptian tlcct w a s winter qiiarters and wis able to respond quickl!.ord o f operatidti tnkcii h b1ontre.iii rriidc. t3ald\vin of Karnlati.Antiocli s o lie coiild conccntriitc' his l i m e s ngaiiist (lie K i t y d o i n of 2. wliicli ivas the tiiiiior avenue ofLpypti. Saladin isolated Aleppo froin its allies and cq)tiircd Aleppo's outer dctcnscs. Kcgiiiald had ship< brokcn tlo\vn and tr.insportcd x w s s tlic Sc:cv t:ilar. R> tlic cntl of June. h l i a t i cit'lbclin. For tlie motncnt. the Scncsclial Joscclin 111. o of r(~ Moiitrcal and Kc'r:th. The Red Scn \vas considered to he cotriplctcl! \cciirc l i w Vloslcni shipping. especially with Saladin's growing strengh. Saladin r c n c w d his offciisi!c against the \4owl- Alcppo alliance.Amhian pcninwln c n r w t c IO and rcnsscinhlcd i i c i r Mcccn. Tlic old inohility fiction consisted of('ount Rnyinond 111. II During the tlircc-year internal po\vcr struggle ( I I80 to I I X3). the Constable Amalric de I." With the dciccir (if Kcginald's attack.

an outstandiitg logistics base with ample water and access to a number of important fortilications il. The Crusnder m i i y did not inow iiir eight days aiid Saladin rcturncd with his army to Damascus.I Moslctns against those nho attack the faith. Egypt and iiaval squadrons.000 ltrong reserve forces ol.idcr arm! did not 21 . With Saladin's success i n S ~ r i a . While thc Kingdom of Jerusalem sustained damage from the raiding parties. h e Crusader Army gathered at Saffiiriya to await reinforccnicnts and Saladin's attack. The Crusader army was the stroiigcst it had hccii iti thirry-tivc years. away from Sathriya. Turkoniaii auxiliaries. the Crusaders wcrc able to sather an iirm! o f approxirnately thirteen hundred knights arid tiftecti thousand infantry. As he was tiot able to lead the Crusader :\rmy.Jeriisalcni. nhich hc sacked and biirtied to the ground. Wliilc awaiting Saladin's attack. and the o w r 4. the kinsdotn had tiot lost any signiticant tcrritory." Saladin critcrcd the kingdom of Jerusalem near thc town o f Uuisan. King Uald\vin IV's leprosy mas approaching its final $tapes: he could no longer scc arid had lost the iisc o f his hands arid feet. A Jihad is a struggle (war/hattlc). The coiirt party succeeded in having their candidate."" In August hc announccd to the Caliph in Baghdad that the tiinc had comc to rcsume the Jihad. the Crusadcrs needed to retreat. Saladin I~OH' commanded a force that consisted of"8. he nccdcd to appoint a bailli.itie. Saladin sent raiding columns throughout the region in an attempt t o lure the Crusader army. There are conflicting tlicorics why fhc Crus. Saladin wanted to lurc the Crusader urrny away from its base at Saffiiriya. led b) Gu) dc Lusignan. The upcoming batdc \vith Saladin would be an opportunity to solidify Gu!'s position as the next king of Jcrusalcm. yet it tiat 11x1 raised a hand against Saladin. Guy dc Lusignan nanicd bailli. What would appear to bc a strategic victor! for the Crusaders was seen as a dct'eat b ! Crusader nobility.500 cavalry.oot soldiers. nunierous l. Saffiiriya offered the Crusaders a central location. l h i s was the largest field urm) the Crusaders had raised since thc Second Crus.

. Salntliii's iittcritioti rcriiniiied focused on b~vlosul.nio\c. thcrcby ensuring that he \\auld hc tlic next king ofJcrusalcni.ti> dc Liisignaii \bas discrcditcd a s a leader.builli. The old nobility was nblc to hiiw Guy rciiimcd a?.. 1:r:iricc. Kcrak \\. The final act signifiing the cliangc w i s the reinstating o f ( ' o u n t Ra!mond Ill . Saladin's attacks against thc Crusaders nerc dircctcd at the fortress of Kcrak. The third theory is that the old nobility knew that tlic Crusaders wcrc consitlerably outiiurribcrcd b> Saladiri's arm! arid that if the Crusndcrs stayed i n their mong position a t Saffuri>a. The first is tliiit Guy dc I.cnk lcndcr uiiuble to decide liow employ ~ I i c army.IS crowned Baldwin V and would succeed Iiiiii. . the niiiii ~ v l i o liad attempted to raid Mecca.i.I' Thc net result o f t l i c dcfcii>i\e iiction \ v a ~ that (. thc next king of. It :ippcarcd tliiit Saladiii ma! h a w coiiductcd thc campaigns only 1 1 ) fiiltill his obligation as defendcr ofttic faith.hilc' still a ~ninor. 'The second theor! is flint tlic old nobility did not \\ant Guy to \\in : I great vicmry obcr Saladiii. Ihldwin IV's tivc-year-old iicpliciv \\. King Baldwin I V cliangcd his will to rend flint Guy \\as no longer clifiblc to succeed to the throne. He tvas dissuaded in this by his iiiotlicr and tlic patriarch: Ihowcver.lerusalciii \vould he choscin by the combined coiiiicil o f t l i c Kings of I~ngland. I t his ricplicw I3aldain V died v.is hailli in November I 18. From November I I 8 3 t o rhc spring (I!' I IX. King Daldmin IV cvcn attempted to Iiavc Guy's marriage t o his sister aniiullcd. the old nobility convinced King Bald\riii IV that Guy was the wrong person to riiccccd l h l d t r i n as King of Jcrusulcnn. h h i e of Saladin's attacks caiiie close to taking Kcrak. Kcriih M ' ~ S also the horne of Kcgirinld dc C:hatilloii.usiginan was n v.3. Saladin would hn\c to come to SaKuriyii or withdrnu .is oiic of the strongest Crusadcr fortilieations and \cr! diflicult to siege due to restrictive tcrrairi and lack oftoddcr for the besieging arm!. and thc Pope. tlic llol> Roniaii I:mpcror. the court part> had lost control of tlic government to tlic old nobilily.'" '5. In additioii.

Saladiii had broken other truce agrccrncnts: however. h o m i n g the child was sickly. Baldwin V mas only h e >cars' old mid \ x i s iiot hualth> child. he appcarcd to hc in no hurry to attack tlic C'rtisadcr States.id- Din's ti)rinner empire. would last iintil I I XY. Saladin fell fravcly ill in I~cccnibcrI 1x5. Whcn S. Saladin iiccdcd 21 signilicant victor! against thc Crusaders. he began to reorganix his empire and rcpl:iccd or rcassigncd emirs H ho were of qucstionahlc loyalty. iinless violated. .iblc [(I takc the licld that liis empire \\as held tofcthcr onl! b again iii I IMI. No m j o r tortress or strutcgic Iocitlion had bccn taken. Saladin had riot seriously weakeiied the Crumdcr States. his nephew Baldwin V was crowned King of ii Jcriisalem. Saladin's illness proved ! his person. Saladiti w a s read! to turn his attentioii toward thc Criisadcr States. One o f ~ l i c rcasoiis held off liis attack is the continued fr:icturing ofthc Crusader le:idcrship. he had signed . Saladin recci\cd word that the ruler of Mosul \\:is moving against Irhil. In accordance \\it11 tliiit he may hnve his will. (.111 spring I 1x5. With thc elid vt'his struffle \villi Mosul. 17 1'0 ensure thc stability ot'his cinpirc.I four-!car triicc with !lie Crusaders that. Ilo\rc\cr.iccused ot'hilliiig : 0 .:mint I<a>iiioiid remained bailli and Baldtrin V \vas givcn into the care of his great uncle . and tlic Crusader arm! was as strong or stronger than \\licii Saladin started his o\\n Crusade iii I 17-1 to reunite Nur-. Saladin negotiated a pcaccllil settlemen[ nitti the ruler of Mosul.lx While Saladin was campaigning ngainst Mosul in I IX5. Count K. did not \\ant the child to die tinder his care and lx .After inconcIusi\c campaigns iii Northern Mcsopornniia and Armenia. Josccliii 111 was still the Scncschal ot'thc Kingdoni and a ctalwart ofthe court party. 13ald\cin I V liiially succumbed to his illiiess and died. lrhil \ u s allied \\it11 Saliidiii.iladin wiis .losccliti 111. Rclicving that he m a ! be dying arid tearing ii revolt in Syria.iyiiond. Saladin signed a four year triicc with the Crusaders to sectire his southern and western flanks prior to mo\iiig on Mosul. Froin Niir-atl-Din's dcatli in I I74 to I 186. giving Saladin tlic cxcusc lie \\as looking thr to attack Mosul.

refused arid left the kingdom for the principality 01'Antioch. 111 \ iolation dBald\viii IV's will. IU Having cffcctivcly scizcd tlic throne. king. The old nobility were willing to split thc kingdom and storm Jcrusalcm. Baldwin of R.is corrcc!. i i t i old enem! of Count Raymond. Count Ila)itlorid \\as to remain bailli until thc Kings o f England and France. the lloly Roman Emperor. Count Raymond and the old nohility attcinptcd to stop the coroiiiitioii hut coiild not m o v e their militar! forces against Jcrusalciii in time. While Count Kayriiond was out o f Jcrusalem. Joscclin Ill told Count Ra)mond thiit he would takc ttic body ot'Baldwin V back to Jerusalem for hurial. King G u y kncn that Count Raymond _ 77 I . Count Kayiiiond's opinion o f Daldwin V's hedth \\.cniplars Gerard de Ridefort. .is 13aldwin V died ii year later. Thcrc w r c t i w exceptions. oiic o f t h c Kingdom's major vassals. iii tlic wcnt o f U n l d ~ i n V's death. and the pope agreed upon who would be the iicxt king. closed tlie city of Jerusalem. 'Thc new Grand Mastcr ofrhe l.the child in order to take the cro\\n. conspircd with the court party to c r o n n (.uj hing.iml. Forccs lo)al to Josccliii Ill scizcd control o f Acre and Beirut. Tlic Count attcinptcd to cro\vIi Humphrey of'l'aron (son o f tlic former Constable). The ~ t h c exception r was Count Raymond who rctrcatcd to his eiistl~' at Tiberias. tlic Patriarch o f Jerusalem (also a mcnihcr ofttic court pert?) cro\bncd G u y King of Jcrusalcm.ih. thc husband o f Baldwin IV's younger sister Isahcl. Count Raymcind was the ruler ofthc County o f l r i p o l i as \vcII as tlie Prince of Galilee. King G u y was faced n i t t i the scriou5 problem of lion 10 dcal with Count Raymond. stating that with Guy as king thc Kingdoni would not last the bear. The old nobility's plan failcd \\hen tlicir cnndidatc Ilumphrcy flcd to Jerusalem arid swore allcgiancc to Guy. Guy dc Lusignaii and his brother Amalric the constable. In accordance with I3aldwin IV's will. The old inobility were nou faced with a tiat accompli and most dccidcd that rhcy had to tiinkc tlic best ot'a hiid sittiittion and swear allcgiancc to G u y . o11cofthc Kingdom's best military Icadcrs. tlie coun part! attempted a coup d'etat.

\\otild alv. and King (.iu!'s hold on the throne was s o ncah that tic could not Saladin then aniiounccd a jihad and gathered liis army at Damascus.illy t o help l i i t i i dcfciid liirnselt and his castle at Tiberias. so tic coiild concentr. tic searched tor an . I'inally in early I 1x7. force Kcginald to cornpl!. An ally ot'c'ount I<a!inond. Saladin oft'crcd the Crusaders the opportunity t o kccp the truce if Kcginald \\cwld return \vhnf hc had takcn and paid an indemnit!. Ttic Kitigdoiii of Jcru~nlcrn \\. The time had coiiic h r tlic decisive attack against ~ h Crusaders: c thcir Iexlcrsliip \\as di\idcd. ~ i ix s ~ to tnegotiate nith the Coimt. Count Ra! moiid rcqucstcd niilitar\ assistmice from Saladill. fins alienated froin the king.a!s at he his rival. 7x . Whcii nc\\s o f i i possihlc militnr! nio\c against him reached Count Kaymond.IS now curiously \ccnkcncd \kith n di\ idcd Ic:. Ucgotintioiis trr(ikc dowii and Sulndin's t r o o p remained in 'l'iberias u i ~ t i l the heginnirig ot' I 1x7. the spark that Saladin liad been waited for occurred.iytiiontl. Haliar1 of Ihclin. Reginald rcftiscd.irrny against tlhc Criihxicrs. 'I' 'The shock of an alliance het\rccn Count Ka!inoiid and Saladin l i m e d tlic court party to ncsotiatc rather than fight. Saladin ayrccd and sciht a large hod! oftroops t o help defend Tiherins. and the‘ king appeared inrffectuul.orr! ahout a k. Couiir Ilayniond stated That he \voiiId .igrcc to \\\car allcgiaticc to tiing G u y if tic ~ v x given control o f Beirut. Salatlin then fiirtlier isolated the Kinydoin in I 1x6 when he agrccd the I3ymitinc Ihipirc. \+hn \\as currently in 1)amascus.ilr the v a s ~ imjorir! o f Iiih . Saliidin also iio longer had to v. Count R. Counr I<nyinond's choice of mi ally was to h:i\c mrijor repercussions and \voiild intlucncc tlic course of events leading to the b a t t l e of Il i l t t i t i .idcrstiip. Rcgin:ild dc Chatillon attacked a rich MosIcni caravan i n violation o t t h c trucc agrccmcnt. t o :In alli:itice \villi No\\an! pretext ot'hclp froni tlic other niajor ('liristinil potrcr in the rcsion \ w s gone.loslc::1 attnck from M o s u l and Alcppo. Most oftlic coiirr parry ad\ iscd King Guy 10 hesiege Count Raymond Tiberias until lie ngrccd to w e a r allegiance. one ot'thc Kingdom's most po\rcrful iwblcs.

idison. "The Decline and Fall ol'. ed. 596-598 "'lhid. I Tlie First tlund-cd.Setton (Madison.594-595. 596-597. NJ: I'rinceton liiiivcrsit). WI: Universit! of Wisconsin Press. cd.3. 1169-1189" in . 595-597. Setton (M. 596-597. Baldwin. Setton (b1.llj=\of rhc Crusades: Vol. Ravrnond Ill of'Tripolis a d The Fall ofJcr!iAnlL. S. K. IOX). Kenneth M. Sclton (Madison. "Andrew Ehrenkrcut7. "The RiscofSalatliii.177 'Marshall W. 'lbid.. Kenneth M. 1972). I1 Ibid. "I'Iic 1)ccliiie aiid Fn11 oiJcriisiilciii. K. 1 The l>r'iIun_dred Ycars.The Kise o f Salatlin. "Marshall W. lY6Y). 1972). 182.ind Fall of Jcriisalcrn. N Y : University ol"eu l:lQ- York Press.idison.(l 1 1 8 7 ) (Princeton. 1 Tlie F i r : c l . & @ I (Albany. 1 ' bid 'Andrcw Ehrcnkreutz. 19693. 'Marshall W. cd.A llistorv ol' che Crusades: Vol. WI: llnivcrsity of Wisconsiii I'rcss. I 160-1 189" in A s t o r v ofthe Crusades: Vol.ysY. Gibb. 1969j. "The Declinc and Fall ofJerusalem.ia (Albaii! N Y : titii\crsit! ofUcir York Press.lcrusalern. "The Decline . I 174-1189" in A Histo? qf the Criisades: Vol. "Marshall Whithcd Ihldwin. Press. Baldwin.'Marshall W. 179- 180. 'Sir Hamilton A. I The First Hundred Years. WI: University o f Wisconsin Press. 571. 1174-1 1 8 9 ' in .l u ! ! d r q l l ... '. 41-46.. 'Sir Ilamilton A . Kenneth M. WI: University of Wisconsin Press. 'lbid.!niversit> of Wisconsin Press. Kcnnctti h.572-. 1174-1189" in A I l i s t o r v of the (:rusa_d_e_s:Vol. Kenneth M . 1969). 597-598.lundred Years. Kcnneth ivl Sctton iuadison. id. Setton (Madison. '51hid.A Historv ofthe Crusades: Vol. cd. Wl: I. Gibb.. I The F)ist_l. WI: University o f Wisconsin Press. 599-600 . Baldwin.1. Hnldwin. 1174-1189" it1 A. ed. 1969).ln. 1960). I Thc First Hundred Years.

190-192. llccline and Fall of Jerusalem. I 171-1 I Xo" in A History of the Crusade?: Vol."lbid. 604-605. 193-198 l"Marshall W . I Ttie First Ilundred Yeays. 605-606 . 1969). WI: 1. "111~.nivrrsity of Wisconsin Press. Baldwin. '"lhid. Kenneth \I. Serton (Madison. cd. 'Xibid....

Unlike the Bymntincs.:ilctii. The Crusailer Ieadcrsliip decided to build irs niilitar! oryiiization .mpower or recruiting b.Icrii~.iwe (II/ Koi dictared that .ise to ccrmpeie with their Moslem enemies. Tlic military tiorccs tliiit rciiiained. The most iiiiportiiiit iliflbrcncc \viis tlie limiution ol' the rclieioiis-iiiilit~iryordcrs: the Knights oftlie Temple .The Crusadcr army that Ihccd Saluiliii a[ tlic Battle of l-iattin had biisicnlly the same organization and equipment of feudiil armies i n Western Europe. With the cstahlishnient of tlic Kingdom ot. The only iircns where the C:rusiitlcr. less t l i a i i tlircc rhousaiid ca\nlry and infantry.irourid a revised versioii d t h e Western European feudal qstetii. The Criisaders still relied on h e lheuv! cavalr) chnrgc to niii the day. B> I 187. the Crus. . I standing thcy did not ha\e the m. I lie l.il rcsotirccs ro defend {tic fronticrs.il. I\msal h:id 10 iI .iidal orgiiniziiticin. The feudal lev> w i s [he hackbone d t h e Crusader arm>. I he I\VO principle terms upplicd to tlic levy wcrc the Liwc (111 Koi mid tlic crrriwc htrii.tlie Criisader leadership rerilized tliiil .itlers had lint adapted to llie new pti>sical and rnilitar! challeng<s ofthc I-My Lontls.in ro(its \\ere [lie sources of ils manpower and ii stronger fi.s military \va\ d renl from its Western Curope.inti llie Knights o f t l i e I lospil. from the First Criisade had to he reorganircd to provide for the ci~riiiiiondefense. the niilirur! ordci-5 n c r c rcspoiisihlc liv dcfciiding i m s t ofilic important horder fortilications ol'tlie Crusiider Skires :ind li)r prwiding die nIicIciis for army.I'lie military orders pro\ ided the Crusader States witti . I trio standing uriii> and aildition.

