SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 139970. June 6, 2002] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

JIMMY DELA CRUZ Y QUIMPO, accused-appellant. DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Before us is the appeal from the decisioni[1] dated July 7, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 5270, convicting accused-appellant JIMMY DELA CRUZ y QUIMPO of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. The Information against him alleged: The undersigned Third Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Aklan hereby accuses JIMMY DELA CRUZ y QUIMPO of Barangay Mobo, Kalibo, Aklan of the crime of MURDER, committed as follows: That on or about the 1st day of September, 1998 in the evening, in Barangay Tigayon, Municipality of Kalibo, Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a knife, with treachery and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one ARNULFO INOCENCIO, inflicting upon the latter physical injuries, to wit: EXTERNAL EXAMINATION: - (+) Stabbed Wound, (L) MCL, Level of 6th Intercostal Space, 3 cm in length. INTERNAL EXAMINATION: - (+) Stabbed Wound, Anterior Pericardium, 3 cm - (+) Stabbed Wound/Perforation of Right Ventricle, 3 cm - (+) Blood, 50 cc Pericardial Space as per Post-Mortem Examination Finding and Certificate of Death, respectively, issued by Segundo L. Anayan, Jr., M.D., Medical Officer III of the Dr. Rafael S. Tumbokon Memorial Hospital, Kalibo, Aklan, copies of which are hereto attached as Annexes A and B, and made as an integral part hereof, and which injuries sustained by the victim have caused his instant death.

That by reason of the unlawful acts of the accused, the heirs of the victim have suffered actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P50,000.00. CONTRARY TO LAW.ii[2] On December 1, 1998 appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged.iii[3] During the plea-bargaining stage, appellant proposed to plead guilty to the lesser crime of homicide, claiming to have acted in self-defense. However, the family of the victim rejected such offer. After his arraignment, trial ensued. The prosecution presented the following witnesses, namely: Dr. Segundo Anayan, Jr., Jovelyn Felizario, Glen Cipriano, and SPO4 Dioscoro Tolentino. DR. SEGUNDO ANAYAN, JR., Medical Officer III of Dr. Rafael S. Tumbokon Memorial Hospital testified that he conducted an autopsy on the body of the victim, Arnulfo Inocencio. He found that the victim suffered a single stab wound located two ribs below the left nipple, which was fatal. He opined that the wound could have been inflicted by the assailant while facing the victim.iv[4] His post-mortem examination revealed: EXTERNAL EXAMINATION: - (+) Stabbed Wound, (L) MCL, Level of 6th Intercostal Space, 3 cm in length. INTERNAL EXAMINATION: - (+) Stabbed Wound, Anterior Pericardium, 3 cm - (+) Stabbed Wound/Perforation of Right Ventricle, 3 cm - (+) Blood, 50 cc Pericardia Space CAUSE OF DEATH: Hypovolemic Shock due to Perforation of Right Ventricle due to Stab Wound.v[5] JOVELYN I. FELIZARIO, first cousin of the victim Arnulfo Inocencio,vi[6] testified that in the evening of September 1, 1998, several visitors were in her house at Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan since it was the birthday of her brother, Jonel. At around 11:00 that evening, Arnulfo Inocencio, appellant Jimmy dela Cruz, and brothers Glenn, Gilbert and Greg Cipriano were having a drinking session. Arnulfo played a guitar while appellant sang along. Afterwards, appellant requested Arnulfo to give the guitar to Gilbert. Arnulfo obliged and rose to hand the guitar to Gilbert. When Arnulfo returned to his seat, appellant suddenly drew his knife from his waist and stabbed Arnulfo. According to the witness, appellant then pointed at Arnulfo and said, There, he is already dead. The witness added she was just two meters away from the victim and the appellant when the stabbing incident happened.

On cross-examination, Jovelyn Felizario said that she knew no reason for the attack, since no altercation between the two took place.vii[7] GLEN M. CIPRIANO, another eyewitness to the stabbing, corroborated the testimony of Jovelyn Felizario. He testified that on September 1, 1998 at around 11:00 P.M., he was with the birthday celebrant Jonel Felizario, his two brothers Gilbert and Greg, appellant, and Arnulfo. They had a drinking spree at the house of Antonio Felizario at Brgy. Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. He was seated in one corner talking to Jovelyn Felizario. In front of them were appellant and Arnulfo who were standing beside each other. According to the witness, appellant suddenly stabbed Arnulfo with a knife hitting the latter on the left side of his breast. The witness said he was just two meters away. After stabbing Arnulfo, appellant said, There he is dead. The stabbing was not preceded by any quarrel or altercation between Arnulfo and appellant, according to the witness. In fact, they were even singing and playing the guitar before the incident. Further, he testified that the victim was unarmed when he was assaulted by appellant.viii[8] SPO4 DIOSCORO G. TOLENTINO, JR., desk officer of Kalibo PNP station, testified that past midnight, at around 12:45 A.M. of September 2, 1998, barangay captain Gil Isberto of Barangay Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, with appellant in tow, went to their station. Barangay captain Isberto informed him that appellant surrendered to him (Isberto) after the stabbing incident. Thereafter, SPO4 Tolentino made the appropriate entry in the police blotter and detained appellant. On the following day, SPO4 Tolentino conducted an investigation and after securing the necessary papers, filed the case with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.ix[9] For the defense, witness Dr. Antonieta J. Templado and barangay captain Gil Isberto, and appellant himself testified. Appellant JIMMY DELA CRUZ y QUIMPO admitted stabbing the victim but claimed that it was the victim who attacked him and that he merely acted in self-defense. He testified that at around 6:30 P.M. of September 1, 1998, he attended the birthday party of Jonel Felizario after having been invited by Jonel, the victim Arnulfo Inocencio, and one Jimmy Inocencio. The party was held at the residence of Jonels father, Antonio Felizario, in Brgy. Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. After eating his dinner, he joined the other visitors who at that time were engaged in singing, playing a guitar, and drinking beer and tuba (toddy). Sometime between 10:00 P.M. and 11:00 P.M., he asked permission to go home from Arnulfo Inocencio. He did not ask permission from the owner of the house because the latter was already asleep and his son Jonel, the birthday celebrant, was in the kitchen. However, Arnulfo did not allow him to leave and asked him to stay a little longer as there was still much liquor to drink. Appellant insisted and informed Arnulfo that he had to go for he had promised his wife that he would be home by 10:00 P.M. He was about to leave when Arnulfo told him, If you are going home, just bring this with you. When appellant turned around, he saw Arnulfo thrusting a knife towards him. He parried the thrust and the knife hit his left hand. When Arnulfo attempted to stab him a second time, appellant drew his own knife from his right waist and stabbed the victim. Thereafter, he immediately left the house and proceeded to his fathers residence. He surrendered to barangay captain Gil Isberto of Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan who turned over his person to the police. He said

