Accelerating Luhmann

Towards a Systems Theory of Ambivalence

Ole Bjerg

Our analysis has given no indication whatsoever that sometime during this century, and presumably during its second half, an epoch break has occurred regarding the system of society, which would justify claiming a transformation from a modern to a postmodern society. (Luhmann, 1 997: 1 1 43) 1

N LUHMANNS systems theory we do not nd a concept of postmodernity. 2 The reason for this is the very obvious one that Luhmann does not recognize society as being postmodern, hence there is no need for a concept of postmodernity. Luhmann does indeed agree with the proponents of postmodernism that the time we live in is permeated by a certain kind of paradoxicality. He believes, however, that this paradoxicality is already adequately incorporated in systems theorys description of contemporary society as consisting of a multitude of differentiated self-referential function systems. Luhmanns account of modernity is, in his own opinion, already sufciently equipped to grasp what some people have chosen to call postmodernism (1 997: 1 1 445). I believe, however, that Luhmanns dismissal of the problem of postmodernity is somewhat too hasty. The paradoxicality that we face in postmodern society is more radical than just the coexistence of a multitude of different world descriptions. In postmodern society we see an implosion (or explosion if you like) of meaning, whereby differentiated function systems are confronted with complexity in an ambivalent form, which they are not able to handle without dissolving themselves. This ambivalence not only questions the validity of a particular systems observations of the environment. It puts the systems fundamental possibility of observation, and thereby its very existence, at stake. The aim of this article is to propose a conception of the postmodern condition of social systems compatible with the terminology of Luhmanns systems theory.
Theory, Culture & Society 2006 (SAGE, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi), Vol. 23(5): 4968 DOI: 1 0. 1 1 77/0263276406067098
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The Possibility and Impossibility of Society Luhmanns social theory is constructed around the classical sociological question: how is society possible? This type of question connects back to the old Hobbesian problem of order and is later appropriated within the sociological tradition by authors like Durkheim (1 893) and Simmel (1 908). In an early article, titled precisely Wie ist soziale Ordnung mglich? (How is Social Order Possible? ) (1 981 ), Luhmann poses the question very explicitly as the central question of the development of social theory. And in the major work, Social Systems (1 984), we nd it in a version accommodating his by then fully accomplished linguistic turn. To Luhmann, society is now tantamount to communication systems and, accordingly, the formulation of the question becomes: How is communication, that is, coordinated selectivity, possible at all? (Luhmann, 1 984: 1 57). Luhmanns detailed studies of particular function systems are also based upon this type of How is X possible? question (e. g. 1 982: 1 9, 1 990a: 91 0). This article revolves around an inquiry into the other side of this question. By taking the possibility of society as his starting point, Luhmann makes himself blind to essential features of contemporary society. These features may be illuminated by posing the question: How is society impossible? or How is communication as a system impossible? The thesis I want to propose is that in society, in its postmodern condition, communication and systems are at the same time both possible and impossible. To fully grasp what is going on in postmodern society, theory must be able to operate with both the possibility and the impossibility of society. In other words, if systems theory and the analysis generated from it are to be in step with contemporary society, it has to incorporate the question: How are systems impossible? Systems theory does indeed take the improbability of communication as its basis, i. e. , the improbability that a communicative operation will nd connection in a subsequent operation (Luhmann, 1 984: 1 57, 1 990c: 96). Probability, however, is a measure for the likelihood of a specic outcome within a eld of possible outcomes. Improbability indicates a low likelihood of an outcome, yet it still is possible. Improbability therefore presupposes possibility. C entral to the notion of autopoiesis is the notion of Anschlussf higkeit 3 (Luhmann, 1 984: 36). Being autopoietic, systems are intrinsically vested with the ability to connect with subsequent operations, vested with the possibility of their own meaningful reproduction. The question of the impossibility of systems is intended to open an inquiry into the impossibility of connectivity, Anschluss un f higkeit . The argument will consist of two stages. First a deconstructive critique exposing those problems or obstacles in systems theory, which make it blind to certain features of function systems in their postmodern condition. And, second, a reconstructive stage attempting to incorporate this critique into systems theory, enabling it to grasp both the modern and the post in contemporary society.