This term w a s used ro refer to locally raiscd mercenaries \tho supplcmcntcd the Kirydom's t'eutlal tiirces. poorl) quipped. and fhur to six n a r horses. In the Outrmicr.Atiticich) supporwd sonwvliurc hct\\ccii 6 3 5 to 750 knights. aftcr irhich the liege lord would have to pa! his vassals for each da! ofser\icc.2 . the Kingdom ofJcrus. Additionall!. tlic liege lord \\as only rcquircd to provide liiod and fodder. The ban \\as a call-up o f a11 men of military age uho could carry n weapon.udul systciii \\a5 the licl'.cl)ancse (:hristi. A Turcopolc cciuld be of . In addition to the fcudal scrvicc rcqtiircniciits o f t l i c nohilit). The ban \\.i licfstructurc (nor including the County of Tripoli or the Priiicipalit! of. 'Ilicre lins been . . a s it dcpriicd [tic cities and fortresses $4 any reserve ofmanpouer.ins or Armcninns. At the time ofthc Battlc of Ilattin. tlic Kingdom of. This \vas a unique fc. however. thc kiiydoni rccci\cd military s e n ice o f both mounted and noiiniounkxi scrgcanrs from church property and !lie tnajor towns and cities. Knights were granted enough tcrritory to pay for their own maintenance.I The hasis for the fi. The otlicr major source ot'manpcwcr was the w r i w o h ~ t (Iicrenftcr i rcfcrrcd to as the ban). that o f a squirc.iturc in the (Julremcr due to the imniediac) ofihc threat and Ilic limited iiianpowcr hasc.in> r a w or rcligioii prcscnt in tlic rcsi. Turcopolcs \\ould be S! r i m and I. Tlic 'Tllrcopcrlc could be either inountcd or foot troops and could he armed in ii variety of Iishions.provide his liege m i l i t q service i t i person for ii period o f ~ i p to ii )ear.Icrusalem suFportud approximately tivc thousand sergeants. Most frcquciirl). iind tliosc that w r c mounted nornially rode to hattlc and disniciuntcd.' Turcopolcs \ w e another major sourcc o f military rnaripo\\cr for the Crusader Stares. a year.ilcm'. Typical scr\icc iii Western Europe was no more thati sixty day:.as normally a desperation inciisurc. The more important niilitar! leaders weru grunted larger tiel's eapablc of mainraining anynherc liorn ten ro one hundrcd knights. and not 21sdisciplined as tlic regular feudal Icv?. :At the time o f t h c Hattlc of1 liittin.icin. M o s t ofthc scrqxnts w r c probabl) infantry. the troops raiscd by the b a n w r c of liiiiitcd qualily.

Froin tlic csmhlisliiiicnt oftlic Crusader States. Joliti of.idcr State5 to tiillill tlic rcqiiirciiic~ir of liglitirig for tlic cross. 'l'hc rcriiaining sotircc oftcniporar! iiianpo\\cr was tisiting iiotiilit>.as cstat~lislicil Jcrusalcm v.ird to prcwct himse1f:ind increase liis st:iitis. he tlraftcd into llic (:riicndcr's . pilgrirri. 1'0 cicfcnd tlicsc posscssioiis the Hospital \\as p a n t e d tlic ahility to raise a military arm d b r o f l i c r hniglifs. litit ~I'lic final and most iniport. l h c iiiaiti dcfcnsc o1'tlic li!Jit cavalry \\:is speed. sailors.a great deal ofdcharc ovcr wliiit role [lie l'tircopolc iiormally playcd. light cn\alr! Iiiid liiiiitctl ariiior protection. With the cstablishmcnt o f t h c Kingdom oficrusalciri. T\\o riia.ircIicrs and give tile C:rusndcrs . I to tlic Moslcm IigIir-riiountcd rcccwii:ii<s.il care to Cliristiaii pilgriiiis in flit IId! Lands. a r w i s seeti \\it11 Philip of1:laiidcrs.ior (aiid latcr one miiior) rcligious military ~irgaiii7ations\\crt formed: tlic Knights ofthc I-lospifal of St.ith chapters in most oftlic rriajor ports oftlie Ilol> Laiids.is pro\idcd by rclipiotis pilyrims.ill tlic iiiniipo\vcr lie could :itt.igcnda. Sailors \vcrc also draftcd or \oluntcercd for military service. In tinics ofcrisis. TIic usctiilncss oftlicsc two source:.irehers aiid light c a a l r y . oI'irianpo\rcr is qiicsrionahlc. l h c Knights o f t l i e H q i i t a l cvoI\cd out ot'a rcligioiis order t1i:it 111' prwidcd iii mcdic.? . hut i t is likely they were priiiiarily niouiircd . i i d i i l i t y \ isitcd tlic Crus. h r i t i g thc C:rus. normally consisting oflicavy clotti or qiiiltcti :irtiior. tlic Hospifallcrs.irrny. I he I isitiiig iinblcs hroiiylit \\ell cqiiippcd and trained troops also ofrcn hroiighf tlicir oivn political .i n i l i t a rorgaiiiwf ~ ion. 'T'lic. tlic iitiirihcr of pilgrims \uxiId incrcascd drar-naticall!. as both \\ere ustiall? ill equipped and liad little or iin traiiiiiig. nohk inormally brought .ider period. the Ktiights ol'flic J .Icrusalcni or Hospitcillcrs :iiid the Kniglits offlic Tciiiplc Jcrusalcm or 'l'cmplars. Tlik organization mirrored ii rcccntl! cst:tbli~liudr e l i ~ i o u s . .int soiircc ofiiiilitar> i i i a t i p o ~ c tor r the Crusader Starc5 \\as the military orders. 'I'lic original Ilospiral \\. and ii<ihiIif>~ Hal> 1-ands. Turcopole light cmalry probided a limited rcspunse moiiiitcd .' vititiiig 111c Short term iiiuiipmwr \\.As tlic d c r grcn it acquired territory and castles liotri patrons tliroiigliotit Europc.iiicc tbrcc.

cprosy hut who still wishcd to continue servicc in the Holy Lands. In a battle whcrc tlie Crusaders could cstablish a battle linc. such as a rear guard or screen.azarus. l l i c King o f Jcriisiilcm was at the top of the feudal structure. Tlic Tcniplars were designed from tlie start to be a militar! organization. the knights owing service to I<cginald o f Sidoii mould fight iindcr l i i s cornmand. The larger nohlc contingents lent thcriisclvcs to the formation of major military tinits. The di\ isions consisted of the largcr iiohlc contingents supplemented with additional forces as neccssar). When the kine was unahlc to take tlic ticld. For example. l h c Knights of St. l l i c Crusader inilitar) organiration \\as directly tied to tlic feudal structure.000 infantry. not including mcrcciiarics.. T h e Tcmplarr established chaptcrs rhroughout Europe n i t l i the express piirposc o i providing meii and matcriiil to support the war in the Holy I. The divisions w r t a niiiturc of infantry arid cs\alr:. normally tlic most scnior noble present or the iiohlc whose territory w a s directly thrcntcncd. Troops iii service to vassals of the king scrvcd iiiidcr their individual licgc lord. the combined military orders could muster approximately 800 knights and prohahly close to 3. a11 troops i n direct service to king w r c commnndctl by the kingdom's con~tahle. La7arus consistcd of Knights who had contracted I. the Crusaders normall! formed up into divisions. l h c Criisadcr army. At their height.. the Crusadcrs formed iiiorc cohcsiw military units that liad . and tic was the military comiiiandcr when he took tlie field. he would appoint an overall military commaiidcr. consisted o f a iiumhcr of small tiiilitwy units under the great nohlcs ofthc kingdom. The minor religious-military organizatioii was the Knights of St. nunihcr o f divisions depcndcd on tlic size of the Crusader army and the size oftlie cncriiy. When a noble other tliati the king coniinnndcd the Crusader arm!.rcmplc o f Jerusalem or the Tcniplars. Thc By separnting the army into divisions. thcrcfbrc. I'hc constnhlc \\as rcspoiisiblu for thc day-to-day dcfcnsc o f t h c kingdom.ands. 1.

the Crusaders ncvcr dc\clopcd mi cffccri\e r n iirchcr and tlie Mnslciii's mobile rtylc oii\. Tlic advancc guard and ruar prevented tlic Moslcms from cloiing I initial contact allowiiig the iiiaiii hod> tn t'orni a battle line. The lack o f . hnvu light or mediiim cavalry that could s x \ c as Fcnuts. The guards were designed to absorb t l ~ c advance p a r d \\as also responsible tix rcc(1nriaicsancc. tlic iiiaiii body and 111crear y a r d .. 'I'hc Hy. 111 addition the di\ isions. while the ca\alr! \ ith the Crusader infantr>. Tlic rear guard niis usually I rignilicant portion of the total Criisadcr army iis ctandard Moslem tactics were to fix the Crusiidcr . Each unit included both infantry and cavalry. Rcminaissiiiicc. IIcuvily arnic:rcd knights und inoitntcd sergeants could not coiripctc ivitli the Mnslcrn horse :ircIicrs. and tlic rear guard. .idcqua!c rcconnaissaiicc was often \~cakiicss o f llic Crusader arm! .I 9 - 3 . the main body. . tlic suppl! trains.' ii fatal rhe two rcniuining units. 4 I f the Crusadcrs \verc tiphtiiig J I ~ the riiarcli. 'The infiinrr! shicldcd tlic cavalr) l i o i i i tlic Moslem inountcd arclicrs.is inadc.cxperieiicc fighting together. had to be done iii force.The distance h c t w c n the thrcc elements of a Crusader arm! ('11 the iiiiircli differed according to the terrain and the tlirciit.lrIirc.jority o f t l i c infantry.Ihc m i t i body consisted ofthe rria. l i n k the otticr Christiali pcwcr iii the rcpioii. \\ere rcspoiisiblc h r the hulk o f t h c army. but close enoilgli r o prevent tlie army from being divided.id\niicc guard wliilc dirccting tlicir main attack itgainst the rear guard. Rccnnnaissiincc \\'as one of the grc:itest c thc Crusaders did in01 \\eiikncsses of army of the Crusaders. With llic exception ~ f t l i l'urcopolcs. whcii it was coiiductcd. and tlic senior Icadcrship. they formed three distinct rnilitar! uiiits: the ad\ancc guard or van.aiitinc\ response to the ~ l o ~ l e horse . a cciitralized fnrcc o f knights \ w s usitall> kept in reserve. Tlic rear guard was rcsponsihlc for prc\entiny a surlirisc ~ittcick on tlic m i i n body. l h c advance and rear guard had to he far enoiigli from rhc main body to allow rhc main bod! to ti?rm a hattlc liiic once coiitiicr \\.

dcrclopcd their

owii

Iiglit-to-mcdiiini nrmorcd

cii\

ulry that was hcttcr equipped to light :I rnorc

mobile battle. I lie I3~iatitirics also hired large iiiiiiitrcrs o i l ~ u r k i s l aiid i Asiatic light Iiorsc archers
to mcct the bloslerns h r c c nii force. The Byzantine!,
facing :

also cstablishcd set rules tiir coiiibat when

Moslcrn horse archers. 'l'lic rulcs cotiilicd hy n ~ z a i i t i n c Empcror Leo thc LVisc iii thc early

tenth centtir! iiicludcd: ncvcr gn to hattlc without infantry. iiiaiiitnin a Inrgc screening tkvce. avoid lightins iii broken groiintl. kccp a large ruscrbc. pick Rattle p(isirions wlicrc tlie rear and possibl!

oiic ot'thc flank\ is guarded hy a niituriil obstacle. altiiiys fortify the camp. and iicver p u r s ~ ~ nc
rcrrcating h r c c without i n h i [ r y , " K l i i l c the C'rusnrlcrs follo\\ed sonic o f t l i c I3y7:intines rules. thc Crusaders n c r c iiiirlhlc to

establish ii proper scrccniiig and rcconniiisancc h r c c due to tlic kick o f light ca\alr>. The
Crusaders rvcrc olicii l'imcd to light i n broken terrain \\liere they could tint l'ortii a good dutctisi\c position. Fiiiiilly. witlimit l l i c ahilit! to match the \loslcm Iiorsc archer. the (:rus;idcrs lost tlic initiative to 11ic Moslems. 'Tlic bloslcms n c r c ahlc to chose \\lien a n t i \vIicrc to cngiiyc the Criisadcr arm!.

The C r w i d c r s had to wait for [lie Moslems to mahu :I tnist;ikc or conic cIo\c

enough s o tlic Crusader's Iicav! cavalry could ch;irgc.' The iirnior and weapons ol'thc \arioits clctiiciits of the Crusadcr arm! diff<rctl ~iccording
to what

thc individiial or liir m a w r could iifLird. A t the titlie ot'tlic D:it!le (il'llii[tin. Ihc core of

the army. the mounted knight. was very lien ily arrnorcd. .A typical knight n o r c n chain iniiil
hauberk (shirt) that covered liiiii from his licad to his knee. Chain iiiail is armor coiisistiny ol' llcxihlc inctal links. 'The niaiti hauberk \vas siipplcrricntcd by chaiii iiiail Icgpings. sonic form of armored gloves. a IicinisplicricaI (covering tlic coriipletc Iiead) o r conical IicIiii. and ; I kite shield. A

kite shield was a large. three to hur-foot-long shield. that \\as shaped like tlic letter "1.1." but
normally coming to a point at i t s base. 'Ilie shield was dcsignctf to help dctlccr the bloir ot'a hiice.

ih

r i d y . the knight's horse norriiall! had sonic form o f n r n i o r protection. iisually a light c h i n miiil
c031.*

I he major weapons d a Crusader knight v.cru the lance. mi! ~ ) t ; ' I \ a r i d ) of Iiaiid-held
ireapons. mid ii wir horse. TIic iiiiiiii inissioii of tlic knight \vas to provide the devastating chargc
or shock against the uncni> liiie. The knight v.ould chargc using tiis Iaiicc and v.ould change to liis secondary \\capon only after he had lost his lance o r he was unable to maneuver. Since the knight had to he able to iiiaiicincr to he cffcctivc.
R

major part o f t h e ccimplctc weapon system (tlic knight)

was the war horse. War Iiorscs were spcciall! brud and trained horses. Thc Iiorscs liiid to hc ;ihIc'
to support the wiglit o f t l i e kiiisht and his armor. tlic horse's c w i i ariiivr. respond to Oiittlc signals.

and r e m i i n under c o i i h l iii battlc. I n battlc. ; I knight would t r a w l with two to tour war horscs.
Ttic Crusudcr infantr! forces l'cll into tlircc catcsorics: l'ciidal lev!. \oluiitccrs and troops raised by the han. and Turcopolcs. The largest category ot' int;intry w a s scrgcciiits raised tlirougli

le\y. .The ser;:cant the tetid~~l

iiormiilly lind quiltcd a r i i i c x midc ofIic;i\> cloth or. iii soiiic cases.

wore chain mail. Infantr! w a s clussiticd as hca\y i t if wore metal armor arid liglit or incdiuiii if i t wore cloth or qiiiltcd armor. .Addud t o that armor protcctioii. tlic scrgaint n o r c ;I coiiical or pot hclni and carried
:I

large shield. Primir! weapons w r c the spear and crossbo\v. The spear mas

used 10 defend against a mnuiitcd cliiirgc and tlic crossbou \\'as used to respond to the Moslem
horsc archers. The quality of tlic armor and cquipinciit depended 011thc sergeant's spoilsor. Tlic
best rquippcd scrfcants n c r c iii scr\icc to tlic military orders."

Ttic v o l i ~ r i t c or ~r~ inl:,intr! raised IJ! the bar1 norniall! did not \year :irnior. Lack of armor
was espcciall! true o f religious pilgriiiis a n d sailors. What little armor the! hnd \\as liriiitcd to the

occasional suit of quilted armor. M?st ot'tlic inf;intr> carried tlic traditional spear. bon. or
crossho\\.

I t i e wluiitecr ;ind hail inthntr! \\as ofquestion;ihlc vrlluc and useful iiiainly for

defrndiiig fortitied positions \\hcrc their lack o f a r i i l o r \cab Icss o f a disadvmit;i~c.
-7

,.

The final type of intarttry w i s the Turcopolc. Thc majority o f Turcopoles are believed to
have been light cavalry: however. local Maronirc and Cliristian Arnicniuns wcrc also used as infantr). The Maronites ncrc noted for the use ofa compound how and frequently supported the arniies of both the Kingdom of Jerusalem and the County o f Tripoli. Tlic Armenians supplcrncritcd
tlic forces o f t h c I'rincipality o f Anriocli but were availahlc in small numbcrs throughout the

Crusader States. The Maronitcs and Armeniiins normall) wore quilted armor. light hcad protection. arid carried a shield. The primary weapon ofthc Maronires \\as the compound how.

The Armenians norinall) carried a how and spear."'

The Crusader army. therefore. consisted of a IIII~IL'IIS of hcavily armored knights. light
ca\ air) ('Turcopoles). rricdiiiin-to-hca\! infantry (wrgcaiits). and ligli! i n h i t r y . A iioriiiiil

Crusader ticld army \roiild h a w a ratio of one knight to cislit to ten infantry. Most contemporary authors do not differentiate tlic 'l'urcopcilcs froni the dil'lcrcnt types of inkintry. Houcvcr. ~ n ~ l c s s
the kingdom was

in cxtrcinis. tlic inlhntry would he dinost ;dl lcudal lev) sergeants. It is difficult

to cstiiniitc what percentage o f a i i iirin! uiis Tiircopolcs: ho\\cvcr. it is iinlikcl! that it uould he

more than 10 to I 5 percent.