he was not able to surrender the knife he used in stabbing Arnulfo because he threw it in the middle of the river.x[10] Appellant denied harboring any grudge against the victim although he admitted that his younger brother figured in a quarrel with Arnulfo sometime earlier.xi[11] DR. ANTONIETA TEMPLADO, Medical Officer IV of Dr. Rafael S. Tumbokon Memorial Hospital, testified that on September 2, 1998, she treated appellant who suffered a one-inch long superficial incised wound at the back of his left hand. She opined, however, that the wound could have been self-inflicted and it could have been caused by a knife.xii[12] GIL ISBERTO, barangay captain of Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan testified that at around 12:00 midnight of September 1, 1998, appellant, appellants father, brother-in-law, and Isbertos nephew went to his house. They informed him that appellant stabbed a certain Inocencio. Isberto noticed that appellant had a superficial wound about two inches long on his left wrist. He turned over appellant to the police.xiii[13] The prosecution presented rebuttal evidence through the testimony of Jonel Felizario. Felizario testified that appellants claim that he was in the kitchen when the latter asked permission to leave his birthday celebration is not true. Neither was appellant stabbed by Arnulfo Inocencio with a knife. He said that he was urinating outside of their house at the time of the stabbing incident and the victim was unarmed since no knife has been recovered at the scene of the crime.xiv[14] Rejecting appellants claim of self-defense, the trial court convicted him of the crime or murder and sentenced him, thus: WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused JIMMY DELA CRUZ y QUIMPO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Further, the Court hereby orders the said accused to pay the legal heirs of the victim ARNULFO INOCENCIO the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the latter. Furthermore, the Court hereby orders that the said accuseds period of preventive imprisonment, be credited in full in the service of his sentence. With COSTS against the accused. SO ORDERED.xv[15] Hence, this appeal, in which appellant contends that: I

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE RAISED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE LATTER WAS ABLE TO DULY PROVE THE SAME WITH HIS CORROBORATED TESTIMONY. II THE COURT A QUO LIKEWISE ERRED IN FINDING THE TESTIMONY OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT NOT CREDIBLE ON THE BASIS OF SPECULATIONS, CONJECTURES AND SURMISES WHICH ARE UNTENABLE GROUNDS. III THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT TREACHERY IS ATTENDANT IN THE CASE AT BAR NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE SAME.xvi[16] The main issue to be resolved by this Court is whether or not the lower court erred in rejecting appellants plea of self-defense while giving full faith and credence to the prosecutions evidence. Appellant admits that he killed the victim, Arnulfo Inocencio. However, he avers he did it in self-defense. He claims that it was Arnulfo who attacked him first and that he had no recourse but to stab Arnulfo. Appellant assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses primarily on the basis of their relationship with the victim as well as the relative weight given by the trial court to their testimonies. For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), contends that the evidence for the defense failed to establish the elements of self-defense as a justifying circumstance. In particular, appellant failed to show unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. According to the OSG, factual findings of the trial court and its evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses must be respected and given full weight on appeal.xvii[17] Further, the OSG asserts that treachery attended the killing of Arnulfo Inocencio. The attack was sudden and unexpected, affording the helpless and unarmed victim no chance to resist or to escape. After a careful review of the record, we find no cogent reason to overturn the assailed decision of the trial court. By invoking self-defense, the burden is placed upon appellant to prove clearly and convincingly the elements thereof: unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression, and lack of sufficient provocation on his part.xviii[18] Although all the three elements must concur, self-defense must rest firstly on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.xix[19] If no unlawful aggression has been proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete.xx[20] In this case, appellants testimony miserably failed to prove the existence of unlawful aggression. He claims that it was the victim who, without provocation on his part, suddenly attacked him. To defend himself, he was constrained to pull out the knife from his waist and stab the victim on the chest.

However, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Jovelyn Felizario and Glen Cipriano controverted appellants version of the incident. They both testified that the stabbing of the victim by appellant was sudden and unprovoked. Their positive declarations certainly outweigh the self-serving allegation of appellant. Likewise, we note the trial courts observation of the appellant on the witness stand, thus: The accused seemed unconfident (sic) when he related before the Court his version of the stabbing incident. He seemed anxious on the witness stand and he appeared to be hiding something as he could not deliver his statements smoothly and naturally. Certainly, these circumstances in his personal behavior as keenly observed on the witness stand, ruined his credibility.xxi[21] With respect to the matter of credibility of witnesses, the well-settled rule is that in the absence of a clear showing that some fact or circumstance of weight or substance had been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied,xxii[22] the trial judges assessment of the witnesses and their testimonies would not be disturbed on appeal. For the determination of credibility is the domain of the trial court, and the matter of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses is best performed by it.xxiii[23] Also, appellant attempted to impugn the credibility of the prosecution witnesses on account of their relationship with the victim. However, the mere fact that Jovelyn and Jonel Felizario are relatives of the victim and that Glen is the victims friend does not prove bias or partiality on their part sufficient to undermine the veracity of their testimonies. It was not shown that they had any ill motive that drove them to make false accusations against appellant. Relationship by itself does not give rise to a presumption of bias or ulterior motive, nor does it ipso facto impair the credibility of a witness. Besides, the natural interest of witnesses, who are relatives of the victim, in securing the conviction of the guilty would deter them from implicating persons other than the true culprits; otherwise, the guilty would go unpunished.xxiv[24] Further, Glen is a good friend of both the appellant and the victim. There is no showing of any reason for him to testify falsely in favor of one and against the other. Appellant assails as purely speculative or conjectural the trial courts findings that his testimony is of doubtful veracity and that the wound in his hand is nothing but a self-inflicted injury. He contends that these findings disclose partiality against him on the part of the trial judge. Unfortunately, appellants contention are not borne by the records of the case. Moreover, a judge enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his functions. The findings by the trial judge are not manifestation of bias or partiality, but they are the result of observations by the judge that he properly took into account in the rendition of judgment.xxv[25] In our view, the one-inch long wound in appellants left hand was too superficial to support his claim that it was inflicted while he was parrying the thrust of the victim. The mere fact that he was wounded does not prove indubitably his claim that he acted in self-defense. Nor that the victim and not he was the aggressor. Note that appellant did not present a knife during the trial to bolster his case. The witnesses for the prosecution denied that the victim was armed with a knife and, indeed, none was recovered from the scene of the crime.