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The Problem of C omplexity A central component if not the central component of systems theory is the distinction between system and environment. A system, according to Luhmann, is only possible as one side of this distinction (1 984: 1 76). The difference between system and environment is furthermore constituted by a difference in gradients of complexity between environment and system (1 984: 1 81 5). We may speak of a drop in complexity ( Komplexittsgef lle ). The capacity of systemic self-reproduction hereby consists in the ability to reduce the complexity that is present in the environment. Reduction of complexity is carried out in a process where the system selects and actualizes potential observations in the environment. C omplexity works as a generator for system creation and Luhmann speaks of a complexity pressure (1 990b: 68) whereby the system is being forced to select (1 984: 25) by the surplus of possible observations in the environment. But for complexity to function as a catalyst for the creation and reproduction of systems, we must assume that complexity in the form of potential observations is present prior to the system, that is, prior to the actualization of the observation (for an exposition of this problem see Habermas, 1 971 : 1 53). If the environment complexity only comes into being with the systems observation of the environment, it cannot function as the compelling force behind the creation of the system (for a discussion on this topic see Bjerg, 2000). Neither will it make sense to ascribe a complexity-reducing function to the system, since then the system would have rst produced the complexity that it later reduces. It would be like a pyromaniac reman who puts out a re that she herself has started. So Luhmann has to work with the assumption of an environment, which is in some way complex an sich . As will be demonstrated, it does not sufce to assume that systems just select from a horizon of pre-existing possible observations, thereby reducing complexity. We must also have an eye for the fact that systems themselves, in a more radical way than Luhmann conceives, produce complexity, not only in the system but also in the environment. 4 This problematic of production and reduction of complexity is expressed in the form of ambivalence. Referring to Spencer Brown, Luhmann constantly states that the basic operation of observation is the drawing of a distinction. But what happens if the object one is observing seems to appear on both sides of the distinction at the same time? What if an object seems to be both an artwork and a non-artwork or if it seems to be neither? In other words, what if the observation is ambivalent? Bauman approaches this problem in an analysis that can be read as a description of what happens in function systems with the emergence of postmodernity:
Through its naming/classifying function, language posits itself between a solidly founded, orderly world t for human habitation, and a contingent world of randomness, in which human survival weapons memory, the capacity for learning would be useless, if not downright suicidal. Language strives to sustain the order and to deny or suppress randomness and contingency. . . .
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The situation turns ambivalent if the linguistic tools of structuration prove inadequate; either the situation belongs to none of the linguistically distinguished classes, or it falls into several classes at the same time. None of the learned patterns could be proper in an ambivalent situation or more than one of the learned patterns could be applied; whatever is the case, the outcome is the feeling of indecision, undecidability, and hence loss of control. The consequences of action become unpredictable, while randomness, allegedly done away with by the structuring effort, seems to make an unsolicited come-back. (Bauman, 1 991 : 1 2) 5

In Luhmannian terms, what Bauman is describing here is a situation in which the system is confronted with a form of irreducible complexity. When a system is observing a given phenomenon in the environment according to its semantics, the phenomenon may be ambivalent in the sense that logically it can appear on both sides of the systems code of observation, or perhaps on neither side. Postmodernity can be described as a situation where it is becoming increasingly difcult to distinguish unambiguously between the two sides of the systems observations, e. g. art/non-art, profitable/non-protable, healthy/sick. This ambivalence is radical in the sense that it cannot simply be settled through a selection in which the system dogmatically places the phenomenon on one side or the other of the distinction, since such a selection would be inconsistent with the systems own semantics. The problem of ambivalence is treated in systems theory under the headline of paradoxicality. As already noted, Luhmann does admit that paradoxicality is an intrinsic part of life in contemporary society. What separates him from Baumann and other proponents of postmodernity is his belief in the systems ability to cope with paradoxicality. Luhmanns trust in modernity in the form of differentiated function systems may be summarized in his statement: Paradoxicality is not a question of existence for the system (1 985: 41 5). The main argument of the current article may be stated as the precise opposite of this formulation. It is precisely the failure to recognize the extent of the problem that paradoxicality constitutes for the system which prevents Luhmann from being able to fully conceptualize postmodernity. In the Luhmannian conception, a paradox occurs when the conditions of the possibility of an operation are at the same time the conditions of the impossibility of this operation (Luhmann, 1 986: 269). However, this is only possible on the level of observation, and therefore paradoxicality always emerges on the level of observation and never on the level of the observed, the level of operation. Luhmann argues in his exposition of the consciousness as a system (which may be generalized to social systems):