I'tic most iniportnnt factor in determining ho\v thc Crusadcr ~ n i ivas ) uscd \+as the limited
manpower hasc. L h c to tlic limited rnanpo\vcr the Crusader's strategy w a s prcdominantl) dclcnsiw. Offensive operations wcrc focused
011

sci7ing a singiilar ohjcctivc or dcfcuting one

cncm) arniy. Major campaigns wcrc rare. the cxceptim k i n g Kine ,4lnialric~s campaigns in

Egypt ( I 163-1 171). A s part oftheir defensive stratcg). the Crusaders attcinptcd to kccp tlicir
Moslctii opponents di\ idcd. The Crusaders even allied with various Moslem rulers ;igainst othcr Moslems. Ciootl ex:imples arc :illiaiiccs with Damascus and Alcppo to kccp the two cities
independent. When Nur al-Diii and Saladin united the Moslcna. the Crusaders liniitcd their offensive action to raids dcsigncd to weaken the Moslems tbliilc not heconiing dccisively engaged.

iX

il. such 21s Kcrnk. and thc loss o f n castle could seriously \vcakcii the kiitgdoni. lie captiired :ill s e w n hundred dcticndcrs.IfJacob's Ford \\as a crushitig blon to tlic Crusaders. I purely dcfuiisivc strategy relyin: hecivily on fortitications and niaintaining a n arm> i n being. The cost (ithiiildiiig thc castle at Jacoh's f o r d required iiionctary assistance l i c m Western t i r o p e . were the tirst linc ofthc kingdom's dcfciisc. To kccp the knights froin being engaged. 'l'lic key liw tlie Crusaders w i t s hccping tlicir knights from being eiigngcd until they could be used dccisi\ely.~din succcssfitll! stormed the ciisrlc nt Jacob's Ford. M a j o r tbrtiticntions were vcry expensive. tlic Crusutlcrs reverted to . rind Bcufort. A good c m i i p l c is tliu castle nr Jacob's Ford. Moiitrcal. Crusader ii fortificatioiis proved to he a ti. I Iloslein n~ c r c protccrcd froin horses. the Crusndcrs rclicd on tlicir clitc heavy c. tlicy \ w e usuall! shielded troni contact 1 3 : intiintr! or mounted Turcopolcs. Thc infantry and IIic ~ I ' u r c o p o l c charge by tlic prcsciicc 01' . \Vhcn S.W i t l i the rise of Saladin.rcc iiiultiplicr and provided opcrationc. i 0 . iucccssful Voslciii attachs 011 mii.itions w r c vcry rare. T h e dcstructiori . The Moslem armies had nothing that inan for iniiii could \tatid against tlic Crusader hniglits. Tlic army's mission \\as to dctciid rhc major capturing agricultural regions and border cities and to prevent tlic invading arm! trom successliill~ a Crusader fortification. I' safe base for Crusader militnr! Tactically. Kcplacing destroyed timitications was cxtrcmcly difticult. M a j o r fbrtifications.ior tiwtitic.i\:ilry and i t s dcvastiitiiig charyc. I-. l'hc infantry and Turcopolcs \vould iisc how or crosshou to kccp the Moslem horse archers at ii distance and prcvcnt serious hiirtii ngninrr rhc kiiyhts and tlicir . The capture o t a major h r t i f i c i i t i o i i also incant the loss ofoll ofthc military cquipmcnt and stores as well ns the capture o f t h c entire garrison. These fortification inadc tlic best itsc of I(!cal terrain and w r c among the most advanccd fortitications o f t h c i r time. 'The Crusaders could not affi)rd : I battle ofartritioti u i t h their enemies." The border fortitications were thc ticnrt of (tic Crusadcr's dctcttsivc str:itcgy.ortiinatcly for the Crusaders.

surprisc.tlic knights.'" Saladin's invasion o f the Kingdoni ol'Jcrtisalcin in I 183 is a good cxatnplc oithc Crusader's dcfcnsivc strategy and tlic s)rnbiotic rclationship o f infantry and knipllts.iladin entered the kingdoin. Tlic Crusader army \\. Good examples arc the battles o f Montgisard and hzaz.il. the Moslems closcd with the Crusader arniy.is also positioned to rclic\c the border Ibrtrcsscs if the) \\ere phccd utidcr siege by Saladin. was able to rout Saladin't army. or o\crconfidcnce on the part ot'thc Moslcms. Saladin's advancc guard conducted hit-and-run attacks agaitist the Crusader camp for s e w n days bchrc Saladin'r army withdrew S. The prescncc ofthe army cnsurcd that Saladin would not be ablc to fakc an) significant tcrritory." When cngagcd. In tlic battle ofAi. The positioii of the Crusader army prewitcd Saladin's army from penetrating info the richest.idcr tactics. When the Crusaders w r c successfiil. At Montgisard.az. well-pr(ivisioncd basc. it was usually due to rcstrictivc tcrrain. Kinf Bald\\in. \\as attacked by fitteen to twenty thousand Moslem cavalr). Saladin attcinptcd to dran tllc Crusader army auay from Saffuri! a by scndiny raiding parties through thc rcgion and by harassing thc Crilsadcr camp. the Crusader army had h n c d at Salfiiri!a. most dcnsely populated arcas ofthc kingdom.idin's horse archers were titiable to c. 40 . Relicviny that they could ovcrwhclm the Crusaders. the Crusader army. l h e symbiotic rclationship bcbrccn the infantry and 'l'urcopolcs and the knights \vas the cornersmic ofCi-us. ' l ' l ~ c Crusader knights w r c then able to charge and routed the MosIems. which corisistcd ofclcvcri hundred cavalry and only two tilousand intantry. tlic kc! to a Crusader victory was forcing the enemy into conccntrating its troops so the Crusader knights could chargc. with approximately 375 knights and two to three thousand inimtry. the knights ~ o u l cliarge d to drive thcni off. which gave tlic Crusaders a very central. I t t h c Moslems attempted to close nit11 the intintry. King Raldwin IV was ablc to surprise Saladin's I:gyptian army in a ravine.iusc any signilicant daniagc.IS the) \\ere . Whetl S.

v.irchcrs did not close with tlie iiifantry.vincd ii \\it11 battle position and let the Moslcms attack.it tlie 13attle of I Iatrin. f x t o r s o f t h c I3attlc of Hattiii.Q pt. which ciiahled flic Uy7anrines to take tlic oflicnsiw iii the early eleventh century i n Anatolia. and tactics all niirrored t x t i c ) utcd iii Wcstcrn Europe.liilc tlie knight\ ensured that the Moslem horse .. how armed ca\. military organization. and tlic kloslcms \\ere \\cI1 aware ill' the importaiicc o f tlic infantry-kniyht relationship. While Wcstcrn European tactics were ruitahlc against Fatamid T. I n battle. tlic army o f t h c Crusader States remained basicall! iincliaiigcd. the) w r c iiot cft'ccrivc against 'l~urkish mounted horse archers. . l ' l i c hrcukdo\vn ofthe s) mhiosis ol'tlic Crusadcr infaiirr) and cmalry \\as o w o f t h c decidiii. The Crusader infaiitr! was able to kccp the Moslciiis awa! from the knights with their h o w and crossho\\c. 'flic iriajor wakncss ofttic Crusader ariii! \rat that it did not . 'Hie Crusadcr ..'rusadcr< were ahle to retain the s>mhiosis. .The Crusaders ncvcr developed a n ctfcctive means for de:ilitig Turkish tactics.unable to get closc cnougii to tlic Crusader camp to tire their arroi\s \\it11 any real penetrating power. I n the roughly ninct! !car\ Ihc~\\cc~i dic First Crusade atid flic I3nrtlc of1 lattiii. ol ~ i i i t i i i i i \ c \\as one more cause for the Crusudcr dcfcat . the kni. waitins for an opportunity to c h a r y . 1-hcrcfcirc.hts early and w r c cut ofl'lioiii the iiifaiitr!.idapt to its nen en\ ironinciit. the Crusadcrs gave awl! the initiati\e and let their Moslem opponents chose when and \vhcrc to tight. In the I'rusadcr defeats. . . the rvloslcms were iiot ahlc to inllict an! siyificant damage. While tlic (.ilry. Most o f t h c Crusader defeats in the eight! years hcforc the Battle o f I lattiii can all he attrihutcd to a breakdown in tlie inl:antr)-knight symbiotic rclationsliip. The Criisaders ncvcr developed their o\vii medium. the C'rusndcrs f.irni>'s cquipiiicnt. 'l'lic 103s . w r c usually pro\oked into cliargiiig Uotli the Cruder.

. 71-73. ' K . 1956): I 1 1 .139. Crusadincr Warfare 1097-1 I93 (Cambridge.. "lbid. 21an Heath: Armies and Encmies ofthe Crusades. l ~ 9 6 .1 12. UK: Cambridge University Press: 1956). 'lbid. Crusading Warfare 1097-1 193 (Cambridge. "R. 1978): 1 12. "'1 bid.1 (Worthing.. 'hid. "Ian Heath. 1096-1291 (Worthing. UK: Flcxiprint I.. 5 1-54. 1978). 1898). 206- 207.1 12. UK: Methuen and CO. 'lbid.: 156-165 bCharles Oman.I 15. 1 1 1 .. C. 1978). Smail. C. 138. A m i e s and Enemies ofthe Crusades. ?bid. I j 0 ) y h . 260-270 'Ian Heath. C. Armies and Enemies o f t h ~ ~ s a l e ~ . 'R. IJK: Cambridge University Press. Crusadinn Warfare 1097-1 193 (Cambridge.. 204-209 ''Ibid. 173-179.&srorv ofthe Art of War (London... Siiuil. 198-203.l ~ (Worthing. 67-69. Smail. 291 UK: Flcxiprint Ltd.. IJK: Cambridy University Press. A.. . IIK: Flexiprint Lrd.td. 1956).

I'lic Seljirk empire ~ setnili.Aleppo had full adrninistrali\e coiilrol of the cit! and w a s only required 10 provide . r w x \\as the size oI'rlie ariny arid its t i n i l i d By I187 S a l x i i n had reuililai : I cootl part o f t l i u Scljith enlpirc.is rwt specilicd blil \ \ a s iisuall! limited 10 a single campaign season and ended prior to the lirll liar\cst.M:loslcrn iiiilitar! force that ticed the ('rusadcrs at llle H. t 3 ) tiniling Moslciri territory froiri Cairo to Moscil. Snladin was ahlc to u t i l i x tlic vast rnanpowcr resources o f t h e region with the sole piirpose o f destroying [tic Crusader arm!. . Moslem troops.I specilied numhcr of troop. 'I lie Sultan graritcd land or revenue in the Ibrm o f iq/n (tict) lo an individual in rettirri Ibr military scr\ ice. aiilir of intents and piirposes. when reqcicstcd t)) !lie Stillan. the Moslem feiid:iI system \\as siiniliir lo the (:rusadcr S1. Thc d I d c r s l i i p tinder Saladiti.trcs. iind Snladin did iio1 hii\c to divert Iroops to defend :iyainst \~l. {heir eqiiipmeiit.m lhal granted tiiider the C'rusadcr l i d system.iidal stiile h h i c h rulicd on il iniitiibcr it 1 n5 111 slrony Sultail (riilcr or monarch) to keep llle empire tcrgcllier. f o r example.tindatioil ol'thl: Crusader States.rt~Ieof1i:ittiii \\as one of the largest tnilitary Ibrccs arrayed a p i r i s t the Crusaders sirice the li. Adminis~rative control granted tinder the iy/tr systetn was iilw greater th. II't11c Sultan . the Moslcrll imlir of. and tilcticz were ciiiiilar to the ilrillies that had I'ought the ~rusntlcr States liw the liisl IiIQ years. o f ways.loslcmrivals. T h e Voslcrns \\ere no longer tlividetl. the Linlikc the Crusader S~iitcs. f o r a11 n ~ i k thc . iitiioiiti1 ol'tiiilc required for service \\. he was virtiiall! on iridcpctldcnt riilcr.

Bedouins fougtit Ihr both the 41 .cllih century. wore little or 110 armor and werc equipped with spear and sword. Arab troops were equipped as mctliiim t o heavy cavalry. For the rouyhly niiict) !cart from thc dcatli of Malik Shall to tlic rise ofSaladiii. Arab c.iniluks. The ima. 13edouins. the inamlukh would form tlie personal guard ofari ainir arid would hc used to dcli\cr the decisive or tiiial attack. Mamluhs had no tribal or rcgiorial loyalt! mid w r e thcrcforc considcrcd to he more rcli. and tlicir primary weapons \\crc hov. and 'Tiirkomans. tlie rnanilukr w r c thc elite cavalr! o f t l i e :\riih world. 1 A n . They \\ere ahlc to survive ot'f'thc I:ind cvcii in harsh terrain. blamluks were slave troops. The Redouinj were used primarily as scouts and foragers. .At the time o f t h c I3attlc ofl-lattin. tlie great Scljuk mnirs operated as indcpcndcnt states. 'The lack of a strons eeiitral leadership uiitil tlic rise of Saladiii was thc major re:isoii tlie Crutadcrs w r c able to >ucccssliilly establish arid maintain the Crusader States.iuxiliary hut usefill wiircc ofcavalr) n c r c the Bedouins. Arah cavalry w a s considered Icss reliable clue to clan and regional loyalties.Aleppo could ignore requests for troops.in armies w r c the rnamluks. '1') pically.illy traincd to tislit as the personal guard o f a n amir or sultan. '1 Iic second source ofca\alr).ivalr) \vould be used to c h a r y an cnciny position and tight hand-to-liand. and inacc. . Arab t with lancc and sword nnd n c r c not considered good liorsc archers \\~licn cavalr) f o u ~ l i primarily compared to tlic Turkom.ior drawhack of tlie i3edouins werc their unrcliabilit).imluks norrnnlly worc metal iiriiior s~inic\\liat similar to tlic Crusader knishts. The elite o f t h c ivloslc. M.ihlc. Bcdouiii cwalr!. non-nomadic Arahs. lance..The! pro\ idcd thc hulk of Moslcni iiicdiuni-to-tica\y cmxlry. spcci. non-nomadic Arabs. Prior to the hattle of1 Iartin. I T\vcllili-ccntur! Moslem armies were predominantly cavalry. Similar to the maniluks. Arah caviilr! were better trained arid equipped t o tislit the Crusader army in hand-to-hand combat tliaii tlic Bedouins and Turkoinans. was in dcclinc h> tlic later half o f t l i c tv. As mcdiurn to hcav! cnvLilry.inr. TIicrc ncrc four primary soiirces of Mohlem cab iilry: m. not of Arabic origin.

/At the time ot'tlic Bnttlc (d'I Inttin. . Turkoman iiriiior had to be liglit and tlcxiblc and cniild not constrict the :irms. there i$ iin rckrence of't3udouiii Iroops j c r \ i n g in Saladiii's arrn! at tlic Battie o f i i ~ t i n . Siilxtiii's Egyptian arm! did tiarc a siiiiill pcriiiaiicnt I'orcc of Dcdollin ca\alry: ho\vc\cr. ~ flit. the 'Turkoiiiaiis \vniild iisuiilly force the C'riiradcrr While the bulk oftlic army \vat cmalry. it \var raised locall) tix a specilic battle or siege then disbanded. It' infantry was required. i t usuall\ had a spcciali/cd liinction. linal arid one ol'tlic iiinst iniportant soiirccs of cavalry were the Turkonian tribes. The Turkoiiians ivcrc usiially liglitly armored horsc archers. I\. who were able to tire arrnns cffcctivcly from horseback while the horse w a s in motinti. the I'urkomans carricd a small round shield and a swnrd or iiiacc. Due to the rcqiiircnicnts nf tiring on tlic move.loslctii intiinrry w r c lightly nrrnorcd and were equipped wit11 how and spear. the Turkoiiians were at a distiiict disadvantaFc iii Iiuiid-lo-liand coiiibar with Crusadcr knights.a ticlrl army. As Moslem tactics relied on mobility. Turkornan tribesmen formed ii major portion o f most nf the Moslem arniics.Crusatlcrs and Saladin. I f r h c C'rusadcrs ivcrc nble to cng~gc the iurkoiiiuns. i n h i t r y were eitlicr not iiicludcd or thrmcd n very small portion nt. battles hctrvccn I'urkoiiiuii tronp\ a i d tlic Crusaders \+ere decided by the uhilit! oftlic Crusatlcrs to crigngc thc Turkonialic.' \van the battle: il_ not. Most infuntr: supported siege operations as citticr :irtillcrymcii or soppcrs. Most Turkonians worc quilted armor or the lightest and most Ilexihle iilctiil armor availahlc. Infiinlry \vas used priiiiaril) tn coiiduct sieges and defend tbrtiticd positions. bloslciii armies hiid iio equivalent to Crusader Iica\y infantry. there rvcrc prot2ssion:il infhntry units iii klo~lciii iirmics.TIicrcli)rc. Lhic 10 their lighr armor and smiill shields. I f a professional infantry unit took the field. When fighting Iiaiid-to-hand. . they normally to witlidraw. Ucdouiris operated in tribal iiiiits and \ri)uld riormall! serve only on ii c:iiiipaign-hy-cnmpaign h:isis.

OOO Harran: 1. Memluk troops were called toassin. A /rdh consisted otoiily one type oftroop (c. 'l'lie following is an estimate ol'tlic siic d t h e dart ( i f ~ l i niii. Tlic iiunihcr of troops in tlic tiilbs arid rcginicnts diffcrcd x c o r d i n g to troop type and where tlic unit \\as raised.iniluk c..ior c :Voslcni ci t ics: Aleppo: 2.imin. coiild comm:ind :i'i ni:iny as four tliotisntid nicti. :lsktrrs w r c broken down into one Iiutidrcd innii r u l h .000 Damascus: 2.o hutidrcd nicii.Tlic basic building hlock o f Moslctn arniics \\:is the rrrlh. Sal:idiii could dra\v oti tlic military nianpowcr ol'. tn. I'rccisc liyurcs arc not available tor the s i x of the mkor.000 t-larnah: 1. with upproximatel! ow tli~~usntid nicn per regiment. a s i n c h idual Rcdouin tribes usu:llly could tio~ cotitrihutc tnorc tlicn a single rrrlh Tlic tiiosr orgatiizcd troops belonged to tlic household cavalr! of h e largest iiniirs Houscliold c x a l r ! w r c called trskart.\ (hlnck slaves).000 ivll>sul: 4.000 -16 . 'I lie tiilh'i wcrc nssigiicd to rcyiment. Xon-tvl.000 E g pt: 10. I k d o i i i n arid I :irkoninn tiilbs vnricd in siic depending on the s i c ol'tribal groups.iniluk'i ntxild onl? he l'cwtid i t i n inniiiluk tiilh). each lend ti! designate ii :in miiir. B ! the firlie o f t h c I k i t t l c of1 Inttin.iII tlic major aniirs l'roni Eg! pr IO iiortlierti Mcsopor. 'I'Iic lcrni iiniir ih WI\ used t o cointiinrider o f n niilitary titiit.\ o f t h e major mtirs.3..000 Murdin: 1.i\slry wcrc callcd ytirtry/rrrltmr. n niilitar! unit that could ranye l'roni se\cnt! to tv.il \vho cotnrn:iiidcd as few as ten troops.000 Diyar Bckr: I. Ucdouins served a s :I rrihal p u p . The tcrni :iniir contiisinp a s it could rcfcr to iiri individu. Askt7rs w r c diftcrcntiateii hy m o p type. l l i c most iiiiportxi! aniirs. the proviticial co\criiors o t t l i c niiijor cities.