Based on the established facts, the Court agrees with the trial court that the killing of Arnulfo Inocencio was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. There is treachery when one employs means, methods or forms in the execution of a crime without risk to oneself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.xxvi[26] The victim was then unarmed and oblivious to the possibility of a deadly attack as he was even having fun with his friends and appellant. There was no altercation or confrontation that preceded the attack. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack even failed to forewarn or arouse any alarm from the victims drinking companions. They did not suspect that anything untoward would happen. Indeed, the essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim that insures its execution without risk to the assailant arising from the defense of his victim.xxvii[27] Moreover, although the victim and his assailant were face to face at the time the stabbing was made, where it appears that the attack was not preceded by a dispute and the offended party was unable to prepare for his defense, treachery should be taken into account.xxviii[28] Finally, to appellants credit, the trial court considered the mitigating circumstance of his voluntary surrender to the barangay captain. Appellant spontaneously and unconditionally placed himself in the hands of the authorities, and saved them the time and effort attendant to a search.xxix[29] The testimony of barangay captain Isberto and the police officer on this point were not contradicted by the prosecution. Thus, we find that the trial court correctly imposed the minimum of the penalty prescribed by law for the crime of murder which is reclusion perpetua. We also find proper the award of P50,000 as civil indemnity but pursuant to current jurisprudence, another sum of P50,000 as moral damages should also be awarded to the heirs of the victim, without need of further proof other than the fact of the victims death.xxx[30] WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 5270, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant JIMMY DELA CRUZ y QUIMPO is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, as well as to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000 as civil indemnity, and P50,000 as moral damages, together with the costs. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Acting C.J., (Chairman), Mendoza, De Leon, Jr., and Corona, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 139970. June 6, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JIMMY DELA CRUZ Y QUIMPO, accused-appellant. DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

Before us is the appeal from the decisionxxxi[1] dated July 7, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 5270, convicting accused-appellant JIMMY DELA CRUZ y QUIMPO of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. The Information against him alleged: The undersigned Third Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Aklan hereby accuses JIMMY DELA CRUZ y QUIMPO of Barangay Mobo, Kalibo, Aklan of the crime of MURDER, committed as follows: That on or about the 1st day of September, 1998 in the evening, in Barangay Tigayon, Municipality of Kalibo, Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a knife, with treachery and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one ARNULFO INOCENCIO, inflicting upon the latter physical injuries, to wit: EXTERNAL EXAMINATION: - (+) Stabbed Wound, (L) MCL, Level of 6th Intercostal Space, 3 cm in length. INTERNAL EXAMINATION: - (+) Stabbed Wound, Anterior Pericardium, 3 cm - (+) Stabbed Wound/Perforation of Right Ventricle, 3 cm - (+) Blood, 50 cc Pericardial Space as per Post-Mortem Examination Finding and Certificate of Death, respectively, issued by Segundo L. Anayan, Jr., M.D., Medical Officer III of the Dr. Rafael S. Tumbokon Memorial Hospital, Kalibo, Aklan, copies of which are hereto attached as Annexes A and B, and made as an integral part hereof, and which injuries sustained by the victim have caused his instant death. That by reason of the unlawful acts of the accused, the heirs of the victim have suffered actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P50,000.00. CONTRARY TO LAW.xxxii[2]

On December 1, 1998 appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged.xxxiii[3] During the plea-bargaining stage, appellant proposed to plead guilty to the lesser crime of homicide, claiming to have acted in self-defense. However, the family of the victim rejected such offer. After his arraignment, trial ensued. The prosecution presented the following witnesses, namely: Dr. Segundo Anayan, Jr., Jovelyn Felizario, Glen Cipriano, and SPO4 Dioscoro Tolentino. DR. SEGUNDO ANAYAN, JR., Medical Officer III of Dr. Rafael S. Tumbokon Memorial Hospital testified that he conducted an autopsy on the body of the victim, Arnulfo Inocencio. He found that the victim suffered a single stab wound located two ribs below the left nipple, which was fatal. He opined that the wound could have been inflicted by the assailant while facing the victim.xxxiv[4] His post-mortem examination revealed: EXTERNAL EXAMINATION: - (+) Stabbed Wound, (L) MCL, Level of 6th Intercostal Space, 3 cm in length. INTERNAL EXAMINATION: - (+) Stabbed Wound, Anterior Pericardium, 3 cm - (+) Stabbed Wound/Perforation of Right Ventricle, 3 cm - (+) Blood, 50 cc Pericardia Space CAUSE OF DEATH: Hypovolemic Shock due to Perforation of Right Ventricle due to Stab Wound.xxxv[5] JOVELYN I. FELIZARIO, first cousin of the victim Arnulfo Inocencio,xxxvi[6] testified that in the evening of September 1, 1998, several visitors were in her house at Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan since it was the birthday of her brother, Jonel. At around 11:00 that evening, Arnulfo Inocencio, appellant Jimmy dela Cruz, and brothers Glenn, Gilbert and Greg Cipriano were having a drinking session. Arnulfo played a guitar while appellant sang along. Afterwards, appellant requested Arnulfo to give the guitar to Gilbert. Arnulfo obliged and rose to hand the guitar to Gilbert. When Arnulfo returned to his seat, appellant suddenly drew his knife from his waist and stabbed Arnulfo. According to the witness, appellant then pointed at Arnulfo and said, There, he is already dead. The witness added she was just two meters away from the victim and the appellant when the stabbing incident happened. On cross-examination, Jovelyn Felizario said that she knew no reason for the attack, since no altercation between the two took place.xxxvii[7]

GLEN M. CIPRIANO, another eyewitness to the stabbing, corroborated the testimony of Jovelyn Felizario. He testified that on September 1, 1998 at around 11:00 P.M., he was with the birthday celebrant Jonel Felizario, his two brothers Gilbert and Greg, appellant, and Arnulfo. They had a drinking spree at the house of Antonio Felizario at Brgy. Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. He was seated in one corner talking to Jovelyn Felizario. In front of them were appellant and Arnulfo who were standing beside each other. According to the witness, appellant suddenly stabbed Arnulfo with a knife hitting the latter on the left side of his breast. The witness said he was just two meters away. After stabbing Arnulfo, appellant said, There he is dead. The stabbing was not preceded by any quarrel or altercation between Arnulfo and appellant, according to the witness. In fact, they were even singing and playing the guitar before the incident. Further, he testified that the victim was unarmed when he was assaulted by appellant.xxxviii[8] SPO4 DIOSCORO G. TOLENTINO, JR., desk officer of Kalibo PNP station, testified that past midnight, at around 12:45 A.M. of September 2, 1998, barangay captain Gil Isberto of Barangay Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, with appellant in tow, went to their station. Barangay captain Isberto informed him that appellant surrendered to him (Isberto) after the stabbing incident. Thereafter, SPO4 Tolentino made the appropriate entry in the police blotter and detained appellant. On the following day, SPO4 Tolentino conducted an investigation and after securing the necessary papers, filed the case with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.xxxix[9] For the defense, witness Dr. Antonieta J. Templado and barangay captain Gil Isberto, and appellant himself testified. Appellant JIMMY DELA CRUZ y QUIMPO admitted stabbing the victim but claimed that it was the victim who attacked him and that he merely acted in self-defense. He testified that at around 6:30 P.M. of September 1, 1998, he attended the birthday party of Jonel Felizario after having been invited by Jonel, the victim Arnulfo Inocencio, and one Jimmy Inocencio. The party was held at the residence of Jonels father, Antonio Felizario, in Brgy. Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. After eating his dinner, he joined the other visitors who at that time were engaged in singing, playing a guitar, and drinking beer and tuba (toddy). Sometime between 10:00 P.M. and 11:00 P.M., he asked permission to go home from Arnulfo Inocencio. He did not ask permission from the owner of the house because the latter was already asleep and his son Jonel, the birthday celebrant, was in the kitchen. However, Arnulfo did not allow him to leave and asked him to stay a little longer as there was still much liquor to drink. Appellant insisted and informed Arnulfo that he had to go for he had promised his wife that he would be home by 10:00 P.M. He was about to leave when Arnulfo told him, If you are going home, just bring this with you. When appellant turned around, he saw Arnulfo thrusting a knife towards him. He parried the thrust and the knife hit his left hand. When Arnulfo attempted to stab him a second time, appellant drew his own knife from his right waist and stabbed the victim. Thereafter, he immediately left the house and proceeded to his fathers residence. He surrendered to barangay captain Gil Isberto of Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan who turned over his person to the police. He said he was not able to surrender the knife he used in stabbing Arnulfo because he threw it in the middle of the river.xl[10]

