Network Planing Criteria

TRANSMISSION PLANNING CRITERIA
PREPARED BY: PETER ANG SYSTEM PLANNING BRANCH

APPROVED BY: BILL BIGNELL TRANSMISSION DIVISION
REPORT NO. TDWP 78-97
January 2006
Printed: 28/02/2008
NETWORK PLANNING CRITERIA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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3.3.1.1 Transmission Lines ..............................................................................................................13
3.3.1.2 Power Transformers.............................................................................................................13
3.3.1.3 Loads.....................................................................................................................................13
3.3.1.4 Capacitor and Reactor Banks..............................................................................................13
3.3.1.5 Synchronous Generators .....................................................................................................13
3.3.1.6 Static VAr Compensators (SVCs) .......................................................................................13
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File#: SDV/77/PC1(156)V1
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5.2.1.1 Transformers operating in parallel.......................................................................................36
5.2.1.2 Transformers not operating in parallel ................................................................................37
5.2.1.3 Usable Firm Capacity...........................................................................................................37
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5.2.2.1 1% Risk Factor “m” Factor ..................................................................................................38
5.2.2.2 Applicable Substations.........................................................................................................39
5.2.2.3 Load Shedding .....................................................................................................................40
5.2.2.4 System Spare Transformer..................................................................................................40
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5.2.3.1 Applicable Substations.........................................................................................................41
5.2.3.2 Unbalanced Transformer Loadings .....................................................................................41
5.2.3.3 Rating of RRST ....................................................................................................................42
5.2.3.4 NCR Capacity .......................................................................................................................42
5.2.3.5 Substations with Dissimilarly Rated Transformers .............................................................42
5.2.3.6 NCR Capacity < Firm or 1% Risk Capacity ........................................................................43
5.2.3.7 Installation of System Spare Transformer Following Deployment of RRST .....................43
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Transmission Planning Criteria Overview .................................................................... 7
Figure 2. Highest Acceptable Level and Duration of AC Temporary Overvoltage. .................... 25
Figure 3. Off Frequency Limits for a Typical Steam Turbine. .................................................... 28
Figure 4. Voltage Performance Parameters.............................................................................. 31
Figure 5. Portion of Load Duration Curve ................................................................................. 38
Figure 6. Short and Long Term Boundaries of the CBD............................................................ 46
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Transmission Elements Qualified as Single Contingency (N-1 Criterion) .................... 21
Table 2. Combinations of Transmission Elements Comprising a Double Contingency (N-2
Criterion) .................................................................................................................. 21
Table 3. Step - Change Voltage Limits ..................................................................................... 23
Table 4. UFLS Scheme Settings (South West Interconnected System).................................... 29
Table 5. UFLS Scheme Settings (North West Interconnected System) .................................... 29
Table 6. CBD Circuit Outage Criteria (Applies to HV Plant Only).............................................. 45
Table 7. CBD Switchgear Outage Criteria (Applies to HV plant only)........................................ 45
Table 8. CBD Major Failure Criteria.......................................................................................... 47
Table 9 Exceptions to the N-1 Criterion - Major Zone Substations............................................ 48
Table 10. Exceptions to the N-1 Criterion - Minor Zone Substations......................................... 49
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PART A – TRANSMISSION PLANNING CRITERIA
The addition or alteration to the power system of:

• transmission lines
• transformers
• generation or
• load
will impact on the performance of the system.
Western Power Corporation (WPC) is the custodian of Western Australia’s power system and a
guardian of system stability, security, reliability and quality of supply for all system
users/customers. Although the planning criteria may not be applicable to privately funded loads or
generators it will be used to assess whether or not they effect the stability, security, reliability and
quality of supply for other users. The “Electricity Transmission Access – Technical Code”,
hereinafter referred to as “Technical Code”, and planning criteria documents are intended to
prevent detrimental impacts on other system users that may occur due to additions and changes to
the power system. The technical requirements for the system are based on the following
documents:
• Technical Code
• Transmission Planning Criteria
• Quality of Electricity Supply
• Australian Standards
This document presents the planning criteria used by WPC to ensure that WPC'
s transmission
systems:
• provide acceptable quality of electricity supply
• provide an acceptably reliable electricity supply
• provide adequate security of electricity supply
• maintain safety standards
• satisfy environmental standards
• are developed at the lowest cost possible whilst meeting the constraints imposed by all of the
above.
The transmission planning criteria in this document may not be applicable to privately funded
interconnections to customer loads or generation provided that the system stability, security,
reliability and quality of supply to other users are not effected.
The limits that are applied to loads of individual users with regards to quality of supply are dealt
with in the Technical Code issued by WPC.
The concept of transmission system planning and the rationale behind the planning criteria are
discussed in Section 2 of this document.
The guidelines for transmission system planning, of particular use to planning engineers, are given
in Section 3 of this document. Section 3 outlines the range of technical and environmental
considerations to which the planning criteria relate.
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The information provided in Sections 2 and 3 form the basis on which planning criteria and limits
are developed in Section 4.
The technical limits that are applied to customers with regards to private interconnection of
generation or load are dealt with in the Technical Code and Sections 3 & 4 of this document.
The role of planning criteria are to help strike a balance between customers'desire for a secure,
reliable, high quality electricity supply and the desire for this service to be provided at the lowest
cost. At the same time, environmental and safety restrictions must be taken into account. Different
types of customers have different expectations with respect to their electricity supply. In defining
this balance, the requirements of the customer and the potential impact of the planning criteria on
these requirements need to be considered.
Where judged necessary, recommendations may be qualified by risk/benefit analysis and other
considerations such as capital investment priorities, social needs, the environment and land use
constraints. In some cases this may mean a more ‘lenient’ technical solution is permitted, while in
other cases a stringent performance criterion may be applied. WPC has an obligation to meet the
technical requirements for the transmission system as legislated in the Technical Code.
It is the responsibility of WPC to ensure that the WPC transmission facilities will provide:
• a safe system
• adequate supply reliability
• adequate security of supply
• adequate quality of supply
Whilst meeting these technical constraints, financial efficiency is pursued by adopting least-cost
system expansion planning. Furthermore, transmission planning must take into account physical,
social and environmental constraints.
An appropriate balance must be achieved between the opposing goals of providing a technically
adequate transmission system whilst minimising costs (to help keep charges “low”). WPC is to
endeavour to make a profit, consistent with maximising its long-term value.
The transmission planning criteria are designed to provide a balance between these opposing
goals. The planning criteria are used to establish the adequacy of forecasted system performance
(with changing load growth and load characteristics) and to determine the need for and timing of
system augmentation or re-configuration. System augmentation plans are then developed which
will satisfy the planning criteria and environmental constraints.
Figure 1 illustrates The Various Aspects Of The Transmission Planning Criteria.
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WPC’s Corporate Safety Policy states that:

‘Safety is the priority value for all aspects of WPC’s business. WPC facilities
will be constructed, maintained and operated to ensure public safety.’
WPC' s motivation in promoting safety as a priority is to achieve a safe environment for employees
and the public.
New projects, additions, or changes to an existing installation should be planned, designed,
constructed, maintained and operated to ensure safety.
The major issues addressed by WPC’s Safety Policy that are relevant to transmission planning are
discussed in Section 3.
The contingency criteria or outage criteria perform two roles:

• they establish the outage conditions for which system performance is examined in relation to
the other planning criteria
• they determine the amount of load that may be shed and the restoration times required for
particular outage conditions.
The contingency criteria, in combination with the reliability criteria, set the reliability performance
level at which the system must adhere to.
The reliability of a transmission system relates to its ability to continue to supply customers given
the finite probability of outages (either planned or forced) of one or more items of plant that make
up the system. In combination with the contingency criteria, the reliability criteria effectively set the
reliability level at which the system (or ‘sub-divisions’ of the system) performance is planned to
match.
This aspect of transmission system planning requires detailed study of the steady state and
dynamic state interaction of the generation and transmissions ‘sub-systems’.
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The steady state criteria apply to the normal continuous behaviour of a power system and cover
post disturbance behaviour once the system has settled.
Satisfying the steady state criteria involves providing sufficient capacity in the system, at whatever
voltage level, to overcome specified contingencies. If insufficient capacity or ‘adequacy’ is
provided, then the various protective measures on WPC' s or customers'plant may react - leading
to varying degrees of loss of supply.
As illustrated in Figure 1, the steady state planning criteria are designed to ensure that there is an
acceptably high probability that:
• voltage levels will be within acceptable maximum and minimum limits
• system frequency will be within acceptable maximum and minimum limits
• voltage fluctuations will be maintained within acceptable limits
• appropriate plant ratings or capacity will not be exceeded.
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These limits are discussed in detail in Section 3. When these limits are forecast to be violated,
some form of action is taken – either system augmentation works (discussed in Section 2.6) or load
management measures (see Section 2.7)
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Stability criteria apply during and immediately after a disturbance before equilibrium conditions are
achieved.
The stability criteria outlined in Figure 1 relate more directly to the security of the system. The
planning criteria are designed to ensure that with an acceptably high probability the system
remains stable following system disturbances that may result in transmission plant outages.
The following aspects of system stability are covered by these criteria:
• transient stability
• dynamic stability
• voltage stability
• frequency stability
These are discussed in Section 3. When either one of these stability criteria is forecast to be
violated, some form of action is taken – either system augmentation works (discussed in Section
2.6), load management measures (see Section 2.7) or control system modifications (see Section
2.8).
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Quality of supply criteria regulate or restrict the ‘contamination levels’ of the voltage and current
waveforms in the system. Satisfactory performance of the system according to quality of supply
criteria is generally checked when some form of augmentation is proposed and with the advent of
large new loads. In the latter case, the criteria are applied to the new customer load to ensure that
it will not cause quality of supply problems for existing (and future) customers.
The aspects of supply that are checked are:
• voltage fluctuation
• system frequency
• harmonic voltage and current
• voltage unbalance
• electro-magnetic interference
These factors are discussed in detail in Section 3.
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Statement of WPC’s corporate environmental policy:
‘The management and workforce will minimise adverse environmental effects
while providing for the efficient and reliable generation, transmission and
distribution of electricity’
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WPC' s motivation towards meeting this objective is reinforced by the legislative framework for
environmental control in Western Australia established by the Environmental Protection Act (1986).
Under provisions of the Act, any new project or change to an existing installation which may have a
significant impact on the environment must be referred to the Environmental Protection Authority
(EPA) for assessment. Procedures established under the Act are then followed to gain appropriate
environmental approvals.
The major issues addressed by WPC’s Environmental Policy that are relevant to transmission
planning are discussed in Section 3.
The need for system augmentation is assessed by comparing the planning criteria with system
performance for:
• safety
• increasing load levels
• changing load demand patterns
• particular load characteristics
• changes to the system configuration
In order to satisfy the performance levels, be they adequacy, security, or quality levels, least cost
and effective plans are developed. The extent of the system augmentation works are dependent
on:
• load forecasts
• the anticipated maximum demands of the customers
• the anticipated maximum demands of wheeling due to Open Access to transmission systems
• the anticipated revenue return which will be provided
• special conditions of the customer's load (eg. lifetime considerations, whether the load will
affect the quality of supply to other customers, security of supply required for various
processing works). If augmentation is required, it will usually be customer funded.
In some cases, system augmentation works may also be justified on an economic basis where
there are immediate benefits in return for capital invested. Examples include the installation of
shunt capacitors and the provision of supply at higher system voltages to reduce system operating
losses.
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Rather than incur capital expenditure on system augmentation works in response to imminent
violation of a planning criterion, it may be possible to change the load characteristic by applying
some form of ’demand management‘.
Several strategies have been identified as options for use by WPC to control peak loads:
• Transfer of load: this involves permanent transfer or providing for temporary (emergency)
transfer of a portion of load to one or more adjacent zone substations.
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• Curtailable loads and energy: customers are offered an incentive to curtail demand during
times of system peak. WPC has in place several contracts with large customers whereby upon
request the customer curtails their load in return for a compensatory payment or a lower tariff.
• Time of use pricing: this strategy relies on modifying tariffs to encourage customers,
particularly commercial ones, to restrict their peak demand - nominally by shifting their demand
to a time that attracts a much lower tariff.
• Co-generation: this involves the purchase of excess power by WPC from industries that have
their own generating plant. Although its primary application is towards deferring new
generating plant on the system, it is relevant to transmission planning because it could provide
additional capacity on the system in a particular area (deferring the need for transmission
reinforcement).
The applicability of one or more of these strategies must be determined on a case by case basis.
Overcoming stability criteria limits usually involves some form of system augmentation, however
control system modification can also be useful.
Exitation automatic voltage regulator (AVR), power system stabiliser (PSS), governor and voltage
regulator tuning can increase system damping which, in turn, extends stability limits.
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Detailed economic analyses are usually not required for fully funded customer projects or essential
(safety related) projects.
Economic analysis serves four functions in relation to power system planning:
• it indicates the return on proposed capital investment
• it facilitates the selection of the most cost effective option
• it facilitates the prioritization of projects relative to other projects which are all competing for
limited resources
• it facilitates the refinement of the planning criteria
Cash flow analysis can provide a realistic estimate of the return on the capital investment.
Typically, the net present value, internal rate of return and discounted pay back period are used.
These figures are used for two purposes:
• to assess if the project meets specified hurdle rates
• to prioritize projects against other projects, allowing Management to allocate (limited) funds
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In this section, each suite of planning criteria is described. This information provides the
background for application of the planning criteria to the WPC’s transmission network, as
presented in Section 4.
Every power system should be equipped with appropriate control and protection facilities to
withstand and overcome major system disturbances. All additions or changes to the existing
system will change the system’s performance and must be subjected to review by system
studies against appropriate criteria. Such a review enables the formulation of technical
requirements for projects.
Transmission Planning Criteria is a combination of standards applied to maintain system
integrity, reliability and quality. The transmission criteria are applied to protect the interest of all
system users in terms of security, reliability and quality of supply.
Safety is a high priority in all planning, design, construction, operation and maintenance
activities carried out within the power system.
The safety criteria perform the following roles:
• ensures solutions that minimise risk to the public and the WPC’s employees
• ensures solutions that minimise risk to the power system and other plant
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Two deterministic criteria are used in the transmission planning contingency criteria: the N-1 and
N-2 criteria.
The N-1 criterion simply means that the consequences of an outage of any one of the N
components that make up the transmission system must be examined.
The N-2 criterion is usually applied only for the most important system elements (such as the
largest system generator(s) or transmission grid lines). N-2 means that the consequences of two
coincident outages (one planned and one unplanned) of transmission elements, at or below 80% of
peak load, are examined.
These criteria are termed ‘deterministic’ because they are based on an examination of a limited
number of outage scenarios for which the consequences are examined by computer simulation. It
determines whether such N-1 and N-2 contingencies would be acceptable if they were to occur.
The steady state criteria generally define the adequacy of the power system. This is defined by
CIGRE as:
‘The ability to supply the aggregate electric power and energy requirements
of the customers within the component ratings and voltage limits, taking
account of planned and unplanned outages of system components.’
In the following sub-sections, the various components of the steady state planning criteria are
defined and explained. In each case an examination of each aspect of system performance is
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carried out taking into account planned and unplanned outages of system components. The
requirements differ between the nominated sub-systems of the transmission network, as defined
and discussed in Section 4.
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In planning a network it is necessary to assess the reactive power requirements under light and
heavy load to ensure that the reactive demand placed on the generators, be it to absorb or
produce reactive power, does not exceed the capability of the generators.
Depending on the voltage regulator setting and type of control relative to the rest of the system, a
given generator may supply a disproportionate share of the MVAr load on the system. As a worst
case, protection may prevent overloading of the generator by tripping it and could lead to cascade
tripping of all the generators off the system. Alternatively, for a reactive power demand shortfall,
system voltage will fall until the reactive power demand matches supply. In cases of severe
shortfalls of reactive power, the voltage may collapse to very low levels.
Power System studies are therefore undertaken at light system load (to check if there is sufficient
reactive power absorbtion capability in the system) and at peak load (to check if there is sufficient
reactive supply capability in the system) for a range of outage scenarios.
When fully loaded, lines absorb reactive power. At light loads the longer lines may produce
capacitive VArs known as line charging.
Transformers always absorb reactive power, whereas cables almost always produce reactive
power due to their high capacitance.
Loads generally demand reactive power. A load at 0.95 power factor lagging implies a reactive
power demand of 0.33kVAr per kW of power.
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Capacitor and reactor banks provide static reactive power supply and absorption capability
respectively.
Synchronous generators are the main source and sink of reactive power. The balance of reactive
power required to maintain voltages within specified limits throughout the system is generally
supplied by the synchronous generators connected to the system. Different generators have
different reactive power production and absorption capabilities.
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SVCs can perform a variety of functions in addition to high speed continuous voltage control
including phase voltage balancing, damping of power system oscillations and control of load
rejection over-voltages. These functions are achieved by production or absorption of reactive
power.
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Different voltage limits are specified at different points in the system with the goal of providing
residential customers with nominal 240/415 volts with a maximum variation under normal steady
state conditions of ±6%. The ±6% factor is established by statutory limits.
Voltage limits are set at levels which ensure that voltage fluctuations at the customer’s supply point
are, with a high degree of probability, tolerable by the customers'electrical equipment.
Voltage fluctuations are caused by switching of transmission elements or customer loads. Real
power swings between two groups of generation may cause voltage disturbances or oscillations
(described as transient voltage dips).
The consequences of large step changes in voltage are:
• perceptible flicker in lighting
• voltage at customers'premises falling outside WPC'
s adopted limits
• possible voltage instability due to load non-linearity
• mal-operation of some equipment
Four categories of voltage limits are considered:

Steady State Voltage Limits:
Steady State Voltage limits should be maintained during steady state operation of the system.
Temporary Over-voltage Limits:
Temporary over-voltages are power frequency over-voltages resulting from system disturbances
such as load rejection or phase-to-earth faults.
Transient Over-voltage Limits:
Transient over-voltages are electromagnetic in nature and are the result of switching operations or
lightning strikes.
Transient Voltage Dip (TVD) Limits:
Transient voltage dips (see Figure 4) are the result of real power swings or pole slips of a
generation group against the main system generation (synchronous instability). The limits prevent
loss of customer load, system voltage collapse and synchronous instability.
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System frequency will fall if there is insufficient total generation to meet total power demand.
However, due to the frequency dependency of loads, the reduction in system frequency will also
result in a reduction in power demand. If this reduction in total load as a consequence of the
reduction in system frequency is insufficient to restore balance between total generation and power
demand, then loads must be disconnected and continue to be disconnected until the frequency
recovers to an acceptable level.
The consequences of prolonged operation at less than nominal system frequency are: damage to
generating plant and malfunction of some frequency dependent equipment and devices. The
alternatives to shedding load are long-term unavailability of damaged equipment, costly repairs and
restricted supplies to customers.
If turbo-generators experience a sudden decrease in the electrical power required, the turbines will
speed up (system frequency increases). This is because the retarding torque on the turbine shaft
is suddenly much smaller. The extreme case of complete loss of load on the shaft could lead to
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over-speeding with possible drastic mechanical breakdown. To avoid this, several mechanical
safety mechanisms are usually built into the machines.
Mechanisms of effective and efficient load shedding are installed in the transmission system to
facilitate the maintenance of nominal system frequency.
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• summer continuous rating
• winter continuous rating
• cyclic rating
The planning criteria enables maximum plant utilisation (to defer system augmentation) while
ensuring that items of plant are not exposed to excessive risk of damage, accelerated ageing or
tripping (due to protection operation).
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Additions to the existing systems in the form of extra lines, transformers or generation may
increase the fault level throughout the system or within some area of the system.
For safety reasons, the fault level throughout the transmission system must not exceed the fault
rating of any equipment reduced by a safety margin in that part of the system at any time.
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System stability is the ability of a power system when operating under the worst possible
credible system load/generation pattern and the most severe N-1 and N-2 contingencies of
transmission plant to maintain system integrity, synchronism, and remain within desired limits
when subjected to system disturbances. Various types of instability are considered. Instability
due to rotor angle has two main types: dynamic and transient stability. Dynamic instability can
occur as a result of small system disturbances. Transient instability, on the other hand, usually
occurs as a result of larger more sudden disturbances.
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Transient stability is related to the ability of a power system to maintain/retain system synchronism
when subjected to a severe disturbance when operating under the worst credible system
load/generation pattern and the most severe N-1 and N-2 contingencies of transmission plant.
Disturbances include three phase faults on transmission facilities, loss of generation, loss of a large
load or other failure. If the relative rotor angle between one (or a group of) synchronous machines
and the rest of the system generation reaches and exceeds 180° without returning, a ‘pole slip’ and
loss of synchronism or synchronous instability are deemed to have occurred.
Some of the factors influencing transient stability are:
• the impedance between generation sources (XT); higher impedance makes the link weaker or
less stable
• generator reactance (lower reactance reduces the initial rotor angle)
• inertia of the generating unit (higher inertia produces a slower rate of change in rotor angle)
• fault clearance time (faster clearance results in lower rotor angle swings)
Transient stability is usually associated with the effect of large disturbances to the system which
need to be removed or cleared in order to prevent system instability or disintegration. Any
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faulted or not faulted plant that could potentially lead to system instability must be disconnected
or separated from the healthy system.
A three-phase short-circuit is selected as the basis for establishing transient stability limits. A
significant number of all HV line faults are three-phase faults. Combinations of events which have a
’reasonable’ probability of occurring should be considered. An example is a single phase fault
together with a stuck breaker or single phase reclosing on lines.
When a fault occurs at the terminals of a synchronous generator the real power output of the
machine is greatly reduced as it is supplying a mainly inductive circuit. However, the input power
to the generator from the turbine has no time to change during the short period of the fault
(governors are relatively slow) and the rotor has a tendency to gain speed to absorb the excess
energy. At the same time, generation and loads remote from the fault do not suffer the same low
voltages as generation close to the fault. This results in an increase in load demand on the remote
generation that is not matched by the input power. The rotors on the remote generators therefore
slow down as energy is absorbed to meet the load demand. This effect actually results in the rotor
angles of the remote generation moving in the opposite direction to those of the generators near
the fault. If the fault persists long enough the rotor angle between machines or between groups of
machines will diverge (increase) continuously and synchronism could be lost.
Transient stability is based on the relative rotor angle swing between two synchronous machines.
Relative rotor angle swings in excess of 90° may lead to the situation where the rotor angle does
not return and the angle increases beyond 180° and ‘pole slip’ or synchronous instability occurs. In
general, an initial generator relative rotor swing angle which does not exceed 120° could be
considered as stable. Relative rotor angle swings of 120° produce transient voltage dips of
approximately 0.25 to 0.30pu (that is the voltage drops to about 0.70 to 0.75pu). An initial relative
rotor swing angle which exceeds 120° with subsequent swings of lower magnitude would be
considered as marginally stable. Relative rotor angle swings exceeding 120° have usually only a
small margin before pole slipping occurs. An initial relative rotor swing angle which is higher than
120° may result in a pole slip or repeated pole slipping.
The 120° maximum relative rotor swing angle limit is only a ‘rule of thumb’ particularly in multi-
machine or multi-group system.
Relative rotor angle swings in excess of 120° or transient voltage dips in excess of 25% may result
in the following detrimental effects on the system:
• system voltage collapse
• motor load loss on undervoltage
• electrical and mechanical stress on system and users’ plant
• pole slipping (due to low synchronising torque at voltages below 0.75pu)
These impacts on a power system are generally not acceptable and need to be prevented.
Limiting the transient voltage dip (TVD) resulting from real power swings or rotor angle swings will
minimise these detrimental impacts on the power system (see Figure 4) One of the major factors
affecting transient stability is the fault clearance time (FCT). The critical fault clearance time is the
longest time that a fault can be allowed to remain on the system while ensuring that transient
instability does not occur. Critical fault clearance times (CFCT) should be established for the
various fault types at key locations. Protection must then be installed and set to ensure that the
critical fault clearance times are achieved.
Generation connected to remote areas, of the main power system via long transmission
interconnections are vulnerable to pole slipping. Generation units vulnerable to pole slipping under
abnormal system conditions, (for example a stuck breaker and a multi phase fault) should be
provided with pole slip protection. The function of pole slip protection is to remove the unstable
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generator from the system and prevent the disturbance from causing major problems to other
users. Pole slip protection only removes the pole slipping generator from the system after the
machine has slipped at least one pole. Pole slip protection only attempts to minimise the damage
to the machine and other users plant. Pole slipping protection is a relay of last resort and should
not be used instead of clearing the fault within the critical fault clearance time.
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Dynamic stability is the ability of a power system when operating under the worst possible system
load/generation pattern and the most severe N-1 and N-2 contingencies of major transmission
plant to:
• damp transient oscillations,
• return to a steady state condition and,
• retain synchronism.
when subjected to small disturbances. A small disturbance may include the effects of continuously
changing system load, switching of lines, and larger disturbances including faults.
A system may not become unstable on the initial rotor swing but may subsequently become
unstable due to poor damping of the rotor swings. This is known as dynamic instability. Dynamic
stability usually applies to power oscillations between individual generators or groups of
generators. If the oscillations are not positively damped they can build up in magnitude until
generators lose synchronism with each other.
Voltage oscillations can occur in a power system as a result of system power swings or other
system resonance conditions.
Dynamic stability can be improved by using power system stabilisers (PSS) on affected
generators. These provide a feedback to the generator excitation control systems to damp out
power oscillations. Static VAr compensators (SVC) can be used to achieve a similar effect.
' ) 2% 1 $ #%# 6) 2% 1 /2%% 7 . 8" .2- - , 7 #-1 9