With classical logic and epistemology we assume that real processes proceed free of paradoxes. This is also possible in self-referential systems. In the constitution of a paradox, the parallel view of a negation is necessary, i. e. the use of a schema of difference, i. e. observation. The progression from thought
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to thought lets itself be carried by a necessity free of negation. The thought being actual in this very moment disappears anyway. It does not have to be negated. And a subsequent thought takes its place anyway . . . without the negation of the previous thought being necessary for the production of the new thought. This happens unnoticed. Only to the observer of this progression do the thoughts form distinct entities; only to the observer is one thought not the other; only to the observer do the thoughts differ from each other; only to the observer does the single thought attain its unity from being distinguished from other thoughts; therefore, only to the observer can paradoxes occur . . . (1 985: 41 41 5)

According to systems theory, the paradox emerges when the system observes itself, thereby realizing its own contingency. But the stream of thoughts constituting the autopoiesis of the system continues, affected only momentarily by the realization of the paradoxicality on the level of selfobservation. Since the paradox emerges on the level of observation, it constitutes only a meta- and not a fundamental or existential problem to the autopoiesis of the system. The system may therefore be able to afford to just ignore the problem and simply continue operation on a lower-order level (Luhmann, 1 997: 578). The necessity free of negation will automatically force the system into making a selection on a rst-order level, regardless of the meta-problem constituted by the paradox. One way of continuing may even be a further self-observation, identifying the rst self-observation as a paradox. The paradox is hereby deparadoxicated by being identied as a paradox through a meta-meta-observation, which in itself is an operation and a continuation of the autopoiesis of the system. A paradox may constitute a logical problem, but since the autopoiesis of a system is basically operational and not necessarily logical, a system may overcome a paradox by jumping between orders of observation, thus escaping (or dodging one might say) the paradox without necessarily solving it. It [the system] releases itself from the paradox by moving on to another distinction (Luhmann, 1 993: 201 ). As long as the system just keeps making observations, it avoids being stopped in its operations. The problem of paradoxicality becomes a question of how, and not whether, the system reproduces itself. This is how Luhmann reaches the conclusion quoted above: Paradoxicality is not a question of existence for the system . In the following I will demonstrate how systems in postmodernity are confronted with a peculiar form of paradoxicality. In a radical sense this paradoxicality puts the very existence of the systems at stake, since it does not lend itself to immediate deparadoxication by switching between orders of observation. To illustrate the logic of this paradoxicality I have constructed a kind of Gedankenexperiment in the form of a very simple system. I would like to demonstrate how a paradox emerges as a result of self-observation (Luhmann would probably agree with this part) but also how the paradox cannot necessarily be dissolved by either continuing the operations of the system on a lower order, or escalating to higher orders of selfobservation. The Gedankenexperiment may also be read as a metaphor for
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postmodernity in the sense that it demonstrates the impossibility of modernity in the form of the ambition of being able to rationally process any kind of complexity, eliminate randomness by way of calculation and turn chaos into order. To paraphrase Bauman (1 991 : 2), the idea is to illustrate the unsolicited come-back of the randomness, allegedly done away with by the structuring effort. Postmodern Prisoners Dilemma Two friends, Max and Sam, have been arrested, convicted and sentenced to the death penalty for a very serious crime. 6 They are now sitting in neighbouring prison cells awaiting the execution of their penalty, due by the end of the week. It is now Monday. Through the bars they are discussing how they feel about their impending death. Max is very afraid. Not so much about death itself, but about knowing exactly when it is going to come. He had always hoped to be surprised by death. To help his old friend, Sam now offers to kill Max by strangulation (he can just about t his arms through the bars) in his sleep on one of the nights before the execution on Sunday, thus relieving Max of having to face his own death. Max welcomes the idea, but stresses that to make it work, the murder has to take place on a night that Max cannot anticipate, since Max would not be able to fall asleep knowing that he was going to die on that particular night. If he were able to anticipate his own murder, the crucial element of surprise would be lost. There are six