Appellant denied harboring any grudge against the victim although he admitted that his younger brother figured in a quarrel with Arnulfo sometime earlier.xli[11] DR. ANTONIETA TEMPLADO, Medical Officer IV of Dr. Rafael S. Tumbokon Memorial Hospital, testified that on September 2, 1998, she treated appellant who suffered a one-inch long superficial incised wound at the back of his left hand. She opined, however, that the wound could have been self-inflicted and it could have been caused by a knife.xlii[12] GIL ISBERTO, barangay captain of Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan testified that at around 12:00 midnight of September 1, 1998, appellant, appellants father, brother-in-law, and Isbertos nephew went to his house. They informed him that appellant stabbed a certain Inocencio. Isberto noticed that appellant had a superficial wound about two inches long on his left wrist. He turned over appellant to the police.xliii[13] The prosecution presented rebuttal evidence through the testimony of Jonel Felizario. Felizario testified that appellants claim that he was in the kitchen when the latter asked permission to leave his birthday celebration is not true. Neither was appellant stabbed by Arnulfo Inocencio with a knife. He said that he was urinating outside of their house at the time of the stabbing incident and the victim was unarmed since no knife has been recovered at the scene of the crime.xliv[14] Rejecting appellants claim of self-defense, the trial court convicted him of the crime or murder and sentenced him, thus: WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused JIMMY DELA CRUZ y QUIMPO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Further, the Court hereby orders the said accused to pay the legal heirs of the victim ARNULFO INOCENCIO the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the latter. Furthermore, the Court hereby orders that the said accuseds period of preventive imprisonment, be credited in full in the service of his sentence. With COSTS against the accused. SO ORDERED.xlv[15] Hence, this appeal, in which appellant contends that: I THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE RAISED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE LATTER WAS ABLE TO DULY PROVE THE SAME WITH HIS CORROBORATED TESTIMONY.

II THE COURT A QUO LIKEWISE ERRED IN FINDING THE TESTIMONY OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT NOT CREDIBLE ON THE BASIS OF SPECULATIONS, CONJECTURES AND SURMISES WHICH ARE UNTENABLE GROUNDS. III THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT TREACHERY IS ATTENDANT IN THE CASE AT BAR NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE SAME.xlvi[16] The main issue to be resolved by this Court is whether or not the lower court erred in rejecting appellants plea of self-defense while giving full faith and credence to the prosecutions evidence. Appellant admits that he killed the victim, Arnulfo Inocencio. However, he avers he did it in self-defense. He claims that it was Arnulfo who attacked him first and that he had no recourse but to stab Arnulfo. Appellant assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses primarily on the basis of their relationship with the victim as well as the relative weight given by the trial court to their testimonies. For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), contends that the evidence for the defense failed to establish the elements of self-defense as a justifying circumstance. In particular, appellant failed to show unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. According to the OSG, factual findings of the trial court and its evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses must be respected and given full weight on appeal.xlvii[17] Further, the OSG asserts that treachery attended the killing of Arnulfo Inocencio. The attack was sudden and unexpected, affording the helpless and unarmed victim no chance to resist or to escape. After a careful review of the record, we find no cogent reason to overturn the assailed decision of the trial court. By invoking self-defense, the burden is placed upon appellant to prove clearly and convincingly the elements thereof: unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression, and lack of sufficient provocation on his part.xlviii[18] Although all the three elements must concur, self-defense must rest firstly on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.xlix[19] If no unlawful aggression has been proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete.l[20] In this case, appellants testimony miserably failed to prove the existence of unlawful aggression. He claims that it was the victim who, without provocation on his part, suddenly attacked him. To defend himself, he was constrained to pull out the knife from his waist and stab the victim on the chest. However, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Jovelyn Felizario and Glen Cipriano controverted appellants version of the incident. They both testified that the stabbing of the victim by appellant was sudden and unprovoked. Their positive declarations certainly outweigh

the self-serving allegation of appellant. Likewise, we note the trial courts observation of the appellant on the witness stand, thus: The accused seemed unconfident (sic) when he related before the Court his version of the stabbing incident. He seemed anxious on the witness stand and he appeared to be hiding something as he could not deliver his statements smoothly and naturally. Certainly, these circumstances in his personal behavior as keenly observed on the witness stand, ruined his credibility.li[21] With respect to the matter of credibility of witnesses, the well-settled rule is that in the absence of a clear showing that some fact or circumstance of weight or substance had been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied,lii[22] the trial judges assessment of the witnesses and their testimonies would not be disturbed on appeal. For the determination of credibility is the domain of the trial court, and the matter of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses is best performed by it.liii[23] Also, appellant attempted to impugn the credibility of the prosecution witnesses on account of their relationship with the victim. However, the mere fact that Jovelyn and Jonel Felizario are relatives of the victim and that Glen is the victims friend does not prove bias or partiality on their part sufficient to undermine the veracity of their testimonies. It was not shown that they had any ill motive that drove them to make false accusations against appellant. Relationship by itself does not give rise to a presumption of bias or ulterior motive, nor does it ipso facto impair the credibility of a witness. Besides, the natural interest of witnesses, who are relatives of the victim, in securing the conviction of the guilty would deter them from implicating persons other than the true culprits; otherwise, the guilty would go unpunished.liv[24] Further, Glen is a good friend of both the appellant and the victim. There is no showing of any reason for him to testify falsely in favor of one and against the other. Appellant assails as purely speculative or conjectural the trial courts findings that his testimony is of doubtful veracity and that the wound in his hand is nothing but a self-inflicted injury. He contends that these findings disclose partiality against him on the part of the trial judge. Unfortunately, appellants contention are not borne by the records of the case. Moreover, a judge enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his functions. The findings by the trial judge are not manifestation of bias or partiality, but they are the result of observations by the judge that he properly took into account in the rendition of judgment.lv[25] In our view, the one-inch long wound in appellants left hand was too superficial to support his claim that it was inflicted while he was parrying the thrust of the victim. The mere fact that he was wounded does not prove indubitably his claim that he acted in self-defense. Nor that the victim and not he was the aggressor. Note that appellant did not present a knife during the trial to bolster his case. The witnesses for the prosecution denied that the victim was armed with a knife and, indeed, none was recovered from the scene of the crime. Based on the established facts, the Court agrees with the trial court that the killing of Arnulfo Inocencio was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. There is treachery when one employs means, methods or forms in the execution of a crime without risk to oneself arising