The term voltage stability is usually applied to heavily loaded systems where an operating point is
reached beyond which an increase in load demand cannot be met because beyond this operating
point, or voltage stability limit, the voltages collapse.
The stability of an asynchronous load is determined by the voltage across it; if this becomes lower
than a critical value, induction motors may become unstable and stall. In a power system it is
possible for both synchronous and load instability to occur. The former is more probable.
The possibility of an actual voltage collapse depends upon the nature of the load and the fault
clearance time. If the load is stiff (constant power) the voltage collapse is aggravated. If the load is
soft, eg. heating, the power falls off rapidly with voltage and the situation is alleviated.
Furthermore, voltage oscillations can arise within a power system as a result of resonance
conditions. Resonance effects are generally caused by a series resonance between a capacitance
and an inductance element. System resonant frequencies can exist above and below
synchronous frequency and a latent resonance can be excited by a variety of system disturbances
(large or small). If a resonance is excited following a system disturbance, then oscillations
appearing as system voltage amplitude modulations can arise. If the damping mode of the system
at the resonant frequency is positive then the oscillation will be absorbed by the system. If,
however, the damping is negative, the oscillations will build up and lead to supersynchronous
(>50Hz) or subsynchronous (<50Hz) instability. If corrective action (typically in the form of load
shedding) is not taken then these forms of oscillations can lead to damage of system and customer
equipment. Locations with low fault level and a weak electrical connection are prone to sub-
synchronous oscillations or resonance.
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Voltage collapse and voltage oscillation damping criteria are specified to ensure voltage stability is
maintained. Customers or independent generators who may cause subsynchronous
resonance/oscillations (ie by installing series capacitors) must provide appropriate measures at the
planning and design stage to prevent introduction of this problem to the WPC system or other user
systems.
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The frequency stability criterion relates to the recovery times for excursions of the system
frequency from the steady state limits.
Under-frequency load shedding relays are installed at zone substations to shed load at pre-
determined levels following loss of a major generator or its interconnection.
(
Quality of supply criteria sets the acceptable limits on the amount of distortion or corruption of
the current and nominal voltage waveforms from the pure 50Hz sinusoidal waveform.
) 2% 1 #, # .
These limits have been discussed in Section 3.3.2.
The limits are listed in Section 4.
. , " 3 4 -/
These limits have been discussed in Sections 3.3.3 and 3.4.4. The limits are listed in Section 4.
", 2-#/ ) 2% 1 - 4"" -

Harmonics relate to the distortion of voltage and current waveforms from the ideal supply at
constant voltage and constant frequency.
Some of the main sources of harmonics are:
• Switching forms of control based on power thyristors as used in:
arcing load such as those of arc furnaces
thyristor-controlled reactive-power compensators
thyristor-controlled series capacitors
frequency converter (ie cycloconverter)
HVDC converter stations
high-power ac/dc conversion for the supply of loads such as those of smelters
thyristor-controlled motor load
other industrial and domestic loads including thyristors.
• harmonics in the magnetising current of transformers, particularly the third harmonic, due to the
non-linear form of transformer magnetisation characteristics
• waveform distortion in rotating machines in transient periods immediately subsequent to
disturbances to steady operating conditions
• variations in air-gap reluctance which set up a continuous variation in flux which in turn distorts
wave shapes
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• flux distortion in synchronous machines arising from pulsations and oscillations in the field flux
caused in turn by movement of the poles in front of the projecting armature teeth
The adverse effects of harmonics in power systems can be widespread:

• Thermal stressing in rotating machines and transformers
• Overloading of shunt capacitor banks
• Interference with:
power line carrier communications systems
public telecommunication facilities
protection functions
the firing sequence in thyristor controllers
• possible resonances at harmonic frequencies
• errors in metering and instrumentation
• malfunction of computer equipment
• rotating machine vibration
The total and contribution limits imposed by WPC are listed in Section 4.5. Individual non-integer
(fractional) harmonics should be included in the distortion limits by incorporation into the nearest
even harmonic limit.
' % / "2!, 1 - #/ - ": " -/

When power and telephone lines run in parallel, voltages sufficient to cause high noise levels may
be induced into communications circuits under certain conditions.
The major problem, however, is due to ground faults producing large zero-sequence currents in the
power line which induce voltage into the neighbouring circuit.
The limits are based on the requirements of Australian Standards.
) 2% 1 -$ % - /
An internationally accepted standard for voltage unbalance is the ratio of applied negative
sequence voltage to positive sequence voltage should be less than 1%. This level can be
acceptable for induction motors.
Voltage unbalance in the transmission system due to asymmetry of transmission lines is reduced
in WPC' s systems by line transposition.
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'
Figure 1 illustrates the various aspects of transmission planning criteria. In this section, the
planning criteria applicable to the WPC’s transmission networks of the South West Interconnected
System (SWIS) and to the North West Interconnected System (NWIS) are presented.
' (
Appropriate system performance will be maintained by meeting the technical requirements
contained in the Technical Code and the Transmission Planning Criteria.
Adequate System Performance will be ensured by fulfilling the following criteria:
• contingency
• reliability
• steady state
• quality of supply
• stability
'
The transmission system, that interconnects generation and terminal stations, consists mainly of
transmission lines, transformers, busbars, switchgear and other circuit components. Terminal
stations are included in the transmission grid.
Loss or outage of a transmission system major component like a breaker, busbar, line,
transformer, or generator, etc. usually affects the transfer capacity. The main purpose of the
contingency criteria is to ensure the adequacy of the system.
' 2- #-1 -/ "# "# :2" 24 5 ; . - "/2- - / . , 6 ; 9

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N-1 criterion:
The system must be capable of withstanding the loss of any single
component at any load level and for any generation schedule.
Notes:
1. The system is generally examined under normal generating schedules with the machine which has the
largest impact on the contingency being examined out-of-service
2. The single component referred to in the above criteria include those listed in Table 1 below.
The N-1 contingency criterion applies to:

• all aspects of the steady-state criteria
• all aspects of the stability criteria
• all aspects of the quality of supply criteria
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N-1 Outages
Transmission Line
Transformer
Static VAr Compensators
Busbar
Circuit Breaker
N-2 Criterion:
The system must be capable of withstanding one unplanned outage
coincident with one planned outage of transmission elements in the
combinations listed in
Table 2 at up to 80% of peak system load.
In relation to the N-2 criteria, it is to be assumed that during the planned outage generation has
been rescheduled to mitigate the effect of a subsequent outage.

♦ all aspects of the steady-state reliability criteria
♦ all aspects of the stability reliability criteria
$% 2, $ #- #2 -. 2: " -., #..#2- %, - . 2, 7 "#.#-1 24 $ % 2- #-1 -/ 6 !

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N-2 Outages
Transmission line and transmission line
Transformer and transformer
Transformer and transmission line
Busbar maintenance and transmission line
Busbar maintenance and transformer
Circuit breaker maintenance and transmission line
Circuit breaker maintenance and transformer
Circuit breaker maintenance and busbar loss
Stuck Breaker Criterion:

For those cases where stuck breaker protection, initiated by line or transformer
faults, results in the tripping of additional lines or transformers, the bulk
transmission system must satisfy steady state criteria at 80% of peak load
without generation re-scheduling.
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' 2- #-1 -/ "# "# :2" 2" 5 ; . - "/2-- / . , 6 ; 9

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N-1 criterion:
The system should be capable of restoring 100% of supply following the
loss of any single component of the interconnectors between the Port
Hedland, Karratha, and Dampier areas at any load level within 30 minutes.
The ties within an area should meet the SWIS’s N-1 criterion.
Notes:
1. the 30 minute time period is designated to provide time for standby generation to be fully loaded
following the loss of power transfer across the CLB-HDT 220kV interconnection for the case where
the Port Hedland load is supplied from CLB Terminal
2. the single component could be, for example, a busbar, a transformer, a capacitor bank or a transmission
line.

• all aspects of the steady-state criteria
• all aspects of the stability criteria
• all aspects of the quality of supply criteria
The other criteria applied in the NWIS are the same as the SWIS.
'
' "# "# 2, , 2- 5"241 5 24 5 ; " -., #..#2- . ,.

Each of the steady state criteria should be satisfied for the contingency criteria in Section 4.2.1 (N-
1 and N-2 criteria):
Voltage Limits:
Steady State Voltage Limits:
The continuous system voltage should not exceed the design limit of
110% of nominal voltage and should not fall below 90% of nominal
voltage.
Step changes in voltage should not exceed the limits specified in
Table 3.
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$% 7 ! 5 -1 ) 2% 1 #, # .
Cause of Outage Pre-Tap Changing Post-Tap Changing (final steady state volts)
HV MV
HV Voltage MV Voltage
Voltage Voltage
Routine Transmission voltages
±3.7% ±3.7% Should attain previous
Switching Step should be between 110%
(max) (max) set point
change and 90% of nominal voltage
Infrequent +6%,-10% +6%,-10% Should Attain previous
±10% (max)
Switching & faults (max) (max) set point
Notes:
1. Specification of transformer tap changing range is critical in meeting the limits in Table 3 and the
statutory ± 6% customer voltage supply limit.
2. Series reactors should be used in the circuits of all shunt capacitor installations to limit the effects of
inrush current.
Thermal limits:
The following thermal ratings should not be exceeded under normal or
emergency operating conditions:
• Transformers:normal cyclic rating
• Switchgear:TRIS summer and winter rating
• Lines:TRIS summer and winter rating
Note: TRIS - Transmission Ratings Information System
Fault limits:
The fault level is limited to 95% of the equipment fault rating throughout
all the WPC’s Transmission Grids.
Generating limits:
Limits to the VAr generation and absorption capability of thermal plant,
gas turbines and reactive compensation plant such as static VArs
compensators should not be exceeded.
Note: Generator capability diagrams should be consulted when reviewing the reactive capability of the
machines to generate and absorb reactive power. Generator capabilities should be checked with
machine owners to ensure that no other factors limit machine MVAr generation.
' "# "# :2" 24 5 ; . - "/2- - / . , " -., #..#2 - "#
Generation scheduling:
Under steady state operating conditions, the SWIS Transmission Grid
system should not restrict economic scheduling of generation amongst
power stations except for N-2 outages.
However, with a pre-existing single outage, economic scheduling of
generation may be restricted due to the need to reschedule generation in
preparation for a second unplanned outage.
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Frequency Limits:
Under normal conditions the system frequency should be maintained at
50Hz ± 0.2 Hz.
' "# "# :2" 2" 5 ; . - "/2- - / . , " -., #..#2- "#
Each of the steady state criteria should be satisfied for the N-1 criterion (Section 4.2.2):
Frequency Limits:
Under normal conditions the system frequency should be maintained at
50Hz ± 0.5 Hz.
''
System conditions:
Each of the stability criteria should be satisfied under the worst possible
system load/generation pattern and the most severe N-1 or N-2
contingencies of major transmission plant as specified in Section 4.2.
'' ) 2% 1 $ #%# #, # .
Temporary Over-Voltages:
Temporary AC over-voltages should not exceed the time duration limits
given in Figure 2.
There necessary to ensure that the temporary over-voltages are limited to
the withstand levels following measures could be applied:
Capacitor switching schemes
Reactor switching in schemes
Static Var Compensation
Other o/voltage protection schemes or measures
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Transient Over-Voltages:
Surge arresters should be used where necessary to ensure that the
transient over-voltage seen by an item of transmission plant is limited to
its impulse withstand level.
Transient voltage dip criteria (TVD):