ivalry. The Syrian contingutits of 1 lam ah^ Iloins. the Mesopotamian trskars of Llosul.ir\ \\ere iiridcr tIic cornniund d'S.jor cor~~poncnts o f Saladiii's field urni>.irics serviny in the same rcgion p r i h i h l y came tiom the s ~ n tribal c groitp t n a k i n ~ intcyra[ion ()f. At thc Hattlc o f Ilattin. Turkomans \witld also forin tlic wirirs ofthc arm) and be used to \beaken and divide the opposing army. Appointing a loyal amir lion1 the rcgion to corninand that region's liirces prcveiitcd dissension. Ttic niarnluks and noiinoiiiadic Arab cavalry were held i n rc'scrvc to deliver tlic titial or dccisitc blow. it \vas important t o inaintiiiii good relations with tlic regional :imirs.y \ w e more iamiliar \bitti eiicli other and hiid likely touyht toycthcr iii the past. A l s o .iIa(fiii. .idvancc guard and scoiits. tlioitsand professional cavalr! arid Moslcni records froin ttic Battle of Hattiri stati that only t ~ c l v e werc present.ih. s lent itsell'natur:illy t o the fbrniation ofthc ma. Alcppo. Thc I3cdouins or Turkomans would be uscd as the . Diyar Hckr. 'HIClarger tisktir. Mardin. and the smaller rcgioiial crskcm foriiicd the right w i r y 0fSaladin's ~ r m ) undcr the corninand ofTaqi-al-F)in of 1 lam. easier.alr! and do not include 'l'iirkoinan and I3edouiti ~~icrcciiarics or itifatitr! .irmy.s could easily form h e vangiiard or \rin:s of :in . the tiskt.i.l'tic figures rcprcsciit only household ca\.ind profissional cavalry. When arrayed tbr battle.Tiirkoman aiixili.r.!' I'hc siic of the provincial t i h r . T h e rcinaining aiid largcct portion of the army the Egyptian :ind Dniiiasccnc . Militarily. ~1ux111arics : . Politicall). Saladin tticrctixc could call on approxirnarcly twenty thous. A Moslem ticld arm) consisted o f all tiwr typcs of Moslem c.7 Grouping tlic trsktrrs regionall) \ \ a s both itiilitarily and politic:ill! imporranr.\kt. It is unlikcly that lie would strip a rcxion o f all its standing military force. and stniillrr regional tiskrrr. wcrc normally grouped together on a rcgioiinl basis. the trsktrrc.c t i ~ m e d the left wing o f Snlndiii's urmy undcr the command of Gokhorki o f Irbil.

troops liad to be drawn froin both t i ! pt and V1csopotmiii:i. Scl. I his is especially true of foddcr and \rater for the Iiorseh. Unlike tlic Crusader ticfsystcni. the Moslcms \r. mid m i s t Moslcni troops \ranted to be liomc in time for tlic liar\cst.idcrs were able to use the limited timc thc 'vloslctm c a l l d kccp iiii m i i y iii tlic ticld to tlicir xhaiitage. . 'I'Iic distance tlic armies had t o travel and the general arid conditions incant flint the bloslcm armies hiid to Iiave :I sizable suppl) triiiii. tic could not count on tlic Id!alty of the rcgion tic coiitrolled t<i raise aiiotlier arm!.\iiotlicr wxkiicss of tlic hloslem . It'tlic Crusaders could prcvcnt the Moslciiis froiii being :ible to resuppl! locally. .Oiic of tlic tiiaior \rcaknesscs of tlic M o ~ l c i i mil! i was i t s logistics. One ofthc !icy tactics of tlic ('rusadcrs was to position tlicir licld arm! to l i \ c olTtlic t o tlcn) tlic Lloslenis tlic abilit! land.ould he forced to \vithdrli\r.To form a ticld arm! I x y c enough to oppose tlic Crusudcrs. and tlic! maintained control ofth:ir rcgioii I ) ! t i i r x of arms. Control o f a rceion \\as not ucually Iicrcditar). 1-heCrus. and thercforc tlic strength d a n aiiiir \ \ a s tiis arm! not ttic territory tic controlled. llnahlc to iiiakc $igniticmit Iicatlway and keep his :inn) supplied. as tlic C'rusadci-s could retake territory once the bldslc~n arm) liad bccii dishandcd. iy. aniirs were given control (ifii rcgion.c: required service for onl! a single campaign sc:isoii.idiii \YJS t i r c e d to dislxind his mil!. 111 Miislciii s t r a t e 2 focused on tlic dcticnt ot'tlic encniy's licltl ariiiy. II'liis .atcd. I single ciiiiipaiyi scasoii. A g o d exaniplc i s Saladill's c a i i i p a i y :ig:iinst the Crusadcrs iii 1183. 'I'Iic inability to keep troops i n tlic field for aii cktciidcd period o f t i i i i c prc\cntcd the Moslems from consoliduting p i n s against tlic Crumicrs. Lloslctn :Iiiiirs were often rotatcd t o d regions to prevent them froiii Ibrriiing strong r c g i c m l lo! iiltics. battles against other 111 the Moslems. -In . thc dcfcat ot'tlic opposine ticld arm! liirccd the opponent hi comc to terms.irtiiics was their limited ability to remain i n the ticld for niorc tlicii .. Sal.juk ciiipirc. m i ! \ \ a s dcli. The ('rusadcrs n c r c ublc to rcinaiii iit Saffuriya mid hiiiically w i i t liir tlic Moslem army to dihind.

Normally the majority ofthc horse archers and light cavalr! was in tlic army's icings. Moslcin armies \ r o i i l d use their ininhilit> to siirround an enemy. 13oh o f these tactics \+ere ~ircd agaiiist tlic Crusaders with sni:iIl niodifications. Evcn with the complete dcstruction nf the Crusader army. Duc t o the Moslcms inability to kccp an arm) in the field for more thaii a singlc campaigii scason. Since ncitlicr side hept an army in tlie tield year round. A t y i c a l carnpuign \ v d d tbcus on sci7ing a singlc major fortitication. Ibrtilications allmved small gxrisons to effectively conrrol a rccion.Wlicn lighting the Crusaders. The main strength o f Voslcm arinics was often in its let? and riglit wings. m i y in tlic ticld loiig enough to takc the Crusader cities of'fyrc.l'ripnli. Thcsc lightcr iirid iiiorc mobile troops \rc?iildconduct probing :~tt:~cks against tlie cncrny \\hilt Littempting ro extend the uicmy's lines. campaigns had limited objectives. Sal. I n cilvclopnicnt. The inahilir to hccp h i s xni! h3se (or the Third Crusade. Even Snl.I( field allowed tlic Crusatlcrs to rccwcr and provide it TIic tactics used by Moslem armies wcrc dcsignetl around the nrmy's m i i n strength. While Saladin's main goal \\as to decisively dcfcat the Crusadcr army. und Aiitioch.. Yloslcrri stratcg tbcused not only on destroying the Crusader field arm! but also on tlie capture of inipartant fortifications. mohility. 1'in w a s uriablc to keep his . Tlic Moslem army's center \ \ a s designed t o appcar to bc weakcr than tlie wings iii ail attempt t o dr. Tlic tiictic of division relied on rnohility to allon [lie Moslems 10 I'orce their cncniy t o extend his lines.i\v the cncrn! tortvnrd s o the \\ins. could 19 .ictics iccrc cnvclopnicnt and divkion. The two ma-ior t. The Moslcnic would then a t t x k ii weak section nfthc line iiitd divide their cncniy. destroying hiin piecemeal. i t is unlikely that he planned for the results of the I h t t l c ot' I-lattin. cutting the enemy o f f frorn ~ p p l and y t'orcing the artily to defend i t s c l f l i o i n 311 sides. . Envelopment was a traditioiial Moslem tactic.# i t i tlic .idin's campaign in I 1x7 was probably limited in scope. I3oth the Crusaders and Moslems relied on forti1icarions to allow thcni to control territory.

itcd torcc. T lie bloslciiis v. The Moslcnis \vould draw tlic C r u d e r cavalry far cnough away tiorn their i n h i t r y so the t\\o forces could riot reunite easily and thcri turn . in . :\iiothcr tactic used l ~ y Due to their inherent mol~ilit>.: Ancithcr tactic tlic bloslciiis used vcr! succcssfi~lly against tlic Crusadcrc retront.cn\clop the cncm!'s positioii. like the! did :it tlic I3attlc o t Ilattin." Wlicii fighting tlic Criisadcr iirniics.xi the symbiotic rc1~itioiisJiiphetireen the Wlicri the Moslcrns could not scpnriitc the Criisadcr cavalry and infantry. When the Moslems succeeded i r i scpariitiiig the Crusader cavalry and i h i t r y .ind artack tlic' \cpar. T h i s is espccinll! true ot'tlic ciiciny's rcar y a r d . . Turkornaii tiorsc archcrr would be used to harass a n cncin! army on the riiarch and prevent the cncriiy from f h i i r i g battle positions.oiild attempt to cut o f f c i t l i c r tlic advance or rear gu:ird o f t h c cncniy's a m ! lion1 i t s innin bod! and then attack the enemy l~ picccincal. ' I l i c Moslem army would tlicii coiiccntr:itc its tixccs on tlic wanis bcrirccn the ina. Lhic to their grcalcr mobility. Tlic purpose ot'tlic ntrnck w s 10 spread out the ciiciii! coluriiri by allon iiig the cncniy \\ah ad\niicc guard t o iiiovc ahead fairly ticel> \\hilt the rcar etiard lixccd to stop and form battle pmitions. 'l'hc goal o f the k i g n c d rctrcat \bas \bas the feigned t o lure tlic Crusudcr cavalr> into cliarginy and pursuing the retreating force.IS the ccntcr the V o s l c i i i s w s to divide the c n c i i i y ' ~ arm!. Crusader infailtry and cav.jor cnciii! torriiations mid split the uneniy's arm) . 'I'Iic apparent ncakness o f t h c center \\as dcccpti\c \va% norinall! held by inamluk heavy cnvalr!. T'lic Moslcms n o r ~ n a l only provided token resistance to the cncni!.ilr!. I l i c Moslcms iindersto. the Crusaders cithcr woii tlic hattlc or n c r c able to \ v i t I i h w from ttic ticld iii good order. the Moslems ustiall! inllictcd great Io\\cs on tlic Crusarlcrs.'s adbancc guard \vlii!c Focusing their attacks on the rear cuard. 1. the M o h i i s could and did driiw out feigned retreats tor days. the Ibcus ol'Lloslcni tactics \\as to separate tlic Crusader cavalr! and int'h!ry.

. and kno\vletlgc of his cncin! . 1978)." The M d c m nrm! tliiit faced the Crusaders at tlic I3.td. -Ian Heath. strong Icadcrsliip. 01-93. 1956). A rnouritcd Crusader I licthilit> wlicti tlic kniyht \\as very difficult to dcfcar due to his tien\!. armor. in battlc. 'I'lic Crusaders a l s o lind difliciill! rcplacinp warhorses.&~:~~!. 90-91 .ind the divided leadcrsliip o f his opponent t o shape the hnrtlcficld and draw tlic Crusaders a ~ a trotn y tlicir siippl! hmc. That armor hccmnc . Criisadinc Warfare 1097-1 I:?> (Canihridgc. 64. . total size. He knew that lie could itot keep his army in the ticld ti)r mi csrctidctl period oftiitic and that lie did not hiivc !lie logistic5 base for a long campaigii. \rhich oftcii had 10 he shipped from Western Iiiropc. Moslem ca\alr! would frcqucnrly direct tlicir Ianccs not at tlic Crusader knight but at his warhorse. C.idcrs \\crc \+on using the tactic 01' feigned retreat\.. Saladin did possess strategic visi(iii. knight was tbrccd to light on foot. UK: I-lexiprinr 'lhid. Tlic Moslems realized that the strength ofthc Crus. Snladiii understood tlic \\cakncsscs of his urmy iiiid rcali7cd that Iic had a limited nniount ottirnc to force the Crusadcr army to tight.. Smail.intly.. UK: Cambridge Ilniversit! Press. . Ilc made ni:ixirniini use n f l i i s army's mohility and \\as able 10 divide tlic Crusader army.Many ofthc major bloslcni Yictoric:. and. most iniport. iiothing lie did tactically was uiiiquc. Criis. Saladin was ahlc to rake adwntage o t the strengths of his ariiiy . ~ 'It.iiein&(ftlie d I. m ~ a n F.' A liiial tactic used ugainsr tlic Crusaders \+aslo taryct tlic Crusaders' Iiorscs.o&lY! (Wortliing. Tlicrcforc. against thc C:rus. strory cciitrnliicd Icadcrsliip.idcr knights was thcir liorscs.ittlc o f Hattin had advanragcs in iiiohility.- . A Crusader knight liad limited niobilit! and could he ovcr\rhcImcd by infantry or liehtl! artiiorcd cavalry. 82-85 'lhid.

l!K: Patrick Stcplieils. 57-01..uidc IOXOI.!. 89. I l a t t i i i I 187: Sal:idin's Grcarcsr Vicror\: (I. ''Ian Heath.. IO ttic-Cr~i~aders (Camhridlc.ondoi1. OK: I'ntrick Stephens. . . 'David Nicollc. X X 4 . "lbid.. 1956).3). Ian Ileath. 199.'lbid. A Warcaulncr's ciuidt: to th.. (I Ibid. L K : Cnmhridge [jiiiversil! l'ress. 75-Xi "'I bid.2 W:lrl?amcr'.44-45. 3 'I<. I O X ~ J ) . 67-75.e Crusaders (Cambridge. Smail. Crusndine \i iirlire 1097-1 193 (Cnmhridge. C. UK: Ohprc! I'ublisliiiig Ltd.

Ha\ iiig defeated tiis major Moslem rivals. llie most p o w r l l i l ('lirislian state i n the rcgioii. to asscmble their troops at I<as al ivlai near Damascus. :illidwith Saladin. A l Adil. Salatlin w a s able to conccntiiite liis arm! tonard execittion ofthc jihad. The Moslem forces ucrc divided. The Kingdom o f Jerusalem was dividcd and 011 tlie hrink ot'civil nar. just trio iiioiitlis prior IU the f3attle o f I lattin. . Salndin'~brother and goverrior o f tgypt. both the Moslems mid Crusaders gathered their forces in preparation for what *as expected to be the Isrgcst military campaign since I IX. and most ofthc Egyptian arrny (iipproxirnately eight thousand troops) reniaiiicd in Egypt. Taqi a1 Din. The Crusaders no\v faced ii iiriilied eiiciiiy with littlc hope for oiitsidc assi\tiince.M:ith Saladin's aiiiioiinceinciit ol'tlic jihad. Saladin's nephew arid governor ol' IIaiiiah. In preparation Ibr the upcoming caiiipaiyn. 'I'Iie decisivc drknt at the I h t t l e o t Ilatrin spelled the end ofthc Kingdom of Jcrusalm and sparked tlie Third Crusade. The threat posed hy Saladin \rould reunite the kingdom. and thu Syri:in mii! (approximately four thousand troops) ncrc in the vicinit! o t Alcppo p u r d i n g against an! riio~cs by the I'rincipalit! of Antioch.3. The remainder ol'the nritiy w i s in northern Mc\opotaiiiia .. at least superticially. Saladin arid his pcrson:il guard (approximately li)ur thousand troops) were in 1:)amascus.mpire. The fragile state of Christian miit! cinJ old rivalries ninong the Cltristnn le:idership ultiniatcly led to tlie h t a l decision to light tlie Uiittle of' Hnttiii.is Salndin's arm! \vas disbanded a l i e r the successlitl cariipaign against Ilosul in I 180. \vat. Saladin ordered his major vassal:. the t3yantinc I.

idiii's :miy was still iii Egypt. 13y contuiniiig tlic o n l ~ ..iscene gii.ind ofttieiri and iiiarched with ii contirigen1orhis own troops to Ihisra.il. the Crusaders cottld have attackd Saladin bcforc lie could conccntratc his the Crusader arm) could torccs. The Crusade: Saliidin.fiilly . [)iic to tlic Crusaders' interior lines ofc~iiiiniiiii~aiioiis. tlic Crusndcrs ceded thc initiati\c to Saladiii.A f h l 'Ali comrn.vl)ti:in i m i y the end ofmuIiarramlApril I IX7 lie (Sdadin) and his army and the I)nlrl. Saladin't tirst iask w a s to succes. concentrate iiiorc rapid11 t1i:iii the Moslenis.At i fear ofthe Sultan. Il e gave his son ill-Mnlik a . grcatcr access 10 fresh w m r . th:it :I large portion ofS. six thousand troops).This \\\as because he had heard that Ariiut of:& Kcr:ik (Rcginald de Chatillon) uas p i n g to attack the pilgrims and cut ofl'tlicir adv:incc..ird leli Daiiiascus and iiiurchetl to Kiis al-Ma. making it cleilr that once he had dealt v. the Crusaders did not IIBVC Icndcrship kncv.' On 26 April I I X7.! 1)uc to tlic di\ isions in the Crusadcr lendership and Count Kayiiioiid's iilliii~ice ~ i t h the ability to conduct offensi\e opcrarions. Saladiii (with approximately four thousand troops j laid siege to tlic castle of Kcrak iii an attempt to prc\cnt Reginald dc Chatillon tiom divupting 11ic trnnsii o f t l i t Egyptiaii army.(approxiinatel!. where llic Syrian continycnts joined theiii. Saladin therefore ninrchcd ( ~ Busm to pre\'ent Arnar's attack on the pilgrims and to mahc liini sta) qiiietly at hoine Ibr .itli llicrii tic would return lo bar the n a y to the Egyplian army and prcvcnt its joining up with the S) rians. l h d c r tlic decisive leadership ofttic wo prcvious kinps Uald\vin I V and Alniiiric it is likely that tlic Crusaders ~ o u l have d takcn thu otf'ciisi\c.isscriiblc his xiii! and prc\cnt any offciisivc action b) the Crusaders wliile h i s army \\as divided. and Saladin only liiitl a limited force will1 liim at 1)aiiiascus. If the Crusaders had been united and able to undcrtahc ollicnsivc operations. . [Jiidcr tlic weak Icndcrship o f King Guy. I I i c C'riisadcrs bcnclircd from hettcr roads.. Saludin's iinmcdi:itc objecti\c was to unite his army iii C)amnscus with the iiiaiii hod! 01' the IIgy. Saladin did not have the troops i)r tlic sicgc equipment to rcriousl? tlircatcn Kcrnk: his objectives were to contiiic I<cgiiialddc C:hatillon's forces inside Kerak and to allo\v tlic m:ijv Egyptian army to forapc and plunder through Oultre~iocirdain. and shorter lines of coiniiiiiliicatioli.