from the defense which the offended party might make.lvi[26] The victim was then unarmed and oblivious to the possibility of a deadly attack as he was even having fun with his friends and appellant. There was no altercation or confrontation that preceded the attack. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack even failed to forewarn or arouse any alarm from the victims drinking companions. They did not suspect that anything untoward would happen. Indeed, the essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim that insures its execution without risk to the assailant arising from the defense of his victim.lvii[27] Moreover, although the victim and his assailant were face to face at the time the stabbing was made, where it appears that the attack was not preceded by a dispute and the offended party was unable to prepare for his defense, treachery should be taken into account.lviii[28] Finally, to appellants credit, the trial court considered the mitigating circumstance of his voluntary surrender to the barangay captain. Appellant spontaneously and unconditionally placed himself in the hands of the authorities, and saved them the time and effort attendant to a search.lix[29] The testimony of barangay captain Isberto and the police officer on this point were not contradicted by the prosecution. Thus, we find that the trial court correctly imposed the minimum of the penalty prescribed by law for the crime of murder which is reclusion perpetua. We also find proper the award of P50,000 as civil indemnity but pursuant to current jurisprudence, another sum of P50,000 as moral damages should also be awarded to the heirs of the victim, without need of further proof other than the fact of the victims death.lx[30] WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 5270, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant JIMMY DELA CRUZ y QUIMPO is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, as well as to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000 as civil indemnity, and P50,000 as moral damages, together with the costs. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Acting C.J., (Chairman), Mendoza, De Leon, Jr., and Corona, JJ., concur.

i[1] Rollo, pp. 14-20. ii[2] Id. at 4-5. iii[3] Records, p. 32. iv[4] TSN, April 12, 1999, pp. 2-7. v[5] Records, p. 3, Exh. "A".

vi[6] TSN, April 12, 1999, p. 13. vii[7] Id. at 8-17. viii[8] TSN, April 13, 1999, pp. 8-12, 17-19. ix[9] Id. at 2-5. x[10] TSN, May 12, 1999, pp. 2-11. xi[11] TSN, May 13, 1999, p. 14. xii[12] Id. at 3-5, 8. xiii[13] TSN, May 25, 1999, pp. 4-5. xiv[14] TSN, June 23, 1999, pp. 3-5. xv[15] Rollo, p. 20. xvi[16] Id. at 44-45. xvii[17] Id. at 86. xviii[18] People vs. Borreros, G.R. No. 125185, 306 SCRA 680, 688 (1999). xix[19] People vs. Aguilar, G.R. Nos. 120622-23, 292 SCRA 349, 356 (1998). xx[20] People vs. Antonio, G.R. No. 118311, 303 SCRA 414, 429 (1999). xxi[21] Rollo, p. 18. xxii[22] People vs. Barellano, G.R. No. 121204, 319 SCRA 567, 592 (1999). xxiii[23] People vs. Basao, G.R. No. 128286, 310 SCRA 743, 762 (1999). xxiv[24] People vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 122746, 302 SCRA 380, 398-399 (1999). xxv[25] People vs. Belaro, G.R. No. 99869, 307 SCRA 591, 600 (1999). xxvi[26] People vs. Ramirez, G.R. No. 138261, April 17, 2001, p. 12. xxvii[27] People vs. Caboquin, G.R. No. 137613, November 14, 2001, pp. 6-7. xxviii[28] People vs. Lagarteja, G.R. No. 127095, 291 SCRA 142, 153 (1998).

xxix[29] See People vs. Baniel, G.R. No. 108492, 275 SCRA 472, 487 (1997). xxx[30] People vs. Givera, G.R. No. 132159, 349 SCRA 513, 536 (2001).

People v. De La Cruz (Crim1)

People of the Philippines v. Pablo De La Cruz People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Pablo De La Cruz, Defendant Appellant En Banc Doctrine: Neither excessive fines nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment Keywords: excessive fines Date: April 17, 1953 Ponente: Justice Bengzon Facts:

In the morning of October 14, 1950, Eduardo Bernardo, Jr. went to the De La Cruz's store in Sampaloc, Manila, and purchased from him a six-ounce tin of "Carnation" milk for thirty centavos. As the purchase had been made for Ruperto Austria, who was not in good terms with Pablo de la Cruz the matter reached the City Fiscal's office and resulted in this criminal prosecution, because Executive Order No. 331 (issued by authority of Republic Act No. 509) fixed 20 centavos as the maximum price for that kind of commodity. Republic Act No. 509 provides in part as follows: o SEC. 12. Imprisonment for a period of not less two months nor more than twelve years or a fine of not less than two thousand pesos nor more than ten thousand pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who sells any article, goods, or commodity in excess of the maximum selling price fixed by the president; . . . . o In addition to the penalties prescribed above, the persons, corporations, partnerships, or associations found guilty of any violation of this Act or of any rule or regulations issued by the president pursuant to this Act shall be barred from the wholesome and retail business for a period of five years for a first offense, and shall be permanently barred for the second or succeeding offenses. Having retailed a can of milk at ten centavos more than the ceiling price, Pablo de la Cruz was sentenced, after trial, in the court of first instance of Manila, to imprisonment for five years, and to pay a fine of five thousand pesos plus costs. He was also barred from engaging in wholesale and retail business for five years.

Issue/s: 1. WON the trial judge erred in imposing a punishment wholly disproportionate to the offence

2. WON the trial judge erred in not invalidating RA No. 509 in so far as it prescribed excessive penalties. 1. Is imprisonment for two months or fine of two thousand pesos too excessive for a merchant who sells goods at prices beyond the ceilings established in the Executive Order? 2. Is five years and five thousand pesos, cruel and unusual for a violation that merely netted a ten-centavo profit to the accused?