nights until the execution, and Sam immediately starts considering which night to choose to kill Max. He reasons as follows: Saturday night, i. e. the last night before the execution, is out of the question. When Max wakes up alive on Saturday morning, he will then be able to gure out that he is going to be killed the following night, since this is the last possible night before the execution. The element of surprise will be lost and Max will not be able to fall asleep in the evening. But what about Friday night? Sam now continues his reasoning: if Max is able to anticipate the killing if it is to be carried out on Saturday night, then Friday night is not a valid option either. On Friday morning when Max wakes up alive, he can gure out that he is going to be killed the following night, since this is the last possible night before the execution, now that Saturday night has been ruled out. Now Sam is starting to get confused: if both Saturday and Friday night can be ruled out as valid options beforehand, then Thursday night cannot be valid either, since in this case as well, when Max has woken up alive and realized that Thursday night is the last possible night, he will be able to anticipate the time of his death and will therefore not be surprised when Sam starts to kill him. In fact he will not even be able to fall asleep. Sams confusion turns into utter frustration when he realizes, that according to the logic of his reasoning, neither Wednesday, Tuesday nor Monday nights can be used as the time for the killing, since in these cases as well, Max will be able to anticipate the killing on the previous morning, and hence the element of surprise will be lost. But how is it possible that a surprise
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murder is not possible, when initially there are six different nights to choose from? Sam now realizes that in his logical considerations he has been working with a hidden premise, namely that Max is thinking as logically as himself. For instance, Thursday night is only an impossible time for the killing if Max has logically calculated that it cannot be Saturday or Friday night, and is therefore not going to be surprised. This gives Sam a moment of relief, and he considers whether Max is thinking as logically as himself and drawing the same conclusions, or whether he can assume that Max is not thinking as logically about the situation as himself, allowing him to set a random night for the killing. While considering this, he strikes upon another hidden premise in his reasoning. Not only is the validity of his reasoning based on the assumption that Max is thinking logically, but Max also has to assume that Sam is thinking logically and not just setting a random night for the killing without any further speculation. If Max is thinking logically, but is assuming that Sam is not thinking logically, then Max cannot make any predictions, since he cannot be sure that Sam has not simply chosen, for example, Friday night, unaware that this night is actually not possible. Sams momentary relief now again turns into confusion as he realizes that not only must he consider whether Max is thinking logically or not, he also has to consider whether Max believes he (Sam) is thinking logically. And his confusion increases as he thinks about the fact that logical thinking might not be a question of either/or, but rather a question of degree: Max may indeed think as far as to rule out Saturday and Friday nights, but perhaps he does not realize that Thursday night is not possible either, and would therefore be surprised if Sam decided to kill him on Wednesday night. Max may also indeed come to the conclusion that all nights are logically impossible, but he may also assume that Sam is not thinking further ahead than to rule out Saturday and Friday. He might then expect the killing to be on Thursday night, and therefore be surprised if Sam settles on Wednesday night. Sam has now reached a level of confusion that makes him too tired to speculate any more. He decides to stick with his promise to kill Max, but gives up on the ambition of logically nding a night on which he can be sure Max is going to be surprised. Instead he simply throws a die and lets it decide the night of the killing. The die lands on four, and Sam prepares himself for killing Max on the Wednesday night (four nights before Sunday). Before he falls asleep in the evening, he cannot help wondering whether Max is going to be surprised on the night after all. He also thinks about whether his solution to the problem was the most rational or the most irrational. He falls asleep without nding an answer to any of the questions. The Paradox Sams considerations can be viewed as operations in a system. The code of the system is kill on this night/not kill on this night, and the semantics,
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which discriminate the observations, consist in the rule that only a night when Max cannot logically anticipate his own death may be used as a possible night for the killing. The system is confronted with a complex environment with six possible observations in the form of the six nights (in the following, Saturday night will be referred to as N1 , Friday night as N2, Thursday night as N3 . . . Monday night as N6). It has to select one of these potential observations and thereby reduce complexity. The paradox is, however, that as soon as the system starts working on the situation to make the complexity-reducing observation, it also starts producing a complexity in the environment that was not there beforehand. Had Sam never become aware of the logical problems involved in nding a proper time, and