Ilcginiild of Sidon. \vas onc o t t l i c richcst nnd tnilitnrilg tlic strolycrt vassal ot K i n g Goy.iriii).' A s tlic si7e ot'Sal:idin's arm) continued to ?row.s route ot'marcti. Ilov. the truce protcctcd Saluditi's tl. the blaster ot'tlic Tcmple-Chard dc Ridetort. In iiortlicrn Sbria.ink and alloivcd liini to strip troops front northurn Syria liv iisc in the wutli. and tlic Arclibishop ot'l )re. had rlic military force to oppose any Crusader otficiisivc action. Hie iiiovcmcnt 01' troops \bas dcsiyned iis a show of force against ttic I'rincipalit! to prcvcnt it from providing siyiilicaiit military astistancc to the Kingdom of Jcrusalcni. tlic rvlasrcr of' the Hospital-lbger de Lcs Ivlouliiis. Count Raymond.I small contingent of knights to tight with Kin? G u y at I Iattin.Saladiii tiov. With tlic xidition ot'tlic Egyptian arm). which could tlircatcn Siiladin'\ tlanks or contribute to tlic dcfcnsc or the Kingdom of Jcriisalctii. Saladin's ticld arm! tiurrtbcrcd o\er tmclvc thousand tric~i.c\er.. Tlic King agrccd tliat a delegation should be sent t~ 1ibcri:is to nc?otiatc nit11 the Count. through tiis control id'tlic County of Tripoli and the Principalit) ol'Galilec. The parry consisted of Dalicin of Ibcliit. 'Taqi al-l)in prdxihl! commanded hct\\ccn four to h e tliousantl i i i o m e d troops plus atixiliaricq.Crusader military l i m e along the L&ptiati . Saladit1 w a s h l e to unite his liirccs with the Egyptian army without Crusadcr opposition. the old nohilit! convincud Kin? (iuy illat he had to makc pcnce \\it11 Count Rayiiioiid. with the possible reintorccment o f Taqi al-Din b! troops froril Mcsopot:itni:i :tiid n i t t i tlic lack d u n y prospect o f outside support due to the political division.l h tnovcd Saladin's nortlierti Syriaii arm! from I latiiali to tlic tortrcss o t Harim on the frontier with the Principalit! ol' Antiocli. l ' a q i a l . The Count also controlled the best access routes over the Jordan ri\cr. tlic l'riticipali!! \\as Ibrccd to sign a triicc with Saladin While the I'riiicipalit! \vould sctid . in the Kingdotii ofJcru\alcm. The l'rittcipality litid tliu economic and tinancial resoiirccs to raise a field army ofsc\ cral tliousantl troops. .

is designed to be favorable to his position and a conciliator) gesture on tlie part of' King Guy. I f he reliised tlie hoon hc feared he would lose the help and couiisd ofSal. but also contributcd to tlic disastcr near the Springs o f Crcsson A s tlie Crusader negotiation party was t r a d i n g to\v. In no town :ind in no h i w c should tic take anything or do any damage.' Without the military assistance o f Salatlin.The composition nf rhc negotiating coniiiiittcc represented a m i x between the court party :ind the nld nobility faction. Kcpiiiald of' Sidon had decided to trawl by ii different route. Finally he dccidcd to act as Ibllows. scc that tlic coinniittcc \\. though fa\oring the latter. arrived at Nablus later that cvcniiig. hc WBS very troubled. Count Ilaymoriil w a s approached by one o f Saladin's sons who requested pcrmihsion to conduct . 56 . The Archbishop appears t o h.' Ihe negotiating party dcpiirtcd on 29 April from . C o u n t Ka) irioiid would. Howver.es Moulins had opposed the wedding of Guy to Sibyl and attempted to prevent the crowning o f King Guy. At sunrise hc should c r o s the river. The party. Rolian of Ibclin's dclny at Nablus probabl) s a w d Iiis lifc. Gcrard dc I<idcfort was an old cncni! o f Count Ilayinond and . This rhe son of Saladin agreed to do. and at sunset he should go back to liis own territory not to return. Kogcr de l. he \vould be terribl) disgraced and blamed hy Christendom.ive been a neutral part).inted it.idin. Count Raymond did not h a w the strength to prevent King Guy from sciring I'ibcrias. I raid i t i rhc I'rincipality of Galilee. TIic goal for the iicxt da)'s journcy was thc Tcmplar castle at a1-l:ulah Raliaii of'lhclin.Icrusalcm.I supporter ot'the court party. belicving that tic could c a d ) mcrtakc the party bcforc thc) rcachcd Tihcrias. II'he gr. dccidcd to spcnd :in extra cia! with his family at Nablus. Ualian of Ibelin and Ilcginald o f Sidon wcrc both nicnihers ofrhe old nobility taction. 1 Ic would warn the Christians s o thcy would lose nothing.ird Nahlus. Counr Raynond'\ position at l'iberias \\'as untenable. Finally. Therefore he informed the son o f Saladin that he was willing to give him leme to enter his lands and the lands d t h c Christians under certain conditions. nominal Icadcr ofthc dclcgatiori. According to Eracles (a contemporary Christian sourcc) Wlicri thc cnunt hcard this request. with tlic cxccption of Ilcginald o f Sidon. rhcrcforc.

\l-Fulah and tlic ncighhoring 'l'crnplnr t'ortrcss o f Caco and WIS ~ b l 10 c raise (brt) secihr knights from Narlireth This small Crusader l i m e nutiihcrui arid possihl! approximatel? one hundred :ind twenty knights. t n c i ot'the leading amirs. I larriin iind I3icssa together nunibered almost as m i n y troops. illid sever:iI others.lnd Master ofthc Hospital and rhc M. the Crusader negotiation tcmii. (probahl! less tliiiii eight hundrcd total troop\). When the! . ol-Afdal."" Al-Aldal \xis the ruler of[)aniascus. A rcisoiioblc estimate ofthc Moslem raiding party would he :ipproximately five thousand cavalr!. which 31that time had approximatel) two thotisand cawlry.irrived. The raiding part! split into 31 Icnct two distinct clcnicntc.ribcrias. Gerard dc I<idcthrt stripped the garrison of .jcctcd. "took Mu/a~far d D i n Kiokbari ihn Zairi a d . and plans were made ti) attack the Lloslem raiding force.The Gerard dc Ridclbrt and the majority o f t h e knights (\rliidi \\ere prcdoniiiiaiirl! Tcmplnrs) ob. The largest clctiiciit under the command ofal-.l h i ((hkbori).inother live hundrcd to one thousand troops. arrived at tlic Tcmpl:ir fortress ot'al-Fulah. while the stiiiillcr part! under the cornrnsnd of Gohbori procccdetl toward Namrcth. ruler of II i i r r m and Edcssa. nnd the other amirs probably lead . an-Uajmi and Yildirirn al-Yaquti. with (.Afdal rcmaincd iicar .ir4iall ofthc .hitnai. rhe part! received nard of tlic impending Vosleni raid.ivailablc tor the s i x ofthe Moslciii (orce: howcwr.iy ot'thc mid.ibIy led hetween one 57 . ininus Ualiun of lbelin and Rcpinald of Sidon.Count Raymond knew that Iii) political <tanding in tlic Crusader States \rould collnpse I it :ippearcd lie not only allmrcd but abettell tlic taking o f Christiaii liics and tlic dcstriicrion 01' Christian property To ensure that tlicrc wtruld he no damage from the raid. No nurnhers are . :is man! as thrcc hundrcd itifantr).r.. Count Ibynoiid sent word throughout the principality of(1alilee warning all Christinns to remain inside on the lirst ot' M u ! . l ' l i c (. On 3 0 April.Tcniplars ndiiscd against risking an cng3gc111ciit \\itti the M o s I c m ~ . A council !\as held uiiioii~ the kiiiflits conccrning the \ioslcm raid. an unknou II iiutiihcr of~I'~ircopolcs. the d. ( h k h r i proh.

the raiding l i m e under Gokbori \+:is probably more a rcc:onnaissancc in tiircc than a raid.tliousand to fiftccn tiundrctl ca\alry. The opposing ti>rccs met near the Springs of Cresson outside Nazareth.hlc to return t o Xazarctli wlicrc he W S rcuiiitcd \+ith I3alian o f lhcliri and tlic Archbishop c)fTyre. 'The Crusaders. Only Gerard dc Ridefort and t\+o of his knights escaped the h i i t ~ l c . prohahly blamed Count Ruymond for the disaster near the Springs of Crcssori. water resources.Gerard dc Kidcliirt wiis . Due t o the limited amount ol'tinic allotted for the raid i w e day). Gerard dc Kidcfort and what rcmaiiicd ot' King Guy's negotiating party rcsumcd their journey to Tihcrias. strengthened h) the disastcr at Springs of Cresson. rhc Crusaders l d t their infantr) bcliind. Sliortlj after dcpnrting. O\cr sixt) Iciiiplar arid Ilospitallcr knights were killed. already an enemy o f Count Raymond. The Crusadcrs counted on the clement of surprise a i d their hmvicr iirmor to carry tlic battle. On 2 May. ' 1 ' 1 1 ~ Master ofthe Hospital and tlic Marshall ofthu Tcmplc mere among the killed. thou~h outnumbered. pla>cd a crucial part in the decision to fight the Battle of Hattin. and the fort) scculiir kniglits from Naiarctli ncrc cuptiirud. B) attacking. and lo gi\c one of die ma. The Moslems. mission \\as to acquire iin updated picture ofthc terrain.I ibcriiis. The negotiating party insisted t l i i i ~ he sever his alliance nitli Saladill. (icrnrd. The Count expressed his willingness to do \\hatever tlie negotiating part! suggcstcd. rcnio\c all \Ioslciii troops froiii . though initially surprised. Ncns of the battle near tlic Springs of Cresson quickly rcncticd Count Raymond. Ciurard rcturricd to Na7arcth duc to wounds frorri the previous day's battle. cliargcd the Moslems wlio appear to have hcen taken by surprise. Tlic pcrsoiial enmity hrtwccn Count I<ayrnoiid and Gerard dc Ridefort. w r c able to coiiiiteriittiick and ovcr\rhelm the smiill Crusudcr torcc. and return n i t h tlic 5X .ior Moslciii commanders (Gokbori) a first hand look at an area that the bloslcm arm) might liiivc to cross. IIc sent an armed escort offifry knights to come? the negotiating party to Tihcrias. The probable.

"' l'roiii tlic rnidtllu ol'hllay until the end of Juiic."' The ~ \ \ c l v c thoitsand cavalry figure probobl! docs iiot include Turkoiiinn tribcsmrin. the b a t i k I d a significant impact on iiioralc.? GII! announced . Kiti. Kiiig Henr! II dI:ngl:intl a s part o1'liis pcnaiice for rhc iriiirdcr of~I'hotii:is released money sent h 59 . tic probabl! led a forcc ofapproxirii. I tic t\\o major lictions iii tlw Kingdom oiJcrusalcin were iiov.iftiiriyu. Their deaths undcrminctl Christian n i ~ m l c .iii urrierc h i . I urcopolcs. All ahlc-bodied i i i c t i in the kingdom ncrc called t o joiii tlic arm! at Sattiiriya.parry and do Iioiriagc to King Gu!. On the ('rusatlcr side.just two months hcforc ilic Hattlc of Hatrin. h. both llic Crusaders . l Thc 'leiiiplars ! . the ciisuiiltics were altiisst cntircly Tcmplnrs or liospitnllcrs.iIacliii's army. IIowcvcr. tlic Mcislcin r:iid arid the barrlc ticiir tlic Yprinp otC'rcsson casl dotihts on Coim fla! mond's loyalty .*'I ticrc lie (Saladin) rcvicwctl his arm! mid cstiiiiatcd that Iic liad t\veIve thous:ind cavalry with r r pilar t i c t i and iiii1it.s \\ell a s voluiitecrs. Tl~c Crusader arm! gathered at S.illy united. .ijust c a s t of I.itlicrcJ their liirccs fiir the iipcoiiiirig c.ind Voslctiis g. I h c to the s i c d'S. I lie volumcrs arc prohahly locally raised infintry. The IIospitdlcrs lost their (irund Master .impnigii. \\ hilc the casualties froin tlic battle nc:ir the Springs of Cresson n c r c sntiill.O n tlic M o s l e m side. "it \\as a great victory. .idcrs.akc Tiheria. the Crusaders Here able to strip ttic dctknscs ofttic c o a s ~ acities. accordin: to Ihn al-Atliir (a coiircniporq Mirtlcni source).licii Saladiii Icti Tcll'ashtcra.Voslem forces g:ithcred at Tcll'u\litcr. ' l h e j o ~ f i ~ ~ilc \ \ s spr& tiir .ircl! twcnt!-ti\c tliousand inen. and possihl! Redoiliris.iry siipcnds ( i y / ~ )a . With the recent dclkat o f t h c Byzantine llcct hy the Noriiims mid i l i c Lgypiimi tlcci b! thc Italians. for ilic rcinpl:irs atid I lospitallcrs \+ere h e hackhonc d t l i c Fraiil\isIi armies.ind I\ idc.itid reliabilit>. :it Iciist wpcrtici. Rotli iricii ncrc rcspccrcd and experienced 1c.itid tlic Tcmplars lost tlicir Marstiall . Count Raymond met tlic King at Ncapolis and swore tcalt! t o hitii. the elite 01"lic Crusader army.

The I'ibcrias garrison u a s able to send word to the Crusader army at Satfuri!a aid was rccci\cd qiiickly.ird\. Saludiii sent raiding parties west to harass the Crusader arm! in an attempt to draw the Crusiders onto the waterless plateau region \vest ofthe Jordan river. Saladin had attcniptcd to lure the Crusaders away from S.t3cckctt.ind took the city b\ rtorin during the nisht. According to Ernoul (a pro Count Ilayinond conremporar) source). the Count rcplicd: 60 .' On 26 June. Wirli the arricrc ban and the rncrcciiarics hired wirli the money provided by IIcnr! II.idin's I I 8 7 c. The rnonc! was used to hire and equip . Saladin moved the bulk of his arniy to the Saladin (according to Ibii aI-Athir) high ground \vest o f t h c t t w n of Tiherins. 0 1 1 the siiiiic day. and dcfcndcd thcmsclws tlicrc while the loner town w'as sacked and burned.\ntioch also provided fifty knights. who was lord ot'Tibcrios and whose wire \\a> iii iriiriicdiatc jeop. "attackcd 'Iibcrias with a small l i m e . Saladiri spent thc next fiw da!s attempting t o drnv tlie Crusaders away from Saffuriya. The Crusader arm! \vas the largest army raised in recent years and one o1'1hc largest ever r a i d hq' the Crusntlcrs.jorit).imp. In an attempt to break the standott: on 2 Jul!. brcachcd tlic wall . S:iladin's army crossed the Jordan Kivcr and 011 27 June.ilTuri)ii for sewn da>s before withdrauing from Crusader territory and disbanding his army.oftlie yarrison Iwd left with Count Hnymond to joir the Crusadcr army at Saffuriya.""' Tibcrias onl! had a skeleton garrison as the ma. IJp until 2 Jul!.idditioiinl 'l'urcopoles. The inhabitants tlcd for rcfiigc to tlic citadel. King Guy called a council ofthc major barons to discuss what action sliould be taken. Prince Dohemond o f . During that campaign. Sul. he cstahli~hcd his camp along its western banks. uhcrc the Countess and her childrcn w r c . the Crusaders were able to muster a11army ot'alniost twent! thoiisand troop\. that their situation was desperate and that the citadel would fall ~iiilcss The message from the 'Tiherins garrison qiiichly cprcad through the Crusader camp. I l i c King tirst sought the advice of Count I<a!moiid.iign looked \cry similar to his unsuccessful campaign in I IXi.

lloucvcr. "He has a wo1l-s skin. and all the barons save only the master of h e Tcmplc. hut will break down the \valls and then leave: and will not conic Iicrc tc) scck (is out i n our encampment. And ifthey do takc my wife and my men and my goods. If lie takes 'l'ihcrias he will not he a h k to stay there." I'he generals decided to advance and give hattle to the Muslims. and the king Iiiinselfcoiicurrcti in that opinioii.impctl until now and . and destroy my city.idvanccd on tlic Muslim army.. but thc Cmiit intervened I U say: "By God. a largc load of liicl will be good for tlie lircs o f Hell . _ _ they inct to take counsel. "said tlic Count.isc you would not have spoken in this wa?. Arid tlic Hospitallcrs assented. and the! agreeti that it should he done a) lie said.I am one o l ~ o u . Clearly you take their sidc and your sympathies arc with them. otIicrv. . and ifyou retreat I sliall retreat. they will not hold it. . Y o u will scc what will Iiappen. According r o contemporary Criisuder soiirces. for they will not put up for long \\itti hcirig away froin rhcir homes and families. antl when he has lcli i t and gone away we will retake it: for i l l i e chooses to stay there Iic will he unahlc to keep his army together." 13oth the Crusader and Moslem accounts agree that Count Ra).it Siilliiriya hl . %lien tlie count had linished his speech. it is largely corroborated hy Moslcm I i i w r i a i i lhii ul-Athir. and we will lice our prisoners. Thc liolloniiig is I i i h account o f t h e Crusadcr coiincil: \vlicn the Iranhs Icarncd that Saladin had attacked Tihcrias . so tlicy Icfi thc p l x c whcrc they tiad bccn cnc. Sonic advised the hiiig to meet the Muslims in hattle and chase them out o t ' l iherias. "and it' gou advance then I shall advance with you. When Saladin received tlie news ht. Nevertheless the king and thc barons agreed to act accordingly.cctlvicc is th:it >ou let Tihcrias go." llul Prince Arnat (Rcginald dc Chatillon) ofal-Kcrak replied: "You h a w tried liard to make us afraid of the Muslims.intlon tlicir position and offer battle.niontl advised against going to the rclicfol"1~ihcrias." 'Ilicn tlic king askell the haroiis \%hatthey tliought o f tlic iid\'isc the count had gi\cii. . He will be forccul to cvxiiatc the city. the Crusader coiiricil coiitiiiucd until :iliiivst midnight and linished with the understanding that the Crusader army \vould reiiiaiii . I \ b i l l redeem them and enclose my tit> again when 1 can. and you and your whole army killed and taken captivc. ordered his army to withdraw trorn its position near Tihcrias: his only rciison for besieging 'Tibcrius was to innke the Franks oh. My because I still \vould rather Tihcrias he destroyed and m> n i l c aiid men antl helongings all taken. As for the size of their army. I kiiow well that i f t l i c Saracci~s takc I iheri:is. then 1111: whole land is lost. the bloslcm accmini diflicrs over \\hen the decisicxi to m r c h liom Sdfuri>a was made. Tlic! answcrcd that all h e count said was true.: ' . I have ohscrwd the armics of Islam over the coiirsc olyears and I have never seen one eqiial to Saladin's army hcrc in numbers or in lightins power." I \ liilc the account given above appears to hcnctir from hindsight. the master o l t l i e Temple said.