Held: We may decrease the penalty, exercising that discretion vested in the courts by the same statutory enactment. Wherefore, reducing the imprisonment to six months and the fine to two thousand pesos, we hereby affirm the appealed decision in all other respects.

Ratio:

The constitution directs that "Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." o The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and apply to punishment which never existed in America of which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete (15 Am. Jur., p. 172), for instance those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like (15 Am. Jur., supra, Note 35 L.R.A. p. 561). o Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition. However, there are respectable authorities holding that the inhibition applies as well to punishments that although not cruel and unusual in nature, may be so severe as to fall within the fundamental restriction. (15 Am. Jur., p. 178) For the purposes of this decision, we may assume, without actually holding, that too long a prison term might clash with the Philippine Constitution. But that brings up again two opposing theories o we are told the prohibition applies to legislation only, and not to the courts' decision imposing penalties within the limits of the statute (15 Am. Jur., "Criminal Law" sec. 526). the section would violate the Constitution, if the penalty is excessive under any and all circumstances, the minimum being entirely out of proportion to the kind of offenses prescribed Is imprisonment for two months or fine of two thousand pesos too excessive for a merchant who sells goods at prices beyond the ceilings established in the Executive Order? NO. because in overstepping the price barriers Dela Cruz might derive, in some instances, profits amounting to thousands of pesos

The prison term must be so disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable men as to what is right and proper under the circumstances (lb.). authorities are not lacking to the effect that the fundamental prohibition likewise restricts the judge's power and authority The second theory would contrast the penalty imposed by the court with the gravity of the particular crime or misdemeanor, and if notable disparity results, it would apply the constitutional brake, even if the statute would, under other circumstances, be not extreme or oppressive. Is five years and five thousand pesos, cruel and unusual for a violation that merely netted a ten-centavo profit to the accused? NO. In our opinion the damage caused to the State is not measured exclusively by the gains obtained by the accused, inasmuch as one violation would mean others, and the consequential breakdown of the beneficial system of price controls.

People of the Philippines vs. De la Cruz

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGAPITO DE LA CRUZ, accused-appellant. G.R. No. L-30912 April 30, 1980 MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: FACTS: In Criminal Case No. 1903, accused Agapito de la Cruz was found guilty as principal by inducement of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, and sentencing him to death, by the Court of First Instance of Basilan City. For the kidnapping and slaying of Yu Chi Chong, the City Fiscal of Basilan City filed against AGAPITO de la Cruz as Amended Information for Kidnapping with Robbery in Band and Murder, which contains that de la Cruz, together with ten others were accused of the crime of kidnapping with robbery in band and murder committed on March 6, 1968. Agapito dela Cruz, as principal by inducement and his co-accused as co-principal by direct participation, armed with carbine and garand rifles, they being all private persons, conspiring and confederating together, aiding and assisting one with the other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and for the purpose of extorting money for ransom, kidnap and deprive the liberty of one Yu Chi Chong and demand the amount of P50,000. 00 as a consideration for, the release of Yu Chi Chong and when Yu Chi Chong was already in the custody of the accused and taking advantage of their superior force, take and steal a wrist watch (Rado) worth P150.00 and cash money in the amount of P400.00, all worth the total amount of P550.00, Philippine Currency, belonging to said Yu Chi Chong and on the way from Basilan to Sulu, the said accused with treachery and evident premeditation, assault, attack and shoot Yu Chi Chong, which caused his death and thereafter dumped the body into the sea. Two of the other accused namely, Jamas Jumaidi and Oyong Asidin were utilized as state witnesses.

ISSUE: WON the trial Court erred in convicting the accused as master-mind or principal by inducement in the absence of the elements of conspiracy to the crime charged. HELD: AGAPITO further assails the conclusion of the trial Court finding him guilty as a principal by inducement reasoning that since he did not take part in the commission of the crime, conspiracy does not exist and consequently he incurs no criminal liability. This contention is untenable. The requisites necessary in order that a person may be convicted as a principal by inducement are: 1. That the inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime; and 2. That such inducement be the determining cause of the commission of the crime by the material executor. The foregoing requisites are indubitably present in this case. The two discharged witnesses testified that Asmad and Amil contacted them to go to Basilan to do a job for AGAPITO. When the group was brought face to face with him, he lost no time in laying down the strategy for the killing of Antonio Yu and the kidnapping of Yu Chi Chong for ransom. It was he who knew when the truck of the intended victims would go to Lantawan to load the copra to be delivered to Isabela. He knew the route that the truck would take and the approximate time that it was to pass by. He even selected the ambush place. Clearly, he had the positive resolution to procure the commission of the crime. He, too, presented the strongest kind of temptation, a pecuniary gain in the form of ransom, which was the determining factor of the commission of the crime by his co-accused. Without him the crime would not have been conceived, much less committed. Clearly, he was a principal by induction, with collective criminal responsibility with the material executors, his co-accused.

PEOPLE v. DELA CRUZ

By Maroon 5 Partners and Associates June 1, 2012 art. 11 rpc self-defense

Facts:

dela Cruz and San Antonio were currently living together when Macapagal (victim, San Antonios ex-live-in partner) went to their apartment, holding a gun (9mm caliber pistol) and banged the door of the bedroom ahere dela Cruz was demanding him to go out Dela Cruz opened the door, and upon seeing that Macapagal was pointing the gun at him, he immediately went back to the room and closed the door. The next time he went out, he, too, was already holding a gun (.35 caliber revolver). The two immediately grappled each other and not long after, shots were heard and Macapagal fell dead on the floor. Appellant told San Antonio to call the police and when they arrive, he surrendered the gun he used and told the police that he shot Macapagal in self defense. According to the autopsy, Macapagal sustained 4 wounds. 3 of which were non-penetrating (upper jaw, below the left shoulder, right side of the waist). The shot that took his life was on the left side of the chest penetrating the heart. Dela Cruz had no license to carry the firearm.

Issue: W/N the accused is able to prove to the court the elements of self-defense in order to extenuate him from the crime.

Held: No.

Ratio:

Three conditions must concur to extenuate him:

1. Unlawful aggression by the person injured or killed

presuppose an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude but most importantly at the time the defensive action was taken against the aggressor. In this case, the victim banged at the bedroom door with his gun but the appellant, upon seeing the victim pointing a gun at him was able to prevent at this stage harm to himself by promptly closing the door. He could have stopped there. Instead, he confronted the victim.

1. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel that unlawful aggression

The number of wounds sustained by the victim would negate this component of self defense. The four gunshot wounds indicate a determined effort to kill.

1. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself

When the appellant confronted the victim, instead of taking precautionary measures, appellant could no longer argue that there was no provocation on his part Claim of self defense rejected

People vs. Dela Cruz

Post under case digests, Criminal Law at Sunday, March 25, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: Daniel Macapagal, a married man, was living-in with a woman for about 2-3 years prior to the womans cohabitation with another man, one Roberto dela Cruz. One night, when Roberto dela Cruz and the woman were in the house of the latter, Macapagal arrived. The woman opened

the door and Macapagal barged in holding a gun while lookibg for someone. He then went to the closed bedroom where dela Cruz was and banged at the door with his gun while yelling Come out. Come out. Dela Cruz then opened the door but he was greeted by Macapagals gun. He thereby immediately closed the door, retrieved his own gun, and reopened the door. Both men grappled for each others firearm and a few moments later, four shots were heard. Macapagal fell dead on the floor, his body sustaining all four gunshot wounds.

Issue: Whether or not Macapagal acted in self-defense. Held: No. Upon opening the door the first time, Macapagal was able to prevent at this stage harm to himself by promptly closing the door. He could have stopped there. Instead, he took his own revolver, again opened the door and, brandishing his own firearm, confronted the victim. This encounter removes the justifying circumstance of selfdefense. The first element, unlawful aggression, is not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude. It is an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person at the time the defensive action was taken against the aggressor. The second element would demand that the means employed to quell the unlawful aggression were reasonable and necessary. The number of wounds sustained by the victim negates the existence of this element of self-defense. The third element was lost when

Macapagal drew his own gun and used it to challenge the initial aggressor.
xxxi[1] Rollo, pp. 14-20. xxxii[2] Id. at 4-5. xxxiii[3] Records, p. 32. xxxiv[4] TSN, April 12, 1999, pp. 2-7. xxxv[5] Records, p. 3, Exh. "A". xxxvi[6] TSN, April 12, 1999, p. 13. xxxvii[7] Id. at 8-17. xxxviii[8] TSN, April 13, 1999, pp. 8-12, 17-19. xxxix[9] Id. at 2-5. xl[10] TSN, May 12, 1999, pp. 2-11. xli[11] TSN, May 13, 1999, p. 14. xlii[12] Id. at 3-5, 8. xliii[13] TSN, May 25, 1999, pp. 4-5. xliv[14] TSN, June 23, 1999, pp. 3-5. xlv[15] Rollo, p. 20. xlvi[16] Id. at 44-45. xlvii[17] Id. at 86. xlviii[18] People vs. Borreros, G.R. No. 125185, 306 SCRA 680, 688 (1999). xlix[19] People vs. Aguilar, G.R. Nos. 120622-23, 292 SCRA 349, 356 (1998). l[20] People vs. Antonio, G.R. No. 118311, 303 SCRA 414, 429 (1999).

li[21] Rollo, p. 18. lii[22] People vs. Barellano, G.R. No. 121204, 319 SCRA 567, 592 (1999). liii[23] People vs. Basao, G.R. No. 128286, 310 SCRA 743, 762 (1999). liv[24] People vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 122746, 302 SCRA 380, 398-399 (1999). lv[25] People vs. Belaro, G.R. No. 99869, 307 SCRA 591, 600 (1999). lvi[26] People vs. Ramirez, G.R. No. 138261, April 17, 2001, p. 12. lvii[27] People vs. Caboquin, G.R. No. 137613, November 14, 2001, pp. 6-7. lviii[28] People vs. Lagarteja, G.R. No. 127095, 291 SCRA 142, 153 (1998). lix[29] See People vs. Baniel, G.R. No. 108492, 275 SCRA 472, 487 (1997). lx[30] People vs. Givera, G.R. No. 132159, 349 SCRA 513, 536 (2001).

People v. De La Cruz (Crim1)

People of the Philippines v. Pablo De La Cruz People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Pablo De La Cruz, Defendant Appellant En Banc Doctrine: Neither excessive fines nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment Keywords: excessive fines Date: April 17, 1953 Ponente: Justice Bengzon Facts:

In the morning of October 14, 1950, Eduardo Bernardo, Jr. went to the De La Cruz's store in Sampaloc, Manila, and purchased from him a six-ounce tin of "Carnation" milk for thirty centavos. As the purchase had been made for Ruperto Austria, who was not in good terms with Pablo de la Cruz the matter reached the City Fiscal's office and resulted in this criminal prosecution, because Executive Order No. 331 (issued by authority of Republic Act No. 509) fixed 20 centavos as the maximum price for that kind of commodity. Republic Act No. 509 provides in part as follows: o SEC. 12. Imprisonment for a period of not less two months nor more than twelve years or a fine of not less than two thousand pesos nor more than ten thousand pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who sells any article, goods, or commodity in excess of the maximum selling price fixed by the president; . . . . o In addition to the penalties prescribed above, the persons, corporations, partnerships, or associations found guilty of any violation of this Act or of any rule or regulations issued by the president pursuant to this Act shall be barred from the wholesome and retail business for a period of five years for a first offense, and shall be permanently barred for the second or succeeding offenses. Having retailed a can of milk at ten centavos more than the ceiling price, Pablo de la Cruz was sentenced, after trial, in the court of first instance of Manila, to imprisonment for five years, and to pay a fine of five thousand pesos plus costs. He was also barred from engaging in wholesale and retail business for five years.

Issue/s: 3. WON the trial judge erred in imposing a punishment wholly disproportionate to the offence 4. WON the trial judge erred in not invalidating RA No. 509 in so far as it prescribed excessive penalties. 1. Is imprisonment for two months or fine of two thousand pesos too excessive for a merchant who sells goods at prices beyond the ceilings established in the Executive Order? 2. Is five years and five thousand pesos, cruel and unusual for a violation that merely netted a ten-centavo profit to the accused?

Held: We may decrease the penalty, exercising that discretion vested in the courts by the same statutory enactment. Wherefore, reducing the imprisonment to six months and the fine to two thousand pesos, we hereby affirm the appealed decision in all other respects.

Ratio:

The constitution directs that "Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." o The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and apply to punishment which never existed in America of which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete (15 Am. Jur., p. 172), for instance those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like (15 Am. Jur., supra, Note 35 L.R.A. p. 561). o Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition. However, there are respectable authorities holding that the inhibition applies as well to punishments that although not cruel and unusual in nature, may be so severe as to fall within the fundamental restriction. (15 Am. Jur., p. 178) For the purposes of this decision, we may assume, without actually holding, that too long a prison term might clash with the Philippine Constitution. But that brings up again two opposing theories o we are told the prohibition applies to legislation only, and not to the courts' decision imposing penalties within the limits of the statute (15 Am. Jur., "Criminal Law" sec. 526). the section would violate the Constitution, if the penalty is excessive under any and all circumstances, the minimum being entirely out of proportion to the kind of offenses prescribed Is imprisonment for two months or fine of two thousand pesos too excessive for a merchant who sells goods at prices beyond the ceilings established in the Executive Order? NO. because in overstepping the price barriers Dela Cruz might derive, in some instances, profits amounting to thousands of pesos The prison term must be so disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable men as to what is right and proper under the circumstances (lb.). o authorities are not lacking to the effect that the fundamental prohibition likewise restricts the judge's power and authority The second theory would contrast the penalty imposed by the court with the gravity of the particular crime or misdemeanor, and if notable disparity results, it would apply the constitutional brake, even if the statute would, under other circumstances, be not extreme or oppressive. Is five years and five thousand pesos, cruel and unusual for a violation that merely netted a ten-centavo profit to the accused? NO. In our opinion the damage caused to the State is not measured exclusively by the gains obtained by the accused, inasmuch as one violation would mean others, and the consequential breakdown of the beneficial system of price controls.