After clearing a system fault the voltage should not drop below 75%
and shall not be below 80% for more than 0.4 seconds during the power
swing that follows the fault". The maximum transient voltage dip is 25%
and the maximum duration of voltage dip exceeding 20% is 20 cycles
(400ms). (see Figure 4 for more details).
Voltage stability:
Voltage Collapse:
All necessary steps should be taken to ensure that voltage
collapse does not occur for the most onerous outage of a
transmission element under credible generation schedules under
full load conditions. It should also be assumed that 3% of the
installed capacitors are unavailable plus the largest system bank
should also be considered as unavailable. Voltage collapse is
associated with a deficit of reactive power. Adequate reactive
reserves should be provided (see notes below).
Voltage Oscillations:
Adequate damping should be provided to ensure that all oscillations of
fundamental and harmonic frequency are well damped as required in
Section 4.4.4. Sub-synchronous and super-synchronous oscillations
should be damped accordingly within five seconds or otherwise counter-
measured by appropriate action within less than two seconds.
Notes:
For Terminal Stations in the Metropolitan Area the following procedure is used;
• Currently, the conditions which may take the system closest to voltage collapse occurs when one
Kwinana Stage C generator is unavailable (the generator that provides the greatest MVAr support to the
Metropolitan Area) and there is a forced outage of one MU 330kV line at peak system load.
• 3% of the total installed capacitance plus the largest HV capacitor are to be taken out of service. This
level of capacitor bank unavailability was determined in 1998 by System Planning Branch and System
Operations.
For other areas of the system, including radials, the following procedure is used to determine the voltage
stability or transfer limit;
• The line or tripping of a generator that causes the largest reduction in system voltage support in the area
of interest is taken as the disturbance used to establish the transfer limit or reactive support limit.
• The normal peak system generation pattern that provides the lowest level of voltage support to the area
of interest is assumed. (Of these units, normally in service in the area, the largest unit is assumed to be
out of service due to a breakdown or other maintenance requirements. If another unit is assigned as a
backup unit then it may be brought into service to support the load area.)
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• The largest capacitor, in the area is to be taken as out of service.
In all situations the following procedures are followed;

• All loads are modelled as constant P & Q loads.
• The load to be used in the study is to be taken as 10% higher than the expected system peak. The
system peak load is determined by linear extrapolation of the system’s historic peak load, with an
allowance for block loads. (The 10% margin includes a safety margin for hot weather, data uncertainty
and uncertainty in the simulation.)
• A positive MVAr reserve margin is to be maintained at major load points for this 10% higher load.
(System voltages should remain with the normal range).
• All other generation is to be taken as available with none of the steady state MVAr limits to be exceeded.
• System conditions are checked after the outage but prior to tap changing of transformers.
• Total system load in the area of interest is not to be overcompensated. (The installed capacitor banks
capacity is not to exceed the MVAr draw of the load at peak load).
'' " 3 4 -/ $ #%# #, # .

Operation at off-nominal frequency causes an accumulation of stress in turbines. These need to
be limited in frequency excursion and restricted in time duration of the frequency excursion. The
capability of a typical steam turbine, (usually the most restricted unit for stress accumulation) to
withstand operation at off-nominal frequencies is shown in Figure 3.
Frequency stability:
Following loss of generating plant, system frequency shall recover to a
steady state value within frequency and time limits as specified in the
Technical Code. Restoration of frequency to within steady state limits is
then accomplished by operator action and automatic govenor control
(AGC), if it is operating.
To cover for a loss of generating plant two measures are applied to arrest the falling frequency
following the loss of generation and to return the frequency to within normal operating levels:
• spinning reserve (the use of fast response plant)
• under-frequency load shedding (UFLS)
Spinning Reserve Policy:

System Operations will schedule the level of spinning reserve to cover for
the loss of the biggest generation unit to avoid UFLS operation taking into
account the interruptible loads.
UFLS Criteria:
UFLS are designed to restore system frequency to normal operating
levels for a loss of up to 75% of the system generation.
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#1 4 " :: " 3 4 -/ #, # . :2" 7 #/ % , 4"$ #-
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The present settings1 for the South West Interconnected System under-frequency load shedding
scheme are given in Table 4 and for the North West Interconnected System under-frequency load
shedding scheme are given in Table 5.
Note, that switchable capacitor banks at substations should also be shed in accordance with
Table 4 and Table 5.
$% ' /5 , #-1 . 6 24 5 ; . - "/2- - / . ,9

Stage Frequency Time Delay Load Cumulative Capacitor Cumulative
(Hz) (s) Shed (%) Load Shed (%) shed (%) Capacitor Shed (%)
1 48.75 0.4 10 14 10 10
2 48.50 0.4 14 24 14 24
3 48.25 0.4 15 39 15 39
4 48.00 0.4 12 51 12 51
5 47.75 0.4 12 63 24 75
6 47.50 0.4 12 75 25 100
$% /5 , #-1 . 6 2" 5 ; . - "/2- - / . ,9

Time Delay Load Shed Capacitor
Stage Freq. (Hz)
(s) (%) Shed (%)
1 49.00 0.5 16 35
2 48.75 0.5 16
3 48.50 0.5 17
4 48.25 0.5 14
5 48.00 0.5 15 18
Not Shed 22 47
'' " -.# - $ #%# "# "#
Faults:
The most severe of the following fault types should be selected
as the type of fault to determine the stability of the power system
with due regard to reclosing;
• A three-phase-to ground fault,
• A single-phase to ground fault cleared by backup protection
• Single Phase Auto Reclosing of lines or,
• Tripping of line or transformer without a fault.
Transient stability:
Transient stability must be maintained for faults cleared by tripping of any
transmission element or a generator under the worst possible system
1
The settings presented in Tables 4 & 5 are subject to change as the SWIS and NWIS changes.
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load or generation pattern. The relative rotor angle swing between two or
more groups of generators on the network should not exceed 180
degrees after allowing for a safety margin. Due consideration must be
given to the Transient Voltage Dips Limits to prevent motor loads being
disconnected from the system by the undervoltage resulting from the
transient power swings.
Transient stability is usually associated with a dramatic disturbance to the system which needs
to be removed/cleared in order to prevent system instability or disintegration. Any faulted or not
faulted plant leading to system instability under the worst possible system load/generation
pattern and the most severe N-1 and N-2 contingencies must be removed or separated from the
healthy system.
Out of Step Protection

Generation units vulnerable to pole slipping under abnormal system conditions, (for example a
stuck breaker and a multi phase fault) shall be provided with pole slip protection. The function of
pole slip protection is to remove the unstable machine (usually generator or synchronous
compensator) from the system and prevent the disturbance from causing problems to other users.
Pole slip protection only removes the pole slipping unit from the system after the machine has
slipped at least one pole. Pole slip protection only attempts to minimise the damage to the machine
and other users plant. Pole slipping protection is a relay of last resort and should not be used
instead of clearing the fault within the critical fault clearance time.
The critical fault clearance time at a point in the network should be greater than the “total fault
clearing time” plus a margin of 20ms. The total fault clearing time is defined as the total breaking
time of the circuit breaker plus the maximum operate time for the protection for a bolted close in
fault.
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Oscillation damping:
All electromechanical oscillations of real power or sub-synchronous
oscillations resulting from any small or large disturbance, and under the
worst possible system load/generation pattern and the most severe N-1
and N-2 contingencies of major transmission plant should be well
damped and the system should return to a stable operating condition.
The damping ratio of the oscillations should be at least 0.5. For inter-
area oscillation modes, lower damping ratios may be acceptable but the
amplitude halving time of such electromechanical oscillations should not
exceed five seconds.
Sub-synchronous and super-synchronous oscillations should be damped
accordingly within five seconds or otherwise should be counter-measured
by appropriate action to remove them.
The Power System Stabiliser settings shall be optimised to provide maximum damping.
If power system simulation studies indicate the possibility of insufficient damping then a
Generator must provide power system stabilising facilities on each synchronous generating unit
even if the unit sizes are smaller than 30MW, if other system users may be effected.
Users/customers or generators who may cause subsynchronous resonance oscillations must
provide appropriate measures at the planning and design stage to prevent introduction of this
problem to the WPC or other user systems.
' (
The limits applicable to the transmission network are included in the Technical Code.
Harmonic Contribution Limits:

The harmonic voltage distortion produced by the customer’s plant shall not exceed 30%
of the limit values (individually and total) given in the Technical Code – Tables 2.1 to 2.3.
Existing (background) levels of harmonic voltage distortion are not included when
assessing the harmonic contribution.
Non-integer (fractional) harmonics should be included in these limits:
Each non-integer harmonic should not exceed the limit specified in the Technical Code, for
the nearest even integer-harmonic. Total harmonic voltage distortion including these non-
integer harmonic contributions should not exceed the limit specified in the Technical Code
for total harmonic voltage distortion.
The energy contained in each non-integer and integer harmonics should be
included in the total harmonic limits (This is essential to minimise the risk to
plant).
More detail is provided in the Technical Code.
Notes:
1. Intermittent (transient) harmonic voltage distortion is subject to the same limits as continuous harmonic
voltage distortion and should be included in assessing thermal ratings.
2. Inter-harmonics (Non-integer or fractional) harmonics are subject to the same limits. They should be
treated as an even integer (the nearest order) harmonic.
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'
As part of the planning process the safety risk should be considered for any new developments
and the existing facilities which may have a significant impact on the safety:
Safety and Prevention

Assess the safety risk in the planning process. Inform, consult and rectify existing
or foreseeable safety risks with relevant bodies in order to ensure safety is
maintained to Industry Standards.
'+ )
As part of the planning process the following criteria should be administered for any new
developments and facilities which may have a significant impact on the environment:
Social Issues
Inform and consult with relevant public bodies, community interest groups and the
general public.
Electromagnetic Fields
Assist in maintaining electromagnetic field exposure to the public and Western
Power employees at levels within industry standards.
Land-use Considerations
Avoid where economically possible the use of land where conflicting uses or
potential uses exist.
Noise
Meet and, where possible, better the noise limit provisions of the Environmental
Protection Act.
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PART B – SUBSTATIONS PLANNING CRITERIA
This section describes the criteria used to determine the timing and extent of substation
reinforcements and the reliability in Western Power’s sub-transmission substations. Presently,
there are three reliability criteria for determining the supply capability of a zone substation.
These are,
1. N-1 Criterion: which defines the Firm Capacity.
2. 1% Risk Criterion: which defines the 1% Risk Capacity.
3. NCR Criterion: which defines the NCR Capacity.
Generally, but not necessarily2, the following rule holds,
NCR Capacity > 1% Risk Capacity > Firm Capacity.
The total capacity of a substation can be limited by any one or more plant items comprising the
following main components in a substation:
• Transmission line circuits.
• Power transformer circuits.
The adequacy of transmission line circuits supplying sub-transmission substations are assessed
through load flow studies subject to the N-1 criterion. On the other hand, the adequacy of
power transformer circuits are assessed by comparing the forecasted substation peak load with
the substation’s capacity determined using the N-1, 1% Risk or NCR reliability criterion
depending on the type of substation under consideration.
Subject to the reliability criteria, the amount of load that can be supplied is limited by primary
plant equipment ratings and, exclusively in the case of the N-1 criterion, the amount of
distribution transfer capacity (DTC) available.
(
Typically a power transformer circuit will consist of one major item of equipment, i.e., the power
transformer and minor items of equipment including current transformers, cables, conductors,
connectors and circuit breakers.
Transformer loading over the course of a day tends to be cyclic and transformers have high
thermal inertia. As a result, Western Power assigns one of three different thermal ratings
depending on the daily load and temperature profile of the load area supplied by a substation.
• Name Plate Rating (NPR): Continuous rating guaranteed by manufacturer.
• Normal Cyclic Rating (NCR): Maximum calculated load that the transformer can
supply, in accordance with IEC 354, without causing
accelerated ageing. It takes into account the maximum
2
Mainly due to transformer unbalanced loading as will be discussed in section 5.2.
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allowable transformer hot spot temperature, and the