The advance g o d was commandcd h ! Counr Ilaymond.itcl!.ttiic tind your disgrace if you. King Guy chose 10 take tlic most direct routc.ln~l. have i t atinoiinced throughout the : m i y that all should arm and r\ery mati go to his companq and l d l o ~ [lie standard ofthe Clol! Crosr. there is no indcpcndciit contirinatioii o f a meeting bctwecn the king and (icrard dc Kidefort alicr the Crusader council broke up. IJnforriin. ' l l i c Crusaders marched as three separate di\ isions. ." he said. The hea\y caialry rcnluiiicd scrcencd behind the infantry and light ca\alr) to protect i t lroin the Moslcni horsc archers 'The Crusader army cainc uiidcr attack alnirist irnrncdiatcly. Go..arid iivt go to the rclicfot'Tihcrias. \\ho have been s o recently heen tnadc king. (and Iiavc as great an arm! as) ever an! kiiig had i t i this land. Cicrard dc Kidcforr returned to tlic tiiiig's trnr to argiic against the decision 10 remain iit Salliiriya. the C:rus:idcr :irrn) hrokc camp and heyan tticir iniircli toward 'T'ibcrias. . . Each division liad its accompati) ing inliinrr) arid llurcopolc light cavalry.itl the hcst kno\rlcdse of tlic tcrriiin and it w a s his city that tlic :irmy was marching to rclic\e. Saladin's army h. Alicr the coiiiicil broke up. the northurn route over the dr! plnrc:iu region to the \vest of Tihcrias. h r l q in tlie morning o f 3 July. For i r m i l l be greatly to your s1i.-ifyou allow :I city oiil! six miles away to he lost. Thc rear guard includcd I h l i a n of lheliri and the Tcinplars.do you helicvc tliat traitor \ r h o lias given you this ad\ise? I t is to s1i.d heen harassing the Crusader carrip for tlie last live days rind continued to do s o as die ('riisxlcr ariii? 62 . (as you have done) i n so short a tinie.is he 1i." I'he king ikircd not gainsay liiiii and so did as tic liad commantlcd. This i s the lirst task which lias fallen td you since you werc cro\\ned. Ihc Tcmplars w u l d put aside thcir \\hitc mantlcr. All Crusader accoiirits (both pro. thr he likctl and feared him hecaiise tie had made hini king and liad given liirn the [reaslire ofthe king of Cn~1.I'hc m i n hody \\:is commandcd by the king and included the true cross. "Sire. or asscmhlcd.mid anti-Count Ila!iiiond) do agree that thc council broke with the decision to rciiiiiiii a t Sal'fiiri!a arid then shortly alicr midnight 11ic king chuiigcd his tniiid aiitl ordurcd preparations hc rnadc t o hrc:ik caiiip imd niiircli a t d a ~ n .iinc you that he liss given it. And know well tliiit riitlier tliiiti see that. arid sell and pawn theiii lest the humiliation the Saracens have causcd me and all ofthem rogethrr he not avenged.

Wlicii c'oniit Ka! rnond sair this 1 1 1 ' 6 : . I!nable to .limned its divisioiis. The rear guard mas under tremendous pressure from the left wing of Saladin's arm! under the command of Ciokbori. Let u s iichicvc their deti. By noon. Thc count advised the king to turii the Crusailcr army riorrh toward the billage of Hattin. True to 'Turkish tactics. and 'l'ihcrius with tlic c o a t Innds \vill open hcfbrc us.cd and the three divisions mere in daiiger of being separated. which \bas approximately six kilometers a\r.i!. the Crusader rear guard sent word to King Ciuy stating tliiit the!. Snthing stands in the wa? o f our conquest. w r c unable to iiiiikc tbraard progress without assistance.iiist outside the small village nf' Marescallia. The harassing attacks against tlic Crusaders increased in intensit!. 'IIic King then reportedly asked Count Kayiiond tiir his a h i c e . Whcn it was apparent that the Crusaders \\ere leaving Saffuriya for Tiherias. I f the Crusader army could reach I liittin. Our strength is non tremendous. thcy could camp tlicrc li)r the n i g h and miitinuc on to Tiheria. I!nder the constant harassment of the Moslciiiq."" Saladin's main body moved away from libcrias and into position to block the passes that lend to I ibcrias and olTthc virtually wtcrlcss platrnu. who was prohabl> canipcd on high grouiid to the south (near the village of Liibia). the Crusader army was iinahlc to move i t i time to reach the p ~ s s to I l a t t i n beforc l'aqi al-Din. Silladin. the main strcrigtli ofthe harassing attacks was directed against the Crusader reilr guard. The Crusader arm! was forced to slo\v to prevent the three divisions from becoming scparnted..idvnncc. the next day. Saladin reportedly stated. Tlic King follo\ved his ad\ ice and attempted to turn the Crusader nrniy ro thc north. King Gu! ordcrcd h a t the ('rusadcr arm! make camp. s a w that the Crusaders wcrc heading toward 1 lattiii and ordered T:iqi al-l)iii and the right iliink of his army to prevent thc Crusader's froni reaching the village. The Crusaders \yere now disorginii. as Saladin attempted to force the Crusaders to make camp. "there is what we arc Lvaiting for.211. The ii ('rusadcr army had cwered only half tlic distance between Saffiiri! and I ihcrias.

the incarest source ()[\rater. The ad\ancc yiiird northcast ofthc main hod!.idc camp in the cnrly alicrnoon. The hest cstiniatc is that tlic right tlank. 'I'licrc is ctill conliisioii on the disposition of Saladin's army. he was not poing to the Crusaders to rcacti \ w c r . tlie main cnpngcrncnt began. The Moslc'm arm! also collected hrusli along the \rindward sidc d t h c Crusader army and their probable line ofin:ircli. bringing up frcsti \rater frorri Lakc . On tlie hllo\rinp moriiing. T11c Moslem x m y a l s o made camp.I iberia5 mid :idditicwal arro\i\s.reportcdl! stated. Saladiii's army fornied a rough "11" shape :iround the Crusider arm!. The Moslem lcit tlank. 1 July. Four hundred loads of arrotrs were distribiited throughout Saladin's army und an additional scvcnt! cmncl loads of arrows \ w e brought forw:ird. Salutliii's ai-my slowly ga\e ground in a i l attempt to tlclay n major cngqcnicnt until the s u n \\. under the command of Taqi al- Din. liarly in thc morning. was to the west and north ot'thc C r i w d e r rear guard. was to the south o f both the Crusader maiii bod! and the rear guard.ord God. The Crusader ariliy asain l'ormcd tlircc divisions. The religious knights \\ere imovcd tc give them sonic' relief from the constant Moslem attacks of'the previous da! and to forin tlicni into tlic mail1 strike force for the Crusader :irmy. The Crusader a m ! W:IS to the w a s still arrayed iii three di\isions.ig:iiiis[ the Crusaders. Saladiii also wanted to scparatc the iillon rhrce divisions ifpossiblc. The main body. tlic Crusader arm\ tried oiicc again to reach thc village of I-latiin. roiighlj cast to \vest. under Gokbori.is Iiiglicr i n an attempt ro use the Jul! liciit . the irar is o\er. "Alas! A l a s ! I. tiwevcr. dewoycd. closest to thc tow1 ofIla[tin. Hie tcrritor! at tlic top o f t h c "u" hctuccn 61 . cast. 'I'Iic main bod! was in the center and the rear guard was \vest. m. tlic advance y i x d tried to force the p a s s Illat led to the village of ILittin. soiith\rest ol'tlic milin hod!. I he major ch:inge liom the previous day \ w s the movement ofthc 'Tcnipl:irs and Ilospitallcrs to the main body. By approxiinatel! nine o'ulock. was to the north and cast o1'tlic Crusadc'r ad\ancc guard."" Wu arc hctro!cd to death arid the Imd I lie Crusader arm! \vitlioiit acce\s to water. under Suladiii's command.

Grcntest_\'ictoV. lQQ.T i e Battle ofHattin. Hattin 1. (Loiidoii: Osprey Publishing Ltd.Fig 1.3). 70-7 I Salad!!us .187. late morning to nooii. Repnnted from: David Nicollc.

I-lowcvcr. iiriahlc to rejoin tlie rnaiii body. T h e lirst attack was made by tlic 'fcniplars and IIospitallcrs against Saladin'. 'l'lie attack dro\c thc Moslems hack but did not hrcdk [lit encirclement. I hc Crusaders wcre. I" 1he ('rusader situation was hcconiing dcspcratc.iped likc the horns oTa hull.IS no longcr the field.'rusader miii body. Count Raymond's attack either broke through or was alloxed to break tlirougli the Moslem right Ilank. left the field o f battle. [he Crusatier cav. 1-he royal tent wis set iip at the hasc ol'tlic soii[Iierii Ilorn Oh .. demoralized hy ti day and a night witlioiit water. thcrelbrc. befan to hrcak fhrniatioii arid moved 1 0 the east toward the Horns ot Hattin. Without infantry protection. with m o k e to their north hloning into their divisions. King Goy ordered that the royal tent hc set lip t o protcct the true cross and pro\idc ii rallying point for the Crusader forces. niiiiii body. Tlic Crusader army was now divided and most of the advmice p a r d cabnlr! oii \\.tlic left :uid right llanks of the Moslcm arm) \\'as wooded and likely patrollctl by Moslem wluiitecr troops :ind infantr!. the Moslems quickly sealed the hreach and cut otfthe advance guard cavalry from tlic (.ilry was no\\ in dircct contact !\it11 Moslems. " K c cannot conie. 'I'Iic attack was dircctcd azainst thc Moslem right Ilank with thc goal of breaking through to the town of IInttin. 'I he infantr) replieti."" 'The Crusader cavalry made two attempts to hrcah throupli thc encirclement. surroundcd. T'he second attack w a s iiiadc by the cavalry ofthe xlviincc guard iindcr tlie command o f Count I<a>mond. The horns arc Iiish ground s1i. hccause w e are perishing o T thirst and cannot liylit. I his was also the area \\ere the brush hud been collcctcd and sct oii tire early thar morning. Count I<aynond and what rcniainetl ofthe adv:ince giiard ca\alr>. Thc infantry w a s prohahl! attcinptinp to move toward Lake l'ibcrias which was visiblc (iom the horns. I'lic Crusader infantry. King Guy and the histiops protccting the true cross sent requests to the infantr! to rejoin tlic main hod! and protcct the king and the true cross.

Tic Battle of Hattiii. 1003). 74-75 I 182: Saladg's Greatest. Hatti!! \'!ctoty.Fig 4 . (Londoll Osprcy Ptlblishing Lrd. . afternooil Rcpriiitcd from David Nicolle.

ands.iround the southern Horn of Ilattin. At the end of the battle Saladin offered liliy dinars for each Templiir and tlospit:iller prisoner. with tears o f j o y . his knights made a gallant charge. I<egin. Saladin's army rccaprurcd most ofttie Holy I. tugged at his hcard.iltl de Chatillon. (icrard dc Kidefort (not executed with his brother knights). When I saw thc Franks flying arid tlic Moslems pursuing. "We have routed them!" But Father turned to nte atid said: . . and I saw Itis dismay: he changed color. I watched him. and i t i this wa) he rid tlie Muslim people ofthem.ill ofthe horscs were killed. Tripolis.of1 lattin. and drove the Moslems back upoti my Father. "Immediately he got two Itundred prisoners. IIc hid these particular men killed hecause thcr were the fiercest of a l l Frankish warriors. who had started the campaign with almost tivc hundred hnights between the two ordcrs. shouting "Ciivc the devil the lie!" So the Moslems fell upon tlic cncmy. ' " I'he battle as dcscrihcd cndcd in the late aliernoon." At that instant the royal tent was overturned. and bowed hitiiselKto earth. The battle continued throuyh the curl! afternoon when the remaining Crusader knights and infantry were forced onto the rocky ground . I cried in glcc. The onl! arcas that remained uncapturcd at tlic end ofthe year ucrc the cities ofT)re.I'hc onl) members ofthe Crusndcr leadership to escape were Count Raymond. Again he urged them forward. Antioch. Very few of'the knights were killed but nltiiost . Due to the cnlling ofthe iirricrc ban h r 0X 1111' Hattlc of . who were decapitated at his connnand. I'hc Cruwdcrs had suffered 1hous:nids o1'easualties. "We have routed them!" 13ur the Franks charged again and drove our men back oncc more to where my Father was. Over the next six months. and rushed forward. giving thanks to God. and drove the enemy up the hill."'" Also among the prisoners were King Gu). Again I shouted.'I lold thy peace! We have not henten them so long as that tent stands there. who retrcatcd up the hill. The greatest losscs had b c u i taken h ! tlic Templars and Iltyitallcrs. M i a n of Ihelin. the battlcticld was compressed to the area surrounding the Iloriis of I-lnttin The tinal hour ofthe battle is best recorded h ! Saladin's son al-Afdal: It w i i s nib first set battle and I was at i n ) h t l t c r ' s side. and most ofthe m j o i nohility. and the 3 r d Ibrtresses of Vontreal and Kerak. and the small number of knights who escaped with them. primarily among tlie i n h i t r y and Turcopolcs. By late alicrnoon. I'hen the Sultan dismounted. W-lien the King ot'thc Franks had retired to the hill.

virttinlly wtcrless terrain and tlie July h u t may have dcterniincd tlic outcome ofthc I h t r l c hcforc tlic m i i n body ot'opposing iirniics iiict :it tlic I-loriis Hattin. flic immcdintc arcn around Saf'fiiriya was one of the must fertile rceions oftlic Kitigdoni of Jcrus. I h c iniport:incc o f 69 . the C:rutndcrs lost \ irtunlly e\'er!thitip thcy had gained over thc pre\ ious nine[! ycars. rlic Sprinps arc loc.lo~lcnii. and the army's innhilit) to coinplcte the march to I ibcrias in on2 day wliilc continuall) in contact \rirh ths enemy. mid fortresses surrendered as to the poor Crusader decisions that \eon iis Salndin'h arm! arrived. and to ultimatcl! inllict the m o s t decisive defeat on the Crusuclcrs since their arrival in the H d ) I-atids. l'hercibre. Tlic decisions made hy the opposing army comniandcrs \+ere directly tied t o tlic 1oc:itioii and mailuhilit! ofwnter. l l i c Crus. ccnrmlly located near the major north-south and ciist-\rcst roads in the liin:doiii. morale.ld.idcrs lost the Hattlc of Hattin due to poor tiictic:il decision m:ikins. ultimately tlic reason for tlie Crusader defeat at the Rattle of Ilattiii \+:is the dividcd and poor Crusader leudership. the Crusader cities and t\)rtrccses did not Iiinc tlie manpower to dctend thcniscI\cs apiins SaI:itlin. The comhined ci'fccts oftlic arid. However.a could move quickl! ti1 :in! rcgioii threatcned h) the h.. due Icd to the 13. Salliiriyii u n s An army camped at Sa(furi). I'rior to making tlic decision to march the Crusiadcr arm> to I'iherius. Saffiiriya had water year round and had been an important sourcc of\r. Ilie terrain and wathcr in the area hetnccn Safluriya and Tihcrias had a sipnilicant inipact 011 tlic outcome ofthc Rattle of IIattin.itcr for tliousiirids (+!ears. l h c C:rusadcr leadcrship did not take into account thc tcrrain. climate.itcd less than liw kilometers north ofthl: cit! of Numrcth in the highlands otGulilcc.ittle of tiattin. Man! citic. Thc Crusader army formed at tlic Springs of Satliiriya. to dcny thc Crusader arm) any ncccss tn \vaicr. 'Ihc Criisiidcr decision to cross the diflicult tcrrain a l l o \ ~Sal.idiii ~I to shape the huttlctic. ncccssar! logistic support.tiattin. the C'ruandcr leadership nccdcd a clear understanding of the area o t operations.ilcm.

which i t a s t w n t y . ii wci sc:isoii and . The pliitcau region .I ibcrias. i\ very arid \\it11 little or no Ihdder r . thc tov. The terriiiii is vcr! rugged and.ider army was dust.ibo\c sea IcvcI. cutliering point for Crusader armies siiicc tlic founding of tlic Kingdoin of Jcrusalcm. The nearest major Crusader settlement was Na7iircth.ililcc. Tihcrias. July is historically onc ofthc hottest inontlis. Due to thc diflicult terrain hct\\ccn Tihcrias and Salliiri!a. Galilee has two distinct scasons.l i v e kilonictcrs away. due to the lack ofstanding water.iIl ir. While there i s no rccord ofthc tctiipcrature for thc third and hurtti ofJuly 11x7. IKihcrias :itid tlic Sea of Galilee Lire surrounded by oiit along B high plntcau. I horses.iintiiIl in the r q i o n ticcurs durin? thc !&ct 70 . In ci. I h c ivct zciisoii lasts tiom October to March or April.: l(i\v a s tort! dcgrccs.ivail:ihle l i o m isolated springs or \vclls.Saffuri!. I.ii was isolated tioni tlic rcsi ol'tlic Principality ot'CiaIiIce. 'I'Iic tciiipcriitiire on the plateau can ru.'" Another factor that may h a w contrihutcd to thc disintcgr.idcrs. Juc its location along the Sea i f Ci.iver:igcs about ciglit hundrcd iiictcrs .ition of thc Crus. the terrain hcgins to rise sharpl! . did not siiffcr the extreme hcat ot'the high pl:ilenu to its icest. Additif to the prohlcins thc Crusaders faced. 1 1 1 1 :t o w bcsicgcd h! Saladin.icIi over one hundred dcgrecs in tlic stiniiiicr. only two locations offered enough w t e r to support the Crusader army: the towis of Ilattiii mid Tur'an.~ \\as undcrstocid b! hoth the ('rus.eaving Sdftiri!a travcliiig to\iard . Thcrc is \cry limited level ground near Tihcrias and tlic t o w s p r 4 the banks oithe Sea of Galilee rather than inland. it is likcl! that the avcragc tcrnpcratiirc itas hct\rccn 85-90 dcgrccs with a high of almost one huiitlrcd degrees at middiiy. l'iherias. I dry season.Saffuriya had heen used as : I . The rcgioii between Saffiiriya and I ihcrias \\.idcrs anti tlic Moslem~.is virtually \vatcrIcss during tlic siiinrncr rnonths. Water wiis otil! . the tcrnperntiirc at night could drop to n. \ u s the most important to\vti on thu Sea ofG:ililec and tlic >cat ot'thc Prince ofCi:ililee (Count Kaymond). Along the route chosen by the Crus. T h e vast majority 01'. .iIiIcc.