People of the Philippines vs. De la Cruz

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGAPITO DE LA CRUZ, accused-appellant. G.R. No. L-30912 April 30, 1980 MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: FACTS: In Criminal Case No. 1903, accused Agapito de la Cruz was found guilty as principal by inducement of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, and sentencing him to death, by the Court of First Instance of Basilan City. For the kidnapping and slaying of Yu Chi Chong, the City Fiscal of Basilan City filed against AGAPITO de la Cruz as Amended Information for Kidnapping with Robbery in Band and Murder, which contains that de la Cruz, together with ten others were accused of the crime of kidnapping with robbery in band and murder committed on March 6, 1968. Agapito dela Cruz, as principal by inducement and his co-accused as co-principal by direct participation, armed with carbine and garand rifles, they being all private persons, conspiring and confederating together, aiding and assisting one with the other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and for the purpose of extorting money for ransom, kidnap and deprive the liberty of one Yu Chi Chong and demand the amount of P50,000. 00 as a consideration for, the release of Yu Chi Chong and when Yu Chi Chong was already in the custody of the accused and taking advantage of their superior force, take and steal a wrist watch (Rado) worth P150.00 and cash money in the amount of P400.00, all worth the total amount of P550.00, Philippine Currency, belonging to said Yu Chi Chong and on the way from Basilan to Sulu, the said accused with treachery and evident premeditation, assault, attack and shoot Yu Chi Chong, which caused his death and thereafter dumped the body into the sea. Two of the other accused namely, Jamas Jumaidi and Oyong Asidin were utilized as state witnesses. ISSUE: WON the trial Court erred in convicting the accused as master-mind or principal by inducement in the absence of the elements of conspiracy to the crime charged. HELD: AGAPITO further assails the conclusion of the trial Court finding him guilty as a principal by inducement reasoning that since he did not take part in the commission of the crime, conspiracy does not exist and consequently he incurs no criminal liability. This contention is untenable. The requisites necessary in order that a person may be convicted as a principal by inducement are: 1. That the inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime; and 2. That such inducement be the determining cause of the commission of the crime by the material executor. The foregoing requisites are indubitably present in this case. The two discharged witnesses testified that Asmad and Amil contacted them to go to Basilan to do a job for AGAPITO. When the group was brought face to face with him, he lost no time in laying down the strategy for the killing of Antonio Yu and the kidnapping of Yu Chi Chong for ransom. It was he who knew when the truck of the intended victims would go to

Lantawan to load the copra to be delivered to Isabela. He knew the route that the truck would take and the approximate time that it was to pass by. He even selected the ambush place. Clearly, he had the positive resolution to procure the commission of the crime. He, too, presented the strongest kind of temptation, a pecuniary gain in the form of ransom, which was the determining factor of the commission of the crime by his co-accused. Without him the crime would not have been conceived, much less committed. Clearly, he was a principal by induction, with collective criminal responsibility with the material executors, his co-accused.

PEOPLE v. DELA CRUZ

By Maroon 5 Partners and Associates June 1, 2012 art. 11 rpc self-defense

Facts:

dela Cruz and San Antonio were currently living together when Macapagal (victim, San Antonios ex-live-in partner) went to their apartment, holding a gun (9mm caliber pistol) and banged the door of the bedroom ahere dela Cruz was demanding him to go out Dela Cruz opened the door, and upon seeing that Macapagal was pointing the gun at him, he immediately went back to the room and closed the door. The next time he went out, he, too, was already holding a gun (.35 caliber revolver). The two immediately grappled each other and not long after, shots were heard and Macapagal fell dead on the floor. Appellant told San Antonio to call the police and when they arrive, he surrendered the gun he used and told the police that he shot Macapagal in self defense. According to the autopsy, Macapagal sustained 4 wounds. 3 of which were non-penetrating (upper jaw, below the left shoulder, right side of the waist). The shot that took his life was on the left side of the chest penetrating the heart. Dela Cruz had no license to carry the firearm.

Issue: W/N the accused is able to prove to the court the elements of self-defense in order to extenuate him from the crime.

Held: No.

Ratio:

Three conditions must concur to extenuate him:

2. Unlawful aggression by the person injured or killed

presuppose an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude but most importantly at the time the defensive action was taken against the aggressor. In this case, the victim banged at the bedroom door with his gun but the appellant, upon seeing the victim pointing a gun at him was able to prevent at this stage harm to himself by promptly closing the door. He could have stopped there. Instead, he confronted the victim.

2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel that unlawful aggression

The number of wounds sustained by the victim would negate this component of self defense. The four gunshot wounds indicate a determined effort to kill.

2. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself

When the appellant confronted the victim, instead of taking precautionary measures, appellant could no longer argue that there was no provocation on his part Claim of self defense rejected

People vs. Dela Cruz

Post under case digests, Criminal Law at Sunday, March 25, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: Daniel Macapagal, a married man, was living-in with a woman for about 2-3 years prior to the womans cohabitation with another man, one Roberto dela Cruz. One night, when Roberto dela Cruz and the woman were in the house of the latter, Macapagal arrived. The woman opened the door and Macapagal barged in holding a gun while lookibg for someone. He then went to the closed bedroom where dela Cruz was and banged at the door with his gun while yelling Come out. Come out. Dela Cruz then opened the door but he was greeted by Macapagals gun. He thereby immediately closed the door, retrieved his own gun, and reopened the door. Both men grappled for each others firearm and a few moments later, four shots were heard. Macapagal fell dead on the floor, his body sustaining all four gunshot wounds. Issue: Whether or not Macapagal acted in self-defense.

Held: No. Upon opening the door the first time, Macapagal was able to prevent at this stage harm to himself by promptly closing the door. He could have stopped there. Instead, he took his own revolver, again opened the door and, brandishing his own firearm, confronted the victim. This encounter removes the justifying circumstance of selfdefense. The first element, unlawful aggression, is not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude. It is an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person at the time the defensive action was taken against the aggressor. The second element would demand that the means employed to quell the unlawful aggression were reasonable and necessary. The number of wounds sustained by the victim negates the existence of this element of self-defense. The third element was lost when Macapagal drew his own gun and used it to challenge the initial aggressor.