had he immediately rolled the die or chosen a night to kill Max in a similar random fashion, the problems would never have emerged. The calculations of the system work as a sort of doubling of the environmental complexity. With the realization of the hidden assumptions, entirely new possibilities of observation emerge that the system now has to deal with and select between. Instead of just selecting between the possibilities N1 , N2, N3 . . . N6, the system now also has to select whether Max is to be observed as thinking logically or randomly, i. e. between N1 ml, N2ml, N3ml . . . N6ml and N1 mr, N2mr, N3mr . . . N6mr (ml = Max is logical; mr = Max is random). And when the system becomes aware of the second hidden assumption about Maxs assumptions about Sam, we get yet another doubling of the rst row, so that N1 ml, N2ml, N3ml . . . N6ml becomes N1 mlsl, N2mlsl, N3mlsl . . . N6mlsl and N1 mlsr, N2mlsr, N3mlsr . . . N6mlsr (sl = Max assumes that Sam is logical; sr = Max assumes that Sam is random). The production of added complexity can go on eternally, since we can add not only the assumption about Maxs rationality and the assumption about Maxs assumptions about Sams rationality, but also an assumption about Maxs assumptions about Sams assumptions about Maxs rationality, and an assumption about Maxs assumptions about Sams assumptions about Maxs assumptions about Sams rationality, and so on. The only way of stopping this process is by appealing to some form of randomness. But when the system makes this move it actually dissolves itself by admitting its own redundancy. If the observation in the last instance can only be made with recourse to a random decision anyway, why even bother to activate the system in the rst place? All that Sam has gained by his logical speculations is half a day of puzzles that make his head ache. He could have saved himself the trouble by doing from the beginning what he eventually ended up doing anyway, namely rolling the die. His considerations have given him neither more nor less condence that Max will be surprised than if he had left his decision to chance from the beginning. And yet! What if the die had landed on one and not on four? Would it not then have been too obvious to plan the killing on the last day? And would not the logical reections have had some value after all in this case? Furthermore, the system and the logical reections are necessary in another way, since it is only by going through these reections that Sam reaches the
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conclusion that he might as well make a random decision regarding the night for the killing. So the system is necessary for the realization of its own redundancy! Acceleration and Repression of C omplexity In system-theoretical terms, the paradox in the example may be described as follows: the system is confronted with an ambivalence that threatens its drop in the degree of complexity in relation to the environment. As mentioned above, the precondition for the existence and reproduction of a system is that the degree of complexity within the system is lower than the degree of complexity in the environment. We may express this in the equation: Sc < Ec (Sc = system complexity; Ec = environment complexity). In the Postmodern Prisoners Dilemma Gedankenexperiment we see two types of operations. One we may call acceleration of reection and the other repression of reection. Both types of operations involve not only an element of complexity reduction but also an element of complexity production . (1 ) As Sam gradually realizes the impossibility of calculating a specic time for the killing (rst he sees that N1 , N2, N3 . . . etc. are all impossible and then he discovers the different layers of hidden assumptions in his reections) the operations of the system are, so to speak, accelerated. Layer upon layer of new reections and self-observations are added. These reections are not just system-internal complexity processing. They simply produce a complexity in the environment, which was not there before. The original environment complexity consisting in six possible dates (N1 , N2, N3 . . . N6) has now been doubled with the inclusion of the possibility that Max is either thinking logically or randomly (N1 ml, N2ml, N3ml . . . N6ml or N1 mr, N2mr, N3mr . . . N6mr). And this set of possibilities is then doubled again in relation to the assumption about whether Sam is thinking logically or randomly (N1 mlsl, N2mlsl, N3mlsl . . . N6mlsl or N1 mlsr, N2mlsr, N3mlsr . . . N6mlsr). As mentioned above, this doubling can go on eternally, making it more and more impossible for the system to reduce the complexity, i. e. it becomes more and more difcult for Sam to make a decision. Escalating into higher orders of self-observation does not dissolve the fundamental paradoxicality, on the contrary, it only seems to accelerate it. The system is in a situation homologous to that of the pyromaniac reman who starts a re that grows to such a size that she is subsequently unable to put it out. It produces a complexity in the environment that it is subsequently unable to process. Thus the balance in the complexity drop between system and environment is being inverted, since the system is responsible for part of the complexity in the environment. The environment complexity consists of an original part, and a part produced by the system. The equation Sc < Ec becomes Sc < Eoc + Espc (Eoc = original complexity in the environment; Espc = system-produced complexity in the environment). But since the system is responsible for Espc, one could ask which side of the equation
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