Rayniondlllpf Tripolis and t!le Fall ofJenrsalem (!I. Marsliall W. 1936).Fig 5 . . 103. (Princeton: Princcton University Press. Reprinted from. M a p ofthe Viciriity o f Hattin. Baldwin.&l 187).

idcr arm> ofiippr~iuiin.iril from taking control ofthc resion and it:. . The northcrii road was tlie most direct hut Ii:id iio water. 'l'hc I:ich o f a Crusader infrastructurc in the region iiiciitit that the Crusiitlcr army did IIO! have a position (if strength 10 n h i c l i they could retreat.ould raise considcrahle dust \rhich probahl! lheightenctl the effects orthc iirmy.ihnr on ligtire '??). Illiring the dr! \easoti. Saladin \\as able to 1i~ir:isstlie Crusaders timi d m w t the iiioiiient thc) lcli Saitiiri! a. T h e soiithern route also Ihtl little Hater and \+. 72 .there i F no iiioisture iii the air. that roiitc \r~iuId probahly have doubled tlic travel time: > .I\ a longer iii:ircli: however.sc:3soii. . I n addition to the two iiiiiiii ro:ids. Tiberias was the only major Crusxicr fortiticxioil witliin twenty-tivc kiloinetcrs. A Criis.Iiheriah.isoii hclpc to sprclid tlic dust. tlicre irere few Crusndcr scttlcnicnts or tortilicntions. if :lie Crusaders were fiirced to stop.\nother import:int tictor \\hen examining tlic region between Saffuriya and Tihcriar is its isoliitioii.iloiig the rotitc. Thcretiire.i~csa i d disad\antages. ad\unce gu. \rill1 the northern road going diie cast o\cr tlie high plateau dircctl! to .s lack afwuter. Both roads Itad their ad\aiit. the skies are cltitidlc~s. There w r e tv. What little \rind occurs diiring tlic dry se.o nizijor roads to I'ihcrins e The niaiti road frcvn Acre to the Jordan which had hccn in use bcliirc the iirri\iil o f ~ h Ilomans. Due to the poor terrain. lust m i t l i of Moiiiit Tur'an. miiilahlc n x c r ." 'l'lic rcstrictiw terriiin in tlie region betireen Satliiri>a iind Tihcrias limitcd the choice oI' routes that the Crusader arm! could tahc to I iheri.Ili. and nonirrigated land bakes and heconies estrcmcly dusty. the Crus. river triivcts fitst pasr Saftiiri>:i (scc tisure 5 ) to thc' south ot'ivlount 'fur'aii.idcrs could have also taken :I tiiorc circuitous route to the north throiigli the vallc! 0 1 I3cth Ketotiih: h o w v e r .I'ht: lack o f tortitications iilsci inc'. and there \rere 110 ('rusader fortiliciirions .itel~ tourtccn thousand troops plus Iiorsc's v. tlicy coiilil retreat to Ihrtilicd positioiis to the nor111 of Moiinr rahor Itvrittcii . The \oiithcrn road hciids southc:ist until i t rciiclics K a f r Sj3bt.int that there was nothing to prevent Saladin':. h e road Ibrks.i\. irhcrc' tlie road turns northeast toward Tiherias.

The only mention of the use of logistics is hy the Moslcriis. The rcsiilt was tlie disintegration o('tlic Crusader army .if tlie Springs of Crcsson and the divisions i n 1111: ('rusader leadership. lack of water. Both parties k n w that i t w a s impossible to maintain an army on the plateau without water. but to no avail. \ r h o llad camel trains for water and arrows. lJsing hindsight. could have overcome snmc oftlie problems ifthey had made proper use of logistics. It ir likclq that tlic Crusader leadership ielt that ii supply train w u l d slow the army's rate o f march m d prevent tlic Crusaders lrnm reiichiny Tibcrias in one day. l h e key was to control the limited wiitcr sources or cross the plateau in one day. N o contemporary sources mention Crusadcr logistics. the) would not have hccri able to support thc army off the land. Saladin had attempted to draw the Crusader arm! aw:iy from S a f h r i y into the same waterless plateau region. the outconic ofthe Battle o f tiattin probably hinged on the Crusaders' inadequate logistics: specifically. In I 1x3. knowing the difliculties o f the terrain their army had 10cross. l'hc Crusader laidciship knew that Saladin's army had plundered the reyion :Iround libcrias and sacked the town. Even if the Crusader army had s u c c c s s f i i l l ~mndc the march to 'l'iherias. Crusader iiinriile liirthcr ?. aIid the weathcr in ihe Cialilenn plateau was well k n o w to both the Crusaders and Saladin. N o support would be avail:ihlc locall! for the Crusaders. Why the Crusaders did not bring a largc enough supplr train is iiot kiiown. . In thc past the Crusaders had used the region as a buffer againrr invading Moslem armies. lack of water.it the Hattle o f Hattin. The Crusaders did not have ii supply train and therefore did riot have enough water and fodder. Another major factor in the otiteome ot'thc l3atrle of I-lottin was the morale of the opposing armies. The Crusader Icadership. 'The Crusaders did not control the water sources and could not cross the platcou in one da). l h e Crusader arm)'s mnrale was Ion due to the recent disastcr oftlie battle .The terrain.

such as ileginald de Chatilloii and Count Ila>mond.ll. l l i c Crusader decision 10 march fo l.llihcrias. T h e Crusader ammy had a large number of inexperienced troops that had been called up h ! the iirricrc him.irrny hiid hccn lighting in S. 'I'Iic 7J . Due to the lien\! reliance offhe Crusader army on infantry.Ilic regional orientation provided easier intcgraiion of uii its. on i t s regular (iqt:i supported) troops. S!ricin troops tinder I'qi ad-lXii: thc Idi flank consisted o f Mesopotamian and Turkish troops under Ciokbori: arid the m i i n bod! was predominantly Efyptian troops under Saladiii. The quality ofthc m i n i n g :ind equipment of'thc Crusnder army \\.idin's campaign\ against /\lcppo anti Mosul and had experience working together. The disposition ofSal. Inlitntr!.ibcriac \\ithotit :I supply tram \\:is ricd to thc idea that The Cruwdcr ledership the Crusader army could cross the platc:iii and reach Tiherias i n one da!.ictory :itid .is very iineveii. rclicd TIic Moslem arm!. Saladin's army was also more homogenous :iiid used ro ligliriiig togctlicr. . thc strong leadership of Saladin.iladin'. The major contribution oftlie volunteer trwps ~ the north ofrhc Crusaders and to gather during thc Battle o f IIattin 'xis to screen the \ \ w d to hrusli to provide smoke. Troops under the command of the religious orders and tlic hordcr nobles.it the Springs of Crcsson. I'he composition of both armies iilso pla!cd a signiticant role. Moslem morale \\. 'l'hc nia. Redouiiis. aliiiost cxclusivcl\. armed religious pilgrims.eroded due to the lack of water 011 3 and 1 July.is high due to the \.iority ofthe . Thc right flank consistcd ofS. Mercenary inlgnfr!. and troops from the normally secure c o ~ s t acities l tiad little experience or training. had to rcaliLe that the army \vould he in contact \\itli the Moslems throughout tIic march.idin's army during tlic buttlc \vas regionally based. \\ere well cqiiippcd and trained 10 light iis a mil. and 'l'urcopolc cavatr! played lesser roles in Saladin's arm>. the lack oftraining nnd cqiiip!ncnt o f t h c majority ofthc infhirr! \ w s ii major \rcaknc while it also had a large number ofvoluntecr or irregular troops. the wcccssfiil stormiiig of.

The Crusudcr let1 iriiles army had to hrciik cnmp.il (Icss than tlirce thousand) casiiiiltics. the rate of march under siiiiilar conditions hy U. I>uc 10 the siic o f t h c forces involved.ince y a r d for tlie prcvicms l i v e days.Crusader camp at Satfiiriyn Iiud hcen harassed by the Mosleni udv. mid travcl over in one day. so there is 110 reason to believe that the Crusaders wo~ild inarcti unopposed. . To win lliu tactical battle.ind the q u a l i ~ y ol' lendership on horli sides. While ihcrc :ire ob\ ious ditYcrenccs bctmccn tlic rate (iftiiarch bct\\ccn the t\r. or placc Saledin's army iii ii position where it c o ~ ~not ld l i r u g c or receive logislic support.iccc?rnplishcd either ot'tlicsc chjeclivcs.clftli and tv. the Crusaders would ha\c Iiud to intlict enough ciisiialtie> 011 Salxliii's arm> to force t h m to withdraw.Even unopposcd. I tacliciil \ ictor) h ! tlic Crusaders was extrcnicl! unlikcly. the march would take :it lea51 l i \ e hours. and the Crusaders did not hii\'c control o f t t i c fixding sites o\cr the Jori1:in r i e r tliat S.iI:idin uscd as his logistics liklinc. . 75 . it i s unlikely \vDS: that tlie Crusader? could 11:ivc . hrtn their thrcc di\isions.The question rciiiiiins wlicthcr the Criissders had an opportitniiy to win IIIC Battle ol' Ilattin. not including thc riiiie nccdcd to hrcak camp and form di\ isions. Army i n h r r y is four to six kilotnctcrs pcr d u ~ . the terrain.S.cntielli ceniiirics. Saladill's arm) much more mohilc. The hest the Crusaders could liavc hoped for was to rclicvc ' I ' i b c r k with tninini. E\en i f t h c Crusaders had ample water :ind tra\clcii a l m g a r(iiite that pro\ idcd better protection and supporr.

ondon. _Ra\r!Ioni i l l of:lGoJs and the Fall 01' Jeriisalem(! 140. NJ: Princeton I!niversity I'rcsc.36). 117. 100-I I I . 120. 1993). I I S .I 1x7) (Princeton.lnrshallWhithcd Baldwin. I lattin I 187 . 120.a!!. IJK: Patrick Stephens.s Guide to the crusudep (Canihridpc. 10. "lbii al-. 122-1 2. 'Marshall Whithed Rald\\iii. 19x4).'Eraclcs as quoted i n Marshall Whithctl thldwiii. 1030). Arab I listorians (>lithe Crusade> (Los . NJ: I'rinccton University Press. I980). Ih 14 Lihellus as quoted in Marshall Whitlied Bnld%in. Kmrnond I l l of'lripolis and the Fall of ?_e_Tusaleiii ( I 140-1 1x7) (Princeton. "Ernoiil a s quotcd in Marshall Whithed Daldwin. "Ihn al-Althir a s quoted in I'ranccsco Gahrieli. I18 'lhitl. 1936). K A y y n d I l l o f ~ r ~ ) l i s . !Arab I-listoriuiis.76)..ibcllus as quoted i n bl\. NJ: I'rinceton I!niversity I'rcss. Imad ad-Din as quoted in Marshall Whithcd Ualduin.(Princeton. '*l. 8 8 4 0 .\lthir as quoted in Franccsco Gahricli. 19 I : Ihid. '"Ihii al-Althir a s quotcd in Franccsco Gahricli. 19. ( 1 4 : Universit! of Caliiimiia I'rcss. 'Ihid. l < a ~ I i i o ~ i ~ oif ll r l i p o l i s and tlic Fall ofJerusalem ( I 140-1 1x7) (I'rinccton.~~ the Crusades. 102. 76 . 1936). 1984). "Ernoul as quoted i n Marshall Whithcd Uuldwin. IJK: Osprq I'uhlisliing I. A. NJ: Princeton liiiivcrsity l'rcs\. R x m c p d 111 of Tripolis and the Fall ol'Jerusalcm ( I 1-10: I I X7) (Princcton.7.td. (Lcls hnzclcs.Angles.. a ! l d r h e a l l!>I' J x s a l c r n ( I 140-1 1x7) (Princeton. 1984). Ravmond 111 of'rripolis and the b..36).l' Jerusalem f 1140-1 1x7) . 123. CA: University of Culilnrnia Press. C A : University oI'CaliI'briiia I'rcss. NJ: Princetori Ilniversity Press. NJ: Princeton I!niversity Press. 124-125 -"'Ian Heath. NJ: Princeton Uniwrsity Press. CA: Ilniversit) of'Calilbrnia Press.Saladin's Circatest Victorv (1. l{uynondlII ofTripolis and thc T m C Jerusalem ( I 140-1 1x7) (Princeton. I21hnal-Althir as quoted in 1-rancesco Ciahricli. 62-64. 23-24. I 13.36). l9X-l). 19. Arab I l i s t o r i ~ i i l ~ ~Crusades ~ l ~ ~ l l e (Lo5 Angcles.. I 17. 19.JVarg4icgr. David Nicollc. &ah I-Iistdrians of:tlic Crusades (Los Angeles. "lbid.

.

I3ecause in tlie liast people are cursing 11s. Count I<aymond :iIso stated that he would restore tlic city a t his ohn expense.Knowing the prohlems the Crusader army \vould h c e due to terrain. shown tluriiig his Inng illness ( I I 8 5 to 1186) wlicti his vas\iils inade prcparatioii to h r w k a\ray from tln: ciiipirc. Saladin's political pvsition relied on his personal prestige. I he major li)rtilications i n tlie region were the great c a s t l c ~ ot' U d v i o r to the southwest ot'l'ihcrias :iiid Sated to tlic north\rcsr. l. climate. A l w . lhc only \ray the hattle could h a \ c iriipro\ed the strategic situiition of the Criisadcr Sratcs would have heen by iritlicting ii decisive dclcut uyain\t Saladin. logistics.is nci! ii major Ibrtilication. the dcci3ion to m:irch t o [tic rclict'under these conditions did nut meet tlic strategic objectives ol'the Crusaders. The instability of'Saladiii's position was clearl.1).saying t h t we no lonycr light the inlidcls hui . The nccd to attack tlic Crusudcrs was reinli)rced by ~ncnibers of Saladin's council ol:iriiirs nlio stated: '. and cnetny opposition. Saladin needed a victor> against the Crusaders to strengthen his po1itic.Voslcin norld. Saladin would not he able to keep liis arm> iii ~ l i c lidd indcliriitcl~.il position i n the .ibcrias could not he held Iiy the Moslems.and the Crusaders w u l d he able to quickly conceiitratc lbrce atid recapture (lie city. I'lie strategic h j e c t i \ e s ofthc Crusader Sintes n c r c to iiiiiintaiii iiii army i n hcing mid to protect the major torti1ic:itions that dcrkndcd tlic lrontier I iberins \\. I'Iic Crusader States hail hceii : I predorninnntl> del'enbi\c lorce siiicc the dcutli of K i n ? Almaric ( I 17. It was an isolated cir! o n the western hank o1'tlic Sea olGalilee. nor iriis it considered part o1'tlie fionticr dclictiscs.

n c y t i v e opinion iri the Ilol! I. arid if' the quote from Suladiii's s o n is correct. The only eff'cctivc use ofttic (:rusadcr heavy cavalry c a m at tlic end ol'tlic battle \\lien Si1l. The Crusadcrs. S o ire milst d o wnctliinp t o justir) otirselves and silencc' o i i r critic\. Count Raymond's reniporary iilliaiice with Saladin.ir c i \ i l irar. tic would h a k c been :hlc to stand up to any pressure lioin the Grand Master of'l'eniplars and an!. I dcciske victor!. the Crusaders probably intlicrcd the grcatcst cilsuiiltics oii the Moslems. was a prcdominantl! defensive f'hrcc. The cnmit! hetireen Count K a ~ r r i o r d and (icrard de Kidcfort was especially irnporrnnt il' the rcportcd midnight mccring between King Gtiy aiid Gerard de Itidefort actiial occured. the armies wcrc loo l a r y and the Moslem:. a11 contributed to an atmorphcre o f hostility and suspicion hct\rccn the senior le.To :icliic\c . thcrctiirc. with its hcav? reliance on i n h i t r y . hca\! cabalry. tlic Lloslcm coninimidc'rs would have to allow the Crusadcrt to lislit n sct piece Ibartlc \\liere the Crusadc'rs could niaxiiiiizc the tisc oftlicir major ad\aiit:ipe. At the Hatrlc ol'l Iattin. the Crusaders almost rciiclicd Sal:idin himself. .luly I 187. All ol'rhc dcci\ion-in.iders ot'rhc Crusader nrniy. . .The Crusadcrs did not have the inobilit! or tiiaitpo\rcr to coilduct an oll'ensi\e campaign \\itlioiit outside assistance. II'King (it!! had been a stronger ruler.Ic'ruralcin into two factions.Ilie illability to decisively use tlic'ir heavy cavalry \\as c\ idciit early on 4 . tlic 1ic. were too mc>hilc t o aIl(iw the Crusaderr to iii:ixiiiiix use ofthcir hca\> cavalry."' Tlic likclihood o f a decisive ('rusndcr victory was vcr! rclriote. The di\isiori ofthc Kingdoin d'.iking prohlenis \\ere thc rcsiilt ofrhc ircak and divided Criisadcr leadership. \\lien tlic tirst chargc hy the religious knights and C o u n t Raymond's chargc failed to intlict sipniticaiit daniagc on the Moslems.have hegiiri to light l l u s l i i i i \ instead.idin attempted to ovcrwlieliii the Crusadcr position. l'lic Crusader nrrny.aridr or Iluropc :Ii. arid rhc disaster at the Spriiigs of Cresson. risked tlicir entire arm! h r a battle that did iiot iiccd to be fought.it \rouId li:ivc 70 . In the last hours otthc battlc.

Saladin had taken into accouiit tlie ctkcts (if the terrain and cliiiiatc and used tticrn 10 ttiuir full advantu~c to shape the I3atrlc ot' I l a t t i i i . Saladill Iiud ii clear strategic vision and lirin control over thc army.ireas en.iladin hiid cxtciisivc experience. lii I IX7. wcsterii hanks o f t l i e Jordan river and \\as plunderiiif .dl . One otlicr major intluencc oii King (.. was iii a ver! siniilar position.ilso ensured flint his troops ncrc ucII supplied and that tnoralc reinaincd high Modern leadership. C.ird dc Kidcthrt tci rc\crw the aliiiost iiniiniiiioiis opinion oftlie Crusader nohility not to go the reliefot'Tibcrias. Instead.ispect to the Crusader leadcrship. m d a l m o s t had his marriage to the WIS King's si\ter annulled. .. Gii!. I'hc Battle of Hattin was the most dccisivc battle in the history oftlic ('rusndcr states. GI]! k i n g IIonever. G u ! kept the army at Safliiriya and Saladin \vithdrc\r Instead ofhcing commended tbr not risking tlie Crusader army for little gain. w a s superifir in a e r y . Guy wa. Saladin's arm! \\as camped along thr. then huilli. In contrast to the Crusader arm!. Kin? (iu) was iritlucnccd h ! (3cr. of any of his comrnantlers..resulted from the loss of Tihcrias. both prior to and during the Battle ofllattin. advised b! the iiohilit) 10 remain at Sai'fiiriy arid force Saladin to light the Crusaders ut SaiXiri!a.u! ma) h v c felt t1i. Sal. S.ii lie ncedcd to prove himself by mcirching to tlic r d i c f o f Tibcriiis.[ (if the Crusader camp a t Saftiiri!a. mid there were no doubts o w the loyalr\. 'l'lic Crusader States survived tor aliriost another two liiindrcd ycars hut never achic\cd tlic cxtcnt o f territory or the militar) strength they had h c l i m the battle. Saladin . his position \\as tiof w o i i g and lie relied on the \upport o f t h e court party.I Giiy KIS condemned a s coward: stripped of the hailliagc.5 decision to 90 to the rclicl'o1'Tihcri:is had tci be tlic results ofthe I I83 canipaign. iiftrr seven da!s.iu!.idin's political 80 . The Battle 01'1 lattin \vas Saladin's greatest victory and established him as the defcndcr ofttic M d e r n faith. the Lloslcm :irmy hiid strong Icndcrship.

and the Ayyubid empire was now established. 119. 'lbn al-Athir as quoted in Franccsco Gabricli: Arab Historians ofthe C-s Angclcs. logistics: and morale on the outcome of a battle. l h e Battle of Iiattin shows the importance of terrain. The Crusader States had survived for almost onc hundred years using a mostly defensive strategy.position in the Moslem world was ensured. There was no need to gamble the future ofthe Crusader States for an objcctive that did not significantly impact thcir strategic interests. 1984). it still provides uscfiil lessons i n military strategy and decision making. climate. The holy city of Jerusalem and the Dome ofthe Rock were restored to the Moslem faith. Also highlighted was the importance of the combined arms approach to warfare (infantry and cavalrv) and an understandins of the capabilities of your army. Probably the most critical lesson is the failure of the Crusader leadership to weigh the risks associatcd with the battle against the possible gains. The battle also shows the results orucak and divided leadership and the lack of strategic vision on the part ofthe Crusaders. While the Battle of Hattin was fought over eight hundred years ago.0s 81 . (1. (:A: University ofCalifornia Press.