cyclic variation in the daily load profile and daily
temperature profile.
• Long Term Emergency Rating Maximum calculated load the transformer can supply,
(LTER): in accordance with IEC 354, for peak summer
temperature and peak load curves without the
maximum allowable winding hot spot temperature
being exceeded3. The maximum hot spot temperature
is typically 1300C and 1400C for older and newer
transformers respectively.
Transformer internal components including HV & LV leads, bushings, winding temperature

indicator (WTI) current transformer (CT) and line drop compensator (LDC) CT are assigned
ratings specific to each component, which may be less than the transformer NCR or LTER
ratings. This is referred to as the component limiting rating (CLR) of the transformer.
Minor components in the power transformer circuit generally have short thermal time constants,
i.e., low thermal inertia. The ratings of these components are not affected by variations in daily
load and temperature profiles. These components can also limit the rating of the power
transformer circuit below the transformer’s NCR or LTER ratings.
The following points apply when determining the rating of a transformer circuit:
• The transformer circuit rating to be used in determining the capacity of a substation is that of
the lowest rated component in the entire power transformer circuit.
• The highest rating that is allowed by Western Power to be used in determining the
transformer circuit rating is the transformer NCR4 rating.
Distribution Transfer Capacity (DTC) refers to the amount of load that can be transferred to
adjacent substations via interconnected distribution networks by switching normally open points
in the distribution system. DTC is typically effected over a period of several hours. The amount
of DTC available at a substation depends on:
• Available spare capacity on individual feeders interconnecting adjacent substations.
• Available spare capacity at adjacent substations.
• Ability to maintain the distribution network voltage profile within regulatory limits.
Due care must be exercised when including DTC in determining substation capacity for the
following reasons:
• Distribution network re-configurations and variations in feeder loading directly impact the
amount of DTC available. Increasing or reducing DTC depending on the nature of change.
As a consequence, available DTC at each substation must be reviewed regularly.
• Determination of DTC at a substation is based solely on distribution network parameters and
limitations. It does not take into account the capacity of adjacent interconnected
substations, which may restrict load transfer.
3
When the load demand curve is “peaky”, the NCR may be almost as large as the LTER.
4
Transformer NCR and LTER rating calculations carried out on a sample group of substations suggest
that generally LTER rating is similar to the NCR rating.
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Historically, transmission system reinforcement or augmentation planning has been carried out
using a deterministic approach, i.e. using the N-1 or N-2 criteria as defined in clause 2.7.
Applying such deterministic planning approaches achieve a high degree of reliability in the
transmission system, however this invariably results in a high degree of redundancy in primary
plant. The costs associated with maintaining such a high level of redundancy in the
transmission system is high.
Since 1998, Western Power’s planning approach for substations in the Perth metropolitan area
has evolved towards a combined deterministic/probabilistic planning approach on which the 1%
Risk and NCR criteria are based. This new approach manages the risk and duration of supply
interruptions to customers under N-1 contingency conditions thereby allowing greater utilisation
of available capacity. Applying a combined deterministic/probabilistic approach inherently
introduces higher risk, however the economic benefits accruing from allowing higher loss of load
risk are considered to outweigh the costs.
! "# "#2-
The N-1 Criterion is used to define a substation’s firm capacity (FC) and is calculated as follows:
• One transformer substation: FC = DTC...................................................... (1)
• Two transformer substation: FC = NCR1 + DTC......................................... (2)
• Three Transformer substation: FC = NCR1 + NCR2 + DTC ............................ (3)
Where, NCR1 = lowest NCR of the transformers in the substation;

NCR2 = second lowest NCR of the transformers in the substation;
DTC = available distribution transfer capacity. As defined in section 5.1.2,
DTC shall be included in eqns (1), (2) and (3) above only if there is a
high degree of confidence in its accuracy.
Inclusion of DTC in the firm capacity of a substation introduces the possibility of overloading on
remaining transformer circuits following the outage of one transformer circuit. Two overload
scenarios can arise depending on the substation’s mode of operation.
In the Perth metropolitan area, Western Power zone substations are not generally operated with
transformers in parallel under normal operating conditions due to fault rating limitations on
distribution network equipment. The scenario below applies when temporary short-term
paralleling is necessary.
Following the outage of one transformer circuit, the full substation load will immediately be
applied to the remaining transformer circuit(s). If the substation is loaded to its firm capacity
which includes DTC prior to the outage, then the remaining transformer circuit(s) will be loaded
beyond its thermal limit until either consumer demand and/or ambient temperature decreases or
until DTC is effected. Normally, switching to effect DTC can be carried out within a maximum of
2 hours.
The risk of plant overloading must be managed to ensure the safety of plant and personnel.
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In this case load connected to the faulted transformer will be tripped immediately – the
remaining transformer(s) is not subjected to any more load than it already supplies until the
tripped feeders are restored.
The procedure used by Western Power for restoring lost load is for operators to reconnect
feeders one at a time while monitoring the load on the remaining transformer(s) as this is being
done, ensuring acceptable loading levels on the transformer(s). If the load exceeds capacity
then distribution transfer capacity must be utilised, with remaining feeders not being
reconnected until distribution transfer is complete.
A substation’s firm capacity calculated from equations (1), (2) or (3) is an ideal capacity that
may not be fully utilisable in practice for the following reasons:
• At substations with three transformers not operating in parallel, it may not be possible to
achieve balanced loading on the two remaining in-service transformers following an N-1
transformer outage. Balanced loading is implicitly assumed as part of the firm capacity
derivation. The following factors restrict the ability to achieve even loading of transformers.
The need to keep transformers split on the LV to limit fault levels.
Feeder loads are discrete and vary in size.
Numbers of feeders on bus sections are not necessarily the same.
Seasonal variation in feeder loads.
Variations in daily feeder load profile.
Feeder(s) with distribution transfer capacity may be aggregated on one bus section.
There may not be adequate operational personnel to carry out distribution network re-
configuration to optimise distribution transfer capacity.
Bus-sections may or may not have capacitor banks.
Unbalanced transformer loading is of particular concern at three transformer substations
because as a result of the above points, load previously supplied by the faulted transformer
circuit cannot be distributed appropriately to the remaining transformer circuits. This may
result in overloading of either one of the remaining two transformer circuits. Increasing the
flexibility of the LV busbars can alleviate this problem, i.e. allowing more transferability of
feeder circuits between transformer circuits. Western Power’s standard substation
configuration is shown in Appendix B.
• Transformer NCR ratings are calculated based on the worst-case daily load profile and
allowing the hot-spot temperature to reach 1400C (1300C for older transformer designs).
Beyond these limits the transformer is vulnerable to system disturbances and could trip due
to gassing of oil. In some instances, the calculated NCR rating of transformers may not be
available due to faster than expected hot-spot temperature rise.
< #.= "# "#2-

The 1% risk criterion is used to define a substation’s 1% Risk Capacity. Under this criteria ideal
1% Risk capacity is calculated as follows:
1% Risk Capacity = FC × (1 + m)............................................ (4)
Where, FC = substation firm capacity as calculated in section 5.2.1.
m = 1% risk factor (refer to section 5.2.2.1).
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Practically5, it is calculated in the following manner:

1% Risk Capacity = FC’ × (1 + m) + DTC...................................... (5)
where, FC’ = substation firm capacity excluding DTC.
< C D E
The 1% Risk factor “m” in equations (4) & (5) can be defined as,
‘A substation’s peak load that is demanded for 1% of time in a year or less
(ie. ≈ 87 hours) expressed as a proportion of its firm capacity excluding
DTC.’
For example, with reference to Figure 5 below, the substation peak load at a substation with FC’
of 22.48MVA is (b) 30.32MVA and the load demand that is exceeded for 1% of time in a year is
(a) 29.13MVA. Therefore, in this example,
30.32 − 29.13
m= = 0.05 .................................................. (6)
22.48
#1 4 " 2" #2- 2: 2 4" #2 - 4"0
Studies indicate that typical values for m are between 0.10 and 0.15 depending on the load
duration curve for each particular substation. For planning purposes, the generally accepted
figure of 0.10 is used regardless of site. Due care in the selection of m must be exercised
5
DTC is excluded from the firm capacity when multiplying by (1+m) to reduce the degree of uncertainty
in the 1% Risk capacity because the availability of DTC cannot be guaranteed for the reasons
outlined in section 5.1.2.
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where the substation load consists of a high proportion of non-cyclic type loads. In this case, an
examination of the substation’s load duration curve may be necessary to determine m.
Loading a zone substation up to its 1% risk capacity means that in the event of a transformer
circuit outage any load above the substation’s firm capacity must be shed in order to prevent
overloading of the remaining transformer circuit(s). Applying the 1% risk criterion as per section
5.2.2 implies that with the loss of a single transformer circuit,
‘The proportion of a substation’s peak load that is demanded for 1% of
time in a year or less (ie. ≈ 87 hours) is not backed-up.’
It is also important to note that the 1% risk criterion is based on the firm capacity, it therefore
inherits all the shortcomings of the N-1 criterion as per section 5.2.1.
This criterion shall be applied to metropolitan zone substations only and to further minimise the
negative impact of supply interruption where load shedding is necessary, the 1% risk criterion
shall not be applied to the following,
• Perth central business district (CBD) substations.
• Double LV busbar substations.
• Substations for which a spare transformer is not available.
At substations where the 1% risk criterion is applied, feeders supplying critical or sensitive loads
shall be exempt from rotational load shedding.
Based on the 1% risk criterion reinforcement planning must conform to the following
requirement:
‘Major reinforcement of an urban zone substation shall not proceed until
the peak load demand reaches a level where load demand in excess of the
substation capacity must be supplied more than 1% of the year, i.e. 87
hours.’
Before application of the 1% Risk criterion for planning substation capacity reinforcement, the
substation firm capacity shall be maximised by ensuring that:
• Capacitor banks are in service during peak periods.
• Distribution transfer capacity is utilised where necessary following a transformer outage.
• Transformer NCR rating is maximised up to an economically justifiable level.
• Transformer circuits are rated to the transformer NCR rating where technically and
economically viable.
• Load characteristics are modified, where possible, to reduce peak load demand (demand
management) and/or peak loading of transformer circuits (load balancing).
The 1% risk criteria allows greater utilisation of available substation capacity and therefore
temporarily defers the need for high capital cost reinforcement projects such as third
transformers or new substations.
The use of the 1% risk criteria is being phased out due to the introduction of the NCR criteria
(refer to section 5.2.3). It is expected that by 2003 there will not be any Western Power zone
substation operating under this criterion.
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The 1% risk criterion introduces a window of risk at a substation where – for a number of years
prior to reinforcement – a risk of rotational load shedding exists in the event of a transformer
circuit outage. The most onerous case where the highest amount of load is at risk is in the final
year prior to reinforcement. Based on a study comparing the maximum shed load at various
risk levels with the average substation feeder loading level at a sample number of substations, it
was concluded that at the 1% risk level6:
• Probably only one feeder would need to be shed on a rotational basis at any one time
because the maximum load shed is, for the substations considered, close to or less than the
average feeder load level.
• Load shedding at a substation would probably only need to occur for one period a day until
the transformer circuit can be reinstated.
This assumes that the transformer circuit is reinstated within a maximum of 10 days and there is
an adequate number of feeders at the substation to minimise the amount of time each feeder
must be shed.
'
The ability to meet the requirement for re-instating the out-of-service transformer circuit within a
maximum of 10 days is critically dependent on the availability of a suitable system spare
transformer. This transformer must be available for service any time there is a transformer
failure.
Once the system spare(s) has(have) been used, a system spare may not be available until the
failed transformer(s) has(have) been repaired. Western Power’s policy is to hold two 132/22-
11kV and one 66/22-11-6.6kV cold mobile system spare transformer.
"# "#2-
The NCR criterion is used to determine a substation’s NCR capacity. The Ideal NCR capacity is
calculated as follows:
• One-transformer substation : NCR Capacity = NCR1 (7)
• Two-transformer substation : NCR Capacity = NCR1 + NCR2 (8)
• Three-transformer substation : NCR Capacity = NCR1 + NCR2 + NCR3 (9)
th
Where, NCRi = normal cyclic rating of the i transformer in the substation.
Important points to note are:

• At substations with more than one transformer, the ideal NCR capacity must be de-rated if
there is any uneveness in the loading of non-paralleled transformers. A possible solution to
maximise load balance is to operate the transformers in parallel. However, this is not
presently feasible at existing substations as distribution network equipment in proximity to
substations are not adequately rated to withstand the resultant fault level.
• The NCR capacity cannot incorporate DTC because this may potentially lead to transformer
circuit loading beyond the NCR capacity resulting in accelerated ageing of transformers.
• The ideal substation NCR capacity must be further de-rated, if a transformer circuit’s rating is
greater than the rating of the RRST (refer to section 5.2.3.3).
6
Different conclusions would apply at higher risk levels, eg. it is likely that more than one feeder would
need to be shed at any one time.
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For the purposes of clarity the following terms are defined:

• Rapid response spare transformer (RRST) – refers to a custom built mobile spare
transformer that can be transported to site, installed and commissioned for temporarily
replacing a failed transformer within an average of 9 hours of the initial failure.
• Ideal NCR capacity – refers to the substation’s NCR capacity calculated either from eqns.
(7), (8) or (9).
• NCR capacity – refers to the substation’s NCR capacity that takes into account transformer
unbalanced loading and the RRST rating limit.
Sections 5.2.3.2, 5.2.3.3 and 5.2.3.4 provide further details on the methodology for calculating a
substation NCR capacity that incorporates these de-rating factors.
The NCR criteria may be applied to zone substations that are non-CBD and non-critical (ie. with
load that can tolerate supply interruptions of up to an average of 9 hours, in the worst case) and
are geographically located such that the RRST (refer to section 5.2.3.3) can be transported and
deployed within an average of 9 hours.
A single RRST is capable of covering up to 30 substations and once deployed is designed to re-
supply all load lost due to the initial N-1 supply interruption.
Before application of the NCR criterion for planning substation capacity reinforcement, the
substation firm capacity should be maximised by ensuring that:
• Capacitor banks are in service during peak periods.
• Distribution transfer capacity is utilised where necessary following a transformer outage.
• Transformer NCR rating is maximised up to an economically justifiable level.
• Transformer circuits are rated to the transformer NCR rating where it is technically and
economically viable.
• Load characteristics are modified, where possible, to reduce peak load demand (demand
management) and/or peak loading of transformer circuits (load balancing).
The NCR criterion allows greater utilisation of available substation capacity and therefore
temporarily defers the need for high capital cost reinforcement projects such as additional
transformers or new substations.
In two or three transformer substations, the ideal NCR capacity must be derated if there is any
uneveness in the loading of non-paralleled transformers. In order to simplify the calculation of
NCR capacity due to unbalanced transformer loading the following assumption is made,
‘As the substation load grows, the load on each transformer grows in
constant proportion with each other until the heaviest loaded transformer
is loaded to a limit of 75% of its NCR rating.’
This constant, “u”, is defined as:

0.75 × RTx
u= ........................................................ (10)
LTx
Where, u = ideal NCR capacity reduction factor (refer to section 5.2.3.4).
RTx = rating of the heaviest loaded transformer circuit as per section 5.1.1.
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LTx = load of the heaviest loaded transformer circuit.
A rapid response spare transformer (RRST) is an integral part of the NCR criterion because it is
required to achieve an average transformer circuit restoration time of 9 hours. In the event of a
transformer circuit failure, the load previously supplied by the faulted transformer circuit has to
be supplied via DTC or shed until the RRST can be deployed as a replacement for the failed
transformer. Once the RRST is in-service load subjected to shedding can be restored. Any
load above the RRST rating will continue to be shed. Therefore, if the rating of the heaviest
loaded transformer circuit (RTx) is greater than the RRST rating (RRRST) then RTx in eqn. (10)
becomes RRRST and u is determined as follows:
0.75 × RRRST
Then, u= ....................................................... (11)
LTx
Where, RRRST = rating of the rapid response spare transformer.
'
The NCR capacity of a substation, that is, the actual capacity that a substation can be
loaded up to under the NCR criterion is determined by the following equation:
n n
NCR = min u× LTi , 0.75 × RTi .................................... (12)
i =1 i =1
Where:
u = NCR capacity factor.
LTi = Transformer MVA loading at substation peak time.
RTi = Normal cyclic rating of the ith transformer.
n = Number of transformers at a given substation.
The following condition applies to eqn. (12) 7,

• If u × LTi > RTi , then the substation NCR capacity shall be scaled by
RTi RTn
s = min , , .
uLTi uLTn
Where:
u = NCR capacity factor.
LTi = MVA loading of the ith transformer at substation peak time.
RTi = Normal cyclic rating of the ith transformer circuit as per section 5.1.1.
n = Number of transformers at a given substation.
7
This condition takes into account the case where the rating of the heaviest loaded transformer is much
greater than the ratings of the other transformers in the substation.
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F < C
At zone substations where load balancing between transformers is poor, it is possible that the
NCR capacity is less than the 1% Risk or even the Firm capacity. This arises because the NCR
capacity takes into account unbalanced transformer loading, i.e. it’s effect on reducing
substation capacity, in its calculation whereas the Firm and 1% Risk capacity do not. At three
transformer zone substations where this occurs, it means that the calculated 1% Risk and/or
Firm capacity at the substation cannot be fully utilised unless the load balance between
transformers is optimal.
In such cases, as a general rule, the load balance between transformers should be improved to
the degree where the NCR capacity is at least greater than or equal to the 1% Risk and/or the
Firm capacity. This may be achieved by implementing some or all of the following measures:
• Re-arranging feeder circuits between transformers.
• Installing additional feeders to increase the symmetry of the LV busbar.
• Installing bus-section isolators to increase flexibility of the LV busbar configuration.
• Re-distributing load at the distribution network level.
In practice, a relative load unbalance of at least 10% between transformers is to be expected
due to the discrete and changing nature of loads.
It is important to note, however, that carrying out some or all of the above does not guarantee
that the full calculated 1% Risk and/or Firm capacity can be utilised. Each substation’s LV
busbar and feeder configuration has to be examined on a case by case basis to maximise
actual available 1% Risk and/or firm capacity. For planning purposes, it may be assumed that
the NCR capacity is equal to the Firm or 1% Risk capacity, which ever is applicable, until the
actual load balance after modifications are made is known.
+ ;
As with the 1% risk criterion, the repair of the failed transformer or a system spare transformer is
required to replace the deployed RRST within a maximum of 10 days. The reasons are:
• The prolonged temporary installation of the RRST is less reliable than a permanent
installation.
• To make the RRST available for another contingency.
) 6 9
In three transformer substations with double LV busbar arrangements where transformers are
not operated in parallel, the Firm, 1% Risk and NCR capacities are calculated as follows,
• Firm Capacity - DTC cannot be included in the substation’s Firm capacity because the third
transformer cannot be connected to the LV busbars (ie. its capacity is not available until at
least one of the operational transformers fail). Transformer load balancing on transformers
supplying a double LV busbar arrangement is also assumed to be reasonable. It is assumed
that as the substation load grows, the load on each of transformer grows in constant
proportion with each other until the heaviest loaded transformer is loaded to a limit of 90% of
the smallest transformer’s NCR.
Hence,
FC’ = NCRS1 + NCRS2 .................................................. (13)
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where, NCRS1 = smallest8 normal cyclic rating of the transformers in the

substation.
NCRS2 = second smallest NCR of the transformers in the substation.
• 1% Risk Capacity does not apply to substations of this type because, as above, the third
transformer cannot be connected to the LV busbar, hence its capacity is not available.
• NCR Capacity,
Ideal NCR capacity = NCRL1 + NCRL2 ............................................................... (14)
where,
NCRL1 = largest NCR of the transformers in the substation.
NCRL2 = second largest NCR of the transformers in the substation.
Eqn. (14) applies because only two transformers can be operational at any one time if
transformers are not run in parallel and clearly the two highest capacity transformers
would be used. Effectively, three transformer double LV busbar substations have NCR
capacities of two transformer substations.
Actual NCR capacity is calculated as per eqn. (12) of section 5.2.3.4 assuming the
lowest rated transformer is out-of-service. In all cases, the capacity of a substation is
defined by the NCR capacity as per section 5.2.3.4.
' 6 9
Perth’s CBD represents an important and sensitive load. Security and reliability of power
supplies affect a large number of businesses, buildings and individuals. Therefore the planning
criteria specific to the CBD are more onerous than for other areas of regional transmission
supply.
The CBD boundary is shown in Figure 6. The CBD criteria are to be applied immediately within
the short-term boundary, which is to be reviewed every five years. The planning criteria for
Major substations (see Section 5.5) and the transmission lines interconnecting them are to
apply outside the short term boundary and within the metropolitan area, however all new work
within the long term boundary is to be carried out to facilitate future implementation of the CBD
criteria.
8
The ratings of the smallest transformers are selected because it is assumed that in an N-1
contingency condition the largest transformer is out-of-service.
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' %# $ #%# "# "#

The reliability criteria for CBD substations are outlined below.
$% #"/4# 4 1 "# "# 6 7 7 %# . 2 ) %- -% 9

Contingency Criterion
1. No loss of supply for line faults.
N-1 2. Supply may be lost for transformer or bus
(unplanned) (air insulated) outages but 100% load
should be restored within 30 seconds.
N-2 1. Supply may be lost but 100% of the
(1 unplanned + 1 planned) or (2 unplanned) loads should be restored within 2 hours.
$% + B # /51 " 4 1 "# "# 6 7 7 %# . 2 ) 7 % - 2-% 9

N-1, N-2 1. Supply may be lost but 100% of load
should be restored within 2 hours.
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1. Up to 24MVA may be lost (four feeders).
Loss of MV bus section 2. 100% of load should be restored within 1 hour.
3. Plant to be restored within 9 months.
1. Up to 36MVA may be lost (six feeders).
Loss of front and rear MV busbars 2. 100% of load should be restored within 2 hours.
1. 100% of load should be restored in 4 hours or
Loss of complete zone substation
less.
(supply will be lost)
Notes:
• Circuit: includes lines (overhead or cable), transformers and busbars, but excludes circuit breakers.
• N-1 Contingency:
The requirement for no supply interruption for N-1 line outages is considered too costly to
implement in existing substations.
• N-2 Contingency:
No individual substation needs to meet the N-2 criteria, however, the CBD substations should
as a group. This means that load can be transferred between substations as long as the time
constraints are met. A distribution automation system project which will accomplish this has
been implemented.
For two circuit outages to constitute an N-2 contingency they should together be more severe
than a N-1 outage – one should make the other worse. Two unrelated outages, such as a
feeder outage in one substation and a capacitor bank outage in another, would not constitute
an N-2 contingency. A circuit out for maintenance, be it planned or not, can form one half of an
N-2 contingency.
• Milligan and Hay Street are the only substations situated within the short term CBD boundary (see
Figure 6. However, Wellington Street supplies a portion of the CBD load and is on the CBD
boundary. It is considered a CBD substation for the purposes of the N-2 criteria.
> ?
A zone substation is considered to be “Major” if it supplies a peak load of 20MVA or more.
Major zone substation components are subject to the N-1 criterion with the exceptions outlined
in Table 9. The transmission lines that interconnect Major zone substation are also subject to
the N-1 criterion.
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$ % & H/ 7 #2-. 2 5 ! "# "#2 - ! G2 " ? 2- 4$ . #2-.