Three primary sources were used in the rcscarcti ofthis papcr: Archhishop M illiarn 01' Tyre's &H&ory

o f k e d s done I ~ e y i d thc Sea: M.I<. Vorgati's

Lbe ('Iironiclc o f Lrnoul and

the Continuati(m ot' Williai~j~'vw~: and Francesco Gnhricli's Arah Historians 01 t l 1 . c . <;riisa&.

All three primary sources were written by individuals directly tied politically arid emotionally to
one oftlie protagonists. While this pro\ ides the iiutliors access to inlimnation on tlie 13;ittle 01'

Ilattin. i t leaves them open fix criticism of hitis. I tic biases ofthe authors will he discussed a> each source is evaluated. Regardless of bins. tlicse three books provide thr: Ibundation for most 01' the analysis done in tlie sccondury sources. O f the two Crusader contemporary sources. Ljji?!!)rv 01'r)eeds r h e Hevond the Sea i s considered one ofthe fixernost pieces of' medieval history due t o it'. c h i t ) and gcncral lack of hias. This document. written hy William. .Archbishop o f . i y e . is the basis for any stud) ofthe Crusades. William was Chancellor ofthe Kingdom of' Jerusalem f'rorri I I71 until his death ( I I 8 4 or 1185). Williani had intimate contact with all otthc major personalities in the Kingdom d' Jerusalem. Unfortunately. his history ofthe ('rusadcr States ends in I I X4.

The Chronicle of Ernoul and the Continuations of William._c!l:l>rg prescnrs a
conteniporar? account ofthe battle. Ihc author. in the service of Baliaii ot'lhelin. foiigtit in the battle. was captured. and later parolcd to Jerusalem where he was able to i n t e n iew other survivors
ol'the battle. His a c c w n t is the only eye\\itricss xeouiit ofthe battle from the Crusaders'

vic\\point. l l i s account is hiiiscd in tsvor ofthc role pla!cd by I<a>rnond Ill due to the politic:il viewpoilit of his employer Haliari i)tlhelin (a rna,jor all) ofKuy11iond Ill). Other contcmporar! historians. while riot acttiall! prcscnt at the b:itrlc. siibstuntintc Emoul's iiccount hut differ iwcr die roles p1;iyt.d by Raymond Ill and King Guy. Hoth I.atin sources suffer trom
;I

numbcr ofdiffcrcnt

editions ~ i n d transliitions. l l i i s is cspcciall! true i i i t l i Ilrnoul. whcrc the diffcrcn~ translations
~ i c t t i ~ i lcliiinsc ly the ordcr ofcvcnts during the battle.

Gahricli'.; book

;2yi!l?

Historians o f t h c Crusades is 3 coiiipcnditini of quotatioils i i n d
notic ofthe

Iiistorical vigncttcs froiii [lie three major Arah histori:ins ofthc time. I!nfortunatcl!.

historians \\ere a[ the battle: lionever. all were conlidants o f Saladirt atid had :icccss to the leaders

c!ftlic Moslem ;imiy. I'hetr accounts ofthe 13attlc ofl-lattin \\ere written within approsiiiiatcl! a
year o f t h c hattlc \vhcn ihc intixmation ivas still fresh. While these liistoriiiiir arc bi;iscd i n I'avor 01' Suladin. the accoiints of the battle agree with those provided by Crnoul, While the soiirccs listctl above wcrc the primnr! contcmporar! sotirccs I;)r most scconti:ir! works on the hattle. h e Ihllo\virif iiuthors \\ere ahlc to add sipniticantl\ to thc ticld o f stid!.. work specializes in ; I particul;ir aspect ofthc L.atiii Kiripdorri of.Icrusalcm that
study o f t h e Rattle ot'l lattiii. I he two exceptions arc t:hrcnkrcutz's h $ & c h !
ih

f'acli

pertinent to the

and Kuncirnan's A

1 li.;iorv . of the ('rus&.V

( ) I . . Both . works wcrc included to provide hiichground on events iind

considerations leading to the battle tiorii both the Crusader and Mvlotlcm perspcctivc. Marshall Baldwin's hook Kavmon? l l l o ~ l r i p o l i and s the Fall of the Kinadoin of Jerusalem is consitlcrcd tlic detinitiie stud!. oftliis crucial tigurc in the Battle o f Hattin. Baldwin provides one ofthc hcst and most dctuiled iiniilysis ofthc battle mid the role of I<:iymond 111. 'I'hc work draws on all availahlc contemporar!. sources and criticizes other \rell-hnown secondary work for incomplete rcvic\\ of source material or hias to\v:ird
:I

pxticular cause

Joliii La hlontc':, work E ~ ! c l a l Monarclp iii the I.atin Kinndom ot'.lerii~ikmI 100 to 1 1 9 1

while dated (19.;').

is one o f t h e classic hook5 011 the feudal strucriirc ofthc Crusader States. La

Monte clcnrl! lays out rhc I;.uJ,I

ohlig;itions ofthc Crusader tiobilit! arid how the whole structure

revolved around providing a stublc base o f inanpower to dcfcnd the Kiiigdoiii of.lcrusalcni. I Iic tciickil w i i c f u r c ofrhe Crtrsadcr States. while initiall! mirroring fhc ti.cltlal insfittilioiis in Wercrri Europe. ;iLlaptcd ro the particular requirements of tlic region. 1.a Monrc also ciplains tlic fciiikil rclntionship bmreen tlic Kingdom o1'Jcrusiilem. rhc l'rincipnlil) of Antioch. and the Count! 01' 'Tripoli. wliich played an important par1 in events leading to tlic battlc o t Hattin.
Ik. R. C. Sniail's Crusadiiix Warlhrc 1097-1 19.3 and Sir Charles Oiiiaii.:, A l.listcv\ ofl!i<

Art of W!ir ill the \,li&le

A I R arc tlie two Icadins studies of the iiiilitar) organizations. hattlcj.

and tactics ol'tlic L'rusadcr States. Oman's work. while dared ( I XOX). i\ tlic lirst scrioiis lirlciiipt iii

the h g l i s l i Iangu;igc to cxmninc tlic Bartle of Llattiii as a iiiilitary operation. His an;ily\is. \vhile
incomplctc. is uscd h ! iiiuny of the gencral hi5tori;iiis o f the crusade>. Sinail's \rork i s iiiiicli niorc
complerc and cxaniincs Crusading \v.arfHrc throiigli~iiit !lie period ofrlic k i r s t Kingdom of

Jcrwtlcin. 'l'his i( the most authoritative work on tlic organimtion. coriipositiori and lactics uscd by the Crusaders ot'the First Kiiigiom.
A ilistorv .

ofthe (:rusades Vol. I and jJ. edited hy Kenneth Sctron. i s iiii aiitliolos> 01'

individiial topics relating to tlic Crusadcs by thc prccinincnr authors in thcir !icld Includcil iii tlicsc anthologies arc five iirticlcs on thc Arab response to tlic growth oftlic Crusader states I>). Sir Hatniliton A. K. Gibh. one ot'thc lcading scholars oil fhc Lcnghid and Aiyuhid Muslini d!tiasrics.
In addition. M;irsh;ill l3aldwin has two articles on flic liiial )ears o f t h c First Kingdom.

I3ackground inaterial i s also probidcd 011 other rcgion;il actors th:i1 Iiud a dirccr or iiidirect clt;.ct rhc Latin Kingdom ot Jerusalem (the H!iantinc l h p i r c . the Normaii Kingdorri ofSicil>. a n d :lie Kingdom of (1 iliciiiii Arincnia ).
XJ

oii

many ofrlic ciirlicr narks (18x0-I 930) q w t e material without providing appropriate references. I l c has nrittcii cxtcnsivcly on botli lieids and has ovcr a do7cn hooks currcnrl!. Saladin still had pov. rtiirtccii sccondar) gciicral Iiiw)rics havc been consulted (and arc listed in the hihliography) t o observe ho\v these authors trciil [lie l3attlc of1 liiltin and \\li:Il sources thcy used in their writing. and h'orrhcrn Atricu. l'lic final secondary source listed is Sir Steven Kunciinun's A Ilistorv oftlie Crusades Vvl. S0mc of thcsc qtiota[ioiis could IIIIYChccn valuable i f vcrilicd: ho\vcvcr. Iraq. I. Il u is the lcadiiig Hritish historian o f t l i c (:rusades and the Hyiantinc Empire.cri'ul rivals in Turkey. Most svcondar! soiirccs focus almost cxclusivcl) 011 tlic conllict ! h i the C'rusadcrs' pcrspccthc and givc lirnitctl trciitmciit to thc problems and goals ofSal. j is helicvcd to bc thc most iicccssiblc and complete general history ot'tlic (.I'hrcnkrctitz's book M i 1 pro\ ides a dctailcd analyhis oi'the rise ol' Saladin m d events that ul'fected his policies toward the Crusaders.nlimun. due to lack ol'rcfcrcriccs thcy Iiiivc hccii omitrcd from this stud!. . Saladin needed a signilicanl victor) against tlic Crusaders.itcl~. To solidify his position. While milirarily dominant in rhc Irloslcin Middle I k t . Runciman has edited or contributed to every scholurly jotirnal coiiccriicd with the Crusades.rusadcs. H i s \wrk is thc only general histcry ofthc Crusades listed in this rcvicw: howcwr. in print.idin.

da~. and Sons. ~ \1. Koclicster.ll.1072 l. . Uo.r!isxfi. IOX-I Cirousset. Sim. !+'arkre iii the I . Marsliiill.Siiltiiii Y@: Lahore. A Warcanicrs (.ands. Ncn York: St. T h f l . 1070. 'I. Kiiigslord. Jolin I. The Crusades tliroiinli Arab Eves. I 0 5 5 L.Nc\r Maalout: Amin.hrcnkrcut/.itcd hy Noel Lindsiy. . cd. VT: I'liorsons P u h l i h w I O X & t. Huiili.l'rinolis and ~ I ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ I J i~ I 140-1 ~ s ~I X7).i 2 O l . Translated b\ Jon Rothncliilil. 10.. Tlic ( ' r u s a d g n d tlic sl~r oflficl. Putn.I. hicagtr: Voiiton and Co. i r l a r h u l l .ikS Archer. 1291. Rent. 19.l?:it bcti.irnb.Epic oftlie -~ C'riisides. i s I t . u t ~ ~ h .~~ii~l~ . New York: 1)ouhle. 1078 .K: C':inihridyc linivcrsily I'rcss.D0. I r. I. Mcron. I n .0s Aiigclcs: Ijnivcrbiry ( ~ ~ C ' i ~ l i h i i i a ' I I .Ki!!~?doni oft\rrncniii.. 1980 -- I-loilpsoii. Yorh: Orion Prcss. P. 1092. York: Ci...ii Monrc.Doran & Comp:iny. S i h C r s ofthe Fniili: Crusatlers an(j \lotlciris at M : ! [ . Kincwf Uald\riii. Franccsco.isc. flic (:rus:itlers i n j l i e IId\ I.36. & l i l i s t o r i a n s Press. 1970. Harold. Ytv. h i l a ! h1on:ircliv in tlic !. I X O X . Pakistan: Islaiiiic Hook Servicc. Knights o f a . 1981.irtin's I'rcss. Alhiiny. 1.atin Kinrdoin Of Jcrusalem I 100 Io York: Kraus Reprint Co.insl.. . Jcriis.Nev. I97X Biiriiiaii. r $ j e ~ ~ s a s \ i n ~ (: . Christopher. Armies and Enemies ol'tlic (:. Edward. 1070. 1983.ilcin: Israel Lniversities Press.n!nontl Ill of. 86 . bllarshiill Whithcd. 1. The Crusades. IIK: Patrick Stcvcns. ~- M'orthiiigton.30. 4. ii: Finuc:inc..A1 S q i Dooks. 11..iuitle to tlic ('rwse. ('ambridge. Konald C.ini's Sons. lhit ol'tlic C:rti\a&>. (iahricli. NY: Statc L!nivcrsiiy ol'Ic\v York I'ress. I%eha'al-lliii Yusef ihii Rali. I.l O 2 . Andrcw. I.. C'mhridgc. M. I3tn\eiiisti. Ltd. iind Cliarlcs I.cindoii: .S. m i l : or v. :uie Tmplars. 1076.itin m!siijfi. K. !he Cilicinii. .. I!K: IFIcsiprinl I A . Inn.. I I ~ I I I Princeton: Princctoii Ijniwrsity Press..

Mnycr. The I>rcam and thc . Mcl3ridc Xr Company. Sctton. 1986. C. Armstrong Xr Son. Canihridge.. A Ilistorv of Dccds Don~.td.I3cvond th~&us.ir in the Mid<llc . OK: Cambridge Ilniversit! Press. The Crusaders in Svria and the -. Kosenhault.. 1073. 1035. York: Stciii and l h y . Joshua. Neu York: Kohert &I. 1973. Netherl.lnds: 17. &&ti Ill and the Fall ofthe Crusadcr States.2.irndcn. 1. 1072. hlunro. I. Otitrerner. 1993. 1973. 1980. Jonathon. Camhridge. 1907.td. I O j . l l a i i s Ehcrhnrd. I I. Ncw York: G . The C'rusadcs. 1'. K. M. Oxhrd: O x h r d liniversit> Press. l h e Kinedorn ofjhe Crusa&j. I 174. ed. St Martin's Press. Oxtord: Clarcndon Prcss.2. Amir Hassan.1. Archbishop of Tyrc. . 1937. The Knights of Sr. ofthe Crusadcs. NI: 1 iniversity of Wisconsin Pres5. 1. I h v i d . lill. Crusading Warhrc. I981 I<ilcpSrnith. :A Ilistorv o f t h r Art of M.arid_s. The Chronicle ol'Ernotil and tlic Continuaticns ol' William 0j. Nev.N: Camhridge linivcrsity Press.gt Victory.lrcd by limil! Atwater rhbcock. Dana Cnrleron. Archon Ilooks. ed. C . Saladiii's Circat. A Ilist or^ ofthc ('rusodes V ~ l a Madison. . A Historv of the Crusadcs Vol.Neir York: Facts on File. Saladin. Prawr. 1990. J. 1930. . ILondon: Osprey Puhlisliing I.. Robson. I'aync. Joliri in Jerusalem and Cvprus c. Josl~ua. 1969. I. 1900. R. Michatid. 197. . Xew York: Octagon Books. Sir Stevai. 105 1 . The Feudal . Oman. A ~ E . Siddiqi. Kuwait: Islamic Book I'uhlishcrs. 1070. Saladin arid thc Saracens. Smail.Crusader Institutions. I-lattin I 187. Kenncih. . Rohert. Port Washingion. Osbrd: O x l i r d IJnivcrsity Press. I'utiiani's Soils.Tomb: a History ol' the Crusades. Translated b> W. 1051._ Hol\ I.I vrs. C'l': The Atla!.lransl. Cliarles. Brill. Joseph Francois. Jerusalern: Yad Izhnk Ilen-Zvi Institute. 87 . Ilccisive Rattles of' Islam. Runciman. 1986. Nohilitv and thc K i n d o m ot'Jcrus~a!em. . Nicholson.onclon: Osprey Publishing I.cidcn.:. N Y : Kennikiit Press. Charles J. Michaud's tiistorv-of tlig Crusades Vol. Nicolle. Rohcrt Imsrcnce. New York: A. 19x4. Praiser. William.ilrv. Morgan.. I'riricc d'Chiv. Trnnslatcd hy John Gillinghani. Loiidon: -. London: Tharncs and Iludson.

& t c i! . ' . Jc:in.." Sncculum .ikofSaladin. 1 Iic .m in rtic Middlc Ages. A .. "William o f Tyrc.UXl/: 58-72 Krcy." ."The Lords ofCncsarcn in the period ofthe C:rusadc\. " A n Accounl of 11ie Dattle of Hattin rcfcrring 10 thu Franhish Mcrcciinrics i n \llc Outrerner. tlic Making of nil Ilisturi. R.'l-cudal Ohligitionr i n \lie I.atin East.atins in Jcruscilem. ' Ildhury. John I.4rahic Sources Ibr IIlc I. "The Settlements of tllc I ." S p x t i l m X V I : I-10-106. C:. I<ichard. 1.a Moiite." Speculuiri X X V I I : 400-503.." Sl>ect~lum X X V I I : 168-177 RX ." Specdutx X X I I : 145161. k ' . l'rawcr. P.B\ m i t i o n K \ ! l : 328-356 (iihh. A. Joshua. 14.

S. KS 66027-1352 Defense Technical Information Center Cameron Station Alcxandria. John T. Army Command and General StaffCollcgc I Reynolds Avc. Navy War College Newport. Gawrvch Combat ! h i e s I n s t i h e USACCSC 1 Rcynolds Ave. VA 22.314 Naval War College Library Ilcwitt Hall US.I N I T I A L DISTRIR1. Cieorcle W. Fort Leavenworth. Broom Combat Studics Institute USAC(iSC I Reynolds Avc.I'I'ION LlS7 Combined Arms Rcscarch I. KS 66027-1 352 89 . Fort Leavenworth.ibrary U. KS 66027-1352 Dr. R I 0284 I -50 I0 Dr. Fort Leavcnworth.

of ccm~c-rcinl .d evalua::io:.4. prcductior. 0: T e s i dnd ' v a l s a t i o n . P r o : ~ ~ c L i .G ~Ln t e s t ar. ni1rta:y narduare.

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