Exceptions Substitute Restoration
Distribution transfer to be carried out

within 2 hours.
1% Risk or NCR Criterion as Load should be shed on a rotational
appropriate. basis until the load level drops below
the firm capacity. Transformer
Transformers Note: Following distribution
replacement within 10 days under 1%
transfer, the 1% risk criterion
Risk criterion or RRST deployment
and NCR criterion may result
within an average of 9 hours under the
in continued load-shedding.
NCR criterion if load shedding is
required; otherwise as soon as
practical.
Load below substation firm capacity
• 100% restoration within 2 hours.
Load above substation firm capacity
• 100% of load supplied from
unfaulted sections of the busbar to
Substation HV busbar Supply may be lost. be restored within 2 hours.
faulted section of the busbar to be
restored within an average of 9
hours, with the deployment of the
RRST under the NCR criteria.
Supply from the relevant LV
within 2 hours.
bus section may be lost
If load shedding is required, RRST
Transformer circuits Note: Following distribution
deployment within an average of 9
transfer, the 1% risk criterion
hours provided RRST connections to
and NCR criterion may result
the transformer LV circuit are not
in continued load-shedding.
affected.
100% restoration within 48 hours (for
metropolitan area substations) from
the time when a safe working
Substation indoor LV Supply from the relevant LV environment can be restored.
busbar bus section(s) may be lost. Note: This can be achieved by
implementing the Rapid Response
Standby Switchboard (RRSS)
contingency plan.
Substation outdoor LV Supply from the relevant LV metropolitan area substations) from
busbar bus section(s) may be lost. the time when a safe working
environment can be restored.
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?
Minor zone substations are those with peak load of less than 20MVA. Minor zone substation
components are subject to the N-1 criterion with the exceptions outlined in Table 10. The
transmission lines that interconnect Minor Zone substations are also subject to the N-1 reliability
criteria with the exceptions outlined in Table 10.
$% * H/ 7 #2 -. 2 5 ! "# "#2 - ! #- 2" ? 2- 4$ . #2-.

Load in excess of that which can be
Single transformer
N-0 criterion as supplied using DTC to be shed on a
substation without
appropriate. rotational basis until transformer
RRST backup.
replacement within 10 days.
Load should be shed on a rotational
basis until the load level drops below the
1% Risk or NCR Criterion firm capacity or, in the case of the NCR
as appropriate. criterion, until the RRST can be
deployed. All supplies should then be
Transformers
restored.
[see guidelines below]
Once the 1% Risk
capacity is exceeded, Standby generation or distribution
provision of additional transfer capacity may be used to provide
capacity should still be partial restoration within 2 hours.
justified individually.
Standby local generation may be used
Individual justification to provide immediate restoration.
Transmission lines should be used to provide
redundancy or sufficient In the case of substations supplied by
[see guidelines below] distribution transfer single radial lines, line restoration to be
capacity. provided within 1 to 2 days depending
on the extent of damage.
Load below substation firm capacity
• 100% restoration within 2 hours.
Load above substation firm capacity
unfaulted sections of the busbar to
Substation HV busbar Supply may be lost be restored within 2 hours.
• 100% of load supplied from faulted
section of the busbar to be restored
within an average of 9 hours, with
the deployment of the RRST under
the NCR criteria.
within 2 hours.
Supply from the relevant
Transformer circuits LV bus section may be Transformer replacement within 10 days
lost. under 1% Risk and average of 9 hours
under NCR criterion if load shedding is
required; otherwise as soon as practical.
Substation indoor LV Supply from the relevant 100% restoration within 48 hours (for
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busbar LV bus section(s) may be metropolitan area substations) from the
lost. time when a safe working environment
can be restored.
Note: This can be achieved by
implementing the Rapid Response
Standby Switchboard (RRSS)
contingency plan.
Supply from the relevant
Substation outdoor LV metropolitan area substations) from the
LV bus section(s) may be
busbar time when a safe working environment
lost.
can be restored.
Guidelines:
The following guidelines are to be used in conjunction with Table 10.
1. Substations with a peak load between 10MVA and 20MVA should normally have sufficient HV line
infeeds to provide N-1 capability.
Exceptions would generally be at the discretion of any major customer at the relevant substation who
may choose to forgo added reliability by not contributing financially to improving substation firm
capacity.
Where exceptions are made:
1.1. Capacity should be maintained to ensure maintenance can be carried out at low load times
without loss of supply.
2. Radially supplied minor substations or substation group (either 66kV or 132kV) with 100% backup.
2.1. These substations are normally supplied radially as it is not possible to connect in the backup
supply without paralleling networks of dissimilar voltages, resulting in the risk of line overloads
for N-1 outages in the higher voltage part of the network. As load grows, the situation may
arise where the backup reduces below 100%. If this occurs, then it must be ensured that there
is sufficient backup capacity to allow maintenance to be carried out at low load times.
2.2. In the case where the connected substation or substation group load has increased above
20MVA, additional infeeds to restore backup to 100% or N-1 capability are to be considered
where the cost can be justified against customer benefit.
3. Transmission lines that supply a group of minor substations whose coincident peak load exceeds
20MVA are subject to the planning criteria as for a major substation. The exception is as for point 2
above.
4. For loads less than 10MVA, the level of redundancy should be dependent upon the type of load being
supplied. Where economically viable, the philosophy assigned to loads between 10MVA and 20MVA
should be applied as for point 1 above. For long country feeders in remote rural areas, the cost may
be prohibitive. However, strategies should be in place to ensure restoration can occur as rapidly as
possible.
DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 50/60

)
This section outlines Western Power’s policy regarding undergrounding of existing overhead
transmission lines.
Western Power’s preference is to keep overhead lines whenever possible rather than
undergrounding them for the following reasons:
• Overhead lines are a strategic long term asset. Overhead lines can readily be uprated in
terms of voltage and capacity. For example, the ST-EP line started as a 66kV line and
subsequently has been uprated to 132kV which allows its capacity to be doubled. This line
is currently undergoing a change of conductors to further double its rating. These types of
changes can be achieved cheaply on overhead lines but this is not the case if the line is
converted to cable. The installation of small lowly rated sections of cable in a line should be
discouraged.
• Cable costs are significantly higher than overhead line costs.
• The cost to convert a 66kV overhead line to 132kV is low. However, a 66kV cable cannot
be converted to 132kV, it must be replaced at high cost.
• Faults on overhead lines can quickly be identified and repaired. With cable faults, it will
normally take at least 2 days to repair.
However, if undergrounding of overhead lines are required, the following rules apply:
• Cable lives are in the order of 50 years. Any cable installed should be designed and rated
for its expected service life.
• The 66kV systems are generally being retired and converted to 132kV to increase our power
transfer capability. All 66kV overhead lines if undergrounded should be installed as 132kV
cable, unless there is no prospect of the line being converted to 132kV in the next 30 years.
• Cable ratings should be matched to the highest rating that can be extracted from the
overhead line. ie. The new cable rating should match the lines emergency rating (120°C),
otherwise the cable will become a strangle point for the line and will have to be replaced at
very high cost.
• Due to the long repair time for cable faults, when undergrounding an entire or a section of a
radial overhead line, an additional fully rated cable or overhead line should be installed to
cover the loss of one cable. This is to avoid causing extended outage while the cable is
being repaired.
DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 51/60

+ )
This section outlines Western Power’s policy regarding upgrading of existing overhead
transmission lines, or replacement of sections of a line. This policy does not apply to repairs.
The life of an overhead line is between 45 and 50 years. In some cases a steel tower line may
last well beyond this time period. Any new transmission line asset must be rated for its expected
service life.
The following rules apply during upgrading of transmission lines:
• Any upgrade must be designed and rated for the line’s expected service life.
• The 66kV systems are generally being converted to 132kV to increase power transfer
capability. Where new poles, conductor or insulators are being installed on 66 kV lines
they should be installed at 132kV, unless there is no prospect of the line being converted
to 132kV in the next 30 years.
• In a line upgrade or other line works, if existing equipment is suitable for continued
service it may be reused. However, where new equipment is installed it should be rated
for the highest rating that can be extracted from the overhead line. The appropriate
rating for emergency use is 120°C. If this is not followed this section will become a
strangle point for the line. (Note the new high temperature conductors operate at
temperatures in excess of 150°C and some as high as 250°C. The various sections
need to be designed for the higher operating temperatures of these conductors)
• In the Metropolitan Area the standard conductor at 132 kV is Venus. New lines
constructed in the Metropolitan area should be a minimum of a single Venus conductor.
Where new equipment is installed on existing lines it should be capable of carrying
Venus conductor. (Note the previous standard conductor was Triton. Some lines were
designed and upgraded for Triton conductor. Triton conductor may be used instead of
Venus on these lines if it is economical to do so.)
• New lines or sections are to include an overhead earth-wire or wires to provide adequate
shielding.
• In country areas, the conductor size should be selected based on the power transfer
needs of the line together with an economic analysis considering the cost of construction
against the cost of losses over the lifetime of the line. Please refer to DMS# 1646420
(also DMS# 1327158 may be of interest).
DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 52/60

Appendix A: STANDARD RATINGS

All new primary plant shall be purchased in accordance with the minimum ratings specified in
the relevant table below. For uprate/extension projects System Capacity section will specify the
minimum requirements for each particular location.
These tables shall be read in conjunction with the following notes.
STANDARD TERMINAL STATION RATINGS
System Voltage 330kV 220kV 132kV 66kV
Rated Voltage (kV rms) 362 245 145 72.5
1 Minute Power Frequency
Withstand Voltage (kV rms)
520 460 275 140
Lighting Impulse Withstand Voltage
across open switching device 1175 1050 650 325
(kV Peak)
Switching Impulse Withstand Voltage
(kV, Peak)
950 - - -
Normal Current (Amps rms): 330/132kV 132/66kV
(a) Busbar Rating 3150 2500 3150 2500 1250
(b) 1 & ½ CB Bay Rating 2500 1250 2500 -
(c) Line Circuit Rating 2000 1250 1600 1250
(d)Transformer Circuit Rating 1250 1250 2500 1600 1250
Short Time Withstand Current / Short
Circuit Breaking Current (kA rms)
50 25 50 25
DC component as per AS62271.100 Generally τ = 45ms curve, but must be confirmed for each
(Figure 9) site.
Short Circuit Duration (s) 1 1 1 3
Total CB Clearing Time (ms) 40 40 60 60
Local Circuit Clearance Time (ms) 100 100 120 120
Remote Clearance Time (ms)
(With intertripping)
140 140 160 160
Remote Clearance Time (ms)
(Without intertripping)
N/A 400 400 400
DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 53/60

STANDARD ZONE SUBSTATION RATINGS

System Voltage 132kV 66kV 33kV 22kV 11kV
Rated Voltage (kV rms) 145 72.5 36 24 12
1 Minute Power Frequency
Withstand Voltage (kV rms)
275 140 70 50 28
Lighting Impulse outdoor
Withstand Voltage
650 325 200 150 95
across open switching indoor
device (kV Peak)
550 325 170 125 75
Normal Current (Amps rms): 6.6kV or
11kV
(a) Busbar Rating 1600 1250 1250 1250 2000 2500
(b) Line/Feeder Circuit Rating 1600 1250 630 630 800 800
(c)Transformer Circuit Rating 6302 630 1250 1250 2000 2000
Short Time Withstand Current / Short 40 16 16 25 25
25
Circuit Breaking Current (kA rms) or 2517 or 1018 or 1018
DC component as per AS62271.100
(Figure 9) Generally τ = 45ms curve, but must be confirmed for each site.
Short Circuit Duration (s) 1 3 3 3 3
Total CB Clearing Time (ms) 60 60 100 100 100
Local Circuit Clearance Times (ms) 120 120
17 & 18
See below comments: Subject to individual review and individual approval for zone substations in
the country areas.
DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 54/60

In addition to the above,

1. All components in the circuit shall meet the above minimum requirements.
2. Current transformers for 132kV zone substation transformer circuits shall have a minimum
primary thermal limit current of 600A to match standard CT characteristics.
3. Earth wires, phase conductors and earth grids shall be rated in accordance with the minimum
required clearing times and design fault ratings in Appendix D.
4. Local clearance time equals total circuit breaker clearing time plus total protection operation
time, plus a margin.
5. Total protection operate time is taken as 40 ms.
6. Total communications operate time end to end is taken as 40 ms.
7. These clearance times are based on generally available standard inter-tripping protection
schemes.
8. These or faster times are to be achieved where new equipment is to be installed unless
CFCT’s dictate faster clearance times.
9. Where new protection is installed on existing primary plant with slower operating times than
the times given in the table, the protection should only take the 40 ms assumed in this table to
operate.
10. If CFCTS shorter than the total Clearing times are required then special equipment may be
required to meet the requested times.
11. In some circumstances the communications operate times may not be able to be readily
achieved with standard schemes, equipment, and existing bearers. In these cases the
specific needs of the circuit should be reviewed.
12. Blocking schemes used on TEED lines may require extended remote clearance times. TEED
lines should be dealt with on a case by case basis. Extended remote clearance times for
TEED lines must be agreed.
13. In addition to the standard DC component requirements for 22kV and 11kV plant:
X
a. 16kA equipment shall be rated for 12.5kA with an /R of 25; and
X
b. 25kA equipment shall be rated for 16kA with an /R of 25.
14. For applications where 22kV plant will be initially operated at 6.6kV or 11kV additional current
ratings are defined above (shaded).
15. For applications where 11kV plant will be initially operated at 6.6kV the current ratings shall
be identical to those for 11kV plant.
16. The minimum ratings required for the generator circuits are not covered by this document.
Please consult System Capacity section about the minimum ratings for this application.
17. In some country areas a lower standard fault level rating could be applied for HV equipment.
In this case the Short Time Withstand Current / Short Circuit Breaking Current for 132 kV
zone substations will be 25 kA (kA, rms). Such cases will be a subject to individual review
and individual approval for zone substations in the country areas. Please consult System
Capacity section for a lower fault level approval before proceeding with any plans or
application.
18. In some country areas a lower standard fault level rating could be applied for LV equipment.
In this case the Short Time Withstand Current / Short Circuit Breaking Current for 33 kV and
22 kV outdoor equipment in zone substations will be 10 kA (kA, rms). Such cases will be a
subject to individual review and individual approval for zone substations in the country areas.
Please consult System Capacity section for a lower fault level approval before proceeding
with any plans or application.
DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 55/60

Appendix B: STANDARD LV BUSBAR DESIGN
Line 1 Line 2
Line 3 HV Busbar Line 4
T1 T2 T3
LV Busbar
DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 56/60

Appendix C: USE OF DTC UNDER NCR CRITERION

This section has been included as an appendix for future consideration. More experience
needs to be gained in applying the NCR criterion first before attempting to push the loading of at
NCR substations any higher.
DTC can be included in the Reduced NCR capacity only if the following conditions are satisfied:
• Heaviest loaded transformer circuit rating is greater than the RRST rating.
• DTC is available on the section of busbar associated with the heaviest loaded transformer
circuit.
• DTC is not supplied from another NCR substation.
• Maximum amount of DTC that can be included is,
DTCTx = RRRST − RTx ..................................................... (1)
Where, DTCTx = maximum amount of DTC associated with the heaviest loaded
transformer circuit that can be included.
Hence, if all the above conditions are satisfied then eqn. (14) becomes:
R RRST + DTCTx
u= ...................................................... (2)
LTx
It is important to note that it is not recommended to include DTC because this can lead to
overloading of the transformer beyond its NCR rating, as previously noted.
DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 57/60

Appendix D: RATING OF OVERHEAD EARTH WIRES, PHASE

CONDUCTORS AND EARTH GRIDS
The minimum required clearing times and design fault ratings for the rating of overhead earth
wires, phase conductors and earth grids at terminal stations and zone substations, are shown in
the following table. These ratings include allowances for the extra heating effect of the DC
offset, which are discussed in detail below. DMS document # 2187772 provides distance
versus fault level graphs for standard 66, 132, 220 and 330 kV transmission lines.
REQUIRED TERMINAL / ZONE SUBSTATION PLANT RATINGS

(Overhead Earth Wires, Phase Conductors, Earth Grids)
132kV
System Voltage 330kV 220kV 66kV
Metro Country*
Overhead Earth
Short Time
Wires, Phase
Conductors &
Withstand Current 56 28 56 / 45 27* 27
(kA)
Earth Grids
Overhead Earth Short Time
Wires Withstand (ms)
200 200 230 230 400
Short Time
Phase Conductors
Withstand (ms)
270 370 280/400 400 1000
Short Time
Earth Grids
Withstand (ms)
500 500 500 500 1000
* Subject to individual review and individual approval.
NOTES:
• These ratings are applicable at the substation/ terminal station only, as the fault level and
DC offset reduce significantly as the distance between the substation/terminal station and
the fault increases. Please refer to the ‘Fault Level vs Distance’ charts to determine the fault
level along the line.
• For substations with high double phase to earth fault levels, the ratings in the table may
need to be increased.
• A local backup clearance time of 270ms is used for new 330kV and 220kV sites. A local
backup clearance time of 310ms is used for new 132kV sites.
• The local backup clearance times of existing 330kV, 220kV, and 132kV sites shall be
improved to 270/310ms as sites are uprated from 40kA to 50kA. Please confirm existing
fault levels with the System Capacity Manager.
• The earthing system shall be designed in accordance with relevant standards, including
AS2067, and shall include N-1 redundancy for earth conductors and earth connections.
• For railway crossings, an earthwire that can withstand the 270/400ms of a circuit breaker
failure should be used, at the ultimate fault level of 60/48kA (330/132kV).
• All OPGW earth wires are to be designed to withstand a fault cleared in local backup time
(LBU) to prevent damage to the optic fibre.
• In some country areas a lower standard fault level rating could be applied. In this case the
Short Time Withstand Current / Short Circuit Breaking Current for 132 kV conductors and
earthwires will be reduced to 27 kA. Such cases will be a subject to individual review and
individual approval for zone substations in the country areas. Please consult System
Capacity section for a lower fault level approval before proceeding with any plans or
application.
DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 58/60

The fault currents provided are the ultimate design fault levels required to ensure that plant will
meet the thermal duty imposed by Western Power’s standard ratings, taking into account the
extra heating effect of the DC offset (X/R).
Installations designed to the new standard will meet the following ‘base’ ratings:
STANDARD TERMINAL STATION / ZONE SUBSTATION RATINGS
132kV
System Voltage 330kV 220kV Zone Sub 66kV
Terminal
Metro Country*
Short Time
Withstand 50 25 50 40 25 * 25
Overhead Current (kA)
Earth Wires Short Time
Withstand 200 200 230 230 230 400
(ms)
Short Time
Withstand 50 / 40 25 50 40 25 * 25
Phase
Current (kA)
Conductors
Short Time
& Earth Grids 270 /
Withstand 370 310 400 400 1000
370
(ms)
* Subject to individual review and individual approval.
The new ratings are devised by applying a suitable ‘design factor’ to the ‘base’ ratings such that;
• The extra heating effect from the DC offset in the current waveform is included, assuming an
X/R of 14, and worst point on wave fault occurrence.
The ‘design factors’ are given as follows.
Time DC offset
(ms)
‘Design Factor’
100 20.0%
200 10.6%
250 8.6%
270 7.9%
400 5.4%
500 4.4%
1000 2.2%
The minimum required fault clearing times are based on analysis provided by Protection (ref.
DMS #1324100v2) that indicates:
Local fault clearance times of 105ms and less are achievable on new circuits with new
protection.
Circuit breaker failure clearance times of 270ms and less are feasible on new 330kV circuits
with new protection. Circuit breaker failure clearance times of 310ms and less are feasible on
new 132kV circuits with new protection.
On existing circuits, reduction in breaker failure clearance times by 40ms can be achieved by
reducing the very conservative 100ms safety margin presently used in the LBU time delay.
Further reductions in times may require changing circuit breakers and protections.
DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 59/60

Actual clearance times will be dependent on a number of factors (eg the protection selected, the
actual trip operating time of the circuit breaker, operating time of adjacent breakers, etc) – the
actual clearance time that can be achieved will thus need to be assessed on a case by case
basis. In this regard, it is proposed that System Capacity will outline the required clearance
times in planning documentation (eg planning criteria, estimate requests).
In summary, the maximum time for which a local fault is cleared at new sites with new
protection, without a CB failure, is 105ms. The maximum time for which a local fault is cleared
by backup protection (LBU), at new sites with new protection, is 310ms.
The local backup (LBU) clearance times (CB fail) may be used to rate phase conductors and
earth grids. This design is in accordance with ‘normal practise’ indicated in AS2067, and the
‘Safearth’ design of the earthing system for the Cockburn switchyard. Note AS2067 suggests
the use of an additional margin (ms). However, an additional safety margin may be provided, by
ensuring the earthing system is designed to a (N-1) level of redundancy for all earth conductors
and earth connections. Note the contribution of remote fault currents to the phase conductor
fault current is minimal. An additional safety margin is included for earth grids (total withstand
time 500ms) due to their buried location and associated maintenance difficulties.
For the rating of overhead earth wires some additional risk may be taken by using the local fault
times (with no CB fail) to rate overhead earth wires. However, it is possible for one or two bays
of earth conductor to be damaged, in the unlikely event of a breaker failure for a close-in fault.
In the case of such an event, the failure of the earth wire may not necessarily result in loss of
supply or increased safety risk. Any damage shall be identified during post-fault line inspection.
Therefore, a clearance time of 200ms is chosen for overhead earth wires, such that the
conductor will withstand the fault current plus one attempt to reclose onto the fault (note there
will be some cooling of the earth wire during deadtime). Again, the contribution of remote fault
currents to the earth wire fault current is minimal.
At existing sites, the maximum time for which a local fault is cleared, without a CB failure, may
be up to 200ms (or 1s @ 66kV). The maximum time for which a local fault is cleared by backup
protection, at existing sites, may be up to 400ms (except 66kV) for design fault levels up to
40kA.
At existing sites, it will be necessary to improve the local backup clearance times to 270/310ms,
at the time of uprating the site to the ultimate design fault level (50kA).
In the interim, when installing new plant at existing terminal stations and zone substations,
provided the plant is designed for ultimate operation at the design fault levels listed in table 2,
the plant will be adequately rated for present fault levels and clearing times, based on an
equivalent I2t analysis.
DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 60/60


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TRANSMISSION PLANNING CRITERIA

PREPARED BY: PETER ANG SYSTEM PLANNING BRANCH

", #- #. #/ "# "#

DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 2/60

DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 3/60

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PART A – TRANSMISSION PLANNING CRITERIA

The addition or alteration to the power system of:

DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 5/60

DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 6/60

#1 4 " A " -., #..#2- % -- #-1 "# "# 0 "0# B

DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 7/60

WPC’s Corporate Safety Policy states that:

The contingency criteria or outage criteria perform two roles:

DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 8/60

$ #%# "# "#

These factors are discussed in detail in Section 3.

DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 9/60

DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 10/60

DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 11/60

", #-#. #/ "# "#

DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 12/60

DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 13/60

Four categories of voltage limits are considered:

DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 14/60

' 5 ", % #-1 #, # .

' " -.# - $ #%#

DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 15/60

DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 16/60

' ) 2% 1 $ #%# 6) 2% 1 /2%% 7 . 8" .2- - , 7 #-1 9

DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 17/60

'' " 3 4 -/ $ #%# "# "#2-

", 2-#/ ) 2% 1 - 4"" -

DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 18/60

The adverse effects of harmonics in power systems can be widespread:

' % / "2!, 1 - #/ - ": " -/

DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 19/60

' 2- #-1 -/ "# "# :2" 24 5 ; . - "/2- - / . , 6 ; 9

The N-1 contingency criterion applies to:

DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 20/60

$% " -., #..#2 - % , - . ( 4 %#:# . #- 1 % 2- #-1 - / 6 ! "# "#2 -9

The N-2 contingency criterion applies to:

$% 2, $ #- #2 -. 2: " -., #..#2- %, - . 2, 7 "#.#-1 24 $ % 2- #-1 -/ 6 !

Stuck Breaker Criterion:

DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 21/60

' 2- #-1 -/ "# "# :2" 2" 5 ; . - "/2-- / . , 6 ; 9

The N-1 contingency criterion applies to:

' "# "# 2, , 2- 5"241 5 24 5 ; " -., #..#2- . ,.

DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 22/60

' "# "# :2" 24 5 ; . - "/2- - / . , " -., #..#2 - "#

DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 23/60

DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 24/60

#1 4 " #1 5 . // 7 $% 0 % - 4 " #2- 2: , 72" " 0 "02 % 1

DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 25/60

Transient voltage dip criteria (TVD):

DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 26/60

• The largest capacitor, in the area is to be taken as out of service.

In all situations the following procedures are followed;

'' " 3 4 -/ $ #%# #, # .

Spinning Reserve Policy:

DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 27/60

#1 4 " :: " 3 4 -/ #, # . :2" 7 #/ % , 4"$ #-

DMS#: 1195855 Printed: 28/02/2008 Page 28/60

$% ' /5 , #-1 . 6 24 5 ; . - "/2- - / . ,9